

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.01)
KBH 4/11/2023

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ^{AD}_{ML}

SUBJECT: Gerry Adams Wants Visa for December Visit:
Fundraising and Other Issues for Decision

Purpose

To decide how to handle Gerry Adams' proposed December visit and fundraising request.

Background

Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has applied for a visa to visit the U.S. December 7-13, stopping in several cities. Adams has asked that he be given a multiple-entry visa with no fundraising restrictions. (Adams' two earlier visas, in January and September this year, were both single-entry visas which prohibited him from raising funds in the U.S.)

There is no opposition within the Administration or from the British to granting Adams a three-month, multiple-entry visa subject to continued IRA observance of the cease-fire, a no fundraising restriction and advance notice of Adams' travel plans and itinerary for each trip.

I believe the appropriate way to handle the visit is for me to receive him in my office in the White House but with no photographs. This is consistent with the level of White House access accorded other Northern Ireland politicians representing political parties of similar size. State and the British can live with my seeing Adams, though they would rather it not be at the White House or include any photo opportunities.

Fundraising Conditions

There is a sharp division of views between Justice, State, FBI, Ambassador Crowe and the British on one side and the Irish, Ambassador Smith, and some important members of Congress on the other over whether to permit Adams to fundraise. The decision

comes at a delicate time in the Northern Ireland peace process and in our relations with the British over Bosnia.

As an individual with a terrorist background, Adams is ineligible for entry into the United States. In waiving that ineligibility, we have the right to impose conditions that we cannot impose on other Sinn Fein members. Justice, State, Ab Mikva and Ambassador Crowe in London strongly oppose allowing Adams to raise funds in the U.S., at least for the time being, primarily because of information that the IRA continues to procure handguns and explosives in the United States, the short time the cease-fire has been in place, the fact that the IRA maintains large stockpiles of weapons, and that it continues to maintain a high state of readiness, including training activities.

Ambassador Crowe also argues strongly that it is particularly important to take strongly-held British views on this issue into account at a time when the bilateral relationship is under severe strain over Bosnia. He feels it would be extremely unwise to cause another rift over Ireland and a time when we need them on the "much more important foreign policy issue" of Bosnia. British officials have said that the UK "would publicly denounce" the Administration if we allow fundraising.

British neuralgia on the fundraising issue, despite the fact that Sinn Fein is permitted to raise funds in Britain, relates to the historical fact that the IRA armed and sustained itself for many years in large part through support from U.S. sources. In practice, Sinn Fein has never demonstrated that the collections are segregated from IRA operational funds, and it has been proven in court that NORaid has used money collected for "widows and orphans" to fund arms purchases. In addition, Ab Mikva believes that as long as IRA weapons procurement activity continues in the U.S., permitting Adams to fundraise will expose us to charges of inconsistent and discriminatory policy if we crack down on Hamas fundraising (although there is a difference as the IRA has implemented a ceasefire).

The Attorney General, FBI and State (including Ambassador Crowe) strongly agree with the British line of argument. They underscore that although the cease-fire continues generally to hold, IRA extortion and other criminal activities continue, though apparently under instructions that firearms not be used. The IRA admitted November 20 that a recent armed robbery in which a postal worker was killed (and over \$200,000 stolen) was committed by IRA members ("volunteers") "acting on instruction" (presumably from local commanders) but "not sanctioned by the IRA leadership." Moreover, IRA extralegal "policing actions" (i.e. beatings of suspected collaborators or petty criminals in Catholic neighborhoods of Northern Ireland) continue, as do IRA

training operations. FBI is monitoring IRA arms procurement activity in the U.S. which has occurred since the cease-fire and is ongoing.

On the other side, the Irish Government (especially Albert Reynolds), Ambassador Smith in Dublin and some important figures on the Hill (including Dodd, Moynihan, Manton, Gilman and Ted Kennedy) argue with equal conviction that there is no practical or political benefit to be derived from continuing to insist that Adams cannot fundraise here and, indeed, that singling out Adams in this way will undermine him and perhaps the entire peace process. They point out that this is not a legal issue but rather a policy one, that other Sinn Fein leaders and supporters who do not need visa waivers can and do raise funds for Sinn Fein, and that Adams, given his positive and pivotal role in bringing IRA into the peace process, should not be "humiliated" in this way.

As Adams and others note, fundraising for Sinn Fein in the UK is legal (he held a fundraiser in London last week) and to deny him the same right in the United States would seriously undermine Adams at a delicate moment in the peace process. The loss of Albert Reynolds as Prime Minister of Ireland removes Adams' strongest supporter from the process and Adams needs to continue to show momentum in the process if he is to keep the hardliners in tow. Adams also argues that they are in urgent need of funds to organize a political party and argues passionately that denying him the right to do so will only make it more difficult for him to move on the important issues such as demobilization.

A denial of fundraising will make big headlines in Ireland of the US charging Adams with continued weapons procurement and calling into question the permanency of the ceasefire. He fears such action will seriously undermine him and encourage the hardliners to pull away from the path of peace.

Fundraising Options

Option I: Maintain Fundraising Prohibition

Option IA) That Adams' three-month multiple entry visa be annotated to indicate that he is not permitted to engage in direct or indirect fundraising, but that he may raise sufficient funds to pay for the costs of his U.S. trip (same conditions as his last visit). No commitments/indications given him as to what our future position might be. [Justice, State, Ambassador Crowe and the British government support; Irish and Ambassador Smith oppose.]

Pros: Even with the fundraising restriction still in place, Adams gets from this trip a substantial liberalization of the travel restrictions on him and the reward of being received at the White House (despite State and British discomfiture with the latter). Takes things a step at a time and keeps fundraising as leverage to encourage the IRA to address the weapons issue early on. Leaves no doubt where we stand on terrorism and expresses our concern about continued IRA criminal and procurement activities. Boosts confidence in London and Belfast that British and Unionist views matter and that Adams does not exercise undue influence on our Northern Ireland policy. Underscores that we are sensitive to the importance of working with them on Bosnia.

Cons: Could weaken Adams politically within the IRA, both by embarrassing him in his already-public request and by denying him the ability to raise funds he says he needs to operate Sinn Fein as a political party. To the extent Adams is weakened, the peace process could be damaged. There will be headlines in the Irish papers that we believe the IRA continues to procure weapons and perhaps that we doubt the permanency of the IRA ceasefire. You will face strong pressure from Ambassador Smith and some on the Hill to concede this issue. The Irish government will strongly urge you to reconsider. Adams may cancel his trip if not allowed to fundraise. Refusal will cause a rift with portions of the Irish-American community; some in the Irish-American community will begin to criticize what to date has been viewed as a successful foreign policy issue.

Option IB) Same as above, but we tell Adams the conditions he must meet in order to get the fundraising issue reconsidered, namely that the IRA must have ceased weapons procurement in the United States and made concrete progress towards demobilizing and disarming. [State, Justice, Crowe and British can accept, while preference is IA. Justice prefers that the IRA be required to cease weapons procurement worldwide and permanently but that standard is not realistic as we cannot verify either. Irish, Smith oppose.]

Pros: Same as above, but makes more explicit why Adams can't fundraise now and what we expect from him before we will alter our position. Provides encouragement to Adams that we will not deny him fundraising access indefinitely. Could encourage an end to weapons procurement and progress on other issues.

Cons: Same as above. In addition, we will in all likelihood face another disagreement within the Administration and between the British and Irish when the time comes to decide if he has made enough progress on ending weapons procurement and on demobilization and disarmament.

Option II: Allow Adams to fundraise on this trip.

Option IIA) Impose no restrictions on Adams' ability to fundraise on this trip. [State, Justice, Crowe and British oppose; Irish, Smith support.]

Pros: Pleases important Irish players on the Hill; strengthens Adams internally, could help advance the peace process.

Cons: Justice, FBI, Ambassador Crowe and State vehemently oppose, as do the British. The British (and Ambassador Crowe) still feel bruised from Adams' last visit and the Vice President's phone call to Adams; allowing Adams to fundraise will open another public U.S.-UK rift in a period of already-substantial strains over Bosnia. Could weaken pressure on Adams to deal with weapons issue and be interpreted in Northern Ireland as a sign that we take lightly the recent IRA murder/robbery incident; subjects us to criticism if there is another incident of violence involving IRA members or weapons. Funds could be directed to weapons purchase, especially if the cease-fire breaks down. Ab Mivka adds that it would be very difficult to permit Adams fundraising while at the same time cracking down on Hamas fundraising (while recognizing that the IRA has implemented a ceasefire and Hamas still engages in terrorism).

Option IIB) Allow Adams to fundraise but impose conditions on how the funds are handled to ensure they are only used for legitimate political party activities. This could involve an extensive audit by a respected firm. [State, Justice, Crowe and British oppose; Irish, Smith support.]

Pros: Boosts Adams and thus could help advance the peace process. Adams has already offered to provide such audits. Underscores the point that we expect Adams to move forward in bringing Sinn Fein/IRA fully away from terrorist and illegal activities. Makes diversion of funds more difficult.

Cons: Same as IIA. Also, money is fungible; even very elaborate safeguards will not stop it from going to support or offset criminal and terrorist activities. Largely symbolic, could be criticized as empty gesture. State and Justice strongly oppose on these grounds.

Option IIC) Allow Adams to fundraise if he agrees to place the funds in a U.S. account which he could not access without our permission. Establish that we will review the situation in early 1995 to decide if the funds can be accessed; factors affecting our decision will include whether the cease-fire still holds and whether Sinn Fein/IRA has ceased weapons procurement in the US and made concrete progress toward demobilization and disarmament. [Justice, State, Ambassador Crowe and the British government oppose; Irish and Ambassador Smith support.]

Pros: Lets Adams go ahead with his fundraising plans while still meeting some of the concerns of the British, State and Justice. Will boost Adams and thus help advance the peace process.

Cons: Neither side will like; either or both may reject. In requiring the US to make a decision on when to release funds, this option would put us under constant pressure on both sides to release or not release the funds and involve the US in the negotiating process in a way we have not been before.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve a three-month entry visa for Adams conditional on continuation of the ceasefire and that he advises us in advance of his travel plans and itinerary. That I meet with him in my office but with no photographs. And that you approve Option IB: Maintain fundraising restriction but tell Adams the conditions he must meet in order to get the fundraising issue reconsidered, namely that the IRA must have ceased weapons procurement in the United States and made concrete progress towards demobilizing and disarming.

Of the difficult choices you face, I believe this option best promotes our goals of maintaining the peace process in Northern Ireland, sending a strong message against terrorism and maintains our strong relationship with the British. A meeting with Adams in the White House is a significant offering to him and a three-month multiple entry visa meets one of his key requests during his last visit. The prestige of entering the White House will lessen any criticism of him personally over denial of his fundraising request. While we have not yet heard back from the Vice President, Leon Fuerth and Jack Quinn agree. Leon Panetta also concurs.

In addition, by pointing out to him our knowledge of continuing procurement of weapons in the US, we might help achieve an end to such activities. We will also speak with the British to encourage them to reach out more positively to Adams to help offset any fallout from the decision. Adams recently wrote to the British and they expect to reply to his letter next week. We

will work with the British to encourage them to be as forthcoming as possible and perhaps hold announcement of our decision so it coincides with any positive response from the British.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Or alternatively,

That you approve Option IIB: Allow Adams to fundraise but impose conditions on how the funds are handled to ensure they are only used for legitimate political party activities, most likely through an extensive audit by a respected firm.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

If you select Option IIB or any other option allowing fundraising, I recommend you telephone Prime Minister Major, Secretary Christopher, and perhaps Attorney General Reno to inform them of your decision.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 3, 1993

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.02)
KBH 4/11/2023

33 MAY 3 P10:00

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Denial of Visa to Gerry Adams, Founder of PIRA

Purpose

To inform you that the State Department has denied a U.S. nonimmigrant visa to Gerard "Gerry" Adams, founder and high level member of the terrorist organization, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).

Background

During the campaign, you mentioned that you would consider the issuance of a visa to the PIRA's Gerry Adams because of his status as a member of the British Parliament. He has since lost his parliament seat in the 1992 election.

Adams has been twice refused a visa under the old Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) because of his advocacy of and involvement in terrorist violence. He appealed the first decision in 1988, but the First Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the denial. He was last denied a visa in March 1991, without legal challenge.

The Act was significantly amended effective June 1, 1991 to prevent discrimination against mere members of terrorist organizations. This is the first time since that change that Adams has applied for a visa. There is thus a chance he may try to challenge our action in court by arguing we are denying his visa request solely because of his membership in an organization rather than any specific action. However, we believe there is sufficient evidence of his involvement in terrorist activities to withstand a court challenge to his visa denial -- basically the same basis used for the 1991 First Circuit decision.

Adams is currently applying to visit the U.S. in May for three weeks, ostensibly to promote his two books, The Street and Cage Eleven. The State Department denied the visa contending that Adams is ineligible under section 212(a)(3)(b) of the Act because he has engaged in terrorist activity as defined in that section: "the preparation or planning of a terrorist activity" (Tab A). Although a founding member of PIRA, Adams denies his membership. (The organization is outlawed.) Because of his leadership status

in PIRA, it is difficult to link Adams directly to the scene of a specific terrorist activity, although, according to the FBI, he is a member of the Provisional Army Council which makes all decisions on terrorist operations. Thus, Adams would have been aware of -- if not a participant in -- PIRA's planning for the explosion at the London financial district, and the March 20 bombing which killed two children. Moreover, the FBI believes that Adams' affiliation with the "Provisional Third Battalion Army Command" makes clear his foreknowledge of the group's terrorist activities.

An FBI summary of Adams' involvement in terrorist activities is attached at Tab B. A CIA report on current PIRA terrorist activities is attached at Tab C.

While there is a waiver provision, we agree with State (and the FBI) that the Attorney General should not be requested to waive ineligibility. In addition to State and FBI objections based on the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Irish Government opposes PIRA and Sinn Fein (of which Adams is current President). Moreover, in the U.S., PIRA fund-raising has dwindled in the past few years; Adams' presence could reinvigorate this activity, including serving as a catalyst for procurement of arms. (A trial is underway in Arizona against IRA supporters accused of purchasing 2,000 detonators -- some of which have been used in the current bombing campaign -- and of attempting to purchase a stinger missile.)

State's decision does not conflict with your campaign statement since you offered to consider his eligibility based on Adams' status as a member of Parliament, a status which he no longer enjoys.

Adams may receive the letter denying the visa as early as Tuesday and we will be sure to inform your Irish supporters of the decision.

Attachments

- Tab A Section 212(a)(3) of Immigration and Nationality Act of June 1, 1991
- Tab B FBI Report on Adams
- Tab C CIA Report on PIRA Activity

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19-Jul-1993 11:39 EDT

*B-1
Tell Morrison
what's going on
let him decide
whether he
wants
briefing on
state
politics, he might
as well*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: M. Brooke Darby (DARBY)
FROM: Barry F. Lowenkron (LOWENKRON)
SUBJECT: Gerry Adams -- Bruce Morrison

Please pass to Nancy ASAP:

To review where we stand on arranging a briefing for Bruce Morrison on the Adams visa denial:

-- I spoke to FBI representatives who tell me that, because of the Privacy Act (let alone sources & methods) they cannot brief Morrison (or even provide him with the gist of the information) on Adams. (The only way a sitting Congressman can get the briefing is through an official request through a Congressional Committee.)

-- State/European Bureau can meet with Morrison today at 4:00 to run him through procedures/reasons why Adams was denied a visa. But, here too, what State can tell Morrison about Adams' activities is limited.

-- If Morrison is interested, he should call Elora Sayre at 648-8027 and give her the relevant info to get cleared into State. His briefer will be John Tefft, Director for Northern European Affairs. (Tefft briefed Mayor Flynn on the same issue.)

FYI, Adams is scheduled to see our number 2 person in the consulate in Belfast on August 4.

CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Jenonne R. Walker (WALKER)
CC: Richard L. Canas (CANAS)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.04)
KBM 4/11/2023

Darby -
Do we need to take another look at the Special Envoy issue?
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Jul-1993 10:13 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: M. Brooke Darby
FROM: Barry F. Lowenkron (LOWENKRON)
SUBJECT: Adams: Morrison--State Meeting

(DARBY)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.05)
K8H 4/11/2023

Brooke, please pass to Nancy:

I got a read-out of the Morrison-State meeting. Morrison met for one hour & 40 minutes at State this morning with John Tefft in the European Bureau and Dick Scully, a State Dept. Lawyer. (Morrison knew Scully from Morrison's Congressional days and respects his knowledge of visa laws.) Points covered:

Gerry Adams Visa: State briefed Morrison on material presented in State's 1988 court deposition defending the decision to deny Adams a visa. Morrison countered that State seemed to be holding Adams to higher standards than Mandela or the PLO.

Special Envoy: Morrison pressed the idea of a special envoy, suggested Jimmy Carter. State asked what our negotiating strategy should be, and how do we protect the President's credibility. State also said that Reynolds is not enthusiastic about the idea of a special envoy at this time, but that the President would keep the option open.

Visa waiver. Morrison asked what Adams would have to do to get a visa. State answered that he would have to renounce terrorism.

The meeting ended well. Morrison said that he still had his views, but he found the meeting useful and would keep in touch with Tefft & Scully.

CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Jenonne R. Walker (WALKER)
CC: Richard L. Canas (CANAS)

~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BERGER DOHSE FUERTH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 151807Z FEB 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4777
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2574
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 002495

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0335-F (1.06)
KBH 4/11/2023

EXDIS

DEPT FOR U/S TARNOFF, A/S HOLBROOKE AND A/S RYAN

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

FROM AMBASSADOR CROWE

E.O. 12356; DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI

SUBJECT: USG SUPPORT FOR THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE
PROCESS

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. WITH AGREEMENT ON THE ANGLO-IRISH JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT (JFD) LIKELY WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK, THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP) THREATENING TO JOIN IAN PAISLEY'S DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) IN REJECTING THE JFD OUTRIGHT, UNREST AMONG PRO-UNION TORY BACKBENCHERS, AND BRITISH MINISTERS PROBABLY SOON TO ENTER TALKS WITH SINN FEIN, WE ARE ENTERING WHAT MAY BE THE SINGLE MOST TRYING PERIOD OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. WE CAN HELP THE PROCESS SUCCEED BY GIVING WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON IRISH REPUBLICANS TO MAKE THE IRA CEASEFIRE IRREVOCABLE. THE MOST URGENT PRIORITY, HOWEVER, IS TO REASSURE UNIONISTS THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING SOLD OUT, WHILE WARNING THEM THAT A REFUSAL EVEN TO NEGOTIATE WOULD CARRY HEAVY COSTS.

3. BASED ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE HMG-SINN FEIN TALKS, WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO LIFT THE FUNDRAISING BAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN A WAY THAT ADVANCES THE PROCESS, AND WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

PRINCIPLES TONY LAKE SET FORTH, BUT LIFTING IT AT A TIME WHEN THE PEACE PROCESS RESTS ON A KNIFE'S EDGE WOULD UNDERMINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, ENRAGE UNIONISTS, AND DIMINISH PROSPECTS FOR AN OVERALL AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

PROCESS AT A CROSSROADS

4. THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS HAS HIT AN UNUSUALLY ROUGH PATCH, AND THE SITUATION MAY GET A GOOD DEAL MORE TURBULENT IN THE WEEKS TO COME. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT MAY BE PUBLISHED AS EARLY AS LATE NEXT WEEK. THE SELECTIVE AND INFLAMMATORY LEAK OF PORTIONS OF THE DOCUMENT HAS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED MODERATE UNIONISTS, AND PROBABLY LOCKED THE UUP INTO AT LEAST PRO FORMA REJECTION OF THE DOCUMENT WHEN IT IS PUBLISHED. THAT DOESN'T NECESSARILY MEAN THE UNIONIST PARTIES WON'T EVENTUALLY ACCEPT IT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT GETTING TO THAT POINT WILL TAKE TIME AND EFFORT. THEY (AND A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF SUPPORTERS ON THE TORY BACKBENCHES) ARE IN A VERY SKITTISH MOOD. AND IF THE UUP WITHDRAWS ITS TACIT SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT, MAJOR WILL HAVE EVEN LESS NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY THAN BEFORE.

5. ON THE NATIONALIST SIDE, TALKS WITH SINN FEIN HAVE MADE INCREMENTAL PROGRESS AT BEST. THE ATMOSPHERE HAS WARMED A DEGREE OR SO, BUT ON THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT SINN FEIN HAS GIVEN NOTHING EXCEPT A WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO (BUT NOT ACCEPT) A BRITISH PROPOSAL, AND A VAGUE UNDERTAKING TO USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE IT MIGHT POSSESS IN A "POSITIVE" WAY AT A TIME OF ITS CHOOSING. AND IT HAS THREATENED TO END THE DIALOGUE UNLESS MINISTERS JOIN IT SOON. THE BRITISH ARE LIKELY TO AUTHORIZE A JUNIOR MINISTER TO TAKE PART, ON THE NOMINAL GROUNDS THAT SINN FEIN HAS AT LEAST "ADDRESSED" THE ARMS QUESTION. BUT MOVING FROM DIALOGUE TO ALL-PARTY TALKS WILL REQUIRE MUCH MORE -- ALMOST CERTAINLY PHYSICAL REMOVAL OF SOME OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM IRA CONTROL.

6. WHEN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT IS PUBLISHED, IT IS LIKELY TO DRAW FIRE FROM SEVERAL QUARTERS -- UNIONISTS, NATIONALISTS AND TORY EUROPHOBES. THIS IS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED, GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND THE LONG HISTORY OF ANGLO-IRISH CONFLICT. ALL PARTIES WILL BE ASKED TO MAKE DIFFICULT COMPROMISES.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

THE USG ROLE

7. DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, THE USG CAN BEST SUPPORT THE PROCESS IN THREE WAYS:

- GIVING THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT OUR WHOLEHEARTED AND UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER TALKS AND THE ONLY FEASIBLE WAY FORWARD;
- MAINTAINING MOMENTUM FOR PEACE BY OFFERING SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS, WHILE WARNING THAT THERE WILL BE NO UNDERSTANDING FOR RENEWED VIOLENCE; AND
- AVOIDING ACTIONS THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE GENERAL PROCESS.

8. IN THE LATTER REGARD, THE NEW FACTOR IN THE EQUATION IS THE DANGER OF UNIONIST AND TORY BACKBENCH REJECTION OF THE JFD. WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE NOT UPSET THE DELICATE PROCESSES NOW UNDERWAY BY MOVING TOO SOON TO LIFT THE BAN ON FUNDRAISING, A STEP WHICH WOULD EXACERBATE TENSIONS BY REINFORCING THE UNIONIST VIEW OF A CONCERTED EFFORT TO DRIVE THEM ONTO A PATH THAT LEADS INEXORABLY TOWARD A UNITED IRELAND.

9. HMG'S HOPE IS THAT THE COMBINATION OF MINISTERIAL ENGAGEMENT AND PUBLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WILL INDUCE THE IRA TO MAKE SOME GESTURE TOWARD DISARMING. THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MIGHT HAPPEN. SINN FEIN AND THE IRA ARE UNDER SEVERE PRESSURE TO BEGIN DECOMMISSIONINGSOME OFFENSIVE WEAPONS: JOHN HUME HAS CALLED FOR IT, THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THEM UNTIL IT HAPPENS, AND WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IT AS A CONDITION FOR FUNDRAISING AUTHORIZATION. IF WE REMOVE ONE OF THESE SOURCES OF PRESSURE BEFORE THE IRA HAS TAKEN ANY SUBSTANTIVE STEP, WE WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE IRA INTRANSIGENCE AND ENRAGE UNIONISTS.

10. MOST OBSERVERS HERE HAD PREDICTED SINCE THE CEASEFIRES THAT THE SINGLE MOST CRITICAL AND DELICATE STAGE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WAS LIKELY TO COME BETWEEN CHRISTMAS AND EASTER. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS BASED LARGELY ON THE IDEA THAT RISING REPUBLICAN DISILLUSIONMENT WOULD INCLINE THE IRA TO RETURN TO VIOLENCE. THOSE FEARS HAVE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

EASED SOMEWHAT. ADAMS CLAIMS, AND APPEARS, TO BE UNDER RELATIVELY LITTLE PRESSURE FROM IRA HARDLINERS AT PRESENT. THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE OVERALL PROCESS NOW COMES FROM THE FEARS -- SOME UNDERSTANDABLE, OTHERS DELIBERATELY INDUCED -- OF THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY. IF MODERATE UUP LEADERS CANNOT CONVINCE THEIR PARTY TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE JFD, THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WILL SUFFER A SEVERE AND PROBABLY PROLONGED SETBACK, AND THE RISK OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE WILL RISE SHARPLY.

11. THE BRITISH, THE IRISH AND WE ALL NEED TO USE THE COMBINATION OF CARROTS AND STICKS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO ENCOURAGE THE PARAMILITARIES AND PARTIES AFFILIATED WITH THEM TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE FOR GOOD, WHILE DISSUADING THE UNIONISTS FROM ABORTING THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN. WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORMER BY MAINTAINING OUR REASONABLE AND DEFENSIBLE POSITION ON FUNDRAISING FOR A LITTLE LONGER, AND TO THE LATTER BY SENDING AN EQUALLY TOUGH MESSAGE TO THE UUP DELEGATION VISITING WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK THAT THEY CAN EXPECT NO UNDERSTANDING FROM US IF THEY BLOCK PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT. WHAT WE MUST AVOID AT ALL COSTS IS PRECIPITATE UNILATERAL ACTION THAT WOULD UNDERMINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS AND INCREASE UNIONIST ALIENATION. CROWE

BT

#2495

NNNN

<MSGID> M1516954

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ SSN: 2495 MSGID: M1516954

OAASZYUW RUEHLOA2495 0461807-SSSS--RHEHAAX.

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 151807Z FEB 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE **4777**

INFO: RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2574

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0335-F (1.07)
KBH 4/11/2023

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 002495

EXDIS

DEPT FOR U/S TARNOFF, A/S HOLBROOKE AND A/S RYAN

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

FROM AMBASSADOR CROWE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI

SUBJECT: USG SUPPORT FOR THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE
PROCESS

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. WITH AGREEMENT ON THE ANGLO-IRISH JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT (JFD) LIKELY WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK, THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP) THREATENING TO JOIN IAN PAISLEY'S DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) IN REJECTING THE JFD OUTRIGHT, UNREST AMONG PRO-UNION TORY BACKBENCHERS, AND BRITISH MINISTERS PROBABLY SOON TO ENTER TALKS WITH SINN FEIN, WE ARE ENTERING WHAT MAY BE THE SINGLE MOST TRYING PERIOD OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. WE CAN HELP THE PROCESS SUCCEED BY GIVING WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON IRISH REPUBLICANS TO MAKE THE IRA CEASEFIRE IRREVOCABLE. THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

MOST URGENT PRIORITY, HOWEVER, IS TO REASSURE UNIONISTS THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING SOLD OUT, WHILE WARNING THEM THAT A REFUSAL EVEN TO NEGOTIATE WOULD CARRY HEAVY COSTS.

3. BASED ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE HMG-SINN FEIN TALKS, WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO LIFT THE FUNDRAISING BAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN A WAY THAT ADVANCES THE PROCESS, AND WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE PRINCIPLES TONY LAKE SET FORTH. BUT LIFTING IT AT A TIME WHEN THE PEACE PROCESS RESTS ON A KNIFE'S EDGE WOULD UNDERMINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, ENRAGE UNIONISTS, AND DIMINISH PROSPECTS FOR AN OVERALL AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

PROCESS AT A CROSSROADS

4. THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS HAS HIT AN UNUSUALLY ROUGH PATCH, AND THE SITUATION MAY GET A GOOD DEAL MORE TURBULENT IN THE WEEKS TO COME. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT MAY BE PUBLISHED AS EARLY AS LATE NEXT WEEK. THE SELECTIVE AND INFLAMMATORY LEAK OF PORTIONS OF THE DOCUMENT HAS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED MODERATE UNIONISTS, AND PROBABLY LOCKED THE UUP INTO AT LEAST PRO FORMA REJECTION OF THE DOCUMENT WHEN IT IS PUBLISHED. THAT DOESN'T NECESSARILY MEAN THE UNIONIST PARTIES WON'T EVENTUALLY ACCEPT IT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT GETTING TO THAT POINT WILL TAKE TIME AND EFFORT. THEY (AND A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF SUPPORTERS ON THE TORY BACKBENCHES) ARE IN A VERY SKITTISH MOOD. AND IF THE UUP WITHDRAWS ITS TACIT SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT, MAJOR WILL HAVE EVEN LESS NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY THAN BEFORE.

5. ON THE NATIONALIST SIDE, TALKS WITH SINN FEIN HAVE MADE INCREMENTAL PROGRESS AT BEST. THE ATMOSPHERE HAS WARMED A DEGREE OR SO, BUT ON THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT SINN FEIN HAS GIVEN NOTHING EXCEPT A WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO (BUT NOT ACCEPT) A BRITISH PROPOSAL, AND A VAGUE UNDERTAKING TO USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE IT MIGHT POSSESS IN A "POSITIVE" WAY AT A TIME OF ITS CHOOSING. AND IT HAS THREATENED TO END THE DIALOGUE UNLESS MINISTERS JOIN IT SOON. THE BRITISH ARE LIKELY TO AUTHORIZE A JUNIOR MINISTER TO TAKE PART, ON THE NOMINAL GROUNDS THAT SINN FEIN HAS AT LEAST "ADDRESSED" THE ARMS QUESTION. BUT MOVING FROM DIALOGUE TO ALL-PARTY TALKS WILL REQUIRE MUCH MORE -- ALMOST CERTAINLY PHYSICAL REMOVAL OF SOME OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM IRA CONTROL.

6. WHEN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT IS PUBLISHED, IT IS LIKELY TO DRAW FIRE FROM SEVERAL QUARTERS -- UNIONISTS, NATIONALISTS AND TORY EUROPHOBES. THIS IS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED, GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND THE LONG HISTORY OF ANGLO-IRISH CONFLICT. ALL PARTIES WILL BE ASKED TO MAKE DIFFICULT COMPROMISES.

THE USG ROLE

7. DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, THE USG CAN BEST SUPPORT THE PROCESS IN THREE WAYS:

- GIVING THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT OUR WHOLEHEARTED AND UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER TALKS AND THE ONLY FEASIBLE WAY FORWARD;
- MAINTAINING MOMENTUM FOR PEACE BY OFFERING SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS, WHILE WARNING THAT THERE WILL BE NO UNDERSTANDING FOR RENEWED VIOLENCE; AND
- AVOIDING ACTIONS THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE GENERAL PROCESS.

8. IN THE LATTER REGARD, THE NEW FACTOR IN THE EQUATION IS THE DANGER OF UNIONIST AND TORY BACKBENCH REJECTION OF THE JFD. WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE NOT UPSET THE DELICATE PROCESSES NOW UNDERWAY BY MOVING TOO SOON TO LIFT THE BAN ON FUNDRAISING, A STEP WHICH WOULD EXACERBATE TENSIONS BY REINFORCING THE UNIONIST VIEW OF A CONCERTED EFFORT TO DRIVE THEM ONTO A PATH THAT LEADS INEXORABLY TOWARD A UNITED IRELAND. → *what's connective with fundraising?*

9. HMG'S HOPE IS THAT THE COMBINATION OF MINISTERIAL ENGAGEMENT AND PUBLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WILL INDUCE THE IRA TO MAKE SOME GESTURE TOWARD DISARMING. THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MIGHT HAPPEN. SINN FEIN AND THE IRA ARE UNDER SEVERE PRESSURE — *from?* TO BEGIN DECOMMISSIONING SOME OFFENSIVE WEAPONS: JOHN HUME HAS CALLED FOR IT, THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THEM UNTIL IT HAPPENS, AND WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IT AS A CONDITION FOR FUNDRAISING AUTHORIZATION. IF WE REMOVE ONE OF THESE SOURCES OF PRESSURE BEFORE THE IRA HAS TAKEN ANY SUBSTANTIVE STEP, WE WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE IRA INTRANSIGENCE AND ENRAGE UNIONISTS.

10. MOST OBSERVERS HERE HAD PREDICTED SINCE THE CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CEASEFIRES THAT THE SINGLE MOST CRITICAL AND DELICATE STAGE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WAS LIKELY TO COME BETWEEN CHRISTMAS AND EASTER. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS BASED LARGELY ON THE IDEA THAT RISING REPUBLICAN DISILLUSIONMENT WOULD INCLINE THE IRA TO RETURN TO VIOLENCE. THOSE FEARS HAVE EASED SOMEWHAT. ADAMS CLAIMS, AND APPEARS, TO BE UNDER RELATIVELY LITTLE PRESSURE FROM IRA HARDLINERS AT PRESENT. THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE OVERALL PROCESS NOW COMES FROM THE FEARS -- SOME UNDERSTANDABLE, OTHERS DELIBERATELY INDUCED -- OF THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY. IF MODERATE UUP LEADERS CANNOT CONVINCE THEIR PARTY TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE JFD, THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WILL SUFFER A SEVERE AND PROBABLY PROLONGED SETBACK, AND THE RISK OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE WILL RISE SHARPLY.

11. THE BRITISH, THE IRISH AND WE ALL NEED TO USE THE COMBINATION OF CARROTS AND STICKS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO ENCOURAGE THE PARAMILITARIES AND PARTIES AFFILIATED WITH THEM TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE FOR GOOD, WHILE DISSUADING THE UNIONISTS FROM ABORTING THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN. WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORMER BY MAINTAINING OUR REASONABLE AND DEFENSIBLE POSITION ON FUNDRAISING FOR A LITTLE LONGER, AND TO THE LATTER BY SENDING AN EQUALLY TOUGH MESSAGE TO THE UUP DELEGATION VISITING WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK THAT THEY CAN EXPECT NO UNDERSTANDING FROM US IF THEY BLOCK PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT. WHAT WE MUST AVOID AT ALL COSTS IS PRECIPITATE UNILATERAL ACTION THAT WOULD UNDERMINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS AND INCREASE UNIONIST ALIENATION. CROWE

BT

#2495

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

PRT: BERGER DOHSE FUERTH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VER:SHBOW

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC SUM2

~~SECRET~~ <PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS>

<DTG> 161458Z FEB 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO ////

~~SECRET~~ 161458Z FEB 95 PRIVACY CHANNELS

FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH, DUBLIN 010

TO THE WHITE HOUSE/NSC, EYES ONLY FOR NANCY SODERBERG

NANCY: SEAN DONLON, PRIME MINISTER BRUTON'S SPECIAL ADVISOR, JUST TELEPHONED FROM LONDON. HE IS VERY DISTRESSED BECAUSE HE HAS TELEPHONED YOU REPEATEDLY LAST NIGHT AND TODAY AND YOU HAVE NOT RETURNED HIS CALLS. HE IS ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS FUND RAISING BY GERRY ADAMS WITH YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

I TRUST YOU HAVE SEEN DUBLIN 811 REPORTING ON MY CONVERSATION FEBRUARY 14 WITH SEAN O'HUIGINN AND EMBASSY LONDON'S RESPONSE IN LONDON 2495. GIVEN OUR CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT, PERHAPS YOU COULD CLARIFY FOR ME WHAT THE EMBASSY MEANT IN PARAGRAPH THREE BY SAYING THEY "BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO LIFT THE FUNDRAISING BAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN A WAY THAT ADVANCES THE PROCESS, AND WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE PRINCIPLES TONY LAKE SET FORTH.

I PRESUME THAT YOU HAVE SEEN THE LETTER OUTLINING CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS OVER BLOCKING FUND RAISING BY ADAMS. HOPEFULLY, THESE WILL BE FULLY WEIGHTED WHEN CONSIDERING ADAMS' APPLICATION FOR ANOTHER VISA, WHICH COULD COME AS EARLY AS TOMORROW. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN SEAN DONLON'S CALLS SOON AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU MYSELF.

~~SECRET~~

DECL OADR

#0170

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.08)
K8H 4/11/2023

NNNN

<MSGID> M1518930

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~SECRET~~

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.
To: Gray, Wendy E.; Hawkins, Ardenia R.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Vershbow, Alexander R.
Subject: RE: A NOTE FROM NANCY SODERBERG [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Wednesday, February 08, 1995 4:14PM

Please pass to Nancy:

Following our telephone conversation earlier today, I made some calls around and learned the following:

-- Nobody agrees with O'Dowd's characterization of the ammo find as an IRA move of any kind. The Irish Embassy says it was routine policework that came upon them; the finding has no political significance. Peter Westmacott says Sinn Fein is not referring to or taking credit for the find publicly or privately. (I found this surprising given the timing of the find and the way it was initially reported in the press, but this is the Irish government/police view, as well as the British.)

-- Tuesday's HMG-Sinn Fein talks made "some progress," according to Westmacott. (I haven't connected with Oakley yet.) Some discussion of weapons decommissioning. IF Thursday's meeting goes similarly well, HMG may offer a meeting with ministers as the next step.

-- The emergency measures the Irish lifted were mostly symbolic, hadn't been used since the '70s. They RETAINED the ability to detain suspected terrorists incommunicado for 48 hours, the aspect of their (and the British) anti-terrorist approach which is most frequently criticized.

Given the fact that the ammunition discovery appears after all not to be a conscious Sinn Fein/IRA gesture (and that a bomb with semtex was defused today in Newry, although the IRA disclaimed responsibility), I suggest we wait to see whether the Brits do indeed offer ministers after tomorrow's meeting before revisiting the fundraising issue.

From: Gray, Wendy E.
To: Stephens, Kathleen D.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Marshall, Betty A.; Maxfield, Nancy H.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Subject: A NOTE FROM NANCY SODERBERG [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Wednesday, February 08, 1995 02:02 AM

Hi Kathy!

Neal O'Dowd called. The IRA gave up a large cache of weapons today, he says. 30,000 rounds of heavy ammo from the 1986 Libyan deal used for Soviet machine guns used to down helos. Neal thinks the IRA is in effect giving up its ability to shoot down helos. He thinks its in response to the Irish decision to lift the state of emergency in place in the south since 1976. Perhaps also due to release of Irish prisoners. Can you check out facts and check with State on whether this meets Peter's conditions. Also, perhaps coupled with expected positive statements next week re: the framework document?

Thanks!

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(1.09)
KBH 4/11/2023

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.
To: Hawkins, Ardenia R.; @CROSS - Cross Hatches
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Kreczko, Alan J.; Vershbow, Alexander R.
Subject: Northern Ireland update ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Tuesday, February 07, 1995 5:37PM

Please pass to Nancy:

-- Nancy, there's press reporting today that the Irish police found an IRA arms cache consisting of 12,000 rounds of ammunition (no guns), some of it for Russian heavy machine guns believed to have been part of the stuff brought from Libya in the '80s.

-- HMG-Sinn Fein had another meeting today and will meet again on Thursday. No read-out yet.

-- State still takes the position that we shouldn't move on fundraising, but if the Brits say the meeting today and Thursday went well, I get the sense State will be prepared to revisit Adams fundraising. With the Unionists still very jumpy, we shouldn't rush, but the arms cache "discovery" is, a definite move in the direction we had indicated was necessary. We'll see if it's enough for the British to have a ministerial "drop-by" at the ongoing talks.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.10)
KBM 4/11/2023

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 181705Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3448
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 2500
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 000842

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.11)
KBH 4/11/2023

EXDIS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC UK EI

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP WITH MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN ON
FUNDRAISING, SINN FEIN-HMG TALKS

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: PROVISIONAL SINN FEIN (PSF) NORTHERN
CHAIRMAN MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN MET WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL
JANUARY 17 TO FOLLOW UP THEIR JANUARY 13 MEETING ON
FUNDRAISING AND OTHER ISSUES (SEPTTEL). MCLAUGHLIN GAVE
THE CG A COPY OF SINN FEIN'S SUBMISSION TO ITS JANUARY
16 TALKS WITH HMG, NOTING PASSAGES THAT ADDRESSED USG
CONCERNS. HE REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF FUNDRAISING
TO SINN FEIN AND HOW THAT ISSUE COULD AFFECT REPUBLICAN
RANK-AND-FILE VIEWS OF "FAIRNESS" FOR PSF IN THE
POLITICAL REALM. END SUMMARY.

3. MCLAUGHLIN VISITED THE CONSULATE JANUARY 17, AFTER
PARTICIPATING IN A SINN FEIN STRATEGY SESSION, TO
DEBRIEF THE CG ON THE JANUARY 16 SESSION OF THE
"EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND HMG. HE
SAID THE JANUARY 16 MEETING WAS "MORE POSITIVE THAN
PREVIOUS" SESSIONS, WITH BOTH SIDES CEDING SOME GROUND.
SINN FEIN WAS PLEASED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT HMG APPEARED TO
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE ARMS QUESTION NEED NOT BE
COMPLETELY RESOLVED BEFORE PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON
OTHER ISSUES. FOR ITS PART, SINN FEIN ACKNOWLEDGED IN
ITS WRITTEN SUBMISSION THAT CRITICAL REPUBLICAN CONCERNS
PRISONERS AND BRITISH "DEMILITARIZATION") WOULD NOT BE
COMPLETELY MET EITHER AS PRECONDITIONS TO INCLUSIVE
DIALOGUE.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

4. MCLAUGHLIN ALSO WISHED TO FOLLOW UP ON THE JANUARY 13 MEETING HE HAD HAD WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL ON SINN FEIN FUNDRAISING (SEPTTEL). HE GAVE THE CG A COPY OF PSF'S JANUARY 16 "SUBMISSION" (FAXED TO EUR/UBI) AND DREW ATTENTION TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH ON PAGE THREE, WHICH CONTAINS A COMMITMENT TO BRINGING ABOUT "DECOMMISSIONING" OF "WEAPONS OF WAR." ACCORDING TO MCLAUGHLIN, THAT PARAGRAPH REFLECTED SINN FEIN'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF USG (AND HMG) CONCERNS. THE SAME HELD FOR THE FIRST TWO PARAGRAPHS ON PAGE FOUR, WHICH SAID SINN FEIN'S POSITION ON ARMS WAS "TRANSPARENT" AND THAT ITS "INFLUENCE" WITH THE IRA WOULD BE USED POSITIVELY.

5. MCLAUGHLIN REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF FUNDRAISING TO THE REPUBLICAN COMMUNITY, STRESSING THAT THE USG OUGHT NOT TO UNDERESTIMATE THE REAL FRAGILITY OF THE PEACE PROCESS -- THERE WAS STILL MUCH SKEPTICISM AMONG REPUBLICAN RANK-AND-FILE ABOUT WHETHER SINN FEIN WOULD BE TREATED "FAIRLY" IN THE POLITICAL REALM. MCLAUGHLIN SAID HE HOPED THIS MESSAGE WAS GETTING THROUGH AS SINN FEIN CONTINUED ITS DIALOGUE WITH U.S. DIPLOMATS IN BELFAST, LONDON AND DUBLIN. THE CONSUL GENERAL REPLIED THAT MCLAUGHLIN COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT SINN FEIN VIEWS WERE ACCURATELY REPORTED.

6. MCLAUGHLIN CONCLUDED BY ASKING THAT THE CG INFORM HIM, GERRY ADAMS OR MARTIN MCGUINNESS IF THE CG HEARD ANYTHING FROM WASHINGTON ON SINN FEIN'S REQUEST THAT THE USG TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE FUNDRAISING ISSUE. CROWE
BT
#0842

NNNN

<MSGID> M1464993

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 201310Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3535

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2512

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 000968

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND ARMS "PRECONDITION"

REFS: (A) DUBLIN 289, (B) LONDON 917

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REF A REPORTED COMMENTS BY SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND DFA SECOND SECRETARY SEAN O'HUIGINN THAT HMG HAD DROPPED IRA ARMS DECOMMISSIONING AS A PRECONDITION FOR SINN FEIN PARTICIPATION IN ALL-PARTY TALKS. THIS IS NOT QUITE ACCURATE, REFLECTING EITHER AN UNDERSTANDABLE DEGREE OF CONFUSION OR A DELIBERATE SINN FEIN ATTEMPT TO MISREPRESENT THE SITUATION IN WAYS THAT CAN LATER BE USED AGAINST HMG.

3. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NEVER CHARACTERIZED ARMS DECOMMISSIONING AS A "PRECONDITION" FOR MOVING TO THE NEXT PHASE OF TALKS; THIS IS SINN FEIN'S OWN RENDITION OF THE HMG POSITION. WHAT THE BRITISH HAVE BEEN SAYING -- AND CONTINUE TO SAY -- IS THAT UNLESS THERE WERE "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS" (A PHRASE THE TAOISEACH CLAIMS TO HAVE COINED) TOWARD DECOMMISSIONING OF THE IRA'S MOST OFFENSIVE WEAPONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE HMG/SINN FEIN DIALOGUE, THE UNIONIST PARTIES (AND HMG) WERE UNLIKELY TO BE WILLING TO JOIN SINN FEIN IN ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. ADAMS' ASSERTION THAT THE PRESENCE OF UNIONIST PARTIES IN SUCH TALKS WAS UNIMPORTANT IS, OF COURSE, NONSENSE, AS IS HIS CLAIM THAT HMG WAS USING THE ARMS ISSUE AS A RUSE TO EXCLUDE SINN FEIN FROM THE TALKS. CROWE

BT

#0968

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.12)
KBH 4/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

NNNN

<MSGID> M1469033

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: SUM SUM2

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 201950Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3574
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2515
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 001011

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.13)
KBH 4/11/2023

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL UK EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH
PM'S AIDE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ROD LYNE SAID THE UNIONISTS WERE INCREASINGLY TROUBLED BY SINN FEIN'S TACTICS ON ARMS DECOMMISSIONING. MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE IS ESSENTIAL. LYNE ARGUED THAT IRA SUPPORT FOR ADAMS HAD NOT MARKEDLY WANED AND PROTESTATIONS TO THE CONTRARY WERE PLOYS TO PRESSURE HMG. THE AMBASSADOR UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR NOT BEING SURPRISED ON FUNDRAISING. END SUMMARY.

3. THE AMBASSADOR MET JANUARY 20 WITH PM MAJOR'S FOREIGN POLICY AIDE, ROD LYNE, FOR A BROAD RANGING FOREIGN POLICY DISCUSSION. THIS MESSAGE DEALS WITH NORTHERN IRELAND; SEPTELS FOLLOW ON RUSSIA, BOSNIA, KEDO AND PM MAJOR'S APRIL 4 VISIT TO THE U.S.

NERVOUSNESS IN THE UNIONIST CAMP

4. ASKED BY THE AMBASSADOR FOR THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY ON THE PEACE PROCESS, LYNE SAID IT WAS ENTERING A CRITICAL PERIOD. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MAYHEW WAS SOMEWHAT MORE OPTIMISTIC, LYNE'S VIEW WAS THAT SINN FEIN, SOOTHING RHETORIC ASIDE, HAD NOT BUDGED AN INCH ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF ARMS DECOMMISSIONING. WORSE, RESPONSIBLE UNIONISTS (MOLYNEAUX, MCGUINNESS AND ROSS) WERE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT HMG WAS MAKING CONCESSIONS TO SINN FEIN E.G, CESSATION OF ARMY DAYTIME PATROLLING IN BELFAST, MEETINGS WITH MINISTERS, WITHOUT RECEIVING ANYTHING IN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

RETURN. THE UNIONISTS ARGUED THAT SINN FEIN WAS ESSENTIALLY SAYING "WE'RE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IRA BUT WE'LL DO OUR BEST TO KEEP THEM ON TRACK SO NOW LET US INTO THE ALL-PARTY TALKS." THIS WAS A PIG IN A POKE AND THE UNIONISTS FEARED HMG WAS BUYING IT.

DECOMMISSIONING CRUCIAL

5. LYNE, WHO APPEARED TO HAVE SOME SYMPATHY WITH THE UNIONIST VIEW, STRESSED THAT HMG'S BOTTOM LINE ON DECOMMISSIONING I.E. "SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS" WAS DELIBERATELY SUBJECTIVE; LONDON DID NOT WANT TO BOX ITSELF IN BUT NEEDED SOME CLEAR MOVEMENT. SINN FEIN'S POSITION THAT DECOMMISSIONING OF ITS ARMS SHOULD BE PART OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR BRITAIN TO HOLD FIRM ON ARMS SINCE A U-TURN WOULD CERTAINLY MEAN UNIONIST WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PEACE PROCESS. CABINET RESIGNATIONS AND A BRUISING FIGHT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS WOULD ALSO BE IN THE OFFING.

6. CONTINUING, LYNE SAID THE IRA WAS MAINTAINING ITS TARGETTING AND TRAINING AND WAS STILL TRYING TO PROCURE WEAPONS OVERSEAS. IT MOST EMPHATICALLY HAD NOT STOOD DOWN AND HAD TAKEN NO OPERATIONAL STEPS TO PREPARE FOR PEACE. THE IRA HAD ABOUT TWO AND ONE-HALF TONS OF SEMTEX AND HMG HAD RELIABLE ESTIMATES ON THEIR INVENTORIES OF HEAVY MACHINE GUNS AND ROCKETS.

7. LOOKING AHEAD, LYNE THOUGHT HMG WOULD HAVE MORE FLEXIBILITY TO MAKE TRADE OFFS ONCE THE EXPLORATORY TALKS MOVED TO THE POLITICAL LEVEL. THE BRITISH WERE CURRENTLY LOOKING INTO THE AREA OF PRISONER RELEASES. THERE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE A GENERAL AMNESTY BUT SOME STEPS COULD BE TAKEN REGARDING PAROLE.

FUNDRAISING

8. LYNE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE FIRM U.S. STANCE ON FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THIS REMAINED A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE IN THE U.S., AND IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT HMG NOT SURPRISE US ON THIS ISSUE. LYNE AGREED FULLY.

NEW IRISH COALITION: BETTER NOW BUT POSSIBLE PROBLEMS

LATER

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

9. ASKED FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE BRUTON GOVERNMENT'S IMPACT ON THE PEACE PROCESS, LYNE SAID THE NEW IRISH PRIME MINISTER, ALONG WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET, CLEARLY HELD LESS NATIONALISTIC VIEWS THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS. THE PM'S PRE-CHRISTMAS MEETING WITH BRUTON HAD GONE VERY WELL. AT THE SAME TIME, HMG RECOGNIZED THAT BRUTON WOULD BE UNDER OPPOSITION PRESSURE AND WOULD OCCASIONALLY HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE HIS GREEN CREDENTIALS. PARADOXICALLY, IT COULD WELL PROVE DIFFICULT FOR BRUTON TO ENGAGE IN END-GAME TRADEOFFS WHICH REYNOLDS MIGHT HAVE DONE WITH THE CONFIDENCE OF THE REPUBLICAN CAMP.

ADAMS AND THE IRA

10. ASKED FOR HIS ANALYSIS OF CURRENT IRA SUPPORT FOR ADAMS, LYNE SAID THE SITUATION HAD NOT CHANGED SINCE THE CEASEFIRE. THE IRA HAS STILL NOT DECIDED THAT THE CEASEFIRE WILL LEAD TO REALIZATION OF ITS AGENDA AND ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAVE A FINITE AMOUNT OF TIME. BOTH MEN WILL PARTICIPATE WITH IRA REPS IN A WEEKEND MEETING OF A TACTICAL STEERING GROUP. THEY ARE EXPECTED TO RECEIVE A GREEN LIGHT TO CONTINUE THE PEACE PROCESS PENDING A FURTHER REIVEW, PROBABLY AROUND EASTER. WHILE SOME IN THE IRA MAY ARGUE THAT A FEW WELL-TIMED BOMBINGS IN ENGLAND WOULD SPUR HMG TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS, ADAM AND MCGUINNESS WILL LIKELY PREVAIL WITH THE VIEW THAT THIS WOULD BE TOO DAMAGING TO THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT INTERNATIONALLY, PARTICULARLY IN THE U.S.

11. IN LYNE'S VIEW, SINN FEIN PROTESTATIONS THAT HMG "INTRANSIGENCE" IS ENDANGERING IRA SUPPORT FOR ADAMS ARE OVERDRAWN AND ESSENTIALLY TACTICAL PLOYS TO PUT PRESSURE ON LONDON. THOUGH ADAMS' POSITION REMAINS SOMEWHAT FRAGILE, HE IS BY NO MEANS UNDER SERIOUS THREAT AT THIS STAGE.

12. COMMENT: AS LYNE ACKNOWLEDGED, MAYHEW IS SOMEWHAT MORE UPBEAT ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY. SEPTEL REPORTS ON THE AMBASSADOR'S DINNER DISCUSSION WITH SIR PATRICK AND LADY MAYHEW ON JAN 19. CROWE

BT

#1011

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

NNNN

<MSGID> M1469982

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~SECRET~~

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

Adm

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.
To: Darby, M. Brooke; Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Northern Ireland issues ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~
Date: Thursday, January 12, 1995 10:51AM

evidence

Please pass to Nancy:

1) Dave Goldwyn called from Peter Tarnoff's office to follow up on your request that Peter provide an idea of measurable criteria for lifting the fundraising restriction. Tarnoff's thinking is as follows:

- FBI should be prepared to say the arms network remains dormant,
- there should be a change in the Sinn Fein position that it can't talk about disarmament because it is not the IRA, ✓
- Sinn Fein should take the paper and respond to it in a manner which demonstrates good faith, perhaps by an arms cache being quietly "discovered" by Irish authorities somewhere. ✓

I told Dave our views here were about the same, and that the new Irish PM seemed to feel about the same too (see Dublin 6929). There'll be a Sinn Fein-British meeting Jan. 16 so we'll see what happens then. I'm checking again today but as far as I know Sinn Fein has basically taken our answer of no fundraising now with little/no comment or reaction.

2) Senator Mitchell has written Tony Lake asking for a plane for his February 13-18 trip to Dublin, Belfast, London and perhaps Brussels. They've asked me to go along, which I'd be happy to do, but I will defer to you if this is a trip you want to join.

3) My schedule has cleared and I would like to sit in on your meeting with the Irish church leaders at 5:30 if that's ok. I will fax you their bios. It should be interesting to hear their perceptions of the mood on the ground in both communities, and of what they think of the arms decommissioning issue, etc.

4) The British RUC chief announced today that British troops will stop patrolling Belfast's streets in daylight hours beginning Sunday.

5) Jay Footlik is working on an expanded list of possible invitees to a briefing by you and perhaps Tony on Northern Ireland. I await your instructions on whether and with whom I meet separately from Bruce Morrison's group.

To TL-

I think Peter's points on fundraising are reasonable

ms

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.14)
KBH 4/11/2023

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

held for Nancy S

DIST: NSC, STEPHENS, VERSHBOW

PREC: PRIORITY CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 221624Z DEC 94

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2594

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2462

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 019978

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL UK EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: NIO OFFICIAL ON EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) DEPUTY SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS, HMG'S CHIEF NEGOTIATOR IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN, GAVE US A READOUT ON THE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS. HIS ACCOUNT FLESHED OUT THAT IN REF A, ADDING USEFUL DETAILS AND ATMOSPHERICS. THOMAS SAID HE CAUGHT SINN FEIN LEADER MARTIN MCGUINNESS IN A KEY CONTRADICTION: HOW COULD THE PARTY CLAIM IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) ARMS, WHEN GERRY ADAMS HAD ALREADY AGREED TO DISCUSS THIS AT A LATER STAGE? HMG'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT SINN FEIN WAS NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE, BUT WANTED ONLY TO MOVE QUICKLY INTO ALL-PARTY TALKS, WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT MOVEMENT ON ARMS DECOMMISSIONING. END SUMMARY.

3. THOMAS INVITED US TO THE NIO DECEMBER 22 AFTER HEARING THAT WE HAD BEEN CASTING ABOUT FOR A READOUT ON THE DECEMBER 19 SECOND ROUND OF EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. HE LEADS THE BRITISH DELEGATION IN THE TALKS, AND WAS PREVIOUSLY THE CENTRAL OFFICIAL IN THE 1993 SECRET CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN/PIRA.

SINN FEIN DISMISSIVE

4. THOMAS SAID THE SINN FEIN DELEGATION HAD COME TO THE SECOND MEETING WITH A MUCH CLEARER BRIEF THAN IN THE FIRST ROUND, AND WITH MUCH LESS APPARENT NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY. MCGUINNESS LED OFF BY DISMISSING HMG'S MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING AS USELESS AND REJECTING THE ANODYNE BRITISH PROCEDURAL PROPOSALS.

5. MCGUINNESS SAID SINN FEIN SAW NO POINT IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH "FACELESS OFFICIALS," THOMAS CONTINUED, AND INSISTED ON MOVING QUICKLY INTO POLITICAL TALKS WITH BRITISH MINISTERS AND THE OTHER PARTIES. HE CLAIMED THAT ONLY HMG AND THE UNIONIST PARTIES WERE OBSTRUCTING THE PATH TO INCLUSIVE TALKS, AND SAID IT WAS UP TO HMG TO PERSUADE THE UNIONISTS TO JOIN THEM. THOMAS SAID HE DREW ONE OF THE FEW LAUGHS OF THE SESSION BY NOTING MILDLY THAT CIVIL SERVANTS WERE USED TO BEING INSULTED AND WOULDN'T TAKE IT PERSONALLY, AND THAT SINN FEIN'S REACTION TO HIS PREVIOUS SUGGESTIONS DEMONSTRATED THE LIMITS OF BRITISH PERSUASIVE POWERS.

ARMS AND PIRA

6. THOMAS SAID HE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF ARMS DECOMMISSIONING AGAIN, REITERATING HIS POINT IN THE FIRST MEETING THAT BOTH SINN FEIN AND HMG WANTED TO

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.15)
KBH 4/11/2023

"TAKE THE GUN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS" AND DIFFERED ONLY ON MODALITIES AND TIMING. MCGUINNESS HAD SHOWN INTEREST IN THIS LINE IN THE FIRST MEETING, BUT IN THE SECOND HE REFUSED TO ACCEPT A BRITISH PAPER ON PHASED DEMILITARIZATION (EVEN ON THE BASIS THAT HE COULD CONVEY IT TO PIRA), AND INSISTED THAT THE ARMS QUESTION WAS "NOTHING TO DO WITH US." HE SAID THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS TO ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM, WHICH WAS BRITISH JURISDICTION ON IRISH TERRITORY. UNLESS THIS WAS RESOLVED, "CONFLICT WILL RESULT."

7. THOMAS SAID HE NOTED THAT SINN FEIN WAS NOT SIMPLY (AS MCGUINNESS HAD CLAIMED) ANOTHER POLITICAL PARTY, BUT WAS BACKED UP BY A FULLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED ARMED FORCE. WAS MCGUINNESS SUGGESTING THAT, SINCE MOST OTHER PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND WERE NOT ABOUT TO ACCEPT THE END OF BRITISH JURISDICTION, A RETURN TO CONFLICT WAS INEVITABLE?

8. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND PIRA, THOMAS SAID HE REMINDED MCGUINNESS THAT GERRY ADAMS' "PRESENTATION" TO PIRA IN LATE AUGUST HAD BEEN CITED AS LEADING DIRECTLY TO THE CEASEFIRE, AND THAT SINN FEIN HAD BEEN QUICK TO ISSUE STATEMENTS ABOUT PIRA INVOLVEMENT IN CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. HE TOLD MCGUINNESS: "YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIND A PARROT IN PEKING, OR A POODLE IN PARIS, WHO BELIEVES YOU, BUT NOT A DOG IN THE STREETS OF NORTHERN IRELAND." HE SAID HMG WAS CONVINCED THAT "AN ASSESSMENT BY YOU" WOULD BE INFLUENTIAL IN PERSUADING PIRA TO DECOMMISSION ITS WEAPONS. NOTING THAT ADAMS HAD AGREED THAT DEMILITARIZATION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN SUBSTANTIVE TALKS BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND OTHERS, HE WONDERED HOW THIS COULD BE DONE IF SINN FEIN HAD NO INFLUENCE ON PIRA'S DECISIONS. MCGUINNESS, APPARENTLY TAKEN ABACK BY THIS LINE OF REASONING, HAD SAID ONLY THAT IT WAS SOMETHING HMG WOULD HAVE TO SORT OUT.

9. THOMAS SAID HE HAD STRESSED IN BOTH ROUNDS OF TALKS THAT RESOLVING THE ARMS ISSUE WAS NOT A PRECONDITION HMG HAD SET FOR PROGRESS TO THE NEXT STAGE. HE SAID HMG WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS (THOUGH NOT NEGOTIATE ON) A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING POLITICAL ONES, AND TRAILED THE NOTION THAT "REAL MOVEMENT" ON DECOMMISSIONING COULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL SINN FEIN COULD SEE A CLEAR PATH TO INVOLVEMENT IN THE WIDER POLITICAL PROCESS. HMG WAS PREPARED TO BE VERY FLEXIBLE ON TIMING AND MODALITIES. BUT AS A MATTER OF FACT, SINN FEIN HAD TO REALIZE THAT TALKS WITHOUT THE UNIONISTS WOULD BE FUTILE, AND TALKS WITH THEM WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE: WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON ARMS.

OTHER ISSUES

10. APART FROM THE ARMS ISSUE, THOMAS SAID, SINN FEIN HAD ALSO RAISED THE RECENT BEATING OF A REPUBLICAN ACTIVIST, "EXCESSIVE" POLICE PATROLLING, D FUNDING FOR AN IRISH-LANGUAGE SECONDARY SCHOOL. THOMAS RESPONDED THAT HMG WAS HAPPY TO HAPPY TO AIR THESE ISSUES, WOULD LOOK AT WHAT SINN FEIN SAID AND PROVIDE ANSWERS WHERE IT COULD. THE IDEA OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR THE IRISH SCHOOL HAD MERIT, BUT SINN FEIN'S DEMANDS WOULD ENTAIL GIVING THAT SCHOOL PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OVER ALL OTHERS IN THE PROVINCE.

PACING DIFFERENCES

11. THOMAS CONFIRMED THAT THE BRITISH HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT SINN FEIN'S SUGGESTION TO DELAY THE NEXT MEETING UNTIL JANUARY 18; IN THE FIRST ROUND, HMG HAD SUGGESTED JANUARY 5 OR 6. THE NIO HAD NO GREAT PROBLEM WITH THE DELAY -- IT WOULD ALLOW MORE TIME TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE ANGLO-IRISH JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, AND HAVING THAT DOCUMENT AVAILABLE FOR DISCUSSION WITH SINN FEIN WOULD MAKE THE DIALOGUE MORE SUBSTANTIVE. BUT IT WAS HARD TO SQUARE SINN FEIN'S REQUEST FOR DELAY WITH ITS INSISTENCE THAT HMG WAS HOLDING UP PROGRESS.

12. AS FOR HMG, THOMAS SAID, "THE LAST THING WE WANT TO DO IS OBSTRUCT." THE NIO WAS READY TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES OVER THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT AT AS FAST A PACE AS THE IRISH COULD ACCOMMODATE, AND ALSO WANTED TO SUSTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF ITS TALKS WITH SINN FEIN. THERE WAS A RANGE OF OPTIONS INVOLVING STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS THAT PIRA COULD USE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INTENT TO DISARM. BUT "AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND POLITICAL REALITY, WE NEED TO HAVE SOME PROGRESS IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE AND SOME MOVEMENT ON ARMS" IN ORDER TO GAIN THE NECESSARY ROOM FOR MANEUVER.

ATMOSPHERICS

13. THOMAS CONFIRMED THAT THE TONE OF THE SECOND MEETING WAS NOTABLY LESS FRIENDLY THAN THE FIRST. THERE WERE FEWER SMILES, NO HINTS OF FLEXIBILITY, AND THE SINN FEIN GROUP SEEMED TO BE UNDER STRICT ORDERS TO STICK TO PREPARED POSITIONS. MCGUINNESS AGAIN DOMINATED HIS SIDE, WITH ONLY OCCASIONAL INTERJECTIONS FROM THE OTHERS.

14. APART FROM MCGUINNESS, THOMAS SAID, THE SINN FEIN GROUP SEEMED AN UNDISTINGUISHED LOT. KELLY, A CONVICTED IRA BOMBER WITH NO PREVIOUS POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT, HAD SAID NOTHING THROUGHOUT THE TWO LONG MEETINGS, BUT SIMPLY SAT AND GLARED AT THOMAS. HE APPEARED TO BE THE PIRA "MINDER" FOR THE DELEGATION. BHREATHNACH, WHILE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PARTY, DID NOT SEEM TO BE A SIGNIFICANT PLAYER. MCMANUS STRUCK THOMAS AS BASICALLY DECENT AND FRIENDLY, BUT PROBABLY INCLUDED AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RELATIVES OF THE "MARTYRS" - HIS SON WAS KILLED ON A PIRA OPERATION. O'HANLON APPEARED TO FUNCTION AS THE SECRETARY TO THE DELEGATION: SHE HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETINGS, BUT SAID NOTHING IN THEM. SHE WAS ALSO KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO ADAMS, AND MIGHT BE HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.

15. HMG HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED, THOMAS SAID, THAT NONE OF THE SINN FEIN "BRAIN TRUST" AROUND ADAMS - TOM HARTLEY, RICHARD MCAULEY, MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN - HAD BEEN NAMED TO THE DELEGATION. THE STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP APPARENTLY HAD DECIDED TO CONTROL THE ACTION FROM OUTSIDE, RATHER THAN PARTICIPATING DIRECTLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE STRONG PIRA PRESENCE IN THE GROUP (THREE OF THE FIVE HAVE TERRORIST CONVICTIONS) GAVE IT USEFUL "STREET CREDIBILITY." BUT THE ABSENCE OF THE STRATEGISTS, SINN FEIN'S UNWILLINGNESS TO TALK FRANKLY AT THIS STAGE, AND INCREASING THREATS OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE IF ITS DEMANDS WERE NOT MET, RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS OVERALL APPROACH. CROWE
BT
#9978

NNNN

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SSN>9978
<^TOR>941222120049 M1430008
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
<^SSN>9978
<^TOR>941222120152 M1430010

FROM:
SITREPRT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

hold for Nancy S.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: NSC, STEPHENS, VERSHLOW

PREC: PRIORITY CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG: 231348Z DEC 94

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2654

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2464

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 020032

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL UK EI
SUBJECT: NIO OFFICIAL ON SINN FEIN STRATEGY

REFS: (A) LONDON 19978, (B) LONDON 16904,
(C) DUBLIN 6838

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) DEPUTY SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS BELIEVES SINN FEIN LEADERS MUST HAVE DEVELOPED A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL STRATEGY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) CEASEFIRE, BUT HAS SEEN LITTLE EVIDENCE OF IT IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE. AMONG THE POSSIBILITIES:

- THEY BELIEVE (ERRONEOUSLY) THAT BRITISH MINISTERS ARE JUST LOOKING FOR A GOOD PRETEXT TO WITHDRAW;
- THEY ARE STILL TRYING TO FASHION A "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT" THAT COULD PLAY ON BRITISH WAR-WEARINESS AND BREAK THE GOVERNMENT'S WILL;
- THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT BRITISH RULE FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER GENERATION, BUT CANNOT REVEAL THIS TO THEIR GRASSROOTS SUPPORTERS; OR
- THEY BELIEVE A RETURN TO VIOLENCE IS INEVITABLE, BUT MUST GO THROUGH THE POLITICAL MOTIONS IN ORDER TO REGENERATE COMMUNITY SUPPORT AND BLAME THE BREAKDOWN ON THE BRITISH.

3. THOMAS SAID SINN FEIN DID NOT APPEAR TO TAKE THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE SERIOUSLY, AND WAS TRYING TO "BOUNCE" HMG INTO ALLOWING IT INTO MULTI-PARTY TALKS WITHOUT TAKING ANY OF THE STEPS NECESSARY TO MAKE THAT STEP FEASIBLE. WHATEVER THE REPUBLICANS HAD IN MIND, HMG WAS DETERMINED TO STICK TO THE PRINCIPLES IN THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. END SUMMARY.

THERE MUST BE A STRATEGY

4. AFTER BRIEFING US DECEMBER 22 ON THE SECOND SESSION OF THE HMG/SINN FEIN EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE (REF A), THOMAS AGREED TO A FREEWHEELING DISCUSSION OF THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT'S OVERALL STRATEGY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE. WE ASKED WHETHER HE AGREED WITH THOSE WHO SAID SINN FEIN HAD NO REAL STRATEGY BEYOND ITS MAXIMAL LONG-TERM DEMANDS AND TOOK INTERIM DECISIONS AS THEY CAME, OR WITH THOSE WHO ARGUED THAT SINN FEIN WAS THE ONLY PARTY IN IRELAND WITH A FULLY-DEVELOPED STRATEGY.

5. THOMAS, WHO HAS BEEN IN HIS PRESENT JOB AT LEAST FOUR YEARS AND CONDUCTED THE 1993 SECRET CONTACTS WITH REPUBLICAN LEADERS, SAID IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE TO HIM THAT SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND THE "BRAIN TRUST" HE HAD ASSEMBLED IN THE 1970'S WOULD HAVE ENTERED THE POST-CEASEFIRE ERA WITHOUT A VERY CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THEY WANTED, WHAT THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD GET, AND HOW THEY COULD GET IT.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
72011-0355-F (1.16)
KBH 4/11/2023**

6. THE GROUP AROUND ADAMS, THOMAS NOTED, HAD ALMOST 20 YEARS' EXPERIENCE AT THE INTERFACE BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGY, AND HAD BEEN SHIFTING THE MOVEMENT'S FOCUS TOWARD ENHANCED POLITICAL ACTIVITY FOR NEARLY A DECADE. ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS HAD STAKED A LOT ON THE SUCCESS OF THE "POLITICAL STRUGGLE," AND IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT THEY HAD NOT THOUGHT THROUGH THE PROBLEMS THEY WERE BOUND TO ENCOUNTER.

7. THOMAS STRESSED SEVERAL TIMES THAT FOR ADAMS, THE PARAMOUNT CONCERN WAS "MOVEMENT MANAGEMENT." HE WAS DETERMINED AT ALL COSTS TO AVOID THE KIND OF SPLITS THAT HAD LED TO HIS OWN RISE TO POWER. IN OUTMANEUVERING THE PREVIOUS GENERATION OF LEADERS, CONSOLIDATING HIS POSITION AND ENGINEERING THE CEASEFIRE, ADAMS HAD SHOWN HIMSELF ADEPT AT THIS KIND OF MANAGEMENT, AND THERE WAS NO REASON TO THINK HE WOULD CHANGE HIS STYLE.

BUT NO EVIDENCE YET

8. AT THE SAME TIME, THOMAS ACKNOWLEDGED, HE HAD SEEN NO INDICATION IN THE FIRST TWO ROUNDS OF EXPLORATORY TALKS OF WHAT THE SINN FEIN STRATEGY MIGHT BE. AS NOTED REF A, HE SAID MARTIN MCGUINNESS HAD BEEN EVEN LESS FORTHCOMING IN THE SECOND SESSION THAN IN THE FIRST, STICKING RIGIDLY TO LONGSTANDING REPUBLICAN POSITIONS. IT APPEARED THAT, WHATEVER ELSE THEY MAY HAVE DECIDED, REPUBLICAN LEADERS HAD NOT THOUGHT ABOUT WHAT TO DO IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE.

9. THOMAS SAID THERE WAS REASON TO BELIEVE SINN FEIN HAD NO INTENTION OF TALKING SERIOUSLY IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE, BUT RATHER WAS TRYING TO "BOUNCE" HMG THROUGH IT AND INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS (NOTE: REF C REPORTS ADAMS' LATEST EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD). THIS WAS A NON-STARTER. EVEN IF ADAMS COULD CONVINCe SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY (SDLP) LEADER JOHN HUME AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE DIALOGUE WAS USELESS AND THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS SHOULD BEGIN AT ONCE, NEITHER OF THE UNIONIST PARTIES WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE. AND WITHOUT THE UNIONISTS, NO WORKABLE AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. THE REPUBLICANS "CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS": THEY WOULD HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR OWN SINCERITY - PARTICULARLY ON THE ARMS QUESTION - BEFORE OTHERS WOULD TREAT THEM AS A LEGITIMATE NEGOTIATING PARTNER.

BASED ON A DELUSION?

10. THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY, THOMAS SAID, THAT SINN FEIN REALLY BELIEVED THAT BRITISH MINISTERS WANTED TO GET OUT OF NORTHERN IRELAND, AND WERE ONLY LOOKING FOR A FIG-LEAF TO COVER THE EXIT. IF THE REPUBLICANS HARBORED THIS DELUSION, THOMAS SAID, THEY MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED LESS RESISTANCE TO THEIR DEMANDS THAN THEY WERE GOING TO ENCOUNTER. THIS MIGHT ALSO EXPLAIN WHY THEY WERE SO DISMISSIVE OF TALKS WITH OFFICIALS AND ANXIOUS TO MEET MINISTERS.

11. THOMAS NOTED MCGUINNESS' STATEMENT IN OCTOBER THAT DURING THE 1993 SECRET CONTACTS, A BRITISH OFFICIAL HAD TOLD HIM THAT HMG'S ULTIMATE AIM WAS "THAT THE ISLAND WOULD BE AS ONE." THIS HAD COME UP AGAIN DURING THE SECOND EXPLORATORY MEETING, AND THOMAS HAD SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE IT CATEGORICALLY, STRESSING THAT THE CONTACT HAD BEEN UNAUTHORIZED, AND THAT WHAT HMG SAID PUBLICLY WAS ITS REAL POSITION. ANY STATEMENT THAT DEVIATED FROM THE PUBLIC LINE WAS SIMPLY NOT ACCURATE.

PAN-NATIONALIST PRESSURE?

12. IT WAS ALSO POSSIBLE, THOMAS SAID, THAT ADAMS STILL THOUGHT HE COULD FORGE A MONOLITHIC "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT" INCLUDING SINN FEIN, THE SDLP, THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT AND THE USG (THROUGH IRISH-AMERICAN PRESSURE). THE IDEA WOULD BE THAT WITH CONCERTED U.S. AND IRISH PRESSURE, COUPLED WITH OPINION POLLS SHOWING

MOST BRITONS WANTED TO BE RID OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, THE WILL OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO REMAIN ENGAGED WOULD COLLAPSE.

13. A STRATEGY BASED ON THESE ASSUMPTIONS WOULD ALSO MISREAD THE SITUATION, THOMAS SAID. JOHN HUME MIGHT BE CONVINCED BY ADAMS' ARGUMENTS (HE VACILLATED CONSTANTLY ON THE ARMS ISSUE), BUT HIS PARTY WAS NOT. THE NEW IRISH GOVERNMENT WAS MUCH LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO REPUBLICAN APPEALS THAN ITS PREDECESSOR. THE BRITISH OPINION POLLS REPRESENTED A LONGING FOR PEACE, NOT A PULLOUT. AND IN ANY EVENT, WHATEVER THEY THOUGHT OF THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING THE UNION VERSUS IRISH UNIFICATION, NO SERIOUS PLAYER IN BRITISH POLITICS WOULD CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL IN THE FACE OF UNIONIST OPPOSITION.

COVERT ACCEPTANCE?

14. THIRD, THOMAS CONTINUED, THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP MIGHT HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THEY HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ACCEPT THE HARD POLITICAL REALITY THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD REMAIN IN THE UK UNTIL A MAJORITY THERE AGREED TO UNIFICATION -- AT LEAST A GENERATION IN THE FUTURE -- BUT NEEDED MORE TIME TO BRING PIRA HARDLINERS AND GRASSROOTS REPUBLICANS AROUND TO THE IDEA. HMG HOPED THIS WAS THE CASE.

15. REPUBLICAN LEADERS, THOMAS NOTED, HAD TALKED INCREASINGLY OF AN "AGREED IRELAND" (BORROWING THE PHRASE FROM HUME); PERHAPS THE PASSAGE OF REFERIENDA IN BOTH PARTS OF IRELAND ON A SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION AND THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO SAY THAT THE IRISH PEOPLE HAD EXERCISED THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. HMG WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF THEY CHARACTERIZED THE RESULTING ARRANGEMENTS AS TRANSITIONAL, AND CONTINUED TO AGITATE FOR UNIFICATION; IT HAD ALWAYS ACCEPTED THE LEGITIMACY OF ASPIRATIONS TO UNITY. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE WAS LITTLE EVIDENCE SO FAR TO SUPPORT THIS ASSESSMENT OF REPUBLICAN INTENTIONS.

PREPARING FOR RENEWED VIOLENCE?

16. FINALLY, THOMAS SAID, THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS MERELY A TACTICAL MANEUVER, CALLED IN RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FLOWING FROM THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. IN THIS SCENARIO, SINN FEIN/PIRA LEADERS KNEW THEY COULD NOT ACHIEVE THEIR AGENDA THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS, AND BELIEVED A RETURN TO THE "ARMED STRUGGLE" WAS INEVITABLE, BUT NEEDED TO REGENERATE SUPPORT FOR IT IN THEIR COMMUNITIES BY GOING THROUGH THE DEMOCRATIC MOTIONS WHILE PREPARING THE GROUNDWORK TO BLAME HMG FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE. THE LACK OF ANY MOVEMENT ON ARMS, CONTINUED PIRA TRAINING AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES, AND MCGUINNESS' WARNING IN THE SECOND MEETING THAT "CONFLICT WILL RESULT" UNLESS BRITISH JURISDICTION ENDED ALL POINTED TO THIS CONCLUSION.

17. THOMAS NOTED THAT REPUBLICAN LEADERS (AS WELL AS SOME IN DUBLIN AND THE SDLP) HAD HARPED RELENTLESSLY ON THE THEME THAT HMG WAS DRAGGING ITS FEET AND PUTTING OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF RECONCILIATION. THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY UNTRUE: NO ONE WAS MORE ANXIOUS THAN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO REACH AGREEMENT. IRISH CLAIMS THAT HMG HAD STALLED AGREEMENT ON THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WERE ESPECIALLY GALLING IN THIS REGARD, SINCE THE IRISH KNEW BETTER: THE NIO HAD GIVEN ITS DRAFT OF THE DOCUMENT TO DFA COUNTERPARTS IN SEPTEMBER 1993, AND GOT NO RESPONSE (EXCEPT FOR THE LEAK OF A HIGHLY REPUBLICAN DRAFT TO IRISH MEDIA) UNTIL APRIL 1994. AND IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE, SINN FEIN HAD SLOWED THE PACE OF MEETINGS AND DECLINED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING BUT ITS MAXIMAL DEMANDS.

BRITISH RESPONSE

18. WHATEVER SINN FEIN PLANNED, THOMAS SAID, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS DETERMINED TO PRESS ON UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. IT WOULD NOT BE MOVED FROM THOSE PRINCIPLES UNDER ANY COMBINATION OF SINN FEIN PROPAGANDA, IRA VIOLENCE OR EXTERNAL PRESSURE. WHEN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT AND THE COMPLEMENTARY BRITISH PAPER ON INTERNAL DEVOLUTION WERE PUBLISHED, THEY WOULD PLEASE NEITHER UNIONISTS NOR NATIONALISTS. THEY WERE NOT, THOMAS STRESSED, INTENDED TO BE RIGID BLUEPRINTS FOR A SETTLEMENT, BUT RATHER A STARTING POINT FOR ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. THEY REPRESENTED THE TWO GOVERNMENTS' BEST ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WAS LIKELY TO ATTRACT THE BROADEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT ACROSS BOTH TRADITIONS IN THE NORTH. IDEALLY, THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT COULD BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT A PACKAGE DEAL WITHIN THOSE PARAMETERS. BUT NEITHER IT NOR ANY OTHER PARTY HAD A RIGHT TO VETO ANY AGREEMENT THAT COULD WIN MAJORITY APPROVAL IN BOTH PARTS OF THE ISLAND. CROWE
BT

FROM:
SITREPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BERGER, FUERTH, ITOH, LAKE, REED, SENS, SIT, SODIERBERG, WOLIN, NSC, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:231140Z DEC 94

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6835

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2548

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006853

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, CVIS, EI, UK
SUBJECT: ADAMS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON - POSITIVE BUT
CONCERNS OVER FUND RAISING REMAIN

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND MAIREAD KEANE, FORMER HEAD OF SINN FEIN'S WOMEN'S SECTION WHO IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH NORTH AMERICA, HAVE REPORTED BACK TO THE AMBASSADOR ON THEIR RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. ADAMS AND KEANE SEPARATELY DESCRIBED THE MEETINGS AT THE NSC WITH TONY LAKE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT WITH EUR/NE DIRECTOR MIKE LEKSON AS POSITIVE. THEY APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO REITERATE THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE PARITY OF ESTEEM AND TO BUILD IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

3. ADAMS AND SINN FEIN ARE ANXIOUS, HOWEVER, TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE QUICKLY AND QUIETLY. THEY DO NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS THE PRESIDENT OR HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT THEY NEED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ADAMS AND KEANE WERE OBVIOUSLY DISTRESSED THAT THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE THEIR CASE DIRECTLY TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. THEY TOTALLY REJECTED AS NONSENSE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT SINN FEIN/IRA ARE ATTEMPTING TO BUY ARMS IN THE U.S. AND OFFERED TO ANSWER ANY QUERIES JUSTICE MIGHT HAVE ON THIS ISSUE. THEY STRESSED INSTEAD THE URGENT NEED TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND MAKE IT IRREVERSIBLE.

4. ADAMS WOULD LIKE TO VISIT THE U.S. AGAIN IN LATE JANUARY TO ENGAGE IN FUND RAISING. KEANE SAID THAT THE "FRIENDS OF SINN FEIN" SHOULD BE REGISTERED AS A FOREIGN AGENT EARLY IN JANUARY AND THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPEN, TRANSPARENT VEHICLE FOR ADAMS' FUND RAISING EFFORTS. SHE ALSO STRESSED THAT SINN FEIN WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE NSC TO EITHER LET THEM ANSWER THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THEM OR BE ALLOWED TO RAISE FUNDS.

5. ADAMS AND KEANE EMPHASIZED, THAT WITH THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN, THE U.S. ROLE IN FURTHERING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER. (FORMER SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE TAOISEACH ON NORTHERN IRELAND MARTIN MANSERGH MADE THE VERY SAME POINT TO US AT THE DECEMBER 14 DINNER FOR SECRETARY OF COMMERCE BROWN AT DUBLIN CASTLE.) THEY UNDERScoreD THE NEED FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE BRITISH TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM. PARITY OF ESTEEM MUST BE ESTABLISHED QUICKLY, AND THE BRITISH SHOULD BE MOVING NOW TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR COMMITMENT. KEANE NOTED THAT IRISH-AMERICANS STILL HAVE FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT, BUT THAT SHE FINDS THEM INCREASINGLY WORRIED THAT THE NEXT LOGICAL STEPS ON FUND RAISING, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE NOT BEING TAKEN QUICKLY ENOUGH.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.17)
KBM 4/11/2023

6. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, KEANE DESCRIBED THE "EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" AS A DISTRACTION. SINN FEIN "FEELS THE NEED TO MOVE BEYOND BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE BRITISH." THEIR GOAL IS TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL-INCLUSIVE, ALL-PARTY TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: ADAMS AND KEANE CLEARLY CAME AWAY FROM THEIR MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON BELIEVING THAT THE FUND RAISING ISSUE WOULD BE RESOLVED EARLY IN JANUARY. IF THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS OF THE NSC, SINN FEIN SHOULD BE TOLD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SINN FEIN IS ANXIOUS TO ADDRESS ANY CONCERNS THAT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE OVER ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE ALSO EAGER TO REASSURE THE U.S.G. OF THE TRANSPARENCY AND LEGALITY OF ANY FUND RAISING THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE U.S. THUS WE RECOMMEND THAT JUSTICE MEET WITH SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS WHATEVER CONCERNS THE FBI OR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE HAVE WHICH KEEP THEM FROM MOVING FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE. ALTERNATIVELY, WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RAISE ANY SUCH QUESTIONS DIRECTLY WITH THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP AND TO SEEK WHATEVER ASSURANCES FELT NECESSARY. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP AS WE DO NOT WANT THE QUESTION OF FUND RAISING BY ADAMS TO ESCALATE INTO THE KIND OF IN-CRISIS WE HAVE HAD OVER VISAS FOR ADAMS IN THE PAST. SMITH

FROM:
SITREPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: NSC, STEPHENS, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 230033Z DEC 94

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6592
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 0058
RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST IMMEDIATE 7193

///

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 338910

LONDON PLEASE PASS TO BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, EI, UK
SUBJECT: BRITISH EMBASSY READ-OUT ON SECOND HMG/SINN FEIN MEETING

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON 12/22, PETER WESTMACOTT, POLITICAL COUNSELOR AT THE UK EMBASSY, PROVIDED A READ-OUT ON SUBJECT TALKS TO EUR/UBI DIRECTOR LEKSON, IRELAND/N.I. DESK OFFICER VAN SON, INR ANALYST LIEBOWITZ, AND NSC EUROPEAN DIRECTOR STEPHENS.

3. WESTMACOTT'S PRESENTATION CLOSELY TRACKED REFTTEL, WITH THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONS:

- MCGUINNESS HAD PROPOSED A "SMALLER" MEETING BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND HMG BEFORE THE NEXT SCHEDULED MEETING ON 1/15.

WESTMACOTT BELIEVES SINN FEIN WAS PROPOSING A SECRET MEETING BETWEEN HMG OFFICIALS AND MCGUINNESS AND SIOBHAN O'HANLON. HMG WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO A MEETING, AS LONG AS IT WAS MADE PUBLIC, EVEN IF AFTER THE FACT. WESTMACOTT WAS SKEPTICAL OF ANY SECRET MEETING SINCE IT WOULD NOT STAY SECRET AND THE FEAR THAT UNIONISTS WOULD BELIEVE A DEAL WAS BEING COOKED UP BEHIND THEIR BACKS.

4. WESTMACOTT STATED THAT SINN FEIN'S REFUSAL EVEN TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT (REFUSAL TO ACCEPT HMG'S PAPER ON SUBJECT) PRESENTS A SERIOUS RISK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS COMING TO A COMPLETE STOP. CITING A CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH PM MAJOR'S ADVISOR ROD LYNE, WESTMACOTT SAID IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF THOSE WHO HAD SINN FEIN'S EAR, INCLUDING AMERICANS, MADE CLEAR THAT THEY MUST ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT. HMG IS WILLING TO BE FLEXIBLE AND IS PREPARED TO LISTEN TO ANY IDEAS OR PROCEDURES ABOUT DISARMAMENT OR DECOMMISSIONING, BUT SINN FEIN CANNOT REFUSE TO TALK ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR INSIST THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRA. THEY WILL NOT GET TO MINISTERIAL-LEVEL TALKS OR THE ALL-PARTY TALKS UNLESS SOME TANGIBLE PROGRESS IS MADE ON THIS ISSUE.

5. ON LIFTING THE FUNDRAISING RESTRICTION ON GERRY ADAMS' VISA, WESTMACOTT STATED THAT HMG WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE FOLLOWING FIRST: TRANSPARENCY IN THE FUNDS COLLECTIONS AND EXPENDITURE PROCESS, SO THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY THAT FUNDS WOULD GO TO ILLICIT PURPOSES; PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE HMG/SF TALKS; AND A CLEAR END TO WEAPONS PROCUREMENT. ON THIS LAST POINT, WESTMACOTT ADMITTED THAT HE HAD SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF ANY ONGOING ACTIVITY IN THE U.S. USG OFFICIALS SAID WE WOULD APPRECIATE SEEING ANY INFORMATION HMG MAY HAVE SUGGESTING ONGOING ORGANIZED ARMS PROCUREMENT BY THE IRA IN THE U.S. OR ANYWHERE ELSE. TALBOTT

cc + return

hold for Nancy S.

1/3

CC TOTL -

wanted to be sure you had seen.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.18)
KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT HAS CLEARED THIS CABLE
(REF. B). BARTHOLOMEW

FROM:
SITREPRT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

NES
→ limit call
NES
Kathy Stephens
NES will call you.
RZ

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 231140Z DEC 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6835
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2548
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006853

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(1.19)
K8H 4/11/2023

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, CVIS, EI, UK
SUBJECT: ADAMS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON -- POSITIVE BUT
CONCERNS OVER FUND RAISING REMAIN

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND MAIREAD KEANE, FORMER HEAD OF SINN FEIN'S WOMEN'S SECTION WHO IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH NORTH AMERICA, HAVE REPORTED BACK TO THE AMBASSADOR ON THEIR RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. ADAMS AND KEANE SEPARATELY DESCRIBED THE MEETINGS AT THE NSC WITH TONY LAKE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT WITH EUR/NE DIRECTOR MIKE LEKSON AS POSITIVE. THEY APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO REITERATE THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE PARITY OF ESTEEM AND TO BUILD IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

3. ADAMS AND SINN PEIN ARE ANXIOUS, HOWEVER, TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE QUICKLY AND QUIETLY. THEY DO NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS THE PRESIDENT OR HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT THEY NEED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ADAMS AND KEANE WERE OBVIOUSLY DISTRESSED THAT THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE THEIR CASE DIRECTLY TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. THEY TOTALLY REJECTED AS NONSENSE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT SINN FEIN/IRA ARE ATTEMPTING TO BUY ARMS IN THE U.S. AND OFFERED TO ANSWER ANY QUERIES JUSTICE MIGHT HAVE ON THIS ISSUE. THEY STRESSED INSTEAD THE URGENT NEED TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND MAKE IT IRREVERSIBLE.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

4. ADAMS WOULD LIKE TO VISIT THE U.S. AGAIN IN LATE JANUARY TO ENGAGE IN FUND RAISING. KEANE SAID THAT THE "FRIENDS OF SINN FEIN" SHOULD BE REGISTERED AS A FOREIGN AGENT EARLY IN JANUARY AND THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPEN, TRANSPARENT VEHICLE FOR ADAMS' FUND RAISING EFFORTS. SHE ALSO STRESSED THAT SINN FEIN WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE NSC TO EITHER LET THEM ANSWER THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THEM OR BE ALLOWED TO RAISE FUNDS.

5. ADAMS AND KEANE EMPHASIZED, THAT WITH THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN, THE U.S. ROLE IN FURTHERING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER. (FORMER SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE TAOISEACH ON NORTHERN IRELAND MARTIN MANSERGH MADE THE VERY SAME POINT TO US AT THE DECEMBER 14 DINNER FOR SECRETARY OF COMMERCE BROWN AT DUBLIN CASTLE.) THEY UNDERScoreD THE NEED FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE BRITISH TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM. PARITY OF ESTEEM MUST BE ESTABLISHED QUICKLY, AND THE BRITISH SHOULD BE MOVING NOW TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR COMMITMENT. KEANE NOTED THAT IRISH-AMERICANS STILL HAVE FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT, BUT THAT SHE FINDS THEM INCREASINGLY WORRIED THAT THE NEXT LOGICAL STEPS ON FUND RAISING, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE NOT BEING TAKEN QUICKLY ENOUGH.

6. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, KEANE DESCRIBED THE "EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" AS A DISTRACTION. SINN FEIN "FEELS THE NEED TO MOVE BEYOND BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE BRITISH." THEIR GOAL IS TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL-INCLUSIVE, ALL-PARTY TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: ADAMS AND KEANE CLEARLY CAME AWAY FROM THEIR MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON BELIEVING THAT THE FUND RAISING ISSUE WOULD BE RESOLVED EARLY IN JANUARY. IF THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS OF THE NSC, SINN FEIN SHOULD BE TOLD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SINN FEIN IS ANXIOUS TO ADDRESS ANY CONCERNS THAT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE OVER ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE ALSO EAGER TO REASSURE THE U.S.G. OF THE TRANSPARENCY AND LEGALITY OF ANY FUND RAISING THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE U.S. THUS WE RECOMMEND THAT JUSTICE MEET WITH SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS WHATEVER CONCERNS THE FBI OR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE HAVE WHICH KEEP THEM FROM MOVING FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE. ALTERNATIVELY, WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RAISE ANY SUCH QUESTIONS DIRECTLY WITH THE SINN

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

FEIN LEADERSHIP AND T SEEK WHATEVER ASSURANCES FELT
NECESSARY. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP AS WE DO NOT WANT THE
QUESTION OF FUD RAISING BY ADAMS TO ESCALATE INTO THE
KIND OF INI-CRISES WE HAVE HAD OVER VISAS FOR ADAMS IN
TE PAST. SMITH
BT
#6853

NNNN
<MSGID> M1431894

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INITIAL HERE 5.11/7
AUTH ES/PT DRAFT PS
CLEAR 1 JK 2 DD
3 JML 4 RO 5 JR
6 SD 7 _____ 8 _____
NSCS S/S S/S-0

ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/UBI:PVANSON:PBV
12/29/94 X76585 SENEII 1526
P:PTARNOFF

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(1.21)
KBH 9/11/2023

EUR:JCKORNBLUM
NSC:
CA:DDILLARD
EUR/UBI:JMLEKSON

S/P:RO'NEILL(SUBS)
DOJ:JREYNOLDS
S/S:
S/CT:DDOBSON

EUR/UBI, CA/VO, P, S/CT

IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, LONDON IMMEDIATE

LONDON PLEASE PASS TO BELFAST FOR ACTION ALSO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CVIS, PTER, PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS (9500250)

REF: A) DUBLIN 37 B) 94 DUBLIN 6853 C) 94 LONDON 19978
D) 94 STATE 33891 E) 94 LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. U.S. OFFICIALS MADE CLEAR TO GERRY ADAMS DURING THEIR MEETINGS ON 12/6/94 THAT IN ORDER FOR THE U.S. TO LIFT THE RESTRICTIONS ON FUNDRAISING BY ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN LEADERS WHO REQUIRE WAIVERS OF THEIR VISA INELIGIBILITIES, THE ADMINISTRATION NEEDED TO SEE MOVEMENT BY SINN FEIN IN TWO AREAS. NO REFERENCES TO TIME TABLES WERE MADE; RATHER, EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON THE FACT THAT IF THESE TWO AREAS WERE RESOLVED, THE FUNDRAISING ISSUE WOULD NO LONGER BE PROBLEMATIC.

3. FIRST, WE NEEDED AN END TO ARMS PROCUREMENT IN THE U.S. SECOND, THE ADMINISTRATION WANTED TO SEE SOME CONCRETE PROGRESS TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION. ADAMS WAS TOLD THAT WE ASSUMED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ON DISARMAMENT WOULD OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF SINN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

FEIN DISCUSSIONS WITH HMG. FURTHERMORE, MOVEMENT ON EXPLOSIVES AND OTHER ARMAMENTS SEEN AS OFFENSIVE (SEMTEX AND MISSILES WERE MENTIONED) WOULD HAVE PARTICULAR RESONANCE WITHIN THE USG. THE RETURN OF FUNDS FROM THE NEWRY ROBBERY/MURDER WAS ALSO MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE.

4. WHILE WE HAVE NO RECENT REPORTS OF PROCUREMENT EFFORTS BY THE IRA IN THE U.S., REPORTS FROM HMG (REFS C, D, AND E) ARE THAT SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REFUSED EVEN TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT OR READ HMG PAPERS ON THE ISSUE. THE COMMITMENT OF SINN FEIN TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND ITS STATED INTENTION FOR THE USE OF FUNDS MR. ADAMS MAY RAISE IN THE THE U.S. APPEAR INCONSISTENT WITH THE REFUSAL OF ITS REPRESENTATIVES EVEN TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION.

4. DUBLIN AND BELFAST SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS WITH ADAMS, MCGUINNESS, AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SINN FEIN OFFICIALS:

-- WE UNDERSTAND MR. ADAMS' DESIRE TO RAISE FUNDS IN THE U.S. TO SUPPORT LEGAL POLITICAL PARTY ACTIVITIES.

-- SINN FEIN PARTY OFFICIALS NOT NEEDING A VISA WAIVER PRESENTLY MAY RAISE FUNDS IN THE U.S. IN COMPLIANCE WITH U.S. LAWS, INCLUDING LAWS RESTRICTING SUCH FUNDS FROM BEING USED TO SUPPORT TERRORIST ACTIVITES. THIS DOES NOT APPLY TO MR. ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN OFFICIALS WHO REQUIRE A VISA WAIVER.

-- AS U.S. OFFICIALS TOLD MR. ADAMS AT MEETINGS ON 12/6, BEFORE THE FUNDRAISING RESTRICTION CAN BE LIFTED, WE NEED TO SEE AN END TO IRA ARMS PROCUREMENT IN THE U.S. AND CONCRETE PROGRESS TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION.

-- ON ARMS PROCUREMENT, WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY OUR INFORMATION OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS. HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO HAVE CONCERNS OVER CONTINUED IRA CONTACTS WITH WEAPON MERCHANTS.

-- WE ALSO WELCOME SINN FEIN PROPOSALS ON VOLUNTARY TRANSPARENT ACCOUNTING FOR ANY FUNDS RAISED IN THE U.S., AND ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY DETAILS YOU MAY HAVE TO OFFER.

-- MOVEMENT ON IRA DECOMMISSIONING OF PARTICULARLY OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SUCH AS SEMTEX AND MISSILES WOULD BE A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE THAT WOULD HELP TO ASSURE THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

USG OF SINN FEIN'S AND THE IRA'S COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE
PROCESS, ~~AND AN END TO WEAPONS PROCUREMENT.~~

-- WE HAD ASSUMED THAT DISCUSSIONS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES OR OF A PROCESS FOR DEMOBILIZATION WOULD OCCUR IN
THE CONTEXT OF SINN FEIN MEETINGS WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS.

-- IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES
HAVE REFUSED TO DISCUSS OR EVEN ACCEPT COPIES OF BRITISH
PROPOSALS ON DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION.

-- THEREFORE, AT THE PRESENT TIME, WE DO NOT FEEL
SUFFICIENT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ALL OF THE AREAS
DISCUSSED WITH YOU TO WARRANT CHANGING THE CONDITIONS ON
MR. ADAMS' VISA WAIVER OR THE WAIVERS OF OTHER SINN FEIN
LEADERS. \\
YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

NES - 141 from R

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

NES
Kathy Stephens
NES will call you.
R

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 231140Z DEC 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6835
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2548
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006853

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.22)
KBM 4/11/2023

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, CVIS, EI, UK
SUBJECT: ADAMS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON -- POSITIVE BUT
CONCERNS OVER FUND RAISING REMAIN

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND MAIREAD KEANE, FORMER HEAD OF SINN FEIN'S WOMEN'S SECTION WHO IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH NORTH AMERICA, HAVE REPORTED BACK TO THE AMBASSADOR ON THEIR RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. ADAMS AND KEANE SEPARATELY DESCRIBED THE MEETINGS AT THE NSC WITH TONY LAKE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT WITH EUR/NE DIRECTOR MIKE LEKSON AS POSITIVE. THEY APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO REITERATE THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE PARITY OF ESTEEM AND TO BUILD IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

3. ADAMS AND SINN PEIN ARE ANXIOUS, HOWEVER, TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE QUICKLY AND QUIETLY. THEY DO NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS THE PRESIDENT OR HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT THEY NEED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ADAMS AND KEANE WERE OBVIOUSLY DISTRESSED THAT THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE THEIR CASE DIRECTLY TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. THEY TOTALLY REJECTED AS NONSENSE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT SINN FEIN/IRA ARE ATTEMPTING TO BUY ARMS IN THE U.S. AND OFFERED TO ANSWER ANY QUERIES JUSTICE MIGHT HAVE ON THIS ISSUE. THEY STRESSED INSTEAD THE URGENT NEED TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND MAKE IT IRREVERSIBLE.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

4. ADAMS WOULD LIKE TO VISIT THE U.S. AGAIN IN LATE JANUARY TO ENGAGE IN FUND RAISING. KEANE SAID THAT THE "FRIENDS OF SINN FEIN" SHOULD BE REGISTERED AS A FOREIGN AGENT EARLY IN JANUARY AND THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPEN, TRANSPARENT VEHICLE FOR ADAMS' FUND RAISING EFFORTS. SHE ALSO STRESSED THAT SINN FEIN WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE NSC TO EITHER LET THEM ANSWER THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THEM OR BE ALLOWED TO RAISE FUNDS.

5. ADAMS AND KEANE EMPHASIZED, THAT WITH THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN, THE U.S. ROLE IN FURTHERING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER. (FORMER SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE TAOISEACH ON NORTHERN IRELAND MARTIN MANSERGH MADE THE VERY SAME POINT TO US AT THE DECEMBER 14 DINNER FOR SECRETARY OF COMMERCE BROWN AT DUBLIN CASTLE.) THEY UNDERScoreD THE NEED FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE BRITISH TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM. PARITY OF ESTEEM MUST BE ESTABLISHED QUICKLY, AND THE BRITISH SHOULD BE MOVING NOW TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR COMMITMENT. KEANE NOTED THAT IRISH-AMERICANS STILL HAVE FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT, BUT THAT SHE FINDS THEM INCREASINGLY WORRIED THAT THE NEXT LOGICAL STEPS ON FUND RAISING, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE NOT BEING TAKEN QUICKLY ENOUGH.

6. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, KEANE DESCRIBED THE "EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" AS A DISTRACTION. SINN FEIN "FEELS THE NEED TO MOVE BEYOND BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE BRITISH." THEIR GOAL IS TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL-INCLUSIVE, ALL-PARTY TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: ADAMS AND KEANE CLEARLY CAME AWAY FROM THEIR MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON BELIEVING THAT THE FUND RAISING ISSUE WOULD BE RESOLVED EARLY IN JANUARY. IF THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS OF THE NSC, SINN FEIN SHOULD BE TOLD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SINN FEIN IS ANXIOUS TO ADDRESS ANY CONCERNS THAT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE OVER ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE ALSO EAGER TO REASSURE THE U.S.G. OF THE TRANSPARENCY AND LEGALITY OF ANY FUND RAISING THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE U.S. THUS WE RECOMMEND THAT JUSTICE MEET WITH SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS WHATEVER CONCERNS THE FBI OR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE HAVE WHICH KEEP THEM FROM MOVING FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE. ALTERNATIVELY, WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RAISE ANY SUCH QUESTIONS DIRECTLY WITH THE SINN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

FEIN LEADERSHIP AND T SEEK WHATEVER ASSURANCES FELT
NECESSARY. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP AS WE DO NOT WANT THE
QUESTION OF FUD RAISING BY ADAMS TO ESCALATE INTO THE
KIND OF INI-CRISES WE HAVE HAD OVER VISAS FOR ADAMS IN
TE PAST. SMITH

BT
#6853

NNNN
<MSGID> M1431894

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 091705Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3086
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 2475
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 000363

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.23)
KOH 7/11/2023

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK

SUBJECT: FUNDRAISING BY SINN FEIN

REF: (A) 94 STATE 338910 (B) 94 DUBLIN 6853

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN ANTICIPATION OF A POSSIBLE FURTHER VISIT BY SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS TO THE U.S. LATE IN THE MONTH, WE QUESTIONED NIO ASSISTANT SECRETARY PETER BELL JANUARY 5 ON HMG'S LATEST VIEWS ON FUNDRAISING BY ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES. BELL CONFIRMED THAT HMG REMAINED FIRMLY OPPOSED TO SINN FEIN FUNDRAISING AND URGED THAT THE USG CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THE CONDITIONS (NO WEAPONS ACQUISITION IN THE U.S.; CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT FUNDS RAISED IN THE U.S. WOULD NOT BE USED FOR PURCHASE OF WEAPONS; AND PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMILITARIZATION) THAT IT HAD SPELLED OUT TO ADAMS DURING HIS MOST RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID THAT HE AND NIO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS HAD CONSULTED WITH NIO SECRETARY SIR PATRICK MAYHEW ON THIS ISSUE JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS, AND THAT MAYHEW HAD STRESSED THAT SINN FEIN HAD MADE NO PROGRESS AT ALL ON THE KEY CONDITION OF MOVEMENT TOWARDS DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS.

3. BELL WENT ON TO NOTE THAT HMG WAS BY NO MEANS SINGLING OUT DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS AS THE ONLY ISSUE FOR ITS EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT AT THE FIRST ROUND OF EXPLORATORY TALKS, QUENTIN THOMAS HAD TAKEN GREAT PAINS TO POINT OUT THAT HMG WAS PREPARED TO PURSUE A WIDE AND FULL AGENDA -- ESSENTIALLY ANY ISSUE THAT SINN FEIN CARED TO RAISE. AT THE SAME TIME, BELL STRESSED THAT HMG COULD NOT ENVISAGE A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION OF THE EXPLORATORY TALKS, AND TRANSITION TO A SUBSEQUENT PHASE, WITHOUT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

SOMETHING HAVING BEEN ACHIEVED ON DECOMMISSIONING. HE SAID THAT THIS POSITION WAS, IN ESSENCE, SHARED BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. BELL STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT THE EXPLORATORY TALKS WOULD NOT RUN OUT OF STEAM SOON BECAUSE OF SINN FEIN OBDURACY. HMG SINCERELY WANTED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE TALKS AND WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO MEET TO DISCUSS THE WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES.

4. RETURNING TO THE ISSUE OF FUNDRAISING, BELL SAID THAT THE BRITISH BOTTOM LINE WAS THAT SINN FEIN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS, TO CONTINUE TO BE INFLEXIBLE IN THE TALKS WHILE HAVING THE BAN ON FUNDRAISING LIFTED. DROPPING THE FUNDRAISING RESTRICTIONS WOULD HARDLY ENCOURAGE SINN FEIN TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE AT THE TABLE; QUITE THE REVERSE, IN FACT, WAS TO BE EXPECTED.

5. AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: FROM ALL THE EVIDENCE I HEAR, SINN FEIN HAS TAKEN NO STEPS SINCE ADAMS' LAST VISIT TO THE U.S. TOWARDS MEETING AT LEAST THE THIRD OF OUR CONDITIONS FOR FUNDRAISING (PROGRESS ON DEMILITARIZATION). I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT WE MAINTAIN OUR CURRENT BAN ON FUNDRAISING PENDING PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. END COMMENT.

CROWE

BT

#0363

NNNN

<MSGID> M1450896

Adm

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.
To: Darby, M. Brooke; Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Gardner, Anthony; Vershbow, Alexander R.; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor
Subject: Instructions on Gerry Adams Fundraising ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~
Date: Friday, January 06, 1995 5:26PM

Dee/Brooke: Please pass to Nancy:

Nancy, I incorporated your revisions into the draft cable on Gerry Adams' fundraising request. State is now getting DOJ/FBI clearances and will then send it over here as a formal cross-hatch with a COB Monday deadline for transmission. DOJ has accepted (though FBI has not yet cleared) the language you suggested for characterizing the state of play on procurement, but neither DOJ nor State is prepared to say categorically that the procurement condition has been met. But the emphasis of the message is on the need to see progress in disarmament. That means, I think, that if Sinn Fein takes a constructive approach on disarmament discussions with the British or otherwise takes steps that can be considered "concrete progress" toward disarmament, we should look at the fundraising issue again, again looking at both the conditions we've set: ending procurement and disarmament.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.24)
K8H 4/11/2023

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 191325Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6997

INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2602

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000289

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, EI, UK

SUBJECT: ADAMS ON FUND RAISING AND BILATERAL TALKS WITH HMG

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F(1.25)
KRM 4/11/2023

REF: BELFAST 0022

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. GERRY ADAMS DISCUSSED THE THIRD MEETING OF SINN FEIN WITH THE HMG AND THE GENERAL QUESTIONS OF HIS PERCEPTION OF THE BRITISH APPROACH TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND OF FUND RAISING WITH AMBASSADOR SMITH JANUARY 16. ADAMS SAID THE BASIC PROBLEM IS THAT THE BRITISH ARE USING THE ARMS ISSUE AS A RUSE TO KEEP SINN FEIN OUT OF INCLUSIVE ALL-PARTY TALKS. IF THIS CONTINUES AND SINN FEIN IS EXCLUDED FROM THE FRAMEWORK TALKS, GERRY ADAMS WILL BE DAMAGED, AND IN THE RESULTING HAVOC THERE WILL BE A REAL POSSIBILITY OF A SPLIT FROM TOP TO BOTTOM IN SINN FEIN/IRA.

3. ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS, ADAMS HAS TOLD THE TAOISEACH THAT "WE ARE PREPARED TO GO OVER IT, UNDER IT, AROUND IT TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO GET A FORMULA THAT WILL WORK." ADAMS RETURNED TO THE LATTER POINT SEVERAL TIMES, "WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD A WORKABLE FORMULA," HE EMPHASIZED. HOWEVER, HE ALSO REITERATED THE NEED FOR PARITY OF ESTEEM AND FOR SINN FEIN TO BE TREATED AS ANY OTHER POLITICAL PARTY. INSTEAD THE BRITISH CONTINUE TO TRY AND ISOLATE SINN FEIN BY EXCLUDING THEM FROM, FOR EXAMPLE, THE BELFAST CONFERENCE AND THE MEETING OF LOCAL COUNCILORS TO BE HELD IN LONDON. THE DISARMAMENT ISSUE IS BEING USED BY THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

UNIONISTS TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH, WHO ARE NOW USING IT TO STALL THE PEACE PROCESS. DISARMAMENT IS BEING USED THE WAY "PERMANENT" WAS EARLIER. JUST AS MAJOR EVENTUALLY WALKED AWAY FROM "PERMANENT", IT IS EXPECTED THAT EVENTUALLY HE WILL BACK AWAY FROM DISARMAMENT. ADAMS STRESSED AGAIN THAT THIS IS ONLY A STALLING TACTIC.

4. ACCORDING TO ADAMS, SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE MEETING BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND THE NIO JANUARY 16. SINN FEIN TABLED A PAPER WHICH EXPLICITLY RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DISARMAMENT WAS A PRECONDITION TO PARTICIPATION BY SINN FEIN IN THE FRAME WORKS TALKS. ACCORDING TO ADAMS, "THE BRITISH WERE MOVED TO SAY THAT DECOMMISSIONING WAS NOT A PRECONDITION." THIS REPRESENTS A COMPROMISE BY THE BRITISH. AT THE SAME TIME SINN FEIN INTIMATED THAT IT MAY BE ABLE TO EXERT INFLUENCE OVER THE IRA.

5. (PARENTHETICALLY, THE NEWLY NAMED SECOND SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HEAD OF THE ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION SEAN O'HUIGINN CONFIRMED THAT THE JANUARY 16 MEETING WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND THAT PERCEPTIBLE, IF MODEST, PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. THE READ-OUTS HE RECEIVED FROM SINN FEIN AND THE NIO BASICALLY TRACKED IN THIS REGARD WITH SINN FEIN FOCUSING ON THE CAUTIOUS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY THE BRITISH THAT DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS WAS NOT A PRECONDITION TO PARTICIPATION IN ALL PARTY TALKS, WHILE THE BRITISH FOCUSED ON SINN FEIN REFERENCES TO POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OVER THE IRA. HOWEVER, SINN FEIN SAID THAT THE BRITISH HAD ARTIFICIALLY DRAWN OUT THE MEETING, AND THE BRITISH COMPLAINED THAT SINN FEIN SIMPLY PARROTED ITS STANDARD LINES IN SPITE OF THE SLIGHT SOFTENING. O'HUIGINN CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS A SCORELESS DRAW.)

6. ON THE ISSUE OF FUND RAISING IN THE U.S. BY GERRY ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES, ADAMS REITERATED THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR THE IRA TO SEEK FUNDS FOR ADDITIONAL ARMS PURCHASES. THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES ALREADY, PLUS THEY HAVE THEIR OWN PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES. BEYOND THAT THERE ARE ARMS ALL OVER THE PLACE, NOT JUST WITH THE IRA.

7. ADAMS BELIEVES THAT, AS THE BRITISH HAVE BACKED AWAY ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING AS A PRECONDITION FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS, DECOMMISSIONING SHOULD NOT BE MADE A PRECONDITION AFFECTING SINN FEIN'S ABILITY TO RAISE FUNDS IN THE U.S. HE RECOGNIZES, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S.

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

DEPENDS ON THE BRITISH IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD, WHICH IS WHY WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THE BRITISH THWART ADAMS' FUND RAISING EFFORTS. NONETHELESS, HE IS SURPRISED THAT HIS LITTLE PARTY IS SO IMPORTANT TO THE WORLD POWERS.

8. ADAMS STRESSED AGAIN THAT SINN FEIN/IRA WERE ABLE TO BROKER A TOTAL CESSATION OF VIOLENCE BECAUSE THEY WERE TOLD THAT THIS WOULD ALLOW THEM INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THAT WAS THE DEAL THAT WAS STRUCK. NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS. NOW SINN FEIN WANTS WHAT THEY WERE PROMISED, I.E., TO BE TREATED WITH "PARITY OF ESTEEM" AND AS ANY OTHER LEGITIMATE, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PARTY. IN RESPONSE TO THE BRITISH ARGUMENT THAT THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN TALKS IF SINN FEIN IS PRESENT, ADAMS ARGUES THAT IT IS NOT IMPORTANT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 000289

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, EI, UK
SUBJECT: ADAMS ON FUND RAISING AND BILATERAL TALKS WITH HMG

WHETHER THE UNIONISTS ARE THERE. ONLY WHAT THE BRITISH HAVE TO SAY IS IMPORTANT. SMITH

BT
#0289

NNNN
<MSGID> M1466869

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, SODERBERG, NSC, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS:~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:201543Z JAN 95

FMI: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7003

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2609

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 000310

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, UK, EI
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER BRUTON ON SINN FEIN FUND RAISING

REF: DUBLIN 121

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SEAN DONLON, THE NEWLY APPOINTED SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE TAOISEACH AND PROGRAM MANAGER COORDINATOR, DISCUSSED THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON FUND RAISING IN THE U.S. BY SINN FEIN, AND SPECIFICALLY GERRY ADAMS, WITH US JANUARY 20. DONLON NOTED THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO CLARIFY HIS VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT DURING THE AMBASSADOR'S INITIAL CALL ON HIM JANUARY 10. SINCE THEN HE HAS REFLECTED ON THE ISSUE AND DISCUSSED IT WITH THE CABINET SUB-COMMITTEE ON NORTHERN IRELAND.

3. DONLON SAID THAT ANY RESERVATIONS BRUTON MAY HAVE HAD PHILOSOPHICALLY OVER SINN FEIN FUND RAISING IN THE U.S. HAVE BEEN LIFTED. (FINE GAEL HAS NEVER BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN ITS FUND RAISING EFFORTS OUTSIDE IRELAND AND HAS THUS NOT GENERALLY SUPPORTED FOREIGN FUND RAISING BY ANY PARTY.) HE STRESSED THAT THE DECISION ON ALLOWING FUND RAISING BY ADAMS IS OBVIOUSLY ONE FOR THE U.S. TO MAKE AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE SO PRESUMPTUOUS AS TO ADVISE US ON WHAT WE SHOULD DO.

4. DONLON FURTHER NOTED THAT SINN FEIN AND GERRY ADAMS CAN AND DO RAISE FUNDS IN "OUR JURISDICTION". THUS IT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT AND INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO OPPOSE THEIR FUND RAISING ELSEWHERE.
SANDBERG

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F(1.26)
KBH 4/11/2023

*Not a
ringing
endorsement,
but a
shift.*

cc ~~in~~
Nancy S.
194

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: NSC, VERSHBOW

PREC: PRIORITY CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 191622Z JAN 95

1/20

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3503

to R
fyi. Some
progress

RUEHDLAMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 2504

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000917

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: BRITISH READOUT ON THIRD ROUND OF TALKS WITH SINN FEIN

us

REFS: (A) 94 LONDON 19978, (B) STATE 5614, (C) LONDON 842

SUMMARY

1. ~~(C)~~ QUENTIN THOMAS, HMG'S CHIEF NEGOTIATOR IN ITS "EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" WITH SINN FEIN, TOLD US THAT THE JANUARY 16 THIRD SESSION WAS MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN THE SECOND, WITH SINN FEIN OFFERING TO USE ITS "INFLUENCE" WITH THE IRA "IN A POSITIVE WAY," WHILE STILL REJECTING THE NEED FOR EARLY DECOMMISSIONING OF IRA ARMS. HMG DANGLED THE POSSIBILITY OF MINISTERIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE TALKS BY EASTER IF PROGRESS WERE MADE BEFORE THEN, WHILE SINN FEIN ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT ANY ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE TO EITHER SIDE COULD BE ADDRESSED.

2. ~~(C)~~ THOMAS SAID THE BRITISH STRATEGY WAS TO ENGAGE SINN FEIN AS WIDELY AND FULLY AS POSSIBLE AND ROUTINIZE THE DIALOGUE. IT WANTED TO GET THROUGH THE EXPLORATORY PHASE AND INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT NEEDED SOME COMBINATION OF WORDS AND DEEDS ON WEAPONS TO MAKE THIS FEASIBLE. SINN FEIN, ON THE OTHER HAND, SEEMED LESS INTERESTED IN SERIOUS DISCUSSION THAN IN SCORING POINTS. THOMAS HOPED THIS REFLECTED A TACTICAL EFFORT TO SQUEEZE AS MANY CONCESSIONS OUT OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE AS POSSIBLE, RATHER THAN A STRATEGIC INTENTION TO PREPARE FOR A RETURN TO VIOLENCE. END SUMMARY.

SKIRMISH ON BRIEFINGS

3. (LOU) AS HE HAD DONE AFTER THE SECOND ROUND OF THE HMG/SINN FEIN EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE (REF A), NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) DEPUTY SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.27)
KBH 4/11/2023

INVITED US JANUARY 18 TO A DEBRIEF ON THE THIRD ROUND, HELD IN BELFAST JANUARY 16.

4. ~~JO~~ THOMAS SAID THE FIRST ISSUE TO ARISE IN THE MEETING HAD BEEN SINN FEIN CHIEF NEGOTIATOR MARTIN MCGUINNESS' COMPLAINT THAT THE NIO HAD BRIEFED THE USG ON THE TALKS (A CLEAR BUT IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO REF B TALKING POINT NOTING SINN FEIN'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A BRITISH PAPER ON DEMILITARIZATION). IN RESPONSE, THOMAS HAD SIMPLY REMINDED MCGUINNESS THAT IN THE FIRST ROUND, HMG HAD PROPOSED CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE TALKS, WHILE SINN FEIN INSISTED ON TRANSPARENCY.

EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS

5. (LOU) AS IN THE FIRST TWO ROUNDS, THOMAS SAID, THE MEETING REVOLVED AROUND AN EXCHANGE OF POSITION PAPERS. THE BRITISH PAPER (FAXED TO EUR/UBI) CITED AREAS OF COMMON GROUND: THE DESIRABILITY OF INCLUSIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH NO PREDETERMINED OUTCOME, AND THE NEED TO (IN JOHN HUME'S PHRASE) "TAKE THE GUN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS." BUT IT REFUTED SINN FEIN'S CHARGE THAT HMG WAS TRYING TO STALL OR ERECT BARRIERS TO PROGRESS, AND THE REPUBLICAN CLAIM THAT BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY WAS "SELF-EVIDENTLY" THE CAUSE OF INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT.

6. (LOU) NOTING THAT SINN FEIN'S DOCUMENT IN ROUND TWO SUGGESTED THAT FAILURE TO REACH AN "ACCEPTABLE" POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT IN CONFLICT, THE BRITISH PAPER ASKED: "ACCEPTABLE TO WHOM?" DID SINN FEIN INSIST ON REMOVING NORTHERN IRELAND FROM THE UK "REGARDLESS OF THE WISHES OF A MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE?" WOULD IT ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF A REFERENDUM ON PROPOSALS DEVELOPED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS?

7. (LOU) THE DOCUMENT DEVOTED ONLY TWO PARAGRAPHS OUT OF 16 TO THE ARMS ISSUE. IT ACCEPTED THAT "SINN FEIN IS AN ORGANIZATION DISTINCT FROM THE IRA," BUT ASKED WHETHER SINN FEIN STILL ACCEPTED THE LEGITIMACY OF THE IRA'S ARMED STRUGGLE. IT DENIED THAT CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE DEPENDED ON ARMS DECOMMISSIONING, BUT REITERATED THAT "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS" MUST BE MADE DURING THE COURSE OF THE DIALOGUE.

8. (U) THE SINN FEIN DOCUMENT:

- INSISTED THAT "THE TALKS PROCESS CAN AND SHOULD NOW MOVE INTO ALL PARTY PEACE TALKS," AND THAT HMG HAD "A POLITICAL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO MOVE US ALL INTO THE NEXT PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS;"
- ASSERTED THAT A "LASTING SETTLEMENT BASED ON DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES ... REQUIRES THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT ENDS ITS INVOLVEMENT IN IRISH AFFAIRS";

- WELCOMED THE ENDING OF DAYLIGHT ARMY PATROLS IN BELFAST, BUT COMPLAINED THAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH ARMAGH HAD INCREASED;
- CONFIRMED (AS NOTED REF C) THAT SINN FEIN WAS "TOTALLY COMMITTED TO BRINGING ABOUT THE COMPLETE AND PERMANENT REMOVAL OF ALL GUNS FROM IRISH POLITICS ... IN THE WORD (SIC) OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 'THE DECOMMISSIONING' OF ALL WEAPONS OF WAR";
- SAID (IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARMS ISSUE) THAT SINN FEIN "WISH TO USE OUR INFLUENCE ON ALL MATTERS, IN A POSITIVE WAY AND WITH THE AIM OF ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS," BUT WITH THE CAVEAT THAT "HOW WE USE OUR INFLUENCE AND HOW MUCH INFLUENCE WE HAVE IS A MATTER OF JUDGMENT FOR US"; AND
- ASKED WHETHER DECOMMISSIONING OF IRA WEAPONS WAS "A PRECONDITION TO SINN FEIN'S INVOLVEMENT IN ALL PARTY NEGOTIATIONS." AND WHETHER FAILURE TO RESOLVE IT WOULD MEAN THAT "THE PEACE PROCESS IS AT AN END."

is it?

9. ~~10~~ IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT, THOMAS SAID, HE HAD GIVEN MCGUINNESS A PROPOSED "WORK PLAN" FOR THE NEXT FIVE ROUNDS OF TALKS. THE FIRST OF THESE SESSIONS WOULD BE DEVOTED TO EXPLORING SINN FEIN'S IDEAS ON THE FORMAT OF ALL-PARTY TALKS, ANOTHER WOULD ADDRESS PRISONER CONCERNS, AND "PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE" (INCLUDING ARMS DECOMMISSIONING) WOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED UNTIL THE FOURTH ROUND (I.E. THE SEVENTH OVERALL). THOMAS SAID THE AGENDA'S STRUCTURE WAS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE TALKS MORE EFFICIENT, REASSURE SINN FEIN THAT THE ARMS ISSUE WAS NOT A PRECONDITION, AND "MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR SINN FEIN TO WALK AWAY."

ORAL DISCUSSIONS

10. ~~11~~ IN DISCUSSING THE DOCUMENTS, THOMAS SAID, HE HAD EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT SINN FEIN'S UNDERTAKING TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE IRA IN A POSITIVE WAY, ESPECIALLY AS HMG BELIEVED THAT INFLUENCE TO BE GREATER THAN MCGUINNESS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED. THOMAS REMINDED MCGUINNESS THAT THE IRA CEASEFIRE FOLLOWED CLOSE ON SINN FEIN PRESIDENT ADAMS' "APPEAL" TO IT, AND THAT IN THE 1993 SECRET CONTACTS SINN FEIN CLAIMED IT HAD "SOUGHT AND OBTAINED" A TWO-WEEK IRA CEASEFIRE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT PARTIES OTHER THAN SINN FEIN ("LIKE THE ALLIANCE PARTY, WHICH HAS NO KNOWN PARAMILITARY WING") MIGHT ALSO WISH TO BRING THEIR INFLUENCE TO BEAR, SO THERE WAS NOTHING ODD ABOUT HMG'S REQUEST TO SINN FEIN TO DO SO.

11. ~~12~~ WHEN MCGUINNESS AGAIN COMPLAINED ABOUT BEING

RESTRICTED TO DISCUSSIONS WITH CIVIL SERVANTS, THOMAS RECOUNTED, HE HAD READ OUT A NOTE REVEALING THAT THE PREVIOUS BAN ON MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN LOCAL COUNCILLORS HAD BEEN LIFTED. MINISTERS ALSO WANTED TO JOIN THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN, BUT IN DECIDING WHEN TO DO SO WERE LIKELY TO CONSIDER WHETHER SINN FEIN ACCEPTED THAT "ALL NECESSARY ISSUES" (I.E. INCLUDING ARMS) WOULD BE ADDRESSED, AND WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE TOWARD "SERIOUS EXPLORATION" (NOT NECESSARILY RESOLUTION) ACROSS THE RANGE OF ISSUES. IF SOME PROGRESS WERE MADE IN TALKS WITH OFFICIALS, IT WAS LIKELY THAT MINISTERS WOULD BE ENGAGED BY EASTER.

12. ~~10~~ MCGUINNESS ASKED WHETHER HMG'S DECISION TO PUBLISH ITS PROPOSALS ON INTERNAL DEVOLUTION SEPARATELY FROM THE ANGLO-IRISH JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT MEANT THAT IT WAS "WALKING AWAY" FROM THE THREE-STRAND PROCESS. RATHER THE REVERSE, THOMAS EXPLAINED: THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT COULD NOT ADDRESS STRAND ONE, SINCE DUBLIN WAS NOT A PARTY TO THOSE TALKS, AND SIMULTANEOUS PUBLICATION WAS MEANT TO REINFORCE THE LINKS AMONG THE STRANDS.

13. ~~10~~ THOMAS SAID SINN FEIN HAD RAISED ORALLY A NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS:

- PRIME MINISTER MAJOR'S MEETING WITH NORTHERN IRELAND'S MAYORS AND COUNCIL LEADERS, NONE OF WHOM WAS SINN FEIN (THOMAS DENIED THIS WAS DESIGNED TO EXCLUDE SINN FEIN, SINCE ALLIANCE HAD THE SAME PROBLEM);
- HMG'S REFUSAL TO FUND NORTHERN IRELAND'S ONLY IRISH-LANGUAGE SECONDARY SCHOOL (WE UNDERSTAND THIS IS LIKELY, THOUGH THE SCHOOL DOES NOT MEET NORMAL CRITERIA);
- CURTAILMENT OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN AN IRA PRISONER IN ENGLAND AND HIS WIFE WHEN THEY INSISTED ON SPEAKING IRISH;
- DELAYS IN TRANSFER OF IRA PRISONERS FROM ENGLAND TO NORTHERN IRELAND;
- SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF AT LEAST ONE IRA PRISONER IN ENGLAND; AND
- POLICE SEARCH OF A HOUSE IN BELFAST AFTER A MAN WAS SEEN ENTERING WITH A RIFLE (IT TURNED OUT TO BE LICENSED).

14. ~~10~~ IN TURN, THOMAS SAID, HE HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF IRA PUNISHMENT BEATINGS. MCGUINNESS WOULD NOT AGREE TO ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE BEATINGS, BUT

SAID ADAMS AND OTHERS HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR DISAPPROVAL OF THE PRACTICE. SINN FEIN ALSO DECLINED AGAIN TO AGREE TO A JOINT PRESS RELEASE, BUT OFFERED NO OBJECTION TO THE BRITISH DRAFT, WHICH STRESSED AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT NO ISSUES CONSIDERED IMPORTANT BY EITHER SIDE WOULD BE EXCLUDED.

15. ~~✓~~ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE WORK PLAN, THOMAS SAID, HE HAD PROPOSED STEPPING UP THE FREQUENCY OF THE MEETINGS TO ONE PER WEEK. MCGUINNESS DID NOT ADDRESS THE OVERALL FREQUENCY QUESTION, BUT SAID THE EARLIEST DATE FOR THE NEXT SESSION WOULD BE FEBRUARY 1, TO WHICH THOMAS AGREED. THOMAS NOTED IRONICALLY THAT SINN FEIN AS AGAIN SLOWING THE PACE, WHILE CONTINUING TO ACCUSE HMG OF FOOT-DRAGGING.

ATMOSPHERE AND STRATEGY

16. ~~✓~~ THOMAS SAID THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE THIRD ROUND HAD BEEN MUCH LIGHTER AND MORE RELAXED THAN IN ROUND TWO. HE SENSED -- AND HOPED -- THAT THE DIALOGUE WAS BECOMING "ROUTINIZED." HMG WANTED TO LOCK SINN FEIN INTO LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY DEMONSTRATING THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE THROUGH DIALOGUE ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO ITS SUPPORTERS. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO WANTED TO MOVE QUICKLY THROUGH THE EXPLORATORY AND MINISTERIAL DIALOGUES INTO RENEWED ALL-PARTY TALKS, BUT NEEDED SOME PROGRESS ON ARMS IN ORDER TO DO SO. THIS COULD CONSIST OF ANY ONE OF A NUMBER OF COMBINATIONS OF WORDS AND DEEDS.

17. ~~✓~~ THOMAS STRESSED THAT HMG WAS NOT TRYING TO PUSH THE REPUBLICANS INTO A CORNER ON ARMS; IN FACT, BY USING THE DELIBERATELY VAGUE FORMULATION OF "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS," IT WAS TRYING TO LET THEM OFF THE HOOK. SINN FEIN (AND SOME IN THE IRISH GOVERNMENT) SEEMED TO ASSUME THAT HMG COULD "DELIVER" THE UNIONISTS REGARDLESS OF WHAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA DID; THIS WAS MANIFESTLY NOT THE CASE. THE UNIONISTS HAD NO VETO ON SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN AN INCLUSIVE DIALOGUE, BUT THEY DID HAVE A VETO ON THEIR OWN PARTICIPATION; AND WITHOUT THEM, THERE COULD BE NO GENUINELY INCLUSIVE TALKS.

18. ~~✓~~ AS FOR SINN FEIN, THOMAS SAID, IT HAD BEGUN TO ADDRESS A WIDER RANGE OF ISSUES, BUT STILL SEEMED MORE INTERESTED IN SCORING PROPAGANDA POINTS THAN IN TALKING SERIOUSLY. MCGUINNESS BRIEFED THE PRESS ON SINN FEIN'S COMPLAINTS BEFORE EACH SESSION, REPEATED THEM IN THE MEETING, AND REPEATED THEM AGAIN TO THE PRESS AFTERWARD AS IF THE BRITISH HAD SAID NOTHING IN RESPONSE. HE INSISTED IN EACH MEETING THAT "THE WHOLE WORLD" (PARTICULARLY DUBLIN AND WASHINGTON) SUPPORTED SINN FEIN'S POSITIONS. IN ROUND THREE, THOMAS HAD REBUTTED THIS BY QUOTING PRIME MINISTER BRUTON'S STATEMENT IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOWNING STREET THAT "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS" ON ARMS DECOMMISSIONING HAD TO BE MADE "IN THE PRESENT PHASE."

19. ~~let~~ HOWEVER, THOMAS CONCLUDED, HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT ADAMS AND THE GROUP AROUND HIM WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND THAT MOST OF THEIR HARDLINE RHETORIC WAS INTENDED FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION. THEY WERE, UNDERSTANDABLY, TRYING TO "GET THE BEST PRICE THEY CAN" FOR THE IRA CEASEFIRE, WRESTING MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS WHILE GIVING LITTLE AWAY AND TRYING TO KEEP THE MORAL HIGH GROUND. IN THE END, HE HOPED, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR FAR LESS THAN THEIR OFFICIAL DEMANDS -- IF THEY COULD GET ENOUGH OF THE IRA TO GO ALONG. THEY ALMOST CERTAINLY HAD CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A RETURN TO VIOLENCE, BUT THIS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE THEIR PREFERRED OPTION. CROWE

FROM:
SITREPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

UK were cast as plead.

but

"subit progress"

of most often —

or else no un...

FBI 2/93

Assessment of targets.

i in procurement cuttimes. 140 investigations
are continuing procurement efforts, discussing costs.
Cheap to buy transported weapons, night vision equipment

fugitive investigations - major fugitives - pt of contact.

no weapons procurement in U.S.
tally to news

maintaining operational capability.

storing weapons in U.S.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER DOHSE FUERTH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 171806Z FEB 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4892
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2589
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 002639

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.29)
KBH 4/11/2023

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PTER UK EI
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF'S MEETING WITH RON LYNE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

THE PEACE PROCESS

2. PRIME MINISTER MAJOR'S AIDE, ROD LYNE, TOLD VISITING UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF FEB. 17 THAT HMG WAS IN THE MIDST OF A MOST DIFFICULT PHASE OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. THERE WAS ANGER IN THE UNIONIST CAMP AND AMONG TORY SUPPORTERS OVER THE DRAFT JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT (JFD). AT THE SAME TIME, SINN FEIN/IRA HAD OFFERED NO REAL MOVEMENT ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF ARMS/EXPLOSIVES DECOMMISSIONING. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF CABINET MEMBERS WHO BELIEVED THE JFD WAS "TOO GREEN" AND WOULD LEAD TO A CLEAVAGE WITH THE UNIONISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. THE CABINET SESSIONS ON FEB. 15 AND 16 HAD BEEN DIFFICULT -- A POINT FOREIGN SECRETARY HURD MADE TO THE AMBASSADOR ON FEB. 16 (REF A).

3. DESPITE PRONOUNCED DIFFERENCES AMONG MINISTERS, HMG HAD DECIDED TO AUTHORIZE MAYHEW TO PROCEED WITH NEGOTIATIONS; HE WOULD MEET DICK SPRING ON SATURDAY, FEB. 18. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE JFD WOULD BE REACHED AT THIS MEETING. THE CABINET WOULD THEN MEET AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK TO GIVE FINAL APPROVAL TO THE DOCUMENT. IT WAS POSSIBLE THE JFD WOULD BE PUBLISHED AS EARLY AS WEDNESDAY, FEB. 22. LYNE STRESSED THAT HMG WANTED TO MOVE QUICKLY AS THE ATMOSPHERE WAS BEING INCREASINGLY POISONED BY UNIONIST CHARGES OF A

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

SELLOUT -- ASSERTIONS WHICH THOUGH INCORRECT WERE FINDING RESONANCE AMONG SOME TORIES.

4. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES, LYNE THOUGHT THAT, ON BALANCE, THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD REMAIN ON TRACK THOUGH THE UNIONISTS MIGHT NOT COME TO THE TABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE JFD. AN ACTUAL AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, MIGHT TAKE YEARS.

THE UNIONISTS

5. LYNE SAID THEY HAD BEEN POORLY HANDLED BY DUBLIN HIGH HAD REINFORCED THEIR FEARS VIA A SERIES OF LEAKS IN RECENT MONTHS. IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR TO HMG WHERE THE "TIMES" LEAK HAD ORIGINATED. IN ANY CASE, IT WAS UUP MP DAVID TRIMBLE AND HIS ALLY DAVID BURNSIDE WHO WERE DRIVING THE UNIONIST REACTION. TRIMBLE WAS SEEKING TO CREATE A UNIONIST FRONT AND REPLACE MOLYNEAUX AS UUP LEADER. HE WAS PREPARED TO TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT AND, ALONG WITH UUP MPS JOHN TAYLOR AND WILLIAM ROSS (NOMINALLY A MOLYNEAUX SUPPORTER BUT ANXIOUS TO GUARD HIS FLANK IN THE STRUGGLE TO SUCCEED THE UUP LEADER) WAS "MADLY" BRIEFING TORY BACKBENCHERS AND MINISTERS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S ABANDONMENT OF UNIONIST PRINCIPLES. THEY WERE WRONGLY CLAIMING THAT THE JFD WAS A SLIPPERY SLOPE TO A UNITED IRELAND. THE SCENE HAD BEEN SET FOR A NASTY UNIONIST REACTION TO THE JFD THOUGH LYNE DID NOT EXPECT THE STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES WHICH ACCOMPANIED SUNNINGDALE AND THE 1985 ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT. THERE WAS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT THE HARDLINE UNIONISTS WOULD SHORTLY INTRODUCE THEIR OWN PAPER TO PRE-EMPT LONDON AND DUBLIN.

SINN FEIN

6. SINN FEIN/IRA (LYNE POINTEDLY NOTED THAT SEVERAL OF THE SINN FEIN NEGOTIATORS WERE KNOWN IRA MEMBERS) WAS STILL ENGAGED IN A MATING DANCE WITH HMG IN THEIR BILATERAL TALKS. THEY WERE PRESSURING THE BRITISH TO ALLOW THEM TO UPGRADE THE TALKS TO MINISTERIAL LEVEL EVEN WHILE THEY REFUSED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF ARMS

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

DECOMMISSIONING. THE BRITISH HAD MADE CLEAR THAT SINN FEIN MUST ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE THAT ARMS MUST BE DEALT WITH AND ENGAGE IN A SERIOUS DISCUSSION ABOUT HOW THEY WOULD DECOMMISSION. HMG COULD NOT MOVE TO A MINISTERIAL LEVEL IF, AS IS NOW THE CASE, SINN FEIN REFUSED EVEN TO ENGAGE ON THIS ISSUE. THE BRITISH RECOGNIZED THAT ADAMS WAS UNDER SOME PRESSURE FROM THE IRA BUT THEY COULD NOT ALLOW SINN FEIN TO LEVER BRITAIN WITH THIS ARGUMENT AT EVERY STEP IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

7. IN CONCLUSION, LYNE REITERATED THAT THE NEXT DAYS WOULD BE VERY ROCKY. IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING THAT A DECISION BY THE U.S. TO CHANGE ITS STANCE ON FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS NOW WOULD BE A "VERY BAD MISTAKE."

8. UNDR SECRETARY TARNOFF DID NOT CLEAR ON THIS CABLE. DEAL

BT
#2639

NNNN
<MSGID> M1523626

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INR

Northern Ireland: Peace Process Enters Crucial Phase

Efforts to make the peace process irreversible are reaching a critical point. Exploratory talks with Sinn Fein have been blocked by its refusal to make significant moves on decommissioning weapons; the Unionists have threatened to bring down Prime Minister Major's government if it proposes north-south bodies with executive power. Whether the obduracy on both sides is tactical or represents a real threat to peace should be known soon.

No progress on arms

After three rounds of talks with Sinn Fein and four with political representatives of the Loyalist paramilitaries, Britain has made scant progress on decommissioning arms. Sinn Fein has abandoned the pretense that it has no influence on the IRA but continues to insist the subject can be considered only in the context of an overall settlement. The Loyalists have maintained much the same position, though — as in the case of the cease-fire — they are unlikely to prevent progress if the Republicans are prepared to move ahead.

The British have told us their position that "substantial progress" on arms must be made before inviting Sinn Fein to all-party political talks was meant to provide maximum flexibility. London is not demanding the surrender of all arms but does insist the paramilitaries make some gestures. If not, they say, subsequent talks will be useless, since the Unionists will boycott them.

Publicly and privately, Gerry Adams has bitterly criticized the British over this issue, alleging it is merely a British delaying tactic and that there is no precedent in Irish history for such a move. Instead, he has pressed for release of "political prisoners," participation of British ministers in talks with Sinn Fein, "demilitarization" of Northern Ireland (while scoffing at steps already taken to reduce British patrols), and permission to raise funds in the United States. If Sinn Fein does not receive "parity of esteem" with other Northern Irish parties, Adams predicts a crisis in the peace process by February 15.

Adams, a tough, shrewd negotiator, could well be taking this position for tactical reasons. North-

ern Ireland Secretary Mayhew seems to believe the issue can be resolved and is willing to make concessions in other areas, though others in the British government are less sanguine.

Talks move forward

Meanwhile the British and Irish governments have almost completed their discussions on the "framework document" they intend to present to the Northern Irish parties in renewed political talks. Mayhew and Irish Foreign Minister Spring made further progress in a January 26 meeting and still hope to have a document ready for publication in late February — possibly following a summit meeting between Major and Prime Minister Bruton.

The key outstanding items remain changes in the Irish constitution and in cross-border administrative bodies intended to improve north-south links by handling matters of common interest: at least at first, relatively non-controversial ones like trade and tourism.

Now that the Unionists' fears over the status of Northern Ireland have been allayed by assurances that any change would be subject to a referendum in the North, they have directed their anxieties toward the cross-border bodies. They insist that those entities not have executive power — that is, that any decisions taken be subject to approval by whatever local government is established in Northern Ireland.

The Unionists went so far as to threaten to defeat the Major government on a vote on EU fishing policy over this issue, winning an assurance that fisheries would not be included in any body with

INR

executive powers. Major has also pledged that the framework document would not give Dublin "joint authority over the affairs of Northern Ireland."

Though the survival of Major's cabinet hangs by a thread, Unionist threats are not entirely credible. If they forced an immediate election, in which – as polls now indicate – Labor would win a large majority, the Unionists' influence as holders of the balance of power in parliament would end. More-

over, a Labor government is more likely to be sympathetic to the Nationalists than is Major's.

The seriousness of threats to the peace process will be better measured after publication of the framework document – possibly in mid-February. Though criticism from all sides can be expected – and would be a sign of the document's impartiality – the parties' willingness then to continue with the process will indicate whether peace can last.

(CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)

~~SECRET~~

Subject: Provisional Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams Demurs on
Renunciation of Violence and Acceptance of Downing Street

REF: STATE 022569

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.32)

KBH 4/11/2023

1. ~~S~~ - Entire Text.

2. SUMMARY: The Consul General and Vice Consul met with Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) President Gerry Adams on January 28. Adams stated that the PSF viewed the Downing Street Declaration as but a "first step" in a peace process, and that it was entirely reasonable to ask for "clarification" from London and Dublin. The PSF, Adams observed, had not rejected Downing Street, but it had not accepted it either. He said that he could not accept the USG's formulation on renouncing violence and committing to end the conflict on the basis of the Downing Street Declaration, for this action would destroy his credibility in republican circles and effectively end his career. Adams argued that the context and problems of Northern Ireland were much too broad to be contained in the formula the USG was asking him to adopt. Adams would not be pinned down on the question of renouncing Provisional IRA violence, restricting himself to asserting that PIRA violence had to be understood in the context of HMG's "violence," as exemplified by the Army and the RUC. Adams opined that the USG was losing an opportunity for peace if it did not grant him a waiver; the political risk for the

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

JAN 28 '94 09:40PM AMCONSULBELFAST

P.2

USG, he averred, was far less than the risks he ran daily in Northern Ireland. Finally, Adams said that the USG policy of not engaging elected PSF officials in substantive talks was ill-conceived and counter-productive. END SUMMARY.

3. The Consul General and Vice Consul met with PSF president Gerry Adams on the afternoon of January 28, 1994. Adams was at first somewhat disconcerted that the press had had such a good handle on the nature and substance of the meeting. He had not involved the press at all in previous meetings on visa matters with USG officials, whether in Dublin or Belfast. He wondered whether he was being "set up" for a quick refusal on the waiver. The CG explained that Adams was not being manipulated; the USG had to have press guidance in place, and if this particular guidance was somewhat specific in nature, it was not out of malice or forejudgment. Adams accepted this and the meeting proceeded without acrimony or recrimination.

4. The CG explained that this meeting was at USG request, and that it pertained entirely to Adams' visa application. He noted that the consulate would report Adams' views to Washington as they were expressed to us, and that Washington would render a final decision on the waiver. The CG then asked for (and later received) a contact number for Adams, explaining that when the Department made a decision it might well ask the CG to inform Adams. The CG also noted that the Department of course reserved the right to make its announcement in the manner that it saw fit, so it was at least possible that Adams might

hear of the decision via the media instead of the consulate. In any case, the CG said, the consulate did not intend to brief the press on any aspect of the meeting, or even the fact of the meeting; we would wait for Washington guidance.

5. The CG opened the more substantive consular discussion by noting that the decision to seek a waiver would be made at a very high level in the USG and that we were interested in his views on the renouncement of violence and the PSF stance toward the Downing Street Declaration. The CG then followed refitel's talking points in bringing to bear USG interest in Adams' views on the peace process. The CG read the statement that we were interested in hearing, and gave Adams a copy on plain bond paper.

6. Adams began by saying that he personally wanted an end to violence. He stated that PSF had been involved in the peace process for at least the last eight years. He said this had led to a number of policy and discussion documents. Under his leadership, PSF had moved toward wanting a negotiated settlement, which was the PSF function as a political party. Adams opined that it was possible to argue that PSF was the only political party with a peace strategy. He said that it was a matter of public record that his party wanted an end to the violence and a demilitarisation of the North of Ireland, (the latter phrase Adams attributed to Albert Reynolds). The PSF had engaged in a number of initiatives to engage a wide variety of the community, with the British government, and with the church leaders. Adams said that

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

they had even had secret meetings with unionist but these had not come to light and might never do so. But the Hume-Adams Dialogue was the most significant.

7. Adams said that he and SDLP leader John Hume had developed the broad concepts that could create an agreement that would accommodate the people of all of Ireland. It was then put to London and Dublin, who had been briefed on the Hume-Adams dialogue all along. The two governments then produced a reply, which was the Downing Street Declaration. The CG interjected that the agreement came about not only because of the Hume-Adams dialogue but was also an answer to the increasing paramilitary violence. Adams conceded this but said the Hume-Adams dialogue was at the very least the context for the Declaration. Adams added that the PSF viewed the declaration as but a "first step"; he claimed that even the British government when pressed would see it so. The PSF wanted to embrace the Declaration and move on. They wanted to know what the second step was and what the mechanism would be to take the process forward and put into action the principles in the Declaration. PSF wanted to see the conflict ended. Matters were at a critical stage dating from December 15th or before. The PSF, Adams averred, was committed to peace and wanted to continue to develop unarmed strategies to replace armed ones.

8. The CG, noting very carefully that he did not intend to enter into a detailed discussion on this matter, or much less pretend to speak for HMG, observed that, to a layman on these matters, section four of the

declaration seemed to have quite specific mechanisms. Adams allowed that this was so, but still stated that the PSF needed to know what "further steps" the declaration envisioned. Currently, Adams complained, HMG was stubbornly refusing to clarify matters and instead threatening to "throw down the gauntlet." This was hardly helpful to PSF's desire for peace.

9. Adams recognized that various HMG officials had made it clear that London had no strategic or selfish interests in Northern Ireland. HMG should now move, with Dublin, to ensure that this "no self-interest" clause was developed into a concerted effort to win "the consent of a greater number of people on the island." In this the PSF was willing to cooperate.

10. Adams said that the PSF had not rejected the Downing Street Declaration. Nevertheless, even if it had, it would not mean that the PSF therefore advocated violence. One did not follow from the other. The CG said that the USG had no quarrel with this logic; what it did find disturbing, however, was Adams' failure to renounce violence as a legitimate political weapon. Adams replied that Dr. John Alderdice (head of the Alliance party) viewed the presence and activities of the British Army in NI as legitimate; this was his opinion but Adams did not share it. Why should he be punished with a visa denial for not sharing with Alderdice what was and was not the legitimate use of force, Adams asked? The CG turned the topic back to the paper he had handed Adams, noting that a philosophical discussion on the legitimacy

JAN 28 '94 09:51PM AMCONSULBELFAST

P.4

of force in any society was an interesting topic, but that meanwhile, the USG remained interested in hearing whether he found the statement that was handed to him acceptable.

11. Adams replied that it was wrong to ask him to renounce something he did not advocate. Further, he said he did not speak for the IRA. After all, Adams claimed, the PSF and the PIRA were two separate organizations. Adams asserted that making such a statement would not help him in any way. Were he to make such a public statement, he might indeed be able to travel to New York, but he would be "without influence" in republican circles when he returned. His people would repudiate him. All that then would be left to do, Adams said with a smile, would be to retire quietly to the mountains. The public statement that the USG was asking him to make was simply not worth it, Adams claimed; all it would do was end his career. The CG at this point carefully repeated Adams' words to him. Was this a fair and accurate characterization, the CG asked? It was, Adams acknowledged. The CG told Adams that he would pass the PSF's president's views on to Washington, and that the final decision on a waiver would be made there.

12. Adams asserted that he should get a visa regardless of his unwillingness to "recite a formula." The U.S. could possibly do a great deal of good at little political risk, were it to allow him to travel irrespective of what was being asked of him in the CG's office. As it was, Adams said he saw much positive in the Clinton administration's statements on a possible peace envoy and its less

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

one-sided view of the McBride Principles. Nevertheless, Adams mused, he expected now to be turned down and not to have another good discussion with the CG until the next time he applied for a visa and had to be interviewed.

13. Warming up to the subject, Adams said that the USG policy of not engaging in substantive dialogue with the PSF was silly and counter-productive. The PSF, he noted, was the largest vote-getter in the city of Belfast and the USG continued to act as if the party did not exist. No wonder the people of West Belfast felt marginalized and left out; these feelings, in turn, only made it easier for paramilitaries to recruit in those neighborhoods.

14. Adams finished by saying that he had to take his own political course, that he had to adopt the political positions he thought most fitting under the circumstances. If this meant no visa, then so be it. He would not be particularly angry, but more disappointed that the visa refusal had allowed an opportunity to slip by. The risk the U.S. would take in granting him a waiver was small compared to the risks he was taking every day in Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, visa or no, the PSF believed that violence would end; the only question was how long it would take and how many more lives would be lost. The Sinn Fein was actively working toward peace, Adams said, and this was the message the USG ought to understand. The context and problems of Northern Ireland were much too broad to be contained in the formula the USG was asking him to adopt.

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

15. The CG noted that he and Adams had just about come to the end of the line; Adams agreed. The CG repeated that he would contact Adams if and when he heard something from Washington. Adams repeated that it was a shame that the only time he had any contact with USG officials was during "visa interrogation" sessions. The meeting then ended.

16. OBSERVATION.

Adams was calm, discursive and self-possessed. As is his style, he was dressed in tweeds, with silk tie and scarf. Offered an ashtray, he noted that he had finally given up his pipe-smoking. Adams spoke well and clearly, but with no particular force or pace. He maintains eye contact, even when denying that the PSF has any links with the Provisional IRA.

Martinez

BT

#

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
MEMCON

January 28, 1994
Consulate General, Belfast

Gerry Adams, President, Provisional Sinn Fein
Valentino E. Martinez, Consul General
Chris Bendsen, Vice-Consul

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.33)
K8H 7/11/2023

SUMMARY

The Consul General met with Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) President Gerry Adams on the afternoon of January 28, 1994. The CG, following the guidance and talking points in State 22569 literally, outlined the USG's interest in ascertaining Adams' views on renouncing violence and committing the PSF and the IRA to end the conflict on the basis of the Joint Declaration. The CG handed Adams a plain sheet of paper with an extract from State 22569, the section that began "We therefore must know" and ended "on the basis of the Joint Declaration."

Adams read the extract and nodded, observing that the local and international press had seemed well aware of what was to be asked of him. "Was he being set up," he queried? The CG replied, "No," and briefly explained how USG press guidance worked. Adams accepted this at face value; the 90-minute conversation proceeded without acrimony or recrimination.

Adams spent much time explaining previous public statements he had made on wanting violence to end and how they related to the PSF's "search for peace". He also explained in great detail his and the PSF's desire for "clarification" of the December 15 Downing Street Declaration.

He then came to the plain paper handed to him earlier by the CG. It was wrong, Adams said, to ask him to renounce something he did not advocate. Further, making such a statement would not help him in any way. Were he to make such a public statement, he might, indeed, be able to travel to NYC, but he would be "without influence" when he returned; the Republican community would repudiate him. All that would be left for him to do, Adams continued, would be a "quiet retirement in the mountains." The public statement of State 22569, Adams averred, was not worth making, as it would effectively end his career. The CG very carefully repeated Adams' words to him. "Was this a fair characterization," the CG inquired? "It was," Adams replied. The CG told Adams that he would pass the PSF President's views on to Washington, and that the final decision on a waiver would be made there.

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Adams stated that he thought he should get a visa regardless of his willingness or lack thereof to "recite a formula." The U.S. could possibly do a great deal of good at little political risk, were it to allow him to travel, irrespective of what was being asked of him in the CG's office. Adams, however, would not be pinned down on the question of denouncing Provisional IRA violence, restricting himself to ascertaining that PIRA violence had to be "understood" in the context of the violence engendered by the, for him, merely putative legitimate forces of order -- the police and the army.

Finally, the CG requested (and later received) a contact phone number for Adams, should the Department instruct the CG to pass on its final decision to Adams.

END EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: FILE HOLL SUM2 VAX WALKER

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 280218Z JAN 94

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 8029
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7673
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 022569
LONDON - PLEASE PASS TO BELFAST
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: CVIS. PREL, IR, UK
SUBJECT: GERRY ADAMS VISA REQUEST

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.34)
KBH 4/11/2013

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS ACTION MESSAGE FOR DUBLIN OR BELFAST.
3. CONSUL GENERAL AT EMBASSY DUBLIN SHOULD SEEK A MEETING WITH GERRY ADAMS ASAP TO DISCUSS HIS VISA APPLICATION. IF ADAMS HAS RETURNED TO BELFAST, CONSUL GENERAL AT CG BELFAST SHOULD CONTACT ADAMS AND CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION.
4. THE CONSUL GENERAL AT THE ACTION POST SHOULD CONVEY THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO ADAMS:
 - THE ADMINISTRATION IS REVIEWING YOUR JANUARY 14 APPLICATION TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE ON NORTHERN IRELAND HOSTED BY THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ON FEBRUARY 1, 1994 IN LIGHT OF EVENTS FLOWING FROM THE DECEMBER 15 JOINT DECLARATION BY PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS AND PRIME MINISTER MAJOR.
 - IN MAKING A DECISION ON WHETHER TO GRANT YOU A WAIVER OF YOUR INELIGIBILITY, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR POSITION ON ACHIEVING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
 - WE THEREFORE MUST KNOW WHETHER YOU WILL STATE PUBLICLY THAT:

"YOU PERSONALLY RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND WILL WORK TO THAT END AND THAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA ARE COMMITTED TO END THE CONFLICT ON THE BASIS OF THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

JOINT DECLARATION."

-- WE BELIEVE AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND MUST RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND PURSUE PEACE THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE. OUR DECISION ON WHETHER TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A VISA STRICTLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE FOR ONE DAY WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER YOU ARE WILLING TO TAKE THIS IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD PEACE.

5. POSTS SHOULD REPORT ADAMS' REACTION BY IMMEDIATE CABLE. POSTS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENTS OR THE PRESS. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOI AND HMG ARE BEING HANDLED SEPARATELY. CHRISTOPHER

BT

#2569

NNNN

<MSGID> M0848282

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Subject: Provisional Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams Demurs on
Renunciation of Violence and Acceptance of Downing Street

REF: STATE 022569

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.35)
KBH 7/11/2023

1. ~~5~~ - Entire Text.

2. SUMMARY: The Consul General and Vice Consul met with Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) President Gerry Adams on January 28. Adams stated that the PSF viewed the Downing Street Declaration as but a "first step" in a peace process, and that it was entirely reasonable to ask for "clarification" from London and Dublin. The PSF, Adams observed, had not rejected Downing Street, but it had not accepted it either. He said that he could not accept the USG's formulation on renouncing violence and committing to end the conflict on the basis of the Downing Street Declaration, for this action would destroy his credibility in republican circles and effectively end his career. Adams argued that the context and problems of Northern Ireland were much too broad to be contained in the formula the USG was asking him to adopt. Adams would not be pinned down on the question of renouncing Provisional IRA violence, restricting himself to asserting that PIRA violence had to be understood in the context of HMG's "violence," as exemplified by the Army and the RUC. Adams opined that the USG was losing an opportunity for peace if it did not grant him a waiver; the political risk for the

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

JAN 28 '94 09:40PM AMCONSULBELFAST

P.2

USG, he averred, was far less than the risks he ran daily in Northern Ireland. Finally, Adams said that the USG policy of not engaging selected PSF officials in substantive talks was ill-conceived and counter-productive. END SUMMARY.

3. The Consul General and Vice Consul met with PSF president Gerry Adams on the afternoon of January 28, 1994. Adams was at first somewhat disconcerted that the press had had such a good handle on the nature and substance of the meeting. He had not involved the press at all in previous meetings on visa matters with USG officials, whether in Dublin or Belfast. He wondered whether he was being "set up" for a quick refusal on the waiver. The CG explained that Adams was not being manipulated; the USG had to have press guidance in place, and if this particular guidance was somewhat specific in nature, it was not out of malice or forejudgment. Adams accepted this and the meeting proceeded without acrimony or recrimination.

4. The CG explained that this meeting was at USG request, and that it pertained entirely to Adams' visa application. He noted that the consulate would report Adams' views to Washington as they were expressed to us, and that Washington would render a final decision on the waiver. The CG then asked for (and later received) a contact number for Adams, explaining that when the Department made a decision it might well ask the CG to inform Adams. The CG also noted that the Department of course reserved the right to make its announcement in the manner that it saw fit, so it was at least possible that Adams might

~~SECRET~~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

hear of the decision via the media instead of the consulate. In any case, the CG said, the consulate did not intend to brief the press on any aspect of the meeting, or even the fact of the meeting; we would wait for Washington guidance.

5. The CG opened the more substantive consular discussion by noting that the decision to seek a waiver would be made at a very high level in the USG and that we were interested in his views on the renouncement of violence and the PSF stance toward the Downing Street Declaration. The CG then followed reftel's talking points in bringing to bear USG interest in Adams' views on the peace process. The CG read the statement that we were interested in hearing, and gave Adams a copy on plain bond paper.

6. Adams began by saying that he personally wanted an end to violence. He stated that PSF had been involved in the peace process for at least the last eight years. He said this had led to a number of policy and discussion documents. Under his leadership, PSF had moved toward wanting a negotiated settlement, which was the PSF function as a political party. Adams opined that it was possible to argue that PSF was the only political party with a peace strategy. He said that it was a matter of public record that his party wanted an end to the violence and a demilitarization of the North of Ireland, (the latter phrase Adams attributed to Albert Reynolds). The PSF had engaged in a number of initiatives to engage a wide variety of the community, with the British government, and with the church leaders. Adams said that

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

they had even had secret meetings with unionist but these had not come to light and might never do so. But the Hume-Adams Dialogue was the most significant.

7. Adams said that he and SDLP leader John Hume had developed the broad concepts that could create an agreement that would accommodate the people of all of Ireland. It was then put to London and Dublin, who had been briefed on the Hume-Adams dialogue all along. The two governments then produced a reply, which was the Downing Street Declaration. The CG interjected that the agreement came about not only because of the Hume-Adams dialogue but was also an answer to the increasing paramilitary violence. Adams conceded this but said the Hume-Adams dialogue was at the very least the context for the Declaration. Adams added that the PSF viewed the declaration as but a "first step"; he claimed that even the British government when pressed would see it so. The PSF wanted to embrace the Declaration and move on. They wanted to know what the second step was and what the mechanism would be to take the process forward and put into action the principles in the Declaration. PSF wanted to see the conflict ended. Matters were at a critical stage dating from December 15th or before. The PSF, Adams averred, was committed to peace and wanted to continue to develop unarmed strategies to replace armed ones.

8. The CG, noting very carefully that he did not intend to enter into a detailed discussion on this matter, or much less pretend to speak for HMG, observed that, to a layman on these matters, section four of the

declaration seemed to have quite specific mechanisms. Adams allowed that this was so, but still stated that the PSF needed to know what "further steps" the declaration envisioned. Currently, Adams complained, HMG was stubbornly refusing to clarify matters and instead threatening to "throw down the gauntlet." This was hardly helpful to PSF's desire for peace.

9. Adams recognized that various HMG officials had made it clear that London had no strategic or selfish interests in Northern Ireland. HMG should now move, with Dublin, to ensure that this "no self-interest" clause was developed into a concerted effort to win "the consent of a greater number of people on the island." In this the PSF was willing to cooperate.

10. Adams said that the PSF had not rejected the Downing Street Declaration. Nevertheless, even if it had, it would not mean that the PSF therefore advocated violence. One did not follow from the other. The CG said that the USG had no quarrel with this logic; what it did find disturbing, however, was Adams' failure to renounce violence as a legitimate political weapon. Adams replied that Dr. John Alderdice (head of the Alliance party) viewed the presence and activities of the British Army in NI as legitimate; this was his opinion but Adams did not share it. Why should he be punished with a visa denial for not sharing with Alderdice what was and was not the legitimate use of force, Adams asked? The CG turned the topic back to the paper he had handed Adams, noting that a philosophical discussion on the legitimacy

JAN 28 '94 09:51PM AMCONSULBELFAST

P.4

of force in any society was an interesting topic, but that meanwhile, the USG remained interested in hearing whether he found the statement that was handed to him acceptable.

11. Adams replied that it was wrong to ask him to renounce something he did not advocate. Further, he said he did not speak for the IRA. After all, Adams claimed, the PSF and the PIRA were two separate organizations. Adams asserted that making such a statement would not help him in any way. Were he to make such a public statement, he might indeed be able to travel to New York, but he would be "without influence" in republican circles when he returned. His people would repudiate him. All that then would be left to do, Adams said with a smile, would be to retire quietly to the mountains. The public statement that the USG was asking him to make was simply not worth it, Adams claimed; all it would do was end his career. The CG at this point carefully repeated Adams' words to him. Was this a fair and accurate characterization, the CG asked? It was, Adams acknowledged. The CG told Adams that he would pass the PSF's president's views on to Washington, and that the final decision on a waiver would be made there.

12. Adams asserted that he should get a visa regardless of his unwillingness to "recite a formula." The U.S. could possibly do a great deal of good at little political risk, were it to allow him to travel irrespective of what was being asked of him in the CG's office. As it was, Adams said he saw much positive in the Clinton administration's statements on a possible peace envoy and its less

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

one-sided view of the McBride Principles. Nevertheless, Adams mused, he expected now to be turned down and not to have another good discussion with the CG until the next time he applied for a visa and had to be interviewed.

13. Warming up to the subject, Adams said that the USG policy of not engaging in substantive dialogue with the PSF was silly and counter-productive. The PSF, he noted, was the largest vote-getter in the city of Belfast and the USG continued to act as if the party did not exist. No wonder the people of West Belfast felt marginalized and left out; these feelings, in turn, only made it easier for paramilitaries to recruit in those neighborhoods.

14. Adams finished by saying that he had to take his own political course, that he had to adopt the political positions he thought most fitting under the circumstances. If this meant no visa, then so be it. He would not be particularly angry, but more disappointed that the visa refusal had allowed an opportunity to slip by. The risk the U.S. would take in granting him a waiver was small compared to the risks he was taking every day in Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, visa or no, the PSF believed that violence would end; the only question was how long it would take and how many more lives would be lost. The Sinn Fein was actively working toward peace, Adams said, and this was the message the USG ought to understand. The context and problems of Northern Ireland were much too broad to be contained in the formula the USG was asking him to adopt.

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

15. The CG noted that he and Adams had just about come to the end of the line; Adams agreed. The CG repeated that he would contact Adams if and when he heard something from Washington. Adams repeated that it was a shame that the only time he had any contact with USG officials was during "visa interrogation" sessions. The meeting then ended.

16. OBSERVATION.

Adams was calm, discursive and self-possessed. As is his style, he was dressed in tweeds, with silk tie and scarf. Offered an ashtray, he noted that he had finally given up his pipe-smoking. Adams spoke well and clearly, but with no particular force or pace. He maintains eye contact, even when denying that the PSF has any links with the Provisional IRA.

Martinez

BT

#

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Objective: To encourage Sinn Fein and the IRA unequivocally to renounce violence, endorse the Joint Declaration and negotiate seriously for an end to the conflict in Northern Ireland.

The President has repeatedly stated that the United States stands ready to contribute to peace in any appropriate way. He has also stated he will keep the issue of the Gerry Adams visa under review as the situation warrants, especially in light of events flowing from the December 15 Joint Declaration by Prime Minister Reynolds and Prime Minister Major. The goal is to use US influence over the parties to try to advance the cause of peace.

Proposal

On January 14, 1994, Gerry Adams applied for a visa to visit the United States January 31 to February 5 to attend a conference on Northern Ireland hosted in New York by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. The application presents the US an opportunity to try to move Adams forward toward the goal stated above.

Over this weekend, the Administration would invite Adams into the US Consulate in Belfast or the Embassy in Dublin (Adams applied at the latter so the Embassy is the most logical choice) to discuss his application and press him on how far he is willing to go in renouncing violence and endorsing the Joint Declaration.

The IRA is currently engaged in an internal debate over whether to take such a step and a decision is not expected until mid-February. However, it may be possible to encourage Adams to move publicly in the right direction.

**If Adams is willing to state publicly that his goal is to end the IRA's role in violence, to move the IRA into the political process and to negotiate an end to the conflict the US would enable him to attend the conference in New York -- but only the conference. We would make it clear that he is not free to travel outside New York, fundraise or do public forums outside the context of the conference. Realistically, he will no doubt talk to the press but we would not permit him to remain in the country to attend the lunches and dinners he currently hopes to attend.

**We would also urge the British to respond to the IRA request for clarification of the Joint Declaration. The current stalemate risks providing the IRA an excuse to walk away from this opportunity. Since issuing the Joint Declaration, the British have maintained the position that the document stands on its own and any requests for clarification are simply veiled stalling techniques. Statements such as having "thrown down the gauntlet to the IRA" only make it more difficult for the IRA to respond. A willingness to discuss certain points in the Declaration would make it more difficult for the IRA to reject the Joint Declaration.

~~SECRET~~

Gerry Adams Visa Draft Options
January 18, 1993

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.37)
K8H 4/11/2023

Issue for decision

Gerry Adams has requested a visa to attend a conference in New York on February 1st. His request comes in the midst of internal Sinn Fein/IRA deliberations on whether to endorse the December 15 Joint Declaration. It also follows a public statement by the President that he would "review" the issue of the Adams visa in light of recent developments. The issue is how we can use the "carrots" at our disposal to press Adams to renounce violence, endorse the Joint Declaration and enter seriously into peace negotiations.

Proposal

1. Ask Adams into the Consulate or Embassy to discuss his visa application in the context of his commitment to peace and the joint declaration. [NOTE: it has been US policy for at least 20 years not to talk to the Sinn Fein until it renounces the use of violence.]

While this step would not be a formal suspension of the current US ban on talking to Sinn Fein, it would be a step to reach out to Adams. We would need to flush out the terms of the discussion and its duration. The goal would be to get Adams to renounce violence (and/or accept the Joint Declaration) in which case we would issue him the visa. We would deny Adams the visa if he failed to renounce violence by the February 1 conference.

If Adams had not renounced violence by the time of the February 1 conference but had not yet rejected the Joint Declaration and those involved felt the talks were productive, the discussions would continue at least until the time Sinn Fein took a public position on the Joint Declaration, expected in mid-February. [NOTE: It is highly unlikely that Adams will be in a position to renounce violence before mid-February.]

This step is substantively a larger step than the symbolic issue of providing Adams a US visa. But it would allow us to make our own judgments on how serious Adams is about peace and enable us to reach out to him to encourage him to make peace. It would enable us to do so while not giving in to his politically charged request for a visa. American involvement would help provide the nationalist community a sense of security about the peace process and could contribute to moving the peace process forward. The step also follows logically from British discussions with IRA and recent Irish ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts. (The Irish, however, still maintain its own ban on talking directly to Sinn Fein).

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Cons: Even if very limited in scope, talks with Sinn Fein could undermine our anti-terrorism stance, unless coupled with similar talks with the Unionists could cause a backlash, might upset the British and perhaps some in Congress.

If Adams fails to renounce violence and the visa is rejected, it could further alienate the nationalist community. President might be criticized for missing an opportunity to press for peace and some in Congress would criticize him.

2. Press the British to clarify the Joint Declaration. The IRA has been pressing for a clarification by the British of the Joint Declaration. The British believe the IRA request is a delaying tactic, although the Irish have made a public attempt to clarify the document. If the British were to agree to clarify the document, it could help determine whether the IRA's action is a bluff or a serious attempt at clarification. Pushing for a clarification would help focus the issue on the substance of the gulf between the parties, would help demonstrate the willingness of the US to support the process and might break the logjam on getting the IRA to join the process.

Cons: Will annoy the British, could drag out the process if the IRA's demands simply increase.

3. Simultaneously reach out in some fashion, ie. a high profile meeting, with the Unionists in order to minimize the backlash against any reaching out to the nationalists. Possible steps include offering to open a dialogue with Ian Paisley (who has rejected the Joint Declaration) or with UUP leader James Molyneaux who has quietly supported dialogue. Another possibility is to provide NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties to match our support for the Catholic SDLP.

Consultations and Sequencing

Wednesday, January 19 Lake and Christopher discuss and agree on a course of action over lunch. President is briefed and accepts proposal.

Thursday and Friday, January 20-21 State consults with British, Irish, SDLP leader John Hume and Congress over proposal.

Saturday, January 22 Consulate in Belfast or Embassy in Dublin calls in Gerry Adams to brief him on proposal.

Monday, January 24 State or White House releases press release with outlines of proposal.

Adams would then have over a week to respond to our proposal and take the necessary steps to obtain a visa.

~~SECRET~~

BACKGROUND PAPER
GERRY ADAMS VISA ISSUE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.38)
KBH 4/11/2023

Decision

Gerry Adams requested a visa on Friday, January 14 to attend a peace conference hosted on February 1st in New York by a prominent Irish-American, William Flynn. He also indicated he hopes to do press interviews, attend a luncheon hosted by Bruce Morrison, dine with his book publishers and attend an AFL/CIO dinner honoring Tom Donahue. The FBI also has information that he intends to hold a \$150 a person fundraising dinner, although his people apparently claim he does not intend to do any fundraising in the country. The FBI also indicated to me that Adams could also easily be handed checks up to \$9,000 which would not have to be reported.

The decision we face is whether and how to use US influence to help induce Sinn Fein/IRA into accepting the Joint Declaration while at the same time maintaining our tough stance against terrorism. Since the Joint Declaration was reached December 15, Sinn Fein and the IRA have been debating the proposal but have not outright rejected it. A decision is likely within the next month. John Hume has continued his private talks with Adams and believes Adams is prepared to make peace if he has the political strength to bring the IRA along. He is pushing the US to provide Adams a visa as a way to enhance Adams' credibility.

The IRA has asked the British to clarify portions of the Joint Declaration. So far, the British have refused, claiming that the document stands for itself and the ball is in the IRA's court. The British believe that the IRA's request for clarifications is simply a means of stalling. In an attempt to reach out to the IRA's concerns, the Irish Prime Minister gave a speech clarifying the Joint Declaration but the IRA wants to hear clarification directly from the British. Earlier this week, the Irish lifted its 20 year ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts in Ireland. It maintains, however, its formal ban on talking to the IRA, although private, indirect discussions are most likely occurring. Last month, the British confirmed the leaks that it had talked to the IRA.

Since the Joint Declaration, the IRA has continued unabated its campaign of violence with almost daily attacks on British security forces. I was briefed by the FBI on Friday and it believes Adams remains in the command structure of the IRA's military campaign (one of the 7 man provisional army council that directs the more spectacular acts of violence and general IRA strategy). They do not have any direct knowledge of Adams' role in any specific act of recent violence but believe that given his position on the council he is involved in directing the actions. I've asked the FBI to check on any recent activity -- you might want to mention to Freeh in your meeting next week and/or ask the British for any information. It is very sensitive and the FBI may not be able to get information at the lower levels.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Others' positions

British -- as you know, the British oppose our giving Adams a visa until he has provided an "unequivocal and irrevocable" commitment to end violence. They believe that we should, however, hold out to him the prospect of the visa if he is willing to meet this condition. They believe that to give a visa to Adams before he has done so would "gravely undermine the joint declaration. The US would be seen to have diverged from the UK."

Irish -- it is unclear what the Irish will confirm publicly or in larger private circles but we have from several sources (John Hume, Ambassador Smith, Senator Kennedy and Ambassador Gallagher after he spoke directly to the Irish Prime Minister about the issue) that the Irish support us giving Adams a visa to attend the conference only. They would not want to see Adams doing high profile press or fundraising but believe that allowing him to attend the peace conference could encourage Adams to move toward peace and that prospect outweighs the negative.

John Hume -- Of all the players, Hume probably knows Adams the best, having engaged in lengthy discussions with him. In fact, the Joint Declaration in a way flowed from his talks with Adams over the last year. As far as I know, Hume is the only one who talks directly to Adams. Hume believes Adams is serious about wanting to move forward but is battling the splits among the IRA. He urges us not to miss this opportunity of using US influence to bring Adams into our fold. Some have made the point that Hume also has his own agenda and the most to gain by moving Adams along -- although as the one closest to the violence, he also has the most to gain from peace.

State -- we don't have anything formal from State, although my informal discussions indicate State will most likely come out in support of the British position.

Congress -- We received a letter today to the President from Senators Kennedy, Kerry, Moynihan and Dodd and Congressmen Manton, Fish and Coyne urging him to grant the visa to Adams. "The United States cannot afford to ignore this possibility and miss this rare opportunity for our country to contribute to peace in Northern Ireland." Senator Kennedy also called Sandy Berger and said that while this was a tough call, we should grant him the visa. He mentioned the strength of Reynolds' push for giving him the visa and the fact that the Irish intelligence believes Adams is talking peace. Senator Lautenberg's office also called me to add his name to the Kennedy letter.

Speaker Foley also called Sandy today to urge us not to give Adams the visa until he has taken steps toward peace. He felt very strongly that it would send the wrong signals.

OPTIONS

I believe most would agree that we ought to reach out to Adams and Sinn Fein/Adams in some fashion. Below are the options I can think of:

1. Publicly state that we will give Adams a visa once he unequivocally rejects violence (and perhaps joined peace process/accepted Joint Declaration)

Pros: Maintains our stance against terrorism, supports the British position, might encourage him in the right direction because it holds out the chance of coming to the US if he makes the right move. Would avoid alienating the Unionist community. Saves major carrot of visa.

Cons: Since the President has indicated he would review the visa in light of current events, a rejection that echoes the position of the British might increase the strength of the hard liners within the IRA. In addition, it might worsen Adams perceived need for something more than the Joint Declaration before he can make peace. A denial will anger the President's supporters from the campaign to whom he promised to give Adams a visa and disappoint those in Congress pushing for a visa. It might be difficult to define the term "unequivocally" or to know exactly when Adams had permanently given up on violence.

2. Provide a visa to Adams to attend the conference only, a one day visa that would limit his activities and exposure

Pros: Could help build up Adams within the IRA enough to enable him to renounce violence and negotiate seriously, would please campaign supporters and some in Congress.

Cons: Might provide Adams a forum to fundraise for the IRA and a platform to advance his cause without agreeing to renounce violence and join the peace process. Weakens stance against terrorism, might anger some in Congress and might provoke a Unionist backlash. Gives up major carrot of the U.S. for uncertain returns.

2a. Simultaneously reach out in some fashion, ie. a high profile meeting, with the Unionists in order to minimize the backlash. UUP leader James Molyneaux has quietly supported dialogue. Another possibility (proposed by State) is to provide NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties to match our support for the Catholic SDLP.

3. Agree to initiate US-Sinn Fein talks within the framework of the Joint Declaration only [NOTE: it has been US policy for at least 20 years not to talk to the Sinn Fein until they renounce the use of violence.]

Pros: Would reach out to the IRA while not giving into the symbolic and charged issue of the visa, would enable the US to determine for itself how serious Adams and the IRA are about making peace, could help bring the IRA to the peace table. Follows logically from British discussions with IRA and recent Irish ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts.

Cons: Even if very limited in scope, could undermine our anti-terrorism stance, unless coupled with similar talks with the Unionists could cause a backlash, would upset the British and perhaps some in Congress. Inconsistent with Irish ban on direct Sinn Fein contacts.

3a. Ask Adams into the Consulate or Embassy to discuss his commitment to peace and the joint declaration, thus avoiding a formal suspension of talking to Sinn Fein

4. Offer to host peace talks if the IRA (and Unionists) accepts the Joint Declaration and renounces violence

Pros: By holding out the carrot of US sponsorship of a peace process, could enhance the confidence of the IRA and others in the process enough to bring them into the process.

Cons: Could commit the US to a lengthy negotiating process with uncertain ends, would annoy the British who resist any US role in the Northern Ireland issue, might not be enough to bring the IRA along.

4a. Offer to host the talks now, as a way to bring all parties on board

Cons: Prospects of success very difficult to predict.

5. Press the British to clarify the Joint Declaration and/or engage in direct talks with Sinn Fein

Pros: Would call the IRA's bluff on whether it really need clarification and thus whether it is serious about peace, would focus the issue on the substance of the gulf between the parties, would help demonstrate the willingness of the US to support the process and might break the logjam on getting the IRA to join the process.

Cons: Will annoy the British who might reject our request, could drag out the process if the IRA's demands simply increase.

6. Send a U.S. special envoy to press for peace

Pros: Could help increase confidence of all parties involved, could advance peace, would please campaign supporters who called for envoy and would fulfill campaign pledge.

Cons: Will be opposed by the British and employ political resources of the US in a difficult problem with no clear end or definably prospects for peace.

7. Attempt to do more to address the root causes of violence by increasing aid ie., propose a US business/investment initiative working with OPIC and Commerce [State's idea]

Pros: Would enable the US to do something tangible in support of peace, especially if above steps were not taken.

Cons: We already have a robust \$20 million a year program of supporting the International Fund whose purpose is the same. Would raise real questions of absorption capacity.

8. Prayer Initiative (suggested by State and Ambassador Flynn) would involve working with the Catholic and Anglican/Protestant Church leaders on an initiative to bring the communities together, including, ie., through a prayer breakfast in Washington

Pros: Would encourage dialogue among the factions, could perhaps be used as cover for private US government talks with parties. Would demonstrate US interest in the conflict.

Cons: Might be a failure, might be difficult to control.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-Feb-1994 19:02 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: George M. Andricos
(ANDRICOS)

SUBJECT: Mike O'Neil

Please pass to Nancy.

Subject: Mike O'Neil/Adams Cables

State is still considering the issue of whether to provide the Adams cables, or access thereto, to Mike O'Neil. State lawyers have raised an additional concern that the cable(s) includes, in part, material from the visa interview which they apparently don't release. As soon as State decides what they want to recommend, I'll let you know. In the meantime, they have told O'Neil that they're still working this and will get back to him as soon as possible.

Mike

Distribution:

FOR: Nancy Soderberg
FOR: Wendy E. Gray
FOR: Brenda I. Hilliard
FOR: Cathy Millison
FOR: M. Brooke Darby
FOR: M. Kay LaPlante
FOR: Allison M. Wright
CC: Jane E. Holl
CC: Jeremy D. Rosner
CC: William C. Danvers
CC: Eric Liu
CC: Christina L. Funches

(SODERBERG)
(GRAY)
(HILLIARD)
(MILLISON)
(DARBY)
(LAPLANTE)
(WRIGHT)
(HOLL)
(ROSNER)
(DANVERS)
(LIU)
(FUNCHES)

*Mike -
shall I call
Mike + let him
know generally
about
Conversation?*

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.70)
KBH 4/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Jan-1994 16:19 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby

(DARBY)

FROM:

Julien D. LeBourgeois
(LEBOURGEOIS)

SUBJECT:

Note for Nancy

Nancy -- Update from our earlier conversation on N. Ireland.

1. Jane and I finally made contact. She has been swamped and unable to get time on the computer to make the changes to her memo you two discussed. She will try to send you tomorrow the original memo with marginal notes on changes to incorporate.

2. FBI will deal with Paisley as well at the 11:00 AM meeting 1/14, according to Gina Genton.

3. John Tefft, per his conversation with you, will seek more specifics on the invalidation of Paisley's 1980 visa. John is also getting guidance from Tarnoff for producing the options paper you requested.

4. You should have received by now copies of the two recent State cables on how to handle Adams when he applies (State 9969) and on how to respond to any press inquiries (State 11255).

Do you want any of this summarized for Sandy, or is he up to speed?

Julien

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

To Julien - you'll get a copy of a
memo to TC+SB bringin them up
to speed. No need to inform them further at
this point

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.41)

KBH 4/11/2023

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Jan-1994 17:58 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: IRA

*To Richard,
I've asked fbi to
brief me on gerry Adams
re: his expected request
for a visa on
Friday.*

The British embassy counter-intelligence types with whom we have liason on IRA terrorism issues informs us that there is an FBI briefing "at the NSC" tomorrow on IRA Terrorism.

Does anybody know anything about that?

Always nice to be told things about the NSC's doings by foreign embassies.

*It never occurred
to me you
wanted to be
involved with
the Gerry Adams
visa issue - If
you want to attend
you are welcome -*

Distribution:

- FOR: George J. Tenet
- FOR: Jenonne R. Walker
- FOR: M. Brooke Darby
- FOR: Mary C. Emery
- FOR: Wilma G. Hall
- FOR: Kristen K. Cicio
- FOR: Katherine M. Veit
- FOR: James W. Reed
- FOR: William H. Itoh
- FOR: Kristie A. Kenney
- FOR: M. Brooke Darby
- FOR: Cathy Millison
- CC: Records
- CC: Richard L. Canas
- CC: Randy R. Beers
- CC: Sean J. Darragh

- (TENET)
- (WALKER)
- (DARBY)
- (EMERY)
- (HALL)
- (CICIO)
- (VEIT)
- (REED)
- (ITOH)
- (KENNEY)
- (DARBY)
- (MILLISON)
- (RECORDS)
- (CANAS)
- (BEERS)
- (DARRAGH)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*NES
Can't we do
more to build on
our current position
without being on the
hard line as the
Brits?
R
1/16/94*

15-Jan-1994 19:45 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby

(DARBY)

FROM:

M. Brooke Darby
(DARBY)

SUBJECT:

gerry adams visa

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.42)
KRH 4/11/2023

December 15, 1993 ?

MEMO TO: Anthony Lake

FROM: Nancy Soderberg

RE: Gerry Adams Visa

I had hoped to have by today a paper from State outlining the options for a Gerry Adams visa. I have yet to receive it but given your request for materials before your returned, I have put together the options paper below. It is a rough draft that we will need to flush out and work through with State before forwarding.

Decision

Gerry Adams requested a visa on Friday, December 14 to attend a peace conference hosted on February 1st in New York by a prominent Irish-American, William Flynn. He also indicated he hopes to do press interviews, attend a luncheon hosted by Bruce Morrison, dine with his book publishers and attend an AFL/CIO dinner honoring Tom Donahue. The FBI also has information that he intends to hold a \$150 a person fundraising dinner, although his people apparently claim he does not intend to do any fundraising in the country. The FBI also indicated to me that Adams could also easily be handed checks up to \$9,000 which would not have to be reported.

The decision we face is whether and how to use US influence to help induce Sinn Fein/IRA into accepting the Joint Declaration

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

while at the same time maintaining our tough stance against terrorism. Since the Joint Declaration was reached December 15, Sinn Fein and the IRA have been debating the proposal but have not outright rejected it. A decision is likely within the next month. John Hume has continued his private talks with Adams and believes Adams is prepared to make peace if he has the political strength to bring the IRA along. He is pushing the US to provide Adams a visa as a way to enhance Adams' credibility.

The IRA has asked the British to clarify portions of the Joint Declaration. So far, the British have refused, claiming that the document stands for itself and the ball is in the IRA's court. The British believe that the IRA's request for clarifications is simply a means of stalling. In an attempt to reach out to the IRA's concerns, the Irish Prime Minister gave a speech clarifying the Joint Declaration but the IRA wants to hear clarification directly from the British. Earlier this week, the Irish lifted its 20 year ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts in Ireland. It maintains, however, its formal ban on talking to the IRA, although private, indirect discussions are most likely occurring. Last month, the British confirmed the leaks that it had talked to the IRA.

Since the Joint Declaration, the IRA has continued unabated its campaign of violence with almost daily attacks on British security forces. I was briefed by the FBI on Friday and it believes Adams remains in the command structure of the IRA's military campaign (one of the 7 man provisional army council that directs the more spectacular acts of violence and general IRA strategy). They do not have any direct knowledge of Adams' role in any specific act of recent violence but believe that given his position on the council he is involved in directing the actions. I've asked the FBI to check on any recent activity -- you might want to mention to Freeh in your meeting next week and/or ask the British for any information. It is very sensitive and the FBI may not be able to get information at the lower levels.

Others' positions

British -- as you know, the British oppose our giving Adams a visa until he has provided an "unequivocal and irrevocable" commitment to end violence. They believe that we should, however, hold out to him the prospect of the visa if he is willing to meet this condition. They believe that to give a visa to Adams before he has done so would "gravely undermine the joint declaration. The US would be seen to have diverged from the UK."

Irish -- it is unclear what the Irish will confirm publicly or in larger private circles but we have from several sources (John Hume, Ambassador Smith, Senator Kennedy and Ambassador Gallagher after he spoke directly to the Irish Prime Minister about the issue) that the Irish support us giving Adams a visa to attend the conference only. They would not want to see Adams doing high profile press or fundraising but believe that allowing

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

him to attend the peace conference could encourage Adams to move toward peace and that prospect outweighs the negative.

John Hume -- Of all the players, Hume probably knows Adams the best, having engaged in lengthy discussions with him. In fact, the Joint Declaration in a way flowed from his talks with Adams over the last year. As far as I know, Hume is the only one who talks directly to Adams. Hume believes Adams is serious about wanting to move forward but is battling the splits among the IRA. He urges us not to miss this opportunity of using US influence to bring Adams into our fold. Some have made the point that Hume also has his own agenda and the most to gain by moving Adams along -- although as the one closest to the violence, he also has the most to gain from peace.

State -- we don't have anything formal from State, although my informal discussions indicate State will most likely come out in support of the British position.

Congress -- We received a letter today to the President from Senators Kennedy, Kerry, Moynihan and Dodd urging him to grant the visa to Adams. "The United States cannot afford to ignore this possibility and miss this rare opportunity for our country to contribute to peace in Northern Ireland." Senator Kennedy also called Sandy Berger and said that while this was a tough call, we should grant him the visa. He mentioned the strength of Reynolds' push for giving him the visa and the fact that the Irish intelligence believes Adams is talking peace. Senator Lautenberg's office also called me to add his name to the Kennedy letter.

Speaker Foley also called Sandy today to urge us not to give Adams the visa until he has taken steps toward peace. He felt very strongly that it would send the wrong signals.

OPTIONS

I believe most would agree that we ought to reach out to Adams and Sinn Fein/Adams in some fashion. Below are the options I can think of:

1. Publicly state that we will give Adams a visa once he unequivocally rejects violence (and perhaps joined peace process/accepted Joint Declaration)

Pros: Maintains our stance against terrorism, supports the British position, might encourage him in the right direction because it holds out the chance of coming to the US if he makes the right move. Would avoid alienating the Unionist community. Saves major carrot of visa.

Cons: Since the President has indicated he would review the visa in light of current events, a rejection that echoes the position of the British might increase the strength of the hard

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

liners within the IRA. In addition, it might worsen Adams perceived need for something more than the Joint Declaration before he can make peace. A denial will anger the President's supporters from the campaign to whom he promised to give Adams a visa and disappoint those in Congress pushing for a visa. It might be difficult to define the term "unequivocally" or to know exactly when Adams had permanently given up on violence.

2. Provide a visa to Adams to attend the conference only, a one day visa that would limit his activities and exposure

Pros: Could help build up Adams within the IRA enough to enable him to renounce violence and negotiate seriously, would please campaign supporters and some in Congress.

Cons: Might provide Adams a forum to fundraise for the IRA and a platform to advance his cause without agreeing to renounce violence and join the peace process. Weakens stance against terrorism, might anger some in Congress and might provoke a Unionist backlash. Gives up major carrot of the U.S. for uncertain returns.

2a. Simultaneously reach out in some fashion, ie. a high profile meeting, with the Unionists in order to minimize the backlash. UUP leader James Molyneaux has quietly supported dialogue. Another possibility (proposed by State) is to provide NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties to match our support for the Catholic SDLP.

*Don't
expand?*

3. Agree to initiate US-Sinn Fein talks within the framework of the Joint Declaration only [NOTE: it has been US policy for at least 20 years not to talk to the Sinn Fein until they renounce the use of violence.]

Pros: Would reach out to the IRA while not giving into the symbolic and charged issue of the visa, would enable the US to determine for itself how serious Adams and the IRA are about making peace, could help bring the IRA to the peace table. Follows logically from British discussions with IRA and recent Irish ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts.

Cons: Even if very limited in scope, could undermine our anti-terrorism stance, unless coupled with similar talks with the Unionists could cause a backlash, would upset the British and perhaps some in Congress. Inconsistent with Irish ban on direct Sinn Fein contacts.

3a. Ask Adams into the Consulate or Embassy to discuss his commitment to peace and the joint declaration, thus avoiding a formal suspension of talking to Sinn Fein

4. Offer to host peace talks if the IRA (and Unionists) accepts the Joint Declaration and renounces violence

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

Pros: By holding out the carrot of US sponsorship of a peace process, could enhance the confidence of the IRA and others in the process enough to bring them into the process.

Cons: Could commit the US to a lengthy negotiating process with uncertain ends, would annoy the British who resist any US role in the Northern Ireland issue, might not be enough to bring the IRA along.

4a. Offer to host the talks now, as a way to bring all parties on board

Cons: Prospects of success very difficult to predict.

5. Press the British to clarify the Joint Declaration and/or engage in direct talks with Sinn Fein

Pros: Would call the IRA's bluff on whether it really need clarification and thus whether it is serious about peace, would focus the issue on the substance of the gulf between the parties, would help demonstrate the willingness of the US to support the process and might break the logjam on getting the IRA to join the process.

Cons: Will annoy the British who might reject our request, could drag out the process if the IRA's demands simply increase.

6. Send a U.S. special envoy to press for peace

Pros: Could help increase confidence of all parties involved, could advance peace, would please campaign supporters who called for envoy and would fulfill campaign pledge.

Cons: Will be opposed by the British and employ political resources of the US in a difficult problem with no clear end or definably prospects for peace.

7. Attempt to do more to address the root causes of violence by increasing aid i.e., propose a US business/investment initiative working with OPIC and Commerce [State's idea]

Pros: Would enable the US to do something tangible in support of peace, especially if above steps were not taken.

Cons: We already have a robust \$20 million a year program of supporting the International Fund whose purpose is the same. Would raise real questions of absorption capacity.

8. Prayer Initiative (suggested by State and Ambassador Flynn) would involve working with the Catholic and Anglican/Protestant Church leaders on an initiative to bring the communities together, including, i.e., through a prayer breakfast in Washington

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

Pros: Would encourage dialogue among the factions, could perhaps be used as cover for private US government talks with parties. Would demonstrate US interest in the conflict.

Cons: Might be a failure, might be difficult to control.

cc: Sandy Berger, Jenonne Walker and Jane Holl

E

FBI Boston

1/14/94

Geary Adams

1969 IRA - McGuinnis Adams etc. unhappy w/ pace of efforts. Orange parade turned violent. British sent in troops, Catholics welcomed at the time they needed protection. Couldnt agree - well meet in 6 months, provisionally - thus the name.

Adams throwing bombs etc. - sole source
 74 - internment policy - rounded up + put in MAZE. Tried to escape twice. 3 yrs in prison.
 77 release. Set up Northern Command group in N. Ireland respon. for carrying out Southern in S. + 7 man Council,
 → Tom. Cahill, Adams, McGuinnis. + General Army convention / council. 86 last convention in Dublin. Come meets at least quarterly, supposedly monthly.
 2 bombings recently, 8mas blowing up subway, Warrington, Shankill (Tom Beegley killed) since 12/15 seen numerous bombings shortly, RUC ambused last week,

2nd command in S, technical training, processing. My fundraising ^{for bullet proof vest} / London, Arizona, obtain funds thru drug deals, W. Coast radar jamming, 82 - \$42-1 million to IRA, now \$100,000 \$150 ahead - Adams plans denials

PROVS:

Army Council

mainland + non-spectacular,
all spectacular.

↙
N. Command

Battalions (individual bombing (shooting))

Brigades

no info that G. Adams spec. approval London bombing. Birds say they do.

Lizrens. G. amounts of weaponry, plastics, weaponry.
250 tons of materials in South.

ARIZONA - McKinley case. Late 89/90 - In Mexico
someone said wanted to buy stingers. arrested in
Sting, bought 2900 bomb detectors.

PIZA uses radar gun to set off bombs.

Green Cross in Dublin - goes to Tom Kehill.

↳ goes to Kehill. 1/2 - 1/3 to war activities, bank
operations.

Friends of Irish Freedom

\$10 million annual budget
Smuggling, cigarette lighters, cattle hormone extraction, organized crime activities.

Embargo shut off route to Libya → ICA.

Paisley - Dem. Union Party, extremist but
not involved in violence.

never publicly associated w/ violence in same way
Adams. ~~Reverenced~~ violence.

What impact?

Recent gov responded to Joint Deal

If let in, undermine UK + balance, & support for ICA

might hurt our terrorism efforts by shutting off
sources of let Adams in same time

& substantial increase in fundraising.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(1.44)
KBH 4/11/2023

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-Jan-1994 17:58 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby (DARBY)
Betty A. Marshall (MARSHALL)

FROM: Julien D. LeBourgeois
(LEBOURGEOIS)

SUBJECT: More on Gerry Adams

For Brooke: Update on our earlier conversations today.
Please pass to Nancy.

For Betty: Please pass to Jane.

State Departement (Mike Parmly of EUR/NE) told me today that Christopher and Hurd had met, with the latter stating it would not be useful for Gerry Adams to get a visa to the U.S. State feels the same way, at least until he has renounced terrorism and made a commitment to peace. Up for discussion is how best to convey this message.

Embassy Dublin's indication that Adams might soon come to the Embassy to apply for a visa with the press in tow has yielded to the impression that he is -- more circumspectly -- taking soundings of what the U.S. reaction would be if/if he applies.

CC: Records
CC: Records

(RECORDS)
(RECORDS)

To Home

We are concerned about ~~the~~ three ~~bomb threats~~ ^{bomb threats} in San Diego reported to have been ~~made~~ ^{conducted} by ~~the~~ ^{So. California} U.K. ~~authorities~~

We are inclined to issue him a US\$ for the conference only; but given this latest report it is difficult for us to do so absent a condemnation of the San Diego threat.

Please approach Adams & ask him if would renounce/denounce/condemn the San Diego actions and state the U.K. had no link to do with them. ~~to~~

We also ~~hope~~ ^{hope} to urge him to renounce

~~denounce~~ ^{all} ~~any~~ ^{and actions} threats against ~~the~~ innocent civilians anywhere.

It would be important for him if ~~at all possible~~ ^{if possible} ~~pers him~~ ^{pers him} also to condemn the recent Oxford Street bombings as well as

Summary

U.S. influence on the peace process is limited. The Administration has effectively supported the process through two well-received Presidential statements. In the effort to bring Sinn Fein into the peace process, the prospect of a U.S. visa for Gerry Adams -- if he participates in the peace process -- might have a marginal impact on Adams' actions. While the President has already highlighted that linkage, contact with Adams if/when he applies for a U.S. visa would allow us to underline the point. The U.S. must be careful, in any interaction with Gerry Adams, not to alienate the moderate Unionists; the U.S. could contribute to efforts to reduce that community's isolation. (A U.S. investment/business promotion initiative would also show our concern and help address conditions in Northern Ireland which feed violence.) Working with the Catholic and Protestant church leaders on an initiative would also raise our profile.

Sinn Fein/Gerry Adams

A primary objective of the Reynolds-Major peace initiative has been to induce the IRA and their political allies in Sinn Fein to halt the terrorist violence. The prospect of a visa for Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams might provide marginal enticement to Adams/Sinn Fein to lay down their arms and join the peace process. However, to be effective, that visa must only be a response to actions on Adams' part, not an enticement with hopes of future Adams' actions. To underline the clarity of the President's message in the December 22 Irish Times, a meeting of the Consul General with Adams when he applies for a visa might be useful. The CG could underline the President's message: renounce violence unambiguously and join the process, and the U.S. would be prepared to consider a waiver of Adams' ineligibility.

Helping Break Unionist Isolation

We must anticipate that Adams will exploit any contact to his own ends. Partly for that reason, care must be taken not to alienate the already-isolated Unionist community. Several actions might be considered. Enhanced dialogue with UUP leader James Molyneaux, who has been quietly supportive of the peace process, would highlight our desire to engage all elements in Northern Ireland. NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties, which we believe has been approved in principle, to match our support for the Catholic SDLP, would also help.

Business Promotion

The depressed economic conditions of key areas of Northern Ireland, and the resultant impact on popular attitudes (especially youth) would make a U.S. business/investment promotion initiative particularly welcome. We already fund IFI projects, and should continue to do so. The Department of Commerce and OPIC could be mobilized to undertake similar initiatives.

Prayer Initiative

Working with the Catholic and Anglican/Protestant Church leaders on an initiative to bring the communities together, including, e.g., through a prayer breakfast in Washington, would raise our profile and support the Anglo-Irish efforts.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

YKUR
Rm 6086 // 0601207287
32 351

9102

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.49)
KBM 4/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

January 11, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland

~~to be discussed~~
wants not object
(and may see value)
"fine with him but
up to U.S."

Some developments in the Gerry Adams visa case you should be aware of:

... from
bar on IRA - political rep. from
The IRA got HOLL...
allow pictures but not review

-- We have heard informally that Adams will apply for a visa in the next week or so (~~it is possible even by the end of this week~~) in order to accept an invitation to come to the U.S. on January 26 as part of a program to permit all parties to the Northern Ireland dispute to air their positions (at the invitation of William Flynn, Chairman of the Board of Mutual of America Life Insurance Company).

-- The Irish ~~have been pushing~~ us to grant Adams a visa and use the opportunity to pressure him to accept the December 15 Joint Declaration. The British have opposed granting the visa in advance of Adams' renunciation of violence and demonstrated intent to carry through.

-- Embassy Dublin has heard that in the NATO bilateral between the President and Prime Minister Major that Major "accepted our proposal on Northern Ireland," and that now there is talk in Dublin of "a U.S. proposal" regarding next steps on Northern Ireland.

What we would propose is the following:

possible noises were made
on our part
2 Dec
Paris
in

-- When Adams' applies for a visa, use the occasion to engage him in a dialogue regarding his intent with respect to the December 15 declaration.

-- The Consul General would underline the President's message of December 22 in the Irish Times, and make explicit to Adams that we would be prepared to grant a waiver of his visa request if he would renounce violence and join the peace process.

-- If Adams' accepts our terms, we would issue ~~the visa~~ ^{as one time visa would}.
[[actions we might take to keep pressure on him to follow through with his pledge.]]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

1/11/94
1179
204
future
subject
with
the
how

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*indicate that we were paid to issue
2
content*

- If Adams balks and goes public with our discussions, we would
- We would also have to ensure that we do not alienate the Unionist community. Actions we might take include:
 - Engage UUP leader James Molyneaux -- who has been quietly supportive of the peace process -- in an enhanced dialogue.
 - Consider NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties to match our support for the Catholic SDLP.
 - Propose a U.S. business/investment initiative, working with OPIC and Commerce.
- We could also work with the Catholic and Anglican/Protestant Church leaders on an initiative to bring the communities together (e.g., via a high profile prayer breakfast in Washington).

(In related developments, apparently both Prime Minister Reynolds and John Hume have registered their dissatisfactions that their conversations with Jean Kennedy Smith have been leaked -- Reynolds heard accounts of his talks with Smith from the British Ambassador in Dublin, and Hume was upset that Ray Flynn apparently had "all the cables" of his discussions with Smith.)

Recommendation

If you approve this strategy, we will discuss this issue with State and develop a memorandum for the President's decision.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

*Made my effort
+ he would
have more.*

*208
Public
a strategy for leaf.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cleared 12/29/13 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUTH Wor DRAFT Ken
CLEAR 1 Ken 2 Ken
3 — 4 — 5 pm
6 — 7 pm 8 pm

ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/NE:KSTEPHENS:DKS
12/23/93 78027 SENEUK 2806
EUR:SOXMAN

P:LBUTLER
NSC:
CA/VO/L/C:LYONTZ
EUR:MAPETERS

EUR/NE:MPARMLY
S/S:
S/S-0:
L/CA:RHENDERSON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.52)
KBH 4/11/2023

EUR, EUR/NE

IMMEDIATE DUBLIN

IMMEDIATE LONDON

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR SMITH FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY OXMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, CVIS, EI, UK

SUBJECT: GERRY ADAMS VISA ISSUE

REF: A) DUBLIN 7365 (NOTAL) B) DUBLIN 7366
C) DUBLIN 7396 (NOTAL)

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIMELY REPORTS ON YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS, SEAN O'HUIGINN, AND JOHN HUME (REFTELS). WE AGREE WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS THAT ISSUANCE OF A VISA SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF BEING HELPFUL TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THAT IS THE CLEAR MESSAGE BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 22 COMMENTS TO THE IRISH TIMES, WHERE HE LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO REVIEW THE ISSUE IN LIGHT OF GERRY ADAMS' RESPONSE TO THE REYNOLDS-MAJOR INITIATIVE.

2. THE NEXT STEP IS UP TO GERRY ADAMS. [IF HE RENOUNCES VIOLENCE AND TAKES STEPS TO JOIN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE A NEW LOOK AT THE RATIONALE FOR A WAIVER THE NEXT TIME HE APPLIES FOR A U.S. VISA.] GRANTING GERRY ADAMS A VISA IS ONE OF THE MOST VISIBLE PIECES OF LEVERAGE WE HAVE TO USE WITH SINN FEIN/PIRA TO ENCOURAGE THEIR JOINING THE PEACE PROCESS. WE WANT TO BE SURE, AS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

SEAN O'HUIGINN PUT IT SO APTLY TO YOU, THAT WE "MAXIMIZE REWARDS." WE HOPE THE CARROT OF A U.S. VISA WILL PROVIDE ADDED INCENTIVE TO GERRY ADAMS TO MOVE AWAY FROM VIOLENCE. YY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INITIALS

APPR:	WC	_____
DRAFT:	DR	_____
OTHER:	PT	_____
OTHER:	MP	_____
OTHER:	MR	_____
OTHER:	NSC	_____
OTHER:	BB	_____
OTHER:	S/S	_____

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2011-0355-F (1.53)
 KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P:DARUSSELL/EUR/NE:JTEFFT:PAM
 01/26/94 7-6071
 THE SECRETARY

P:PTARNOFF
 CA:MRYAN
 S/CT:BBODINE
 S/S-0:

EUR:MAPETERS
 NSC:
 S/S

IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, LONDON IMMEDIATE

LONDON - PLEASE PASS TO BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: CVIS, PREL, IR, UK

SUBJECT: GERRY ADAMS VISA REQUEST

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS ACTION MESSAGE FOR DUBLIN OR BELFAST.
3. CONSUL GENERAL AT EMBASSY DUBLIN SHOULD SEEK AN EARLY MEETING WITH GERRY ADAMS TO DISCUSS HIS VISA APPLICATION. IF ADAMS HAS RETURNED TO BELFAST, CONSUL GENERAL AT CG BELFAST SHOULD CONTACT ADAMS AND CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION.
4. THE CONSUL GENERAL AT THE ACTION POST SHOULD CONVEY THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO ADAMS:
 - WASHINGTON IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING YOUR VISA APPLICATION.
 - IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR WASHINGTON TO KNOW IF YOU WOULD BE WILLING TO STATE PUBLICLY THAT:
 - YOU PERSONALLY RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND URGE ~~ALL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

will walk to that end; + But

2

seek an

~~PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO DO SO NOW; THAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THAT THE JOINT DECLARATION REPRESENTS THE BASIS FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS.~~

(basis of the

-- SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD HELP WASHINGTON CLARIFY YOUR VIEWS AND DETERMINE WHETHER A WAIVER OF YOUR INELIGIBILITY WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME.

5. POSTS SHOULD REPORT ADAMS' REACTION BY IMMEDIATE CABLE. POSTS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENTS OR THE PRESS. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOI AND HNG ARE BEING HANDLED SEPARATELY.

YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SODERBERG, LEBOURGEOIS, NSC, SUM2, VAX, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 141545Z SEP 94

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7843

RUEHDC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2053

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.54)
KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 014600

COMMERCE FOR USDOC/4000/AS/IEP/CMEISSNER
AND USDOC/4200/DAS/EUR/PVARGO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAID, EFIN, UK, EI
SUBJECT: LOOKING FOR WAYS TO HELP THE NORTHERN IRELAND
PEACE PROCESS: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

REF: (A) STATE 244940 (B) 93 LONDON 22850 (C) LONDON
14240

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY AND PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS: EMBASSY APPRECIATES OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER ITS VIEWS ON WAYS THE USG COULD SHOW ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS OUR PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS AND HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH CONGEN BELFAST. EMBASSY OFFICERS WILL VISIT BELFAST AT THE END OF THE MONTH TO DISCUSS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WITH A FOCUS ON WAYS TO PROMOTE PRIVATE INVESTMENT. PLEASE LET US KNOW BY COB SEPTEMBER 26 IF WASHINGTON AGENCIES HAVE ANY SPECIFIC INTERESTS THAT THEY WOULD LIKE EMBASSY OFFICERS TO ADDRESS DURING THIS VISIT.
3. OUR PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING U.S. INITIATIVES TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY AND PROMOTE JOB GROWTH:
 - INVESTMENT CONFERENCE AND MISSION;
 - INCREASED FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI) AND ACTION TO EXPEDITE IFI'S WORK AND ALLOW DIRECT PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

- DIRECT AIR SERVICE FROM THE UNITED STATES;
- TOURISM PROMOTION;
- AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE; AND
- TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION.

WE DO NOT THINK IT LIKELY THE UK WOULD BE WILLING TO OFFER TAX BREAKS FOR INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

4. IN FORMULATING U.S. INITIATIVES, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK IN MIND, IN PARTICULAR THE NEED TO FOSTER TRUST AND COOPERATION FROM THE MAJORITY COMMUNITY. TO THIS END, USG SHOULD AT THIS STAGE AVOID MEASURES THAT TREAT THE ISLAND AS A UNIT OR SUGGEST THAT THE USG DOES NOT CONSIDER THE PROVINCE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE UK. THAT SAID, ENHANCED ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND (OR JOINT APPROACHES TO SOMETHING LIKE TOURISM) COULD BE A USEFUL ELEMENT IN THE REVITALIZATION OF THE REGION'S ECONOMY. END SUMMARY

UK INCOME TAX REDUCTION

5. REF A ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON THE PRACTICALITY OF ENCOURAGING THE UK TO OFFER A LIMITED TAX EXEMPTION OR REDUCTION ON INCOME TAX FOR COMPANIES LOCATED IN NORTHERN IRELAND. WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT ANY SUCH MEASURE WOULD BE ENACTED FOR SEVERAL REASONS:

- THE LARGE UK BUDGET DEFICIT, CURRENTLY RUNNING AT ABOUT SIX PERCENT OF GDP, RESULTS IN STRONG RESISTANCE TO TAX CUTS OF ANY SORT.
- THERE IS ALREADY A NET UK SUBSIDY OF 4.5 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR TO THE PROVINCE, SO THERE IS LITTLE INCLINATION TO PROVIDE MORE. THIS INCLUDES OUTRIGHT GRANTS TO PROMOTE OUTSIDE INVESTMENT.
- HM TREASURY STRONGLY OPPOSES DIFFERENT TAX RATES FOR ONE DISADVANTAGED REGION SINCE THERE ARE MANY OTHER AREAS THAT COULD QUALIFY. MOREOVER, TAX BREAKS LACK TRANSPARENCY, DISTORT ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND PRESENT TAX ADMINISTRATION PROBLEMS.
- DIFFERENTIAL CORPORATE (OR INDIVIDUAL) TAX RATES FOR NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD REQUIRE FREESTANDING LEGISLATION IN THE PARLIAMENT. MP'S FROM EVERY OTHER DISADVANTAGED AREA IN THE UK WOULD CLAMOR FOR TAX BREAKS FOR THEIR CONSTITUENTS.
- FINALLY, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANYTHING BUT A VERY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LARGE TAX PREFERENCE WOULD HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT EFFECT IN ATTRACTING NEW INVESTMENT. FOREIGN INVESTORS ALREADY FIND THE UK ONE OF THE MOST ATTRACTIVE SITES IN EUROPE EVEN WITH THE CURRENT CORPORATE TAX RATE OF 33 PERCENT. A REDUCTION TO THE TOP U.S. CORPORATE RATE OF 30 PERCENT WOULD ONLY PROVIDE MARGINAL BENEFIT TO U.S. FIRMS.

EXISTING INVESTMENT INCENTIVES

6. AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE WE HAVE EXAMINED EXISTING UK INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD OF NORTHERN IRELAND (IDB) OFFERS A WIDE RANGE OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE INWARD INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY AND TRADEABLE SERVICES:

- CAPITAL GRANTS UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE COST OF THE PROJECT;
- TRAINING GRANTS;
- RENT GRANTS UP TO FIVE YEARS; AND
- INTEREST RELIEF GRANTS TO OFFSET INTEREST COSTS.

7. FISCAL 1993-94 (APRIL 1993 - MARCH 1994) WAS IDB'S MOST SUCCESSFUL YEAR SINCE 1982 WITH 13 INVESTMENTS TOTALING 260 MILLION POUNDS STERLING (413 MILLION DOLLARS), OF WHICH IDB GRANTS ACCOUNTED FOR 64 MILLION POUNDS (102 MILLION DOLLARS).

INVESTMENT PROMOTION

8. THE END OF VIOLENCE SHOULD ITSELF REMOVE A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO INVESTMENT. THE U.S. SHOULD REINFORCE THIS BY EXPLORING MEANS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND JOB CREATION IN THE REGION. THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS IS PROBABLY BY MAKING BUSINESS MORE AWARE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH INVESTMENT CONFERENCES AND MISSIONS. IDB OFFICIALS CLAIM THAT FULLY 24 OF THE 38 U.S. FIRMS PRESENTLY ACTIVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND DECIDED TO INVEST THERE BECAUSE OF THE EFFORTS, BOTH PROMOTIONAL AND FINANCIAL, OF THE IDB. (THESE U.S. FIRMS EMPLOY ,000 WORKERS AND HAVE INVESTED OVER 850 MILLION DOLLARS IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. WE BELIEVE A HIGH-LEVEL INVESTMENT CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON THIS WINTER OR NEXT SPRING WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY SPARK INCREASED INTEREST WITHIN THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY. MANY OF THE U.S. FIRMS ALREADY OPERATING IN NORTHERN IRELAND COULD SHARE THEIR POSITIVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE PROVINCE'S HIGHLY-EDUCATED AND MOTIVATED WORKFORCE. A HIGH-LEVEL INVESTMENT MISSION TO NORTHERN IRELAND FROM THE U.S. AFTER SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL. AMCHAMS AND MANUFACTURING ASSOCIATIONS IN THE U.S., UK AND IRELAND SHOULD BE MOBILIZED TO SUPPORT THESE EFFORTS.

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND

10. WE CONSIDER THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI) THE BEST WAY TO CHANNEL NEW USG FINANCIAL RESOURCES SINCE IT IS TRUSTED BY BOTH RECIPIENTS AND DONORS, INCLUDING THE CONGRESS. IT HAS PROVED ITSELF EFFECTIVE IN PUTTING RESOURCES DIRECTLY IN THE HANDS OF PEOPLE WHO KNOW THE PRIORITIES AND HAS EIGHT YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN VETTING PROJECTS AND MONITORING RESULTS. MOREOVER, IF SOME NEW FOCUS OR ACCELERATION OF SPENDING IS DESIRED, A SPECIAL FACILITY COULD PROBABLY BE CREATED FOR THAT PURPOSE. BRITISH OFFICIALS, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE CRITICIZED IFI'S SLOW RESPONSE TIME, BUT WE SEE NO REASON WHY A CONCERTED EFFORT ON OUR PART COULD NOT SPEED UP THE PROCESS.

11. IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO REVISE THE IFI TO ALLOW DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM INDIVIDUALS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS. DOING SO COULD INCREASE PUBLIC AWARENESS AND SUPPORT FOR ITS ACTIVITIES.

NEED FOR DIRECT AIR LINK WITH U.S.

12. WE HAVE BEEN STRUCK THAT IN VIRTUALLY EVERY DISCUSSION REGARDING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROVINCE'S ECONOMY OUR INTERLOCUTORS EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR DIRECT IR SERVICE FROM THE UNITED STATES. SUCH AN AIR LINK IS WIDELY SEEN AS CRUCIAL TO ATTRACTING BOTH POTENTIAL INVESTORS AND TOURISTS.

13. CURRENTLY ONE SMALL U.S. CARRIER, AMERICAN TRANSAIR, FLIES BETWEEN BELFAST AND THE U.S. THE WEEKLY (BIWEEKLY IN SUMMER) FLIGHT FROM NEW YORK LANDS IN BELFAST, CONTINUES TO RIGA, LATVIA, AND RETURNS BY THE SAME ROUTE. NO U.K. CARRIER PRESENTLY OPERATES A DIRECT FLIGHT BETWEEN BELFAST AND THE U.S., ALTHOUGH THE U.K. COULD ADD BELFAST AS AN ADDITIONAL GATEWAY UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14. AIRLINE COMPANIES, OF COURSE, MUST THEMSELVES DECIDE ON COMMERCIAL GROUNDS WHETHER POTENTIAL TRAFFIC FROM OTHER U.S. GATEWAYS WOULD WARRANT SERVICE. IN THE NEXT ROUND OF CIVIL AVIATION TALKS WITH HMG, THE USG COULD RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL CHARTERS AND "EXTRA-BILATERAL" SCHEDULED SERVICES TO BELFAST. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO NEGOTIATE FULL 5TH FREEDOM TRAFFIC RIGHTS.

TOURISM PROMOTION

15. MOST ANALYSTS CONSIDER THE TOURISM INDUSTRY TO BE THE BEST PROSPECT FOR MUCH NEEDED NEAR-TERM JOB CREATION. TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE HAVE WREAKED HAVOC ON THE PROVINCE'S TOURISM INDUSTRY.

16. TOURISM EARNINGS CONTRIBUTE ONLY 1.5 PERCENT TO THE REGION'S GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, COMPARED TO 5.6 PERCENT IN THE REST OF THE BRITISH ISLES. WHILE OVER 1.2 MILLION TOURISTS VISITED NORTHERN IRELAND LAST YEAR, TOURISM OFFICIALS TELL US OF THEIR CONCERN THAT MOST WERE VISITING RELATIVES (AND THEREFORE NOT STAYING IN HOTELS) OR ON BUSINESS TRIPS. THEY EXPECT PEACE WILL GREATLY INCREASE THE NUMBERS COMING PURELY FOR HOLIDAYS, WHO NOW ONLY ACCOUNT FOR 20 PERCENT OF VISITORS, COMPARED TO 49 PERCENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AND 44 PERCENT IN GREAT BRITAIN. SUCH "PURE HOLIDAY MAKERS" SPEND FAR MORE PER PERSON ON LODGING, MEALS AND SIGHTSEEING.

17. A RECENT REPORT FROM THE CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY (CBI) ESTIMATES THAT THE TOURISM INDUSTRY COULD GENERATE AN ADDITIONAL 3,000 JOBS IN THE SHORT TERM AND UP TO 10,000 BY THE END OF THE DECADE, A NUMBER EQUIVALENT TO ROUGHLY HALF THE JOBS EXPECTED TO BE LOST IN THE SECURITY INDUSTRY OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

18. USG INITIATIVES IN THIS SECTOR MIGHT INCLUDE TOURISM PROMOTION AT INVESTOR CONFERENCES AND INCREASED FUNDING FOR PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND, TO IMPROVE THE TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE CONGRESS IS NEGATIVE ABOUT TOURISM PROJECTS (REF C) SO WE WOULD HAVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO TRY AND CHANGE THEIR VIEWS ON THIS.)

AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE

19. NORTHERN IRELAND'S AGRI-FOOD SECTOR IS RELATIVELY MORE IMPORTANT THAN IN VIRTUALLY ANY OTHER REGION OF THE UK, ACCOUNTING FOR SEVEN PERCENT OF GDP AND 10 PERCENT OF EMPLOYMENT. AS A RESULT, IT IS THREE TIMES MORE IMPORTANT TO THE ECONOMY OF NORTHERN IRELAND THAN IS THE CASE FOR THE UK AS A WHOLE. AS NORTHERN IRELAND HAS A POPULATION OF ONLY 1.5 MILLION, THE AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY RELIES HEAVILY ON EXPORTS.

20. NORTHERN IRELAND RECENTLY APPLIED FOR USDA APPROVAL FOR ITS SLAUGHTERHOUSES TO EXPORT TO THE UNITED STATES. A TEAM FROM USDA'S FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE IS PLANNING TO VISIT NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE NEAR FUTURE. CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN TO EXPEDITING THE APPROVAL PROCESS.

21. ANOTHER POSSIBLE U.S. INITIATIVE COULD INVOLVE DEVELOPING A PROGRAM SIMILAR TO SECTION 1420 OF THE 1985 FARM BILL WHICH PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. AGRIBUSINESS ALSO SHOULD BE MADE AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY INVESTMENT MISSION.

TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION

22. ONE AVENUE FOR ENHANCING COOPERATION IN THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AREA WOULD INVOLVE ESTABLISHING COLLABORATION AMONG "TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION CENTERS" THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN SET UP IN THE U.S. AND NORTHERN IRELAND. MARY GOOD, USDOC UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECHNOLOGY, EXPLORED THIS POSSIBILITY DURING HER VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND IN JUNE.

CROWE
BT
#4600

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03
<^SSN>4600
<^TOR>940914115246 M1251992
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<^SSN>4600

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

To Kately -
Could we get

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VAX VERSHBOW

State to do a background paper on the issues relating to the framework document. Include

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 281636Z OCT 94
text dr articles 213 of Irish Const. + analysis of what is at issue re act of '20.

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0008

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2277

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 017119

Lets discuss I'm not sure I know what the issues are re: the framework document + where we go from here.

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: MAYHEW CAUTIONS THAT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE AGREED

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT BREAKFAST WITH THE AMBASSADOR OCTOBER 28, NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY SIR PATRICK MAYHEW CAUTIONED US NOT TO ASSUME AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED ON THE ANGLO-IRISH "FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT" FOR NEW ALL-PARTY TALKS ON THE FUTURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. EVERYONE WANTED AGREEMENT, BUT THE REMAINING PROBLEMS WERE VERY DIFFICULT.

3. MAYHEW CONFIRMED THAT THE KEY AREAS OF DIFFERENCE WERE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (ARTICLES TWO AND THREE OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND ACT OF 1920), THE SCOPE OF NEW CROSS-BORDER INSTITUTIONS, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE EUROPEAN UNION. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SHOULD BE MANAGEABLE: THEY HAD LITTLE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE, BUT WERE THE HIGHEST CARD REYNOLDS HAD TO PLAY, AND HE WAS UNDERSTANDABLY HOLDING OUT FOR THE MAXIMUM PAYOFF.

4. CROSS-BORDER INSTITUTIONS WERE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT, MAYHEW SAID. THE IRISH WANTED TO SET UP FREE-STANDING, NON-ACCOUNTABLE BODIES WITH EXTENSIVE POWERS. THE UNIONISTS COULD NOT SWALLOW THIS, AND HMG ALSO HAD PROBLEMS WITH IT. THE BRITISH IDEA WAS TO START MODESTLY, WITH LIMITED POWERS DELEGATED TO BODIES FOCUSING ON AREAS OF UNQUESTIONED COMMON INTEREST. AS THESE PROVED THEIR WORTH AND UNIONISTS GREW COMFORTABLE WITH THEM, MORE BODIES AND POWERS COULD BE ADDED. MAYHEW WONDERED WHETHER THE USG COULD QUIETLY SUPPORT THIS "COMMON LAW" APPROACH IN DISCUSSIONS WITH IRISH LEADERS.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.53)
KBH 7/11/2023

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

5. FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT, MAYHEW ACKNOWLEDGED, WOULD BE A "VERY CONSIDERABLE SETBACK" TO THE PEACE PROCESS. WITHOUT A FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, THERE COULD BE NO NEW ALL-PARTY TALKS. HMG WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK BILATERALLY WITH DUBLIN AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PARTIES, AND COULD MAKE SOME PROGRESS IN INDIVIDUAL AREAS, BUT THE CONTENTIOUS ISSUES WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED IF THERE WERE TO BE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

6. COMMENT: MAYHEW'S CAUTION IS A USEFUL ANTIDOTE TO THE CURRENT GENERAL EUPHORIA. WE STILL THINK IT MORE LIKELY THAN NOT THAT AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED -- THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS WOULD BE SEVERE. BUT WE ALSO SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE REMAINING HURDLES, AND SHOULD EXPECT FURTHER LOBBYING FROM BOTH SIDES. CROWE

BT
#7119

NNNN
<MSGID> M1331698

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.56)
KBH 4/11/2023

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VAX VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 281627Z OCT 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6475
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2429
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 005895

NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND SODERBERG FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S HOLBROOKE AND EUR/NE

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, UK, EI
SUBJECT: IRISH UPSET BY PERCEIVED BRITISH SLIGHT AT
FORUM

REF: (A) LONDON 16940
(B) DUBLIN 05843

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION ON OCTOBER 28 (SEPTTEL), DPA ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION HEAD SEAN O'HUIGINN TOLD ME THAT:

-- IRISH OFFICIALS ARE "VERY UPSET" OVER BRITISH AMBASSADOR BLATHERWICK'S AND M.P. PETER TEMPLE-MORRIS' REFUSAL TO ATTEND THE OPENING SESSION OF THE FORUM. THE IRISH CONSIDER THEIR REFUSAL A "SLAP IN THE FACE" SINCE IT APPEARS THE BRITISH WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO HIGHLIGHT THEIR DISTASTE FOR THE FORUM. (ALL MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS WERE INVITED TO ATTEND THIS OPENING SESSION. NO AMBASSADOR WAS UNDER ANY OBLIGATION TO SPEAK TO PARTICIPANTS.)

-- THE IRISH DO NOT KNOW WHY MAJOR REFUSED TO ALLOW BLATHERWICK TO ATTEND. SOME ARE SPECULATING THAT MAJOR IS FOLLOWING A DUAL TRACK, I.E., SAYING ONE THING WHILE DOING ANOTHER, PERHAPS FROM A DESIRE TO HOLD THINGS UP UNTIL CLOSER TO THE NEXT BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION.

*Kasly-
Did all but
the British attend?
ms*

Saudy -

Here's all you should need
on Ireland. I've left a "to do history"
with Kathy Stevens who will work it
up for the press tomorrow.

I forgot to fill you in on ~~the~~^{the} TL pointer I
mentioned earlier. He is intrigued by Studeman's
suggestion that we covertly lift the Bosnian
arms embargo & asked that we should look at
it very quietly. I've conveyed to Vershlow &
he'll work up a proposal.

Kathy Stevens is fully up to speed. I'll
call in.

MS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.58)
KRM 4/11/2023

NEAL WOLIN FYI

FROM: NANCY SODERBERG

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland: Sinn Fein Officials Arrive,
IRA Statement Predicted for August 31

Sinn Fein officials Joe Cahill and Patrick Treanor arrived in New York mid-day August 30. Cahill refused to talk to the press at the airport, saying he was on a "private visit." The visa story will likely receive extensive press treatment in Britain and Ireland tomorrow, though it will be overshadowed by the IRA announcement, if it comes tomorrow, as now expected. If the IRA statement warrants it, the President should consider issuing a statement welcoming the breakthrough and perhaps telephoning Reynolds and Major as well.

Cahill and Treanor agreed they would not engage in fund-raising in the U.S., that they would adhere to a set itinerary (which includes stops in New York, Connecticut, Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago) and that they would depart immediately if the anticipated announcement by the IRA does not reflect a commitment to the total cessation of violence. In any event, their departure must take place no later than September 4.

Predictably, the visa issuances have made the Unionists, already fearful of a "British sell-out," even more jittery. I tried unsuccessfully to reach Ulster Unionist Party leader James Molyneaux today by telephone but left word emphasizing our desire to maintain an active dialogue with the Unionist community. Molyneaux will be meeting with Bill Crowe in London on Thursday.

There is speculation in the press about what the U.S. is prepared to do should there be a breakthrough in Northern Ireland. We are preparing a package of options for you to consider in such an event, including such ideas as convening a Presidential Conference on Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland, increasing the annual U.S. contribution to the International Fund for Ireland and creating an "America House" in Belfast under USIA auspices. While some of these steps would require new funding from Congress or other legislative initiatives, the watershed event of an IRA renunciation of violence, if it occurs, could provide a unique opportunity for such an initiative.

Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith tried to reach the President by telephone today. We have talked with her on his behalf, but

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

should he decide to telephone her, she can be reached in Dublin at the Embassy, 353-1-6687122, or at her residence, 353-1-677-0101/3506.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

EYES ONLY

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING CABLE FROM NANCY SODERBERG TO
AMBASSADOR CROWE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:

RATHER THAN WAKE YOU AGAIN, I THOUGHT I'D GIVE YOU AN UPDATE IN
WRITING. OUR VISITORS SEEM TO HAVE ARRIVED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND
SO FAR HAVE DECLINED TO TAKE QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS. THE VISA
WAIVER LEAKED MID AFTERNOON HERE BUT THE REACTION SEEMS TO BE
FAIRLY STRAIGHT FORWARD SO FAR. I TRUST YOU RECEIVED OUR PRESS
GUIDANCE.

REGARDING THE EXPECTED ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE IRA, OUR BEST
INFORMATION INDICATES THAT IT WILL COME ON WEDNESDAY. ONCE WE
HAVE SEEN THE TEXT, THE PRESIDENT MAY WANT TO CALL PRIME MINISTER
MAJOR. ASSUMING THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS WHAT WE EXPECT, WE WILL ALSO
WANT TO ISSUE A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND WILL BE SURE TO
CONSULT WITH YOU FIRST.

TONY LAKE CALLED MOLYNEAUX BUT HE HAD LEFT FOR LONDON. HE HAD A
BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH THE PARTY SECRETARY JIM WILSON AND
CONVEYED THE POINTS WE HAD DISCUSSED. MR. WILSON SEEMED
DELIGHTED BY THE CALL AND INDICATED THAT SOME OF THEIR OFFICIALS
WERE IN FACT CONSIDERING A VISIT TO THE U.S. BUT THEY WERE
UNDECIDED BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. YOU MAY HEAR MORE IN
YOUR MEETING ON THURSDAY. MOLYNEAUX HAS NOT CALLED US BACK BUT
WE'LL LET YOU KNOW IF WE HEAR FROM HIM. WILSON SAID MOLYNEAUX
WAS IN A BUOYANT MOOD AND THAT HE PLANNED TO SEE THE PRIME
MINISTER THIS WEEK. HE MADE A POINT OF SAYING THAT MEETING IS
NOT PUBLIC.

I AM OFF TO THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT OF PANAMA BUT
SANDY BERGER, SANDY VERSHBOW AND/OR KATHY STEPHENS WILL BE
HANDLING THE ISSUE AND WILL BE IN TOUCH. LET'S HOPE THINGS WORK
OUT!

BEST REGARDS,

NANCY

October 3, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

FROM: BROOKE DARBY

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: Telephone Call Between Nancy Soderberg and Gerry Adams (1st Official Contact Between U.S. Official and Sinn Fein Representative)

3:25 - 4:15 P.M., SATURDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1994

-- Hi, Nancy Soderberg here.

-- Yeah, nice to meet you by phone.

-- Likewise, how's the trip going?

-- Who do you think was behind the murder attempt and other....?

-- When was that?

-- Yeah, it's something I've been following for a long time when I was with Senator Kennedy's Office -- plastic bullets and shoot to kill. It's something people here have a long standing issue with the British over.

-- Yeah, he told me about it.

-- OK, I'll pass that on.

-- I think he has every intention of continuing to do that.

-- This is a very naughty thing.

-- Let me tell you where we are on your trip to D.C. I know you've been talking to Niall (O'Dowd) -- who has been great. He's really first class and can keep things to himself -- which is all too rare.

I think he's filled you in on where we are on the meeting. It's problematic. What we trying to do is balance your needs with those of the British and the Unionists so we can push all sides to move forward to help those who have taken courageous steps, including yourself.

[2011-0355-F, 1.6b]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

-- This should have been handled differently.

You got some misinformation in the beginning.

-- We didn't get into the process until your trip was already planned. It was important for you to keep to your original itinerary but it was not the best timing for us.

-- It is hard for you to understand our nuances of bureaucracy.

-- We wanted to try to keep our strong support of you and our good relations with the Unionists and British to allow us to push them forward.

-- What was important was that you maintained your timeframe and we appreciated the political sensitivities of the British and Unionists given the short timeframe between timing since the ceasefire.

To keep the British from going off the deep end, we needed you to come and to calibrate the reciprocity of who you'd see in D.C. with the distance from the ceasefire -- the longer away you get from the ceasefire, the higher level the visit. You would be received at a level commensurate with how long it is away from the ceasefire.

For you to come for 2 weeks with your itinerary, be received by Members of Congress, meet with people at State and from the White House, announce the lifting of the ban.....

-- The President's goal is to support you strongly and keep us in a position to push the British when we need to.

-- I appreciate that.

-- That's true, right.

-- That's why we were thinking your visit would be further down the road so we could work it out ahead of time.

-- I would have wanted to avoid this situation.

-- The context of how the people here view the situation -- that's the fundamental problem and why we want to put distance at receiving at this level. There needs to be a time lag between coming to the White House and renouncing violence.

-- . Let me tell you the politics.

-- There is a strong culture in the U.S. against those involved in violence.

It was two years from the time the PLO announced violence that they came here.

-- It was a major heavy lift to get the visa.

-- That's not how people look at it here.

-- Yes, you've done what we asked and made a courageous step forward.

-- Here, the ultimate prestige presence is the prestige of walking through the White House doors needs to be calibrated as part of a process we're getting moving.

-- We've done a lot getting you here, lifting the ban, getting you meetings with Administration officials. We support you politically and are sending strong support and visible acceptance.

-- This is part of a process. First you get received officially. We went through this with the President last night. He said we can do more next time -- that this is part of a process.

-- We know the problem is with the Unionists and with Hume having met with the President. But the Unionists are seen as not involved in violence.

-- I said we should have had this done 3 weeks ago and told people that we wanted to avoid this kind of discussion.

-- There are a couple of ways to look at this. Part of it is how the press is playing it up because we haven't been able to say what we're doing.

-- I think this situation is unfortunate but we are where we are. We spend about six hours yesterday on this. None of us are comfortable on this but we're trying to make the best of it.

-- Niall has been extraordinarily helpful.

-- With respect to how we play this -- I want to announce the ban is lifted on talking to Sinn Fein and the meeting with you at the State Department in a White House press release. They'll be regular meetings in Belfast and Dublin and dialogues with you directly. You'll be able to present your

case at the State Department. It will be useful for you to develop a dialogue with the State Department who does the diplomacy (not just with me).

- My only rebuttal is that I understand the situation. But this is the beginning of the relationship and of a process. You have the support of the White House and we are pushing the other parties.
- We got jammed on your planning your trip before we could work it.
- Tony Lake negotiated with Major on how to keep them on board. It is important to coordinate your trip with making decisions on where and by whom you'd be received. To go back against the British will undercut us in going back to the British on some of the things you may need.
- They're in a bind.
- This should have been worked out well before you got on a plane.
- I did. I was pretty clear.
- I heard the Belfast thing didn't go too well. Niall mentioned that, which is unfortunate.
- In Val's defense, that was State's formal instructions -- he had no choice.
- We wanted to clearly work out the fundraising issue before you got here.
- My best advice is -- this is a bad situation. It's unfortunate and should have been avoided. But now you have 2 choices: to agree to a meeting or not.

If you agree, we can talk to the Unionists and Major and keep Alderdice away. We can make a big deal of lifting the ban and the meeting with White House and State people, including the Vice President's National Security Advisor.

The Vice President has been very helpful. Without him, you wouldn't have gotten the visa in February.

- It is a worse negative to have no meeting. They can say they've won -- that there's friction between us.

- Or we can say this is part of a process. We can get our press operation to make this a big deal.
- You don't want to minimize the magnitude of your walking in the doors of the State Department and letting our press operation work it.
- I recommend announcing this as soon as possible. I can't say anything now. I don't want to say anything until you've agreed.
- The difference is and this is where you have credibility -- they have had a dialogue with us for some time, so they have meetings with us at a higher level.

But this is a first step and we can the press to spin this. This is the first time we've talked to you in 25 years. That's no minor action.

- I understand the problems with the Unionist access.
- You're beginning to change perceptions. This is the first stage in a process that will continue.

The President said yesterday that we will do more next time and I think he means it. You have a friend in moving forward.

- You shouldn't minimize the fact that we want a chip for going back to the British --- to say that we've held up our end and now you do your part.
 - I was very straightforward with Niall on this and I was hopeful we could change this.
- But the reality is that everything was set in stone when...
- He is from the same hometown as Tony Lake -- he's been very helpful in talking to Tony about this.
 - We aren't going to do anything until you're comfortable with it.
 - Saturday.
 - All I would say -- let me leave you with -- let's start it on Monday and we can build from there.

- I think we can do that with this meeting: lifting the ban and make clear that's exactly what we're doing.

- Likewise.
- You should talk to me later and I'll fill him in.
- You should know that we spent a lot of time going back and forth on this.
- I've been formally prohibited from talking to you until today.
- OK.
- Let me give you a number for this evening if you want to talk again (gave home number). I'll be here 'til 6:00 and then home.
- We can talk later tonight or tomorrow morning.
- I'm going to talk to him right now.
- I called you.
- Do you want to set a time to talk again, or just when you're ready?
- I'll leave it with you and let me know what you want to do.
- If you want to do it tomorrow, it would be helpful to formally announce whatever we agree on.
- Do you mean to lift the ban without addressing the meeting?
- We announce....
- It would be helpful for you if we announced the ban without addressing the meeting.
- OK, let me see if we can do that.
- Is there someone I can talk to while you're at the reception?
- Historic first contact.
- I'll let him know either way -- I'll go talk about it right now.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

NZS - Should this change our position? R

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KIRNEY L... ROSENBERG
SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLE SUMZ MAY 1994

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 100955Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4430
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1765
RUSNSTB/USCINCPAC VAIHINGEN GE

Annual Conf in February

***** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *****

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 00051Z

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, RI, US, NS
SUBJECT: FERGUS FINLAY ON NOFIBER DECLAR
REF: DUBLIN 00218

DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.41)
RBH 4/11/2023

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FERGUS FINLAY, PERSONAL ADVISOR TO FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING, TOLD US ON JANUARY 25 THAT:
 - SINN FEIN/IRA HAD APPARENTLY REACHED THE JOINT DECLARAT. AND WOULD NOT/NOT REVERSE COURSE.
 - THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAD ESCORTED PROTESTS LEADING TO THE JOINT DECLARATION OWING TO THE FACT THAT JERRY ADAMS AND MARTIN MCGUINNESS GENUINELY BELIEVED IN IT. BUT, THEY HAD EVIDENTLY MISCALCULATED IN BELIEVING THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING THE HARD-LINERS ABOARD WITH THEM. NEITHER HAD THE COURAGE OPENLY TO OPPOSE THEM.
 - SINN FEIN/IRA WOULD LIKELY CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO REFLECT UPON, AND TO SEEK CLARIFICATION ABOUT, THE JOINT DECLARATION.

MEM FILE, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO GET REALLY SPA. S TALK STARTED AT THE END OF FEBRUARY.
EVEN IF SINN FEIN/IRA REJECTS THE JOINT DECLARATION, IT WOULD REMAIN SIGNIFICANT FOR THE BUILDING UP OF TRUST BETWEEN THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND THE IRA. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER IN THE FUTURE TO WORK TOGETHER.

-- TO ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT, STREY RELATED THAT SEAN O'HUIGINN, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, AND HE HAD RECENTLY TAKEN ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY MEMBERS KEN MAGINN AND THE MCGIMPSEY BROTHERS OUT TO EAT AT A NICE RESTAURANT JUST DOWN THE STREET FROM DFA. FINLAY ADDED THAT HE WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH UNIONISTS. SMITH

BT
#0502

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

NNNN

<MSGID> M0846247

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 08

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BLEICKEN BURGOS CLARKER FILE HOLL SUM2 VAX WALKER

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 311755Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6418
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 1163
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 01725
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INI
IAL REACTIONS TO ADAMS
VISA

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-03-55-F.(1.65)
KBH 4/11/2023

SUMMARY

1. (S) INITIAL REACTIONS IN THE UK TO THE USG DECISION TO GRANT A VISA TO SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS ARE ALMOST UNIFORMLY NEGATIVE. ONLY ONE NEWSPAPER EDITORIAL HAS APPEARED SO FAR; THE GENERAL TONE OF THE REPORTING IS HIGHLY CRITICAL. HMG HAS SAID ONLY THAT THE DECISION IS AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR THE USG, AND THAT IT HOPES THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE WILL CONVINCe ADAMS TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE. PRIVATELY, HOWEVER, OFFICIALS ARE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED AND ANGRY. THE LABOR PARTY'S PUBLIC LINE IS THE SAME AS THE GOVERNMENT'S. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS ARE PUBLICLY NEUTRAL, BUT PRIVATELY THINK WE EXACTED TOO SMALL A PRICE.

2. (S) IN NORTHERN IRELAND, UNIONISTS ARE OUTRAGED, WHILE THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOR PARTY (SDLP) HOPES THE VISA WILL ENCOURAGE ADAMS TO ACCEPT THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. SINN FEIN WELCOMED THE USG DECISION TO "DEEPEN UNDERSTANDING IN THE U.S.A." OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND SITUATION, AND DENIED THAT ADAMS HAD GIVEN ANY UNDERTAKING TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE. THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP), THE LARGEST IN THE PROVINCE, HAS FROZEN RELATIONS WITH OUR CONSULATE GENERAL, WHICH HAS FIELDDED NUMEROUS ANGRY CALLS. BOTH UNIONIST PARTIES ARE BOYCOTTING THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.
CRITICAL REPORTING

3. (U) MOST BRITISH PAPERS CARRIED REPORTS OF THE USG DECISION TO WAIVE ADAMS' VISA INELIGIBILITY IN THEIR JANUARY 31 EDITIONS, BUT THE STORY APPARENTLY BROKE TOO LATE FOR EDITORIAL COMMENT IN THE MORNING DAILIES. THE "EVENING STANDARD" TOOK THE LINE THAT "THE BRITISH

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 08

GOVERNMENT NEEDEDN'T LOSE MUCH SLEEP" ABOUT LETTING "A RATHER VERBOSE POLITICIAN WHOSE ARGUMENTS ARE NOT, TO PUT IT MILDLY, INTELLECTUALLY COHERENT" LOOSE ON THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. WE EXPECT MORE CRITICAL EDITORIALS TOMORROW.

4. (U) THE OTHER ARTICLES CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF STRAIGHT REPORTING OF THE DECISION, THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, AND REACTIONS. BUT THEY ALSO NOTED THAT ADAMS HAD NOT MET THE CONDITIONS STIPULATED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S JANUARY 27 STATEMENT, AND CLAIMED THAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAD IGNORED ADVICE FROM THE BUREAUCRACY. ACCORDING TO "THE TIMES":

-- "THE STATE AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENTS AND THE FBI HAD AGREED WITH BRITAIN THAT MR. ADAMS'S APPLICATION, SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE OF HIS TERRORIST LINKS, AS EIGHT BEFORE IT HAD BEEN."

-- "THEIR VIEWS WERE APPARENTLY OVERRULED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND BY NANCY SODERBERG, THE NSC'S THIRD-IN-COMMAND."

5. (U) ALL NEWSPAPERS VIEWED THE DECISION AS A COUP FOR ADAMS AND THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) -- "AN ENTRANCE TO MAINSTREAM POLITICS FOR THE IRA AND ITS POLITICAL MOUTHPIECE," ACCORDING TO THE "DAILY MAIL," WHICH ALSO SAID THE CONFERENCE "NOW THREATENS TO TURN INTO A PARADE OF TRIUMPH FOR THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT."

6. (U) THE PAPERS ALSO CONCLUDED UNANIMOUSLY THAT THE VISA DEALT "A BODY BLOW TO JOHN MAJOR, THE GREATEST IN A YEAR OF INCREASING COLDNESS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND LONDON" ("DAILY MAIL"). ACCORDING TO "THE TIMES," IT "SEEMS CERTAIN TO RAISE NEW QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SO-CALLED 'SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP' SINCE MR. CLINTON TOOK POWER." IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE, THE ARTICLE CONTINUED, "THAT THE BUSH OR REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS WOULD HAVE DELIVERED SUCH A SLAP IN THE FACE TO AMERICA'S CLOSEST ALLY."

STIFF UPPER LIP

7. (LOU) DOWNING STREET HAS NOT ISSUED ANY FORMAL

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 LONDON 01725

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INITIAL REACTIONS TO ADAMS
VISA

REACTION TO THE DECISION. PRESS OFFICE OFFICIALS TOLD US THAT THEY WERE USING ONLY THE FOLLOWING LINE IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 08

- "WE HOPE THAT THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE WILL FIRMLY IMPRESS GERRY ADAMS THAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA MUST END VIOLENCE IMMEDIATELY AND PERMANENTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JOINT DECLARATION."
8. (U) BEFORE THIS LINE WAS SET IN CONCRETE, DOWNING STREET SPOKESMEN HAD ALSO TOLD REPORTERS THAT:
- "ADAMS SAID IN A STATEMENT THAT HE WANTS TO END VIOLENCE AND IS WORKING TOWARDS SUPPORTING THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION, AND IT IS ON THAT BASIS THAT HE IS BEING ADMITTED, UNDER VERY STRICT CONDITIONS FOR 48 HOURS."
- "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT ISSUE VISAS FOR ADMISSION TO THE U.S."

PRIVATE ANGER

-
9. (S) A SENIOR NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) OFFICIAL TOLD US JANUARY 31 THAT HMG WAS DETERMINED TO AVOID PUBLIC RECRIMINATIONS, AND TO "KEEP ANY NOTE OF DISAPPOINTMENT OUT OF OUR PUBLIC VOICE." PRIVATELY, HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT DISAPPOINTMENT WOULD BE "THE MOST DIPLOMATIC WAY OF PUTTING IT. THE MOOD HERE IS THAT WITH FRIENDS LIKE THAT, WHO NEEDS ENEMIES?"
10. (S) SINN FEIN'S STRATEGY, THE OFFICIAL CONTINUED, WAS TO PROBE FOR AND EXPLOIT ANY GAPS AMONG THE BRITISH, IRISH AND U.S. POSITIONS. LONDON AND DUBLIN HAD STRUGGLED, WITH SOME DIFFICULTY, TO MAINTAIN A UNITED FRONT. AS FOR THE USG, "WE CAN UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL NEXUS IN WASHINGTON, BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT IT'S AN UNFORTUNATE DECISION. ADAMS GETS ALL THE BENEFITS OF BEING A GOOD BOY WITHOUT ACTUALLY BEING A GOOD BOY."
11. (S) SIMILARLY, AN FCO OFFICIAL DESCRIBED THE MOOD THERE AS "GLOOMY." HE SAID THE TIMING OF THE CONFERENCE, JUST AS FOREIGN SECRETARY DOUGLAS HURD VISITED WASHINGTON FOR IMPORTANT TALKS, COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN WORSE. THE SIMULTANEOUS PRESENCE OF HURD AND ADAMS IN THE U.S. WOULD FORCE THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TO REACT TO EACH OF ADAMS' STATEMENTS IN A WAY THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE TO DO IN LONDON.
12. (S) A SENIOR AIDE TO THE PRIME MINISTER CALLED THE AMBASSADOR TO REGISTER DOWNING STREET'S PRIVATE OUTRAGE OVER THE DECISION. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR HMG, WHICH HAD REPEATEDLY MADE ITS VIEWS KNOWN AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN WASHINGTON. MOREOVER, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT ADAMS HAD NOT MET THE ADMINISTRATION'S OWN CRITERIA FOR A WAIVER. THE AIDE ALSO NOTED THAT ADAMS WAS A LEADER OF AN ORGANIZATION THAT KILLED AND MAIMED NUMEROUS BRITISH CITIZENS, INCLUDING POLICE AND

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 08

SOLDIERS, PUBLIC FIGURES AND CHILDREN. TO GRANT HIM A WAIVER RAN COUNTER TO OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY.

13. (U) ONLY ONE CONSERVATIVE MP HAS COMMENTED PUBLICLY ON THE ISSUE SO FAR -- FORMER NORTHERN IRELAND JUNIOR MINISTER MICHAEL MATES. HE TOLD BBC RADIO THAT THE DECISION WAS "MYSTIFYING," THAT IT HANDED "AN ENORMOUS PROPAGANDA COUP" TO PIRA, AND THAT SINN FEIN HAD "LED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AROUND BY THE NOSE."

OPPOSITION PARTY RESPONSES

14. (C) THE MOST UNEQUIVOCAL WELCOME FOR THE DECISION CAME FROM LEFT-WING LABOR MP TONY BENN, WHO HAS BEEN CAMPAIGNING AGAINST HMG'S ORDER EXCLUDING ADAMS FROM GREAT BRITAIN. SHADOW NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY KEVIN MCNAMARA TOLD THE PRESS THAT "WE ARE AGAINST EXCLUSION ORDERS IN PRINCIPLE. IT IS PURELY AN INTERNAL DOMESTIC MATTER FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND I HAVE NO
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 LONDON 01725

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INITIAL REACTIONS TO ADAMS
VISA

VIEWS ABOUT IT." SPEAKING TO US PRIVATELY, MCNAMARA ECHOED THAT LINE, ADDING THAT "IF IT EASES GERRY ADAMS INTO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, WE WOULD WELCOME IT."

15. (C) LIBERAL DEMOCRAT NORTHERN IRELAND SPOKESMAN LORD HOLME TOLD US THAT, WHILE HIS PARTY WOULD NOT CRITICIZE THE USG DECISION, THEY WERE "NOT ECSTATIC" OVER IT. A U.S. VISA FOR ADAMS "MEANS MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE" TO SINN FEIN, AND WAS WORTH A MUCH HIGHER PRICE THAN WE HAD EXACTED. HOLME SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT ADAMS REPRESENTED ONLY THE VIOLENT RUMP OF THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT, WHICH HAD CHOSEN TO ENGAGE IN TERRORISM RATHER THAN WORK THROUGH THE AVAILABLE DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES. ADAMS WAS "NOT A MANDELA, NOT AN ARAFAT." THE LAVISH PUBLIC ATTENTION HE WOULD GET AT THE CONFERENCE WOULD PUT HIM "TOO MUCH AT CENTER STAGE."
NORTHERN IRELAND RESPONSES

16. (U) REACTIONS IN THE PROVINCE PRODUCED NO SURPRISES, BUT SOME DEPRESSING (SEE PARA 22) AND PERHAPS OMINOUS (PARAS 25-26) FEATURES. SINN FEIN WELCOMED THE DECISION, SAYING IT REFLECTED CONCERN BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION "TO DEEPEN UNDERSTANDING IN THE U.S.A. OF HOW THE PEACE PROCESS IN IRELAND CAN BE ADVANCED." BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, ADAMS TOLD REPORTERS THAT HE HAD

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 08

GIVEN NO UNDERTAKING TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE (AND ACCORDING TO SOME PRESS ACCOUNTS, THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ASKED FOR ONE), BUT THAT HE HAD HAD "A VERY INTERESTING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS" WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL.

17. (C) WE HAVE HEARD NO DIRECT STATEMENT FROM SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME, THOUGH HIS ROLE IN PRESSING FOR THE VISA IS WIDELY KNOWN. SDLP MP JOE HENDRON, WHO TOOK ADAMS' WEST BELFAST SEAT IN THE 1992 GENERAL ELECTION, GAVE A QUALIFIED WELCOME TO THE DECISION. HE COULD UNDERSTAND UNIONIST ANGER, BUT FELT THAT THE VISIT TO THE U.S. MIGHT HELP ADAMS FURTHER THE PEACE PROCESS.

18. (U) THE RESPONSE FROM UNIONISTS HAS BEEN UNIVERSAL OUTRAGE. DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) LEADER IAN PAISLEY TOLD REPORTERS HE WAS NOT SURPRISED THAT "THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS GONE BACK ON THEIR DECLARED PRINCIPLES IN FAVOR OF GERRY ADAMS. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC IRISH BOSTON LOBBY WAS TOO STRONG FOR CLINTON TO RESIST." PAISLEY ALSO WROTE TO THE AMBASSADOR TO NOTE "THE OUTRAGE CAUSED IN NORTHERN IRELAND AT THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION TO GRANT A VISA TO ALLOW THE SINN FEIN/IRA LEADER GERRY ADAMS TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES TO ADDRESS A CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK."

19. (C) DUP SPOKESMAN NIGEL DODDS CALLED CONSUL GENERAL MARTINEZ JANUARY 31 TO ALERT HIM TO PAISLEY'S LETTER TO THE AMBASSADOR. HE SAID THAT, TO THE DUP, IT APPEARED THE ADMINISTRATION HAD MADE A "COMPLETE REVERSAL." HE ADDED THAT THE VISA DECISION HAD SMASHED ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THE U.S. COULD PLAY A ROLE AS AN "HONEST BROKER" IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

20. (U) ULSTER UNIONIST MP JOHN TAYLOR ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

-- "THE DECISION BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION TO GIVE IN TO PRESSURE FROM THE IRISH LOBBY IN WASHINGTON CAME AS NO SURPRISE, BUT IT IS DESPICABLE.

-- "THE IRISH MAFIA, LED BY SENATOR KENNEDY, HAVE BEEN CANVASSING THE WHITE HOUSE FOR A VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS. I EXPECT NOTHING BETTER FROM SUCH PEOPLE WITHIN THE U.S.A. DEMOCRATIC PARTY. NOW WE KNOW THAT NOT ONLY DOES THE IRA GET MOST OF ITS FUNDING FOR ITS MURDER GANGS FROM THE U.S.A., BUT THE WHITE HOUSE NOW WISHES TO FACILITATE THE APOLOGISTS FOR THE IRA MURDER CAMPAIGN IN IRELAND.

-- "THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND SAY TO CLINTON, 'YOU SHOULD BE ASHAMED OF YOURSELF -- NO LONGER CAN YOU CONDEMN TERRORISM ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD.'"

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 LONDON 01725

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 08

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI
 SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INITIAL REACTIONS TO ADAMS
 VISA

21. (U) UUP MP KEN MAGINNIS, WHO HAD PLANNED TO ATTEND THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE IF SINN FEIN DID NOT, TOLD REPORTERS THAT THE USG HAD "HANDED TERRORISM A VICTORY."

-- "MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT TWO CONDITIONS WERE BEING IMPOSED ON MR. ADAMS.... I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED EITHER OF THOSE."

-- "ONE HAS TO ASSUME THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT INTERESTED IN FURTHERING THE PEACE PROCESS BUT MERELY FINDING WAYS OF PRESSURING OUR OWN GOVERNMENT TO CONCEDE TO VIOLENCE."

UNIONISTS FREEZE RELATIONS

22. (C) UUP GENERAL SECRETARY JIM WILSON PHONED THE CONSUL GENERAL JANUARY 31 TO INFORM HIM THAT PARTY LEADER JAMES MOLYNEAUX HAD CANCELED HIS SCHEDULED MEETING WITH THE CG LATER THAT DAY, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER FORMAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE UUP AND THE CONSULATE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE WORD FROM "THE TOP," WILSON SAID, WAS THAT "YOU ARE NOT WELCOME HERE." THE UUP WOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT ON THE VISA ISSUE LATER IN THE DAY, AND IT WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE "OVER-POLITE."

23. (C) THE DUP HAS NOT BROKEN RELATIONS, BUT MAY DO SO LATER WHEN IT HEARS OF THE ACTION OF THE MORE MODERATE UUP.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONFERENCE

24. (C) IN A LATE-NIGHT CONVERSATION WITH THE CG JANUARY 30, MAGINNIS EXPRESSED AS MUCH UNHAPPINESS WITH THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AS WITH THE USG. THE VISA DECISION WAS AN OUTRAGE, COMING AS IT DID AFTER A VERY PUBLIC USG DEMAND THAT ADAMS HAD VERY PUBLICLY NOT MET. BUT THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZERS HAD ALSO FAILED EVEN TO REPLY TO A FORMAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (ON SINN FEIN ATTENDANCE) HE HAD SENT THEM A WEEK EARLIER. NOT HAVING RECEIVED AN ANSWER, MAGINNIS SAID HE NOW BELIEVED THE ENTIRE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN SET UP "IN BAD FAITH."

PUBLIC ANGER AND SECURITY CONCERNS

25. (C) CONGEN BELFAST REPORTS THAT A POPULAR RADIO CALL-IN PROGRAM JANUARY 31 FEATURED MUCH ABUSIVE LANGUAGE DIRECTED AT THE CONSULATE. WORD HAS CIRCULATED IN NORTHERN IRELAND, VIA THAT PROGRAM AND THE RUMOR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 08

MILL, THAT THE CONSUL GENERAL WAS "RESPONSIBLE" FOR THE ADAMS VISA, AND THAT IT WAS ISSUED ONLY "ON HIS RECOMMENDATION" FOLLOWING THE JANUARY 28 INTERVIEW.

26. (C) THE CONSULATE ITSELF HAS FIELDDED A NUMBER OF IRATE TELEPHONE CALLS. SOME CALLERS "HOPED" THAT THE CONSULATE "DOESN'T GET BOMBED"; OTHERS EXPRESSED "CONCERN" THAT "NOTHING HAPPENS TO THE CG PERSONALLY." ONE OF THE MORE VOCIFEROUS CALLERS SAID SHE REPRESENTED "THOUSANDS" WHO WERE AWARE OF THE CG'S "INTERVENTION" ON ADAMS' BEHALF, AND THAT THE CG MIGHT DO WELL TO WATCH HIMSELF. NO CALL CONTAINED DIRECT THREATS TO CONSULATE STAFF, BUT THERE IS CLEARLY MUCH GRASSROOTS ANGER OVER THE ISSUE. THE CONSULATE HAS MADE NO COMMENT, PUBLICLY OR IN RESPONSE TO THE CALLS, REFERRING ALL INQUIRIES TO USIS LONDON AND RELEASING THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT TO THOSE WHO WANT IT.

27. (C) THE CONSUL GENERAL HAS MET WITH CONSULATE STAFF TO DISCUSS SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF PUBLIC ANGER. RSO LONDON PLANS TO DISCUSS THE CONSULATE'S SECURITY SITUATION WITH BELFAST POLICE OFFICIALS.

COMMENT

28. (S) UNLESS ADAMS SAYS SOMETHING IN NEW YORK THAT CLEARLY INDICATES POSITIVE SINN FEIN/PIRA MOVEMENT TOWARD THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION, WE ARE IN FOR A
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 LONDON 01725

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INITIAL REACTIONS TO ADAMS VISA

VERY ROCKY PERIOD. BRITISH MINISTERS AND MANY OFFICIALS UNDERSTAND THE FACTORS BEHIND OUR DECISION, BUT DON'T LIKE IT ANY BETTER FOR THAT. IF SINN FEIN REJECTS THE JOINT DECLARATION (AS IT WAS LIKELY TO IN ANY EVENT), IT IS INEVITABLE THAT MANY WILL SEE US AS PARTLY RESPONSIBLE. JOURNALISTS ARE LIKELY TO GIVE US A ROUGH TIME, STOKING OLD SUSPICIONS (PREDOMINANTLY BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY IN NORTHERN IRELAND) THAT THE USG SUPPORTS AT LEAST THE AIMS, IF NOT THE METHODS, OF THE IRA.

29. (C) CONGEN BELFAST'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNIONISTS HAVE SUFFERED A SHARP SETBACK. THE FACT THAT THE VISA ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE WHILE PIRA WAS ATTACKING SECURITY FORCES IN WEST BELFAST DID NOT HELP MATTERS. THE UUP MADE CLEAR TO THE CG THAT ITS BOYCOTT OF THE CONSULATE WAS PROFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL, NOT PERSONAL; THE CG WOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN QUIET "OFF THE RECORD" CONTACTS WITH WILSON, A CLOSE AND VALUED CONTACT. BUT

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 08 OF 08

IT IS LIKELY TO BE QUITE SOME TIME BEFORE RELATIONS BETWEEN EITHER OF THE UNIONIST PARTIES (WHO REPRESENT THE MAJORITY OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S POPULATION) AND ANY USG OFFICIALS RETURN TO THE EASY CORDIALITY THAT HAD DEVELOPED IN RECENT YEARS. ?385"

BT

#1725

NNNN

<MSGID> M0853344

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 07

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: GARDNER NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

*File
relat Fund*

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 251342Z NOV 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6630

INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2484

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F(1.66)

KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 006370

LONDON PLEASE PASS BELFAST

STATE PLEASE PASS TO AID FOR AA/ENI DINE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EAID, EUN, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROPOSED EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
PACKAGE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND BORDER COUNTIES

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY - A PROPOSAL WILL BE MADE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON DECEMBER 7, 1994, AND, IF APPROVED, PRESENTED TO THE ESSEN MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON DECEMBER 9 AND 10, 1994, FOR AN ECONOMIC AID PACKAGE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND. THE PACKAGE WILL INCLUDE A MODEST INCREASE IN FUNDING FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND AND SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED FUNDING FOR EXISTING EU PROGRAMS IN BOTH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AREAS. THE REPORT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL CARLO TROJAN WILL RECOMMEND A "FREESTANDING" EU BODY TO OVERSEE THE PROGRAM. THE EU COMMITMENT TO NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BORDER COUNTIES SHOULD BE IN THE RANGE OF 100 MILLION - 150 MILLION ECU PER YEAR, IN ADDITION TO ALREADY COMMITTED STRUCTURAL AND COHESION FUNDS, FOR A MINIMUM OF THREE YEARS. END SUMMARY

3. THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH COLM LARKIN, DIRECTOR OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OFFICE IN DUBLIN, AND BRENDAN SCANNELL, FUND MANAGER OF THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI) FOR THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ON NOVEMBER 1, 1994. THE MEETING FOLLOWED A VISIT TO IRELAND BY EU ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL CARLO TROJAN, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EU TASK FORCE ON NORTHERN IRELAND ESTABLISHED BY JACQUES DELORS. ON NOVEMBER 14, 1994 TROJAN PREPARED THE FIRST DRAFT OF HIS REPORT TO THE COMMISSION OUTLINING EU GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 07

IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON NOVEMBER 29, 1994. IT SHOULD BE FORMALLY RATIFIED BY THE COMMISSION ON DECEMBER 7, 1994, AND PRESENTED BY DELORS TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION AT ESSEN ON DECEMBER 9 AND 10, 1994.

4. THE EU IS NOW THE MAJOR DONOR TO THE IFI CONTRIBUTING 15 MILLION ECU PER YEAR TO THE FUND. IN RESPONSE TO THE TERMINATION OF PARAMILITARY VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THE EU COMMISSION ALMOST IMMEDIATELY INCREASED ITS ANNUAL DONATION TO THE IFI BY 5 MILLION ECU TO 20 MILLION ECU PER YEAR. SHORTLY AFTER THE COMMISSION ANNOUNCEMENT, MEP'S ON THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BUDGET COMMITTEE VOTED TO TREBLE THE EU CONTRIBUTION TO IFI. THE MOVE CAME AS A SURPRISE TO THE COMMISSION AND WAS THE RESULT OF LOBBYING BY ALL THE NORTHERN IRELAND AND REPUBLIC OF IRELAND MEP'S FROM AREAS RECEIVING IFI FUNDS. THE COMMISSION IS CONCERNED THAT THE IFI, WITH A RELATIVELY SMALL SECRETARIAT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF, MAY NOT BE ABLE TO ABSORB AND PROPERLY DISTRIBUTE THIS SUDDEN DRAMATIC INCREASE IN FUNDING. CARLO TROJAN WAS SENT TO IRELAND TO CHAIR AN EU TASK FORCE CHARGED WITH PRODUCING A EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE CEASEFIRE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND CONVINCING THE IRISH AND UK GOVERNMENTS TO ACCEPT LESS DIRECT FUNDING TO THE IFI AS PART OF A LARGER OVERALL AID PROGRAM FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BORDER COUNTIES.

5. THE COMMISSION, ACCORDING TO LARKIN, IS READY TO FUND MORE PROJECTS, VIA IFI, IN THE SOCIAL AREAS BUT IS CONCERNED WITH REACTION IN THE U.S. CONGRESS. SCANNELL SAID THE FUND WOULD COMMIT MORE FUNDS TO THE SOCIAL AREA, UNDER THE NEW COMMUNITIES IN CRISES PROGRAM, OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS. HE HOPES THAT CONGRESS WILL RECOGNIZE THE RADICALLY CHANGED ENVIRONMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND FOLLOWING THE CEASEFIRE AND RECOGNIZE THAT THE FUND HAS TO REDIRECT ITS EFFORTS TO REFLECT THE NEW SITUATION.

6. BOTH SCANNELL AND LARKIN EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER UNIONIST PERCEPTIONS THAT THE FUND FAVORS NATIONALISTS OVER UNIONISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. SCANNELL SAID THE RECORD OF FUND DISBURSEMENTS PROVED THAT THE ALLEGATIONS WERE UNFOUNDED BUT RECOGNIZED THAT THE FUND HAD TO MAKE HEROIC EFFORTS TO REASSURE ALL PARTIES THAT THE FUND WAS NOT FAVORING ANY ONE COMMUNITY OVER ANOTHER. LARKIN SAID THAT TROJAN ALSO RECOGNIZED UNIONIST CONCERNS BUT CONSIDERS THEM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 07

UNFOUNDED.

7. LARKIN WAS ADAMANT THAT THE EU INITIATIVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BORDER COUNTIES WOULD BE A BRUSSELS CREATION REPRESENTING THE BRUSSELS' PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROBLEM AND NOT JUST A TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO THE IRISH AND U.K- GOVERNMENTS. THE COMMISSION'S PLANS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE THREE MEP'S FROM NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE REPORTS OF COMMISSION OFFICIALS RATHER THAN ONLY NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENTS. THE COMMISSION WANTS GREATER SYNERGY AMONG THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BORDER COUNTIES, PARTICULARLY INWARD INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL MECHANISMS. LARKIN SAID THAT DELORS HAS RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A REDEVELOPMENT BANK FOR NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUING PEACE BONDS USING THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 DUBLIN 006370

LONDON PLEASE PASS BELFAST

STATE PLEASE PASS TO AID FOR AA/ENI DINE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EAID, EUN, EI; UK

SUBJECT: PROPOSED EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND BORDER COUNTIES

THE EU WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN HOW U.S. EFFORTS MIGHT DOVETAIL WITH EUROPEAN EFFORTS. LARKIN SAID A NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE BONDS DRIVE IN THE U.S., MODELED ON PAST ISRAELI BOND DRIVES, MIGHT BE COMPATIBLE WITH EIB EFFORTS. HE HOPED THAT THE U.S. FIRMS LOOKING FOR INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD CONSIDER PARTNERSHIPS WITH EUROPEAN FIRMS HAVING SIMILAR INTERESTS.

8. LARKIN SAID THE UK GOVERNMENT WANTED TO MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR EUROPEAN CONSIDERATION. THE EU REJECTED THIS AND CALLED FOR A MORE WIDE SPREAD CONSULTATIVE PROCESS THAT WOULD RESULT IN A EUROPEAN PACKAGE ACCEPTABLE TO THE MEP'S, THE U.K. GOVERNMENT, AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. TROJAN AND THE MEP'S MET WITH OVER 500 PEOPLE AND ACCEPTED ABOUT 80 PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION BY BRUSSELS. THE COMMISSION'S PROGRAM WILL FOCUS ON THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

(A) URBAN AND RURAL REGENERATION - THIS WIDERANGING INITIATIVE WILL ENCOURAGE LOCAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REGENERATION BY IMPROVING THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 07

ENVIRONMENT IN URBAN AREAS, TOWNS, AND VILLAGES. IT WILL INCLUDE LANDSCAPING AND CLEARING OF DERELICT SITES. THERE WILL BE FOUR OR FIVE MAJOR URBAN REGENERATION PROJECTS; PROBABLY TWO IN BELFAST, ONE IN DERRY, AND ONE IN ANOTHER LOCATION.

(B) EMPLOYMENT - THIS INITIATIVE WILL FOCUS ON THE LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYED, THE YOUNG, AND THOSE DISPLACED FROM THE CONSTRUCTION AND SECURITY INDUSTRY. IT WILL SEEK TO DEVELOP EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES, INCLUDING TOURISM AND AGRI-TOURISM. THERE WILL BE A TRAINING PROGRAM IN ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE SKILLS SHORTAGES, AND ENCOURAGEMENT FOR INNOVATION AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LEADING TO JOB CREATION.

(C) CROSS-BORDER DEVELOPMENT - THIS PROGRAM WILL PROMOTE CROSS-BORDER DEVELOPMENT THROUGH ENHANCED TRADE, ECONOMIC INTERCOURSE, AND AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION AS WELL AS UPGRADING OF INFRASTRUCTURES, SUCH AS BORDER CROSSINGS AND NORTH-SOUTH LINKS.

(D) SOCIAL INCLUSION - THIS DRIVE WILL FOCUS ON DEPRIVED AND MARGINALIZED AREAS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BORDER COUNTIES. CROSS-COMMUNITY COOPERATION WOULD BE AN OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE OF THIS PROGRAM. THIS INITIATIVE WILL INCLUDE GRASSROOTS ACTIVITIES AIMED AT INTEGRATING THE TWO COMMUNITIES AND AN EDUCATION AND TRAINING COMPONENT AIMED AT VULNERABLE GROUPS, VICTIMS, EX-OFFENDERS, AND YOUNG PEOPLE.

(E) INWARD INVESTMENT AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT - THIS INITIATIVE WILL COMPLEMENT AND REINFORCE EXISTING POLICIES TO STIMULATE INVESTMENT AND PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF SME'S AS THE KEY TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND JOB CREATION IN THE REGION.

9. THE TROJAN TASK FORCE SUGGESTS A "SPECIFIC FREESTANDING SUPPORT PROGRAM" THAT IS MULTIANNUAL, COMPREHENSIVE, AND COMPLEMENTARY TO EXISTING POLICIES UNDER THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS. ALL FUNDING WILL BE IN ADDITION TO EXISTING EXPENDITURES IN THE REGION. THE PROGRAM'S BENEFITS MUST BE EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTED AMONG ALL COMMUNITIES, WHILE CONCENTRATING ON MOST DEPRIVED AREAS, AND PROGRAM IMPACT MUST BE IMMEDIATE AND VISIBLE.

10. THE TROJAN PROPOSALS WILL MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 07

(A) THE UK AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS ARE EXPECTED TO "REFOCUS" EXISTING STRUCTURAL FUND PROGRAMS IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEW ENVIRONMENT ARISING FROM THE CESSATION OF VIOLENCE AND TAKE OPTIMAL ADVANTAGE OF COMMUNITY INITIATIVES TO ENCOURAGE SUSTAINED SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE REGION.

(B) THE COUNCIL WILL INTRODUCE A "NEW INTEGRATED AND FREESTANDING SINGLE COMMUNITY INITIATIVE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BORDER COUNTIES" TO PROSECUTE THE URBAN AND RURAL REGENERATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND CROSS-BORDER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

(C) THE COUNCIL WILL ESTABLISH A NEW COMMUNITY INSTRUMENT TO ESTABLISH AND OVERSEE THE "SOCIAL INCLUSION PROGRAM" INCLUDING EDUCATION AND TRAINING, CROSS-COMMUNITY INTEGRATION, AND IMMEDIATE PROGRAMS FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS.

(D) THE ENHANCEMENT, IF NECESSARY BY NEW INSTRUMENTS, OF EXISTING FACILITIES TO ATTRACT INWARD INVESTMENT AND PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT OF SME'S, INCLUDING EIB LOANS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 DUBLIN 006370

LONDON PLEASE PASS BELFAST

STATE PLEASE PASS TO AID FOR AA/ENI DINE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EAID, EUN, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROPOSED EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND BORDER COUNTIES

(E) THE EXAMINATION OF APPROPRIATE ACTIONS IN OTHER COMMUNITY AREAS SUCH AS THE TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS (TEN'S) PROGRAM. THIS MAY INCLUDE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEWRY-BORDER HIGHWAY.

(F) THE NEW POLICY INSTRUMENTS WOULD BE MANAGED ON AN INTEGRATED BASIS TO ENSURE COMPLEMENTARITY OF EFFORT. THE NEW INSTRUMENTS WOULD WORK CLOSELY ON CO-FINANCING PROJECTS WITH SUCH PRE-EXISTING BODIES AS THE IFI.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 07

11. THE COMMISSION WANTS THE EU INITIATIVE TO HAVE APPROPRIATE GRASSROOTS INVOLVEMENT IN THE SHAPING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL PROGRAMS. A SINGLE CONSULTATIVE PLATFORM IS RECOMMENDED THAT WOULD INCLUDE LOCAL REPRESENTATION FROM BOTH COMMUNITIES.

12. THE TROJAN TASK FORCE RECOMMENDS THE EU INITIATIVE TO RUN FOR FIVE YEARS, CONCURRENTLY WITH THE PRESENT STRUCTURAL FUNDS. THE FIRST TRANCHE OF COMMUNITY FUNDING WOULD BE FOR THREE YEARS AT A LEVEL OF 100 MILLION TO 150 MILLION ECU'S PER YEAR. THE COMMUNITY WOULD THEN REVIEW THE INITIATIVE AND DECIDE ON FUNDING LEVELS FOR YEARS FOUR AND FIVE. COMMUNITY FINANCING WOULD BE LIMITED TO 75 PER CENT OF PROJECTS, OR 90 PER CENT FOR PROJECTS UNDER THE SOCIAL INCLUSION PROGRAM. CO-FINANCING FROM OTHER STRUCTURES, SUCH AS IFI, COULD BE USED TO PROVIDE REQUIRED MATCHING FUNDS. FUNDING WOULD BE DIRECTED PRIMARILY TO NORTHERN IRELAND, 75-80 PER CENT, WITH THE REMAINDER GOING TO THE BORDER COUNTIES.

13. BOTH LARKIN AND SCANNELL SAID THE NEW EU INITIATIVES AND OLDER STRUCTURES, SUCH AS IFI, COULD WORK TOGETHER HARMONIOUSLY. WHILE THE IFI IS "PROJECT" DRIVEN, THE EU INITIATIVES ARE "PROGRAM" DRIVEN. BOTH FEEL THE BRITISH WILL BE UNEASY WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE COMMUNITY INITIATIVE REMAIN "FREESTANDING." HOWEVER, THEY POINT OUT THAT, LIKE PRESENT STRUCTURAL FUNDS, MOST LOCAL ADMINISTRATION WILL BE UNDERTAKEN BY HOST COUNTRY CIVIL SERVANTS. THEY STRESSED THAT THE PLAN WAS ENDORSED BY ALL THE NORTHERN IRELAND MEP'S REPRESENTING THE FULL SPECTRUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY MEP IAN PAISLEY WOULD ONLY SIGN ON IF THERE WAS A FLAGSHIP PROJECT IN HIS DISTRICT. A ROAD FROM ANTRIM TO BALLYMENA WAS AGREED UPON. THE COMMISSION SEES NO NEED FOR THE ROAD, BUT CONSIDER IT A SMALL PRICE FOR PAISLEY'S COOPERATION. ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY MEP JIM NICHOLSON WAS DESCRIBED AS VERY HELPFUL.

14. BOTH SCANNELL AND LARKIN SAID THAT THE PLAN WOULD PUSH NORTH-SOUTH STRUCTURES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THE INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE ENVISIONED BY THE EU WILL BE ON A NORTH-SOUTH BASIS. TROJAN FOUND A LOT OF SUPPORT FOR INCREASED NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE NORTHERN BUSINESS COMMUNITY. THE EU WILL CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT ON A NORTH-SOUTH BASIS, SUCH AS THE NEW NATURAL GAS INTERCONNECTOR, UNDER

ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 07

THE TEN'S PROGRAM. THEY WILL ALSO ENCOURAGE CROSS-BORDER CONTACTS IN EDUCATION

UNDER THE ERASMUS PROGRAM AND MORE CROSS-BORDER CONTACTS FOR RURAL POPULATIONS VIA THE LEADER PROGRAM. LARKIN, SCANNELL, AND SEAN O'HUIGINN, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ANGLO-IRISH AFFAIRS IN THE IRISH DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARE CONVINCED THAT THE CROSS-BORDER ELEMENTS OF THE INITIATIVE WILL NOT OFFEND UNIONISTS.

15. LARKIN POINTED OUT THAT THE TROJAN REPORT OF THE EU TASK FORCE ON NORTHERN IRELAND WAS STILL A PROPOSAL AT THE "EUROPEAN CIVIL SERVANT LEVEL" AND HAS NOT FACED THE "POLITICAL LEVEL" OF THE COUNCIL. IT WILL BE DELORS' LAST EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND BOTH LARKIN AND SCANNELL ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE BRITISH WILL NOT LIKE THE REPORT BUT WILL AGREE TO ITS ADOPTION RATHER THAN RISK LOSING UP TO HALF A BILLION ECU OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. SMITH

BT
#6370

NNNN

<MSGID> M1382043

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 07
PRT: SODERBERG
SIT: SUM2

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.67)
KBH 4/11/2023

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 141545Z SEP 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7843
INFO RUEHDC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2053
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 014600

COMMERCE FOR USDOC/4000/AS/IEP/CMEISSNER
AND USDOC/4200/DAS/EUR/PVARGO

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAID, EFIN, UK, EI
SUBJECT: LOOKING FOR WAYS TO HELP THE NORTHERN IRELAND
PEACE PROCESS: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

REF: (A) STATE 244940 (B) 93 LONDON 22850 (C) LONDON
14240

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY AND PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS: EMBASSY
APPRECIATES OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER ITS VIEWS ON WAYS THE
USG COULD SHOW ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS OUR
PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS AND HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH
CONGEN BELFAST. EMBASSY OFFICERS WILL VISIT BELFAST AT
THE END OF THE MONTH TO DISCUSS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
WITH A FOCUS ON WAYS TO PROMOTE PRIVATE INVESTMENT.
PLEASE LET US KNOW BY COB SEPTEMBER 26 IF WASHINGTON
AGENCIES HAVE ANY SPECIFIC INTERESTS THAT THEY WOULD
LIKE EMBASSY OFFICERS TO ADDRESS DURING THIS VISIT.

3. OUR PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING U.S.
INITIATIVES TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY AND PROMOTE JOB
GROWTH:

-- INVESTMENT CONFERENCE AND MISSION;

-- INCREASED FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND
(IFI) AND ACTION TO EXPEDITE IFI'S WORK AND ALLOW DIRECT
PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS;

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 07

- DIRECT AIR SERVICE FROM THE UNITED STATES;
- TOURISM PROMOTION;
- AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE; AND
- TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION.

WE DO NOT THINK IT LIKELY THE UK WOULD BE WILLING TO OFFER TAX BREAKS FOR INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

4. IN FORMULATING U.S. INITIATIVES, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK IN MIND, IN PARTICULAR THE NEED TO FOSTER TRUST AND COOPERATION FROM THE MAJORITY COMMUNITY. TO THIS END, USG SHOULD AT THIS STAGE AVOID MEASURES THAT TREAT THE ISLAND AS A UNIT OR SUGGEST THAT THE USG DOES NOT CONSIDER THE PROVINCE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE UK. THAT SAID, ENHANCED ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND (OR JOINT APPROACHES TO SOMETHING LIKE TOURISM) COULD BE A USEFUL ELEMENT IN THE REVITALIZATION OF THE REGION'S ECONOMY. END SUMMARY

UK INCOME TAX REDUCTION

5. REF A ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON THE PRACTICALITY OF ENCOURAGING THE UK TO OFFER A LIMITED TAX EXEMPTION OR REDUCTION ON INCOME TAX FOR COMPANIES LOCATED IN NORTHERN IRELAND. WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT ANY SUCH MEASURE WOULD BE ENACTED FOR SEVERAL REASONS:

- THE LARGE UK BUDGET DEFICIT, CURRENTLY RUNNING AT ABOUT SIX PERCENT OF GDP, RESULTS IN STRONG RESISTANCE TO TAX CUTS OF ANY SORT.
- THERE IS ALREADY A NET UK SUBSIDY OF 4.5 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR TO THE PROVINCE, SO THERE IS LITTLE INCLINATION TO PROVIDE MORE. THIS INCLUDES OUTRIGHT GRANTS TO PROMOTE OUTSIDE INVESTMENT.
- HM TREASURY STRONGLY OPPOSES DIFFERENT TAX RATES FOR ONE DISADVANTAGED REGION SINCE THERE ARE MANY OTHER AREAS THAT COULD QUALIFY. MOREOVER, TAX BREAKS LACK TRANSPARENCY, DISTORT ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND PRESENT TAX ADMINISTRATION PROBLEMS.
- DIFFERENTIAL CORPORATE (OR INDIVIDUAL) TAX RATES FOR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 07

NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD REQUIRE FREESTANDING LEGISLATION IN THE PARLIAMENT. MP'S FROM EVERY OTHER DISADVANTAGED AREA IN THE UK WOULD CLAMOR FOR TAX BREAKS FOR THEIR CONSTITUENTS.

-- FINALLY, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANYTHING BUT A VERY LARGE TAX PREFERENCE WOULD HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT EFFECT IN ATTRACTING NEW INVESTMENT. FOREIGN INVESTORS ALREADY FIND THE UK ONE OF THE MOST ATTRACTIVE SITES IN EUROPE EVEN WITH THE CURRENT CORPORATE TAX RATE OF 33 PERCENT. A REDUCTION TO THE TOP U.S. CORPORATE RATE OF 30 PERCENT WOULD ONLY PROVIDE MARGINAL BENEFIT TO U.S. FIRMS.

EXISTING INVESTMENT INCENTIVES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 LONDON 014600

COMMERCE FOR USDOC/4000/AS/IEP/CMEISSNER
AND USDOC/4200/DAS/EUR/PVARGO

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EAID, EFIN, UK, EI

SUBJECT: LOOKING FOR WAYS TO HELP THE NORTHERN IRELAND
PEACE PROCESS: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

6. AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE WE HAVE EXAMINED EXISTING UK INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD OF NORTHERN IRELAND (IDB) OFFERS A WIDE RANGE OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE INWARD INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY AND TRADEABLE SERVICES:

-- CAPITAL GRANTS UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE COST OF THE PROJECT;

-- TRAINING GRANTS;

-- RENT GRANTS UP TO FIVE YEARS; AND

-- INTEREST RELIEF GRANTS TO OFFSET INTEREST COSTS.

7. FISCAL 1993-94 (APRIL 1993 - MARCH 1994) WAS IDB'S MOST SUCCESSFUL YEAR SINCE 1982 WITH 13 INVESTMENTS TOTALING 260 MILLION POUNDS STERLING (413 MILLION DOLLARS), OF WHICH IDB GRANTS ACCOUNTED FOR 64 MILLION POUNDS (102 MILLION DOLLARS).

INVESTMENT PROMOTION

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 07

8. THE END OF VIOLENCE SHOULD ITSELF REMOVE A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO INVESTMENT. THE U.S. SHOULD REINFORCE THIS BY EXPLORING MEANS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND JOB CREATION IN THE REGION. THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS IS PROBABLY BY MAKING BUSINESS MORE AWARE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH INVESTMENT CONFERENCES AND MISSIONS. IDB OFFICIALS CLAIM THAT FULLY 24 OF THE 38 U.S. FIRMS PRESENTLY ACTIVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND DECIDED TO INVEST THERE BECAUSE OF THE EFFORTS, BOTH PROMOTIONAL AND FINANCIAL, OF THE IDB. (THESE U.S. FIRMS EMPLOY ,000 WORKERS AND HAVE INVESTED OVER 850 MILLION DOLLARS IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS.)

9. WE BELIEVE A HIGH-LEVEL INVESTMENT CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON THIS WINTER OR NEXT SPRING WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY SPARK INCREASED INTEREST WITHIN THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY. MANY OF THE U.S. FIRMS ALREADY OPERATING IN NORTHERN IRELAND COULD SHARE THEIR POSITIVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE PROVINCE'S HIGHLY-EDUCATED AND MOTIVATED WORKFORCE. A HIGH-LEVEL INVESTMENT MISSION TO NORTHERN IRELAND FROM THE U.S. AFTER SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL. AMCHAMS AND MANUFACTURING ASSOCIATIONS IN THE U.S., UK AND IRELAND SHOULD BE MOBILIZED TO SUPPORT THESE EFFORTS.

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND

10. WE CONSIDER THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI) THE BEST WAY TO CHANNEL NEW USG FINANCIAL RESOURCES SINCE IT IS TRUSTED BY BOTH RECIPIENTS AND DONORS, INCLUDING THE CONGRESS. IT HAS PROVED ITSELF EFFECTIVE IN PUTTING RESOURCES DIRECTLY IN THE HANDS OF PEOPLE WHO KNOW THE PRIORITIES AND HAS EIGHT YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN VETTING PROJECTS AND MONITORING RESULTS. MOREOVER, IF SOME NEW FOCUS OR ACCELERATION OF SPENDING IS DESIRED, A SPECIAL FACILITY COULD PROBABLY BE CREATED FOR THAT PURPOSE. BRITISH OFFICIALS, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE CRITICIZED IFI'S SLOW RESPONSE TIME, BUT WE SEE NO REASON WHY A CONCERTED EFFORT ON OUR PART COULD NOT SPEED UP THE PROCESS.

11. IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO REVISE THE IFI TO ALLOW DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM INDIVIDUALS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS. DOING SO COULD INCREASE PUBLIC AWARENESS AND SUPPORT FOR ITS ACTIVITIES.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 07

NEED FOR DIRECT AIR LINK WITH U.S.

12. WE HAVE BEEN STRUCK THAT IN VIRTUALLY EVERY DISCUSSION REGARDING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROVINCE'S ECONOMY OUR INTERLOCUTORS EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR DIRECT IR SERVICE FROM THE UNITED STATES. SUCH AN AIR LINK IS WIDELY SEEN AS CRUCIAL TO ATTRACTING BOTH POTENTIAL INVESTORS AND TOURISTS.

13. CURRENTLY ONE SMALL U.S. CARRIER, AMERICAN TRANSAIR, FLIES BETWEEN BELFAST AND THE U.S. THE WEEKLY (BIWEEKLY IN SUMMER) FLIGHT FROM NEW YORK LANDS IN BELFAST, CONTINUES TO RIGA, LATVIA, AND RETURNS BY THE SAME ROUTE. NO U.K. CARRIER PRESENTLY OPERATES A DIRECT FLIGHT BETWEEN BELFAST AND THE U.S., ALTHOUGH THE U.K. COULD ADD BELFAST AS AN ADDITIONAL GATEWAY UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT.

14. AIRLINE COMPANIES, OF COURSE, MUST THEMSELVES DECIDE ON COMMERCIAL GROUNDS WHETHER POTENTIAL TRAFFIC FROM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 LONDON 014600

COMMERCE FOR USDOC/4000/AS/IEP/CMEISSNER
AND USDOC/4200/DAS/EUR/PVARGO

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EAID, EFIN, UK, EI

SUBJECT: LOOKING FOR WAYS TO HELP THE NORTHERN IRELAND
PEACE PROCESS: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

OTHER U.S. GATEWAYS WOULD WARRANT SERVICE. IN THE NEXT ROUND OF CIVIL AVIATION TALKS WITH HMG, THE USG COULD RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL CHARTERS AND "EXTRA-BILATERAL" SCHEDULED SERVICES TO BELFAST. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO NEGOTIATE FULL 5TH FREEDOM TRAFFIC RIGHTS.

TOURISM PROMOTION

15. MOST ANALYSTS CONSIDER THE TOURISM INDUSTRY TO BE THE BEST PROSPECT FOR MUCH NEEDED NEAR-TERM JOB CREATION. TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE HAVE WREAKED HAVOC ON THE PROVINCE'S TOURISM INDUSTRY.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 07

16. TOURISM EARNINGS CONTRIBUTE ONLY 1.5 PERCENT TO THE REGION'S GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, COMPARED TO 5.6 PERCENT IN THE REST OF THE BRITISH ISLES. WHILE OVER 1.2 MILLION TOURISTS VISITED NORTHERN IRELAND LAST YEAR, TOURISM OFFICIALS TELL US OF THEIR CONCERN THAT MOST WERE VISITING RELATIVES (AND THEREFORE NOT STAYING IN HOTELS) OR ON BUSINESS TRIPS. THEY EXPECT PEACE WILL GREATLY INCREASE THE NUMBERS COMING PURELY FOR HOLIDAYS, WHO NOW ONLY ACCOUNT FOR 20 PERCENT OF VISITORS, COMPARED TO 49 PERCENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AND 44 PERCENT IN GREAT BRITAIN. SUCH "PURE HOLIDAY MAKERS" SPEND FAR MORE PER PERSON ON LODGING, MEALS AND SIGHTSEEING.

17. A RECENT REPORT FROM THE CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY (CBI) ESTIMATES THAT THE TOURISM INDUSTRY COULD GENERATE AN ADDITIONAL 3,000 JOBS IN THE SHORT TERM AND UP TO 10,000 BY THE END OF THE DECADE, A NUMBER EQUIVALENT TO ROUGHLY HALF THE JOBS EXPECTED TO BE LOST IN THE SECURITY INDUSTRY OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

18. USG INITIATIVES IN THIS SECTOR MIGHT INCLUDE TOURISM PROMOTION AT INVESTOR CONFERENCES AND INCREASED FUNDING FOR PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND, TO IMPROVE THE TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE CONGRESS IS NEGATIVE ABOUT TOURISM PROJECTS (REF C) SO WE WOULD HAVE TO TRY AND CHANGE THEIR VIEWS ON THIS.)

AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE

19. NORTHERN IRELAND'S AGRI-FOOD SECTOR IS RELATIVELY MORE IMPORTANT THAN IN VIRTUALLY ANY OTHER REGION OF THE UK, ACCOUNTING FOR SEVEN PERCENT OF GDP AND 10 PERCENT OF EMPLOYMENT. AS A RESULT, IT IS THREE TIMES MORE IMPORTANT TO THE ECONOMY OF NORTHERN IRELAND THAN IS THE CASE FOR THE UK AS A WHOLE. AS NORTHERN IRELAND HAS A POPULATION OF ONLY 1.5 MILLION, THE AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY RELIES HEAVILY ON EXPORTS.

20. NORTHERN IRELAND RECENTLY APPLIED FOR USDA APPROVAL FOR ITS SLAUGHTERHOUSES TO EXPORT TO THE UNITED STATES. A TEAM FROM USDA'S FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE IS PLANNING TO VISIT NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE NEAR FUTURE. CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN TO EXPEDITING THE APPROVAL PROCESS.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 07

21. ANOTHER POSSIBLE U.S. INITIATIVE COULD INVOLVE DEVELOPING A PROGRAM SIMILAR TO SECTION 1420 OF THE 1985 FARM BILL WHICH PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. AGRIBUSINESS ALSO SHOULD BE MADE AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY INVESTMENT MISSION.

TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION

22. ONE AVENUE FOR ENHANCING COOPERATION IN THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AREA WOULD INVOLVE ESTABLISHING COLLABORATION AMONG "TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION CENTERS" THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN SET UP IN THE U.S. AND NORTHERN IRELAND. MARY GOOD, USDOC UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECHNOLOGY, EXPLORED THIS POSSIBILITY DURING HER VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND IN JUNE.

CROWE
BT
#4600

NNNN
<MSGID> M1251992

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 07

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: FILE

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 241336Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5998

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 1113

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 01245

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG REFUSES "CLARIFICATION"
BUT OFFERS "ASSURANCES"

SUMMARY

1. (U) PRIME MINISTER MAJOR AND NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MAYHEW HAVE AGAIN REJECTED SINN FEIN DEMANDS FOR "CLARIFICATION" OF THE DECEMBER 15 ANGLO-IRISH JOINT DECLARATION. DOWNING STREET PUBLISHED AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH SINN FEIN, IN WHICH GERRY ADAMS SOUGHT TO SCRAP THE DECLARATION AND NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF AN EARLIER IRISH DRAFT. IN A DECEMBER 20 SPEECH, MAYHEW OFFERED "ASSURANCES" TO BOTH UNIONISTS AND NATIONALISTS THAT THE DECLARATION MET THEIR FUNDAMENTAL ASPIRATIONS. HE STRESSED THAT THE OFFER TO SINN FEIN REMAINED OPEN, BUT THAT THE POLITICAL TALKS PROCESS WOULD CONTINUE WHATEVER ITS RESPONSE. BRITISH OPPOSITION AND ULSTER UNIONIST PARTIES SUPPORT HMG'S REJECTION OF CLARIFICATION, BUT THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOR PARTY (SDLP) -- WHILE INCREASINGLY EXASPERATED WITH SINN FEIN PROCRASTINATION -- WANTS MAJOR TO CALL ADAMS' BLUFF BY PROVIDING CLARIFICATION WITHOUT RENEGOTIATION.

2. (U) HMG WANTS TO GET THE TALKS BACK INTO FORMAL SESSION SOON, AND BELIEVES DUBLIN WILL AGREE, BUT IS UNSURE WHETHER SDLP LEADER HUME WILL PARTICIPATE. WE BELIEVE IT PUBLISHED THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ADAMS WANTS RENEGOTIATION, NOT CLARIFICATION. END SUMMARY.

COMMONS STATEMENTS

3. (U) JOHN MAJOR (IN PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTION TIME JANUARY 20) AND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW (IN A NORTHERN IRELAND DEBATE JANUARY 21) REITERATED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ACCEDE TO SINN FEIN CALLS FOR "CLARIFICATION" OF THE JOINT DECLARATION. MAYHEW SAID THAT "WE SHALL NOT ADD TO, OR TAKE AWAY FROM, GLOSS OR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.68)
KBH 4/11/2023

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 07

INTERPRET THE TEXT. IN SHORT, WE SHALL NOT CLARIFY IT BECAUSE IT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF, AND AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED IT WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO."

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

4. (U) ON JANUARY 21, DOWNING STREET RELEASED THE TEXTS OF AN UNSIGNED JANUARY 7 ADAMS LETTER TO MAJOR, AND THE JANUARY 20 REPLY BY MAJOR'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, RODERIC LYNE. TEXTS FOLLOW:

ADAMS LETTER:

MR. MAJOR, A CHARA

I AM TAKING THE UNUSUAL STEP OF WRITING TO YOU DIRECTLY REGARDING THE POTENTIALLY HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN IRELAND WHICH CURRENTLY EXISTS AND, SPECIFICALLY TO URGE YOU TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO REALIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY.

IN JOINT STATEMENTS WITH THE LEADER OF THE SDLP JOHN HUME AND IN MY OWN PUBLIC STATEMENTS I HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSERTED MY SINCERE BELIEF THAT IF ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, BUT MOST CRITICALLY YOUR GOVERNMENT, ARE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE COURAGE AND IMAGINATION, AN EFFECTIVE PEACE PROCESS CAN BE ESTABLISHED AT THIS POINT. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THE POSITION PUT TO YOU IN JUNE BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO MOVE US OUT OF CONFLICT AND TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION.

THE LEADERSHIP OF THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY HAS ALSO MADE ITS POSITION CLEAR. IN A STATEMENT ON OCTOBER 3 THEY SAID: "THE LEADERSHIP OF OGLAIGH NA HEIREANN WELCOMES THIS (THE HUME/ADAMS) INITIATIVE.

"WE ARE INFORMED OF THE BROAD PRINCIPLES INVOLVED WHICH WILL BE FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE DUBLIN AND LONDON GOVERNMENTS.

"IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REACTION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 LONDON 01245
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG REFUSES "CLARIFICATION"
BUT OFFERS "ASSURANCES"

TO THIS INITIATIVE SO FAR HAS BEEN NEGATIVE AND HAS FUELED UNIONIST REACTION. NONETHELESS, IF THE POLITICAL WILL EXISTS OR CAN BE CREATED, IT COULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR PEACE."

YOUR PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THIS WAS AN ABSOLUTE REJECTION. ADDITIONALLY THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION SIGNED BY YOU AND THE TAOISEACH, ALBERT REYNOLDS, ON DECEMBER 15 IS

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 07

SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT IN KEY AREAS TO THE IRISH POSITION PUT TO YOU IN JUNE. HOWEVER, IT HAS BEEN ASSERTED THAT THESE DIFFERENCES ARE NO MORE THAN SEMANTICAL AND THAT THE UNDERLYING POLITICS OF BOTH DOCUMENTS ARE IDENTICAL. REPUBLICANS ARE MORE THAN WILLING TO EXAMINE, POSITIVELY, THE VALIDITY OF SUCH AN ASSERTION. HOWEVER TO DO SO EFFECTIVELY AND ACCURATELY, FULL CLARIFICATION ON THE KEY ISSUES IS ESSENTIAL. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS, FROM 1990, BEEN INVOLVED IN PROLONGED CONTACT AND DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. ONLY RECENTLY WAS THIS CONTACT ENDED. NOW, WHEN YOU CLAIM YOU HAVE THE BASIS OF A SETTLEMENT YOU REFUSE TO USE THESE CHANNELS, AN INCONSISTENCY WHICH MUST INCREASE REPUBLICAN DOUBTS AND SUSPICIONS. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A REAL AND LASTING SETTLEMENT HAS NEVER BEEN MORE REALIZABLE. YOUR GOVERNMENT HOLDS THE KEY IN ALL OF THIS. IT IS CRUCIAL, THEREFORE, THAT YOU CLARIFY THESE ISSUES, URGENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY THROUGH DIRECT DIALOGUE. IF PEACE IS A REALISTIC PROSPECT, AS YOU HAVE ASSERTED, THEN THE OPPORTUNITY SHOULD NOT BE LOST BECAUSE OF CONFUSION OCCASIONED BY THE ABSENCE OF OPEN AND HONEST DIALOGUE.

IS MISE
GERRY ADAMS

LYNE REPLY:

DEAR MR. ADAMS,

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ASKED ME TO REPLY TO THE LETTER DATED 7 JANUARY WHICH, THOUGH UNSIGNED, IS ON YOUR HEADED NOTEPAPER.

AS YOU KNOW, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH MADE THEIR JOINT DECLARATION ON 15 DECEMBER. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND REFLECTED INTENSIVE WORK BETWEEN THEM IN THE PRECEDING WEEKS. YOUR LETTER SEEKS TO REOPEN ISSUES FOR RENEGOTIATION BY POINTING BACK TO A POSITION YOU SAY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT PUT FORWARD IN JUNE LAST YEAR. BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF RENEGOTIATION OF THEIR JOINT DECLARATION. IT PROVIDES A BALANCED FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY WHICH RECOGNIZES THE INTERESTS AND ASPIRATIONS OF BOTH MAIN TRADITIONS THAT EXIST IN IRELAND. THAT TEXT, AND ONLY THAT TEXT, IS WHAT IS AT ISSUE.

YOU ANNOUNCED THAT YOU WERE WRITING TO THE PRIME MINISTER. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS DECIDED TO MAKE THIS LETTER AND THAT RECEIVED FROM YOUR OFFICE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE.

YOURS SINCERELY,

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 07

RODERIC LYNE

5. (U) ADAMS LATER TOLD REPORTERS THAT HMG WAS PLAYING GAMES, AND THAT RELEASE OF THE LETTERS WAS "A PATENTLY OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO FRUSTRATE A GENUINE EFFORT TO END THE STAND-OFF." HE SAID HE WAS "PREPARED TO BE PERSUADED THAT THIS CAN IN FACT BE A STEP ALONG THE ROAD TO PEACE." BUT HE DID NOT BACK OFF FROM HIS REJECTION OF CENTRAL ELEMENTS OF THE DECLARATION.

MAYHEW SPEECH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 LONDON 01245

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG REFUSES "CLARIFICATION"
BUT OFFERS "ASSURANCES"

6. (U) IN A SPEECH TO THE TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN DINING CLUB IN LONDON JANUARY 20, MAYHEW OUTLINED THE HISTORY OF THE TALKS PROCESS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE JOINT DECLARATION. HE ATTEMPTED TO REASSURE BOTH UNIONISTS AND NATIONALISTS THAT THEIR ASPIRATIONS WERE FULLY ACCOMMODATED IN THE DECLARATION. HE SPELLED OUT AGAIN THE OFFER TO SINN FEIN OF EXPLORATORY BILATERAL TALKS THREE MONTHS AFTER A DEFINITIVE CESSATION OF VIOLENCE. THE DECLARATION WOULD STAND, AND THE OFFER WOULD REMAIN OPEN, BUT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT WOULD CONTINUE REGARDLESS OF SINN FEIN REACTION. EXCERPTS:

- "POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN IRELAND HAS NEVER BEEN FAR FROM THE SURFACE, AND HAS FREQUENTLY ERUPTED. TWO TRADITIONS WITH OPPOSING NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS HAVE LONG VIED WITH ONE ANOTHER. MANY THINGS HAVE BEEN DONE THAT ARE NOW THE SUBJECT OF REAL AND GENERAL REGRET."
- "WE WILL NOT ALLOW HISTORY TO STAND IN THE WAY OF A BETTER FUTURE. WE WILL NOT ALLOW AN OFTEN BLOODY HISTORY TO RULE US FROM THE GRAVE."
- AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT "MUST BE ACHIEVED IN A WAY THAT COMMANDS WIDE SUPPORT ACROSS BOTH TRADITIONS
-- THERE CAN BE NO GOING BACK TO A SYSTEM WHICH HAS THE ALLEGIANCE OF, AND IS OPERATED BY, ONLY ONE PART OF THE COMMUNITY."
- "THE JOINT DECLARATION ... IS NOT A SETTLEMENT IN ITSELF, BUT RATHER IS A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE. IT COMPLEMENTS AND UNDERPINS THE PEACE PROCESS."
- "TO THOSE WHO ASPIRE TO A SOVEREIGN AND UNITED IRELAND, THE DECLARATION SENDS A MESSAGE THAT SHOULD REASSURE. LEST THEY SUPPOSE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD PURSUE NARROW COLONIAL OR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 07

STRATEGIC AMBITIONS TO THEIR DETRIMENT, IT SAYS THE GOVERNMENT HAVE NO SELFISH STRATEGIC OR ECONOMIC INTEREST IN NORTHERN IRELAND."

-- FOR UNIONISTS, "THE PRIME MINISTER REAFFIRMED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD UPHOLD THE DEMOCRATIC WISH OF A GREATER NUMBER OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THEY PREFER TO SUPPORT THE UNION OR A SOVEREIGN UNITED IRELAND. THE DECLARATION MAKES IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT IT IS THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND ON THIS POINT THAT ARE AND WILL REMAIN DECISIVE."

-- "IT IS FOR THOSE INVOLVED IN THE TALKS PROCESS TO COME TO AGREEMENT ON THE TOTALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS, ON THE BASIS OF DEMOCRACY AND CONSENT.... (THE TWO GOVERNMENTS) WILL SEEK TO CREATE A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED IN A REASONABLE TIME-SCALE."

-- "WE WILL NOT ALLOW THOSE WHO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE, YET DECIDE NOT TO DO SO, TO APPLY A BRAKE TO PROGRESS."

-- "WHATEVER SINN FEIN'S RESPONSE PROVES TO BE, PROGRESS IS GOING TO CONTINUE."

-- "IF THE VIOLENCE ENDS, THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THAT IT HAS NECESSITATED WILL, BY DEFINITION, BECOME UNNECESSARY. BUT IF THE VIOLENCE CONTINUES, THE WORK OF OPPOSING IT WILL OF COURSE CONTINUE WITH THE UTMOST VIGOR."

-- "SINN FEIN HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING PEACE TO IRELAND, BUT NEITHER THEY NOR ANYONE ELSE HAS A VETO OVER THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND."

-- "NOR DO THEY HAVE A VETO ON POLITICAL PROGRESS. THE THREE STRANDED TALKS PROCESS CONTINUES...."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OFHPT LONDON 01245

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG REFUSES "CLARIFICATION" BUT OFFERS "ASSURANCES"

THERE IS A MOMENTUM FOR AGREEMENT, A HUNGER FOR THE DIGNITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF DECIDING AND GOVERNING LOCAL AFFAIRS, A DETERMINATION TO WORK TOGETHER. SINN FEIN CAN JOIN IN, OR STAY OUT, BUT THEY CAN'T STOP IT."

-- "IF SINN FEIN GRASP THIS CHANCE THEN, AS HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR, WITHIN THREE MONTHS WE CAN BE ENGAGED IN EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE. WE SET OUT THE PURPOSES OF THAT DIALOGUE IN OUR MESSAGE OF 5 NOVEMBER."

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 07

-- "THAT IS WHERE CLARIFICATION COULD BE APPROPRIATE, NOT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION BUT OF THE PROCESSES WE DESCRIBED IN NOVEMBER."

-- "THERE CAN BE, AND THERE HAS BEEN, NO NEGOTIATING OF THE POLITICAL FUTURE WITH THOSE WHO USE OR JUSTIFY THE USE OF VIOLENCE."

PARTY REACTIONS

7. (U) LABOR SHADOW NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY KEVIN MCNAMARA WARMLY WELCOMED MAYHEW'S SPEECH IN THE NEXT DAY'S DEBATE, JOKINGLY ACCUSING MAYHEW OF COMING PERVIOUSLY CLOSE TO BEING A "PERSUADER" FOR A UNITED IRELAND. LABOR COMPLETELY SUPPORTED THE GOVERNMENT'S REJECTION OF ANY RENEGOTIATION OF THE DECLARATION.

8. (U) BUT SDLP LEADER HUME, WHO DID NOT SPEAK IN THE COMMONS DEBATE, LATER CHALLENGED MAJOR TO "CALL SINN FEIN'S BLUFF" AND MAKE THE MEANING OF THE DOCUMENT AS CLEAR AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT RENEGOTIATING IT. SDLP MP'S HAVE SHOWN INCREASING EXASPERATION WITH SINN FEIN'S INSISTENCE ON WORKING FROM THE HUME-ADAMS PROPOSALS RATHER THAN THE JOINT DECLARATION; THEY INSIST THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO ON THE KEY ISSUE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. SDLP DEPUTY LEADER SEAMUS MALLON TOLD BBC RADIO JANUARY 22 THAT "CLARIFICATION" HAD BECOME A "WEASEL-WORD." HE PRAISED THE TAOISEACH'S JANUARY 20 SPEECH, WHICH "LAID BARE (SINN FEIN'S) ALLEGATIONS THAT THE JOINT DECLARATION WAS NOT FAIR," AND SAID MAJOR SHOULD DO THE SAME -- THERE SHOULD BE "NO NEGOTIATION, NO GIVING WAY," BUT HMG SHOULD "TAKE THE ARGUMENTS OF SINN FEIN AND STRIP THEM BARE."

9. (U) ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP) MP KEN MAGINNIS TOLD BBC RADIO JANUARY 22 THAT IT WOULD BE "ABSOLUTELY WRONG TO EXPAND UPON" THE JOINT DECLARATION, AND THAT CLARIFICATION WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO EXPANSION. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) HAD DECIDED OVER THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAY (WHEN HUNDREDS OF REPUBLICAN PRISONERS WERE PAROLED) TO REJECT THE DECLARATION, AND THAT ADAMS WAS TRYING TO HIDE THIS FACT UNTIL HE COULD FIND A WAY TO SHIFT THE BLAME TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND THE OTHER PARTIES.

PUSHING FOR TALKS RESUMPTION

10. (C) AS IS CLEAR FROM MAYHEW'S SPEECH, HMG SEES THE JOINT DECLARATION AS A ONE-TIME COMPONENT OF A BROADER POLITICAL PROCESS OF WHICH THE THREE-STRAND TALKS CONSTITUTE THE ONGOING ELEMENT. IT DOES NOT AGREE WITH THOSE IN THE SDLP AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WHO SEE IT AS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 07

A MAKE-OR-BREAK CHANCE FOR PEACE.

11. (C) NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) ASSISTANT SECRETARY JIM DANIELL TOLD US JANUARY 20 THAT HMG WAS DETERMINED TO PRESS FOR EARLY RESUMPTION OF FORMAL MULTILATERAL TALKS, AND HOPED THIS WOULD BE AGREED AT THE JANUARY 28 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE, THOUGH THE TALKS THEMSELVES MIGHT NOT RESUME UNTIL SOME WEEKS LATER. DANIELL CLAIMED THAT DUBLIN SHARED THIS DESIRE, BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME HAD NOT YET AGREED TO PARTICIPATE. HE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UUP WAS ANXIOUS TO GET THE TALKS UNDERWAY AND MAKE DEMONSTRABLE PROGRESS BEFORE CAMPAIGNING FOR THE JUNE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS BEGAN. IF TALKS WERE DELAYED TOO LONG, THE UUP MIGHT FEAR CAMPAIGN CHARGES BY DEMOCRATIC

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 LONDON 01245
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG REFUSES "CLARIFICATION"
BUT OFFERS "ASSURANCES"UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) LEADER IAN PAISLEY THAT IT WAS
APPEASING NATIONALISTS AND GETTING NOTHING IN RETURN.

COMMENT

12. (C) THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT DOWNING STREET'S DECISION TO PUBLISH THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS HAD LESS TO DO WITH ADAMS' ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WOULD WRITE THE PRIME MINISTER THAN WITH THE CLEAR REVELATION IN ADAMS' LETTER THAT HE WANTED RENEGOTIATION OF THE DECLARATION RATHER THAN MERE CLARIFICATION OF ITS TERMS. THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION HAS STRONG CROSS-PARTY SUPPORT IN PARLIAMENT, BUT WE SUSPECT THE NIO FEARS THAT ADAMS' INCESSANT REITERATION OF THE NEED FOR "CLARIFICATION" BEFORE HE CAN EVEN PRESENT THE "PACKAGE" TO PIRA MAY BE PLAYING BETTER IN NATIONALIST CIRCLES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THE REPUBLIC AND BEYOND. SEITZ

BT

#1245

NNNN

<MSGID> M0839162

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLL VAX WALKER

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.49)
KBM 4/11/2023

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 051421Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5039

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 1087

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 00111

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, UK,, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: SINN FEIN STATEMENTS HINT
AT REJECTION OF JOINT DECLARATION

REF: A) BELFAST 0002, B) 93 LONDON 22924

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: STATEMENTS BY SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND VICE PRESIDENT MARTIN MCGUINNESS OVER THE NEW YEAR'S WEEKEND (REF A) CONTAINED STRONG HINTS THAT THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT MAY BE PREPARING TO REJECT THE DECEMBER 15 ANGLO-IRISH JOINT DECLARATION (JD). WHILE NEITHER RULED OUT EVENTUAL ACCEPTANCE, AND BOTH STRESSED THAT CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE MOVEMENT CONTINUE, THE CONDITIONS THEY LAID DOWN FOR PEACE ARE CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROCESS, AND APPEAR TO REPRESENT A REVERSION TO TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN POSITIONS. IT MAY BE THAT THESE ARE TACTICAL MANEUVERS DESIGNED TO CONVINCING THEIR OWN ACTIVISTS THAT EVERY POSSIBLE CONCESSION HAS BEEN WRUNG OUT OF LONDON AND DUBLIN BEFORE A CEASEFIRE. BUT THE MORE LIKELY EXPLANATION IS THAT ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS HAVE FOUND INSUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR THE JD AMONG THEIR SUPPORTERS, AND ARE LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR REJECTION. END SUMMARY. MCGUINNESS "BRITS OUT"

3. MARTIN MCGUINNESS' INTERVIEW IN THE DUBLIN "SUNDAY BUSINESS POST" JANUARY 2 (REF A) MARKED A SHARP REVERSION TO TRADITIONAL SINN FEIN/PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) RHETORIC AFTER THE MOVEMENT'S INITIAL TEMPORIZING REACTION TO THE JD (REF B). MCGUINNESS DECLINED TO REJECT THE DECLARATION OUTRIGHT, NOTING THAT CONVERSATIONS WITHIN SINN FEIN/PIRA WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL LATE JANUARY AND THAT ONLY THE PIRA GENERAL ARMY CONVENTION COULD APPROVE MORE THAN A BRIEF CEASEFIRE. CONSULTATIONS WITHIN SINN FEIN HAD UNCOVERED MIXED VIEWS, BUT NOT DIVIDED 50-50. HOWEVER, HE SAID, IF THE BRITISH POSITION WAS THAT GIVEN PUBLICLY BY PRIME

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

MINISTER MAJOR, THE DECLARATION WAS "WORTHLESS". THE BRITISH MUST DECLARE THEIR INTENT TO PULL OUT OF IRELAND IN A FIXED TIME SCALE, THEN WORK ACTIVELY TO PERSUADE UNIONISTS TO ACCEPT IRISH UNIFICATION.

ADAMS: "SELF-DETERMINATION"

4. IN THE FACE OF A BARRAGE OF CRITICISM, MCGUINNESS AND SINN FEIN SPOKESMEN INSISTED THAT HIS REMARKS HAD BEEN MISINTERPRETED, AND THAT HE HAD NOT SLAMMED THE DOOR ON PEACE. BUT SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS, SPEAKING TO PARTY ACTIVISTS IN WEST BELFAST DECEMBER 3, (REF A) ADOPTED A SIMILARLY OBDURATE POSITION ON ANOTHER FRONT. WHILE CLAIMING THAT THE JD RECOGNIZED FOR THE FIRST TIME THE IRISH PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, AND COULD THUS SERVE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, HE REJECTED ALLOWING A MAJORITY IN THE NORTH ALONE TO BLOCK UNIFICATION, AND SAID THERE COULD BE NO LASTING PEACE WITHOUT AN END TO PARTITION. NOT WHAT'S ON OFFER

5. ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZE THAT THE "CLARIFICATIONS" THEY WANT WOULD EFFECTIVELY NEGATE THE CAREFUL COMPROMISES THAT FORM THE HEART OF THE JD. THE REDEFINITIONS THEY PROPOSE WOULD CONSTITUTE AN OUTRIGHT VICTORY FOR PIRA, AND ARE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO HMG AND THE UNIONISTS. IT APPEARS THAT THEY HAVE RETRACTED EVEN THE MODEST COMPROMISES CONTAINED IN THE HUME-ADAMS AGREEMENT, AND HAVE REVERTED TO HARDLINE POSITIONS SINN FEIN HAS ESPOUSED FOR OVER TWO DECADES. TACTICAL MOVES?

6. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ADAMS/MCGUINNESS STATEMENTS REPRESENT FURTHER EFFORTS TO TEST THE LIMITS OF WHAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CAN ACCEPT, AND TO PROBE FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM. THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP DARE NOT LAY ITSELF OPEN TO THE CHARGE THAT IT ACCEPTED SOMETHING SHORT OF THE BEST POSSIBLE DEAL. BUT UNLIKE PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO SOUND OUT THE GOVERNMENTS' POSITIONS ON EARLY PRISONER RELEASE AND TIMING OF EXPLORATORY TALKS, THE ISSUES THEY RAISED OVER THE WEEKEND GO TO THE HEART OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 00111
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, UK,, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: SINN FEIN STATEMENTS HINT AT REJECTION OF JOINT DECLARATION
THE JOINT DECLARATION, AREAS IN WHICH BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE CONVINCED THEY HAVE OFFERED ALL THEY CAN.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

PREPARING TO REJECT?

7. IT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, MORE LIKELY THAT THE LEADERSHIP'S INITIAL ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH SINN FEIN/PIRA ACTIVISTS HAS REVEALED LITTLE SUPPORT FOR THE DECLARATION AS IT STANDS. THOSE WHO ATTEND SUCH MEETINGS TEND INEVITABLY TO BE THE MOST HARDLINE ELEMENTS, AND THERE IS LITTLE IN THE JD TO CONVINCING THEM THAT 25 YEARS OF CONFLICT HAVE PRODUCED ENOUGH GAINS TO JUSTIFY ENDING THE STRUGGLE. UNLESS SINN FEIN LEADERS GET THE MESSAGE FROM THEIR BROADER CONSTITUENCY (THOSE WHO VOTE FOR THE PARTY BUT PLAY NO ACTIVE ROLE IN THE STRUGGLE) THAT THEIR SUPPORT BASE HAS BECOME TOO NARROW TO SUSTAIN VIOLENCE, IT LOOKS INCREASINGLY LIKELY THAT THEY WILL REJECT THE JD AND HOPE THAT CONTINUED TERRORISM--PARTICULARLY IN GREAT BRITAIN--WILL PUSH LONDON INTO FURTHER CONCESSIONS.

8. IF THIS ANALYSIS IS CORRECT, THE WEEKEND STATEMENT CAN BE SEEN AS AN ATTEMPT TO SHORE UP HARDLINE REPUBLICAN SUPPORT WHILE USING LANGUAGE DESIGNED TO CAST THE GOVERNMENTS--RATHER THAN THE TERRORISTS--AS THE OPPONENTS OF PEACE. SINN FEIN WOULD BE ABLE TO ARGUE THAT IT WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE JD IF ONLY A FEW AMBIGUITIES HAD BEEN RESOLVED, BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENTS REFUSED TO MEET IT "HALF WAY."

SEITZ

BT

#0111

NNNN

<MSGID> M0810883

~~SECRET~~
CABLE TO DUBLIN VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
FOR DELIVERY OOB 1/6 TO AMBASSADOR SMITH
FROM NANCY SODERBERG

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.70)

KRM 7/11/2023

DEAR JEAN:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR CABLE REGARDING THE GERRY ADAMS VISA ISSUE. I'D BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH YOU DIRECTLY BY PHONE IF YOU WISH BUT ALSO WANTED TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR CABLE.

LET ME FIRST ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR CABLES HOME RECEIVE WIDE, HIGH LEVEL AND SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. TONY LAKE, SANDY BERGER, MYSELF AND APPROPRIATE NSC STAFF EACH RECEIVE COPIES OF THEM. AS YOU MAY KNOW, TONY TAKES A STRONG INTEREST IN THE ISSUE AND IS PERSONALLY ENGAGED IN ENSURING THE U.S. DOES WHAT IT CAN TO PROMOTE PEACE AND SUPPORT THE CURRENT EFFORT. IN GENERAL, WE REVIEW MOST SENSITIVE POLICY ISSUES AND TONY AND I HAD BOTH PERSONALLY REVIEWED THE OXMAN CABLE TO WHICH YOU REFER.

REGARDING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MESSAGE, OUR SENSE IS THAT WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO MOVE ADAMS TO TAKE A STEP TOWARD PEACE BY USING THE CARROT OF THE VISA. THE CABLE WAS MEANT TO UNDERSCORE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE A SERIOUS LOOK AT THE ISSUE GIVEN ADAMS' RECENT ACTIONS AND TO SEE HOW BEST WE CAN MAXIMIZE THE RESULTS FROM A VISA ISSUANCE. PERHAPS WE CAN PUSH ADAMS TO GO FURTHER TOWARD PEACE, PERHAPS NOT. BUT I THINK WE NEED TO EXPLORE ALL THE POSSIBILITIES BEFORE WE GIVE UP THE LEVERAGE OF THE VISA -- THERE MAY BE A CHANCE WE CAN GET HIM TO TAKE A MORE DRAMATIC, TANGIBLE STEP IN EXCHANGE FOR THE VISA.

BEFORE WE CAN MAKE A DECISION ON WHETHER OR WHEN TO ISSUE ADAMS A VISA, WE NEED TO LOOK AT THESE OPTIONS AND GET A VERY HIGH LEVEL DECISION. YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO ANNOUNCE OUR WILLINGNESS TO ISSUE ADAMS A VISA AS WELL AS REYNOLDS' AND HUME'S VIEWS ARE VERY MUCH PART OF THAT PROCESS. WE ALSO NEED TO DO SOME CONSULTING ON OUR END WITH THE IRISH AND BRITISH BEFORE MAKING ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. DESPITE THE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE UPCOMING TRIP, I ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE SEIZED WITH THE ISSUE -- ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF YOUR REPORTS THAT ADAMS IS LIKELY TO REQUEST A VISA VERY SHORTLY. FOR NOW, HOWEVER, WE THINK IT IS BEST TO STICK TO THE LINE IN THE CABLE (WE ARE PREPARED TO REVIEW THE ISSUE IN LIGHT OF GERRY ADAMS' RESPONSE TO THE REYNOLDS-MAJOR INITIATIVE) WHILE WE WORK ON GETTING A DECISION HERE.

I REGRET ANY CONFUSION ON THE CABLES. PERHAPS WE SHOULD MAKE SURE OUR CABLES TO YOU INCLUDE A BIT MORE OF OUR THINKING SO YOU DON'T HAVE THE IMPRESSION YOU ARE SENDING THINGS INTO A BLACK HOLE. IN ANY CASE, WE'LL BE SURE TO KEEP YOU POSTED AS WE WORK ON GETTING A DECISION HERE AND I HOPE YOU WILL CONTINUE TO SEND US YOUR FRANK ASSESSMENTS. THEY REALLY ARE USEFUL AND FAR FROM ANY BLACK HOLES!

I HOPE YOU HAD A WONDERFUL CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR -- ESPECIALLY WITH A VISITING BROTHER! THANKS AGAIN FOR THE CABLE AND I LOOK FORWARD TO STAYING IN TOUCH -- I DO THINK THE TIME FOR A BREAKTHROUGH IS WITHIN REACH.

WITH WARM REGARDS AND BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR, NANCY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: FILE PRIVACY_IN SIGLER SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 051332Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 051332Z JAN 94 PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FM AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY SMITH, DUBLIN 001

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR NANCY SODERBERG IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS

REFS: A. 93 STATE 38742

B. DUBLIN 0025

C. 93 DUBLIN 7396

D. 93 DUBLIN 7366

E. 93 DUBLIN 7365

1. NANCY, I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE BEEN OUT OF TOWN AND THAT YOU MAY NOT BE FULLY AWARE OF THE REFERENCED MESSAGES REPORTING ON MY CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS, JOHN HUME AND OTHERS ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE MAY WELL BE AN IMMINENT REQUEST BY GERRY ADAMS FOR A VISA TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE. THE LATTER MESSAGE FROM STEVE OXMAN WAS I ASSUME ^{1.} CLEARED BY THE NSC. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO INDICATION TO THAT EFFECT. THE MESSAGE DOES REFER TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 22 COMMENTS TO THE IRISH TIMES. IT DOES NOT ADDRESS, HOWEVER, THE STRONGLY EXPRESSED VIEW OF PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS AND JOHN HUME THAT ADAMS IS SINCERE IN HIS QUEST FOR PEACE. NOR DOES IT ADDRESS THE FACT THAT REYNOLDS FEELS MAJOR SHOULD NOT HAVE A PROBLEM WITH ADAMS RECEIVING A VISA AT THIS TIME.

REYNOLDS AND HUME ARE CONVINCED THAT ADAMS IS THE ONLY ONE WHO CAN CONVINCE ALL IRISH AMERICANS TO SUPPORT THE JOINT DECLARATION. THEY BELIEVE THIS SUPPORT COULD BE INSTRUMENTAL IN PUSHING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD.

2. THE IRISH PRESS RAN AN EDITORIAL YESTERDAY ON THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S INTERNAL DEBATE OVER EASING THE BROADCASTING BAN ON SINN FEIN AND THE IRA WHICH EXPRESSES MOST PERSUASIVELY THE REASONS WHY NOW IS THE TIME TO ALLOW GERRY ADAMS TO BE HEARD AND TO BE MADE TO ANSWER HIS CRITICS. I QUOTE: THE FATE OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION -- AND THE PEACE HOPES IT HAS RAISED -- DEPEND PRIMARILY ON THE RESPONSE OF THE PROVISIONALS. IT IS SELF-EVIDENTLY ABSURD THAT WHILE THE DEBATE ON WHAT THAT RESPONSE MIGHT BE, AND WHY, DOMINATES NATIONAL RADIO AND TV, THOSE WHO CAN BEST ANSWER THE QUESTIONS BEING POSED ARE DELIBERATELY EXCLUDED. SUCH CENSORSHIP IS NOT JUST SELF-DEFEATING IN THAT IT DENIES THE PUBLIC INFORMATION TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED -- IT IS ALSO

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 1011-0355-F (1.71)
 KBH 7/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

DAMAGING TO THE PROSPECTS OF THE DECLARATION BEING ACCEPTED.

ONE OF THE MAIN AIMS OF THE INITIATIVE IS TO BRING THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT IN FROM THE COLD AND PERSUADE IT TO ABANDON ITS CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE. ALLOWING ITS REPRESENTATIVES ACCESS TO THE AIRWAVES IN THE PRESENT DEBATE WOULD FURTHER THAT PROCESS IN HELPING TO END THE PROVOS' SENSE OF ISOLATION, EVEN IF IT IS SELF-IMPOSED. END QUOTE.

3. THIS ARGUMENT APPLIES EQUALLY TO THE VISA ISSUE AND I URGE THAT WE TAKE PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS' AND JOHN HUME'S RECOMMENDATIONS SERIOUSLY. I AM SENDING THIS MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO YOU IN THIS CHANNEL BECAUSE I HAVE HAD NO INDICATION FROM YOUR OFFICE THAT YOU HAVE SEEN MY MESSAGES AND THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED HIGH LEVEL CONSIDERATION AT THE WHITE HOUSE. I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR RESPONSE IN THIS CHANNEL AS WELL. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND I FIRMLY BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE PRO-ACTIVE IN THIS CASE AND NOT APPEAR TO BE RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE AFTER THE ISSUE HAS BEEN SEIZED UPON BY THE IRISH AMERICAN LOBBY. I REALIZE THAT EVERYONE IS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE UPCOMING TRIP TO BRUSSELS BUT AS WE EXPECT TO HEAR FROM ADAMS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, I WOULD APPRECIATE A RESPONSE PRIOR TO THE TRIP. THANKS AND BEST WISHES FOR A HAPPY AND HOPEFULLY PEACEFUL NEW YEAR.

SMITH

DECL OADR

#1332

NNNN

<MSGID> M0810822

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: FILE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.72)
KBH 7/11/2023

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 231646Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4232

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 007396

NODIS

PLS PASS URGENTLY TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NANCY SODERBERG
FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFFT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: MORE ON A VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS

REF: (A) DUBLIN 07366

(B) DUBLIN 07364

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I TALKED WITH JOHN HUME THIS MORNING (DECEMBER 23), WHO SAID, IN REGARD TO A VISA FOR SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS (REF. A), THAT THE TIMING WAS NOW RIGHT AND THAT IT WOULD HELP THE PEACE PROCESS TO GIVE HIM ONE. HUME HAS OBVIOUSLY CHANGED HIS MIND IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS (REF. B).

3. "THE IRISH TIMES" CARRIED A SHORT ITEM ON THE FRONT PAGE THIS MORNING WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

THE SINN FEIN PRESIDENT, MR. GERRY ADAMS, IS EXPECTED TO REAPPLY FOR A US VISA AFTER PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID IN YESTERDAY'S "IRISH TIMES" THAT HE WAS PREPARING TO REVIEW POLICY ON DENYING MR. ADAMS A VISA (ARTICLES FAXED TO EUR/NE ON DECEMBER 22). MR. ADAMS SAID YESTERDAY: "THE POLICY OF CENSORSHIP, BY VISA DENIAL, OF SINN FEIN MEMBERS HAS BEEN A MAIN POLICY PLANK OF SUCCESSIVE US ADMINISTRATIONS IN THEIR PARTISAN SUPPORT FOR BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY IN IRELAND.

"THIS, I AM NOW INFORMED, IS UNDER REVIEW. I WILL BE TESTING THE PRECISE MEANING OF THAT IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON THE BACK OF AN APPROPRIATE INVITATION TO SPEAK IN THE UNITED STATES. IRISH-AMERICAN SUPPORTERS OF FREEDOM, JUSTICE AND PEACE IN IRELAND ARE TO BE CONGRATULATED FOR FOCUSING THE US ADMINISTRATION'S ATTENTION ON THE CONFLICT IN IRELAND."

END TEXT.

4. I HAVE ALSO BEEN HEARING FROM CONTACTS, WHO CITE NEW YORK IRISH-AMERICANS AS THEIR SOURCES, THAT ADAMS PLANS TO APPLY FOR A VISA, POSSIBLY IN DUBLIN, IN THE VERY NEAR

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

FUTURE, POSSIBLY ON DECEMBER 29.

5. ALL OF THIS SUGGESTS THAT EVENTS ARE MOVING FASTER THAN EVEN I ANTICIPATED IN REF. A, MY REPORTING ON MY CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS YESTERDAY. AS A RESULT, I AM INCREASINGLY CONVINCED THAT NOW, DURING THIS CHRISTMAS TIME OF PEACE, WE SHOULD REMOVE OUR BLINDERS, STEP AWAY FROM THE ACCEPTED WISDOM OF HOW TO DEAL WITH GERRY ADAMS AND TAKE A MORE CREATIVE, PRO-ACTIVE APPROACH. HE IS ALREADY TALKING "SECRETLY" WITH THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS. IN ADDITION PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS AND NOW JOHN HUME HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THAT THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT ADAMS IS MAKING A GENUINE GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO BRING ALL SIDES OF THE IRA TOGETHER TO FORM A CONSENSUS FOR PEACE. (THE DELAY IN ACCEPTING THE JOINT DECLARATION IS NOT TACTICAL ON ADAMS PART BUT RATHER DEMONSTRATES THE DIFFICULTY OF BRINGING ALL THE DISPARATE ASPECTS OF THE EQUATION TOGETHER.) THEY ALSO AGREE THAT THE PEACE PROCESS CAN BE ENHANCED BY ADAMS BEING EXPOSED TO PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. AND IRISH-AMERICANS TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE AND WORK FOR REAL PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

6. AS I HAVE ARGUED BEFORE, I BELIEVE IT IS SIMPLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO CONTINUE TO KEEP ADAMS OUT OF THE U.S. INSTEAD, WE SHOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT MAKING IT CLEAR THAT A WAIVER WILL BE GRANTED BECAUSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF THAT THIS WILL FURTHER THE PEACE PROCESS. THIS WOULD PLACE THE ONUS SQUARELY ON ADAMS TO DELIVER PEACE.

7. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WE SHOULD SEIZE THIS RARE OPPORTUNITY TO CREATIVELY MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FURTHER BY PLACING THE OBLIGATION ON GERRY ADAMS AND THE IRA TO BRING PEACE AT THIS TIMELY, SEASONAL MOMENT. PLEASE SEND YOUR RESPONSE NIACT IMMEDIATE AS THE EMBASSY'S COMMUNICATION'S UNIT WILL BE CLOSED UNTIL DECEMBER 29.

SMITH

BT

#7396

NNNN

<MSGID> M0797277

N
O
D
I
SN
O
D
I
SN
O
D
I
S

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: FILE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.73)

KRM 4/11/2023

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 041527Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4265
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1694
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 000025

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFFT FROM
AMBASSADOR SMITH

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: SENATOR KENNEDY'S AND MY DECEMBER 30 MEETING
WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS

REF: (A) LONDON 22924
(B) BELFAST 00268
(C) DUBLIN 07365

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SENATOR KENNEDY AND I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS ON DECEMBER 30. HE SAID THAT:
 - HE WAS NOT/NOT DISCOURAGED BY SINN FEIN/IRA COMMENTARY FOLLOWING THE DECEMBER 15 JOINT DECLARATION. IT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE UNTIL THE END OF JANUARY FOR THEM TO CONTACT ALL THEIR "CELLS" AND TO BUILD THE NECESSARY CONSENSUS.
 - ADAMS HIMSELF IS THE PRODUCT OF AN IRA SPLIT AND WILL THEREFORE BE CAREFUL TO AVOID CAUSING ANOTHER.
 - HE (REYNOLDS) WOULD BE WORRIED IF SINN FEIN/IRA RHETORIC WERE THE SAME AT THE END OF JANUARY.
 - SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS IS WORKING FOR PEACE AND SHOULD GET A U.S. VISA. REYNOLDS ADDED THAT JOHN HUME AGREED WITH HIM: ADAMS SHOULD NOW GET A VISA. REYNOLDS FEELS THAT IT SHOULD NOT CAUSE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR ANY DIFFICULTY.
 - ADAMS CAN EXPLAIN THE SITUATION TO IRISH-AMERICAN GROUPS AND GET THEIR UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR PEACE. SUCH AN ENDORSEMENT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
 - ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY LEADER JIM MOLYNEAUX HAD SENT HIM A LETTER (WHICH HE SHOWED US) IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION. IN THE LETTER, MOLYNEAUX SAID THAT HE HAD SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH THE DECLARATION BUT THAT, IF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HELD FIRM, THEY COULD WIN.
 - MAJOR HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE MASSIVE SUPPORT THE JOINT DECLARATION HAD RECEIVED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E
X
D
I
S

E
X
D
I
S

E
X
D
I
S

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

WAS DELIGHTED BY HIS UPSWING IN THE POLLS AS A RESULT.
 -- PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN ENORMOUSLY
 HELPFUL; ITS TIMING WAS PERFECT.
 -- DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY LEADER IAN PAISLEY HAS BEEN
 MARGINALIZED FOR THE TIME BEING.
 -- DESPITE THAT 40 PERCENT OF MI5 IS IN NORTHERN IRELAND,
 THE BRITISH DO NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE.
 MAJOR NEEDS TO BE TOLD HOW THE IRA WORKS. HE HAD NEVER
 BEEN TO THE NORTH UNTIL THIS LAST TRIP.
 -- (IN RESPONSE TO THE SENATOR'S QUESTION), HE (REYNOLDS)
 WAS UNAWARE OF ANY INTELLIGENCE ON NORTHERN IRELAND
 PROVIDED BY THE USG. THEREFORE, THE IRISH HAD TO USE THEIR
 OWN.
 -- HE (REYNOLDS) HAD TOLD MAJOR THAT NORTHERN POLICEMEN WHO
 VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.
 (REYNOLDS WAS QUITE EMPHATIC ABOUT THIS.) "YOU CAN'T TALK
 ABOUT PEACE AND THEN HAVE POLICEMEN KILLING CIVILIANS."
 -- THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE BUT DOES NOT
 WANT TO INTERFERE.
 -- ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION HAVE NEVER
 BEEN A PROBLEM SINCE THEIR INTRODUCTION IN 1937 AND THEY
 ARE NOT/NOT ONE NOW. SMITH
 BT
 #0025
 NNNN
 <MSGID> M0809779

E
X
D
I
S

E
X
D
I
S

E
X
D
I
S

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: FILE

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 221833Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.74)
KBH 7/11/2023

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4218
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 007366

NODIS

PLS PASS URGENTLY TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NANCY SODERBERG
FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFPT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, CVIS, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS RECOMMENDS ISSUANCE OF
A VISA TO SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER ALBERT REYNOLDS ON DECEMBER 22 TO DISCUSS NORTHERN IRELAND IN LIGHT OF THE DECEMBER 15 JOINT DECLARATION. HE SAID THAT:
 - IT WOULD BE FINE WITH HIM IF SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS RECEIVED A VISA, BUT THAT WAS UP TO THE U.S.
 - A VISA SHOULD BE GIVEN ON THE BASIS OF BEING HELPFUL TO THE PEACE PROCESS.
 - ADAMS COULD BRING THE IRISH-AMERICAN COMMUNITY WITH HIM. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE PEACE PROCESS TO HAVE ALL AMERICANS BEHIND THE JOINT DECLARATION.
 - ADAMS IS TRYING HARD AND IS BEING VERY SUPPORTIVE OF THE PEACE PROCESS.
 - BOTH MARTIN MCGUINNESS AND HE ARE QUITE CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER OF A SPLIT IN SINN FEIN/IRA AND SO ARE BEING CAREFUL TO TOUCH ALL BASES IN THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS.
 - THE SINN FEIN/IRA CONSULTATION PROCESS WILL PROBABLY LAST UNTIL THE END OF JANUARY OR THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY.
 - ADAMS WILL ENGAGE IN SOME POSTURING FOR POLITICAL REASONS, BUT THIS IS NOTHING TO BE ALARMED ABOUT.
 - JOHN MAJOR AND THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT/NOT BE A PROBLEM IN REGARD TO A VISA FOR ADAMS. ALL WANT PEACE. HE (REYNOLDS) WOULD DO THE SAME FOR MAJOR IF CIRCUMSTANCES WERE REVERSED.
 - IRA PRISONERS WANT PEACE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE HEAD OF THEIR PRISONERS' GROUP AT THE MAZE PRISON.
 - RATHER THAN "AMNESTY," THE PHRASE "TERM REDUCTIONS" WILL BE USED IN REGARD TO EARLY RELEASE OF PRISONERS FOLLOWING PEACE.
 - ONE REASON FOR THE CONTINUATION OF SINN FEIN/IRA

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

CONSULTATIONS AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF JANUARY IS THEIR DESIRE TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS IN REGARD TO SECTION 31 OF THE BROADCASTING ACT, WHICH MUST BE RENEWED OR LAPSE ON JANUARY 19.

-- HE (REYNOLDS) HAS ALWAYS BEEN AGAINST SECTION 31; THE GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY NOT/NOT RENEW IT.

-- IT WOULD BE NICE IF PRESIDENT CLINTON COULD VISIT IRELAND NEXT JUNE, OR EVEN IN JANUARY, IF, BY CHANCE, PEACE HAS ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE (REYNOLDS) UNDERSTANDS THAT IT MIGHT BE EASIER FOR THE PRESIDENT TO COME IN 1995.

-- IT WOULD BE BETTER, ON THE OTHER HAND, IF SPEAKER FOLEY AND OTHER INTERESTED AMERICANS POSTPONED POSSIBLE VISITS UNTIL AFTER PEACE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.

-- IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE IRA WILL NOT AGREE TO A DEMAND THAT THEY SURRENDER ALL THEIR WEAPONS -- THEY HAVE NEVER DONE SO IN IRISH HISTORY.

-- OBVIOUSLY, THEY WILL HAVE TO GIVE UP SEMTEX AND HEAVY WEAPONS.

COMMENT

3. CLEARLY, THE PERCEPTION HERE IS THAT A VISA FOR ADAMS WOULD HELP THE PEACE PROCESS BY DEMONSTRATING THAT HIS MORE RESPONSIBLE AND FORTHCOMING POSITION HAS REAPED BENEFITS. A VISA WOULD ALSO REMOVE THIS QUESTION FROM THE IRISH-AMERICAN AGENDA, WHICH, IN TURN, WOULD, HOPEFULLY, LEAD TO A UNANIMOUS, PUBLIC CHORUS OF IRISH-AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS, SOMETHING THAT THE NATIONALISTS, FOR VARIOUS REASONS, FEEL IS IMPORTANT. THE BRITISH HAVE BEEN TALKING WITH THE IRA, AND THE IRISH HAVE DONE SO INDIRECTLY. THEY WILL, ACCORDING TO REYNOLDS, LIFT THE BROADCASTING BAN ON SINN FEIN NEXT MONTH. THUS, IT NOW APPEARS TO BE THE RIGHT TIME TO PREPARE THE GROUNDWORK TO ALLOW US PROMPTLY TO GIVE ADAMS A VISA WHEN HE REAPPLIES. THIS GESTURE WOULD DEFINITELY HELP THE PROCESS OF FINDING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. SHOULD ADAMS, AS IS POSSIBLE, REQUEST A VISA IN DUBLIN, WE WOULD RECOMMEND A WAIVER OF HIS INELIGIBILITY AND AUTHORIZATION TO ISSUE HIM ONE IMMEDIATELY. (FYI: WE HAD HOPED TO DISCUSS THIS RECOMMENDATION WITH JOHN HUME BUT WERE UNABLE TO REACH HIM. HE TOLD ME TWO WEEKS AGO THAT GIVING ADAMS A VISA WOULD

HAVE, AT THAT MOMENT, "MADE HIM TOO IMPORTANT.")

4. IT WOULD SEEM THAT DENYING ADAMS A VISA AT THIS TIME WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THE PRESIDENT IS PERCEIVED TO BE DOING EVERYTHING TO GET THE PEACE PROCESS MOVING. IF HE MOVES QUICKLY ON THE VISA ISSUE, IT WOULD BE A POSITIVE STEP SINCE IT WOULD HELP SUSTAIN THIS MOMENTUM. SMITH

BT

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

#7366

NNNN

<MSGID> M0794459

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 05
PRT: SODERBERG
SIT: FILE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.75)
KBH 7/14/2023

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 221724Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4215
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1681
RUSNSTB/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 007365
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFFT FROM
AMBASSADOR SMITH

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: DFA ON NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: (A) LONDON 22525

(B) DUBLIN 07306

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. SEAN O'HUIGINN, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, SAYS THAT THE BEST THING AMERICANS, ESPECIALLY IRISH-AMERICANS, CAN DO NOW IS PUBLICLY TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION AND THE PEACE PROCESS. THE IRISH WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AT ANY TIME; HOWEVER, THEY APPEAR NOT/NOT TO WANT VISITS BY OTHER OUTSIDERS AT THIS TIME. NEITHER GOVERNMENT WANTS A SPECIAL ENVOY NOW, AND IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER SINN FEIN/IRA HAS RENOUNCED VIOLENCE TO GIVE GERRY ADAMS A VISA. SINN FEIN'S

CONSULTATION PROCESS WILL LIKELY BE LENGTHY; MEANWHILE, THE IRISH WILL TALK WITH THE BRITISH ABOUT THE TALKS PROCESS IN JANUARY. DEALING WITH THE ISSUES OF AN AMNESTY AND DISARMING THE IRA ARE "DOWN THE ROAD" AT THE MOMENT. END SUMMARY.

MEETING WITH SEAN O'HUIGINN

3. I MET WITH SEAN O'HUIGINN, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, ON DECEMBER 21 TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN THE WAKE OF THE PROMULGATION OF THE DECEMBER 15 JOINT DECLARATION. HE WAS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC.

THE U.S. ROLE

4. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION ABOUT WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD BE DOING, O'HUIGINN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND SAID THAT EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION FROM PROMINENT AMERICANS, ESPECIALLY IRISH-AMERICANS, WOULD BE JUST RIGHT AT THIS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

POINT. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE WORLD BE SEEN TO REGARD THE JOINT DECLARATION AS "HONORABLE." THE MESSAGE SHOULD CONSISTENTLY BE THAT THE DECLARATION IS USEFUL IN FACILITATING A SWITCH TO THE POLITICAL MODE. IT IS IMPERATIVE TO AVOID DISTRACTIONS AND THE CREATION OF THE IMPRESSION THAT ALTERNATIVES, E.G., MEDIATION BY OUTSIDERS, EXIST.

5. POSITIVE AMERICAN INTEREST, O'HUIGINN STRESSED, IS MOST HELPFUL. IN FACT, HE SAID, PRESIDENT CLINTON IS THE REASON THAT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR WENT AS FAR AS HE DID. VISITS?

6. ALTHOUGH O'HUIGINN SAID THAT A VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT OR SPEAKER FOLEY WOULD BE WELCOME AT ANY TIME, HE IMPLIED THAT, EXCEPT FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE IRISH WOULD PREFER THAT OTHERS LEAVE THE PEACE PROCESS TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS FOR THE TIME BEING. O'HUIGINN STRESSED THAT THE IRISH WANT A VISIT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. O'HUIGINN ADDED THAT PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS HAD WRITTEN THE PRESIDENT TO INVITE HIM TO VISIT IRELAND.

A SPECIAL ENVOY?

7. O'HUIGINN CONTINUED THAT NEITHER GOVERNMENT SAW ANY NEED FOR A SPECIAL ENVOY AT THIS TIME. DOWN THE ROAD A WAYS, DEPENDING ON HOW THINGS WENT, AN ENVOY MIGHT BECOME A GOOD IDEA, BUT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WANTED TO RUN WITH THEIR BILATERAL INITIATIVE AND SEE THE RESULTS BEFORE CONSIDERING ANYTHING ELSE.

A VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS?

8. O'HUIGINN WAS INITIALLY EVASIVE WHEN I ASKED HIM ABOUT A VISA FOR SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS, SAYING THAT IT WAS A MATTER FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. WHEN I PRESSED HIM, HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO "MAXIMIZE REWARDS," IMPLYING THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER SINN FEIN/IRA HAD RENOUNCED VIOLENCE TO GIVE ADAMS A VISA. "PEACE WOULD CHANGE EVERYTHING."

SINN FEIN/THE IRA

9. O'HUIGINN SAID THAT THE SINN FEIN/IRA WAS CLAIMING THAT THE JOINT DECLARATION HAD LEFT THE "UNIONIST VETO" INTACT. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, MAINTAINS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PROCEDURES AND THE REALITY OF THE UNIONIST POSITION: ONE MILLION OF THEM LIVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND CANNOT BE IGNORED. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO FORCE A SETTLEMENT ON THEM. TO REJECT THE CONCEPT OF UNITY BY CONSENT WOULD BE TO REJECT THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY. A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO BRING ALONG THE INHABITANTS OF THE CATHOLIC GHETTOS IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 DUBLIN 007365

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFFT FROM

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

AMBASSADOR SMITH

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: DFA ON NORTHERN IRELAND

BELFAST AND DERRY, WHERE FEELINGS RUN HIGH AND AN ISOLATIONIST MENTALITY EXISTS. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS TOLD SINN FEIN/IRA THAT MORE FIGHTING WILL SIMPLY DELAY A UNITED IRELAND.

THE JOINT DECLARATION

10. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, O'HUIGINN CONTINUED, BELIEVES THAT THE DECEMBER 15 JOINT DECLARATION IS A REASONABLE EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE BRITISH. THE IRISH WOULD HAVE BROUGHT THE BRITISH EVEN FURTHER IF IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE TO DO SO. THE DOCUMENT FULLY RECOGNIZES IRISH SELF-DETERMINATION, WITH THE ONE CONDITION OF CONSENSUS. IT IS NECESSARY AT ALL COSTS TO AVOID "DUPLICATION," I.E., CREATING THE SAME SITUATION IN A UNITED IRELAND AS EXISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND: AN ALIENATED MINORITY. THE JOINT DECLARATION IS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF A SOLUTION.

NEXT STEPS

11. O'HUIGINN BELIEVES THAT THE SINN FEIN/IRA CONSULTATION PROCESS WILL BE LENGTHY, EXTENDING OVER WEEKS AND MAYBE EVEN OVER MONTHS. ON THE ONE HAND, ADEQUATE CONSULTATION IS IMPORTANT SINCE IT LESSENS CHANCES OF A SPLIT IN THE IRA. IN THAT REGARD, IT WOULD BE IN NOBODY'S INTEREST IF YOUNG HOTHEADS REPLACED GERRY ADAMS AND THE REST OF ITS PRESENT LEADERSHIP. ON THE OTHER HAND, LONG CONSULTATIONS ARE FRAUGHT WITH PERIL. ONE OR TWO INCIDENTS COULD PROVOKE PROTESTANT PARA-MILITARY RETALIATION OR UNIONIST REJECTION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION.

12. IF SINN FEIN/IRA IN EFFECT REJECTS THE JOINT DECLARATION, O'HUIGINN CONTINUED, THEY WILL HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY ARE INCAPABLE OF RELATING TO THE WIDER IRISH COMMUNITY AND WILL BE ISOLATING THEMSELVES. THEY WILL SHOW THAT THEY ARE NOT SERIOUS AND THAT THEY WANT TO CONTINUE THE VIOLENCE. SO FAR, THEY HAVE AVOIDED PURELY SECTARIAN WARFARE, AND SO, HOPEFULLY, WILL OPT FOR PEACE.

THE TALKS

13. BOTH GOVERNMENTS, O'HUIGINN NOTED, WANT TO MAKE A RENEWAL OF THE TALKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND CENTER-STAGE. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT HOSTILE TO THE BILATERALS BEING CONDUCTED BY BRITISH JUNIOR MINISTER MICHAEL ANCRAM BUT CONSIDERS THEM A FAILURE. CONCENTRATING ON TRIVIA, THEY AMOUNT TO NOTHING MORE THAN A "TEA PARTY." ANCRAM IS RAPIDLY LOSING CREDIBILITY. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A TABLE AT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

WHICH ALL CAN SIT WITHOUT LOSS OF DIGNITY AND AT WHICH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CAN "BREAK SOME HEADS," IF NEED BE, TO SECURE A SETTLEMENT. THE IRISH WILL TALK WITH THE BRITISH IN JANUARY ABOUT RESTARTING THE TALKS PROCESS.

14. O'HUIGINN OBSERVED THAT THE IRISH ARE WILLING TO USE THE 3-STRAND FORMAT BUT BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO "GO DEEPER" THAN BEFORE. FOR INSTANCE, "PLAUSIBLE" NORTH/SOUTH INSTITUTIONS HAVE TO BE CREATED UNDER STRAND 2 IF A SETTLEMENT IS TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NATIONALISTS. THEY WOULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY INTERNAL STRUCTURES ALONG THE LINES OF WHAT THE UNIONISTS WANT. BUT, IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE PEACE IF THE TALKS ARE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS. THE IRISH DO NOT/NOT VIEW THE PEACE AND TALKS PROCESSES AS RIVALS; THEY ARE SIMPLY REALISTIC.

15. IF SINN FEIN/IRA REJECTS THE PEACE PROCESS, O'HUIGINN COMMENTED, THERE IS NOT MUCH MORE THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CAN DO. THEY WOULD PROBABLY DECIDE TO TALK WITH WHOEVER IS WILLING TO LISTEN.

THE FORUM

16. THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION, O'HUIGINN REITERATED, WAS INCLUDED IN THE JOINT DECLARATION AS AN INCENTIVE TO SINN FEIN/IRA TO CONTINUE THE PEACE PROCESS. THE FORUM IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE SINN FEIN WITH AN IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PLATFORM BOTH TO OCCUPY IT AND TO EDUCATE IT. IT WILL GIVE SINN FEIN A CHANCE TO "LEARN HOW THE IRISH THINK."

JOHN HUME

17. O'HUIGINN SAID THAT SOCIAL AND DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY LEADER JOHN HUME STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE JOINT DECLARATION. HE IS WORRIED ABOUT BEING ECLIPSED POLITICALLY IF THINGS GO WRONG, BUT HE WILL AT LEAST BE ABLE TO SAY THAT HE TRIED.

HE BELIEVES THAT THE DECLARATION BASICALLY REFLECTS SINN FEIN'S AGENDA. HUME HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ADAMS AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 DUBLIN 007365
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFFT FROM
AMBASSADOR SMITH

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: DFA ON NORTHERN IRELAND

WITH MARTIN MCGUINNESS.

AN AMNESTY?

18. O'HUIGINN SAID THAT AN AMNESTY IS "DOWN THE ROAD," BUT SOMETHING WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO BE DONE. THE WORD ITSELF, HE CAUTIONED, IS SOMEWHAT MISLEADING, SINCE WHAT EVENTUALLY HAPPENS IN THIS REGARD MAY HAVE A DIFFERENT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

LABEL. THE BRITISH ARE LIKELY TO INSIST THAT ANY AMNESTY BE IMPLEMENTED IN PIECEMEAL FASHION UNDER COVER OF A WELTER OF REGULATIONS. THE REASON FOR THIS INSISTENCE IS THE POLITICAL DANGER FACING PRIME MINISTER MAJOR, WHO MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO ALIENATE TORY BACK-BENCHERS, "TIGERS IN LONG GRASS," STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF "LAW AND ORDER." (MAJOR MAY ALSO BE IN TROUBLE IN JUNE IF THE TORIES DO BADLY IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS.) IT IS NOT SURPRISING, THEREFORE, THAT THE BRITISH HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT STATEMENTS ABOUT AN EVENTUAL AMNESTY BY VARIOUS IRISH POLITICIANS OVER THE WEEKEND. THE PRESENCE OF GENUINE PSYCHOPATHS AMONG PRISONERS CANDIDATES FOR AN AMNESTY IS ANOTHER PROBLEM. WHATEVER IS DONE, THE CREDIBILITY OF SENTENCING MUST BE MAINTAINED, OR IRA RECRUITMENT WILL SOAR.

DISARMING THE IRA

19. THIS IS ANOTHER STEP, O'HUIGINN SAID, WHICH IS "DOWN THE ROAD." IT IS NECESSARY, HOWEVER, IF PEACE IS TO ENDURE. THE TIMING AND MANNER DEPEND ON "THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE." AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IS THE ATTITUDE OF "GHETTO CATHOLICS" IN THE NORTH, WHO HAVE COME TO DEPEND ON THE IRA FOR PROTECTION AGAINST FROM PROTESTANT INCURSIONS. IT MAY EVEN BE POSSIBLE DISCREETLY TO FUSE THE TWO ISSUES OF AN AMNESTY AND GUNS IN SOME FORM OF STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS.

MAYHEW

20. O'HUIGINN SAID THAT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW HAD BEEN SO DAMAGED BY HIS HANDLING OF THE ISSUE OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONTACT WITH THE IRA THAT HE HAD LITTLE CREDIBILITY. "IRAQ-GATE" MIGHT ALSO BECOME A FACTOR IN HIS FATE. MAYHEW HAD SEEMED OUT OF SORTS LATELY. IT MIGHT JUST BE THAT HE WAS JEALOUS OF MAJOR'S HIGHER PROFILE ROLE ON NORTHERN IRELAND; BUT, OTHER FACTORS MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE. ALTHOUGH MAYHEW IS QUICKER ON HIS FEET, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE PETER BROOKE WAS MORE THOUGHTFUL. MAYHEW HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN "INTEGRATING" THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND THEREFORE DOES NOT/NOT HAVE A "COHERENT" VIEW OF IT. SMITH

BT

#7365

NNNN

<MSGID> M0794111

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SIT SODERBERG TRIP
SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLL SUM2 VAX WALKER

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 121010Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4331
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1713
~~SECRET~~ DUBLIN 000190

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.77)
KBH 9/11/2023

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - NANCY SODERBERG; CA FOR ASSISTANT
SECRETARY RYAN; EUR FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OXMAN FROM
AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY SMITH
LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CVIS, PREL, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: VISA WAIVER FOR GERRY ADAMS

REF: (A) STATE 09969, (B) DUBLIN 0025, (C) 93 DUBLIN
7396, (D) 93 DUBLIN 7366, (E) 93 DUBLIN 7365

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. ACTION REQUEST FOLLOWS.
2. APPRECIATE RECEIVING GUIDANCE CONTAINED REF A.
HOWEVER, AS THERE WILL BE VERY HEAVY PRESS COVERAGE IF
ADAMS DECIDES TO APPLY HERE, I WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE
RECEIVING PRESS GUIDANCE ASAP.
3. MY VIEWS ON WHETHER GERRY ADAMS SHOULD BE GRANTED A
VISA TO VISIT THE U.S. HAVE ALREADY BEEN PRESENTED IN THE
REFERENCED TELEGRAMS CITED ABOVE. THUS I DO NOT NEED TO
REITERATE MY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE WAIVER AND
ISSUANCE OF A VISA TO GERRY ADAMS.
4. THERE IS, HOWEVER, DISSENT WITHIN MY COUNTRY TEAM
OVER THIS ISSUE. THERE ARE THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT ADAMS
SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED A VISA UNTIL HE HAS RENOUNCED THE
USE OF VIOLENCE. THOSE WHO ARGUE THIS LINE DO NOT AGREE
WITH WHAT I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET ACROSS TO WASHINGTON
THESE PAST WEEKS. THAT IS VERY SIMPLY THAT THE TWO
PEOPLE PERHAPS MOST CLOSELY ENGAGED IN DEVELOPING THE
PEACE PROCESS, ALBERT REYNOLDS AND JOHN HUME, ARE
CONVINCED THAT GERRY ADAMS IS SINCERELY COMMITTED TO
PEACE. THE DELAY IN RESPONDING TO THE JOINT DECLARATION,
AND THE MOST RECENT CALL BY HIM AND OTHERS IN SINN FEIN
AND THE IRA FOR CLARIFICATION, ARE PART OF A DELICATE
BALANCING ACT ADAMS IS ENGAGED IN WHILE TRYING TO
CONVINCE THOSE WHO HAVE LOST FAMILY OVER THE PAST 25
YEARS THAT THE JOINT DECLARATION OFFERS ENOUGH FOR THEM
TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT VICTORY IS AT HAND -- LAY DOWN

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

YOUR ARMS. BECAUSE REYNOLDS AND HUME ARE CONVINCED OF THE SINCERITY OF ADAMS' COMMITMENT TO PEACE, THEY BELIEVE HE SHOULD BE GIVEN WHATEVER BACKING POSSIBLE TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION WITH THE HARDLINERS WITHIN THE IRA. IF ADAMS WAS TO BE FORCED TO COME OUT FOR AN END TO VIOLENCE WITHOUT THE FULL BACKING OF THE VARIOUS SPLINTER GROUPS WITHIN PIRA, HIS LIFE WOULD BE IN DANGER AND IN ALL LIKELIHOOD A SPLIT WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE IRA WHICH WOULD BE A SEVERE SETBACK TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

5. I BELIEVE THAT GRANTING A VISA TO GERRY ADAMS TO ALLOW HIM TO FACE HIS CRITICS IN THE U.S., AND AS PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS SAID TO ME, TO "PREACH THE GOSPEL OF PEACE," WOULD BE A VALUABLE SIGN OF SUPPORT FOR HIM AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT WHEN HE IS RISKING HIS LIFE IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACE PROCESS. I AM CONVINCED THAT BY STRENGTHENING ADAMS' POSITION, WE WILL FURTHER THE PEACE PROCESS. I AM ALSO CONFIDENT FROM MY MANY CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS AND JOHN HUME THAT THEY FULLY AGREE WITH THIS POSITION EVEN THOUGH THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION HERE MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO STATE THIS PUBLICLY AND I TRUST THAT IN THE FUTURE THE REPORTS OF THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH ME WILL BE THOROUGHLY PROTECTED. SMITH

BT
 #0190
 NNNN
 <MSGID> M0821507

E
X
D
I
S

E
X
D
I
S

E
X
D
I
S

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(1.78)
KRM 4/11/2023

PRT: SIT SODERBERG TRIP *BERGER*
SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLL SUM2 VAX WALKER

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 121010Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4331
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1713
~~SECRET~~ DUBLIN 000190

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - NANCY SODERBERG; CA FOR ASSISTANT
SECRETARY RYAN; EUR FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OXMAN FROM
AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY SMITH

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CVIS, PREL, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: VISA WAIVER FOR GERRY ADAMS

REF: (A) STATE 09969, (B) DUBLIN 0025, (C) 93 DUBLIN
7396, (D) 93 DUBLIN 7366, (E) 93 DUBLIN 7365

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. ACTION REQUEST FOLLOWS.
2. APPRECIATE RECEIVING GUIDANCE CONTAINED REF A. HOWEVER, AS THERE WILL BE VERY HEAVY PRESS COVERAGE IF ADAMS DECIDES TO APPLY HERE, I WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE RECEIVING PRESS GUIDANCE ASAP.

3. MY VIEWS ON WHETHER GERRY ADAMS SHOULD BE GRANTED A VISA TO VISIT THE U.S. HAVE ALREADY BEEN PRESENTED IN THE REFERENCED TELEGRAMS CITED ABOVE. THUS I DO NOT NEED TO REITERATE MY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE WAIVER AND ISSUANCE OF A VISA TO GERRY ADAMS.

4. THERE IS, HOWEVER, DISSENT WITHIN MY COUNTRY TEAM OVER THIS ISSUE. THERE ARE THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT ADAMS SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED A VISA UNTIL HE HAS RENOUNCED THE USE OF VIOLENCE. THOSE WHO ARGUE THIS LINE DO NOT AGREE WITH WHAT I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET ACROSS TO WASHINGTON THESE PAST WEEKS. THAT IS VERY SIMPLY THAT THE TWO PEOPLE PERHAPS MOST CLOSELY ENGAGED IN DEVELOPING THE PEACE PROCESS, ALBERT REYNOLDS AND JOHN HUME, ARE CONVINCED THAT GERRY ADAMS IS SINCERELY COMMITTED TO PEACE. THE DELAY IN RESPONDING TO THE JOINT DECLARATION, AND THE MOST RECENT CALL BY HIM AND OTHERS IN SINN FEIN AND THE IRA FOR CLARIFICATION, ARE PART OF A DELICATE BALANCING ACT ADAMS IS ENGAGED IN WHILE TRYING TO CONVINCENCE THOSE WHO HAVE LOST FAMILY OVER THE PAST 25 YEARS THAT THE JOINT DECLARATION OFFERS ENOUGH FOR THEM TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT VICTORY IS AT HAND -- LAY DOWN

NS - status?

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

I'm working up an options paper for

consideration next week when everyone returns.

peter wanted to wait until next week.

We can probably work it so Adams doesn't come in

on Friday but waits until next week

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

YOUR ARMS. BECAUSE REYNOLDS AND HUME ARE CONVINCED OF THE SINCERITY OF ADAMS' COMMITMENT TO PEACE, THEY BELIEVE HE SHOULD BE GIVEN WHATEVER BACKING POSSIBLE TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION WITH THE HARDLINERS WITHIN THE IRA. IF ADAMS WAS TO BE FORCED TO COME OUT FOR AN END TO VIOLENCE WITHOUT THE FULL BACKING OF THE VARIOUS SPLINTER GROUPS WITHIN PIRA, HIS LIFE WOULD BE IN DANGER AND IN ALL LIKELIHOOD A SPLIT WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE IRA WHICH WOULD BE A SEVERE SETBACK TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

5. I BELIEVE THAT GRANTING A VISA TO GERRY ADAMS TO ALLOW HIM TO FACE HIS CRITICS IN THE U.S., AND AS PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS SAID TO ME, TO "PREACH THE GOSPEL OF PEACE," WOULD BE A VALUABLE SIGN OF SUPPORT FOR HIM AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT WHEN HE IS RISKING HIS LIFE IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACE PROCESS. I AM CONVINCED THAT BY STRENGTHENING ADAMS' POSITION, WE WILL FURTHER THE PEACE PROCESS. I AM ALSO CONFIDENT FROM MY MANY CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS AND JOHN HUME THAT THEY FULLY AGREE WITH THIS POSITION EVEN THOUGH THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION HERE MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO STATE THIS PUBLICLY AND I TRUST THAT IN THE FUTURE THE REPORTS OF THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH ME WILL BE THOROUGHLY PROTECTED. SMITH

BT
#0190
NNNN
<MSGID> M0821507

E
X
D
I
S

E
X
D
I
S

E
X
D
I
S

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 9969 MSGID: M0821232

OAACZYUW RUEHCAA9969 0120517-CCCC-RHEHAAX.

ZNY CCCCC ZH

O 120517Z JAN 94

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 7939
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6955
RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 6931

INFO:

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.79)

K8H 7/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 009969
LONDON PLEASE PASS TO BELFAST SOONEST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: CVIS. PREL, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: ANTICIPATING A GERRY ADAMS VISA APPLICATION

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS WILL APPLY FOR A U.S. VISA IN THE COMING DAYS, EITHER IN DUBLIN OR IN BELFAST. FOST SHOULD REFER APPLICATION IMMEDIATELY TO WASHINGTON FOR DECISION IN VISAS DONKEY FORMAT. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE REVIEWING THE ISSUE IN LIGHT OF CURRENT EVENTS.

3. IN THE EVENT ADAMS APPLIES IN PERSON HIS APPLICATION IS TO BE TAKEN BY A CONSULATE OFFICIAL NO HIGHER THAN A VICE CONSUL. POSTS SHOULD NOT ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WITH ADAMS, EITHER ABOUT HIS VISA APPLICATION OR THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. TARNOFF

BT

#9969

NNNN

DIST:

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: FILE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.80)

KBH 4/11/2023

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 131212Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4339

INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1716

RUSNSTB/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000218

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: FERGUS FINLAY ON NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: (A) DUBLIN 00157

(B) LONDON 00570

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. FERGUS FINLAY, PERSONAL ADVISOR TO FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING, SAYS THAT SINN FEIN/IRA IS PLAYING FOR TIME IN AN ATTEMPT TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE RENOUNCING VIOLENCE. FINLAY PERSONALLY FAVORS MAKING THE END OF JANUARY THE DEADLINE FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE JOINT DECLARATION. HE SUPPORTS THE DECISION NOT/NOT TO RENEW SECTION 31 OF THE BROADCASTING ACT IN THE BELIEF THAT GERRY ADAMS' APPEARANCE ON TV WILL "DE-MYTHOLOGIZE" HIM IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. HE OPPOSES A U.S. VISA FOR ADAMS IN THE BELIEF THAT WHAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A TRIUMPHAL TOUR OF AMERICA WOULD ONLY INCREASE SUPPORT FOR SINN FEIN/IRA AMONG IRISH-AMERICANS. THE IRISH AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS, AND THE TWO PARTIES OF THE GOVERNING COALITION, ARE STILL FIRMLY IN AGREEMENT ON THE PEACE PROCESS. END SUMMARY.
MEETING WITH FERGUS FINLAY

3. VISITING IRISH DESK OFFICER SCHAFFER AND POLOFF MET WITH FERGUS FINLAY, PERSONAL ADVISOR TO FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING, ON JANUARY 12 TO DISCUSS THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. FINLAY COMMENTED AS FOLLOWS.

SINN FEIN/IRA

4. SINN FEIN/IRA ARE PLAYING FOR TIME. THEIR GOAL IS NOT/NOT A BRITISH PROMISE TO WITHDRAW FROM NORTHERN IRELAND OR SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL IRELAND. RATHER, THEY ARE TRYING THROUGH TACTICAL MANEUVERS TO ENTER INTO DE FACTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ONE OR BOTH GOVERNMENTS BEFORE RENOUNCING VIOLENCE. IN THIS RESPECT, THEY MAY BE USING THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AS A ROLE MODEL. EVENTUALLY, IT WILL BE THE 11-PERSON IRA GENERAL ARMY COUNCIL WHICH WILL DECIDE WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE JOINT DECLARATION AND TO RENOUNCE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

VIOLENCE. GERRY ADAMS' PERSONAL SECURITY IS PROBABLY NOT A FACTOR INFLUENCING HIS BEHAVIOR AS HE LONG AGO CEASED TO WORRY ABOUT IT.

A DEADLINE?

5. FINLAY PERSONALLY BELIEVES THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD WAIT NO LONGER THAN THE END OF THE MONTH FOR AN ANSWER FROM SINN FEIN/IRA. IT MUST TAKE THE FORM OF A FORMAL STATEMENT RENOUNCING VIOLENCE IF IT IS TO BE ACCEPTABLE. WHATEVER SINN FEIN/IRA DO, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD THEN BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION WITH WHOEVER ELSE IS INTERESTED.

SECTION 31

6. FINLAY PERSONALLY SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT'S JANUARY 11 DECISION NOT/NOT TO RENEW SECTION 31 OF THE BROADCASTING ACT. HE HAD LONG FAVORED ITS RETENTION, BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE INCREASED "MYTHOLOGIZATION" OF GERRY ADAMS SINCE THE DECEMBER 15 PROMULGATION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION, HAVE CAUSED HIM TO CHANGE HIS MIND. FINLAY NOW BELIEVES THAT NOTHING WOULD BE AS EFFECTIVE IN ERODING ADAMS' SUPPORT, IN EFFECT, "DE-MYSTIFYING" HIM, BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH AS THE PUBLIC'S LISTENING TO HIM ON TV. (NOTE: IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL CIRCUMSCRIBE SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES' TV APPEARANCES BY BANNING LIVE ONES, THEREBY PREVENTING THEM FROM APPEARING ON THE NUMEROUS, POPULAR TALK SHOWS, AND BY CAREFULLY EDITING TAPES USED ON NEWS PROGRAMS.)

A VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS

7. PARADOXICALLY, FINLAY SAID, HE OPPOSES GIVING ADAMS A U.S. VISA EVEN THOUGH HE SUPPORTS HIS APPEARANCE ON IRISH TV. THE REASON IS THAT THE TWO CULTURES, IRISH AND AMERICAN, ARE DIFFERENT ENOUGH THAT AN ADAMS' VISIT TO THE U.S. COULD TURN INTO A TRIUMPHAL TOUR AND RESULT IN SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER SUPPORT FOR SINN FEIN/IRA AMONG IRISH-AMERICANS. FINLAY OBSERVED THAT YOUNG, PRAGMATIC, FIRST-GENERATION IRISH-AMERICANS HAVE ASSUMED THE LEADERSHIP OF IRISH-AMERICAN GROUPS IN THE U.S. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY, HE BELIEVES, IF THEY WERE TO BE "CONVERTED" BY GERRY AD

AMS, SINCE ONE IMPORTANT REASON FOR SINN FEIN/IRA'S RECENT APPARENT INTEREST IN PEACE IS THE RADICAL DECREASE IN AMERICAN SUPPORT SINCE THE EARLY 1970S. UNITED WE STAND,...

8. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE FIRMLY UNITED IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION, WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCES IN THE RHETORIC OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICIALS/SPOKESPERSONS. THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE TWO WOULD AGREE ON ALL ASPECTS OF A FUTURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 000218

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: FERGUS FINLAY ON NORTHERN IRELAND

POLITICAL SOLUTION. THE TWO PARTIES OF THE GOVERNING COALITION ARE ALSO IN AGREEMENT ABOUT IRISH POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND. THAT IS NOT TO SAY, FINLAY MUSED, THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING IS PLEASED WITH THE PUBLICITY WHICH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS HAS BEEN RECEIVING. BUT, FINLAY AGREED, THAT IS PART OF THE BAGGAGE WHICH COMES WITH BEING NUMBER TWO.

COMMENT

9. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE HERE SUGGESTING A RIFT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OR BETWEEN THE TWO COALITION PARTIES OVER NORTHERN IRELAND. ON THE OTHER HAND, NO ONE WILL ADMIT TO THE EXISTENCE OF A "GOOD COP, BAD COP" ROUTINE BY DUBLIN AND LONDON IN THEIR RESPECTIVE APPROACHES TO SINN FEIN,IRA. FINLAY'S PERSONAL PREFERENCES IN REGARD TO THE TIMING OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS, OF COURSE, WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE THOSE OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. MOST OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO GIVE SINN FEIN/IRA MORE TIME IN WHICH TO RESPOND TO THE JOINT DECLARATION THAN FINLAY WOULD. SMITH

BT

#0218

NNNN

<MSGID> M0823971

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: FILE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.81)

KBH 4/11/2023

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 131212Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4339

INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1716

RUSNSTB/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000218

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: FERGUS FINLAY ON NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: (A) DUBLIN 00157

(B) LONDON 00570

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. FERGUS FINLAY, PERSONAL ADVISOR TO FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING, SAYS THAT SINN FEIN/IRA IS PLAYING FOR TIME IN AN ATTEMPT TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE RENOUNCING VIOLENCE. FINLAY PERSONALLY FAVORS MAKING THE END OF JANUARY THE DEADLINE FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE JOINT DECLARATION. HE SUPPORTS THE DECISION NOT/NOT TO RENEW SECTION 31 OF THE BROADCASTING ACT IN THE BELIEF THAT GERRY ADAMS' APPEARANCE ON TV WILL "DE-MYTHOLOGIZE" HIM IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. HE OPPOSES A U.S. VISA FOR ADAMS IN THE BELIEF THAT WHAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A TRIUMPHAL TOUR OF AMERICA WOULD ONLY INCREASE SUPPORT FOR SINN FEIN/IRA AMONG IRISH-AMERICANS. THE IRISH AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS, AND THE TWO PARTIES OF THE GOVERNING COALITION, ARE STILL FIRMLY IN AGREEMENT ON THE PEACE PROCESS. END SUMMARY. MEETING WITH FERGUS FINLAY

3. VISITING IRISH DESK OFFICER SCHAFFER AND POLOFF MET WITH FERGUS FINLAY, PERSONAL ADVISOR TO FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING, ON JANUARY 12 TO DISCUSS THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. FINLAY COMMENTED AS FOLLOWS. SINN FEIN/IRA

4. SINN FEIN/IRA ARE PLAYING FOR TIME. THEIR GOAL IS NOT/NOT A BRITISH PROMISE TO WITHDRAW FROM NORTHERN IRELAND OR SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL IRELAND. RATHER, THEY ARE TRYING THROUGH TACTICAL MANEUVERS TO ENTER INTO DE FACTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ONE OR BOTH GOVERNMENTS BEFORE RENOUNCING VIOLENCE. IN THIS RESPECT, THEY MAY BE USING THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AS A ROLE MODEL. EVENTUALLY, IT WILL BE THE 11-PERSON IRA GENERAL ARMY COUNCIL WHICH WILL DECIDE WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE JOINT DECLARATION AND TO RENOUNCE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

VIOLENCE. GERRY ADAMS' PERSONAL SECURITY IS PROBABLY NOT A FACTOR INFLUENCING HIS BEHAVIOR AS HE LONG AGO CEASED TO WORRY ABOUT IT.

A DEADLINE?

5. FINLAY PERSONALLY BELIEVES THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD WAIT NO LONGER THAN THE END OF THE MONTH FOR AN ANSWER FROM SINN FEIN/IRA. IT MUST TAKE THE FORM OF A FORMAL STATEMENT RENOUNCING VIOLENCE IF IT IS TO BE ACCEPTABLE. WHATEVER SINN FEIN/IRA DO, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD THEN BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION WITH WHOEVER ELSE IS INTERESTED.

SECTION 31

6. FINLAY PERSONALLY SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT'S JANUARY 11 DECISION NOT/NOT TO RENEW SECTION 31 OF THE BROADCASTING ACT. HE HAD LONG FAVORED ITS RETENTION, BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE INCREASED "MYTHOLOGIZATION" OF GERRY ADAMS SINCE THE DECEMBER 15 PROMULGATION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION, HAVE CAUSED HIM TO CHANGE HIS MIND. FINLAY NOW BELIEVES THAT NOTHING WOULD BE AS EFFECTIVE IN ERODING ADAMS' SUPPORT, IN EFFECT, "DE-MYSTIFYING" HIM, BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH AS THE PUBLIC'S LISTENING TO HIM ON TV. (NOTE: IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL CIRCUMSCRIBE SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES' TV APPEARANCES BY BANNING LIVE ONES, THEREBY PREVENTING THEM FROM APPEARING ON THE NUMEROUS, POPULAR TALK SHOWS, AND BY CAREFULLY EDITING TAPES USED ON NEWS PROGRAMS.)

A VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS

7. PARADOXICALLY, FINLAY SAID, HE OPPOSES GIVING ADAMS A U.S. VISA EVEN THOUGH HE SUPPORTS HIS APPEARANCE ON IRISH TV. THE REASON IS THAT THE TWO CULTURES, IRISH AND AMERICAN, ARE DIFFERENT ENOUGH THAT AN ADAMS' VISIT TO THE U.S. COULD TURN INTO A TRIUMPHAL TOUR AND RESULT IN SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER SUPPORT FOR SINN FEIN/IRA AMONG IRISH-AMERICANS. FINLAY OBSERVED THAT YOUNG, PRAGMATIC, FIRST-GENERATION IRISH-AMERICANS HAVE ASSUMED THE LEADERSHIP OF IRISH-AMERICAN GROUPS IN THE U.S. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY, HE BELIEVES, IF THEY WERE TO BE "CONVERTED" BY GERRY AD

AMS, SINCE ONE IMPORTANT REASON FOR SINN FEIN/IRA'S RECENT APPARENT INTEREST IN PEACE IS THE RADICAL DECREASE IN AMERICAN SUPPORT SINCE THE EARLY 1970S.

UNITED WE STAND, ...

8. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE FIRMLY UNITED IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION, WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCES IN THE RHETORIC OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICIALS/SPOKESPERSONS. THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE TWO WOULD AGREE ON ALL ASPECTS OF A FUTURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 000218

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: FERGUS FINLAY ON NORTHERN IRELAND

POLITICAL SOLUTION. THE TWO PARTIES OF THE GOVERNING COALITION ARE ALSO IN AGREEMENT ABOUT IRISH POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND. THAT IS NOT TO SAY, FINLAY MUSED, THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING IS PLEASED WITH THE PUBLICITY WHICH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS HAS BEEN RECEIVING. BUT, FINLAY AGREED, THAT IS PART OF THE BAGGAGE WHICH COMES WITH BEING NUMBER TWO.

COMMENT

9. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE HERE SUGGESTING A RIFT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OR BETWEEN THE TWO COALITION PARTIES OVER NORTHERN IRELAND. ON THE OTHER HAND, NO ONE WILL ADMIT TO THE EXISTENCE OF A "GOOD COP, BAD COP" ROUTINE BY DUBLIN AND LONDON IN THEIR RESPECTIVE APPROACHES TO SINN FEIN, IRA. FINLAY'S PERSONAL PREFERENCES IN REGARD TO THE TIMING OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS, OF COURSE, WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE THOSE OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. MOST OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO GIVE SINN FEIN/IRA MORE TIME IN WHICH TO RESPOND TO THE JOINT DECLARATION THAN FINLAY WOULD. SMITH

BT

#0218

NNNN

<MSGID> M0823971

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Return)

cc TZ
SB
fyi.
interesting
ms

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: FILE HOLL VAX WALKER

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 201536Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4393
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1738
RUSNSTB/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 000396

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: MARTIN MANSERGH ON NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: DUBLIN 00358

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(1.82)
KBH 4/11/2023

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON JANUARY 20, WE MET WITH MARTIN MANSERGH, PRIME MINISTER REYNOLD'S ADVISOR ON NORTHERN IRELAND AND A MEMBER OF THE SMALL GROUP OF IRISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO WORKED ON THE JOINT DECLARATION, TO DISCUSS THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. MANSERGH SAID THAT:

-- REYNOLDS WOULD ADDRESS LAW GRADUATES THAT EVENING ON THE SUBJECT OF "SELF-DETERMINATION" AS PART OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO CLARIFY PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE JOINT DECLARATION.

-- IRISH OFFICIALS ARE STUDYING THE TOPIC OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN PARTITIONED STATES, ABOUT WHICH THERE IS PRECIOUS LITTLE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE, TO SEE IF THEY CAN FIND SOMETHING APPLICABLE TO THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. TO DATE, THE WAY SOUTH KOREA IS DEFINING KOREAN SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE CONTEXT OF EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION SEEMS MOST APPLICABLE TO THE IRISH SITUATION.

-- THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS HOLDING FIRMLY TO THE AGREEMENT WITH THE BRITISH NOT/NOT TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH SINN FEIN/IRA PENDING THEIR RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE.

HOWEVER, THE IRISH BELIEVE THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO "SELL" THE JOINT DECLARATION, WHICH BELIEF ACCOUNTS FOR ATTEMPTS TO CLARIFY IT, FOR THE REFUSAL TO RENEW SECTION 31 OF THE BROADCASTING ACT AND FOR THE SUPPORT FOR A U.S. VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS.

-- THE BRITISH, UNFORTUNATELY, HAVE BEEN PLAYING INTO SINN FEIN'S HANDS. THE BRITISH SHOULD ALSO START SELLING THE JOINT DECLARATION. THE JANUARY 21 DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS WILL, HOPEFULLY, MARK THE BEGINNING OF SUCH AN EFFORT.

-- MEMBERS OF SINN FEIN AND OTHERS HAVE INFORMED IRISH

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

OFFICIALS THAT THE REASON FOR THE DELAY IN THE PARTY'S RESPONSE TO THE JOINT DECLARATION IS THEIR DESIRE FOR CLARIFICATION, RATHER THAN THE CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURE ITSELF.

-- BUT, ONLY SO MUCH CLARIFICATION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION IS POSSIBLE. IT WILL NOT TAKE MORE THAN ANOTHER MONTH OR SO, IF THAT LONG, UNTIL SINN FEIN REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION BECOME REPETITIVE, AND IT BEGINS RAPIDLY TO LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY.

-- MEDIA COVERAGE OF SINN FEIN WILL INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON IT TO RESPOND TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

-- THE IRISH GOVERNMENT DECIDED NOT TO RENEW SECTION 31 OF THE BROADCASTING IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT SINN FEIN "WOULD INITIALLY HAVE A BALL," BUT THE NOVELTY OF HEARING ITS MEMBERS WILL SOON WEAR OFF, AND THEY WILL FIND THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO EXPLOIT THE MEDIA AS THEY PROBABLY EXPECTED TO.

-- THE AUDIENCE WHICH GERRY ADAMS WILL ADDRESS IN THE U.S. IF HE GETS A VISA WILL BE TOO SOPHISTICATED TO BE TAKEN IN BY ANYTHING HE SAYS. RATHER, ITS SOPHISTICATION WILL FORCE ADAMS TO SPEAK SERIOUSLY AND FRANKLY. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO EXPOSE ADAMS TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD, TO INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION, ESPECIALLY IN THE U.S.

-- THE JANUARY 28 MEETING OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAI CONFERENCE WILL START THE NEGOTIATING TRAIN'S ENGINE RUNNING. IT WILL REMAIN IN THE STATION, HOWEVER, UNTIL THE FOLLOWING CONFERENCE MEETING AT THE END OF FEBRUARY. IF SINN FEIN BY THEN HAS EITHER REJECTED THE JOINT DECLARATION OR REFUSED TO RESPOND, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL START NEW TALKS, I.E., NEGOTIATIONS, ON NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- IRISH UNITY IS NOT AT HAND, IF ONLY FOR PRACTICAL REASONS SUCH AS COST. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST ALSO OBSERVE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND. THAT IS POLITICAL REALITY.

-- THE SINN FEIN LEADERS UNDERSTAND THIS AND ALSO GENUINELY WANT PEACE. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY CAN DELIVER THE RANK-AND-FILE. IN TRYING TO DO S O, THEY WANT TO AVOID A SPLIT.

-- NO ONE KNOWS IF THEIR EFFORT WILL SUCCEED. THE ODDS APPEAR TO BE 50-50. SMITH

BT

#0396

NNNN

<MSGID> M0834417

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: FILE LEBOURGEOIS NSC SUM SUM2 VAX VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 091228Z AUG 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6129
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 1888
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 012586
DEPT FOR EUR/NE AND PA
NSC FOR SODERBERG
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV UK EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: NEWSPAPER CLAIMS NSC CONTACTS
WITH SINN FEIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.89)
KBM 4/11/2023

1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST -- SEE PARAS 10-11.
SUMMARY

2. (U) THE LONDON DAILY "INDEPENDENT" OF AUGUST 9
CLAIMED IN A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE THAT:
-- AN NSC LETTER TO SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS
WAS DELIVERED IN APRIL;
-- THERE HAD BEEN "NUMEROUS OTHER INDIRECT CONTACTS"
BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND THE NSC;
-- THE STATE DEPARTMENT "NO LONGER DIRECTS U.S. POLICY
ON IRELAND," WHICH INSTEAD "IS BEING HANDLED
DIRECTLY FROM THE WHITE HOUSE BY NANCY SODERBERG";
-- THE USG WOULD PROBABLY GIVE ADAMS ANOTHER VISA IF
THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) ENDED
ITS VIOLENCE; AND
-- ADAMS "HOPES TO USE HIS INFLUENCE IN THE U.S. TO
PUT PRESSURE ON BRITAIN IN ANY FUTURE TALKS."

Mike Price

3. (U) IN AUGUST 8 TALKS WITH THE AUTHORS, CONGEN
BELFAST AND EMBASSY LONDON OFFICERS CONFIRMED DELIVERY
OF THE LETTER, TRIED TO DAMPEN SPECULATION ABOUT A SINN
FEIN/NSC "CHANNEL," AND DISPELLED THE AUTHORS' ORIGINAL
IDEA THAT A MAJOR USG INITIATIVE WAS UNDERWAY. HMG AND
CONGEN BELFAST HAVE GOTTEN SEVERAL PRESS QUERIES ON THE
SUBJECT, AND WE EXPECT OTHERS TO THE EMBASSY. WE NEED
CLEARANCE ASAP ON PROPOSED PRESS GUIDANCE IN PARA 10,
AND ON WHETHER TO RELEASE THE TEXT OF THE NSC LETTER.
ENDSUMMARY.

"INDEPENDENT" ARTICLE

4. (U) THE SECOND LEAD ARTICLE IN THE AUGUST 9
"INDEPENDENT," BY DAVID MCKITTRICK AND LEONARD DOYLE,

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

WAS HEADLINED "U.S. HOLDS KEY TO EARLY IRA CEASEFIRE."
EXCERPTS:

- "THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY WITH SINN FEIN IN BELFAST, URGING THE REPUBLICANS TO ACCEPT THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION AND END IRA VIOLENCE, ACCORDING TO RELIABLE SOURCES."
- "A LETTER FROM THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WAS HAND-DELIVERED IN APRIL BY VAL MARTINEZ, THE AMERICAN CONSUL-GENERAL IN BELFAST, TO A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF THE SINN FEIN PRESIDENT, GERRY ADAMS."
- "THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS OTHER INDIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION SINCE THEN, ACCORDING TO AUTHORITATIVE U.S. SOURCES. AMERICAN POLICY IS BEING HANDLED DIRECTLY FROM THE WHITE HOUSE BY NANCY SODERBERG, A DIRECTOR AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND A CLOSE CONFIDANT OF PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON."
- "SPECULATION IN BELFAST AND DUBLIN CENTERS ON A CEASEFIRE OF ABOUT THREE MONTHS. HOWEVER, SEVERAL SOURCES SAY A CEASEFIRE IS NOT EXPECTED DURING AUGUST, BUT COULD START NEXT MONTH."
- "BOTH LONDON AND DUBLIN HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID SINN FEIN COULD NOT EXPECT A PLACE AT ANY CONFERENCE TABLE UNLESS A PERMANENT CESSATION WAS IN PLACE. BUT EVEN A LIMITED CEASEFIRE WOULD EASE THE PRESSURE THE REPUBLICANS ARE NOW UNDOUBTEDLY FEELING."
- "A CEASEFIRE OF THREE OR EVEN TWO MONTHS WOULD LEAD TO CALLS FROM MANY SOURCES IN IRELAND, BRITAIN AND THE U.S. FOR A POSITIVE MOVE FROM BRITAIN. THE PROSPECT OF FUTURE AMERICAN VISAS FOR GERRY ADAMS AND OTHER REPUBLICAN LEADERS IS SEEN AS ONE OF THE POSSIBLE INDUCEMENTS TO SINN FEIN TO OPT FOR THE POLITICAL PROCESSES."
- "THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION IS THAT IT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING MR. ADAMS A VISA EARLIER THIS YEAR DESPITE FIERCE BRITISH OPPOSITION. THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT IS UNHAPPY THAT THE VISA WAS GRANTED BECAUSE IT SOURED RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN, BUT IT NO LONGER DIRECTS U.S. POLICY ON IRELAND, WHICH HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT IN DOMESTIC U.S. POLITICS."

-- "IN THE EVENT OF A CEASEFIRE MR. ADAMS HOPES TO BE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 LONDON 012586

DEPT FOR EUR/NE AND PA

NSC FOR SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: NEWSPAPER CLAIMS NSC CONTACTS
WITH SINN FEIN

ABLE TO USE HIS INFLUENCE IN THE U.S. TO PUT PRESSURE ON BRITAIN IN ANY FUTURE TALKS AND ONCE PEACE HAS TAKEN HOLD, SINN FEIN BELIEVES IT COULD RELY ON A SYMPATHETIC AUDIENCE IN THE U.S. TO MAINTAIN THAT PRESSURE."

-- "IT IS ALSO EXPECTED THAT MR. ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN LEADERS COULD CONDUCT A TOUR OF MAJOR U.S. CITIES TO DRUM UP SUPPORT IN THE EVENT OF PROLONGED CEASEFIRE. U.S. ADMINISTRATION SOURCES RECENTLY TOLD THE IRISH TIMES THAT MR. ADAMS WOULD PROBABLY GET ANOTHER VISA TO EXPLAIN SINN FEIN POLICY TO SUPPORTERS IN THE U.S. IF THE IRA STOPPED THE VIOLENCE."

DAMPENING SPECULATION

5. (C) DOYLE CALLED BELFAST CONSUL GENERAL MARTINEZ AUGUST 8 (AND TRIED TO CONTACT THE EMBASSY'S PRESS OFFICE) FOR COMMENT ON HIS STORY. ON BACKGROUND, MARTINEZ CONFIRMED THE DELIVERY OF A LETTER TO SINN FEIN, BUT TRIED TO DAMPEN DOYLE'S SPECULATION ABOUT A "CHANNEL" BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND THE NSC.

6. (C) SEVERAL HOURS LATER, MCKITTRICK PHONED THE EMBASSY AND SAID DOYLE'S STORY WOULD ALLEGE THAT THERE WAS A CURRENT MAJOR USG INITIATIVE AFOOT TO BRING SINN FEIN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AS EVIDENCED BY THE LETTER TO ADAMS. ON DEEP BACKGROUND, WE REPLIED THAT THE LETTER WAS OLD NEWS: IT HAD BEEN DELIVERED IN EARLY APRIL, NOT TO ADAMS BUT TO AN ASSOCIATE, AND RESPONDED TO AN ADAMS-CLINTON LETTER THAT SINN FEIN HAD PUBLISHED. WE POINTED OUT THAT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR'S PRIVATE SECRETARY HAD RESPONDED IN SIMILAR FASHION TO ADAMS' LETTER TO MAJOR. THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE IN THE FACT THAT THE REPLY CAME FROM THE NSC RATHER THAN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WERE NOT AWARE OF ANY SINN FEIN/NSC "CHANNEL," NOR OF ANY NEW USG INITIATIVE. MCKITTRICK SAID "THIS TAKES A LOT OF THE STEAM OUT OF THE STORY," AND PROMISED TO TONE DOWN THE ARTICLE.

7. (C) ON AUGUST 9, WE PHONED MCKITTRICK TO POINT OUT THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE ARTICLE AND ITS HEADLINE (WHICH FIT THE ORIGINAL DRAFT RATHER THAN THE FINAL VERSION). MCKITTRICK SAID HE HAD HAD NO HAND IN DRAFTING THE HEADLINE, AND APOLOGIZED FOR ITS MISLEADING NATURE. DOYLE HAD BEEN UNDER SEVERE PRESSURE FROM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

EDITORS TO COME UP WITH AN EYE-CATCHING STORY ON A SLOW NEWS DAY.

COMMENT

8. (C) THERE IS NOTHING IN THE "INDEPENDENT" ARTICLE THAT HAS NOT APPEARED IN PREVIOUS PRESS ACCOUNTS. THE "SUNDAY TIMES" HAS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS ALLEGED DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS AND SINN FEIN, CITING ADMINISTRATION SOURCES. ON APRIL 13, THE "IRISH TIMES" OF DUBLIN, ALSO CITING ADMINISTRATION SOURCES, REPORTED NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR LAKE'S REPLY TO ADAMS AND CARRIED A GARBLED ACCOUNT OF THE TEXT. AS MCKITTRICK TOLD US, "INDEPENDENT" EDITORS WERE DESPERATE FOR A HOT STORY DURING THE AUGUST DOLDRUMS.

FURTHER QUERIES

9. (C) THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE AND CONGEN BELFAST HAVE BEEN DELUGED WITH QUERIES FROM ELECTRONIC AND PRINT MEDIA FOR COMMENT ON THE ARTICLE. HMG'S LINE AT THE MOMENT IS THAT THE USG HAS BEEN FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS' EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE TO NORTHERN IRELAND THROUGH THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION, AND THAT ANY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE USG AND SINN FEIN WERE AN INTERNAL U.S. MATTER. BELFAST HAS REFRAINED FROM OFFERING ANY COMMENT PENDING CLEARED GUIDANCE.

PROPOSED PRESS GUIDANCE

10. (LOU) WE WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT AND NSC CLEARANCE (OR REVISION) OF THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED PRESS LINE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNLESS WE HEAR OTHERWISE, WE WILL BEGIN TO USE IT WITH THE MEDIA AT 1700 LOCAL TIME.

- MR. ADAMS WROTE TO PRESIDENT CLINTON MARCH 31 TO EXPLAIN THE IRA'S EASTER CEASEFIRE. SINN FEIN RELEASED THAT LETTER AT THE TIME.
- ON APRIL 8, A WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL REPLIED TO MR. ADAMS' LETTER (AS PRIME MINISTER MAJOR'S OFFICE HAD DONE TO A SIMILAR LETTER THE DAY BEFORE). U.S.

As National Security Advisor Anthony Calv.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 LONDON 012586
 DEPT FOR EUR/NE AND PA
 NSC FOR SODERBERG
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL PTER PCOV UK EI
 SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: NEWSPAPER CLAIMS NSC CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN

DIPLMATS DELIVERED THE REPLY TO AN ASSOCIATE OF MR. ADAMS APRIL 9.

- THE WHITE HOUSE REPLY WAS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

PUBLIC STATEMENTS OVER THE PAST NINE MONTHS ^{endone} WHICH HAVE REPEATEDLY CALLED ON SINN FEIN TO ~~ACCEPT~~ THE ~~TERMS OFFERED IN~~ THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION, AND ON THE IRA TO IMPLEMENT A PERMANENT END TO ITS CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE.

-- THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND POLITICAL PROGRESS AMONG THE TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, AND BELIEVE THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION IS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCH PROGRESS. THERE CAN BE NO ~~FURTHER~~ EXCUSE FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE FROM EITHER REPUBLICAN OR LOYALIST GROUPS.

11. (C) WE WOULD ALSO LIKE GUIDANCE ON WHETHER TO RELEASE THE TEXT OF MR. LAKE'S APRIL 8 LETTER, WHICH WAS SENT TO BELFAST FROM WASHINGTON BY UNCLASSIFIED FAX. ?

CROWE

BT

#2586

NNNN

<MSGID> M1193764

No. 7 per SIT room c think

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: ITOH KENNEY REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: FILE HOLL LEBOURGEOIS SUM SUM2 VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 051429Z APR 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4991
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1967
RUSNSTB/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 001884

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING AND SINN FEIN
OFFICIAL MCGUINNESS COMMENT ON PEACE

REF DUBLIN 01853

1. (U) ON EASTER SUNDAY, APRIL 3, FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING CALLED ON SINN FEIN TO SPELL OUT CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY THE ISSUES ON WHICH IT REQUIRED CLARIFICATION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION AND REJECTED AS "VAGUE RITUALISTIC STATEMENTS" THE DEMANDS WHICH SINN FEIN VICE PRESIDENT MARTIN MCGUINNESS MADE AT A DUBLIN COMMEMORATION CEREMONY EARLIER THAT DAY (SEE PARAS. 3 AND 4 BELOW). SPRING CONTINUED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO FEEL SORROW AND DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE IRA'S FAILURE TO ANNOUNCE A PERMANENT CEASEFIRE AND THAT, ALTHOUGH THE IRA MIGHT REGARD THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE AS SIGNIFICANT AND IMPORTANT, "IT WOULD NOT IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE SUFFICIENTLY TO ENABLE ANY PROGRESS TO BE MADE."

2. (U) THE APRIL 5 LOCAL MEDIA QUOTE SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS AS CHARACTERIZING SPRING'S COMMENTS AS "DISAPPOINTING." IN WHAT PURPORTS TO BE A DIRECT MESSAGE TO SPRING, ADAMS SAYS THAT "THE POTENTIAL OF THE IRA INITIATIVE MUST NOT BE IGNORED AND SHOULD BE BUILT UPON. IT IS A STEP FORWARD IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REAL PEACE PROCESS AND DESERVES AN IMAGINATIVE RESPONSE FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. DICK SPRING SHOULD NOT BE DEFENDING BRITISH INFLEXIBILITY."

3. (U) IN HIS EASTER REMARKS MENTIONED ABOVE, SINN FEIN VICE PRESIDENT MARTIN MCGUINNESS SAID THAT SINN FEIN NEEDED CLARIFICATION OF THREE THINGS BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT: "TEXTUAL AMBIGUITIES" IN THE JOINT DECLARATION; STEPS SUBSEQUENT TO SINN FEIN'S ACCEPTANCE OF IT; AND BRITAIN'S LONG-TERM INTENTIONS IN REGARD TO NORTHERN IRELAND. MCGUINNESS FRAMED THESE "CLARIFICATIONS" WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SINN FEIN'S PEACE POLICY: "INCLUSIVE NEGOTIATIONS AS A

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.85)
KBH 4/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

MEANS OF ENDING THE CONFLICT; AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN TO END PARTITION; INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN BREAKING THE DEADLOCK; AND A PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN THE LEAD-UP TO A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE."

4. (U) IN ADDITION TO "CLARIFICATION," MCGUINNESS IDENTIFIED THE "OTHER CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT ISSUE" AS "RECOGNITION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF THE SINN FEIN VOTE; THE VALIDITY OF OUR VOTE AND THE RIGHTS OF OUR PEOPLE." HE ALSO SAID THAT HE WOULD BE "VERY SURPRISED" IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REJECTED A MEETING WITH SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE PURPOSE OF CLARIFYING THE JOINT DECLARATION SINCE IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT "BRITAIN HAS LOST THE CLARIFICATION DEBATE." IF THE BRITISH DID PROVIDE THE NECESSARY CLARIFICATION, MCGUINNESS PROMISED, SINN FEIN WOULD QUICKLY RESPOND TO THE DECLARATION ITSELF. "WHAT WOULD HAPPEN (AFTER THE MEETING WITH THE BRITISH) IS THAT SINN FEIN WILL THEN REFLECT ON WHAT (IT) WAS TOLD BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, AND WE WILL THEN MAKE A FINAL DECISION ABOUT THE...DECLARATION, AND PEOPLE WILL NOT HAVE TO WAIT ANY LENGTH OF TIME WHATSOEVER FOR US TO DO THAT. IT WILL ALL HAPPEN VERY, VERY QUICKLY, INDEED."

COMMENT

5. (✓) SPRING'S "TOUGH" LINE ON THE IRA'S TEMPORARY CEASEFIRE PROBABLY BOTH REFLECTS THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S AND HIS GENUINE DISAPPOINTMENT OVER ITS BREVITY AND CONSTITUTES AN ATTEMPT TO PRESSURE THE IRA INTO EXPLICITLY OR TACITLY EXTENDING IT. SMITH

BT

#1884

NNNN

<MSGID> M0975015

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

file w/ Adams

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLL SUM2 VAX WALKER

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 031750Z FEB 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.89)
KBH 4/11/2023

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6636
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 1231
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 01995
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, CVIS, UK, EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG SEEKS TO REGAIN
INITIATIVE AFTER ADAMS VISIT
REFS: (A) LONDON 1725, (B) LONDON 1764, (C) LONDON 1902
SUMMARY

1. (c) NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY SIR PATRICK MAYHEW ANNOUNCED FEBRUARY 3 THAT HE WOULD SOON SUBMIT A BRITISH OUTLINE FOR RENEWED POLITICAL TALKS TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND PARTIES AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. THE PLANS WERE ALREADY IN TRAIN, BUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MOVED FORWARD IN AN EFFORT TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE FROM SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS. MEDIA COMMENT CONTINUES TO DESCRIBE THE ADAMS VISIT TO THE U.S. AS A CATASTROPHE FOR THE UK, BUT THE FOCUS HAS SHIFTED TO WHETHER HMG COULD HAVE DONE MORE TO COUNTER ADAMS' IMPACT, AND WHETHER THE BAN ON BROADCASTING ADAMS' VOICE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS WARM RECEPTION IN THE U.S. TWO EDITORIALS ARGUED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STATEMENTS DURING THE VISIT GAVE IMPORTANT NEW ASSURANCES TO HMG AND UNDERCUT ADAMS' MEDIA SUCCESS. END SUMMARY.

MAYHEW INITIATIVE

2. (U) IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE "FINANCIAL TIMES," PUBLISHED FEBRUARY 3, MAYHEW SAID HE REMAINED CONVINCED, DESPITE THE VISA DECISION, THAT "AGREEMENT BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN ON THE PROVINCE'S FUTURE WILL LEAD TO PROGRESSIVE INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION OF THE IRA."
3. (U) MEANWHILE, MAYHEW SAID, HE WOULD "TABLE WITHIN TWO WEEKS AN OUTLINE PLAN FOR A NEW POLITICAL SETTLEMENT" TO EACH OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. IT WOULD INCLUDE PLANS FOR A DEVOLVED ASSEMBLY AND "CROSS-BORDER EXECUTIVE BOARDS WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCH AREAS AS TOURISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT." NEW TALKS ON THE BASIS OF THE OUTLINE WOULD BE BILATERALLY WITH EACH PARTY.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

4. (U) IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS LATER IN THE DAY, PRIME MINISTER MAJOR CONFIRMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, WITH OR WITHOUT ADAMS: "PROGRESS ON NORTHERN IRELAND CANNOT AND WILL NOT WAIT FOR SINN FEIN." SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOR PARTY (SDLP) DEPUTY LEADER SEAMUS MALLON SUPPORTED THE INITIATIVE, SAYING THAT ADAMS' STATEMENTS IN THE U.S. "DEMONSTRATED THAT HE DOES NOT ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION BASED ON CONSENT" WHICH IS AT THE HEART OF THE JOINT DECLARATION.

5. (C) WE HAVE KNOWN FOR SOME TIME THAT HMG WAS ANXIOUS TO REGENERATE FORMAL TALKS, BUILDING ON NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) JUNIOR MINISTER MICHAEL ANCRAM'S MONTHS OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PARTIES. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AGREES ON THE DESIRABILITY OF RESTORING MOMENTUM TO THE TALKS PROCESS, BUT WANTS TO AVOID GIVING SINN FEIN ANY PRETEXT FOR REJECTING THE JOINT DECLARATION. THUS, THE ONLY SURPRISE IN MAYHEW'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS ITS TIMING.

6. (C) NIO ASSISTANT SECRETARY JIM DANIELL TOLD US FEBRUARY 3 THAT THE "DESIRE NOT TO LET THE INITIATIVE DRIFT AWAY" HAD PROMPTED MAYHEW TO ADVANCE HIS ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT "ONLY BY A DAY OR TWO." WHILE THE OUTLINE -- WHICH REFLECTED AREAS OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES, AND NOT A BRITISH BLUEPRINT -- WOULD BE PRESENTED SOON, THE TALKS PROBABLY WOULD NOT START FOR SEVERAL MORE WEEKS.

MEDIA REACTION

7. (U) THE ADAMS VISIT CONTINUES TO REVERBERATE IN THE BRITISH PRESS, DRAWING HEADLINES AND EDITORIAL COMMENT. CRITICISM OF THE USG REMAINS A POPULAR THEME:

-- "THE SUN": "CLINTON'S CYNICAL DUPLICITY HAS LET MILLIONS OF AMERICANS BE CONNED INTO SENDING MONEY TO THE IRA CAUSE. THERE WILL BE BLOOD ON HIS HANDS IN THE WHITE HOUSE."

-- "DAILY EXPRESS": "THE HERO'S WELCOME ACCORDED TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 01995

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, CVIS, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG SEEKS TO REGAIN INITIATIVE AFTER ADAMS VISIT

GERRY ADAMS DURING HIS MACABRE, 48-HOUR CIRCUS PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED STATES IS A CAUSE FOR SHAME AND BEWILDERMENT."

-- PAUL JOHNSON IN THE "DAILY MAIL": "IT IS THE WORST REVERSE WE HAVE RECEIVED ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

AND FOR OUR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH AMERICA SINCE THE SUEZ DEBACLE OF 1956."

-- CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN IN "THE INDEPENDENT": "THE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS FORMULA" -- THAT ADAMS GOT HIS VISA BY OPPOSING ONLY THE KILLING OF CIVILIANS RATHER THAN RENOUNCING ALL VIOLENCE -- "IS EQUIVALENT TO CONCEDED THE EXISTENCE OF LEGITIMATE TARGETS FOR POLITICAL TERRORISM."

8. (U) BUT MORE OF THE FOCUS OF BLAME HAS BEEN SHIFTED INWARD. SOME COMMENTATORS, INCLUDING JOHNSON AND O'BRIEN, BLAMED THE HMG-IRA CONTACTS AND THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION FOR GIVING THE USG A PRETEXT TO ADMIT ADAMS. OTHERS ACCUSED FOREIGN SECRETARY HURD, AMBASSADOR RENWICK AND THE FCO FOR FAILING TO OBTAIN EQUAL AIR TIME TO MAKE THE BRITISH CASE. STILL OTHERS ARGUED THAT THE BRITISH BROADCASTING BAN HAD GIVEN ADAMS ADDITIONAL MYSTIQUE AS SOMEONE WHOSE WORDS WERE "BANNED IN LONDON," AND HANDED THE IRA A "FREEDOM OF SPEECH" PROPAGANDA PLOY.

9. (U) TWO EDITORIALS IN LEADING QUALITY DAILIES ARGUED THAT ADAMS CAME BACK FROM NEW YORK WITH LESS THAN APPEARANCES WOULD SUGGEST:

-- "THE GUARDIAN": "HE RETURNS WITH A REJECTION FROM THE SAME ADMINISTRATION WHICH ALLOWED HIM TO VISIT THE COUNTRY IN THE FIRST PLACE.... IT MAY OR MAY NOT BE TRUE, AS (ULSTER UNIONIST MP KEN) MAGINNIS ALLEGES, THAT THE PRESIDENT SENT A WRONG SIGNAL TO THE WORLD BY GIVING MR. ADAMS HIS VISA. BUT IT IS INDISPUTABLE THAT MR. CLINTON HAS NOW SENT THE RIGHT SIGNAL TO MR. ADAMS."

-- "THE INDEPENDENT": "THE SINN FEIN LEADER MAY HAVE WALKED THE AMERICAN STAGE VIRTUALLY UNCHALLENGED, BUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WON AN IMPORTANT CONCESSION FROM THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION TO REWARD ITS FORBEARANCE."

SEITZ

BT

#1995

NNNN

<MSGID> M0862138

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0335-F (1.91)
KBH 4/11/2023

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: FILE

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 131212Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4339

INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1716

RUSNSTB/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000218

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: FERGUS FINLAY ON NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: (A) DUBLIN 00157

(B) LONDON 00570

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. FERGUS FINLAY, PERSONAL ADVISOR TO FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING, SAYS THAT SINN FEIN/IRA IS PLAYING FOR TIE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE RENOUNCING VIOLENCE. FINLAY PERSONALLY FAVORS MAKING THE END OF JANUARY THE DEADLINE FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE JOINT DECLARATION. HE SUPPORTS THE DECISION NOT/NOT TO RENEW SECTION 31 OF THE BROADCASTING ACT IN THE BELIEF THAT GERRY ADAMS' APPEARANCE ON TV WILL "DE-MYTHOLOGIZE" HIM IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. HE OPPOSES A U.S. VISA FOR ADAMS IN THE BELIEF THAT WHAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A TRIUMPHAL TOUR OF AMERICA WOULD ONLY INCREASE SUPPORT FOR SINN FEIN/IRA AMONG IRISH-AMERICANS. THE IRISH AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS, AND THE TWO PARTIES OF THE GOVERNING COALITION, ARE STILL FIRMLY IN AGREEMENT ON THE PEACE PROCESS. END SUMMARY. MEETING WITH FERGUS FINLAY

3. VISITING IRISH DESK OFFICER SCHAFFER AND POLOFF MET WITH FERGUS FINLAY, PERSONAL ADVISOR TO FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING, ON JANUARY 12 TO DISCUSS THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. FINLAY COMMENTED AS FOLLOWS.
SINN FEIN/IRA

4. SINN FEIN/IRA ARE PLAYING FOR TIME. THEIR GOAL IS NOT/NOT A BRITISH PROMISE TO WITHDRAW FROM NORTHERN IRELAND OR SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL IRELAND. RATHER, THEY ARE TRYING THROUGH TACTICAL MANEUVERS TO ENTER INTO DE FACTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ONE OR BOTH GOVERNMENTS BEFORE RENOUNCING VIOLENCE. IN THIS RESPECT, THEY MAY BE USING THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AS A ROLE MODEL. EVENTUALLY, IT WILL BE THE 11-PERSON IRA GENERAL ARMY COUNCIL WHICH WILL DECIDE WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE JOINT DECLARATION AND TO RENOUNCE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

VIOLENCE. GERRY ADAMS' PERSONAL SECURITY IS PROBABLY NOT A FACTOR INFLUENCING HIS BEHAVIOR AS HE LONG AGO CEASED TO WORRY ABOUT IT.

A DEADLINE?

5. FINLAY PERSONALLY BELIEVES THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD WAIT NO LONGER THAN THE END OF THE MONTH FOR AN ANSWER FROM SINN FEIN/IRA. IT MUST TAKE THE FORM OF A FORMAL STATEMENT RENOUNCING VIOLENCE IF IT IS TO BE ACCEPTABLE. WHATEVER SINN FEIN/IRA DO, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD THEN BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION WITH WHOEVER ELSE IS INTERESTED.

SECTION 31

6. FINLAY PERSONALLY SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT'S JANUARY 11 DECISION NOT/NOT TO RENEW SECTION 31 OF THE BROADCASTING ACT. HE HAD LONG FAVORED ITS RETENTION, BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE INCREASED "MYTHOLOGIZATION" OF GERRY ADAMS SINCE THE DECEMBER 15 PROMULGATION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION, HAVE CAUSED HIM TO CHANGE HIS MIND. FINLAY NOW BELIEVES THAT NOTHING WOULD BE AS EFFECTIVE IN ERODING ADAMS' SUPPORT, IN EFFECT, "DE-MYSTIFYING" HIM, BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH AS THE PUBLIC'S LISTENING TO HIM ON TV. (NOTE: IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL CIRCUMSCRIBE SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES' TV APPEARANCES BY BANNING LIVE ONES, THEREBY PREVENTING THEM FROM APPEARING ON THE NUMEROUS, POPULAR TALK SHOWS, AND BY CAREFULLY EDITING TAPES USED ON NEWS PROGRAMS.)

A VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS

7. PARADOXICALLY, FINLAY SAID, HE OPPOSES GIVING ADAMS A U.S. VISA EVEN THOUGH HE SUPPORTS HIS APPEARANCE ON IRISH TV. THE REASON IS THAT THE TWO CULTURES, IRISH AND AMERICAN, ARE DIFFERENT ENOUGH THAT AN ADAMS' VISIT TO THE U.S. COULD TURN INTO A TRIUMPHAL TOUR AND RESULT IN SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER SUPPORT FOR SINN FEIN/IRA AMONG IRISH-AMERICANS. FINLAY OBSERVED THAT YOUNG, PRAGMATIC, FIRST-GENERATION IRISH-AMERICANS HAVE ASSUMED THE LEADERSHIP OF IRISH-AMERICAN GROUPS IN THE U.S. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY, HE BELIEVES, IF THEY WERE TO BE "CONVERTED" BY GERRY AD

AMS, SINCE ONE IMPORTANT REASON FOR SINN FEIN/IRA'S RECENT APPARENT INTEREST IN PEACE IS THE RADICAL DECREASE IN AMERICAN SUPPORT SINCE THE EARLY 1970S.

UNITED WE STAND;...

8. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE FIRMLY UNITED IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION, WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCES IN THE RHETORIC OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICIALS/SPOKESPERSONS. THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE TWO WOULD AGREE ON ALL ASPECTS OF A FUTURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 000218

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: FERGUS FINLAY ON NORTHERN IRELAND

POLITICAL SOLUTION. THE TWO PARTIES OF THE GOVERNING COALITION ARE ALSO IN AGREEMENT ABOUT IRISH POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND. THAT IS NOT TO SAY, FINLAY MUSED, THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING IS PLEASED WITH THE PUBLICITY WHICH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS HAS BEEN RECEIVING. BUT, FINLAY AGREED, THAT IS PART OF THE BAGGAGE WHICH COMES WITH BEING NUMBER TWO.

COMMENT

9. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE HERE SUGGESTING A RIFT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OR BETWEEN THE TWO COALITION PARTIES OVER NORTHERN IRELAND. ON THE OTHER HAND, NO ONE WILL ADMIT TO THE EXISTENCE OF A "GOOD COP, BAD COP" ROUTINE BY DUBLIN AND LONDON IN THEIR RESPECTIVE APPROACHES TO SINN FEIN, IRA. FINLAY'S PERSONAL PREFERENCES IN REGARD TO THE TIMING OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS, OF COURSE, WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE THOSE OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. MOST OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO GIVE SINN FEIN/IRA MORE TIME IN WHICH TO RESPOND TO THE JOINT DECLARATION THAN FINLAY WOULD. SMITH

BT

#0218

NNNN

<MSGID> M0823971

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.92)
KBH 4/11/2023

PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG

SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLL SUM2 VAX WALKER

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 221724Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4215

INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1681

RUSNSTB/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 007365

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFPT FROM
AMBASSADOR SMITH

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: DFA ON NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: (A) LONDON 22525

(B) DUBLIN 07306

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. SEAN O'HUIGINN, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, SAYS THAT THE BEST THING AMERICANS, ESPECIALLY IRISH-AMERICANS, CAN DO NOW IS PUBLICLY TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION AND THE PEACE PROCESS. THE IRISH WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AT ANY TIME; HOWEVER, THEY APPEAR NOT/NOT TO WANT VISITS BY OTHER OUTSIDERS AT THIS TIME. NEITHER GOVERNMENT WANTS A SPECIAL ENVOY NOW, AND IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER SINN FEIN/IRA HAS RENOUNCED VIOLENCE TO GIVE GERRY ADAMS A VISA. SINN FEIN'S CONSULTATION PROCESS WILL LIKELY BE LENGTHY; MEANWHILE, THE IRISH WILL TALK WITH THE BRITISH ABOUT THE TALKS PROCESS IN JANUARY. DEALING WITH THE ISSUES OF AN AMNESTY AND DISARMING THE IRA ARE "DOWN THE ROAD" AT THE MOMENT. END SUMMARY.

MEETING WITH SEAN O'HUIGINN

3. I MET WITH SEAN O'HUIGINN, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, ON DECEMBER 21 TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN THE WAKE OF THE PROMULGATION OF THE DECEMBER 15 JOINT DECLARATION. HE WAS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC.

THE U.S. ROLE

4. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION ABOUT WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD BE DOING, O'HUIGINN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND SAID THAT EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION FROM PROMINENT AMERICANS, ESPECIALLY IRISH-AMERICANS, WOULD BE JUST RIGHT AT THIS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

POINT. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE WORLD BE SEEN TO REGARD THE JOINT DECLARATION AS "HONORABLE." THE MESSAGE SHOULD CONSISTENTLY BE THAT THE DECLARATION IS USEFUL IN FACILITATING A SWITCH TO THE POLITICAL MODE. IT IS IMPERATIVE TO AVOID DISTRACTIONS AND THE CREATION OF THE IMPRESSION THAT ALTERNATIVES, E.G., MEDIATION BY OUTSIDERS, EXIST.

5. POSITIVE AMERICAN INTEREST, O'HUIGINN STRESSED, IS MOST HELPFUL. IN FACT, HE SAID, PRESIDENT CLINTON IS THE REASON THAT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR WENT AS FAR AS HE DID. 1/1

VISITS?

6. ALTHOUGH O'HUIGINN SAID THAT A VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT OR SPEAKER FOLEY WOULD BE WELCOME AT ANY TIME, HE IMPLIED THAT, EXCEPT FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE IRISH WOULD PREFER THAT OTHERS LEAVE THE PEACE PROCESS TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS FOR THE TIME BEING. O'HUIGINN STRESSED THAT THE IRISH WANT A VISIT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. O'HUIGINN ADDED THAT PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS HAD WRITTEN THE PRESIDENT TO INVITE HIM TO VISIT IRELAND.

A SPECIAL ENVOY?

7. O'HUIGINN CONTINUED THAT NEITHER GOVERNMENT SAW ANY NEED FOR A SPECIAL ENVOY AT THIS TIME. DOWN THE ROAD A WAYS, DEPENDING ON HOW THINGS WENT, AN ENVOY MIGHT BECOME A GOOD IDEA, BUT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WANTED TO RUN WITH THEIR BILATERAL INITIATIVE AND SEE THE RESULTS BEFORE CONSIDERING ANYTHING ELSE.

A VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS?

8. O'HUIGINN WAS INITIALLY EVASIVE WHEN I ASKED HIM ABOUT A VISA FOR SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS, SAYING THAT IT WAS A MATTER FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. WHEN I PRESSED HIM, HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO "MAXIMIZE REWARDS," IMPLYING THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER SINN FEIN/IRA HAD RENOUNCED VIOLENCE TO GIVE ADAMS A VISA. "PEACE WOULD CHANGE EVERYTHING."

SINN FEIN/THE IRA

9. O'HUIGINN SAID THAT THE SINN FEIN/IRA WAS CLAIMING THAT THE JOINT DECLARATION HAD LEFT THE "UNIONIST VETO" INTACT. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, MAINTAINS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PROCEDURES AND THE REALITY OF THE UNIONIST POSITION: ONE MILLION OF THEM LIVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND CANNOT BE IGNORED. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO FORCE A SETTLEMENT ON THEM. TO REJECT THE CONCEPT OF UNITY BY CONSENT WOULD BE TO REJECT THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY. A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO BRING ALONG THE INHABITANTS OF THE CATHOLIC GHETTOS IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 DUBLIN 007365

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFFT FROM

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

AMBASSADOR SMITH

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: DFA ON NORTHERN IRELAND

BELFAST AND DERRY, WHERE FEELINGS RUN HIGH AND AN ISOLATIONIST MENTALITY EXISTS. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS TOLD SINN FEIN/IRA THAT MORE FIGHTING WILL SIMPLY DELAY A UNITED IRELAND.

THE JOINT DECLARATION

10. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, O'HUIGINN CONTINUED, BELIEVES THAT THE DECEMBER 15 JOINT DECLARATION IS A REASONABLE EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE BRITISH. THE IRISH WOULD HAVE BROUGHT THE BRITISH EVEN FURTHER IF IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE TO DO SO. THE DOCUMENT FULLY RECOGNIZES IRISH SELF-DETERMINATION, WITH THE ONE CONDITION OF CONSENSUS. IT IS NECESSARY AT ALL COSTS TO AVOID "DUPLICATION," I.E., CREATING THE SAME SITUATION IN A UNITED IRELAND AS EXISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND: AN ALIENATED MINORITY. THE JOINT DECLARATION IS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF A SOLUTION.

NEXT STEPS

11. O'HUIGINN BELIEVES THAT THE SINN FEIN/IRA CONSULTATION PROCESS WILL BE LENGTHY, EXTENDING OVER WEEKS AND MAYBE EVEN OVER MONTHS. ON THE ONE HAND, ADEQUATE CONSULTATION IS IMPORTANT SINCE IT LESSENS CHANCES OF A SPLIT IN THE IRA. IN THAT REGARD, IT WOULD BE IN NOBODY'S INTEREST IF YOUNG HOTHEADS REPLACED GERRY ADAMS AND THE REST OF ITS PRESENT LEADERSHIP. ON THE OTHER HAND, LONG CONSULTATIONS ARE FRAUGHT WITH PERIL. ONE OR TWO INCIDENTS COULD PROVOKE PROTESTANT PARA-MILITARY RETALIATION OR UNIONIST REJECTION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION.

12. IF SINN FEIN/IRA IN EFFECT REJECTS THE JOINT DECLARATION, O'HUIGINN CONTINUED, THEY WILL HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY ARE INCAPABLE OF RELATING TO THE WIDER IRISH COMMUNITY AND WILL BE ISOLATING THEMSELVES. THEY WILL SHOW THAT THEY ARE NOT SERIOUS AND THAT THEY WANT TO CONTINUE THE VIOLENCE. SO FAR, THEY HAVE AVOIDED PURELY SECTARIAN WARFARE, AND SO, HOPEFULLY, WILL OPT FOR PEACE.

THE TALKS

13. BOTH GOVERNMENTS, O'HUIGINN NOTED, WANT TO MAKE A RENEWAL OF THE TALKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND CENTER-STAGE. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT HOSTILE TO THE BILATERALS BEING CONDUCTED BY BRITISH JUNIOR MINISTER MICHAEL ANCRAM BUT CONSIDERS THEM A FAILURE. CONCENTRATING ON TRIVIA, THEY AMOUNT TO NOTHING MORE THAN A "TEA PARTY." ANCRAM IS RAPIDLY LOSING CREDIBILITY. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A TABLE AT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

WHICH ALL CAN SIT WITHOUT LOSS OF DIGNITY AND AT WHICH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CAN "BREAK SOME HEADS," IF NEED BE, TO SECURE A SETTLEMENT. THE IRISH WILL TALK WITH THE BRITISH IN JANUARY ABOUT RESTARTING THE TALKS PROCESS.

14. O'HUIGINN OBSERVED THAT THE IRISH ARE WILLING TO USE THE 3-STRAND FORMAT BUT BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO "GO DEEPER" THAN BEFORE. FOR INSTANCE, "PLAUSIBLE" NORTH/SOUTH INSTITUTIONS HAVE TO BE CREATED UNDER STRAND 2 IF A SETTLEMENT IS TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NATIONALISTS. THEY WOULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY INTERNAL STRUCTURES ALONG THE LINES OF WHAT THE UNIONISTS WANT. BUT, IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE PEACE IF THE TALKS ARE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS. THE IRISH DO NOT/NOT VIEW THE PEACE AND TALKS PROCESSES AS RIVALS; THEY ARE SIMPLY REALISTIC.

15. IF SINN FEIN/IRA REJECTS THE PEACE PROCESS, O'HUIGINN COMMENTED, THERE IS NOT MUCH MORE THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CAN DO. THEY WOULD PROBABLY DECIDE TO TALK WITH WHOEVER IS WILLING TO LISTEN.

THE FORUM

16. THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION, O'HUIGINN REITERATED, WAS INCLUDED IN THE JOINT DECLARATION AS AN INCENTIVE TO SINN FEIN/IRA TO CONTINUE THE PEACE PROCESS. THE FORUM IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE SINN FEIN WITH AN IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PLATFORM BOTH TO OCCUPY IT AND TO EDUCATE IT. IT WILL GIVE SINN FEIN A CHANCE TO "LEARN HOW THE IRISH THINK."

JOHN HUME

17. O'HUIGINN SAID THAT SOCIAL AND DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY LEADER JOHN HUME STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE JOINT DECLARATION. HE IS WORRIED ABOUT BEING ECLIPSED POLITICALLY IF THINGS GO WRONG, BUT HE WILL AT LEAST BE ABLE TO SAY THAT HE TRIED.

HE BELIEVES THAT THE DECLARATION BASICALLY REFLECTS SINN FEIN'S AGENDA. HUME HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ADAMS AND
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 DUBLIN 007365
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFFT FROM
AMBASSADOR SMITH

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: DFA ON NORTHERN IRELAND

WITH MARTIN MCGUINNESS.

AN AMNESTY?

18. O'HUIGINN SAID THAT AN AMNESTY IS "DOWN THE ROAD," BUT SOMETHING WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO BE DONE. THE WORD ITSELF, HE CAUTIONED, IS SOMEWHAT MISLEADING, SINCE WHAT EVENTUALLY HAPPENS IN THIS REGARD MAY HAVE A DIFFERENT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

LABEL. THE BRITISH ARE LIKELY TO INSIST THAT ANY AMNESTY BE IMPLEMENTED IN PIECEMEAL FASHION UNDER COVER OF A WELTER OF REGULATIONS. THE REASON FOR THIS INSISTENCE IS THE POLITICAL DANGER FACING PRIME MINISTER MAJOR, WHO MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO ALIENATE TORY BACK-BENCHERS, "TIGERS IN LONG GRASS," STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF "LAW AND ORDER." (MAJOR MAY ALSO BE IN TROUBLE IN JUNE IF THE TORIES DO BADLY IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS.) IT IS NOT SURPRISING, THEREFORE, THAT THE BRITISH HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT STATEMENTS ABOUT AN EVENTUAL AMNESTY BY VARIOUS IRISH POLITICIANS OVER THE WEEKEND. THE PRESENCE OF GENUINE PSYCHOPATHS AMONG PRISONERS CANDIDATES FOR AN AMNESTY IS ANOTHER PROBLEM. WHATEVER IS DONE, THE CREDIBILITY OF SENTENCING MUST BE MAINTAINED, OR IRA RECRUITMENT WILL SOAR.

DISARMING THE IRA

19. THIS IS ANOTHER STEP, O'HUIGINN SAID, WHICH IS "DOWN THE ROAD." IT IS NECESSARY, HOWEVER, IF PEACE IS TO ENDURE. THE TIMING AND MANNER DEPEND ON "THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE." AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IS THE ATTITUDE OF "GHETTO CATHOLICS" IN THE NORTH, WHO HAVE COME TO DEPEND ON THE IRA FOR PROTECTION AGAINST FROM PROTESTANT INCURSIONS. IT MAY EVEN BE POSSIBLE DISCREETLY TO FUSE THE TWO ISSUES OF AN AMNESTY AND GUNS IN SOME FORM OF STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS.

MAYHEW

20. O'HUIGINN SAID THAT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW HAD BEEN SO DAMAGED BY HIS HANDLING OF THE ISSUE OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONTACT WITH THE IRA THAT HE HAD LITTLE CREDIBILITY. "IRAQ-GATE" MIGHT ALSO BECOME A FACTOR IN HIS FATE. MAYHEW HAD SEEMED OUT OF SORTS LATELY. IT MIGHT JUST BE THAT HE WAS JEALOUS OF MAJOR'S HIGHER PROFILE ROLE ON NORTHERN IRELAND; BUT, OTHER FACTORS MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE. ALTHOUGH MAYHEW IS QUICKER ON HIS FEET, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE PETER BROOKE WAS MORE THOUGHTFUL. MAYHEW HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN "INTEGRATING" THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND THEREFORE DOES NOT/HAVE A "COHERENT" VIEW OF IT. SMITH
BT

#7365

NNNN

<MSGID> M0794111

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 08

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG

SIT: BLEICKEN BURGOS CLARKER FILE HOLL SUM2 VAX WALKER

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 311755Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6418
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 1163
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 01725
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INI
IAL REACTIONS TO ADAMS
VISA

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.95)
KBH 4/11/2023

SUMMARY

1. (S) INITIAL REACTIONS IN THE UK TO THE USG DECISION TO GRANT A VISA TO SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS ARE ALMOST UNIFORMLY NEGATIVE. ONLY ONE NEWSPAPER EDITORIAL HAS APPEARED SO FAR; THE GENERAL TONE OF THE REPORTING IS HIGHLY CRITICAL. HMG HAS SAID ONLY THAT THE DECISION IS AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR THE USG, AND THAT IT HOPES THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE WILL CONVINCe ADAMS TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE. PRIVATELY, HOWEVER, OFFICIALS ARE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED AND ANGRY. THE LABOR PARTY'S PUBLIC LINE IS THE SAME AS THE GOVERNMENT'S. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS ARE PUBLICLY NEUTRAL, BUT PRIVATELY THINK WE EXACTED TOO SMALL A PRICE.

2. (C) IN NORTHERN IRELAND, UNIONISTS ARE OUTRAGED, WHILE THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOR PARTY (SDLP) HOPES THE VISA WILL ENCOURAGE ADAMS TO ACCEPT THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. SINN FEIN WELCOMED THE USG DECISION TO "DEEPEN UNDERSTANDING IN THE U.S.A." OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND SITUATION, AND DENIED THAT ADAMS HAD GIVEN ANY UNDERTAKING TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE. THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP), THE LARGEST IN THE PROVINCE, HAS FROZEN RELATIONS WITH OUR CONSULATE GENERAL, WHICH HAS FIELDDED NUMEROUS ANGRY CALLS. BOTH UNIONIST PARTIES ARE BOYCOTTING THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.

CRITICAL REPORTING

3. (U) MOST BRITISH PAPERS CARRIED REPORTS OF THE USG DECISION TO WAIVE ADAMS' VISA INELIGIBILITY IN THEIR JANUARY 31 EDITIONS, BUT THE STORY APPARENTLY BROKE TOO LATE FOR EDITORIAL COMMENT IN THE MORNING DAILIES. THE "EVENING STANDARD" TOOK THE LINE THAT "THE BRITISH

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 08

GOVERNMENT NEEDEDN'T LOSE MUCH SLEEP" ABOUT LETTING "A RATHER VERBOSE POLITICIAN WHOSE ARGUMENTS ARE NOT, TO PUT IT MILDLY, INTELLECTUALLY COHERENT" LOOSE ON THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. WE EXPECT MORE CRITICAL EDITORIALS TOMORROW.

4. (U) THE OTHER ARTICLES CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF STRAIGHT REPORTING OF THE DECISION, THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, AND REACTIONS. BUT THEY ALSO NOTED THAT ADAMS HAD NOT MET THE CONDITIONS STIPULATED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S JANUARY 27 STATEMENT, AND CLAIMED THAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAD IGNORED ADVICE FROM THE BUREAUCRACY. ACCORDING TO "THE TIMES":

-- "THE STATE AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENTS AND THE FBI HAD AGREED WITH BRITAIN THAT MR. ADAMS'S APPLICATION SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE OF HIS TERRORIST LINKS, AS EIGHT BEFORE IT HAD BEEN."

-- "THEIR VIEWS WERE APPARENTLY OVERRULED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND BY NANCY SODERBERG, THE NSC'S THIRD-IN-COMMAND."

5. (U) ~~ALL NEWSPAPERS VIEWED THE DECISION AS A COUP FOR ADAMS AND THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA)~~ -- "AN ENTRANCE TO MAINSTREAM POLITICS FOR THE IRA AND ITS POLITICAL MOUTHPIECE," ACCORDING TO THE "DAILY MAIL," WHICH ALSO SAID THE CONFERENCE "NOW THREATENS TO TURN INTO A PARADE OF TRIUMPH FOR THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT."

6. (U) THE PAPERS ALSO CONCLUDED UNANIMOUSLY THAT THE VISA DEALT "A BODY BLOW TO JOHN MAJOR, THE GREATEST IN A YEAR OF INCREASING COLDNESS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND LONDON" ("DAILY MAIL"). ACCORDING TO "THE TIMES," IT "SEEMS CERTAIN TO RAISE NEW QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SO-CALLED 'SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP' SINCE MR. CLINTON TOOK POWER." IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE, THE ARTICLE CONTINUED, "THAT THE BUSH OR REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS WOULD HAVE DELIVERED SUCH A SLAP IN THE FACE TO AMERICA'S CLOSEST ALLY."

STIFF UPPER LIP

7. (LOU) DOWNING STREET HAS NOT ISSUED ANY FORMAL

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 LONDON 01725

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INITIAL REACTIONS TO ADAMS VISA

REACTION TO THE DECISION. PRESS OFFICE OFFICIALS TOLD US THAT THEY WERE USING ONLY THE FOLLOWING LINE IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 08

- "WE HOPE THAT THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE WILL FIRMLY IMPRESS GERRY ADAMS THAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA MUST END VIOLENCE IMMEDIATELY AND PERMANENTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JOINT DECLARATION."
8. (U) BEFORE THIS LINE WAS SET IN CONCRETE, DOWNING STREET SPOKESMEN HAD ALSO TOLD REPORTERS THAT:
- "ADAMS SAID IN A STATEMENT THAT HE WANTS TO END VIOLENCE AND IS WORKING TOWARDS SUPPORTING THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION, AND IT IS ON THAT BASIS THAT HE IS BEING ADMITTED, UNDER VERY STRICT CONDITIONS FOR 48 HOURS."
- "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT ISSUE VISAS FOR ADMISSION TO THE U.S."

PRIVATE ANGER

9. (S) A SENIOR NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) OFFICIAL TOLD US JANUARY 31 THAT HMG WAS DETERMINED TO AVOID PUBLIC RECRIMINATIONS, AND TO "KEEP ANY NOTE OF DISAPPOINTMENT OUT OF OUR PUBLIC VOICE." PRIVATELY, HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT DISAPPOINTMENT WOULD BE "THE MOST DIPLOMATIC WAY OF PUTTING IT. THE MOOD HERE IS THAT WITH FRIENDS LIKE THAT, WHO NEEDS ENEMIES?"
10. (S) SINN FEIN'S STRATEGY, THE OFFICIAL CONTINUED, WAS TO PROBE FOR AND EXPLOIT ANY GAPS AMONG THE BRITISH, IRISH AND U.S. POSITIONS. LONDON AND DUBLIN HAD STRUGGLED, WITH SOME DIFFICULTY, TO MAINTAIN A UNITED FRONT. AS FOR THE USG, "WE CAN UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL NEXUS IN WASHINGTON, BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT IT'S AN UNFORTUNATE DECISION. ADAMS GETS ALL THE BENEFITS OF BEING A GOOD BOY WITHOUT ACTUALLY BEING A GOOD BOY."
11. (S) SIMILARLY, AN FCO OFFICIAL DESCRIBED THE MOOD THERE AS "GLOOMY." HE SAID THE TIMING OF THE CONFERENCE, JUST AS FOREIGN SECRETARY DOUGLAS HURD VISITED WASHINGTON FOR IMPORTANT TALKS, COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN WORSE. THE SIMULTANEOUS PRESENCE OF HURD AND ADAMS IN THE U.S. WOULD FORCE THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TO REACT TO EACH OF ADAMS' STATEMENTS IN A WAY THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE TO DO IN LONDON.
12. (S) A SENIOR AIDE TO THE PRIME MINISTER CALLED THE AMBASSADOR TO REGISTER DOWNING STREET'S PRIVATE OUTRAGE OVER THE DECISION. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR HMG, WHICH HAD REPEATEDLY MADE ITS VIEWS KNOWN AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN WASHINGTON. MOREOVER, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT ADAMS HAD NOT MET THE ADMINISTRATION'S OWN CRITERIA FOR A WAIVER. THE AIDE ALSO NOTED THAT ADAMS WAS A LEADER OF AN ORGANIZATION THAT KILLED AND MAIMED NUMEROUS BRITISH CITIZENS, INCLUDING POLICE AND

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 08

SOLDIERS, PUBLIC FIGURES AND CHILDREN. TO GRANT HIM A WAIVER RAN COUNTER TO OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY.

13. (U) ONLY ONE CONSERVATIVE MP HAS COMMENTED PUBLICLY ON THE ISSUE SO FAR -- FORMER NORTHERN IRELAND JUNIOR MINISTER MICHAEL MATES. HE TOLD BBC RADIO THAT THE DECISION WAS "MYSTIFYING," THAT IT HANDED "AN ENORMOUS PROPAGANDA COUP" TO PIRA, AND THAT SINN FEIN HAD "LED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AROUND BY THE NOSE."

OPPOSITION PARTY RESPONSES

14. (C) THE MOST UNEQUIVOCAL WELCOME FOR THE DECISION CAME FROM LEFT-WING LABOR MP TONY BENN, WHO HAS BEEN CAMPAIGNING AGAINST HMG'S ORDER EXCLUDING ADAMS FROM GREAT BRITAIN. SHADOW NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY KEVIN MCNAMARA TOLD THE PRESS THAT "WE ARE AGAINST EXCLUSION ORDERS IN PRINCIPLE. IT IS PURELY AN INTERNAL DOMESTIC MATTER FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND I HAVE NO
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 LONDON 01725

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INITIAL REACTIONS TO ADAMS
VISA

VIEWS ABOUT IT." SPEAKING TO US PRIVATELY, MCNAMARA ECHOED THAT LINE, ADDING THAT "IF IT EASES GERRY ADAMS INTO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, WE WOULD WELCOME IT."

15. (C) LIBERAL DEMOCRAT NORTHERN IRELAND SPOKESMAN LORD HOLME TOLD US THAT, WHILE HIS PARTY WOULD NOT CRITICIZE THE USG DECISION, THEY WERE "NOT ECSTATIC" OVER IT. A U.S. VISA FOR ADAMS "MEANS MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE" TO SINN FEIN, AND WAS WORTH A MUCH HIGHER PRICE THAN WE HAD EXACTED. HOLME SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT ADAMS REPRESENTED ONLY THE VIOLENT RUMP OF THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT, WHICH HAD CHOSEN TO ENGAGE IN TERRORISM RATHER THAN WORK THROUGH THE AVAILABLE DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES. ADAMS WAS "NOT A MANDELA, NOT AN ARAFAT." THE LAVISH PUBLIC ATTENTION HE WOULD GET AT THE CONFERENCE WOULD PUT HIM "TOO MUCH AT CENTER STAGE."
NORTHERN IRELAND RESPONSES

16. (U) REACTIONS IN THE PROVINCE PRODUCED NO SURPRISES, BUT SOME DEPRESSING (SEE PARA 22) AND PERHAPS OMINOUS (PARAS 25-26) FEATURES. SINN FEIN WELCOMED THE DECISION, SAYING IT REFLECTED CONCERN BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION "TO DEEPEN UNDERSTANDING IN THE U.S.A. OF HOW THE PEACE PROCESS IN IRELAND CAN BE ADVANCED." BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, ADAMS TOLD REPORTERS THAT HE HAD

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 08

GIVEN NO UNDERTAKING TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE (AND ACCORDING TO SOME PRESS ACCOUNTS, THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ASKED FOR ONE), BUT THAT HE HAD HAD "A VERY INTERESTING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS" WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL.

17. (C) WE HAVE HEARD NO DIRECT STATEMENT FROM SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME, THOUGH HIS ROLE IN PRESSING FOR THE VISA IS WIDELY KNOWN. SDLP MP JOE HENDRON, WHO TOOK ADAMS' WEST BELFAST SEAT IN THE 1992 GENERAL ELECTION, GAVE A QUALIFIED WELCOME TO THE DECISION. HE COULD UNDERSTAND UNIONIST ANGER, BUT FELT THAT THE VISIT TO THE U.S. MIGHT HELP ADAMS FURTHER THE PEACE PROCESS.

18. (U) THE RESPONSE FROM UNIONISTS HAS BEEN UNIVERSAL OUTRAGE. DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) LEADER IAN PAISLEY TOLD REPORTERS HE WAS NOT SURPRISED THAT "THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS GONE BACK ON THEIR DECLARED PRINCIPLES IN FAVOR OF GERRY ADAMS. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC IRISH BOSTON LOBBY WAS TOO STRONG FOR CLINTON TO RESIST." PAISLEY ALSO WROTE TO THE AMBASSADOR TO NOTE "THE OUTRAGE CAUSED IN NORTHERN IRELAND AT THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION TO GRANT A VISA TO ALLOW THE SINN FEIN/IRA LEADER GERRY ADAMS TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES TO ADDRESS A CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK."

19. (C) DUP SPOKESMAN NIGEL DODDS CALLED CONSUL GENERAL MARTINEZ JANUARY 31 TO ALERT HIM TO PAISLEY'S LETTER TO THE AMBASSADOR. HE SAID THAT, TO THE DUP, IT APPEARED THE ADMINISTRATION HAD MADE A "COMPLETE REVERSAL." HE ADDED THAT THE VISA DECISION HAD SMASHED ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THE U.S. COULD PLAY A ROLE AS AN "HONEST BROKER" IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

20. (U) ULSTER UNIONIST MP JOHN TAYLOR ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

-- "THE DECISION BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION TO GIVE IN TO PRESSURE FROM THE IRISH LOBBY IN WASHINGTON CAME AS NO SURPRISE, BUT IT IS DESPICABLE.

-- "THE IRISH MAFIA, LED BY SENATOR KENNEDY, HAVE BEEN CANVASSING THE WHITE HOUSE FOR A VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS. I EXPECT NOTHING BETTER FROM SUCH PEOPLE WITHIN THE U.S.A. DEMOCRATIC PARTY. NOW WE KNOW THAT NOT ONLY DOES THE IRA GET MOST OF ITS FUNDING FOR ITS MURDER GANGS FROM THE U.S.A., BUT THE WHITE HOUSE NOW WISHES TO FACILITATE THE APOLOGISTS FOR THE IRA MURDER CAMPAIGN IN IRELAND.

-- "THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND SAY TO CLINTON, 'YOU SHOULD BE ASHAMED OF YOURSELF -- NO LONGER CAN YOU CONDEMN TERRORISM ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD.'"

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 LONDON 01725

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 08

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI
 SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INITIAL REACTIONS TO ADAMS
 VISA

21. (U) UUP MP KEN MAGINNIS, WHO HAD PLANNED TO ATTEND THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE IF SINN FEIN DID NOT, TOLD REPORTERS THAT THE USG HAD "HANDED TERRORISM A VICTORY."

- "MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT TWO CONDITIONS WERE BEING IMPOSED ON MR. ADAMS.... I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED EITHER OF THOSE."
 -- "ONE HAS TO ASSUME THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT INTERESTED IN FURTHERING THE PEACE PROCESS BUT MERELY FINDING WAYS OF PRESSURING OUR OWN GOVERNMENT TO CONCEDE TO VIOLENCE."

UNIONISTS FREEZE RELATIONS

22. (C) UUP GENERAL SECRETARY JIM WILSON PHONED THE CONSUL GENERAL JANUARY 31 TO INFORM HIM THAT PARTY LEADER JAMES MOLYNEAUX HAD CANCELED HIS SCHEDULED MEETING WITH THE CG LATER THAT DAY, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER FORMAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE UUP AND THE CONSULATE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE WORD FROM "THE TOP," WILSON SAID, WAS THAT "YOU ARE NOT WELCOME HERE." THE UUP WOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT ON THE VISA ISSUE LATER IN THE DAY, AND IT WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE "OVER-POLITE."

23. (C) THE DUP HAS NOT BROKEN RELATIONS, BUT MAY DO SO LATER WHEN IT HEARS OF THE ACTION OF THE MORE MODERATE UUP.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONFERENCE

24. (C) IN A LATE-NIGHT CONVERSATION WITH THE CG JANUARY 30, MAGINNIS EXPRESSED AS MUCH UNHAPPINESS WITH THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AS WITH THE USG. THE VISA DECISION WAS AN OUTRAGE, COMING AS IT DID AFTER A VERY PUBLIC USG DEMAND THAT ADAMS HAD VERY PUBLICLY NOT MET. BUT THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZERS HAD ALSO FAILED EVEN TO REPLY TO A FORMAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (ON SINN FEIN ATTENDANCE) HE HAD SENT THEM A WEEK EARLIER. NOT HAVING RECEIVED AN ANSWER, MAGINNIS SAID HE NOW BELIEVED THE ENTIRE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN SET UP "IN BAD FAITH."

PUBLIC ANGER AND SECURITY CONCERNS

25. (C) CONGEN BELFAST REPORTS THAT A POPULAR RADIO CALL-IN PROGRAM JANUARY 31 FEATURED MUCH ABUSIVE LANGUAGE DIRECTED AT THE CONSULATE. WORD HAS CIRCULATED IN NORTHERN IRELAND, VIA THAT PROGRAM AND THE RUMOR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 08

MILL, THAT THE CONSUL GENERAL WAS "RESPONSIBLE" FOR THE ADAMS VISA, AND THAT IT WAS ISSUED ONLY "ON HIS RECOMMENDATION" FOLLOWING THE JANUARY 28 INTERVIEW.

26. (S) THE CONSULATE ITSELF HAS FIELDDED A NUMBER OF IRATE TELEPHONE CALLS. SOME CALLERS "HOPED" THAT THE CONSULATE "DOESN'T GET BOMBED"; OTHERS EXPRESSED "CONCERN" THAT "NOTHING HAPPENS TO THE CG PERSONALLY." ONE OF THE MORE VOCIFEROUS CALLERS SAID SHE REPRESENTED "THOUSANDS" WHO WERE AWARE OF THE CG'S "INTERVENTION" ON ADAMS' BEHALF, AND THAT THE CG MIGHT DO WELL TO WATCH HIMSELF. NO CALL CONTAINED DIRECT THREATS TO CONSULATE STAFF, BUT THERE IS CLEARLY MUCH GRASSROOTS ANGER OVER THE ISSUE. THE CONSULATE HAS MADE NO COMMENT, PUBLICLY OR IN RESPONSE TO THE CALLS, REFERRING ALL INQUIRIES TO USIS LONDON AND RELEASING THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT TO THOSE WHO WANT IT.

27. (S) THE CONSUL GENERAL HAS MET WITH CONSULATE STAFF TO DISCUSS SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF PUBLIC ANGER. RSO LONDON PLANS TO DISCUSS THE CONSULATE'S SECURITY SITUATION WITH BELFAST POLICE OFFICIALS.

COMMENT

28. (S) UNLESS ADAMS SAYS SOMETHING IN NEW YORK THAT CLEARLY INDICATES POSITIVE SINN FEIN/PIRA MOVEMENT TOWARD THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION, WE ARE IN FOR A ~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 LONDON 01725

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INITIAL REACTIONS TO ADAMS VISA

VERY ROCKY PERIOD. BRITISH MINISTERS AND MANY OFFICIALS UNDERSTAND THE FACTORS BEHIND OUR DECISION, BUT DON'T LIKE IT ANY BETTER FOR THAT. IF SINN FEIN REJECTS THE JOINT DECLARATION (AS IT WAS LIKELY TO IN ANY EVENT), IT IS INEVITABLE THAT MANY WILL SEE US AS PARTLY RESPONSIBLE. JOURNALISTS ARE LIKELY TO GIVE US A ROUGH TIME, STOKING OLD SUSPICIONS (PREDOMINANTLY BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY IN NORTHERN IRELAND) THAT THE USG SUPPORTS AT LEAST THE AIMS, IF NOT THE METHODS, OF THE IRA.

29. (S) CONGEN BELFAST'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNIONISTS HAVE SUFFERED A SHARP SETBACK. THE FACT THAT THE VISA ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE WHILE PIRA WAS ATTACKING SECURITY FORCES IN WEST BELFAST DID NOT HELP MATTERS. THE UUP MADE CLEAR TO THE CG THAT ITS BOYCOTT OF THE CONSULATE WAS PROFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL, NOT PERSONAL; THE CG WOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN QUIET "OFF THE RECORD" CONTACTS WITH WILSON, A CLOSE AND VALUED CONTACT. BUT

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 08 OF 08

IT IS LIKELY TO BE QUITE SOME TIME BEFORE RELATIONS
BETWEEN EITHER OF THE UNIONIST PARTIES (WHO REPRESENT
THE MAJORITY OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S POPULATION) AND ANY
USG OFFICIALS RETURN TO THE EASY CORDIALITY THAT HAD
DEVELOPED IN RECENT YEARS. ?385"

BT

#1725

NNNN

<MSGID> M0853344

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~SECRET~~

Darby, M. Brooke

From: Kreczko, Alan J.
To: Darby, M. Brooke
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Stephens, Kathleen D.
Subject: IRA visas [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Tuesday, September 13, 1994 4:56PM

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.98)
KBH 4/11/2023

Please pass to Nancy:

AG's views re Adams visa:

—she does not object, if it is determined that his entry serves foreign policy purposes. She does not want to be portrayed as supporting; she does not object.

—as to accompanying individuals, they reserve their position until they have a chance to review their files on any proposed additional person.

—as to fundraising, she strongly opposes.

I don't have an answer yet on Kieran Staunton.

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

*faxed to
Lake*

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: BERGER SIT SODERBERG
SIT: PRIVACY_IN SUM SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 301645Z AUG 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 301645Z AUG 94 PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FM AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY SMITH, DUBLIN 009

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, NSC EYES ONLY FOR ANTHONY LAKE

TONY: THE TAOISEACH WANTED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU AND MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF, ESPECIALLY NANCY SODERBERG AND SANDY VERSHBOW, HIS GRATITUDE FOR YOUR RESPONSIVENESS ON THE RECENT VISA REQUESTS.

IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THE FUTURE, HOWEVER, IF THE RESPONSE TO SUCH REQUESTS MADE BY MYSELF ON BEHALF OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WERE TO BE SENT BACK TO THE IRISH THROUGH ME. CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD BE CLEAR TO THEM AND ME. OTHERWISE, MY POSITION AND INFLUENCE CAN BE UNDERMINED.

AGAIN, MANY THANKS FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE. I EXPECT TO HAVE SOME VERY GOOD NEWS FOR YOU IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE.

~~SECRET~~

#0000

NNNN

<MSGID> M1227608

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
*2011-0355-F (1.99)
KBH 4/11/2023*

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 161108Z SEP 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6193
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 005030

NODIS

FOR P, EUR AND EUR/NE

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

PASS TO LONDON AND BELFAST

PASS TO BONN FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: VISAS FOR GERRY ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN
OFFICIALS

REF: DUBLIN 4973

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. JUST TO CLARIFY AND NSURE THAT THERE IS NO CONFUSION
OVER THE INTENTIONS OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THE ISSUE
OF VISA WAIVERS FOR GERRY ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES, I
REPEAT WHAT I REPORTED IN REFTEL, "MARTIN MANSERGH, THE
PRIME MINISTER'S SPECIAL ADVISOR RESPONSIBLE FOR NORTHERN
IRELAND, ASKED ME SEPTEMBER 14 TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE
TO FACILITATE THE ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO GERRY ADAMS AND
TWO OF HIS ASSOCIATES WHO WILL APPLY AT CONGEN BELFAST IN
THE NEAR FUTURE. MANSERGH STATED THAT PRIME MINISTER
REYNOLDS AND FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING ARE IN COMPLETE
AGREEMENT THAT PROMPT ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO THE SINN FEIN
LEADERS WILL BE A CRITICALLY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO
THE PEACE PROCESS."

3. THIS UNSEEMLY DELAY IN WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A
ROUTINE MATTER IS PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE THAT
QUESTION THE SINCERITY OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE AND FOR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.02)

KBH 4/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

WHATEVER REASON ARE THREATENING THE CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS BY THEIR NIT-PICKING AND GRUDGERY. THE DELAY IS CAUSING CONFUSION OVER OUR INTENTIONS AND GOOD WILL. WE APPEAR TO BE ACCEPTING OVER EXAGGERATED CLAIMS OF THE IMPACT THIS VISIT IS GOING TO HAVE EITHER AT HOME OR ABROAD BY THOSE WHO ARE SEEKING VIRTUALLY ANY REASON TO SCUTTLE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A ROUTINE, ADMINISTRATIVE FINDING.

4. OUR CONCERN SHOULD BE FIRST AND FOREMOST, WHAT IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THE PRESIDENT HAS CLEARLY DEFINED THAT TO BE PEACE AND AN END TO VIOLENCE. THE SINN FEIN/IRA HAVE DONE THEIR PART. NOW IT IS INCUMBENT ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT THEIR COMMITMENT TO PEACE. TO STRENGTHEN AND SOLIDIFY THEIR COMMITMENT TO PURSUING THEIR OBJECTIVES DEMOCRATICALLY THROUGH THE POLITICAL PROCESS, WE MUST CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE RANK AND FILE OF THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY THAT THE PEACEFUL PURSUIT OF POLITICAL ENDS BRINGS ACCEPTANCE AND INCLUSION. THIS DELAY IS SIMPLY SUPPLYING AMMUNITION TO THOSE WHO WOULD ARGUE THAT THE NATIONALISTS ARE STILL BE TREATED AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS AND THAT THE PEACEFUL, DEMOCRATIC OPTION IS NOT BEARING THE PROMISED FRUIT.

5. I HAVE BEEN ASSURED AGAIN THIS MORNING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND SPEAKS AS ONE, WITH NO DISSSENT, IN SUPPORTING THE IMMEDIATE GRANTING OF VISAS TO GERRY ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THAT THIS PEACE MUST BE BUILT ON AND CEMENTED. THIS IS A MEANINGFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CAN PLAY. IT IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST AND ONE WHICH WE SHOULD NOT SHIRK. ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE HELD OFF IN APPLYING FOR THEIR VISAS OUT OF CONCERN OVER THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT SHOULD THEY BE DENIED. HOWEVER, TIME IS NOW SHORT AND COMMITMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE ON THEIR BEHALF AROUND THE U.S. THUS, IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR ADVICE FROM ONE OF THEIR INTERLOCUTORS, THIS MORNING, I SUGGESTED THAT THEY PROCEED WITH THEIR APPLICATIONS SO THAT THEY MAY BE PREPARED TO TRAVEL AS SOON AS THE WAIVERS ARE GRANTED. I REQUEST THAT THE DECISION BE MADE URGENTLY TO GRANT THESE WAIVERS AND ALLOW THIS PSYCHOLOGICALLY VITAL VISIT TO TAKE PLACE ASAP. AS I NOTED IN REFTTEL, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WHATEVER COMMITMENTS MR. ADAMS MAKES IN REGARD TO THIS WAIVER, E.G. STAYING ON THE WEST COAST AND OUT OF WASHINGTON WHILE OTHERS ARE THERE, ETC., WILL BE KEPT.

*Will my r
set her to
hold it*

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

6. PLEASE ADVISE URGENTLY. SMITH

BT

#5030

NNNN

<MSGID> M1255976

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 5002 MSGID: M1252198

OAACZYUW RUEHDLA5002 2571554-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 141554Z SEP 94

FM AMEMBASSY **DUBLIN**

FM: AMEMBASSY **DUBLIN**

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6180

INFO: ////

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (2.03)

KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **DUBLIN** 5002

NODIS

FOR P, EUR AND EUR/NE

NSC FOR LAKE

STATE PASS TO LONDON AND BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: VISAS FOR GERRY **ADAMS** AND OTHER SINN FEIN
OFFICIALS

REF: A) **DUBLIN** 4778, B) LONDON 14496 C) **DUBLIN** 4973

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. MARTIN MANSERGH, THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPECIAL ADVISOR RESPONSIBLE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, ASKED ME SEPTEMBER 14 TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO FACILITATE THE ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO GERRY **ADAMS** AND TWO OF HIS ASSOCIATES WHO WILL APPLY AT CONGEN BELFAST IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MANSERGH STATED THAT PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS AND FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING ARE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT PROMPT ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO THE SINN FEIN LEADERS WILL BE A CRITICALLY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE PROCESS. AS WE POINTED OUT IN REF A, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SINN FEIN LEADERS BE REINFORCED IN THEIR NEW COMMITMENT TO PURSUING

PEACE THROUGH THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

3. MANSERGH CONFIRMED THAT THE IRISH HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT WITH **ADAMS** THAT THE SINN FEIN DELEGATION, WHICH PLANS TO LEAVE FOR THE U.S. SEPTEMBER 23, WILL NOT VISIT WASHINGTON UNTIL OCTOBER 12 OR 13 IN ORDER NOT TO UPSTAGE OTHER PLANNED VISITS TO NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON BY IRISH OFFICIALS AND UNIONIST LEADERS. THE TIMING ALSO PUTS **ADAMS** IN WASHINGTON WELL AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE, WHICH MANSERGH BELIEVES SHOULD ASSUAGE BRITISH CONCERNS OVER THE VISIT. AS NOTED REF C, THE SINNFEIN FOLLOW A SCHEDULE THAT WILL PUT IT ON THE WEST COAST WHILE SPRING IS IN WASHINGTON AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER.

4. MANSERGH STRESSED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING AND CAUSE DEEP UNHAPPINESS IF **ADAMS** AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE REFUSED VISAS AT THIS POINT. THEY WANT TO BE TREATED AND BE SEEN TO BE TREATED AS NORMAL DEMOCRATS. CLEARLY, THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP IS BEING AMENABLE AND FLEXIBLE IN APPROACHING THIS VISA REQUEST. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY CONTINUE TO BE ABLE TO SHOW TO THEIR STILL DOUBTFUL SUPPORTERS THE VALUE AND THE BENEFITS TO BE GAINED FROM ENGAGING PEACEFULLY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THUS WE SHOULD MOVE QUICKLY TO ISSUE THESE VISAS WITHOUT UNDO HINDRANCE. DELAYS AND WRANGLING OVER TIMING NOW WILL BE PERCEIVED TO BE THE RESULT OF BRITISH INTERFERENCE AND NOT CONTRIBUTE TO MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. THIS IS THE MESSAGE FROM THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND I STRONGLY URGE THAT, GIVEN THE ASSURANCES FROM THE SINN FEIN ON THEIR ITINERARY, WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO ISSUE **ADAMS** AND HIS COLLEAGUES VISAS ASAP. PLEASE ADVISE URGENTLY.

SMITH

BT

#5002

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SEN. S. SODERBERG WOODMONT
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SIT: LEBOURGEOIS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VAX VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 161633Z SEP 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7980
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 2062
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 014777

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2011-0355-F (2.04)
KBH 4/11/2023

DEPARTMENT FOR P, EUR AND EUR/NE

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CVIS PTER PGOV PREL PINR UK EI

SUBJECT: ADAMS PARTY INQUIRES ABOUT VISAS, CLAIM TO HAVE
RECEIVED "INDICATION"

REF: AMBASSADOR CROWE-MARTINEZ TELCON, 9/16/94

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

ALDAN MCATEER, OF THE PROVISIONAL SINN FEIN (PSF) CALLED THE CONSULATE ON SEPTEMBER 16, INFORMING A CONSULAR FSN THAT HE, PSF PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND PSF MEMBER RICHARD MCCAULEY, ALL "WANTED VISAS FOR SEPTEMBER 21." THE CONSUL GENERAL WAS ON ANOTHER LINE AT THE TIME; MCATEER TOLD THE FSN HE WOULD CALL BACK IN TEN MINUTES TO TALK TO THE CG. THE CONSUL GENERAL CALLED THE AMBASSADOR, (REF) TELLING HIM THAT, BARRING ANY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CONTRARY, HE INTENDED TO TELL MCATEER THAT THE SINN FEIN DELEGATION SHOULD ALL COME IN MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, FOR A VISA INTERVIEW, AND TO BRING A DETAILED ITINERARY. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED.

3. MCATEER CALLED THE CG A FEW MINUTES LATER. HE SAID THAT SINN FEIN HAD RECEIVED AN "INDICATION" THAT THE DELEGATION SHOULD ALL APPLY FOR VISAS AT "1500, SEPTEMBER 16". THIS WAS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT, MCATEER RELATED, BECAUSE HE INTENDED TO TRAVEL ON SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, TO ADVANCE THE ADAMS VISIT. ADAMS AND MCCAULEY, MCATEER CONTINUED, WERE PLANNING TO TRAVEL ON SEPTEMBER 21.

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

4. THE CONSUL GENERAL TOLD MCATEER THAT HE, THE CG, HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY INDICATION THAT THE SINN FEIN DELEGATION SHOULD APPLY ON SEPTEMBER 16. THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION HERE. MCATEER REPLIED THAT, YES, THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION. THE CONSUL GENERAL TOLD MCATEER THAT, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, IT MIGHT BE BEST FOR THE SINN FEIN DELEGATION TO SIT TIGHT UNTIL MATTERS CLARIFIED THEMSELVES. MCATEER AGREED. THE CG AND MCATEER DID NOT/NOT SCHEDULE AN INTERVIEW FOR MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 19. IT APPEARS THAT SINN FEIN WILL SIT UNTIL THIS MATTER RESOLVES ITSELF.

CROWE

BT

#4777

NNNN

<MSGID> M1256717

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG WOLIN

SIT: FILE KELLY SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 211139Z JUL 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5066

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 011437

NODIS

DEPT FOR UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

FROM AMBASSADOR CROWE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: RESPONDING TO SINN FEIN'S
RESPONSE TO THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION

REF: DUBLIN 3967

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BASED ON MY CONVERSATIONS WITH NORTHERN IRELAND
POLITICAL LEADERS AND MEDIA REPORTS, IT IS NOW FAIRLY
CLEAR WHAT SINN FEIN'S RESPONSE TO THE DOWNING STREET
DECLARATION NEXT WEEK IS LIKELY TO CONTAIN. IN SOME
WAYS, IT WILL BE A MIRROR IMAGE OF THE DECLARATION
ITSELF: IN REPLY TO A DOCUMENT THAT WAS "ORANGE IN
SUBSTANCE, GREEN IN LANGUAGE," IT WILL BE POSITIVE IN
TONE, BUT NEGATIVE IN REJECTING THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF NORTHERN MAJORITY CONSENT TO ANY CHANGE IN
THE PROVINCE'S CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS AND BRITISH
NEUTRALITY OVER THE OUTCOME. IT MAY RPT MAY BE
ACCOMPANIED OR FOLLOWED BY A PROVISIONAL IRISH
REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) DECLARATION OF A CEASEFIRE.

3. IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT RUSH TO
JUDGMENT ON WHAT SINN FEIN MAY SAY. THE REPUBLICANS
WILL TRY HARD TO PUT DAYLIGHT BETWEEN US AND THE BRITISH
(AND PERHAPS ALSO THE IRISH) GOVERNMENT. WE MUST RPT
MUST RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO ASSUME THAT ANY FORM OF
ORDS WILL USHER IN THE MILLENNIUM. THIS IS A NASTY
CIVIL WAR THAT HAS RAGED SPORADICALLY FOR CENTURIES. WE
MAY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN ITS DENOUEMENT, BUT ONLY IN
COORDINATION WITH BOTH DUBLIN AND LONDON.

4. AFTER THE SINN FEIN PROCLAMATION (WHICH WE EXPECT
WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT JULY 25), WE
WILL NEED TO CONDUCT A QUICK BUT THOROUGH ROUND OF
CONSULTATIONS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND MAJOR OPPOSITION
PARTIES, AS WELL AS LEADING FIGURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND,
BEFORE WE CAN ASSESS THE SINN FEIN REPLY. WHAT IS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.05)

KBH 4/11/2023

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

ALREADY QUITE CLEAR, HOWEVER, IS THAT FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS THE SINN FEIN ANNOUNCEMENT IS OF FAR LESS IMPORTANCE THAN WHAT PIRA MAY DO AFTERWARD. IN RECENT WEEKS, THE IRISH HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE ADAMANT THAN THE BRITISH THAT SINN FEIN CAN ENTER THE POLITICAL PROCESS ONLY AFTER A PERMANENT END TO PIRA TERRORISM.

5. THERE UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE PRESSURE ON WASHINGTON TO GIVE SINN FEIN PRESIDENT ADAMS ANOTHER VISA TO EXPLAIN HIS PARTY'S (AND PIRA'S) STRATEGY TO ITS AMERICAN CONSTITUENCY. A SECOND VISA WAIVER WOULD ONLY BE WARRANTED IF THE IRA FOLLOWS THROUGH BY DECLARING -- AND IMPLEMENTING -- A CEASEFIRE OF SUBSTANTIAL DURATION. IF THE DECLARED LENGTH IS LESS THAN SEVERAL MONTHS, IT WILL BE MEANINGLESS; IF LONGER BUT NOT PERMANENT, OUR REACTION SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THAT OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MOST AFFECTED.

6. WITH REGARD TO PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS' SUGGESTION TO AMBASSADOR SMITH (REFTEL) THAT SENIOR AMERICAN POLITICIANS AND BUSINESSMEN SHOULD SEEK OUT ADAMS TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE THAT HIS GOALS -- BUT NOT PIRA'S METHODS -- ENJOY IRISH-AMERICAN SUPPORT, I AGREE FULLY THAT THE MESSAGE SHOULD BE SENT, BUT HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT THE MODALITIES.

7. AS SO OFTEN HAPPENS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THERE IS ANOTHER DIMENSION THAT MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED. MUCH AS WE ALL WANT TO BRING THE REPUBLICANS IN FROM THE COLD, IT SIMPLY WON'T WORK IF THE UNIONISTS CONCLUDE THEY ARE BEING SOLD OUT. LOYALIST VIOLENCE IS NOT ENTIRELY REACTIVE TO PIRA'S; IT IS DETERMINED EVEN MORE BY PROTESTANT INSECURITIES. AND IF LOYALIST TERRORISM SURGES DURING A PIRA CEASEFIRE, THE REPUBLICANS WILL COME UNDER ENORMOUS GRASSROOTS PRESSURE TO RESUME THEIR CAMPAIGN. AT THE MOMENT, AFTER UNIONIST LEADERS' SUCCESSFUL VISITS TO WASHINGTON, WE ENJOY THEIR TRUST AND APPRECIATION. SACRIFICING THAT BY APPEARING TO PANDER TO ADAMS WOULD NOT HELP ANYONE IN THE LONG RUN.

8. THE MESSAGE REYNOLDS OUTLINED IS A GOOD ONE, BUT IT CAN BE SENT JUST AS EFFECTIVELY BY LOWER-PROFILE MEANS. WE NEITHER CAN NOR SHOULD ATTEMPT TO BLOCK VISITS INITIATED BY CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS, BUT WE SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE THEM AT THIS DELICATE AND AMBIGUOUS JUNCTURE; AND WE SHOULD, AS ALWAYS, URGE ANY VISITORS TO EXPOSE THEMSELVES TO THE FULL RANGE OF NORTHERN IRELAND OPINION.

9. S/S-O PLEASE REPEAT TO DUBLIN. CROWE

BT

#1437

NNNN

N
O
D
I
SN
O
D
I
SN
O
D
I
S

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

<MSGID> M1162453

S-DON

S-DON

S-DON

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

NES

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 131624Z SEP 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6172
INFO ////
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 004973

Spring.

NODIS

FOR P, EUR AND EUR/NE

NSC FOR LAKE

STATE PASS TO LONDON AND BELFAST

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.06)
KBH 7/11/2023

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, UK, EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: FURTHER CLARIFICATION ON
IRISH CONCERNS OVER TIMING OF ADAMS' VISIT TO U.S.

REF: LONDON 14496

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. MARTIN MANSERGH, THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPECIAL ADVISOR RESPONSIBLE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, INFORMED THE CHARGE SEPTEMBER 13 THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING HAVE NOW CLARIFIED THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S CONCERNS OVER THE TIMING OF GERRY ADAMS' PROPOSED VISIT TO THE U.S. FOLLOWING A DISCUSSION WITH THE SINN FEIN LEADER, IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT ADAMS WILL ADJUST HIS SCHEDULE IN THE U.S. TO ENSURE THAT HE DOES NOT VISIT WASHINGTON OR NEW YORK UNTIL AFTER THE FOREIGN MINISTER, PRIME MINISTER AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN THERE AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER. THIS WILL PROBABLY BE ABOUT OCTOBER 10 OR 11. ACCORDING TO MANSERGH, ADAMS WILL ENSURE THAT HE IS ON THE WEST COAST WHILE SPRING IS IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

3. WHILE STRESSING THAT SUCH MATTERS WERE TOTALLY UP TO THE USG TO DECIDE, MANSERGH SAID THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN SOME THOUGHT TO WHAT MIGHT BE THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL AT WHICH ADAMS COULD BE RECEIVED BY THE USG SHOULD THEY BE ASKED. MANSERGH SAID THAT THE IRISH

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

BELIEVE A MEETING AT THE NANCY SODERBERG LEVEL WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE. HE IS CONFIDENT ADAMS WILL BE MORE THAN SATISFIED WITH THAT.

4. MANSERGH ALSO SIGNALLED THAT WHEN THE ADAMS PARTY CALLS ON THE CONSUL GENERAL IN BELFAST TO APPLY FOR A VISA, THEY WILL EXPRESS THEIR HOPE THAT ANY RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR VISIT CAN BE MINIMAL. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHETHER THEY WILL BE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN FUND-RAISING EVENTS. WHILE THE IRISH HAVE NOT YET FINALIZED THEIR POSITION ON THIS ASPECT OF ADAMS ACTIVITIES, THEIR INITIAL REACTION WOULD BE FAVORABLE IF ADAMS WOULD COMMIT HIMSELF THAT THE FUNDS WOULD ONLY BE RAISED FOR LEGITIMATE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES. MANSERGH POINTED OUT THAT LEGITIMATE FUND-RAISING WOULD HELP REMOVE THE SINN FEIN/IRA'S NEED FOR RAISING FUNDS BY MORE NEFARIOUS MEANS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE SINN FEIN LEADERS CAN BE TRUSTED TO ADHERE TO THE LETTER OF ANY COMMITMENT THEY MAKE TO THE CONSUL GENERAL. SANDBERG
BT
#4973

NNNN

<MSGID> M1250693

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Wolyn

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 171600Z SEP 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6198
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 005041

NODIS

FOR P, EUR AND EUR/NE

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

PASS TO LONDON AND BELFAST

PASS TO BONN FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: VISAS FOR GERRY ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN
OFFICIALS

REF: A) DUBLIN 5039, B) DUBLIN 4973

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN REFTELS, WE REPORTED THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON ALLOWING SINN FEIN TO RAISE FUNDS IN THE U.S. AND THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL AT WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD MEET WITH ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES. ON THE FORMER, I AGREE TOTALLY WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THAT IT IS NOW IMPORTANT TO ENCOURAGE SINN FEIN TO RAISE THE FUNDS THEY NEED TO OPERATE AS AN OVERT, DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY IN THE TRADITIONAL WAYS CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES RAISE FUNDS AROUND THE WORLD. WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE SINN FEIN ARE ATTEMPTING TO CHANGE FROM A MILITARY CULTURE TO A POLITICAL CULTURE. THIS CANNOT BE DONE WITHOUT ADEQUATE FUNDING. LACK OF FUNDS WILL MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO OPERATE. WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE AND ACCEPT SINN FEIN'S DESIRE TO BE TREATED LIKE ANY OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY AND NOT TO BE TREATED LIKE SECON CLASS CITIZENS.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.08)
KRH 4/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF THE SINN FEIN IN THIS REGARD.

3. THUS, IF ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE INVITED BY WELL INTENTIONED PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS AND ORGANIZATIONS TO FUNCTIONS AT WHICH FUND RAISING WILL TAKE PLACE, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE U.S.G. SHOULD STAND IN THEIR WAY. FOR TOO LONG, SINN FEIN HAS BEEN OBLIGED TO RAISE FUNDS FOR THEIR LEGITIMATE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL GOALS IN OFTEN NEFARIOUS WAYS. THIS SHOULD COME TO AN END NOW. SHOULD THERE BE GUIDELINES OR PARAMETERS TO WHICH OTHER FOREIGN POLITICAL PARTIES FUND RAISING IN THE U.S. MUST ADHERE, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE SINN FEIN WILL ACCEPT THESE. WE ARE ALSO CONFIDENT THAT THE SINN FEIN LEADERS WILL KEEP THEIR WORD WHEN AGREEING TO ANY SUCH PARAMETERS.

4. I RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MAY BE SOME LEGAL CONSTRAINTS IN THE U.S. TO SUCH FUND RAISING. IF THERE ARE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ASAP BACKGROUND ON SUCH WHICH WE CAN SHARE WITH OUR IRISH GOVERNMENT INTERLOCUTORS. THANKS.

5. AS FOR THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN THE ADMINISTRATION AT WHICH CONTACTS WITH ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES SHOULD BE HELD, I FEEL THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE AT LEVEL HIGHER THAN NANCY SODERBERG AT THE NSC OR SOMEONE AT ROUGHLY HER EQUIVALENT LEVEL IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. AS NOTED IN REF B, MARTIN MANSERGH, THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPECIAL ADVISOR ON NORTHERN IRELAND, IS CONVINCED THAT ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD BE "MORE THAN SATISFIED WITH THAT." MORE IMPORTANTLY, AS SEAN O'HUIGINN, THE HEAD OF THE ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SAID YESTERDAY, THERE WILL BE OTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR HIGHER LEVEL CONTACTS. WE NEED TO HOLD THESE IN RESERVE TO PRESSURE OVER TIME THE SINN FEIN/IRA TO MOVE FORWARD IN OTHER AREAS, SUCH AS TURNING IN THEIR ARMS, ETC. I ALSO SHARE THIS VIEW.

SMITH

BT

#5041

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

#4107

NNNN

<MSGID> M1237534

S-D-O-Z

S-D-O-Z

S-D-O-Z

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: BRANSCUM DARRAGH LEBOURGEOIS NSC SUM SUM2 VAX VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 061600Z SEP 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 1589
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7496
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 1999
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 014126
CAIRO FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY
NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND OVP
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (GORE, ALBERT JR.) PREL PTER UK EI
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH IRISH PRIME
MINISTER: LONDON INPUT

REF: DUBLIN 4798

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AS A SUPPLEMENT TO DUBLIN'S BACKGROUND CABLE ON THE GORE/REYNOLDS MEETING (REFTEL), WE WOULD LIKE TO OFFER A FEW PERSPECTIVES FROM LONDON.
3. THE DECEMBER 1993 DOWNING STREET DECLARATION WAS THE MOST DRAMATIC PRECURSOR TO THE RECENT IRA CEASEFIRE, BUT IT CAME AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF:
 - FIVE YEARS OF SPORADIC TALKS BETWEEN SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME AND SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS;
 - A 1991-92 SERIES OF TALKS AMONG LONDON, DUBLIN AND THE PROVINCE'S FOUR MAIN NONVIOLENT PARTIES THAT CAME CLOSE TO AGREEMENT, AND MAY RESUME SOON;
 - SECRET HMG/IRA CONTACTS THROUGHOUT 1993 IN WHICH INCLUSION OF SINN FEIN IN THE ALL-PARTY TALKS WAS OFFERED IN EXCHANGE FOR A PERMANENT END TO VIOLENCE;
 - GROWING REVULSION THROUGHOUT THE BRITISH ISLES AT TERRORISM BY BOTH THE IRA AND LOYALIST GUNMEN; AND
 - SECURITY FORCE SUCCESS IN EARNING COMMUNITY SUPPORT AND SQUEEZING THE TERRORISTS' REVENUE BASE.
3. IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHY THE IRA CHOSE THIS MOMENT TO CALL A CEASEFIRE -- IT WAS CERTAINLY ENCOURAGED BY ADAMS' RECEPTION IN THE U.S. IN FEBRUARY, AND PROBABLY AFRAID THAT RENEWED DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE OTHER PARTIES WOULD REACH AGREEMENT WITHOUT IT -- OR WHAT IT HOPED TO GAIN THEREBY. SINN FEIN PLANS A MAJOR CAMPAIGN OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS DEMANDS, AND PROBABLY AN INTENSIVE PROPAGANDA PUSH (NOT LEAST IN THE U.S.) TO BRING DUBLIN AND THE USG INTO A "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT."
4. IT IS ALSO NOT QUITE CLEAR YET WHETHER THE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.10)
KBH 4/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

CEASEFIRE IS INTENDED TO BE PERMANENT. ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS HAVE NOT, IN FACT, SAID SO PUBLICLY, AND OTHER SINN FEIN OFFICIALS HAVE COME CLOSER. HMG IS LEANING TOWARD ACCEPTANCE THAT THE IRA INTENDS THE CEASEFIRE TO BE PERMANENT, BUT, CONTRARY TO REFTTEL, JOHN MAJOR HAS NOT YET ACCEPTED THIS VIEW. THE PRIME MINISTER IS BEING UNDERSTANDABLY CAUTIOUS IN LIGHT OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF VIOLENCE AND MANY PREVIOUS FALSE DAWNS. THE BRITISH AND THE REPUBLICANS ARE EDGING TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE RECKLESS ABANDON OF COURTING SCORPIONS; WE SUSPECT THEY WILL GET THERE WITHIN A FEW DAYS, BUT BRITISH OFFICIALS COMPLAIN THAT REYNOLDS' ENTHUSIASTIC EMBRACE OF ADAMS IS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO REASSURE UNIONISTS THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO SECRET DEAL.

5. IN NORTHERN IRELAND, ACCORDING TO THE POLL MENTIONED IN REFTTEL, ONLY 30 PERCENT EXPECTED THE CEASEFIRE TO BE PERMANENT, AND 56 PERCENT THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN A SECRET HMG/IRA AGREEMENT. MODERATE UNIONIST POLITICIANS ARE TRYING TO CALM NERVES, BUT TENSIONS ARE HIGH. IN ADDITION TO THE MURDER MENTIONED IN REFTTEL, A LOYALIST GROUP TRIED TO BOMB SINN FEIN HEADQUARTERS SEPTEMBER 4. ONE OF THE MAIN LOYALIST GROUPS REPORTEDLY FAVORS A CEASEFIRE, THE OTHER IS MORE HESITANT.

6. PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS IS REPORTEDLY IRRITATED BY HMG'S CAUTION, AND IS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON (SEPTEMBER) WITH ADAMS AND HUME. IN HIS SEPTEMBER 5 DISCUSSION WITH NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MAYHEW, IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING URGED FASTER PROGRESS, BUT ACCORDING TO BRITISH OFFICIALS ALSO EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR BRITISH CAUTION. POLICE AND ARMY CHIEFS IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARE DISCUSSING STEPS THEY CAN TAKE TO MAKE THE SECURITY FORCES' PRESENCE LESS VISIBLE WHILE PROTECTING CATHOLIC COMMUNITIES FROM LOYALIST ATTACK.

7. AS NOTED REFTTEL, REYNOLDS' PEACE FORUM IS UNLIKELY TO ATTRACT EITHER OF THE MAIN UNIONIST PARTIES. HOWEVER, AN SDLP LEADER TOLD US HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONFRONT SINN FEIN WITH THE FACT THAT NONE OF IRELAND'S OTHER NATIONALIST PARTIES ACCEPTED ITS DEMANDS FOR EARLY BRITISH WITHDRAWAL OR UNIFICATION WITHOUT MAJORITY CONSENT IN THE NORTH. THE BRITISH WILL BE WATCHING SINN FEIN'S PERFORMANCE AT THE FORUM CLOSELY FOR EVIDENCE OF ITS COMMITMENT TO NONVIOLENCE.

8. WE HEARTILY ENDORSE DUBLIN'S EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR THE USG TO CONTINUE REACHING OUT TO UNIONISTS AND
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 014126
CAIRO FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND OVP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (GORE, ALBERT JR.) PREL PTER UK EI

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH IRISH PRIME
MINISTER: LONDON INPUT

ASSURING THEM OF OUR EVEN-HANDEDNESS. WE BELIEVE THE
DRAFT STATEMENT IN REFTEL SHOULD PROVE USEFUL IN THAT
REGARD. CROWE

BT

#4126

NNNN

<MSGID> M1237439

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AK*

SUBJECT: Supporting Peace in Northern Ireland:
Options for Greater U.S. Support

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.11)
KBH 4/11/2023

Purpose

To decide upon a package of measures to support the peace process in Northern Ireland by encouraging greater job growth and investment there.

Background

Since the IRA cease-fire announcement August 31, we have reviewed options for increases in U.S. assistance to Northern Ireland to take advantage of the opportunity for peace that now exists. We have consulted with the Congress, the Irish and British governments, and leaders of Northern Irish political parties to get their views on what kind of assistance would be most helpful.

Northern Ireland is already beginning to enjoy a peace dividend. The EU has increased its annual pledge to the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) from about \$20 million to over \$24 million annually and may do substantially more to assist Northern Ireland financially. Australia has also made a modest (\$1 million yearly for five years) commitment to IFI for the first time. The longer the peace holds, the more businesses will look at investing in Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic.

In that context, our options focus on promoting increased trade and investment with Ireland, particularly the north, and on supporting the IFI. The IFI remains the best way to channel the bulk of U.S. assistance to Ireland. It is trusted by both communities in Northern Ireland (including growing trust and participation from the Unionist community, which was initially skeptical), by the Irish and British governments, and by Congress. Its mandate is to do precisely what we have identified as the priority development tasks in Northern Ireland. You should be aware, however, that despite its increasingly strong reputation, IFI continues to come under occasional criticism in the media for "flaky" programs. The TV tabloid program Inside Edition is scheduled to air such a story November 3, which will

reportedly criticize questionable past IFI projects including a butterfly farm and a golf course. These are old stories and the Fund has taken steps to avoid such projects and made progress in improving its programs and image.

Options

OPIC Equity Fund: At the request of Congress, OPIC is investigating whether an OPIC-sponsored equity fund could mobilize U.S. private capital. Congress (Rep. Gilman and others) has asked for a feasibility study to determine if an equity fund not to exceed \$60 million is appropriate for both Northern Ireland and the Republic.

OPIC and OMB are opposed to an OPIC Equity Fund. OPIC says there is no shortage of capital in Ireland, that more attractive investment and loan terms are available from the British and Irish investment boards, and that there is therefore no incentive for U.S. investors to subscribe to an OPIC-administered equity fund which charges fees for doing business. Because of this, OPIC believes that it would be unable to obtain capital for a \$60 million fund. OPIC is also concerned, given other requirements, about having sufficient personnel to manage such a fund once it was announced. Supporters of the equity fund idea on the Hill and in the Irish-American business community counter that interest in a Fund does exist but that OPIC would need to be proactive to exploit it. In addition, OPIC currently has a loan guarantee program which has not been used so they oppose expanding it further.

Recommendation: That we not take any position on the OPIC proposal for an equity fund until the study is completed. In the likely event of a negative study, that we then look at ways, including through our investment conference (see below), to work with the Irish and British investment boards to encourage increased U.S. business activity.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

International Fund for Ireland: Given the lack of viability of the OPIC equity fund proposal, U.S. support for the IFI becomes even more important as a concrete demonstration of our readiness to support those who take risks for peace in Ireland, as we support those who take similar risks in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The Administration included in its budget proposals for FY 94 and FY 95 \$19.6 million per year for IFI. This was a break with previous years, when Congress, not the Administration, was the

driving force behind getting and keeping IFI funding. We suggest building on this by reaffirming our present commitment for FY 95 and seeking Congressional concurrence to a \$10 million increase spread over FY96 and FY97 (approximately \$5 million in additional funding for each year), thereby roughly matching the EU increase and keeping the level of U.S. and EU funding for the IFI on the same level.

Pros: Increasing funding for IFI for two crucial years in the peace process would provide concrete evidence of the seriousness of our engagement on this issue. Without even a modest increase for IFI, our package risks being branded by the Irish groups on the Hill and elsewhere as hollow. IFI has identified numerous important new programs which it wants to fund, including "seed money" for the building of a University of Ulster branch campus which would geographically (and psychologically) straddle the sectarian divide and provide much-needed jobs and job training in a cross-community setting. OMB and State agree to this proposed level and timing of increase.

Cons: Although IFI enjoys increasingly strong credibility on all sides in Ireland, its management and some of its projects remain vulnerable to criticism. Announcing an increase on the eve of the Inside Edition story, however bogus the "expose" is, does carry some risk, although we could hedge this by emphasizing our intent to work with IFI to further strengthen its programs and its management. Congress will be wary of another promise from the Administration on foreign aid but in our initial conversations, we believe this modest increase will be manageable. Anthony Lake has calls into Leahy and Obey. Generally, the appropriators are likely to oppose; others (Dodd, Foley, Kennedy) will strongly support.

Recommendation: That you announce your intent to seek Congressional agreement to an increase of U.S. funding for IFI of \$10 million over FY96 and 97 (for a total of roughly \$25 million per year).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Investment Mission and Conference: This initiative promises to enjoy widespread support and attention, particularly if it is held in Philadelphia (which Senator Wofford in particular welcomes, and which also makes sense overall), and most especially if you participate by giving an opening or keynote speech. The State Department will appoint a coordinator for the conference (thereby addressing in a modified form sentiment from Joe Kennedy and others on the Hill for an "Economic Coordinator" for Ireland). The Coordinator will work with IFI (which is interested in underwriting the conference), the British and Irish

investment boards, and interested Irish-American and other private sector groups and individuals. We should consider inviting some or all of Northern Ireland's party leaders to the conference (Hume and Molyneaux for a start).

Prime Minister Major is holding an Investment Conference in Belfast in December; we propose to send Secretary Brown there and to Dublin. We may also want him to take a delegation of U.S. business leaders with him.

Recommendations:

That you agree to participate in a White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland, probably by giving the opening speech, in Philadelphia in April 1995.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you announce Commerce Secretary Brown's participation in the British Investment Conference in Belfast in December 1994 and Secretary Brown's additional stop in Dublin to explore the all-island dimensions of U.S. trade and investment in Ireland, in preparation for our spring conference.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Provision of U.S. Technical and Other Expertise: We have identified numerous other ways in which U.S. government agencies might begin or expand their contacts with Northern Ireland to focus on areas of greatest importance to solidifying the peace and promoting reconciliation. These could be done within existing budgets, with strong direction from you on the priority you attach to these programs.

- The Department of Commerce has begun enhancing cooperation in the science and technology field by establishing collaboration among "Technology Innovation Centers" already set up in the U.S. and Northern Ireland. We will also discuss with them the possibility of establishing business exchange programs similar to those we have with the NIS.
- USIA will expand its programs to encourage Northern Irish participation in numerous new programs, including a new conflict resolution exchange and training project, which would give a university or organization in the U.S. funding (\$60,000-\$150,000) to fund a project in conflict resolution in Northern Ireland..
- The National Democratic Institute (NDI) is presently conducting a political party training program funded by the

National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (\$200,000 budgeted); we can encourage NED to expand it and to explore other ways to take advantage of the changed circumstances.

- HUD and other U.S. agencies could provide to Northern Ireland leaders information and training they have developed on community banking, urban development, and other areas in which they have expertise. AID is looking into providing technical assistance to IFI for development of a micro-enterprise program.
- The Trade and Development Agency will lead a mission to the region to explore business opportunities.

Summary Recommendation

That you approve the text of the announcement at Tab A. This announcement includes Secretary Brown's trip to Belfast and Dublin, your participation in a White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland in April in Philadelphia, and a proposed increase in U.S. funding for IFI of \$10 million over FY96 and 97.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Proposed October 31 Announcement

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Supporting Peace in Northern Ireland:
Options for Greater U.S. Support

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.12)
KBH 4/11/2023

Purpose

To decide upon a package of measures to support the peace process in Northern Ireland by encouraging greater job growth and investment there.

Background

Since the IRA cease-fire announcement August 31, we have reviewed options for increases in U.S. assistance to Northern Ireland to take advantage of the opportunity for peace that now exists. We have consulted with the Congress, the Irish and British governments, and leaders of Northern Irish political parties to get their views on what kind of assistance would be most helpful.

Northern Ireland is already beginning to enjoy a peace dividend. The EU has increased its annual pledge to the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) from about \$20 million to over \$24 million annually and may do substantially more to assist Northern Ireland financially. Australia has also made a modest (\$1 million yearly for five years) commitment to IFI for the first time. The longer the peace holds, the more businesses will look at investing in Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic.

In that context, our options focus on promoting increased trade and investment with Ireland, particularly the north, and on supporting the IFI. The IFI remains the best way to channel the bulk of U.S. assistance to Ireland. It is trusted by both communities in Northern Ireland (including growing trust and participation from the Unionist community, which was initially skeptical), by the Irish and British governments, and by Congress. Its mandate is to do precisely what we have identified as the priority development tasks in Northern Ireland. You should be aware, however, that despite its increasingly strong reputation, IFI continues to come under occasional criticism in the media for "flaky" programs. The TV tabloid program Inside Edition is scheduled to air such a story November 3, which will

reportedly criticize questionable past IFI projects including a butterfly farm and a golf course. These are old stories and the Fund has taken steps to avoid such projects and made progress in improving its programs and image.

Options

OPIC Equity Fund: At the request of Congress, OPIC is investigating whether an OPIC-sponsored equity fund could mobilize U.S. private capital. Congress (Rep. Gilman and others) has asked for a feasibility study to determine if an equity fund not to exceed \$60 million is appropriate for both Northern Ireland and the Republic.

OPIC and OMB are opposed to an OPIC Equity Fund. OPIC says there is no shortage of capital in Ireland, that more attractive investment and loan terms are available from the British and Irish investment boards, and that there is therefore no incentive for U.S. investors to subscribe to an OPIC-administered equity fund which charges fees for doing business. Because of this, OPIC believes that it would be unable to obtain capital for a \$60 million fund. OPIC is also concerned, given other requirements, about having sufficient personnel to manage such a fund once it was announced. Supporters of the equity fund idea on the Hill and in the Irish-American business community counter that interest in a Fund does exist but that OPIC would need to be proactive to exploit it. In addition, OPIC currently has a loan guarantee program which has not been used so they oppose expanding it further.

Recommendation: That we not take any position on the OPIC proposal for an equity fund until the study is completed. In the likely event of a negative study, that we then look at ways, including through our investment conference (see below), to work with the Irish and British investment boards to encourage increased U.S. business activity.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

International Fund for Ireland: Given the lack of viability of the OPIC equity fund proposal, U.S. support for the IFI becomes even more important as a concrete demonstration of our readiness to support those who take risks for peace in Ireland, as we support those who take similar risks in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The Administration included in its budget proposals for FY 94 and FY 95 \$19.6 million per year for IFI. This was a break with previous years, when Congress, not the Administration, was the

driving force behind getting and keeping IFI funding. We suggest building on this by reaffirming our present commitment for FY 95 and seeking Congressional concurrence to a \$10 million increase spread over FY96 and FY97 (approximately \$5 million in additional funding for each year), thereby roughly matching the EU increase and keeping the level of U.S. and EU funding for the IFI on the same level.

Pros: Increasing funding for IFI for two crucial years in the peace process would provide concrete evidence of the seriousness of our engagement on this issue. Without even a modest increase for IFI, our package risks being branded by the Irish groups on the Hill and elsewhere as hollow. IFI has identified numerous important new programs which it wants to fund, including "seed money" for the building of a University of Ulster branch campus which would geographically (and psychologically) straddle the sectarian divide and provide much-needed jobs and job training in a cross-community setting. OMB and State agree to this proposed level and timing of increase.

Cons: Although IFI enjoys increasingly strong credibility on all sides in Ireland, its management and some of its projects remain vulnerable to criticism. Announcing an increase on the eve of the Inside Edition story, however bogus the "expose" is, does carry some risk, although we could hedge this by emphasizing our intent to work with IFI to further strengthen its programs and its management. Congress will be wary of another promise from the Administration on foreign aid but in our initial conversations, we believe this modest increase will be manageable. Anthony Lake has calls into Leahy and Obey. Generally, the appropriators are likely to oppose; others (Dodd, Foley, Kennedy) will strongly support.

Recommendation: That you announce your intent to seek Congressional agreement to an increase of U.S. funding for IFI of \$10 million over FY96 and 97 (for a total of roughly \$25 million per year).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Investment Mission and Conference: This initiative promises to enjoy widespread support and attention, particularly if it is held in Philadelphia (which Senator Wofford in particular welcomes, and which also makes sense overall), and most especially if you participate by giving an opening or keynote speech. The State Department will appoint a coordinator for the conference (thereby addressing in a modified form sentiment from Joe Kennedy and others on the Hill for an "Economic Coordinator" for Ireland). The Coordinator will work with IFI (which is interested in underwriting the conference), the British and Irish

investment boards, and interested Irish-American and other private sector groups and individuals. We should consider inviting some or all of Northern Ireland's party leaders to the conference (Hume and Molyneux for a start).

Prime Minister Major is holding an Investment Conference in Belfast in December; we propose to send Secretary Brown there and to Dublin. We may also want him to take a delegation of U.S. business leaders with him.

Recommendations:

That you agree to participate in a White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland, probably by giving the opening speech, in Philadelphia in April 1995.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you announce Commerce Secretary Brown's participation in the British Investment Conference in Belfast in December 1994 and Secretary Brown's additional stop in Dublin to explore the all-island dimensions of U.S. trade and investment in Ireland, in preparation for our spring conference.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Provision of U.S. Technical and Other Expertise: We have identified numerous other ways in which U.S. government agencies might begin or expand their contacts with Northern Ireland to focus on areas of greatest importance to solidifying the peace and promoting reconciliation. These could be done within existing budgets, with strong direction from you on the priority you attach to these programs.

- The Department of Commerce has begun enhancing cooperation in the science and technology field by establishing collaboration among "Technology Innovation Centers" already set up in the U.S. and Northern Ireland. We will also discuss with them the possibility of establishing business exchange programs similar to those we have with the NIS.
- USIA will expand its programs to encourage Northern Irish participation in numerous new programs, including a new conflict resolution exchange and training project, which would give a university or organization in the U.S. funding (\$60,000-\$150,000) to fund a project in conflict resolution in Northern Ireland.
- The National Democratic Institute (NDI) is presently conducting a political party training program funded by the

National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (\$200,000 budgeted); we can encourage NED to expand it and to explore other ways to take advantage of the changed circumstances.

- HUD and other U.S. agencies could provide to Northern Ireland leaders information and training they have developed on community banking, urban development, and other areas in which they have expertise. AID is looking into providing technical assistance to IFI for development of a micro-enterprise program.
- The Trade and Development Agency will lead a mission to the region to explore business opportunities.

Summary Recommendation

That you approve the text of the announcement at Tab A. This announcement includes Secretary Brown's trip to Belfast and Dublin, your participation in a White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland in April in Philadelphia, and a proposed increase in U.S. funding for IFI of \$10 million over FY96 and 97.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Proposed October 31 Announcement

CDS:

C 09404LONDON 172123041724ZSCO 94-8339135

MIDB
UPID

S
/ /

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FRP: ,2,3, , , , ,

ACTION: NONE INFO: AFSMETS, C/EUR/BCI, CTCARCHIVE, DONOVA, EUR/CA, EUR/EIES, EUR/RR, FBIS6, IRL, MDSX, NHTC/EUR, NPCEDC, ODPB, ODPD, ODPS, OPCTR/EURA, ORMS/EUR, SA/DCIFIR, STATDICT, FILE, CTC/CCB, PWSTAFF/JR (3/W)

94 8339135 SCO

PAGE 001
TOR: 311724Z OCT 94

NC 8339135
LONDON 17212

HEADER:

OO RUEAIIB
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
MSI4653
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHLO #7212 3041620
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311620Z OCT 94
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0074
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2282
BT

*To Kathy S.
Did we ever
make a decision
not to see
Robinson?
ms*

CONTROLS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 017212

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

BCDY:

TAGS: PREL OVIP PGOV UK EI
SUBJECT: DUP DEPUTY LEADER PETER ROBINSON DECLINES STATE DEPARTMENT MEETINGS; VENTS ANGER OVER LEAKS AND "SECOND-HAND" TREATMENT OF DUP

REFS: (A) LONDON 16315, (B) LONDON 16385

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PETER ROBINSON, DEPUTY LEADER OF THE DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP), CALLED THE CONSUL GENERAL ON OCTOBER 31 FROM THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, WHERE HE WAS CONDUCTING SOME LAST-MINUTE BUSINESS BEFORE FLYING OUT

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2011-0355-F (2.13)
KBH 9/11/2023

TO THE U.S. LATER THAT DAY. ROBINSON WAS EXTREMELY UPSET OVER AN ARTICLE BY JAMIE DETTMER IN THE OCTOBER 26 LONDON "EVENING STANDARD" THAT CITED "WASHINGTON SOURCES" DESCRIBING IN SOME DETAIL HIS WISH TO SEE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND SAYING THAT "CLINTON OFFICIALS ARE UNDERSTOOD TO BE WARY OF MR. ROBINSON'S MOTIVES."

3. ROBINSON COMPLAINED THAT CONFIDENTIAL AND SENSITIVE CONVERSATIONS HE HAD HAD WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL HAD BEEN SEVERELY COMPROMISED BY SOMEONE IN WASHINGTON; HE WAS ESPECIALLY UPSET ABOUT A LINE CLAIMING THE ADMINISTRATION FEARED "BEING DRAWN INTO INTERNAL DUP POLITICS." THE CG REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN THE ARTICLE; THE "EVENING STANDARD" HARDLY CIRCULATED IN NORTHERN IRELAND (EMBASSY LONDON SUBSEQUENTLY FAXED US A COPY OF THE ARTICLE).

4. THE CONSUL GENERAL THEN TOLD ROBINSON THAT, REGARDING HIS REQUEST TO SEE THE VICE PRESIDENT (REFTELS), IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT SUCH A MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE. INSTEAD, STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS AT THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND OFFICE DIRECTOR LEVELS WERE PREPARED TO SEE ROBINSON IN WASHINGTON ON NOVEMBER 9 OR 10. ROBINSON RETORTED THAT THIS WAS "COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE." EVERY POLITICAL PARTY IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAD ALREADY SEEN WHITE HOUSE OR NSC OFFICIALS, AND THE VICE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAD TELEPHONED SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS. THE FACT THAT ONLY THE DUP WAS SHUNNED BY THE WHITE HOUSE/NSC MEANT THAT THE PARTY WOULD NOW "HAVE TO MAKE A PUBLIC ISSUE OVER THIS SECOND-HAND TREATMENT." MANY UNIONISTS, NOT ONLY DUP MEMBERS, WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COMPREHEND THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD PHONE "THAT TERRORIST GERRY ADAMS" BUT NO RANKING WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL WOULD EVEN SEE SENIOR LEVELS OF THE DUP.

5. THE CG RESPONDED THAT ROBINSON WOULD HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT SOME OF THE DUP'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION HARDLY HELPED MATTERS -- GOOD RELATIONS, AFTER ALL, WERE A MATTER FOR BOTH PARTIES. THE CG REPEATED THAT THE OFFER TO SEE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS WAS A GOOD FAITH GESTURE, AND THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE "NON-CONFRONTATIONAL," AS ROBINSON HIMSELF HAD CLAIMED HE WISHED ANY MEETING TO BE. THE DUP DEPUTY WAS NOT MOVED; HE WOULD NOT ATTEND ANY STATE DEPARTMENT MEETING. THE CG OBSERVED THAT, WHEN ALL WAS SAID AND DONE, THE DUP WAS THE BEST JUDGE OF ITS TACTICS AND THE TONE OF RELATIONS WITH THE USG; THE PARTY WOULD DO WHAT IT THOUGHT IT MUST AND IF THE RELATIONSHIP FRAYED IT WAS NOT BECAUSE THE USG SOUGHT SUCH AN OUTCOME. CROWE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE ^{AL} _{ML} _{SL}

SUBJECT:

Supporting Peace in Northern Ireland:
Options for Greater U.S. Support

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.14)
KBH 4/11/2023

Purpose

To decide upon a package of measures to support the peace process in Northern Ireland by encouraging greater job growth and investment there.

Background

Since the IRA cease-fire announcement August 31, we have reviewed options for increases in U.S. assistance to Northern Ireland to take advantage of the opportunity for peace that now exists. We have consulted with the Congress, the Irish and British governments, and leaders of Northern Irish political parties to get their views on what kind of assistance would be most helpful.

Northern Ireland is already beginning to enjoy a peace dividend. The EU has increased its annual pledge to the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) from about \$20 million to over \$24 million annually and may do substantially more to assist Northern Ireland financially. Australia has also made a modest (\$1 million yearly for five years) commitment to IFI for the first time. The longer the peace holds, the more businesses will look at investing in Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic.

In that context, our options focus on promoting increased trade and investment with Ireland, particularly the north, and on supporting the IFI. The IFI remains the best way to channel the bulk of U.S. assistance to Ireland. It is trusted by both communities in Northern Ireland (including growing trust and participation from the Unionist community, which was initially skeptical), by the Irish and British governments, and by Congress. Its mandate is to do precisely what we have identified as the priority development tasks in Northern Ireland. You should be aware, however, that despite its increasingly strong reputation, IFI continues to come under occasional criticism in the media for "flaky" programs. The TV tabloid program Inside Edition is scheduled to air such a story November 3, which will

reportedly criticize questionable past IFI projects including a butterfly farm and a golf course. These are old stories and the Fund has taken steps to avoid such projects and made progress in improving its programs and image.

Options

OPIC Equity Fund: At the request of Congress, OPIC is investigating whether an OPIC-sponsored equity fund could mobilize U.S. private capital. Congress (Rep. Gilman and others) has asked for a feasibility study to determine if an equity fund not to exceed \$60 million is appropriate for both Northern Ireland and the Republic.

OPIC and OMB are opposed to an OPIC Equity Fund. OPIC says there is no shortage of capital in Ireland, that more attractive investment and loan terms are available from the British and Irish investment boards, and that there is therefore no incentive for U.S. investors to subscribe to an OPIC-administered equity fund which charges fees for doing business. Because of this, OPIC believes that it would be unable to obtain capital for a \$60 million fund. OPIC is also concerned, given other requirements, about having sufficient personnel to manage such a fund once it was announced. Supporters of the equity fund idea on the Hill and in the Irish-American business community counter that interest in a Fund does exist but that OPIC would need to be proactive to exploit it. In addition, OPIC currently has a loan guarantee program which has not been used so they oppose expanding it further.

Recommendation: That we not take any position on the OPIC proposal for an equity fund until the study is completed. In the likely event of a negative study, that we then look at ways, including through our investment conference (see below), to work with the Irish and British investment boards to encourage increased U.S. business activity.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

International Fund for Ireland: Given the lack of viability of the OPIC equity fund proposal, U.S. support for the IFI becomes even more important as a concrete demonstration of our readiness to support those who take risks for peace in Ireland, as we support those who take similar risks in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The Administration included in its budget proposals for FY 94 and FY 95 \$19.6 million per year for IFI. This was a break with previous years, when Congress, not the Administration, was the

driving force behind getting and keeping IFI funding. We suggest building on this by reaffirming our present commitment for FY 95 and seeking Congressional concurrence to a \$10 million increase spread over FY96 and FY97 (approximately \$5 million in additional funding for each year), thereby roughly matching the EU increase and keeping the level of U.S. and EU funding for the IFI on the same level.

Pros: Increasing funding for IFI for two crucial years in the peace process would provide concrete evidence of the seriousness of our engagement on this issue. Without even a modest increase for IFI, our package risks being branded by the Irish groups on the Hill and elsewhere as hollow. IFI has identified numerous important new programs which it wants to fund, including "seed money" for the building of a University of Ulster branch campus which would geographically (and psychologically) straddle the sectarian divide and provide much-needed jobs and job training in a cross-community setting. OMB and State agree to this proposed level and timing of increase.

Cons: Although IFI enjoys increasingly strong credibility on all sides in Ireland, its management and some of its projects remain vulnerable to criticism. Announcing an increase on the eve of the Inside Edition story, however bogus the "expose" is, does carry some risk, although we could hedge this by emphasizing our intent to work with IFI to further strengthen its programs and its management. Congress will be wary of another promise from the Administration on foreign aid but in our initial conversations, we believe this modest increase will be manageable. Anthony Lake has calls into Leahy and Obey. Generally, the appropriators are likely to oppose; others (Dodd, Foley, Kennedy) will strongly support.

Recommendation: That you announce your intent to seek Congressional agreement to an increase of U.S. funding for IFI of \$10 million over FY96 and 97 (for a total of roughly \$25 million per year).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Investment Mission and Conference: This initiative promises to enjoy widespread support and attention, particularly if it is held in Philadelphia (which Senator Wofford in particular welcomes, and which also makes sense overall), and most especially if you participate by giving an opening or keynote speech. The State Department will appoint a coordinator for the conference (thereby addressing in a modified form sentiment from Joe Kennedy and others on the Hill for an "Economic Coordinator" for Ireland). The Coordinator will work with IFI (which is interested in underwriting the conference), the British and Irish

investment boards, and interested Irish-American and other private sector groups and individuals. We should consider inviting some or all of Northern Ireland's party leaders to the conference (Hume and Molyneaux for a start).

Prime Minister Major is holding an Investment Conference in Belfast in December; we propose to send Secretary Brown there and to Dublin. We may also want him to take a delegation of U.S. business leaders with him.

Recommendations:

That you agree to participate in a White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland, probably by giving the opening speech, in Philadelphia in April 1995.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you announce Commerce Secretary Brown's participation in the British Investment Conference in Belfast in December 1994 and Secretary Brown's additional stop in Dublin to explore the all-island dimensions of U.S. trade and investment in Ireland, in preparation for our spring conference.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Provision of U.S. Technical and Other Expertise: We have identified numerous other ways in which U.S. government agencies might begin or expand their contacts with Northern Ireland to focus on areas of greatest importance to solidifying the peace and promoting reconciliation. These could be done within existing budgets, with strong direction from you on the priority you attach to these programs.

- The Department of Commerce has begun enhancing cooperation in the science and technology field by establishing collaboration among "Technology Innovation Centers" already set up in the U.S. and Northern Ireland. We will also discuss with them the possibility of establishing business exchange programs similar to those we have with the NIS.
- USIA will expand its programs to encourage Northern Irish participation in numerous new programs, including a new conflict resolution exchange and training project, which would give a university or organization in the U.S. funding (\$60,000-\$150,000) to fund a project in conflict resolution in Northern Ireland..
- The National Democratic Institute (NDI) is presently conducting a political party training program funded by the

National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (\$200,000 budgeted); we can encourage NED to expand it and to explore other ways to take advantage of the changed circumstances.

- HUD and other U.S. agencies could provide to Northern Ireland leaders information and training they have developed on community banking, urban development, and other areas in which they have expertise. AID is looking into providing technical assistance to IFI for development of a micro-enterprise program.
- The Trade and Development Agency will lead a mission to the region to explore business opportunities.

Summary Recommendation

That you approve the text of the announcement at Tab A. This announcement includes Secretary Brown's trip to Belfast and Dublin, your participation in a White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland in April in Philadelphia, and a proposed increase in U.S. funding for IFI of \$10 million over FY96 and 97.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Proposed October 31 Announcement

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (2.15)

KBH 7/11/2023

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: KATHLEEN STEPHENS ^{KS}SUBJECT: Supporting Peace in Northern Ireland:
Options for Greater U.S. SupportPurpose

To decide upon a package of measures the President can announce to support the peace process in Northern Ireland by encouraging greater job growth and investment there.

Background

Nancy Soderberg chaired an interagency study of ways in which the USG might increase or refocus U.S. assistance to Northern Ireland to take advantage of the opportunity for peace presented by the IRA cease-fire and the strong interest in Congress and the Irish-American community in building on this breakthrough. We have also consulted with the Irish and British governments and leaders of Northern Irish political parties to get their views on what kind of assistance would be most helpful. We have concluded that:

- Our role in Northern Ireland -- economic and political -- is and will remain a supporting one. We should not get out in front of the Irish and British governments either in terms of forcing the pace of political negotiations or in terms of our economic role. We do not have the funds nor, in relative terms, does Northern Ireland have a need which would justify a large economic assistance effort; the British government and the EU should remain the primary sources of funds for Northern Ireland's development needs.
- Northern Ireland is already beginning to enjoy a modest "peace dividend;" the EU has increased its annual pledge to the International Fund for Ireland from about \$20 million to over \$24 million annually. Australia has committed to contribute for the first time, at a rate of \$1 million annually for the next five years. The longer the peace holds, the more businesses will look again, or for the first time, at investing in Northern Ireland. Our initiative

therefore need not start from ground zero but rather can aim to encourage these trends.

- The International Fund for Ireland (IFI) is the best way to channel the bulk of any new USG effort. It is trusted by both communities in Northern Ireland, by the British and Irish governments, and by Congress. Its mandate is to do precisely what we have identified as the priority development tasks in Northern Ireland. We are in touch with Jim Lyons, the U.S. Observer to the IFI Board, who has reported to us on the IFI Board's September 29-30 meeting. Tab A describes the IFI in detail. Tab B is Lyons' October 10 memo describing the Board's recent decisions.
- Although there is great interest on the Hill in "doing something" for Northern Ireland, there is no optimism about getting new money -- particularly with IFI already amply funded, at least for the moment. There may be support on the Hill, however, for an OPIC or other program to establish an equity or growth fund for Northern Ireland.
- Although we have examined numerous proposals put forward by HMG, the Irish government and Northern Ireland politicians for preferential tax or tariff treatment, it appears that Northern Ireland, as a part of the UK and the EU, is already in most regards in a highly favorable trade and tax position vis-a-vis the United States. Treasury would strongly oppose any move to grant unique tax breaks to encourage business in Northern Ireland on the grounds of maintaining the integrity of our tax treaty system.

Options

Based on these findings, we have identified the following options for your decision. With your approval, we will use these proposals as the basis for an October Presidential announcement, perhaps in connection with a visit to the White House by influential Irish-Americans.

International Fund for Ireland: The Administration included in its budget proposals for FY94 and FY95 \$19.6 million per year for IFI. This was a break with previous years, when Congress, not the Administration, was the driving force behind getting and keeping IFI funding. We can build on this in several ways.

Amount of Funding

We have two choices:

- A) Commit now to maintaining the present level of funding over the next two years. This could be announced in terms of our plan to obligate approximately \$40 million to IFI in FY95

(this would consist of FY94 appropriated but not yet obligated monies along with the anticipated FY95 appropriations) and to seek Congressional concurrence for a total of about \$40 million over the following two fiscal years; or

- B) Affirm our present commitment to obligate \$40 million in FY95, and secure State Department commitment to seeking increased funding beginning in FY96 to match the EU's increased pledge of \$24 million annually.

Recommendation: Option B

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Conditions

- A) Continue to appropriate funds to IFI under existing guidelines, which permit IFI's Board of Directors wide latitude in their use of the funds.
- B) Seek to reinforce IFI's efforts to increase donor commitments, including from private industry, by requiring that IFI set aside up to \$15 million over three years for:
 - a matching grant program under which IFI could leverage up to twice the amount in private donations for a "flagship program" such as the proposed Springvale campus of the University of Ulster. The Springvale campus would be built to stretch between North and West Belfast, an area which has the highest levels of long-term unemployment.
 - a loan guarantee program that would target small business development in an effort to increase bicommunal activities.

Potentially, these programs could leverage an additional \$30-\$50 million in private funds. There may be opposition at the Fund, however, to any set-aside requirement/condition without the promise of any new money for the Fund, and concern within the Irish-American community that this approach could draw funds away from other existing private efforts. However, the IFI is highly interested in the Springvale project (Tab B), and might be interested in a matching grant program used new funds.

Recommendation: Option B, with new money

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Investment Conference and Mission: This idea promises to attract widespread support and attention, particularly if it is held in Washington with Presidential or Vice Presidential participation.

The IFI Board is prepared to sponsor such a conference as early in 1995 as feasible. We should consider inviting some or all of Northern Ireland's party leaders to the conference (Hume and Molyneaux for a start). The conference could be followed by a trade and investment mission to Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, possibly led by Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, and with Irish-American and other business participation. We do not yet have a formal reaction from Commerce; this has to be further explored with them.

Recommendations: That we encourage IFI to organize and sponsor an investment and business conference on Northern Ireland in Washington, D.C. as soon as possible, with a commitment on our part to Presidential or Vice Presidential participation in the form of an opening or keynote address.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That following the conference, the Department of Commerce and/or other appropriate agencies be tasked with working with IFI to organize a trade and investment mission to Northern Ireland.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

OPIC Equity Fund: OPIC is investigating whether an OPIC-sponsored equity fund could mobilize U.S. private capital. Congress (Representative Gilman) has asked for a feasibility study to determine if an equity fund not to exceed \$60 million is appropriate for both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

Recommendation: Welcome the OPIC feasibility study and Congressional interest. Upon completion of the study, depending on the results, work with Congress to establish an equity fund.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Provision of U.S. Technical and Other Expertise: We have identified numerous other ways in which U.S. government agencies might begin or expand their contacts with Northern Ireland to focus on areas of greatest importance to solidifying the peace and promoting reconciliation. We believe that these could be done within existing budgets, with strong direction from the President on the priority he attaches to these programs. For example,

- One avenue for enhancing cooperation in the science and technology area would involve establishing collaboration among "Technology Innovation Centers" that have already been

set up in the U.S. and Northern Ireland. The Department of Commerce has begun exploring this possibility.

- USIA could encourage Northern Irish participation in its new "conflict resolution" exchange and training project, which would give a university or organization in the U.S. funding (\$60,000-\$150,000) to fund a project in conflict resolution in Northern Ireland.
- The National Democratic Institute (NDI) is presently conducting a political party training program funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (\$200,000 budgeted); we can encourage NED to expand it (to include Sinn Fein) and to explore other ways of taking advantage of the changed circumstances.
- HUD and other U.S. agencies could provide to Northern Ireland leaders information and training they have developed on community banking, urban developments, and other areas in which they have expertise.
- The Appropriations Conference on the Hill recently appropriated \$11 million for the evaluation of Starstreak, a short range anti-air missile made by Short Brothers of Belfast, for possible acquisition by the U.S. Army. Short Brothers is a major contributor to the Northern Ireland economy whose achievements on fair employment are widely recognized. We could place the evaluation and possible acquisition of Starstreak in the context of our desire to promote economic revitalization and job growth in Northern Ireland.

SUMMARY RECOMMENDATION

That the President issue a statement in October, based on the options you have selected, announcing a package of measures aimed at supporting peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. This statement would emphasize the importance of international support for IFI, describe the extensive network of U.S. official and private ties with Northern Ireland on which we intend to build, and announce the President's (or Vice President's) intention to participate in an investment conference for Northern Ireland. We would also announce the formation of an international working group, under USG auspices, to continue discussions of U.S. public and private efforts to support Northern Ireland's economic and political development. (This idea is appealing to both the British and Irish governments, and to the Northern Ireland political parties, as a means to assure their voices continue to be heard.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Concurrences by: Bill Danvers and Rodney Bent (OMB)

Attachment

Tab A 1993 Report to Congress on IFI

Tab B Jim Lyons' October 10 Memo re IFI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SODERBERG, LEBOURGEOIS, NSC, SUM2, VAX, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 141545Z SEP 94

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7843

RUEHDC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2053

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (2.16)
KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 014600

COMMERCE FOR USDOC/4000/AS/IEP/CMEISSNER
AND USDOC/4200/DAS/EUR/PVARGO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAID, EFIN, UK, EI
SUBJECT: LOOKING FOR WAYS TO HELP THE NORTHERN IRELAND
PEACE PROCESS: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

REF: (A) STATE 244940 (B) 93 LONDON 22850 (C) LONDON
14240

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY AND PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS: EMBASSY APPRECIATES OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER ITS VIEWS ON WAYS THE USG COULD SHOW ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS OUR PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS AND HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH CONGEN BELFAST. EMBASSY OFFICERS WILL VISIT BELFAST AT THE END OF THE MONTH TO DISCUSS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WITH A FOCUS ON WAYS TO PROMOTE PRIVATE INVESTMENT. PLEASE LET US KNOW BY COB SEPTEMBER 26 IF WASHINGTON AGENCIES HAVE ANY SPECIFIC INTERESTS THAT THEY WOULD LIKE EMBASSY OFFICERS TO ADDRESS DURING THIS VISIT.
3. OUR PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING U.S. INITIATIVES TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY AND PROMOTE JOB GROWTH:
 - INVESTMENT CONFERENCE AND MISSION;
 - INCREASED FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI) AND ACTION TO EXPEDITE IFI'S WORK AND ALLOW DIRECT PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

- DIRECT AIR SERVICE FROM THE UNITED STATES;
- TOURISM PROMOTION;
- AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE; AND
- TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION.

WE DO NOT THINK IT LIKELY THE UK WOULD BE WILLING TO OFFER TAX BREAKS FOR INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

4. IN FORMULATING U.S. INITIATIVES, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK IN MIND, IN PARTICULAR THE NEED TO FOSTER TRUST AND COOPERATION FROM THE MAJORITY COMMUNITY. TO THIS END, USG SHOULD AT THIS STAGE AVOID MEASURES THAT TREAT THE ISLAND AS A UNIT OR SUGGEST THAT THE USG DOES NOT CONSIDER THE PROVINCE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE UK. THAT SAID, ENHANCED ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND (OR JOINT APPROACHES TO SOMETHING LIKE TOURISM) COULD BE A USEFUL ELEMENT IN THE REVITALIZATION OF THE REGION'S ECONOMY. END SUMMARY

UK INCOME TAX REDUCTION

5. REF A ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON THE PRACTICALITY OF ENCOURAGING THE UK TO OFFER A LIMITED TAX EXEMPTION OR REDUCTION ON INCOME TAX FOR COMPANIES LOCATED IN NORTHERN IRELAND. WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT ANY SUCH MEASURE WOULD BE ENACTED FOR SEVERAL REASONS:

- THE LARGE UK BUDGET DEFICIT, CURRENTLY RUNNING AT ABOUT SIX PERCENT OF GDP, RESULTS IN STRONG RESISTANCE TO TAX CUTS OF ANY SORT.
- THERE IS ALREADY A NET UK SUBSIDY OF 4.5 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR TO THE PROVINCE, SO THERE IS LITTLE INCLINATION TO PROVIDE MORE. THIS INCLUDES OUTRIGHT GRANTS TO PROMOTE OUTSIDE INVESTMENT.
- HM TREASURY STRONGLY OPPOSES DIFFERENT TAX RATES FOR ONE DISADVANTAGED REGION SINCE THERE ARE MANY OTHER AREAS THAT COULD QUALIFY. MOREOVER, TAX BREAKS LACK TRANSPARENCY, DISTORT ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND PRESENT TAX ADMINISTRATION PROBLEMS.
- DIFFERENTIAL CORPORATE (OR INDIVIDUAL) TAX RATES FOR NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD REQUIRE FREESTANDING LEGISLATION IN THE PARLIAMENT. MP'S FROM EVERY OTHER DISADVANTAGED AREA IN THE UK WOULD CLAMOR FOR TAX BREAKS FOR THEIR CONSTITUENTS.
- FINALLY, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANYTHING BUT A VERY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LARGE TAX PREFERENCE WOULD HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT EFFECT IN ATTRACTING NEW INVESTMENT. FOREIGN INVESTORS ALREADY FIND THE UK ONE OF THE MOST ATTRACTIVE SITES IN EUROPE EVEN WITH THE CURRENT CORPORATE TAX RATE OF 33 PERCENT. A REDUCTION TO THE TOP U.S. CORPORATE RATE OF 30 PERCENT WOULD ONLY PROVIDE MARGINAL BENEFIT TO U.S. FIRMS.

EXISTING INVESTMENT INCENTIVES

6. AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE WE HAVE EXAMINED EXISTING UK INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD OF NORTHERN IRELAND (IDB) OFFERS A WIDE RANGE OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE INWARD INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY AND TRADEABLE SERVICES:

- CAPITAL GRANTS UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE COST OF THE PROJECT;
- TRAINING GRANTS;
- RENT GRANTS UP TO FIVE YEARS; AND
- INTEREST RELIEF GRANTS TO OFFSET INTEREST COSTS.

7. FISCAL 1993-94 (APRIL 1993 - MARCH 1994) WAS IDB'S MOST SUCCESSFUL YEAR SINCE 1982 WITH 13 INVESTMENTS TOTALING 260 MILLION POUNDS STERLING (413 MILLION DOLLARS), OF WHICH IDB GRANTS ACCOUNTED FOR 64 MILLION POUNDS (102 MILLION DOLLARS).

INVESTMENT PROMOTION

8. THE END OF VIOLENCE SHOULD ITSELF REMOVE A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO INVESTMENT. THE U.S. SHOULD REINFORCE THIS BY EXPLORING MEANS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND JOB CREATION IN THE REGION. THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS IS PROBABLY BY MAKING BUSINESS MORE AWARE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH INVESTMENT CONFERENCES AND MISSIONS. IDB OFFICIALS CLAIM THAT FULLY 24 OF THE 38 U.S. FIRMS PRESENTLY ACTIVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND DECIDED TO INVEST THERE BECAUSE OF THE EFFORTS, BOTH PROMOTIONAL AND FINANCIAL, OF THE IDB. (THESE U.S. FIRMS EMPLOY ,000 WORKERS AND HAVE INVESTED OVER 850 MILLION DOLLARS IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. WE BELIEVE A HIGH-LEVEL INVESTMENT CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON THIS WINTER OR NEXT SPRING WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY SPARK INCREASED INTEREST WITHIN THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY. MANY OF THE U.S. FIRMS ALREADY OPERATING IN NORTHERN IRELAND COULD SHARE THEIR POSITIVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE PROVINCE'S HIGHLY-EDUCATED AND MOTIVATED WORKFORCE. A HIGH-LEVEL INVESTMENT MISSION TO NORTHERN IRELAND FROM THE U.S. AFTER SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL. AMCHAMS AND MANUFACTURING ASSOCIATIONS IN THE U.S., UK AND IRELAND SHOULD BE MOBILIZED TO SUPPORT THESE EFFORTS.

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND

10. WE CONSIDER THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI) THE BEST WAY TO CHANNEL NEW USG FINANCIAL RESOURCES SINCE IT IS TRUSTED BY BOTH RECIPIENTS AND DONORS, INCLUDING THE CONGRESS. IT HAS PROVED ITSELF EFFECTIVE IN PUTTING RESOURCES DIRECTLY IN THE HANDS OF PEOPLE WHO KNOW THE PRIORITIES AND HAS EIGHT YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN VETTING PROJECTS AND MONITORING RESULTS. MOREOVER, IF SOME NEW FOCUS OR ACCELERATION OF SPENDING IS DESIRED, A SPECIAL FACILITY COULD PROBABLY BE CREATED FOR THAT PURPOSE. BRITISH OFFICIALS, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE CRITICIZED IFI'S SLOW RESPONSE TIME, BUT WE SEE NO REASON WHY A CONCERTED EFFORT ON OUR PART COULD NOT SPEED UP THE PROCESS.

11. IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO REVISE THE IFI TO ALLOW DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM INDIVIDUALS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS. DOING SO COULD INCREASE PUBLIC AWARENESS AND SUPPORT FOR ITS ACTIVITIES.

NEED FOR DIRECT AIR LINK WITH U.S.

12. WE HAVE BEEN STRUCK THAT IN VIRTUALLY EVERY DISCUSSION REGARDING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROVINCE'S ECONOMY OUR INTERLOCUTORS EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR DIRECT IR SERVICE FROM THE UNITED STATES. SUCH AN AIR LINK IS WIDELY SEEN AS CRUCIAL TO ATTRACTING BOTH POTENTIAL INVESTORS AND TOURISTS.

13. CURRENTLY ONE SMALL U.S. CARRIER, AMERICAN TRANSAIR, FLIES BETWEEN BELFAST AND THE U.S. THE WEEKLY (BIWEEKLY IN SUMMER) FLIGHT FROM NEW YORK LANDS IN BELFAST, CONTINUES TO RIGA, LATVIA, AND RETURNS BY THE SAME ROUTE. NO U.K. CARRIER PRESENTLY OPERATES A DIRECT FLIGHT BETWEEN BELFAST AND THE U.S., ALTHOUGH THE U.K. COULD ADD BELFAST AS AN ADDITIONAL GATEWAY UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14. AIRLINE COMPANIES, OF COURSE, MUST THEMSELVES DECIDE ON COMMERCIAL GROUNDS WHETHER POTENTIAL TRAFFIC FROM OTHER U.S. GATEWAYS WOULD WARRANT SERVICE. IN THE NEXT ROUND OF CIVIL AVIATION TALKS WITH HMG, THE USG COULD RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL CHARTERS AND "EXTRA-BILATERAL" SCHEDULED SERVICES TO BELFAST. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO NEGOTIATE FULL 5TH FREEDOM TRAFFIC RIGHTS.

TOURISM PROMOTION

15. MOST ANALYSTS CONSIDER THE TOURISM INDUSTRY TO BE THE BEST PROSPECT FOR MUCH NEEDED NEAR-TERM JOB CREATION. TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE HAVE WREAKED HAVOC ON THE PROVINCE'S TOURISM INDUSTRY.

16. TOURISM EARNINGS CONTRIBUTE ONLY 1.5 PERCENT TO THE REGION'S GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, COMPARED TO 5.6 PERCENT IN THE REST OF THE BRITISH ISLES. WHILE OVER 1.2 MILLION TOURISTS VISITED NORTHERN IRELAND LAST YEAR, TOURISM OFFICIALS TELL US OF THEIR CONCERN THAT MOST WERE VISITING RELATIVES (AND THEREFORE NOT STAYING IN HOTELS) OR ON BUSINESS TRIPS. THEY EXPECT PEACE WILL GREATLY INCREASE THE NUMBERS COMING PURELY FOR HOLIDAYS, WHO NOW ONLY ACCOUNT FOR 20 PERCENT OF VISITORS, COMPARED TO 49 PERCENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AND 44 PERCENT IN GREAT BRITAIN. SUCH "PURE HOLIDAY MAKERS" SPEND FAR MORE PER PERSON ON LODGING, MEALS AND SIGHTSEEING.

17. A RECENT REPORT FROM THE CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY (CBI) ESTIMATES THAT THE TOURISM INDUSTRY COULD GENERATE AN ADDITIONAL 3,000 JOBS IN THE SHORT TERM AND UP TO 10,000 BY THE END OF THE DECADE, A NUMBER EQUIVALENT TO ROUGHLY HALF THE JOBS EXPECTED TO BE LOST IN THE SECURITY INDUSTRY OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

18. USG INITIATIVES IN THIS SECTOR MIGHT INCLUDE TOURISM PROMOTION AT INVESTOR CONFERENCES AND INCREASED FUNDING FOR PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND, TO IMPROVE THE TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE CONGRESS IS NEGATIVE ABOUT TOURISM PROJECTS (REF C) SO WE WOULD HAVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO TRY AND CHANGE THEIR VIEWS ON THIS.)

AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE

19. NORTHERN IRELAND'S AGRI-FOOD SECTOR IS RELATIVELY MORE IMPORTANT THAN IN VIRTUALLY ANY OTHER REGION OF THE UK, ACCOUNTING FOR SEVEN PERCENT OF GDP AND 10 PERCENT OF EMPLOYMENT. AS A RESULT, IT IS THREE TIMES MORE IMPORTANT TO THE ECONOMY OF NORTHERN IRELAND THAN IS THE CASE FOR THE UK AS A WHOLE. AS NORTHERN IRELAND HAS A POPULATION OF ONLY 1.5 MILLION, THE AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY RELIES HEAVILY ON EXPORTS.

20. NORTHERN IRELAND RECENTLY APPLIED FOR USDA APPROVAL FOR ITS SLAUGHTERHOUSES TO EXPORT TO THE UNITED STATES. A TEAM FROM USDA'S FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE IS PLANNING TO VISIT NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE NEAR FUTURE. CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN TO EXPEDITING THE APPROVAL PROCESS.

21. ANOTHER POSSIBLE U.S. INITIATIVE COULD INVOLVE DEVELOPING A PROGRAM SIMILAR TO SECTION 1420 OF THE 1985 FARM BILL WHICH PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. AGRIBUSINESS ALSO SHOULD BE MADE AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY INVESTMENT MISSION.

TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION

22. ONE AVENUE FOR ENHANCING COOPERATION IN THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AREA WOULD INVOLVE ESTABLISHING COLLABORATION AMONG "TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION CENTERS" THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN SET UP IN THE U.S. AND NORTHERN IRELAND. MARY GOOD, USDOC UNDER SECRETARY FOR TECHNOLOGY, EXPLORED THIS POSSIBILITY DURING HER VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND IN JUNE.

CROWE
BT
#4600

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03
<^SSN>4600
<^TOR>940914115246 M1251992
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<^SSN>4600

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F(2.17)
KBH 4/11/2023

09/08/94 113603 PRINTER: HI

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 LONDON 22850 01 OF 11 231553Z

ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AGRE-00 AID-01 A-01 CA-02 CC0-00

CEA-01 CG-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 CTME-00 C-01 DASY-00

DODE-00 DOEE-00 DOTE-00 DS-00 EB-01 EXIM-06 E-01

FAAE-00 FBIE-00 FRB-03 HA-09 H-01 IMMC-01 TEDE-00

INR-00 INSE-00 IO-16 ITC-01 JUSE-00 L-03 ADS-00

MMP-00 M-00 NRCE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OIG-04

OIS-01 OMB-01 OPIC-08 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01

SCT-03 SIL-00 SNP-00 SP-00 SR-03 SSO-00 SS-00

STR-16 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 USSS-00 ASDS-01 RPE-01

/108W

-----13DA74 231558Z /38

P 231504Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TJ SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4798

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMCONSUL BELFAST

AMCONSUL EDINBURGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 11 LONDON 22850

DEPT PLEASE PASS TREASURY FOR RZEMIEM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, PREL, UK, EI, KPRP

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE TROUBLES

REFS: (A) 92 LONDON 15503, (B) 92 LONDON 15504

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 22850 01 OF 11 231553Z

SUMMARY

1. (U) NORTHERN IRELAND'S ECONOMY IS A BASKET CASE. ONCE A MAJOR MANUFACTURING CENTER, IT HAS SEEN ITS TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES NEARLY EVAPORATE IN THE FACE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION. HUGE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES HAVE REDUCED DEPRIVATION AND GENERATED A PATCHY AND SUPERFICIAL PROSPERITY, BUT NORTHERN IRELAND'S ECONOMIC INDICES ARE WELL BELOW THE REST OF THE UK, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY ABOVE THOSE IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. THE PUBLIC SECTOR DOMINATES AND DISTORTS THE ECONOMY.
2. (U) CATHOLICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAVE LONG FARED MORE POORLY THAN PROTESTANTS, A RESULT OF SECTARIAN CONFLICT, OFFICIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. FOR MOST OF THIS CENTURY, CATHOLICS HAD TWICE THE BIRTHRATE OF PROTESTANTS, TWICE THE EMIGRATION RATE, AND TWICE THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE. PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION IN JOBS AND HOUSING SPARKED THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROTESTS THAT LED TO SECTARIAN VIOLENCE.
3. (U) DESPITE TWO DECADES OF EFFORTS TO REDRESS THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BALANCE, CATHOLICS REMAIN RELATIVELY DISADVANTAGED, PARTICULARLY IN EMPLOYMENT, THOUGH MATERIAL INEQUALITIES HAVE NARROWED. GOVERNMENT POLICIES HAVE BROUGHT CATHOLICS TO PARITY IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, AND FORCED PROGRESS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THE CATHOLIC MIDDLE CLASS HAS EXPANDED GREATLY, BUT LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT IS PERVERSIVE IN CATHOLIC (AND SOME PROTESTANT) GHETTOS.

4. (C) HMG OFFICIALS DENY THAT THEIR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 LONDON 22850 01 OF 11 231553Z
CONDITIONS FOR CATHOLICS ARE PART OF A CONSCIOUS STRATEGY, BUT IN PRACTICE THEY CONSTITUTE PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT MEASURE IN DAMPENING SUPPORT FOR THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) AND RECONCILING CATHOLICS TO CONTINUED UNION WITH BRITAIN.

5. (U) NORTHERN IRELAND IS A MASSIVE ECONOMIC BURDEN FOR BRITAIN, COSTING TAXPAYERS ABOUT THREE BILLION POUNDS (4.5 BILLION USD) IN NET TRANSFERS A YEAR. IT IS DIFFICULT TO FORESEE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE PROVINCE COULD AGAIN BECOME A NET CONTRIBUTOR TO THE BRITISH ECONOMY. AN END TO VIOLENCE WOULD HELP RESUSCITATE THE PRIVATE SECTOR, BUT IN THE SHORT TERM MIGHT LEAD TO EVEN HIGHER UNEMPLOYMENT BECAUSE OF LAYOFFS IN THE LARGE SECURITY INDUSTRY. SUSTAINING A PEACE PROCESS MIGHT REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIC SUPPORT, IN WHICH U.S. AID AND INVESTMENT WOULD BE EXPECTED.

6. (C) UNIFICATION OF IRELAND ANY TIME IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE WOULD PRODUCE SEVERE STRAINS, WITH LARGE-SCALE EXTERNAL AID NEEDED TO MITIGATE DECLINING LIVING STANDARDS. END SUMMARY.

INTRODUCTION

7. (U) THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAVE ATTRACTED MUCH SCRUTINY. THIS REPORT SEEKS TO ANALYZE THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE TROUBLES IN THIS CORNER OF EUROPE, AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 LONDON 22850 01 OF 11 231553Z
PARTICULARLY TO ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

- (1) HOW VIABLE IS NORTHERN IRELAND'S ECONOMY TODAY, AND WHAT ARE ITS PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE?
- (2) WHAT ROLE HAVE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, INCLUDING THE GAP BETWEEN CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS, PLAYED IN FOMENTING THE CONFLICT?
- (3) WHAT HAS HMG DONE TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS, AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 2

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 LONDON 22350 02 OF 11 231554Z

ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LUG-00	ACDA-17	AGRE-00	AID-01	A-01	CA-02	CCD-00
	CEA-01	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	C-01	OASY-00
	DUDE-00	DOEE-00	DOFE-00	DS-00	EB-01	EXIM-06	E-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	FR9-03	HA-09	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-16	ITC-01	JUSE-00	L-03	ADS-00
	MMP-00	M-00	NRCB-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OIS-01	OMB-01	OPIC-08	PA-01	PA-02	PRS-01	P-01
	SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSQ-00	SS-00
	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	RPE-01

/108W

-----130A80 231559Z /38

P 231504Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4799

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMCONSUL BELFAST

AMCONSUL EDINBURGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 11 LONDON 22850

DEPT PLEASE PASS TREASURY FOR RZEMIEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, PREL, UK, EI, KPRP

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE TROUBLES

HOW DO ITS ECONOMIC POLICIES MESH WITH ITS POLITICAL AND SECURITY STRATEGY?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 22850 02 OF 11 231554Z

(4) DOES BRITAIN HAVE ANY ECONOMIC STAKE IN PRESERVING THE UNION?

(6) WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPACT OF PEACE OR EVENTUAL UNIFICATION WITH THE IRISH REPUBLIC?

I. THE PROVINCIAL ECONOMY

LONG-TERM DECLINE

8. (U) AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY THE NORTH OF IRELAND WAS A FAIRLY PROSPEROUS PLACE, COMPARABLE TO MOST OF BRITAIN AND FAR AHEAD OF THE REST OF THE ISLAND. AN EARLY CENTER OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, BELFAST WAS AMONG THE WORLD LEADERS IN SHIPBUILDING (THE VAST HARLAND AND WOLFF SHIPYARD PRODUCED MANY OF THE GREATEST SHIPS OF THE ERA, INCLUDING THE "TITANIC"), AVIATION (SHORT BROTHERS IS THE WORLD'S OLDEST AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER), AND TEXTILES (THE WORLD CENTER OF THE LINEN INDUSTRY). LONDONDERRY WAS AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT MANUFACTURERS OF TEXTILES AND CLOTHING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. (U) SINCE THE DEPRESSION OF THE 1930'S, HOWEVER, THE PROVINCE'S LEADING INDUSTRIES HAVE SUFFERED AN INEXORABLE DECLINE, AS ITS LACK OF NATURAL RESOURCES, HIGH ENERGY COSTS, AND GEOGRAPHIC ISOLATION MADE IT UNCOMPETITIVE WITH AMERICAN, CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN, AND MORE RECENTLY ASIAN RIVALS. HARLAND AND WOOLF NOW EMPLOYS LESS THAN TEN PERCENT OF ITS PEAK WORKFORCE; THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 LONDON 22850 02 OF 11 231554Z
LINEN INDUSTRY IS VIRTUALLY DEAD; AND MANUFACTURING AT SHORTS IS CONFINED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO COMPONENTS FOR LARGER PARTNERS.

10. (S) AT THE CRUCIAL POINT IN THE LATE 1960'S, WHEN THE REST OF THE BRITISH ECONOMY FINALLY BEGAN TO RECOVER FROM POSTWAR AUSTERITY AND MOVE INTO SUNRISE INDUSTRIES, THE ONSET OF THE "TROUBLES" SCARED OFF POTENTIAL INVESTORS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE SECTARIAN CONFLICT, WHICH INCLUDED BOMB AND ARSON ATTACKS AT MANY FACTORIES (AND THE ASSASSINATION OF A FEW INDUSTRIALISTS) MADE BELFAST ABOUT AS ATTRACTIVE AN INVESTMENT SITE AS BEIRUT. THE NORTHERN IRELAND ECONOMIC RESEARCH CENTER ESTIMATES THAT THIS FACTOR ACCOUNTS FOR 24,000 OF THE 32,000 MANUFACTURING JOBS LOST SINCE 1980.

11. (U) THE NORTHERN IRELAND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD (IDB) CONFIRMS THAT THE PERCEPTION OF WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE IS BY FAR THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE IN ATTRACTING OUTSIDE INVESTMENT. THE IDB HAS TRIED HARD TO ATTRACT INVESTORS, BUT WITH GENERALLY DISCOURAGING RESULTS. WHILE SOME AMERICAN FIRMS (NOTABLY FORD AND DUPONT) HAVE PROSPERED, TWO HIGH-PROFILE U.S. VENTURES -- DELOREAN AND LEAR -- ENDED IN DISASTER. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN DURING THE TROUBLES, THE OVERALL MURDER RATE IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAS BEEN LOWER THAN IN MOST AMERICAN STATES, AND FAR MORE PEOPLE HAVE DIED IN ROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE PROVINCE.)

BRITAIN'S POOR COUSIN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 LONDON 22850 02 OF 11 231554Z
12. (U) TODAY, THE PROVINCE'S PER CAPITA GDP IS ONLY 75 PERCENT OF THE UK AVERAGE, AND IT IS ONE OF THREE AREAS IN THE UK THAT QUALIFY FOR EC AID TO DEPRESSED REGIONS. NORTHERN IRELAND HAS THE LOWEST LEVEL OF PERSONAL CONSUMPTION IN THE UK, AND BY FAR THE HIGHEST INCIDENCE OF POVERTY. UNEMPLOYMENT IS ABOUT HALF AGAIN AS HIGH AS IN BRITAIN (13.9 PERCENT TO 10.1 PERCENT IN THE OCTOBER 1993 FIGURES). EVEN MORE WORRISOME ARE THE CORROSIVE EFFECTS OF LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT: 18 PERCENT OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ /

PAGE 4

03 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 LONDON 22850 03 OF 11 231554Z

ACTION EUR-01							
INFO LOG-00	ACDA-17	AGRE-00	AID-01	A-01	CA-02	CCO-00	
CEA-01	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	C-01	OASY-00	
DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOFE-00	DS-00	EB-01	EXIM-06	E-01	
FAAE-00	FBIE-00	FRB-03	HA-09	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	
INR-00	INSE-00	IO-16	ITC-01	JUSE-00	L-03	ADS-00	
MMP-00	M-00	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	
DIS-01	OMB-01	OPIC-08	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	
SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00	SS-00	
STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	RPE-01	

/108W

-----130AA1 231600Z /38

231504Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4800
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMCONSUL BELFAST
AMCONSUL EDINBURGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 11 LONDON 22850

DEPT PLEASE PASS TREASURY FOR RZEMLEN

E.O. 12355: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PHJM, PTER, PINS, PREL, UK, EI, KPRP

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE TROUBLES

UNEMPLOYED HAVE BEEN OUT OF WORK FOR MORE THAN FIVE YEARS, COMPARED TO FOUR PERCENT THROUGHOUT THE UK. IT IS NOT UNCOMMON TO FIND FAMILIES IN WHICH NO MALE MEMBER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 22850 03 OF 11 231554Z

HAS HELD A PERMANENT JOB FOR THREE GENERATIONS.
13. (U) AGRICULTURE REMAINS ONE OF THE PROVINCE'S LARGEST SECTORS, ACCOUNTING FOR SEVEN PERCENT OF THE LABOR FORCE -- MORE THAN THREE TIMES THE PROPORTION IN THE REST OF THE UK. SOME OF IT IS HIGHLY COMPETITIVE: THE LARGE FARMS OF COUNTY ANTRIM ARE VERY EFFICIENT, AND THE PROVINCE'S MEAT AND DAIRY PRODUCTS ARE SUPERB. BUT MUCH OF THE PROVINCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE CATHOLIC-DOMINATED BORDER REGIONS, IS DIVIDED INTO SMALL FAMILY FARMS WITH LITTLE ARABLE LAND, INSUFFICIENT TO GENERATE MORE THAN A SUBSISTENCE LIVING.
14. (U) NORTHERN IRELAND HAS FEW NATURAL RESOURCES, WITH NO COMMERCIALLY VIABLE QUANTITIES OF COAL OR IRON ORE AND FEW INDIGENOUS ENERGY RESOURCES. A PROPOSED GOLD-MINING PROJECT IN COUNTY TYRONE FACES STIFF ENVIRONMENTAL RESISTANCE. THE PROVINCE IS HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON IMPORTS FROM THE REST OF THE UK FOR FUEL, RAW MATERIALS AND OTHER INPUTS FOR BOTH ITS MANUFACTURING AND SERVICE SECTORS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOME ADVANTAGES ...

15. (U) THE ONLY REAL ASSETS NORTHERN IRELAND OFFERS TO AN INVESTOR ARE THE QUALITY OF ITS WORKFORCE, EXCELLENT INFRASTRUCTURE, AND A HIGH QUALITY OF LIFE FOR MANAGERIAL-LEVEL EMPLOYEES. THE SCHOOLS ARE SUPERB: NORTHERN IRELAND STUDENTS, BOTH CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT, ROUTINELY OUTSCORE THOSE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE UK ON NATIONAL TESTS, THOUGH THE PROVINCE ALSO SUFFERS THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 LONDON 22850 03 OF 11 231554Z
 HIGHEST RATE OF DROPOUTS IN THE UK BECAUSE POOR JOB PROSPECTS REDUCE THE INCENTIVE TO STUDY. THERE IS A LARGE POOL OF HIGHLY SKILLED WORKERS, LABOR RELATIONS ARE THE BEST IN THE UK, AND DUPONT CLAIMS ITS LOCALLY HIRED MANAGERS ARE THE BEST IN THE WORLD. THE NETWORK OF ROADS, PORTS AND AIRPORTS IS FIRST-RATE, AS ARE COMMUNICATION LINKS. THE MIDDLE CLASS ENJOYS EXCELLENT HOUSING AT LOW PRICES, SUPERB RECREATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, AND FINE CULTURAL FACILITIES.

... BUT STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS ...

16. (U) THE NORTHERN IRELAND ECONOMIC COUNCIL HAS IDENTIFIED SEVERAL STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS THAT, REGARDLESS OF FUTURE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, WILL HAMPER THE PROVINCE'S GROWTH OF OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE SHORT TERM. THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR IS NARROWLY BASED AND HAS A RATHER LOW LEVEL OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY IS LOW: MANUFACTURING OUTPUT PER HEAD IS ONLY 80 PERCENT OF THAT IN BRITAIN (PARTLY REFLECTING LOW LEVELS OF INVESTMENT).

17. (U) BY FAR THE GREATEST STRUCTURAL DISTORTION IN THE ECONOMY IS THE HIGH LEVEL OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE: CURRENTLY ALMOST 75 PERCENT OF GDP, COMPARED TO 42 PERCENT IN BRITAIN. TWO OUT OF EVERY FIVE WORKERS ARE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR; IN BRITAIN THE PROPORTION IS ONE IN FOUR AND DECLINING. AS A RESULT, THE MAIN DETERMINANT OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY HAS BECOME THE LEVEL AND RATE OF GROWTH OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 LONDON 22850 03 OF 11 231554Z
 18. (U) THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR DERIVES DIRECTLY FROM THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FRAGILITY OF NORTHERN IRELAND, PLUS THE HEAVY USE OF SUBSIDIES TO NARROW SECTARIAN GAPS, AND OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TO REDRESS JOB BIAS. IN ADDITION TO ITS HIGH COST, THE PUBLIC SECTOR ATTRACTS MANY BRIGHT GRADUATES WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, AND HAS CREATED A CULTURE OF DEPENDENCY. MANY YOUNG PEOPLE,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 7

09/08/94 113604 PRINTER: HI

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PARTICULARLY IN CATHOLIC GHETTOS, SEE NO GOOD REASON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 8

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 LONDON 22850 04 OF 11 231555Z

ACTION EUR-J1

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AGRE-00	AID-01	A-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CEA-01	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	C-01	OASY-00
	DDDE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	DS-00	EB-01	EXIM-06	E-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	FRB-03	HA-09	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-16	ITC-01	JUSE-00	L-03	ADS-00
	MMP-00	M-00	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OIS-01	OMB-01	OPIC-08	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01
	SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSD-00	SS-00
	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	RPE-01

/103W

-----130ABA 231602Z /38

P 231504Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4801
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMCONSUL BELFAST
AMCONSUL EDINBURGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 11 LONDON 22850

DEPT PLEASE PASS TREASURY FOR RZEMIEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, PREL, UK, EI, KPRP

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE TROUBLES

EVER TO SEEK WORK. BENEFIT FRAUD IS PERVASIVE: MANY WELFARE RECIPIENTS WORK "OFF THE BOOKS," STABLE COUPLES WITH CHILDREN DECLINE TO MARRY SO THAT THE MOTHER CAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 22850 04 OF 11 231555Z

CLAIM LONE PARENT BENEFITS, AND FULL-TIME TERRORISTS (INCLUDING MOST PIRA LEADERS) COLLECT UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS. ACCORDING TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO), ONE FARMER WHOSE MEAGER HOLDING WOULD NORMALLY PROVIDE AN ANNUAL INCOME OF 5000 POUNDS RECEIVES TENS OF THOUSANDS EACH YEAR IN "COMPENSATION" BY CLAIMING THAT HIS SIX COWS ABORT EVERY TIME AN ARMY HELICOPTER FLIES NEARBY. CIVIL SERVANTS CANNOT CRACK DOWN ON THESE ABUSES WITHOUT RISKING TERRORIST RETALIATION.

... AND SUPERFICIAL PROSPERITY

19. (U) WITH ALL THESE DRAWBACKS, HOWEVER, THE SIZE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR HAS ALSO HAD POSITIVE EFFECTS, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM. NORTHERN IRELAND, WHILE LONG RELATIVELY DEPRESSED, SUFFERED FAR LESS FROM THE RECENT RECESSION THAN DID THE REST OF THE UK. THE GROWTH OF WELL-PAID JOBS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE AND SECURITY FORCES HAS DONE MUCH TO EXPAND THE MIDDLE CLASS, EASE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CATHOLICS, GENERATE SERVICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, AND CREATE AT LEAST A PATCHY AND SUPERFICIAL PROSPERITY. THE BELFAST OUTLETS OF MCDONALD'S AND MARKS AND SPENCER ARE THE MOST PROFITABLE IN THE UK, AND THE LOCAL BMW DEALERSHIP IS THE NATION'S LARGEST. BELFAST NOW BOASTS A NUMBER OF FINE RESTAURANTS (A SHARP CONTRAST FROM A DECADE EARLIER) AND SEVERAL GOOD NEW HOTELS. WHILE NOMINAL RATES OF POVERTY ARE HIGH, THE QUALITY OF PUBLIC HOUSING IS THE BEST IN THE UK, AND ONE SEES LESS VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF MISERY (E.G., BEGGARS AND HOMELESS PEOPLE) THAN IN LONDON.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 LONDON 22850 04 OF 11 231555Z

 II. SECTARIAN ECONOMICS

HISTORY OF CONFLICT

20. (U) MOST PROTESTANTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARE DESCENDANTS OF ENGLISH AND SCOTTISH IMMIGRANTS SETTLED THERE BY LONDON-BASED CORPORATIONS, AT THE SAME TIME AND IN THE SAME WAY THAT THE MASSACHUSETTS COLONY WAS FOUNDED. LIKE THEIR AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS, THE ULSTER SETTLERS GRABBED THE BEST LAND FOR THEMSELVES, PUSHING THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION TO THE FRINGES. THIS EXPLAINS THE PROTESTANT DOMINATION IN COUNTY ANTRIM, MOST OF COUNTY DOWN, AND PORTIONS OF COUNTIES LONDONDERRY AND TYRONE. CATHOLICS REMAINED PREDOMINANT IN THE GLENS OF ANTRIM AND MOST OF THE SOUTH AND WEST OF THE SIX-COUNTY AREA.

21. (U) IRISH CATHOLICS SUPPORTED THE LOSING SIDE IN THE ANGLO-SPANISH WARS OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY, THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR OF THE 1640'S AND THE OVERTHROW OF JAMES II BY WILLIAM OF ORANGE IN 1688 -- AND SUFFERED AS A RESULT. FROM 1690 UNTIL THE LATE 19TH CENTURY, THEY WERE SUBJECT TO A WIDE RANGE OF OPPRESSIVE AND DISCRIMINATORY LAWS. IN RESPONSE, THEY LAUNCHED SPORADIC AND ILL-SUPPORTED REBELLIONS, OCCASIONALLY WITH FRENCH HELP.

22. (U) THE INTRODUCTION OF THE POTATO IN ABOUT 1780 LED TO A PHENOMENAL IRISH POPULATION EXPLOSION, BUT THE INADEQUATE BRITISH RESPONSE TO THE POTATO FAMINE OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 LONDON 22850 04 OF 11 231555Z

1840'S LEFT SCARS THAT HAVE NOT YET HEALED. A MILLION IRISHMEN STARVED, AND MILLIONS MORE EMIGRATED TO BRITAIN, THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA.

23. (U) THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PASSED A HOME RULE ACT FOR IRELAND IN 1912, BUT IMPLEMENTATION WAS BLOCKED FIRST BY MASSIVE PROTESTANT RESISTANCE, THEN BY THE ONSET OF WORLD WAR I. THE FAILED EASTER RISING OF 1916

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 10

09/08/94 113604 PRINTER: HI

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN DUBLIN COALESCED CATHOLIC SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 11

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 LONDON 22850 05 OF 11 231556Z

ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AGRE-00	AID-01	A-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CEA-01	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	C-01	OASY-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOFE-00	DS-00	EB-01	EXIM-06	E-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	FRB-03	HA-09	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	INSE-00	ID-16	ITC-01	JUSE-00	L-03	ADS-00
	MMP-00	M-00	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	DIS-01	OMB-01	OPIC-08	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01
	SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	RPE-01

/108W

-----130A01 231603Z /38

P 231504Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TJ SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4802
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMCONSUL BELFAST
AMCONSUL EDINBURGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 11 LONDON 22850

DEPT PLEASE PASS TREASURY FOR RZEMIEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, PREL, UK, EI, KPRP

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE TROUBLES

RATHER THAN HOME RULE. NO PARTY TO THE CONFLICT WANTED PARTITION, BUT IT EMERGED AS THE ONE SOLUTION ALL COULD ACCEPT, AND THE SIX COUNTIES WITH MAJORITY PROTESTANT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 22850 05 OF 11 231556Z
POPULATIONS FORMED AN AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE WHEN THE IRISH FREE STATE WAS FOUNDED IN 1921. UNTIL 1972, A "PROTESTANT PARLIAMENT FOR A PROTESTANT PEOPLE" AT STORMONT NEAR BELFAST PRACTICED BLATANT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CATHOLICS THROUGH DENIAL OF EQUAL PUBLIC SERVICES, TOLERANCE OF PERVASIVE JOB BIAS, AND ELECTORAL GERRYMANDERING. ANTI-CATHOLIC RIOTS IN 1922 AND 1936 REINFORCED THE REPRESSIVE CLIMATE.
EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS

24. (U) WHEN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION CAME TO IRELAND IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY, VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE NEW INDUSTRIES WERE FOUNDED BY PROTESTANTS, AND SITED IN PROTESTANT AREAS AROUND BELFAST AND LONDONDERRY. AFTER THE POTATO FAMINE, CATHOLICS MIGRATED TO THE CITIES IN SEARCH OF WORK, BUT WERE HIRED ONLY WHEN COMMERCIAL DEMAND OUTSTRIPPED THE ABILITY OF PROTESTANT WORKERS TO MEET IT. THE PATTERN THUS ESTABLISHED -- THAT PROTESTANTS MONOPOLIZED THE MANAGERIAL AND SKILLED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BLUE-COLLAR JOBS, WHILE CATHOLICS FORMED A LABOR POOL FOR TEMPORARY AND MENIAL WORK -- MIGHT HAVE DEVELOPED EVEN WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION, BUT WAS REINFORCED BY THE LEGACY OF SECTARIAN SUSPICIONS AND TENSIONS.

25. (U) BY THE TIME VIOLENCE ERUPTED IN 1969, A CURIOUS SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION HAD EVOLVED. BRIGHT PROTESTANT STUDENTS SELDOM WENT TO UNIVERSITY; WITH "A-LEVEL" QUALIFICATIONS (ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO A JUNIOR COLLEGE DEGREE), THEY COULD GO INTO BUSINESS AND RISE TO THE TOP WITHOUT IMPEDIMENT. LESS QUALIFIED PROTESTANT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 LONDON 22850 05 OF 11 231556Z

YOUTHS TENDED TO INHERIT THEIR FATHERS' SKILLED BLUE-COLLAR JOBS THROUGH APPRENTICESHIPS THAT WERE AT LEAST AS SOUGHT AFTER AS COLLEGE PLACES. CATHOLICS HAD NO SUCH OPPORTUNITIES. THE BRIGHTEST WERE ENCOURAGED TO STAY IN SCHOOL BY GENEROUS STUDENT GRANTS AND LACK OF ALTERNATIVES, SO THEY CONCENTRATED ON THE PROFESSIONS, NOTABLY LAW, MEDICINE AND ACCOUNTING. THE REST LEFT SCHOOL EARLY AND LOOKED FOR CASUAL WORK, MOSTLY IN CONSTRUCTION. CATHOLICS WHO DID MANAGE TO FIND GOOD JOBS IN PROTESTANT-DOMINATED FIRMS WERE SUBJECT TO FREQUENT INTIMIDATION, AND OCCASIONAL DEATH THREATS, FROM PROTESTANT WORKMATES.

26. (U) DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS REFLECTED AND REINFORCED THIS STRATIFICATION. TRADITIONALLY, THE CATHOLIC BIRTHRATE WAS ABOUT TWICE THAT OF PROTESTANTS, BUT THE POPULATION RATIO REMAINED NEARLY CONSTANT AT 2:1 BECAUSE CATHOLICS ALSO EMIGRATED AT TWICE THE PROTESTANT RATE. AND AS CATHOLICS SUFFERED MOST IN THE POST-DEPRESSION ECONOMIC DECLINE, THEIR UNEMPLOYMENT RATE WAS TWICE THAT OF PROTESTANTS.

SPARK FOR THE TROUBLES

27. (U) ECONOMIC INEQUALITY PROVIDED MUCH OF THE IMPETUS FOR THE DEMONSTRATIONS THAT SPARKED THE TROUBLES. THE SPECIFIC TRIGGER FOR ONE OF THE FIRST PROTESTS WAS THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC HOUSING TO A SINGLE PROTESTANT WOMAN WHEN MANY NEARBY CATHOLIC FAMILIES NEEDED SHELTER. A SURVEY AT THE TIME FOUND THAT CATHOLICS WERE FAR MORE CONCERNED ABOUT ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION THAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 LONDON 22850 05 OF 11 231556Z

ABOUT IRISH UNIFICATION, BUT THAT 69 PERCENT OF PROTESTANTS OPPOSED EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LEGISLATION. THE OVERWHELMING POLITICAL GOAL OF SINN FEIN AND PIRA IS UNIFICATION, BUT MUCH OF THEIR COMMUNITY SUPPORT DERIVES FROM PERCEPTIONS OF INEQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 13

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

III. HMG ACTIONS TO REDRESS INEQUALITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 LONDON 22850 06 OF 11 231556Z

ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AGRE-00	AID-01	A-01	CA-02	CCD-00
	CEA-01	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	C-01	OASY-00
	DDDE-00	DOEE-00	DDTE-00	DS-00	EB-01	EXIM-06	E-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	FRB-03	HA-09	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	INSE-00	ID-16	ITC-01	JUSE-00	L-03	ADS-00
	MMP-00	M-00	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	DIS-01	OMB-01	OPIC-08	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01
	SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSD-00	SS-00
	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	RPE-01

/108W

-----13DAED 231605Z /38

P 231504Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4803

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMCONSUL BELFAST

AMCONSUL EDINBURGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 06 OF 11 LONDON 22850

DEPT PLEASE PASS TREASURY FOR RZEMLEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ECON, PGDV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, PREL, UK, EI, KPRP

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE TROUBLES

28. (U) IN 1972, FOUR YEARS AFTER THE ONSET OF THE TROUBLES, HMG ASSUMED DIRECT RULE OVER THE PROVINCE. SINCE THEN, IT HAS WORKED TO ADDRESS LEGITIMATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 22850 06 OF 11 231556Z

GRIEVANCES OF CATHOLICS, WITH SUBSTANTIAL BUT INCOMPLETE SUCCESS.

HOUSING

29. (U) BELFAST'S HOUSING STOCK IN THE EARLY 1970'S WAS RATED, ALONG WITH NAPLES, AS THE WORST IN THE EC. IN SOME DISTRICTS, WELL OVER HALF THE HOMES LACKED INDOOR PLUMBING, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MANY WERE DESTABILIZED BY TERRORIST BOMBS. ARSON AND MOB ATTACKS FORCED THOUSANDS OF FAMILIES TO MOVE TO "THEIR SIDE" OF THE SECTARIAN DIVIDE, OFTEN CROWDING IN WITH RELATIVES. INADEQUATE HOUSING WAS MUCH MORE WIDESPREAD IN CATHOLIC NEIGHBORHOODS, BUT ALSO AFFLICTED PROTESTANT GHETTOS.

30. (LOU) GOVERNMENT PLANNERS INITIALLY MADE THE SAME MISTAKES AS THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE U.S. THEY MOVED FAMILIES OUT OF TRADITIONAL ROW HOUSES INTO HIGH-RISE APARTMENT BLOCKS, DESTROYING NEIGHBORHOODS AND ENCOURAGING VANDALISM. ONE SUCH PROJECT WAS DESIGNED TO HOUSE BOTH PROTESTANTS AND CATHOLICS; IT WAS RENDERED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNINHABITABLE WITHIN A FEW YEARS. BECAUSE CATHOLIC NEED WAS GREATEST, AND OVERCOMING NATIONALIST ALIENATION WAS TOP PRIORITY, MOST OF THE DAMAGE OF THIS MISPLACED IDEALISM WAS INFLICTED ON THE CATHOLIC COMMUNITY.

31. (U) SINCE THE LATE 1970'S, HOWEVER, HOUSING CONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED AND SENSITIVE. NEWER PROJECTS FEATURE UPGRADED TRADITIONAL TOWNHOUSES, CLUSTERED TO STIMULATE NEIGHBORHOOD COHESION. BELFAST NOW PROBABLY ENJOYS THE BEST PUBLIC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 LONDON 22850 06 OF 11 231556Z
HOUSING IN THE UK; SOLDIERS FROM GREAT BRITAIN SOMETIMES COMPLAIN THAT PIRA MEMBERS HAVE BETTER HOUSING THAN THEIR OWN FAMILIES. COMPLAINTS ABOUT HOUSING BIAS ARE RARE, AND COME AT LEAST AS OFTEN FROM PROTESTANTS AS CATHOLICS. A NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) OFFICIAL TOLD US THE VIRTUAL ELIMINATION OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION WAS THE BIGGEST SUCCESS OF DIRECT RULE THUS FAR IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SPHERE. CATHOLIC PRIESTS IN WEST BELFAST, SOME HEARTILY ANTI-BRITISH, ALSO ADMIT THIS.
PUBLIC SERVICES

32. (U) PROVISION OF MOST OTHER PUBLIC SERVICES HAS ALSO BECOME MUCH MORE EVEN-HANDED. HEALTH CARE FOR BOTH COMMUNITIES IS OUTSTANDING, AS ARE THE STATE AND CATHOLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS. THERE ARE MORE GOVERNMENT-RUN COMMUNITY CENTERS AND ATHLETIC FACILITIES IN CATHOLIC AREAS THAN IN PROTESTANT ONES, AND FAR MORE THAN IN BRITAIN. A STRIKING FEATURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND IS THAT, WHILE MOST PEOPLE ARE CONTEMPTUOUS BOTH OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND OF THEIR ELECTED POLITICIANS, THEY GIVE HIGH MARKS TO THE CIVIL SERVICE. THE MOST NOTABLE EXCEPTION IS POLICE PROTECTION: CATHOLICS COMPLAIN THAT POLICE RESPOND MUCH MORE RAPIDLY TO CRIMES IN PROTESTANT NEIGHBORHOODS. THE MAIN REASON IS THAT BEFORE THEY CAN ENTER A CATHOLIC GHETTO TO INVESTIGATE, POLICE HAVE TO ARRANGE ARMY COVER TO PROTECT THEM FROM ASSASSINATION.
EMPLOYMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 LONDON 22850 06 OF 11 231556Z

33. (U) DIFFERENTIAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES ARE NOW THE MOST GLARING DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE COMMUNITIES, AND HAVE BECOME THE MAIN SYMBOL OF SOCIAL INJUSTICE. DESPITE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS, CATHOLIC UNEMPLOYMENT REMAINS STUCK AT 2-2.5 TIMES THE PROTESTANT LEVEL. CATHOLICS ALSO EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 16

09/08/94 113605 PRINTER: HI

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISCOURAGING MANY FROM ENTERING OR REMAINING IN THE
LABOR FORCE. AS A RESULT OF THE HISTORICAL PATTERN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 17

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 LONDON 22850 07 OF 11 231557Z

ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AGRE-00	AID-01	A-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CEA-01	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	C-01	OASY-00
	DDDE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	DS-00	EB-01	EXIM-06	E-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	FRB-03	HA-09	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-16	ITC-01	JUSE-00	L-03	ADS-00
	MMP-00	M-00	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	GIC-02	OIG-04
	OIS-01	OMB-01	OPIC-08	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01
	SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	RPE-01

/108W

-----13DAF5 231608Z /38

P 231504Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4804

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMCONSUL BELFAST

AMCONSUL EDINBURGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 07 OF 11 LONDON 22850

DEPT PLEASE PASS TREASURY FOR RZEMIEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, PREL, UK, EI, KPRP

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE TROUBLES

DESCRIBED ABOVE, THE DISPARITY IS MOST ACUTE AT SKILLED BLUE-COLLAR LEVEL. CATHOLICS ARE OVER-REPRESENTED IN THE PROFESSIONS -- THEY COMPRISE WELL OVER HALF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 22850 07 OF 11 231557Z

PROVINCE'S LAWYERS -- AND HAVE BEGUN TO PROSPER IN SMALL BUSINESS FORMATION, BUT HAVE YET TO CRACK THE LOWER MIDDLE CLASS.

34. (U) IN ORDER TO REDRESS THIS IMBALANCE, HMG FOCUSED FIRST ON THE CIVIL SERVICE, OVER WHICH IT HAD DIRECT CONTROL. IN 1971, ONLY 11 OF THE TOP 1400 CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE PROVINCE WERE CATHOLICS. TODAY, THEY FILL ONE THIRD OF SENIOR JOBS, AND ARE REPRESENTED THROUGHOUT THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN EXACT PROPORTION TO THEIR SHARE OF THE POPULATION (ABOUT 40 PERCENT). AT LOCAL LEVEL, 35 PERCENT OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE 26 DISTRICT COUNCILS ARE CATHOLIC, THOUGH THERE ARE STILL SOME DISTRICTS (NOTABLY BELFAST) IN WHICH THEY ARE UNDER-REPRESENTED.

35. (U) CATHOLICS ALSO HAVE BEGUN TO MAKE INROADS IN MAJOR MANUFACTURING CONCERNS SINCE PASSAGE OF THE 1989 FAIR EMPLOYMENT (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT, WHICH IS FAR MORE STRINGENT THAN LAWS APPLYING ELSEWHERE IN THE UK. THE ACT REQUIRES ANNUAL ACCOUNTING OF THE RELIGIOUS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ /

PAGE 18

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONTENT OF THE WORKFORCE BY ALL BUT THE SMALLEST FIRMS, AND THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL IT ESTABLISHED HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY AGGRESSIVE IN ORDERING EMPLOYMENT, PROMOTION OR COMPENSATION FOR WORKERS WHO HAVE SUFFERED FROM DISCRIMINATION. SHORT BROTHERS, NOW THE LARGEST PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYER, BOOSTED CATHOLIC REPRESENTATION FROM THREE PERCENT IN THE EARLY 1970'S TO 12 PERCENT IN 1993. MOST OF THESE JOBS, HOWEVER, ARE AT ENTRY LEVEL. AMERICAN FIRMS IN THE PROVINCE HAVE AN EXCELLENT RECORD, EMPLOYING SLIGHTLY MORE CATHOLICS THAN THEIR SHARE OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 LONDON 22850 07 OF 11 231557Z

THE POPULATION. PERCENTAGE GAINS IN MANUFACTURING DO NOT, HOWEVER, REFLECT A SIGNIFICANT NET INCREASE IN JOBS, SINCE THE SECTOR AS A WHOLE HAS SUFFERED A SHARP DECREASE IN EMPLOYMENT OVER THE LAST 15 YEARS.

36. (U) LARGELY AS A RESULT OF THESE EFFORTS, THE CATHOLIC MIDDLE CLASS IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAS EXPANDED DRAMATICALLY. CONFINED 20 YEARS AGO TO A SMALL PROFESSIONAL ELITE, IT NOW INCLUDES LARGE NUMBERS OF CIVIL SERVANTS, SOMEWHAT FEWER MANAGERS AND ENTREPRENEURS, AND A GROWING NUMBER OF SKILLED WORKERS. MANY OF THEM LIVE IN PEACEFUL INTEGRATED NEIGHBORHOODS. DAVID MCKITTRICK, THE DEAN OF NORTHERN IRELAND JOURNALISTS, CALLS THIS DEVELOPMENT THE "GENTRIFICATION OF THE CATHOLICS," AND CONSIDERS IT THE MOST PROMISING DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAST TWO DECADES.

THE SECURITY FACTOR

37. (S) THE ONE SECTOR IN WHICH CATHOLICS ARE STILL RARELY FOUND IS SECURITY. THE POLICE AND ARMY ACTIVELY RECRUIT CATHOLICS, BUT AVERSION TO THE ROLE AND WELL-FOUNDED FEARS OF PIRA REPRISALS DETER ALL BUT A HANDFUL FROM JOINING. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT, IF A CATHOLIC JOINS THE POLICE OR THE ARMY, HE MUST MOVE TO A MIXED NEIGHBORHOOD AND CAN SELDOM VISIT HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS AGAIN. PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS AND GUARDS EMPLOYED BY PRIVATE COMPANIES ARE ALSO MOSTLY PROTESTANT. OUR ROUGH CALCULATIONS INDICATE THAT EMPLOYMENT IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS ACCOUNTS FOR VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 LONDON 22850 07 OF 11 231557Z

CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT UNEMPLOYMENT RATES. IF THE ROUGHLY 50,000 SECURITY JOBS WERE ELIMINATED, THE RATES WOULD BE NEARLY IDENTICAL.

PART OF A PLAN?

38. (S) BRITISH OFFICIALS DENY THAT THEY ARE ATTEMPTING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

09/08/94 113606 PRINTER: HI

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO "GENTRIFY" THE CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IN ORDER TO DAMPEN
NATIONALIST SENTIMENT. BUT A "STATEMENT OF SECURITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 20

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 LONDON 22850 08 OF 11 231558Z

ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AGRE-00	AID-01	A-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CEA-01	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	C-01	OASY-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTTE-00	DS-00	EB-01	EXIM-06	E-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	FRB-03	HA-09	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-16	ITC-01	JUSE-00	L-03	ADS-00
	MMP-00	M-00	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	GIC-02	OIG-04
	OIS-01	OMB-01	OPIC-08	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01
	SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	RPE-01

/108W

-----130810 231614Z /38

P 231504Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TJ SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4805

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMCONSUL BELFAST

AMCONSUL EDINBURGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 08 OF 11 LONDON 22850

DEPT PLEASE PASS TREASURY FOR RZEMIEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, PREL, UK, ET, KPRP

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE TROUBLES

"POLICY" ISSUED BY THE NIO IN MARCH 1993 ACKNOWLEDGES THAT POLICIES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING "WILL HELP TO CREATE A CLIMATE IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 22850 08 OF 11 231558Z

WHICH PEACEFUL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT CAN TAKE PLACE, THEREBY COMPLEMENTING AND REINFORCING THE GOVERNMENT'S SECURITY STRATEGY."

DAMPEN SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE ...

39. (S) IN FACT, IN SOME WAYS THE EFFORT TO BOOST CATHOLIC LIVING STANDARDS -- WHILE PERFECTLY JUSTIFIABLE IN ITS OWN RIGHT -- FORMS THE HEART OF HMG'S STRATEGY TO QUELL POLITICAL VIOLENCE. THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE ACCEPTED THAT THEY ALONE CANNOT CRUSH THE PARAMILITARY GROUPS, AT LEAST WITHOUT RESORTING TO MEASURES UNACCEPTABLE IN A DEMOCRACY. THE GOVERNMENT'S ANALYSIS (WITH WHICH WE CONCUR) IS THAT TERRORISM FEEDS ON GRIEVANCES ARISING BOTH FROM ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION AND SECTARIAN BIAS, AND IS OVERWHELMINGLY A WORKING-CLASS PHENOMENON. CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS WHO ESCAPE FROM THE GHETTOS INTO THE SUBURBS ALMOST NEVER ENGAGE IN TERRORISM. PEOPLE WITH GOOD JOBS AND HOUSES HAVE A STAKE IN THE SYSTEM, AND ARE UNLIKELY TO TRY TO DESTROY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IT. AS THE GHETTOES SHRINK, THE PROBLEM OF URSAN
TERRORISM AT LEAST BECOMES MUCH MORE CONTAINABLE.

... AND RECONCILE CATHOLICS TO THE UNION

40. (C) OPINION SURVEYS AND ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE INDICATE
THAT MIDDLE-CLASS CATHOLICS ALSO TEND TO ACCORD LESS
IMPORTANCE TO IRISH UNIFICATION THAN THEIR WORKING-CLASS
CORELIGIONISTS, AND MOST WOULD NEVER CONSIDER MOVING TO
THE REPUBLIC. MIDDLE-CLASS CATHOLIC VOTES SPLIT FAIRLY
EVENLY BETWEEN THE MODERATE NATIONALIST SOCIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 LONDON 22850 08 OF 11 231558Z
DEMOCRATIC AND LABOR PARTY (SDLP) AND THE NON-SECTARIAN
ALLIANCE, WITH A SUBSTANTIAL MINORITY SUPPORTING
UNIONIST PARTIES.

41. (C) THIS CORRELATION BETWEEN CATHOLIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC
STATUS AND SUPPORT FOR UNIFICATION MAY BE CRITICAL TO
NORTHERN IRELAND'S FUTURE. THE 1985 ANGLO-IRISH
AGREEMENT AND THE DECEMBER 1993 JOINT DECLARATION
STIPULATE THAT WHENEVER A MAJORITY IN THE PROVINCE
PREFER TO LEAVE THE UK AND JOIN THE REPUBLIC, THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS WILL INTRODUCE LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE
TRANSFER. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS INDICATE THAT CATHOLICS
WILL ACHIEVE A MAJORITY IN THE PROVINCE SOME TIME IN THE
FIRST HALF OF THE NEXT CENTURY. HOW SOON (IF EVER)
AFTER THAT TIME UNIFICATION GAINS MAJORITY ELECTORAL
SUPPORT MAY DEPEND VERY LARGELY ON THE SIZE OF THE
CATHOLIC MIDDLE CLASS.

IV. THE COST OF THE PROVINCE

HUGE SUBSIDIES

42. (LOU) ACCORDING TO H.M. TREASURY, TOTAL BRITISH
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON NORTHERN IRELAND THIS YEAR
ARE ESTIMATED AT 7.9 BILLION POUNDS (11.9 BILLION USD),
ABOUT THREE BILLION POUNDS MORE THAN TAX REVENUES FROM
THE PROVINCE. NORTHERN IRELAND ALSO RECEIVES ABOUT 150
MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR FROM THE EC THROUGH SPECIAL
SOCIAL, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER FUNDS, AND SOME 30 MILLION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 LONDON 22850 08 OF 11 231558Z
DOLLARS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND. THESE
HUGE EXTERNAL SUBVENTIONS ACCOUNT FOR THE FACT THAT PER
CAPITA CONSUMPTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS 82 PERCENT OF
THAT IN BRITAIN, WHILE PRIVATE SECTOR OUTPUT PER HEAD IS
ONLY 64 PERCENT OF THE BRITISH LEVEL. THERE ARE ALSO
SUBSTANTIAL INDIRECT COSTS TO BRITAIN IN THE FORM OF
PIRA ATTACKS IN ENGLAND, WHICH KILLED THREE PEOPLE AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WROUGHT NEARLY A BILLION DOLLARS IN PROPERTY DAMAGE IN
1993. FREQUENT SECURITY ALERTS AND DISRUPTION OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 23

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 LONDON 22850 09 OF 11 231558Z

ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AGRE-00	AID-01	A-01	CA-02	CCD-00
	CEA-01	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	C-01	DASY-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOFE-00	DS-00	E3-01	EXIM-06	E-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	FRB-03	HA-09	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-16	ITC-01	JUSE-00	L-03	ADS-00
	MMP-00	M-00	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OIS-01	OMB-01	OPIC-08	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01
	SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASOS-01	RPE-01

/108W

-----130B26 231559Z /38

P 231504Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TJ SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4806

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMCONSUL BELFAST

AMCONSUL EDINBURGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 09 OF 11 LONDON 22850

DEPT PLEASE PASS TREASURY FOR RZEMIEH

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, PREL, UK, EI, KPRP

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE TROUBLES

TRANSPORT LEAD TO NEAR-DAILY LOSSES OF EFFICIENCY IN THE ECONOMY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 22850 09 OF 11 231558Z

43. (U) DIRECT SECURITY COSTS OF 1.4 BILLION POUNDS (2.2 BILLION DOLLARS) ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT ONE FIFTH OF THE TOTAL -- A MUCH LOWER SHARE THAN IS COMMONLY BELIEVED.

THESE INCLUDE 590 MILLION POUNDS FOR THE POLICE, 136 MILLION FOR PRISONS, 101 MILLION IN COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM, AND 477 MILLION IN EXTRA COSTS TO THE ARMY (ABOVE NORMAL PEACETIME REQUIREMENTS).

44. (U) EVEN EXCLUDING SECURITY, EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS 26 PERCENT HIGHER THAN THE UK AVERAGE BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR NEEDS AND DEMOGRAPHY OF THE PROVINCE. MUCH OF THE BRITISH SUPPORT ACCRUES AUTOMATICALLY THROUGH THE NORMAL MECHANISMS OF CIVILIAN WELFARE SPENDING ON HEALTH, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL SECURITY -- PAYMENTS TO WHICH RESIDENTS OF NORTHERN IRELAND ARE ENTITLED ON THE SAME BASIS AS OTHER BRITISH SUBJECTS. EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL SECURITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS INCREASED BY HIGHER LEVELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT, WHILE GREATER EDUCATION SPENDING REFLECTS A LARGER PROPORTION OF SCHOOL-AGE CHILDREN (MOSTLY CATHOLICS) IN THE PROVINCE. NORTHERN IRELAND'S HIGH BIRTHRATE ALSO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 24

13 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCREASES THE COST OF THE GOVERNMENT-RUN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, AS DO THE COLD, WET CLIMATE AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS TO TERRORISM. LIKELY TO CONTINUE

5. (LOU) DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS INDICATE THAT THESE COSTS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE RISING FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. NORTHERN IRELAND HAS THE HIGHEST BIRTHRATE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY -- 20 PERCENT ABOVE THE UK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 LONDON 22850 09 OF 11 231558Z
AVERAGE. IN THE PAST, THIS HAS BEEN OFFSET BY EQUALLY HIGH EMIGRATION RATES, KEEPING THE PROVINCE'S POPULATION STABLE AT 1.5 MILLION. THERE ARE INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT TRADITIONAL PATTERNS MAY BE SHIFTING. NIO STUDIES INDICATE THAT THE POTENTIAL LABOR FORCE IS LIKELY TO INCREASE AT A FASTER RATE THAN IN BRITAIN. DURING THE REST OF THIS DECADE, THE DECLINE IN THE 16-24 AGE GROUP WILL BE ONLY HALF THAT IN BRITAIN. INCREASING NUMBERS OF ACADEMICALLY GIFTED PROTESTANTS ARE LEAVING THE PROVINCE FOR UNIVERSITIES IN BRITAIN AND ABROAD; FEW RETURN. AT THE SAME TIME, GENEROUS SOCIAL BENEFITS (AND WIDESPREAD CHEATING) APPEAR TO BE ENCOURAGING UNEMPLOYED CATHOLICS TO STAY IN THE PROVINCE. INTERNAL NIO STUDIES PROJECT INCREASED LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT, ESPECIALLY AMONG CATHOLICS, WELL INTO THE NEXT DECADE. UK HAS NO ECONOMIC STAKE

6. (LOU) THESE FACTORS, COUPLED WITH THE DECLINE OF TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES AND THE VERY REAL STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED ABOVE, BELIEVE THE ASSERTION SOMETIMES MADE THAT BRITAIN HOLDS ON TO NORTHERN IRELAND FOR ECONOMIC REASONS. THE PROVINCE COSTS BRITISH TAXPAYERS NEARLY (NEARLY TEN PERCENT OF THE CURRENT HUGE BUDGET DEFICIT), AND WE SEE NO CREDIBLE SCENARIO UNDER WHICH IT COULD AGAIN BECOME A NET CONTRIBUTOR TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

7. WHAT COULD CHANGE?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 LONDON 22850 09 OF 11 231558Z
PEACE NO PANACEA ...

7. (LOU) A CESSATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN BOTH DOMESTIC AND OUTSIDE INVESTMENT. NUMEROUS SMALL BUSINESSES THAT HAVE SPRUNG UP IN RECENT YEARS WOULD BE ABLE TO EXPAND WITHOUT THE DRAG OF HIGH SECURITY COSTS. THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

09/08/94 113606 PRINTER: HI

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LONG-DORMANT TOURISM SECTOR (LESS THAN TWO PERCENT OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 26

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 LONDON 22850 10 OF 11 231559Z

ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AGRE-00	AID-01	A-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CEA-01	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	C-01	OASY-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOFE-00	DS-00	EB-01	EXIM-06	E-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	FRB-03	HA-09	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	INSE-00	ID-16	ITC-01	JUSE-00	L-03	ADS-00
	MMP-00	M-00	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OIS-01	OMB-01	OPIC-08	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01
	SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	RPE-01

/108W

-----130844 231559Z /38

P 231504Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4807

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMCONSUL BELFAST

AMCONSUL EDINBURGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 10 OF 11 LONDON 22850

DEPT PLEASE PASS TREASURY FOR RZEMIAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ECON, PGDV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, PREL, UK, EI, KPRP

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE TROUBLES

GDP AT PRESENT, HALF THAT IN BRITAIN) WOULD PROBABLY REBOUND QUICKLY TOO. BUT THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO THINK THE PROVINCE WOULD SUDDENLY BECOME A MECCA FOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 22850 10 OF 11 231559Z

MAJOR UK OR FOREIGN INVESTMENT. AND THE SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS DISCUSSED ABOVE WOULD ACT AS A DRAG ON THE GROWTH OF ECONOMIC OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT.

48. (LOU) IN FACT, AN END TO VIOLENCE MIGHT ACTUALLY INCREASE UNEMPLOYMENT FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD. THE ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY (NOW NUMBERING 17,000 TO COVER A LARGELY LAW-ABIDING POPULATION OF 1.5 MILLION) WOULD CERTAINLY SHRINK, AS WOULD THE LOCAL ARMY REGIMENTS. IF ONE ADDS PART-TIME POLICE AND SOLDIERS, AND THE LARGE NUMBER OF PRIVATE SECURITY PERSONNEL, AS MANY AS 50,000 JOBS COULD GO DIRECTLY, WITH FURTHER CONSEQUENT REDUCTIONS IN THE SERVICE SECTOR. VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE IMPACT WOULD BE ON THE PROTESTANT COMMUNITY. HMG MIGHT WELL COME UNDER PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURE TO GAIN A "PEACE DIVIDEND" FOR THE TREASURY BY REDUCING SOME OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SUBSIDIES TO THE PROVINCE. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT SUSTAINING THE MOMENTUM OF ANY PEACE PROCESS WOULD REQUIRE SOME FAIRLY SUBSTANTIAL NEW ECONOMIC SUPPORT, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

/

PAGE 27

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

93 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

... NOR IS UNIFICATION

49. (U) SOME ARGUE THAT MOST OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS COULD BE SOLVED BY UNIFICATION WITH THE REPUBLIC. THEY CITE A STUDY BY THE CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY AND ITS IRISH COUNTERPART SUGGESTING THAT IMPROVED CROSS-BORDER TRADE COULD GENERATE AS MANY AS 75,000 NEW JOBS, AND THE COST OF DUPLICATIVE AND COMPETING DEVELOPMENT, TOURIST AND OTHER AGENCIES COULD BE ELIMINATED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 LONDON 22850 10 OF 11 231559Z

50. (S) THE ACCURACY OF THIS ASSESSMENT IS DOUBTFUL. CROSS-BORDER ECONOMIC COOPERATION WOULD CERTAINLY CREATE JOBS AND REDUCE COSTS, BUT THIS IS ALREADY UNDERWAY AND NEED NOT DEPEND ON UNIFICATION. UNDERNEATH, THE ECONOMIES OF NORTH AND SOUTH ARE PROBABLY NOT VERY COMPLEMENTARY -- THEY PRODUCE MANY OF THE SAME GOODS, SUFFER THE SAME RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS, AND HAVE LITTLE TO OFFER EACH OTHER.

51. (S) IN THE SHORT TO MEDIUM TERM, DUBLIN COULD FACE ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO INCORPORATE THE NORTH. MAINTAINING THE CURRENT BRITISH SUBSIDY WOULD ABSORB ROUGHLY ONE SIXTH OF THE REPUBLIC'S GNP. THE PER CAPITA BURDEN FOR IRISH TAXPAYERS WOULD BE 1290 DOLLARS A YEAR, COMPARED TO 81 DOLLARS FOR EACH BRITISH SUBJECT. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT LIVING STANDARDS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CURRENT BORDER WOULD DECLINE SHARPLY IN THE NORTH, AND PERHAPS IN THE SOUTH AS WELL WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL OUTSIDE HELP.

52. (S) IN ADDITION, EVEN PEACEFUL UNIFICATION WOULD PROBABLY EXACERBATE PROTESTANT ALIENATION, AND MANY WOULD EMIGRATE TO BRITAIN AND ELSEWHERE. IT WOULD DEPRIVE THE NORTH OF MUCH OF ITS MANAGERIAL CLASS AND SKILLED WORKFORCE, ACCELERATING ECONOMIC DECLINE.

CONCLUSION

53. (S) THE CURRENT ANGLO-IRISH PEACE INITIATIVE LOOKS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 LONDON 22850 10 OF 11 231559Z

MORE PROMISING THAN ANY IN THE PAST TWO DECADES, AND IRISH UNIFICATION MIGHT BE FEASIBLE IN THE RATHER DISTANT FUTURE. BUT THE PATH TO EITHER IS LIKELY TO BE TORTUOUS, AND ECONOMIC FACTORS WILL PLAY A KEY ROLE. REGENERATION OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S ECONOMY AND ENHANCED CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION WILL BE VITAL IN MAINTAINING SUPPORT IN BOTH COMMUNITIES FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF REAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND RECONCILIATION OF THE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ /

PAGE 28

09/08/94 113607 PRINTER: HI

13 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRADITIONS. SHOULD AN END TO VIOLENCE BE ACHIEVED, BOTH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ /

PAGE 29

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

3 LONDON 22850

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 LONDON 22850 11 OF 11 231559Z

SECTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AGRE-00	AID-01	A-01	CA-02	CCO-00
	CEA-01	CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	C-01	OASY-00
	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOFE-00	DS-00	EB-01	EXIM-06	E-01
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	FRB-03	HA-09	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-16	ITC-01	JUSE-00	L-03	ADS-00
	MMP-00	M-00	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OIS-01	OMB-01	OPIC-03	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01
	SCT-03	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SSJ-00	SS-00
	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASOS-01	RPE-01

/108W

-----13DB4C 231559Z /38

231504Z DEC 93

1 AMEMBASSY LONDON

1 SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4808

1 EMBASSY DUBLIN

1 CONSUL BELFAST

1 CONSUL EDINBURGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 11 OF 11 LONDON 22850

1 DEPT PLEASE PASS TREASURY FOR RZEMEN

1 NO. 12356: DECL: OADR

1 TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PINS, PREL, UK, EI, KPRP

1 SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE TROUBLES

1 BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS ARE LIKELY TO LOOK TO THE U.S. FOR SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, IN INVESTMENT PROMOTION

1 NOT IN DIRECT AID. SEITZ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 22850 11 OF 11 231559Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Pls keep on file -

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: FILE PRIVACY_IN SIGLER SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 051332Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 051332Z JAN 94 PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FM AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY SMITH, DUBLIN 001

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR NANCY SODERBERG IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS

REFS: A. 93 STATE 38742

B. DUBLIN 0025

C. 93 DUBLIN 7396

D. 93 DUBLIN 7366

E. 93 DUBLIN 7365

1. NANCY, I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE BEEN OUT OF TOWN AND THAT YOU MAY NOT BE FULLY AWARE OF THE REFERENCED MESSAGES REPORTING ON MY CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS, JOHN HUME AND OTHERS ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE MAY WELL BE AN IMMINENT REQUEST BY GERRY ADAMS FOR A VISA TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE. THE LATTER MESSAGE FROM STEVE OXMAN WAS I ASSUME CLEARED BY THE NSC. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO INDICATION TO THAT EFFECT. THE MESSAGE DOES REFER TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 22 COMMENTS TO THE IRISH TIMES. IT DOES NOT ADDRESS, HOWEVER, THE STRONGLY EXPRESSED VIEW OF PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS AND JOHN HUME THAT ADAMS IS SINCERE IN HIS QUEST FOR PEACE. NOR DOES IT ADDRESS THE FACT THAT REYNOLDS FEELS MAJOR SHOULD NOT HAVE A PROBLEM WITH ADAMS RECEIVING A VISA AT THIS TIME.

REYNOLDS AND HUME ARE CONVINCED THAT ADAMS IS THE ONLY ONE WHO CAN CONVINCED ALL IRISH AMERICANS TO SUPPORT THE JOINT DECLARATION. THEY BELIEVE THIS SUPPORT COULD BE INSTRUMENTAL IN PUSHING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD.

2. THE IRISH PRESS RAN AN EDITORIAL YESTERDAY ON THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S INTERNAL DEBATE OVER EASING THE BROADCASTING BAN ON SINN FEIN AND THE IRA WHICH EXPRESSES MOST PERSUASIVELY THE REASONS WHY NOW IS THE TIME TO ALLOW GERRY ADAMS TO BE HEARD AND TO BE MADE TO ANSWER HIS CRITICS. I QUOTE: THE FATE OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION -- AND THE PEACE HOPES IT HAS RAISED -- DEPEND PRIMARILY ON THE RESPONSE OF THE PROVISIONALS. IT IS SELF-EVIDENTLY ABSURD THAT WHILE THE DEBATE ON WHAT THAT RESPONSE MIGHT BE, AND WHY, DOMINATES NATIONAL RADIO AND TV, THOSE WHO CAN BEST ANSWER THE QUESTIONS BEING POSED ARE DELIBERATELY EXCLUDED. SUCH CENSORSHIP IS NOT JUST SELF-DEFEATING IN THAT IT DENIES THE PUBLIC INFORMATION TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED -- IT IS ALSO

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-5(2.20)
KBH 7/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

DAMAGING TO THE PROSPECTS OF THE DECLARATION BEING ACCEPTED.

ONE OF THE MAIN AIMS OF THE INITIATIVE IS TO BRING THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT IN FROM THE COLD AND PERSUADE IT TO ABANDON ITS CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE. ALLOWING ITS REPRESENTATIVES ACCESS TO THE AIRWAVES IN THE PRESENT DEBATE WOULD FURTHER THAT PROCESS IN HELPING TO END THE PROVOS' SENSE OF ISOLATION, EVEN IF IT IS SELF-IMPOSED. END QUOTE.

3. THIS ARGUMENT APPLIES EQUALLY TO THE VISA ISSUE AND I URGE THAT WE TAKE PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS' AND JOHN HUME'S RECOMMENDATIONS SERIOUSLY. I AM SENDING THIS MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO YOU IN THIS CHANNEL BECAUSE I HAVE HAD NO INDICATION FROM YOUR OFFICE THAT YOU HAVE SEEN MY MESSAGES AND THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED HIGH LEVEL CONSIDERATION AT THE WHITE HOUSE. I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR RESPONSE IN THIS CHANNEL AS WELL. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND I FIRMLY BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE PRO-ACTIVE IN THIS CASE AND NOT APPEAR TO BE RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE AFTER THE ISSUE HAS BEEN SEIZED UPON BY THE IRISH AMERICAN LOBBY. I REALIZE THAT EVERYONE IS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE UPCOMING TRIP TO BRUSSELS BUT AS WE EXPECT TO HEAR FROM ADAMS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, I WOULD APPRECIATE A RESPONSE PRIOR TO THE TRIP. THANKS AND BEST WISHES FOR A HAPPY AND HOPEFULLY PEACEFUL NEW YEAR.

SMITH

DECL OADR

#1332

NNNN

<MSGID> M0810822

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~SECRET~~

cleared 12/29/13 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUTH WJW DRAFT WJW
CLEAR 1 WJW 2 WJW
3 — 4 — 5 WJW
6 — 7 WJW 8 WJW

ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/NE:KSTÉPHENS:DKS
12/23/93 78027 SENEUK 2806
EUR:SOXMAN

P:L BUTLER
NSC:
CA/VO/L/C:LYONTZ
EUR:MAPETERS

EUR/NE:MPARMLY
S/S:
S/S-0:
L/CA:RHENDERSON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(2.21)
KBH 7/11/2023

EUR, EUR/NE

IMMEDIATE DUBLIN

IMMEDIATE LONDON

MODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR SMITH FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY OXMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, CVIS, EI, UK

SUBJECT: GERRY ADAMS VISA ISSUE

REF: A) DUBLIN 7365 (NOTAL) B) DUBLIN 7366
C) DUBLIN 7396 (NOTAL)

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIMELY REPORTS ON YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS, SEAN O'HUIGINN, AND JOHN HUME (REFTELS). WE AGREE WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS THAT ISSUANCE OF A VISA SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF BEING HELPFUL TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THAT IS THE CLEAR MESSAGE BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 22 COMMENTS TO THE IRISH TIMES, WHERE HE LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO REVIEW THE ISSUE IN LIGHT OF GERRY ADAMS' RESPONSE TO THE REYNOLDS-MAJOR INITIATIVE.

2. THE NEXT STEP IS UP TO GERRY ADAMS. [IF HE RENOUNCES VIOLENCE AND TAKES STEPS TO JOIN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE A NEW LOOK AT THE RATIONALE FOR A WAIVER THE NEXT TIME HE APPLIES FOR A U.S. VISA.] GRANTING GERRY ADAMS A VISA IS ONE OF THE MOST VISIBLE PIECES OF LEVERAGE WE HAVE TO USE WITH SINN FEIN/PIRA TO ENCOURAGE THEIR JOINING THE PEACE PROCESS. WE WANT TO BE SURE, AS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

SEAN O'HUIGINN PUT IT SO APTLY TO YOU, THAT WE "MAXIMIZE REWARDS." WE HOPE THE CARROT OF A U.S. VISA WILL PROVIDE ADDED INCENTIVE TO GERRY ADAMS TO MOVE AWAY FROM VIOLENCE. YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.22)
KBM 4/11/2023

PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: SODERBERG
SIT: FILE

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 231646Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4232
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 007396

NODIS

PLS PASS URGENTLY TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NANCY SODERBERG
FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFPT
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US
SUBJECT: MORE ON A VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS
REF: (A) DUBLIN 07366
(B) DUBLIN 07364

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I TALKED WITH JOHN HUME THIS MORNING (DECEMBER 23), WHO SAID, IN REGARD TO A VISA FOR SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS (REF. A), THAT THE TIMING WAS NOW RIGHT AND THAT IT WOULD HELP THE PEACE PROCESS TO GIVE HIM ONE. HUME HAS OBVIOUSLY CHANGED HIS MIND IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS (REF. B).

3. "THE IRISH TIMES" CARRIED A SHORT ITEM ON THE FRONT PAGE THIS MORNING WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT:

THE SINN FEIN PRESIDENT, MR. GERRY ADAMS, IS EXPECTED TO REAPPLY FOR A US VISA AFTER PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID IN YESTERDAY'S "IRISH TIMES" THAT HE WAS PREPARING TO REVIEW POLICY ON DENYING MR. ADAMS A VISA (ARTICLES FAXED TO EUR/NE ON DECEMBER 22). MR. ADAMS SAID YESTERDAY: "THE POLICY OF CENSORSHIP, BY VISA DENIAL, OF SINN FEIN MEMBERS HAS BEEN A MAIN POLICY PLANK OF SUCCESSIVE US ADMINISTRATIONS IN THEIR PARTISAN SUPPORT FOR BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY IN IRELAND.

"THIS, I AM NOW INFORMED, IS UNDER REVIEW. I WILL BE TESTING THE PRECISE MEANING OF THAT IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON THE BACK OF AN APPROPRIATE INVITATION TO SPEAK IN THE UNITED STATES. IRISH-AMERICAN SUPPORTERS OF FREEDOM, JUSTICE AND PEACE IN IRELAND ARE TO BE CONGRATULATED FOR FOCUSING THE US ADMINISTRATION'S ATTENTION ON THE CONFLICT IN IRELAND."
END TEXT.

4. I HAVE ALSO BEEN HEARING FROM CONTACTS, WHO CITE NEW YORK IRISH-AMERICANS AS THEIR SOURCES, THAT ADAMS PLANS TO APPLY FOR A VISA, POSSIBLY IN DUBLIN, IN THE VERY NEAR

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

FUTURE, POSSIBLY ON DECEMBER 29.

5. ALL OF THIS SUGGESTS THAT EVENTS ARE MOVING FASTER THAN EVEN I ANTICIPATED IN REF. A, MY REPORTING ON MY CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS YESTERDAY. AS A RESULT, I AM INCREASINGLY CONVINCED THAT NOW, DURING THIS CHRISTMAS TIME OF PEACE, WE SHOULD REMOVE OUR BLINDERS, STEP AWAY FROM THE ACCEPTED WISDOM OF HOW TO DEAL WITH GERRY ADAMS AND TAKE A MORE CREATIVE, PRO-ACTIVE APPROACH. HE IS ALREADY TALKING "SECRETLY" WITH THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS. IN ADDITION PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS AND NOW JOHN HUME HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THAT THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT ADAMS IS MAKING A GENUINE GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO BRING ALL SIDES OF THE IRA TOGETHER TO FORM A CONSENSUS FOR PEACE. (THE DELAY IN ACCEPTING THE JOINT DECLARATION IS NOT TACTICAL ON ADAMS PART BUT RATHER DEMONSTRATES THE DIFFICULTY OF BRINGING ALL THE DISPARATE ASPECTS OF THE EQUATION TOGETHER.) THEY ALSO AGREE THAT THE PEACE PROCESS CAN BE ENHANCED BY ADAMS BEING EXPOSED TO PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. AND IRISH-AMERICANS TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE AND WORK FOR REAL PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

6. AS I HAVE ARGUED BEFORE, I BELIEVE IT IS SIMPLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO CONTINUE TO KEEP ADAMS OUT OF THE U.S. INSTEAD, WE SHOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT MAKING IT CLEAR THAT A WAIVER WILL BE GRANTED BECAUSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF THAT THIS WILL FURTHER THE PEACE PROCESS. THIS WOULD PLACE THE ONUS SQUARELY ON ADAMS TO DELIVER PEACE.

7. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND WE SHOULD SEIZE THIS RARE OPPORTUNITY TO CREATIVELY MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FURTHER BY PLACING THE OBLIGATION ON GERRY ADAMS AND THE IRA TO BRING PEACE AT THIS TIMELY, SEASONAL MOMENT. PLEASE SEND YOUR RESPONSE NIACT IMMEDIATE AS THE EMBASSY'S COMMUNICATION'S UNIT WILL BE CLOSED UNTIL DECEMBER 29.

SMITH

BT

#7396

NNNN

<MSGID> M0797277

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: FILE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.23)
KBM 4/11/2023

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 041527Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4265
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1694
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 000025

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFFT FROM
AMBASSADOR SMITH

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: SENATOR KENNEDY'S AND MY DECEMBER 30 MEETING
WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS

REF: (A) LONDON 22924
(B) BELFAST 00268
(C) DUBLIN 07365

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SENATOR KENNEDY AND I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS ON DECEMBER 30. HE SAID THAT:
 - HE WAS NOT/NOT DISCOURAGED BY SINN FEIN/IRA COMMENTARY FOLLOWING THE DECEMBER 15 JOINT DECLARATION. IT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE UNTIL THE END OF JANUARY FOR THEM TO CONTACT ALL THEIR "CELLS" AND TO BUILD THE NECESSARY CONSENSUS.
 - ADAMS HIMSELF IS THE PRODUCT OF AN IRA SPLIT AND WILL THEREFORE BE CAREFUL TO AVOID CAUSING ANOTHER.
 - HE (REYNOLDS) WOULD BE WORRIED IF SINN FEIN/IRA RHETORIC WERE THE SAME AT THE END OF JANUARY.
 - SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS IS WORKING FOR PEACE AND SHOULD GET A U.S. VISA. REYNOLDS ADDED THAT JOHN HUME AGREED WITH HIM: ADAMS SHOULD NOW GET A VISA. REYNOLDS FEELS THAT IT SHOULD NOT CAUSE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR ANY DIFFICULTY.
 - ADAMS CAN EXPLAIN THE SITUATION TO IRISH-AMERICAN GROUPS AND GET THEIR UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR PEACE. SUCH AN ENDORSEMENT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
 - ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY LEADER JIM MOLYNEAUX HAD SENT HIM A LETTER (WHICH HE SHOWED US) IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION. IN THE LETTER, MOLYNEAUX SAID THAT HE HAD SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH THE DECLARATION BUT THAT, IF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HELD FIRM, THEY COULD WIN.
 - MAJOR HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE MASSIVE SUPPORT THE JOINT DECLARATION HAD RECEIVED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

WAS DELIGHTED BY HIS UPSWING IN THE POLLS AS A RESULT.

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN ENORMOUSLY HELPFUL; ITS TIMING WAS PERFECT.

-- DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY LEADER IAN PAISLEY HAS BEEN MARGINALIZED FOR THE TIME BEING.

-- DESPITE THAT 40 PERCENT OF MI5 IS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THE BRITISH DO NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE. MAJOR NEEDS TO BE TOLD HOW THE IRA WORKS. HE HAD NEVER BEEN TO THE NORTH UNTIL THIS LAST TRIP.

-- (IN RESPONSE TO THE SENATOR'S QUESTION), HE (REYNOLDS) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY INTELLIGENCE ON NORTHERN IRELAND PROVIDED BY THE USG. THEREFORE, THE IRISH HAD TO USE THEIR OWN.

-- HE (REYNOLDS) HAD TOLD MAJOR THAT NORTHERN POLICEMEN WHO VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.

(REYNOLDS WAS QUITE EMPHATIC ABOUT THIS.) "YOU CAN'T TALK ABOUT PEACE AND THEN HAVE POLICEMEN KILLING CIVILIANS."

-- THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE BUT DOES NOT WANT TO INTERFERE.

-- ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION HAVE NEVER BEEN A PROBLEM SINCE THEIR INTRODUCTION IN 1937 AND THEY ARE NOT/NOT ONE NOW. SMITH

BT

#0025

NNNN

<MSGID> M0809779

E
X
D
I
S

E
X
D
I
S

E
X
D
I
S

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: FILE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(2.24)
KBH 4/11/2023

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 221833Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4218

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 007366

NODIS

PLS PASS URGENTLY TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NANCY SODERBERG
FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFPT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, CVIS, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS RECOMMENDS ISSUANCE OF
A VISA TO SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER ALBERT REYNOLDS ON DECEMBER
22 TO DISCUSS NORTHERN IRELAND IN LIGHT OF THE DECEMBER 15
JOINT DECLARATION. HE SAID THAT:

-- IT WOULD BE FINE WITH HIM IF SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY
ADAMS RECEIVED A VISA, BUT THAT WAS UP TO THE U.S.

-- A VISA SHOULD BE GIVEN ON THE BASIS OF BEING HELPFUL TO
THE PEACE PROCESS.

-- ADAMS COULD BRING THE IRISH-AMERICAN COMMUNITY WITH HIM.
IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE PEACE PROCESS TO HAVE ALL
AMERICANS BEHIND THE JOINT DECLARATION.

-- ADAMS IS TRYING HARD AND IS BEING VERY SUPPORTIVE OF THE
PEACE PROCESS.

-- BOTH MARTIN MCGUINNESS AND HE ARE QUITE CONSCIOUS OF THE
DANGER OF A SPLIT IN SINN FEIN/IRA AND SO ARE BEING CAREFUL
TO TOUCH ALL BASES IN THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS.

-- THE SINN FEIN/IRA CONSULTATION PROCESS WILL PROBABLY
LAST UNTIL THE END OF JANUARY OR THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY.

-- ADAMS WILL ENGAGE IN SOME POSTURING FOR POLITICAL
REASONS, BUT THIS IS NOTHING TO BE ALARMED ABOUT.

-- JOHN MAJOR AND THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT/NOT BE A PROBLEM
IN REGARD TO A VISA FOR ADAMS. ALL WANT PEACE. HE
(REYNOLDS) WOULD DO THE SAME FOR MAJOR IF CIRCUMSTANCES
WERE REVERSED.

-- IRA PRISONERS WANT PEACE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE HEAD
OF THEIR PRISONERS' GROUP AT THE MAZE PRISON.

-- RATHER THAN "AMNESTY," THE PHRASE "TERM REDUCTIONS" WILL
BE USED IN REGARD TO EARLY RELEASE OF PRISONERS FOLLOWING
PEACE.

-- ONE REASON FOR THE CONTINUATION OF SINN FEIN/IRA

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

NODIS

NODIS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

CONSULTATIONS AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF JANUARY IS THEIR DESIRE TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS IN REGARD TO SECTION 31 OF THE BROADCASTING ACT, WHICH MUST BE RENEWED OR LAPSE ON JANUARY 19.

-- HE (REYNOLDS) HAS ALWAYS BEEN AGAINST SECTION 31; THE GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY NOT/NOT RENEW IT.

-- IT WOULD BE NICE IF PRESIDENT CLINTON COULD VISIT IRELAND NEXT JUNE, OR EVEN IN JANUARY, IF, BY CHANCE, PEACE HAS ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE (REYNOLDS) UNDERSTANDS THAT IT MIGHT BE EASIER FOR THE PRESIDENT TO COME IN 1995.

-- IT WOULD BE BETTER, ON THE OTHER HAND, IF SPEAKER FOLEY AND OTHER INTERESTED AMERICANS POSTPONED POSSIBLE VISITS UNTIL AFTER PEACE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.

-- IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE IRA WILL NOT AGREE TO A DEMAND THAT THEY SURRENDER ALL THEIR WEAPONS -- THEY HAVE NEVER DONE SO IN IRISH HISTORY.

-- OBVIOUSLY, THEY WILL HAVE TO GIVE UP SEMTEX AND HEAVY WEAPONS.

COMMENT

3. CLEARLY, THE PERCEPTION HERE IS THAT A VISA FOR ADAMS WOULD HELP THE PEACE PROCESS BY DEMONSTRATING THAT HIS MORE RESPONSIBLE AND FORTHCOMING POSITION HAS REAPED BENEFITS. A VISA WOULD ALSO REMOVE THIS QUESTION FROM THE IRISH-AMERICAN AGENDA, WHICH, IN TURN, WOULD, HOPEFULLY, LEAD TO A UNANIMOUS, PUBLIC CHORUS OF IRISH-AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS, SOMETHING THAT THE NATIONALISTS, FOR VARIOUS REASONS, FEEL IS IMPORTANT. THE BRITISH HAVE BEEN TALKING WITH THE IRA, AND THE IRISH HAVE DONE SO INDIRECTLY. THEY WILL, ACCORDING TO REYNOLDS, LIFT THE BROADCASTING BAN ON SINN FEIN NEXT MONTH. THUS, IT NOW APPEARS TO BE THE RIGHT TIME TO PREPARE THE GROUNDWORK TO ALLOW US PROMPTLY TO GIVE ADAMS A VISA WHEN HE REAPPLIES. THIS GESTURE WOULD DEFINITELY HELP THE PROCESS OF FINDING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. SHOULD ADAMS, AS IS POSSIBLE, REQUEST A VISA IN DUBLIN, WE WOULD RECOMMEND A WAIVER OF HIS INELIGIBILITY AND AUTHORIZATION TO ISSUE HIM ONE IMMEDIATELY. (FYI: WE HAD HOPED TO DISCUSS THIS RECOMMENDATION WITH JOHN HUME BUT WERE UNABLE TO REACH HIM. HE TOLD ME TWO WEEKS AGO THAT GIVING ADAMS A VISA WOULD

HAVE, AT THAT MOMENT, "MADE HIM TOO IMPORTANT.")

4. IT WOULD SEEM THAT DENYING ADAMS A VISA AT THIS TIME WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THE PRESIDENT IS PERCEIVED TO BE DOING EVERYTHING TO GET THE PEACE PROCESS MOVING. IF HE MOVES QUICKLY ON THE VISA ISSUE, IT WOULD BE A POSITIVE STEP SINCE IT WOULD HELP SUSTAIN THIS MOMENTUM. SMITH

BT

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

#7366

NNNN

<MSGID> M0794459

JUN 1963

NOV 1963

NOV 1963

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 05
PRT: SODERBERG
SIT: FILE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.25)
KBM 4/11/2023

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 221724Z DEC 93

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4215
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1681
RUSNSTB/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 007365
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFFT FROM
AMBASSADOR SMITH
LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US
SUBJECT: DFA ON NORTHERN IRELAND
REF: (A) LONDON 22525
(B) DUBLIN 07306

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. SEAN O'HUIGINN, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, SAYS THAT THE BEST THING AMERICANS, ESPECIALLY IRISH-AMERICANS, CAN DO NOW IS PUBLICLY TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION AND THE PEACE PROCESS. THE IRISH WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AT ANY TIME; HOWEVER, THEY APPEAR NOT/NOT TO WANT VISITS BY OTHER OUTSIDERS AT THIS TIME. NEITHER GOVERNMENT WANTS A SPECIAL ENVOY NOW, AND IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER SINN FEIN/IRA HAS RENOUNCED VIOLENCE TO GIVE GERRY ADAMS A VISA. SINN FEIN'S CONSULTATION PROCESS WILL LIKELY BE LENGTHY; MEANWHILE, THE IRISH WILL TALK WITH THE BRITISH ABOUT THE TALKS PROCESS IN JANUARY. DEALING WITH THE ISSUES OF AN AMNESTY AND DISARMING THE IRA ARE "DOWN THE ROAD" AT THE MOMENT. END SUMMARY.

MEETING WITH SEAN O'HUIGINN

3. I MET WITH SEAN O'HUIGINN, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, ON DECEMBER 21 TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN THE WAKE OF THE PROMULGATION OF THE DECEMBER 15 JOINT DECLARATION. HE WAS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC.

THE U.S. ROLE

4. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION ABOUT WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD BE DOING, O'HUIGINN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND SAID THAT EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION FROM PROMINENT AMERICANS, ESPECIALLY IRISH-AMERICANS, WOULD BE JUST RIGHT AT THIS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

POINT. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE WORLD BE SEEN TO REGARD THE JOINT DECLARATION AS "HONORABLE." THE MESSAGE SHOULD CONSISTENTLY BE THAT THE DECLARATION IS USEFUL IN FACILITATING A SWITCH TO THE POLITICAL MODE. IT IS IMPERATIVE TO AVOID DISTRACTIONS AND THE CREATION OF THE IMPRESSION THAT ALTERNATIVES, E.G., MEDIATION BY OUTSIDERS, EXIST.

5. POSITIVE AMERICAN INTEREST, O'HUIGINN STRESSED, IS MOST HELPFUL. IN FACT, HE SAID, PRESIDENT CLINTON IS THE REASON THAT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR WENT AS FAR AS HE DID. VISITS?

6. ALTHOUGH O'HUIGINN SAID THAT A VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT OR SPEAKER FOLEY WOULD BE WELCOME AT ANY TIME, HE IMPLIED THAT, EXCEPT FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE IRISH WOULD PREFER THAT OTHERS LEAVE THE PEACE PROCESS TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS FOR THE TIME BEING. O'HUIGINN STRESSED THAT THE IRISH WANT A VISIT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. O'HUIGINN ADDED THAT PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS HAD WRITTEN THE PRESIDENT TO INVITE HIM TO VISIT IRELAND.

A SPECIAL ENVOY?

7. O'HUIGINN CONTINUED THAT NEITHER GOVERNMENT SAW ANY NEED FOR A SPECIAL ENVOY AT THIS TIME. DOWN THE ROAD A WAYS, DEPENDING ON HOW THINGS WENT, AN ENVOY MIGHT BECOME A GOOD IDEA, BUT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WANTED TO RUN WITH THEIR BILATERAL INITIATIVE AND SEE THE RESULTS BEFORE CONSIDERING ANYTHING ELSE.

A VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS?

8. O'HUIGINN WAS INITIALLY EVASIVE WHEN I ASKED HIM ABOUT A VISA FOR SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS, SAYING THAT IT WAS A MATTER FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. WHEN I PRESSED HIM, HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO "MAXIMIZE REWARDS," IMPLYING THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER SINN FEIN/IRA HAD RENOUNCED VIOLENCE TO GIVE ADAMS A VISA. "PEACE WOULD CHANGE EVERYTHING."

SINN FEIN/THE IRA

9. O'HUIGINN SAID THAT THE SINN FEIN/IRA WAS CLAIMING THAT THE JOINT DECLARATION HAD LEFT THE "UNIONIST VETO" INTACT. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, MAINTAINS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PROCEDURES AND THE REALITY OF THE UNIONIST POSITION: ONE MILLION OF THEM LIVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND CANNOT BE IGNORED. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO FORCE A SETTLEMENT ON THEM. TO REJECT THE CONCEPT OF UNITY BY CONSENT WOULD BE TO REJECT THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY. A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO BRING ALONG THE INHABITANTS OF THE CATHOLIC GHETTOS IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 DUBLIN 007365

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFFT FROM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

AMBASSADOR SMITH

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: DFA ON NORTHERN IRELAND

BELFAST AND DERRY, WHERE FEELINGS RUN HIGH AND AN ISOLATIONIST MENTALITY EXISTS. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS TOLD SINN FEIN/IRA THAT MORE FIGHTING WILL SIMPLY DELAY A UNITED IRELAND.

THE JOINT DECLARATION

10. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, O'HUIGINN CONTINUED, BELIEVES THAT THE DECEMBER 15 JOINT DECLARATION IS A REASONABLE EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE BRITISH. THE IRISH WOULD HAVE BROUGHT THE BRITISH EVEN FURTHER IF IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE TO DO SO. THE DOCUMENT FULLY RECOGNIZES IRISH SELF-DETERMINATION, WITH THE ONE CONDITION OF CONSENSUS. IT IS NECESSARY AT ALL COSTS TO AVOID "DUPLICATION," I.E., CREATING THE SAME SITUATION IN A UNITED IRELAND AS EXISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND: AN ALIENATED MINORITY. THE JOINT DECLARATION IS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF A SOLUTION.

NEXT STEPS

11. O'HUIGINN BELIEVES THAT THE SINN FEIN/IRA CONSULTATION PROCESS WILL BE LENGTHY, EXTENDING OVER WEEKS AND MAYBE EVEN OVER MONTHS. ON THE ONE HAND, ADEQUATE CONSULTATION IS IMPORTANT SINCE IT LESSENS CHANCES OF A SPLIT IN THE IRA. IN THAT REGARD, IT WOULD BE IN NOBODY'S INTEREST IF YOUNG HOTHEDS REPLACED GERRY ADAMS AND THE REST OF ITS PRESENT LEADERSHIP. ON THE OTHER HAND, LONG CONSULTATIONS ARE FRAUGHT WITH PERIL. ONE OR TWO INCIDENTS COULD PROVOKE PROTESTANT PARA-MILITARY RETALIATION OR UNIONIST REJECTION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION.

12. IF SINN FEIN/IRA IN EFFECT REJECTS THE JOINT DECLARATION, O'HUIGINN CONTINUED, THEY WILL HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY ARE INCAPABLE OF RELATING TO THE WIDER IRISH COMMUNITY AND WILL BE ISOLATING THEMSELVES. THEY WILL SHOW THAT THEY ARE NOT SERIOUS AND THAT THEY WANT TO CONTINUE THE VIOLENCE. SO FAR, THEY HAVE AVOIDED PURELY SECTARIAN WARFARE, AND SO, HOPEFULLY, WILL OPT FOR PEACE.

THE TALKS

13. BOTH GOVERNMENTS, O'HUIGINN NOTED, WANT TO MAKE A RENEWAL OF THE TALKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND CENTER-STAGE. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT HOSTILE TO THE BILATERALS BEING CONDUCTED BY BRITISH JUNIOR MINISTER MICHAEL ANCRAM BUT CONSIDERS THEM A FAILURE. CONCENTRATING ON TRIVIA, THEY AMOUNT TO NOTHING MORE THAN A "TEA PARTY." ANCRAM IS RAPIDLY LOSING CREDIBILITY. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A TABLE AT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

WHICH ALL CAN SIT WITHOUT LOSS OF DIGNITY AND AT WHICH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CAN "BREAK SOME HEADS," IF NEED BE, TO SECURE A SETTLEMENT. THE IRISH WILL TALK WITH THE BRITISH IN JANUARY ABOUT RESTARTING THE TALKS PROCESS.

14. O'HUIGINN OBSERVED THAT THE IRISH ARE WILLING TO USE THE 3-STRAND FORMAT BUT BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO "GO DEEPER" THAN BEFORE. FOR INSTANCE, "PLAUSIBLE" NORTH/SOUTH INSTITUTIONS HAVE TO BE CREATED UNDER STRAND 2 IF A SETTLEMENT IS TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NATIONALISTS. THEY WOULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY INTERNAL STRUCTURES ALONG THE LINES OF WHAT THE UNIONISTS WANT. BUT, IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE PEACE IF THE TALKS ARE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS. THE IRISH DO NOT/NOT VIEW THE PEACE AND TALKS PROCESSES AS RIVALS; THEY ARE SIMPLY REALISTIC.

15. IF SINN FEIN/IRA REJECTS THE PEACE PROCESS, O'HUIGINN COMMENTED, THERE IS NOT MUCH MORE THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CAN DO. THEY WOULD PROBABLY DECIDE TO TALK WITH WHOEVER IS WILLING TO LISTEN.

THE FORUM

16. THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION, O'HUIGINN REITERATED, WAS INCLUDED IN THE JOINT DECLARATION AS AN INCENTIVE TO SINN FEIN/IRA TO CONTINUE THE PEACE PROCESS. THE FORUM IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE SINN FEIN WITH AN IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PLATFORM BOTH TO OCCUPY IT AND TO EDUCATE IT. IT WILL GIVE SINN FEIN A CHANCE TO "LEARN HOW THE IRISH THINK."

JOHN HUME

17. O'HUIGINN SAID THAT SOCIAL AND DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY LEADER JOHN HUME STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE JOINT DECLARATION. HE IS WORRIED ABOUT BEING ECLIPSED POLITICALLY IF THINGS GO WRONG, BUT HE WILL AT LEAST BE ABLE TO SAY THAT HE TRIED.

HE BELIEVES THAT THE DECLARATION BASICALLY REFLECTS SINN FEIN'S AGENDA. HUME HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ADAMS AND
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 DUBLIN 007365
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFFT FROM
AMBASSADOR SMITH

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: DFA ON NORTHERN IRELAND
WITH MARTIN MCGUINNESS.

AN AMNESTY?

18. O'HUIGINN SAID THAT AN AMNESTY IS "DOWN THE ROAD," BUT SOMETHING WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO BE DONE. THE WORD ITSELF, HE CAUTIONED, IS SOMEWHAT MISLEADING, SINCE WHAT EVENTUALLY HAPPENS IN THIS REGARD MAY HAVE A DIFFERENT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

LABEL. THE BRITISH ARE LIKELY TO INSIST THAT ANY AMNESTY BE IMPLEMENTED IN PIECEMEAL FASHION UNDER COVER OF A WELTER OF REGULATIONS. THE REASON FOR THIS INSISTENCE IS THE POLITICAL DANGER FACING PRIME MINISTER MAJOR, WHO MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO ALIENATE TORY BACK-BENCHERS, "TIGERS IN LONG GRASS," STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF "LAW AND ORDER." (MAJOR MAY ALSO BE IN TROUBLE IN JUNE IF THE TORIES DO BADLY IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS.) IT IS NOT SURPRISING, THEREFORE, THAT THE BRITISH HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT STATEMENTS ABOUT AN EVENTUAL AMNESTY BY VARIOUS IRISH POLITICIANS OVER THE WEEKEND. THE PRESENCE OF GENUINE PSYCHOPATHS AMONG PRISONERS CANDIDATES FOR AN AMNESTY IS ANOTHER PROBLEM. WHATEVER IS DONE, THE CREDIBILITY OF SENTENCING MUST BE MAINTAINED, OR IRA RECRUITMENT WILL SOAR.

DISARMING THE IRA

19. THIS IS ANOTHER STEP, O'HUIGINN SAID, WHICH IS "DOWN THE ROAD." IT IS NECESSARY, HOWEVER, IF PEACE IS TO ENDURE. THE TIMING AND MANNER DEPEND ON "THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE." AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IS THE ATTITUDE OF "GHETTO CATHOLICS" IN THE NORTH, WHO HAVE COME TO DEPEND ON THE IRA FOR PROTECTION AGAINST FROM PROTESTANT INCURSIONS. IT MAY EVEN BE POSSIBLE DISCREETLY TO FUSE THE TWO ISSUES OF AN AMNESTY AND GUNS IN SOME FORM OF STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS.

MAYHEW
20. O'HUIGINN SAID THAT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW HAD BEEN SO DAMAGED BY HIS HANDLING OF THE ISSUE OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONTACT WITH THE IRA THAT HE HAD LITTLE CREDIBILITY. "IRAQ-GATE" MIGHT ALSO BECOME A FACTOR IN HIS FATE. MAYHEW HAD SEEMED OUT OF SORTS LATELY. IT MIGHT JUST BE THAT HE WAS JEALOUS OF MAJOR'S HIGHER PROFILE ROLE ON NORTHERN IRELAND; BUT, OTHER FACTORS MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE. ALTHOUGH MAYHEW IS QUICKER ON HIS FEET, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE PETER BROOKE WAS MORE THOUGHTFUL. MAYHEW HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN "INTEGRATING" THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND THEREFORE DOES NOT/HAVE A "COHERENT" VIEW OF IT. SMITH
BT

#7365

NNNN

<MSGID> M0794111

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (2.24)
KRM 4/11/2023

October 21, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE
SANDY BERGER
BRUCE LINDSEY

FROM: NANCY SODERBERG

SUBJECT: Jean Smith's Role

Attached are two cables, one from Jean Smith objecting to the State Department having limited the scope of her recent visit to Northern Ireland and a draft cable to Jean defining her role.

Jean sees her role as one that includes an active role in Northern Ireland, in her view, in order to keep the President informed. She states that "part of my mandate is to provide the President with my best advice on the situation [in Northern Ireland] and on how best the United States might help the international efforts to promote peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. . . . President Clinton has made it clear that he expects me to advise him on whether or not to send a peace envoy or a fact-finding mission to Northern Ireland."

The attached guidelines proposed by State will probably annoy Jean. To me, they seem about right, perhaps a bit narrow. It suggests limiting visits to the North "to approximately one every six months." I might say "one or two" every six months to give her some flexibility. In discussing the issue with State, they feel pretty strongly about keeping it to "approximately one" and I don't think we should fight it.

You should know that Jean attended a trial of an individual accused of attempted murder without the authorization of State. That action undercut her effort to push for a more independent role.

She will probably want a more formal purpose relating to Northern Ireland in defining her role as a policy advisor. As currently defined in the draft cable, her policy role is limited to the Republic and keeping the President and the State Department fully informed of the views of leaders and public opinion in the Republic of Ireland on the issues of Northern Ireland.

10/22 [Signature]
This arose from
telco from Jarroff
looking for white
house guidance on
how to handle Smith.
I think we should tell
State it is their call
(whatever modification
we suggest)
This does
not become
blw JKS and
Doc Pres.
[Signature]

Given Jean's specific reference to the envoy and Northern Ireland conflict, it might help smooth things a bit if we added to the end of that paragraph, "including the advisability of a U.S. Special Representative to Northern Ireland and other initiatives to promote peace in Northern Ireland." State seemed fine on this in my informal discussions.

I've discussed Jean's expectations with Senator Kennedy's office and they support the general outlines of State's proposal.

If you agree, I'll suggest this slight modification to State and give White House approval to the guidelines.

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

DRAFT~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/NE:JFTEFFT/EUR:MAPETERS
 10/08/93 79626 SEEUR 1766
 THE SECRETARY

P:PTARNOFF
 S/S:

EUR:SAOXMAN

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (2.27)

KBH 4/11/2023

IMMEDIATE

DUBLIN

NODIS
 FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN
 - NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: DUBLIN 5293

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEAR JEAN,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT TELEGRAM ON YOUR ROLE IN
 PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
 IN LIGHT OF YOUR COMMENTS, WE HAVE REVIEWED OUR
 UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE ROLE OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN IN
 CONNECTION WITH NORTHERN IRELAND, AS WELL AS PAST
 PRACTICES.

3. FIRST, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE DECISION TO ASK
 YOU NOT TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE NORTH DURING
 YOUR LAST VISIT REFLECTED OUR BEST JUDGEMENT OF WHAT WOULD
 BE APPROPRIATE IN THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE
 APPRECIATED YOUR COOPERATION IN ADHERING TO THAT
 GUIDANCE. IF ASKED, HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE NOT HAVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**DRAFT**

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

AGREED TO YOUR ATTENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PEOPLE ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTED MURDER FOR ATTACKING AN ARMY PATROL. //!

4. WITH REGARD TO FUTURE VISITS, I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD LIMIT THEM TO APPROXIMATELY ONE EVERY SIX MONTHS. SINCE 1982 YOUR PREDECESSORS VISITED ONCE OR TWICE PER YEAR, AND THESE WERE PRIVATE VISITS. THEY WERE ARRANGED BY THE AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL IN BELFAST, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. THESE PRIVATE VISITS BY YOUR PREDECESSORS INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH A RANGE OF SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FIGURES, AS WELL AS VISITS TO PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI). THESE VISITS PROVIDED A MEANS OF FAMILIARIZING OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN WITH NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUES AND ENHANCED THE AMBASSADOR'S ABILITY TO WORK WITH SENIOR REPUBLIC OF IRELAND OFFICIALS. //

5. A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN FREQUENCY OF SUCH VISITS, PARTICULARLY BY AN AMBASSADOR AS VISIBLE AS YOURSELF, WOULD SEND A CONFUSING SIGNAL, IN LIGHT OF THE EFFORTS OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH TO RESTART THE TALKS, AND THE CURRENT VIEW OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BECOME A DIRECT PARTICIPANT EITHER BY SENDING A SPECIAL ENVOY OR SOME OTHER MEANS. CLEARLY WE NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ALL PARTIES, BUT WE CAN DO THAT THROUGH OUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN BELFAST AND OUR EMBASSY IN LONDON AS WELL AS OUR EMBASSY IN DUBLIN. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, IN PARTICULAR, REMAINS SENSITIVE TO THE TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF VISITS TO NORTHERN IRELAND BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN.

6. WITH RESPECT TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE, YOU ARE, OF COURSE, A KEY POLICY ADVISOR AND WE GREATLY VALUE YOUR:

-- KEEPING THE PRESIDENT AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT FULLY INFORMED OF THE VIEWS OF LEADERS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ON THE ISSUES OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- ENCOURAGING THE GOI TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT.

-- ENGAGING AND EXPLAINING TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND USG VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- TAKING THE LEAD IN FOLLOWING IFI ACTIVITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

-- COORDINATING WITH EMBASSY LONDON SO AS TO PRESENT A COHERENT PICTURE TO FOREIGN INTERLOCUTORS OF USG VIEWS ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE.

7. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMITMENT TO OUR GOAL OF RESOLVING THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, AND I WILL CONTINUE TO WELCOME YOUR INSIGHTS AND VIEWS ON IT. WITH BEST REGARDS.YY

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ SSN: 8750 MSGID: M0616787

OAASZYUW RUEHCAA8750 2650155-SSSS--RHEHNSC.

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 220156Z SEP 93 ZFF5

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: ****

INFO: NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE 8765

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 288750

NODIS

FOLLOWING DUBLIN 05293 DATED 21 SEP 93 SENT ACTION SECSTATE
BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE

~~SECRET~~ DUBLIN 05293

NODIS

PASS THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - TONY LAKE
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY
SMITH

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN
IRELAND1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON MARCH 17, IN ANNOUNCING HIS INTENTION TO APPOINT ME AS AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND, THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS TO PROMOTE THE NECESSARY DIALOGUE TO BRING ABOUT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HE ALSO SAID HE WOULD STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SITUATION IN IRELAND. CLEARLY THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF MY MANDATE IS TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH MY BEST ADVICE ON THE SITUATION HERE AND ON HOW BEST THE UNITED STATES MIGHT HELP THE VITAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

3. IN THIS REGARD I HAVE ALREADY TRAVELED TWICE TO NORTHERN IRELAND; VISITED THE EMBASSY IN LONDON FOR TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR SEITZ AND NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MAYHEW (WHO INCIDENTALLY ENCOURAGED ME TO VISIT NORTHERN

9/21/93 Nancy - Joda -
Read your
recommendation on
how to ~~handle~~
~~handle~~ handle
this.
[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262011-0355-F (2.28)
KBH 4/11/2023

IRELAND, BUT TO BE "EVENHANDED" IN MEETING WITH BOTH COMMUNITIES); ATTENDED A TWO DAY SEMINAR IN CAMBRIDGE ON NORTHERN IRELAND SPONSORED BY THE BRITISH-IRISH ASSOCIATION; AND HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF VISITORS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND HERE AT THE EMBASSY AND MY RESIDENCE. THE COMMON THREAD RUNNING THROUGHOUT THESE MANY AND VARIED CONTACTS IS THE BURNING DESIRE OF EVERYONE FROM POLITICIANS TO SOCIAL WORKERS, CLERICS TO BUSINESSMEN, ARTISTS TO CIVIL SERVANTS TO FIND PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. JUST AS EMOTIVE IS THE STRONGLY EXPRESSED DESIRE TO HAVE THE UNITED STATES PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE DIALOGUE WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO RECONCILIATION.

4. DURING MY VISIT TO BELFAST, THE CONSUL GENERAL ORGANIZED A MEETING OF WOMEN FROM BOTH COMMUNITIES PROMINENT IN A VARIETY OF FIELDS, INCLUDING BUSINESS, ACADEMIA AND COMMUNITY WORK. FOR MOST OF THEM IT WAS THE FIRST OCCASION THEY HAD EVER HAD TO MEET WOMEN ENGAGED IN SIMILAR WORK IN NEIGHBORING COMMUNITIES. THEIR HEARTFELT GRATITUDE FOR OUR BRINGING THEM TOGETHER WAS GENUINE AND DEMONSTRATES THE VALUE OF OUR ROLE IN PROMOTING DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. THEY URGED ME TO RETURN OFTEN AND CONTINUE TO REACH OUT TO BOTH COMMUNITIES. ONE OF THEM, JANE MORRICE, HEAD OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN BELFAST, COMMENTED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE LUNCH THAT IT HAD BEEN THE BEST POLITICAL DISCUSSION SHE HAD PARTICIPATED IN IN THIRTY YEARS. FOLLOWING ANOTHER MEETING, IAN PAISLEY, JUNIOR, SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN GENUINELY WORTHWHILE TO TALK WITH ME GIVEN MY INTEREST IN THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT I WOULD RETURN OFTEN. FINALLY, THE BELFAST TELEGRAPH, A MODERATE UNIONIST NEWSPAPER WITH THE LARGEST CIRCULATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WELCOMED MY VISIT IN AN EDITORIAL SEPTEMBER 15 AND POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH MY OFFICIAL REMIT EXTENDS ONLY TO THE BORDER, I HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CITING HOW INTERTWINED ARE THE POLITICS AND ECONOMY OF THE TWO PARTS OF THE ISLAND AND THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND WHICH I AM "ENTITLED TO EXAMINE".

5. GIVEN THIS REACTION TO MY VISITS, I FIND THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW ME TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AS CONVEYED TO ME IN LONDON BY AMBASSADOR SEITZ AND BY TELEPHONE WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY OXMAN DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTS ME TO ADVISE HIM ON WHETHER OR NOT TO SEND A PEACE ENVOY OR A FACT-FINDING MISSION TO NORTHERN IRELAND. ONE CAN NOT DO

THIS UNLESS, AND I QUOTE FROM THE AFOREMENTIONED BELFAST TELEGRAPH EDITORIAL, ONE GETS "AS ROUNDED A PICTURE OF THE SITUATION AS POSSIBLE. THAT SHOULD INCLUDE LOCAL POLITICIANS, ESPECIALLY UNIONISTS WHOSE CASE HAS OFTEN GONE BY DEFAULT, PARTICULARLY IN AMERICA." VAGUE REFERENCES TO "SENSITIVE MOMENTS" AND THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DO NOT OUTWEIGH MY MANDATE FROM THE PRESIDENT NOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN ~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 288750

NODIS

NORTHERN IRELAND. PERHAPS THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY TO REMIND THE EUROPEAN BUREAU AND THE EMBASSY IN LONDON OF THIS REALITY. REGARDS.

SMITH UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

BT

#8750

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG

SIT: FILE HOLL SUM SUM2 WALKER WHSR_SPECIAL

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 4665 MSGID: M0681917

OAACZYUW RUEHCAA4665 2962141-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 232132Z OCT 93 ZFF5

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: ****

INFO: USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (2.29)

KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE **324665** TOSEC 170387

NODIS

CORRECTED COPY (ADDED CAPTION)

FOLLOWING SECSTATE **324665** DTD 23OCT93 SENT ACTION

DUBLIN REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMAIOTN 23OCT93

QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE **324665**

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN

- NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: DUBLIN 5293

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEAR JEAN, —

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT TELEGRAM ON YOUR ROLE IN
FROMTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
IN LIGHT OF YOUR COMMENTS, WE HAVE REVIEWED OUR
UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE ROLE OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN IN
CONNECTION WITH NORTHERN IRELAND, AS WELL AS PAST
PRACTICES.

3. FIRST, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE DECISION TO ASK
YOU NOT TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE NORTH DURING
YOUR LAST VISIT REFLECTED OUR BEST JUDGEMENT OF WHAT WOULD
BE APPROPRIATE IN THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE

APPRECIATED YOUR COOPERATION IN ADHERING TO THAT GUIDANCE. IF ASKED, HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE NOT HAVE

AGREED TO YOUR ATTENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PEOPLE ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTED MURDER FOR ATTACKING AN ARMY PATROL.

4. WITH REGARD TO FUTURE VISITS, I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD LIMIT THEM TO APPROXIMATELY ONE EVERY SIX MONTHS. SINCE 1982 YOUR PREDECESSORS VISITED ONCE OR TWICE PER YEAR, AND THESE WERE PRIVATE VISITS. THEY WERE ARRANGED BY THE AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL IN BELFAST, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. THESE PRIVATE VISITS BY YOUR PREDECESSORS INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH A RANGE OF SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FIGURES. AS WELL AS VISITS TO PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI). THESE VISITS PROVIDED A MEANS OF FAMILIARIZING OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN WITH NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUES AND ENHANCED THE AMBASSADOR'S ABILITY TO WORK WITH SENIOR REPUBLIC OF IRELAND OFFICIALS.

5. A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN FREQUENCY OF SUCH VISITS, PARTICULARLY BY AN AMBASSADOR AS VISIBLE AS YOURSELF WOULD SEND A CONFUSING SIGNAL, IN LIGHT OF THE EFFORTS OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH TO RESTART THE TALKS, AND THE CURRENT VIEW OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BECOME A DIRECT PARTICIPANT EITHER BY SENDING A SPECIAL ENVOY OR SOME OTHER MEANS. CLEARLY WE NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ALL PARTIES, BUT WE CAN DO THAT THROUGH OUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN BELFAST AND OUR EMBASSY IN LONDON AS WELL AS OUR EMBASSY IN DUBLIN. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN PARTICULAR, REMAINS SENSITIVE TO THE TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF VISITS TO NORTHERN IRELAND BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN.

6. WITH RESPECT TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE. YOU ARE, OF COURSE, A KEY POLICY ADVISOR AND WE GREATLY VALUE YOUR:

-- KEEPING THE PRESIDENT AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT FULLY INFORMED OF THE VIEWS OF LEADERS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ON THE ISSUES OF NORTHERN IRELAND, INCLUDING ON THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND OTHER INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- ENCOURAGING THE GOI TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT.

-- ENGAGING AND EXPLAINING TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THE

REPUBLIC OF IRELAND USG VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- TAKING THE LEAD IN FOLLOWING IFI ACTIVITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND.

-- COORDINATING WITH EMBASSY LONDON SO AS TO PRESENT A COHERENT PICTURE TO FOREIGN INTERLOCUTORS OF USG VIEWS ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE.

7. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMITMENT TO OUR GOAL OF RESOLVING THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, AND I WILL CONTINUE TO WELCOME YOUR INSIGHTS AND VIEWS ON IT. WITH BEST REGARDS. WHARTON
UNQUOTE WHARTON

BT

#4665

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

SIT: NODIST WHSR_SPECIAL

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.30)
KBH 4/11/2023

October 21, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE
SANDY BERGER
BRUCE LINDSEY

FROM: NANCY SODERBERG

SUBJECT: Jean Smith's Role

Attached are two cables, one from Jean Smith objecting to the State Department having limited the scope of her recent visit to Northern Ireland and a draft cable to Jean defining her role.

Jean sees her role as one that includes an active role in Northern Ireland, in her view, in order to keep the President informed. She states that "part of my mandate is to provide the President with my best advice on the situation [in Northern Ireland] and on how best the United States might help the international efforts to promote peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. . . . President Clinton has made it clear that he expects me to advise him on whether or not to send a peace envoy or a fact-finding mission to Northern Ireland."

The attached guidelines proposed by State will probably annoy Jean. To me, they seem about right, perhaps a bit narrow. It suggests limiting visits to the North "to approximately one every six months." I might say "one or two" every six months to give her some flexibility. In discussing the issue with State, they feel pretty strongly about keeping it to "approximately one" and I don't think we should fight it.

You should know that Jean attended a trial of an individual accused of attempted murder without the authorization of State. That action undercut her effort to push for a more independent role.

She will probably want a more formal purpose relating to Northern Ireland in defining her role as a policy advisor. As currently defined in the draft cable, her policy role is limited to the Republic and keeping the President and the State Department fully informed of the views of leaders and public opinion in the Republic of Ireland on the issues of Northern Ireland.

10/22 [Signature]
This arose from
telco from Jarroff
looking for White
House guidance on
how to handle Smith.
I think we should tell
State it is their call
(whatever modification
we suggest)
This does
not become
blw JKS and
Doc Pra.
[Signature]

Given Jean's specific reference to the envoy and Northern Ireland conflict, it might help smooth things a bit if we added to the end of that paragraph, "including the advisability of a U.S. Special Representative to Northern Ireland and other initiatives to promote peace in Northern Ireland." State seemed fine on this in my informal discussions.

I've discussed Jean's expectations with Senator Kennedy's office and they support the general outlines of State's proposal.

If you agree, I'll suggest this slight modification to State and give White House approval to the guidelines.

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUTH _____ DRAFT _____
CLEAR 1 _____ 2 _____
3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____
6 _____ 7 _____ 8 _____

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/NE:JFTEFFT/EUR:MAPETERS
10/08/93 79626 SEEUR 1766
THE SECRETARY

P:PTARNOFF
S/S:

EUR:SAOXMAN

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.31)
KBH 4/11/2023**

IMMEDIATE DUBLIN

NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN
- NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: DUBLIN 5293

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEAR JEAN,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT TELEGRAM ON YOUR ROLE IN
PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
IN LIGHT OF YOUR COMMENTS, WE HAVE REVIEWED OUR
UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE ROLE OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN IN
CONNECTION WITH NORTHERN IRELAND, AS WELL AS PAST
PRACTICES.

3. FIRST, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE DECISION TO ASK
YOU NOT TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE NORTH DURING
YOUR LAST VISIT REFLECTED OUR BEST JUDGEMENT OF WHAT WOULD
BE APPROPRIATE IN THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE
APPRECIATED YOUR COOPERATION IN ADHERING TO THAT
GUIDANCE. IF ASKED, HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE NOT HAVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

-- COORDINATING WITH EMBASSY LONDON SO AS TO PRESENT A COHERENT PICTURE TO FOREIGN INTERLOCUTORS OF USG VIEWS ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE.

7. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMITMENT TO OUR GOAL OF RESOLVING THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, AND I WILL CONTINUE TO WELCOME YOUR INSIGHTS AND VIEWS ON IT. WITH BEST REGARDS.YY

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ SSN: 8750 MSGID: M0616787

OAASZYUW RUEHCAA8750 2650155-SSSS--RHEHNSC.

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 220156Z SEP 93 ZFF5

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: ****

INFO: NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE 8765

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2011-0355-F (2.32)
KBH 4/11/2023

*9/29 Nancy - (Social...)
Read your
recommendation on
how to ~~handle~~
handle
this.
[Signature]*

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 288750

NODIS

FOLLOWING **DUBLIN** 05293 DATED 21 SEP 93 SENT ACTION SECSTATE
BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE

~~SECRET~~ **DUBLIN** 05293

NODIS

PASS THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - TONY LAKE
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY
SMITH

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN
IRELAND

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON MARCH 17, IN ANNOUNCING HIS INTENTION TO APPOINT ME AS AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND, THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS TO PROMOTE THE NECESSARY DIALOGUE TO BRING ABOUT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HE ALSO SAID HE WOULD STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SITUATION IN IRELAND. CLEARLY THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF MY MANDATE IS TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH MY BEST ADVICE ON THE SITUATION HERE AND ON HOW BEST THE UNITED STATES MIGHT HELP THE VITAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
3. IN THIS REGARD I HAVE ALREADY TRAVELED TWICE TO NORTHERN IRELAND; VISITED THE EMBASSY IN LONDON FOR TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR SEITZ AND NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MAYHEW (WHO INCIDENTALLY ENCOURAGED ME TO VISIT NORTHERN

IRELAND, BUT TO BE "EVENHANDED" IN MEETING WITH BOTH COMMUNITIES); ATTENDED A TWO DAY SEMINAR IN CAMBRIDGE ON NORTHERN IRELAND SPONSORED BY THE BRITISH-IRISH ASSOCIATION; AND HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF VISITORS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND HERE AT THE EMBASSY AND MY RESIDENCE. THE COMMON THREAD RUNNING THROUGHOUT THESE MANY AND VARIED CONTACTS IS THE BURNING DESIRE OF EVERYONE FROM POLITICIANS TO SOCIAL WORKERS, CLERICS TO BUSINESSMEN, ARTISTS TO CIVIL SERVANTS TO FIND PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. JUST AS EMOTIVE IS THE STRONGLY EXPRESSED DESIRE TO HAVE THE UNITED STATES PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE DIALOGUE WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO RECONCILIATION.

4. DURING MY VISIT TO BELFAST, THE CONSUL GENERAL ORGANIZED A MEETING OF WOMEN FROM BOTH COMMUNITIES PROMINENT IN A VARIETY OF FIELDS, INCLUDING BUSINESS, ACADEMIA AND COMMUNITY WORK. FOR MOST OF THEM IT WAS THE FIRST OCCASION THEY HAD EVER HAD TO MEET WOMEN ENGAGED IN SIMILAR WORK IN NEIGHBORING COMMUNITIES. THEIR HEARTFELT GRATITUDE FOR OUR BRINGING THEM TOGETHER WAS GENUINE AND DEMONSTRATES THE VALUE OF OUR ROLE IN PROMOTING DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. THEY URGED ME TO RETURN OFTEN AND CONTINUE TO REACH OUT TO BOTH COMMUNITIES. ONE OF THEM, JANE MORRICE, HEAD OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN BELFAST, COMMENTED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE LUNCH THAT IT HAD BEEN THE BEST POLITICAL DISCUSSION SHE HAD PARTICIPATED IN IN THIRTY YEARS. FOLLOWING ANOTHER MEETING, IAN PAISLEY, JUNIOR, SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN GENUINELY WORTHWHILE TO TALK WITH ME GIVEN MY INTEREST IN THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT I WOULD RETURN OFTEN. FINALLY, THE BELFAST TELEGRAPH, A MODERATE UNIONIST NEWSPAPER WITH THE LARGEST CIRCULATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WELCOMED MY VISIT IN AN EDITORIAL SEPTEMBER 15 AND POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH MY OFFICIAL REMIT EXTENDS ONLY TO THE BORDER, I HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CITING HOW INTERTWINED ARE THE POLITICS AND ECONOMY OF THE TWO PARTS OF THE ISLAND AND THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND WHICH I AM "ENTITLED TO EXAMINE".

5. GIVEN THIS REACTION TO MY VISITS, I FIND THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW ME TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AS CONVEYED TO ME IN LONDON BY AMBASSADOR SEITZ AND BY TELEPHONE WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY OXMAN DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTS ME TO ADVISE HIM ON WHETHER OR NOT TO SEND A PEACE ENVOY OR A FACT-FINDING MISSION TO NORTHERN IRELAND. ONE CAN NOT DO

THIS UNLESS, AND I QUOTE FROM THE AFOREMENTIONED BELFAST TELEGRAPH EDITORIAL, ONE GETS " AS ROUNDED A PICTURE OF THE SITUATION AS POSSIBLE. THAT SHOULD INCLUDE LOCAL POLITICIANS, ESPECIALLY UNIONISTS WHOSE CASE HAS OFTEN GONE BY DEFAULT, PARTICULARLY IN AMERICA." VAGUE REFERENCES TO "SENSITIVE MOMENTS" AND THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DO NOT OUTWEIGH MY MANDATE FROM THE PRESIDENT NOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN

~~SECRET~~SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 288750

NODIS

NORTHERN IRELAND. PERHAPS THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY TO REMIND THE EUROPEAN BUREAU AND THE EMBASSY IN LONDON OF THIS REALITY. REGARDS.

SMITH UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

BT

#8750

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG

SIT: FILE HOLL SUM SUM2 WALKER WHSR_SPECIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ with
~~SECRET~~ attachment

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

*Discussed
w/ NES
R*

October 21, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE
SANDY BERGER
BRUCE LINDSEY

FROM: NANCY SODERBERG

SUBJECT: Jean Smith's Role

Attached are two cables, one from Jean Smith objecting to the State Department having limited the scope of her recent visit to Northern Ireland and a draft cable to Jean defining her role.

Jean sees her role as one that includes an active role in Northern Ireland, in her view, in order to keep the President informed. She states that "part of my mandate is to provide the President with my best advice on the situation [in Northern Ireland] and on how best the United States might help the international efforts to promote peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. . . . President Clinton has made it clear that he expects me to advise him on whether or not to send a peace envoy or a fact-finding mission to Northern Ireland."

The attached guidelines proposed by State will probably annoy Jean. To me, they seem about right, perhaps a bit narrow. It suggests limiting visits to the North "to approximately one every six months." I might say "one or two" every six months to give her some flexibility. In discussing the issue with State, they feel pretty strongly about keeping it to "approximately one" and I don't think we should fight it.

You should know that Jean attended a trial of an individual accused of attempted murder without the authorization of State. That action undercut her effort to push for a more independent role.

She will probably want a more formal purpose relating to Northern Ireland in defining her role as a policy advisor. As currently defined in the draft cable, her policy role is limited to the Republic and keeping the President and the State Department fully informed of the views of leaders and public opinion in the Republic of Ireland on the issues of Northern Ireland.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ with
~~SECRET~~ attachment
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.37)
KBM 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ with
~~SECRET~~ attachment

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Given Jean's specific reference to the envoy and Northern Ireland conflict, it might help smooth things a bit if we added to the end of that paragraph, "including the advisability of a U.S. Special Representative to Northern Ireland and other initiatives to promote peace in Northern Ireland." State seemed fine on this in my informal discussions.

I've discussed Jean's expectations with Senator Kennedy's office and they support the general outlines of State's proposal.

If you agree, I'll suggest this slight modification to State and give White House approval to the guidelines.

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ with
~~SECRET~~ attachment

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUTH _____ DRAFT _____
CLEAR 1 _____ 2 _____
3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____
6 _____ 7 _____ 8 _____

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/NE:JFTEFFT/EUR:MAPETERS
10/08/93 79626 SEEUR 1766
THE SECRETARY

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2011-0755-F (2.34)
KBH 4/11/2023

P:PTARNOFF
S/S:

EUR:SAOXMAN

IMMEDIATE DUBLIN

NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN
- NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: DUBLIN 5293

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEAR JEAN,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT TELEGRAM ON YOUR ROLE IN PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. IN LIGHT OF YOUR COMMENTS, WE HAVE REVIEWED OUR UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE ROLE OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN IN CONNECTION WITH NORTHERN IRELAND, AS WELL AS PAST PRACTICES.

3. FIRST, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE DECISION TO ASK YOU NOT TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE NORTH DURING YOUR LAST VISIT REFLECTED OUR BEST JUDGEMENT OF WHAT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE APPRECIATED YOUR COOPERATION IN ADHERING TO THAT GUIDANCE. IF ASKED, HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE NOT HAVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGREED TO YOUR ATTENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PEOPLE ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTED MURDER FOR ATTACKING AN ARMY PATROL.

4. WITH REGARD TO FUTURE VISITS, I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD LIMIT THEM TO APPROXIMATELY ONE EVERY SIX MONTHS. SINCE 1982 YOUR PREDECESSORS VISITED ONCE OR TWICE PER YEAR, AND THESE WERE PRIVATE VISITS. THEY WERE ARRANGED BY THE AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL IN BELFAST, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. THESE PRIVATE VISITS BY YOUR PREDECESSORS INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH A RANGE OF SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FIGURES, AS WELL AS VISITS TO PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI). THESE VISITS PROVIDED A MEANS OF FAMILIARIZING OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN WITH NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUES AND ENHANCED THE AMBASSADOR'S ABILITY TO WORK WITH SENIOR REPUBLIC OF IRELAND OFFICIALS.

5. A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN FREQUENCY OF SUCH VISITS, PARTICULARLY BY AN AMBASSADOR AS VISIBLE AS YOURSELF, WOULD SEND A CONFUSING SIGNAL, IN LIGHT OF THE EFFORTS OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH TO RESTART THE TALKS, AND THE CURRENT VIEW OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BECOME A DIRECT PARTICIPANT EITHER BY SENDING A SPECIAL ENVOY OR SOME OTHER MEANS. CLEARLY WE NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ALL PARTIES, BUT WE CAN DO THAT THROUGH OUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN BELFAST AND OUR EMBASSY IN LONDON AS WELL AS OUR EMBASSY IN DUBLIN. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, IN PARTICULAR, REMAINS SENSITIVE TO THE TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF VISITS TO NORTHERN IRELAND BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN.

6. WITH RESPECT TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE, YOU ARE, OF COURSE, A KEY POLICY ADVISOR AND WE GREATLY VALUE YOUR:

- KEEPING THE PRESIDENT AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT FULLY INFORMED OF THE VIEWS OF LEADERS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ON THE ISSUES OF NORTHERN IRELAND.
- ENCOURAGING THE GOI TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT.
- ENGAGING AND EXPLAINING TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND USG VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
- TAKING THE LEAD IN FOLLOWING IFI ACTIVITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

-- COORDINATING WITH EMBASSY LONDON SO AS TO PRESENT A COHERENT PICTURE TO FOREIGN INTERLOCUTORS OF USG VIEWS ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE.

7. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMITMENT TO OUR GOAL OF RESOLVING THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, AND I WILL CONTINUE TO WELCOME YOUR INSIGHTS AND VIEWS ON IT. WITH BEST REGARDS.YY

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ SSN: 8750 MSGID: M0616787

OAASZYUW RUEHCAA8750 2650155-SSSS--RHEHNSC.

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 220156Z SEP 93 ZFF5

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: ****

INFO: NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE 8765

*9/29 Nancy - (Soderberg)
Need your
recommendation on
how to ~~handle~~
make handle
this.
[Signature]*

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 288750

NODIS

FOLLOWING **DUBLIN** 05293 DATED 21 SEP 93 SENT ACTION SECSTATE BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE

~~SECRET~~ **DUBLIN** 05293

NODIS

PASS THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - TONY LAKE

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY SMITH

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. ~~SECRET~~- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON MARCH 17, IN ANNOUNCING HIS INTENTION TO APPOINT ME AS AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND, THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS TO PROMOTE THE NECESSARY DIALOGUE TO BRING ABOUT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HE ALSO SAID HE WOULD STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SITUATION IN IRELAND. CLEARLY THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF MY MANDATE IS TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH MY BEST ADVICE ON THE SITUATION HERE AND ON HOW BEST THE UNITED STATES MIGHT HELP THE VITAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

3. IN THIS REGARD I HAVE ALREADY TRAVELED TWICE TO NORTHERN IRELAND; VISITED THE EMBASSY IN LONDON FOR TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR SEITZ AND NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MAYHEW (WHO INCIDENTALLY ENCOURAGED ME TO VISIT NORTHERN

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (2.35)

KSH 4/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IRELAND, BUT TO BE "EVENHANDED" IN MEETING WITH BOTH COMMUNITIES); ATTENDED A TWO DAY SEMINAR IN CAMBRIDGE ON NORTHERN IRELAND SPONSORED BY THE BRITISH-IRISH ASSOCIATION; AND HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF VISITORS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND HERE AT THE EMBASSY AND MY RESIDENCE. THE COMMON THREAD RUNNING THROUGHOUT THESE MANY AND VARIED CONTACTS IS THE BURNING DESIRE OF EVERYONE FROM POLITICIANS TO SOCIAL WORKERS, CLERICS TO BUSINESSMEN, ARTISTS TO CIVIL SERVANTS TO FIND PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. JUST AS EMOTIVE IS THE STRONGLY EXPRESSED DESIRE TO HAVE THE UNITED STATES PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE DIALOGUE WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO RECONCILIATION.

4. DURING MY VISIT TO BELFAST, THE CONSUL GENERAL ORGANIZED A MEETING OF WOMEN FROM BOTH COMMUNITIES PROMINENT IN A VARIETY OF FIELDS, INCLUDING BUSINESS, ACADEMIA AND COMMUNITY WORK. FOR MOST OF THEM IT WAS THE FIRST OCCASION THEY HAD EVER HAD TO MEET WOMEN ENGAGED IN SIMILAR WORK IN NEIGHBORING COMMUNITIES. THEIR HEARTFELT GRATITUDE FOR OUR BRINGING THEM TOGETHER WAS GENUINE AND DEMONSTRATES THE VALUE OF OUR ROLE IN PROMOTING DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. THEY URGED ME TO RETURN OFTEN AND CONTINUE TO REACH OUT TO BOTH COMMUNITIES. ONE OF THEM, JANE MORRICE, HEAD OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN BELFAST, COMMENTED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE LUNCH THAT IT HAD BEEN THE BEST POLITICAL DISCUSSION SHE HAD PARTICIPATED IN IN THIRTY YEARS. FOLLOWING ANOTHER MEETING, IAN PAISLEY, JUNIOR, SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN GENUINELY WORTHWHILE TO TALK WITH ME GIVEN MY INTEREST IN THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT I WOULD RETURN OFTEN. FINALLY, THE BELFAST TELEGRAPH, A MODERATE UNIONIST NEWSPAPER WITH THE LARGEST CIRCULATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WELCOMED MY VISIT IN AN EDITORIAL SEPTEMBER 15 AND POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH MY OFFICIAL REMIT EXTENDS ONLY TO THE BORDER, I HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CITING HOW INTERTWINED ARE THE POLITICS AND ECONOMY OF THE TWO PARTS OF THE ISLAND AND THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND WHICH I AM "ENTITLED TO EXAMINE".

5. GIVEN THIS REACTION TO MY VISITS, I FIND THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW ME TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AS CONVEYED TO ME IN LONDON BY AMBASSADOR SEITZ AND BY TELEPHONE WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY OXMAN DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTS ME TO ADVISE HIM ON WHETHER OR NOT TO SEND A PEACE ENVOY OR A FACT-FINDING MISSION TO NORTHERN IRELAND. ONE CAN NOT DO

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THIS UNLESS, AND I QUOTE FROM THE AFOREMENTIONED BELFAST TELEGRAPH EDITORIAL, ONE GETS " AS ROUNDED A PICTURE OF THE SITUATION AS POSSIBLE. THAT SHOULD INCLUDE LOCAL POLITICIANS, ESPECIALLY UNIONISTS WHOSE CASE HAS OFTEN GONE BY DEFAULT, PARTICULARLY IN AMERICA." VAGUE REFERENCES TO "SENSITIVE MOMENTS" AND THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DO NOT OUTWEIGH MY MANDATE FROM THE PRESIDENT NOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 288750

NODIS

NORTHERN IRELAND. PERHAPS THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY TO REMIND THE EUROPEAN BUREAU AND THE EMBASSY IN LONDON OF THIS REALITY. REGARDS.

SMITH UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

BT

#8750

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG

SIT: FILE HOLL SUM SUM2 WALKER WHSR_SPECIAL

February 14, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALAN KRECZKO *AK*
SUBJECT: Irish Extraditees

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2011-0355-F (2.36)
KBH 4/11/2023

Issue

Whether to send the attached letter to DOJ concerning appeal of a district court's decision to grant bail to three IRA members being extradited to the United Kingdom. Jack Quinn concurs in the letter. If we want to influence the DOJ position, we must submit our views Thursday, as DOJ must make its appeal decision on Friday. (I could not send this memo to you earlier because we have been seeking reconfirmation by the U.K. Embassy that it continued not to object to bail in the aftermath of the IRA bombing of last Friday. They did so Wednesday afternoon.)

Background

The U.K. is seeking the extradition of three IRA members. The three escaped from Maze prison in Northern Ireland in a mass and violent prison breakout in 1983. One of the three had been convicted of murder; the second, of possession of a bomb; the third, of several offenses, including felony murder arising from a bombing. The three fled to the United States at various times after the jailbreak. They were arrested here in or after 1992, pursuant to a U.K. arrest warrant and extradition request. They had been held in California prison since then, pending an extradition hearing, until the district court in late December granted their request for bail. (Two were released on \$500,000 bond; one, on \$1 million bond.)

Gerry Adams wrote the President urging the individuals be released on bail, pending their extradition hearing. The President declined to intervene with DOJ, which strongly opposed bail. The district court recently granted bail to all three. DOJ/Criminal division wants to appeal, but needs the approval of the Solicitor General. The case is being followed by Irish-American groups. The SG needs to decide on Friday whether to appeal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 2/14/01

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DOJ/Criminal Analysis (elaborated at Tab II)

The district court got it wrong.

The Supreme Court has held that the ordinary presumption against bail does not apply in extradition cases. Instead, the Court has held that bail should be denied in extradition cases unless the extraditee can demonstrate "special circumstances." The Court fashioned this rule primarily for foreign policy reasons -- if an individual were released on bail and then skipped, the USG would be in violation of its treaty obligation to produce the individual. DOJ obviously strongly supports this Supreme Court holding, as should we. It enables us to fulfill our treaty obligations, and it positions us to press other countries to deny bail in extradition cases of importance to us.

What constitutes sufficient "special circumstances" to entitle an individual to bail is not clear in case law. However, it was intended to be a narrow concept and has generally been so applied by the courts. Courts have said the special circumstances must be "extraordinary," "when the requirements of justice are absolutely preemptory." Examples would include situations where the individual is seriously ill.

In this case, the district court found "special circumstances" in four factors: (1) the fact that bail had been permitted in a similar extradition case (Smyth); (2) the long period of time defendants have been jailed awaiting their extradition hearings; (3) the fact such time would not be credited by the U.K. against their prison sentence in the U.K.; and (4) the fact that one U.S. district court has found the extradition statute unconstitutional.

DOJ/Criminal (correctly, in my view) finds all of these unpersuasive: (1) the analogous bail case cited by the judge is not that analogous, (2) the defendants have been in jail a long time because they requested a delay in their hearing; (3) the U.K. does not give credit for time served awaiting extradition when a prisoner escapes from prison (there has to be some penalty for breaking out of prison); and (4) other courts have not let a single district court decision on constitutionality reverse long-standing bail practice.

Moreover, DOJ/Criminal considers the individuals a serious flight risk, even with the bail conditions imposed.

DOJ/Criminal has an additional reason for wanting to appeal. Courts in the Ninth Circuit have been whittling away at established case law concerning bail in extradition cases, particularly by expanding the concept of "special circumstances." They want a Ninth Circuit ruling that reverses that trend. While DOJ/Criminal advocates appeal, it acknowledges that it is a close

question. The case is not a sure win (IRA extradition cases have drawn vociferous dissents in the Ninth Circuit), particularly in view of the time the individuals have served already in jail. A loss at the Ninth Circuit level will encourage the trend DOJ is seeking to reverse. Even though the delay was of their own making, judges are going to be uncomfortable with the fact that these individuals have been in jail for two years without an extradition hearing.

My Analysis

DOJ/Criminal is right that the district court got it wrong. They are also right to be looking for a case to take to the Ninth Circuit to stop the erosion of established case law in this area.

But, in my view, this is the wrong case to take up. It is far from a sure winner, and a loss will be very damaging to extradition law and practice.

Moreover, one of the key reasons for denying bail -- foreign policy -- does not appear to be present in this case. The State Department informs us that the U.K. Embassy has indicated that it is satisfied with the bail conditions, does not consider the individuals a serious flight risk given the bail, and does not intend to make an issue over whether to appeal. The State Department has confirmed that this remains the U.K. view after the Friday IRA bombing. (DOJ/crim says that it continues to hear through police channels that the U.K. wants bail denied, but we are entitled to rely on the embassy for statements of U.K. position.)

I therefore think we should discourage DOJ from appealing this case. However, we would need to accept that if there is no appeal, the individuals, who have been convicted of serious crimes and who have already fled prison once, may skip bail. I would, therefore, make sure any letter from us acknowledges that DOJ, not we, must evaluate the flight risk.

Concurrence by: Mary Ann Peters *by AK*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to send the attached letter to the Justice Department

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Letter to the Solicitor General

Tab II Justice Analysis

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.37)
KBM 4/11/2023

Dear Solicitor General Days:

I am writing to convey our view, which has been coordinated with the Counsel to the President, on the issue of whether the USG should appeal the granting of bail to three extradition defendants in In the Matter of Extradition of Artt, Brennan & Kirby. (U)

The Supreme Court determined in Wright v. Henkel that there is no presumption of bail in extradition cases and that bail will be granted only under "special circumstances." Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903). This holding is grounded in our important foreign relations interest in fulfilling extradition obligations. Moreover, its application is important to our ability on a reciprocal basis to urge other countries to deny bail in extradition cases of interest to us. (U)

We agree that the district court erred in its application of the "special circumstances" doctrine to this case, for the reasons identified in the Criminal Division's memorandum. We also understand that there has been other erosion of this important doctrine by courts in the Ninth Circuit, and that it would be useful to have a Ninth Circuit decision reestablishing the proper principles to be applied to bail requests in extradition cases. (U)

Nonetheless, our sense is that this is the wrong case to use for that purpose. As the Criminal Division memorandum notes, this is a close call. The case is not a sure winner on appeal, particularly taking into account the length of time the individuals have, for whatever reason, been in jail. A loss at the Ninth Circuit level will reinforce exactly the trends we are seeking to reverse. (U)

One additional fact contributes substantially to our view. The Supreme Court's holding in Wright is based primarily on foreign policy grounds, namely the foreign policy reaction if we fail to produce an individual under our extradition treaty. However, other courts have noted that where this consideration is not dominant, bail may be granted without any damage to the Wright principle. (See, e.g. United States v. Messina, 566 F. Supp. 740, at 742 (1983): "One court surveyed the more contemporary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify on: 2/14/01

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

reported cases and reported that "granting of bail pending completion of the extradition proceedings has been the rule rather than the exception." (cites omitted). The mere frequency with which bail has been granted, however, may not indicate any change in the test of Wright v. Henkel. It may be due to lack of strong opposition by the government in particular cases, perhaps after consultation with officials of the requesting government.") (U)

In this case, we understand from the State Department that the embassy of the United Kingdom, the requesting State, has indicated that it is satisfied with the bail conditions, that it considers the flight risk minimal in this case given the bail imposed, and that it does not intend to make an issue of the appeal. While we understand that Justice Department officials may be hearing things differently through law enforcement channels, we believe we are entitled to rely on the statements of the embassy for the position of the United Kingdom. Given the foreign policy underpinning of Wright v. Henkel, we believe that the position of the United Kingdom should be relevant to our own analysis of whether to appeal this case for misapplication of the "special circumstances" doctrine. (U)

We understand, however, that in reaching your decision you must also take into account factors such as flight risk which we are not in a position to evaluate. (U)

Sincerely,

Alan Kreczko
Special Assistant to the President
and Legal Adviser

The Honorable Drew S. Days III
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Room 5143
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Kessinger, Jodi

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Prisoner Transfers/Extradition [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Wednesday, February 14, 1996 2:34PM

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.38)
KBM 4/11/2023**

There are two issues -- the direct transfer of prisoners in U.S. jails back to Ireland as requested under the international convention Ireland signed last fall, and the possible transfer back to Ireland of prisoners we are preparing to extradite back to the UK.

On the first issue, one prisoner has already been transferred and five others are awaiting a USG decision. DOJ had recommended against the transfer BUT were prepared to bow to State if State would write a letter saying their transfer would help the peace process. State did that and the transfer would probably have been approved, but for the bombing. State has now asked DOJ not to do anything for the present. They have not rescinded the letter, just asked that no action be taken immediately. I think this was the right call, since Justice is looking for ways to react to the bombing and might make a negative decision on the transfers if it took action now.

I also talked about the second question with State, on a close hold basis. Legally this would be a 2-step process, with the 4 prisoners extradited back to the UK as step 1, and then a UK decision taken to transfer them under the international convention to Ireland as step 2. We would have to reach advance political agreement with the UK that they would implement step 2. Unlikely to get that now since it would be politically untenable in the UK to transfer these escapees to Ireland after the bombing, when HMG hadn't even approved the transfer of better behaved prisoners before the bombing. Home Secretary Michael Howard is the most hardline of Tories and would fight hard against making any such deal with us. But we could talk to HMG about being more forthcoming on transfers of other prisoners now, especially since Dublin as not been "soft" on the bombing.

February 14, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALAN KRECZKO AK
SUBJECT: Irish Extraditees**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2011-0355-F (2.39)
KBM 4/11/2023Issue

Whether to send the attached letter to DOJ concerning appeal of a district court's decision to grant bail to three IRA members being extradited to the United Kingdom. Jack Quinn concurs in the letter. If we want to influence the DOJ position, we must submit our views Thursday, as DOJ must make its appeal decision on Friday. (I could not send this memo to you earlier because we have been seeking reconfirmation by the U.K. Embassy that it continued not to object to bail in the aftermath of the IRA bombing of last Friday. They did so Wednesday afternoon.)

Background

The U.K. is seeking the extradition of three IRA members. The three escaped from Maze prison in Northern Ireland in a mass and violent prison breakout in 1983. One of the three had been convicted of murder; the second, of possession of a bomb; the third, of several offenses, including felony murder arising from a bombing. The three fled to the United States at various times after the jailbreak. They were arrested here in or after 1992, pursuant to a U.K. arrest warrant and extradition request. They had been held in California prison since then, pending an extradition hearing, until the district court in late December granted their request for bail. (Two were released on \$500,000 bond; one, on \$1 million bond.)

Gerry Adams wrote the President urging the individuals be released on bail, pending their extradition hearing. The President declined to intervene with DOJ, which strongly opposed bail. The district court recently granted bail to all three. DOJ/Criminal division wants to appeal, but needs the approval of the Solicitor General. The case is being followed by Irish-American groups. The SG needs to decide on Friday whether to appeal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 2/14/01

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DOJ/Criminal Analysis (elaborated at Tab II)

The district court got it wrong.

The Supreme Court has held that the ordinary presumption against bail does not apply in extradition cases. Instead, the Court has held that bail should be denied in extradition cases unless the extraditee can demonstrate "special circumstances." The Court fashioned this rule primarily for foreign policy reasons -- if an individual were released on bail and then skipped, the USG would be in violation of its treaty obligation to produce the individual. DOJ obviously strongly supports this Supreme Court holding, as should we. It enables us to fulfill our treaty obligations, and it positions us to press other countries to deny bail in extradition cases of importance to us.

What constitutes sufficient "special circumstances" to entitle an individual to bail is not clear in case law. However, it was intended to be a narrow concept and has generally been so applied by the courts. Courts have said the special circumstances must be "extraordinary," "when the requirements of justice are absolutely peremptory." Examples would include situations where the individual is seriously ill.

In this case, the district court found "special circumstances" in four factors: (1) the fact that bail had been permitted in a similar extradition case (Smyth); (2) the long period of time defendants have been jailed awaiting their extradition hearings; (3) the fact such time would not be credited by the U.K. against their prison sentence in the U.K.; and (4) the fact that one U.S. district court has found the extradition statute unconstitutional.

DOJ/Criminal (correctly, in my view) finds all of these unpersuasive: (1) the analogous bail case cited by the judge is not that analogous, (2) the defendants have been in jail a long time because they requested a delay in their hearing; (3) the U.K. does not give credit for time served awaiting extradition when a prisoner escapes from prison (there has to be some penalty for breaking out of prison); and (4) other courts have not let a single district court decision on constitutionality reverse long-standing bail practice.

Moreover, DOJ/Criminal considers the individuals a serious flight risk, even with the bail conditions imposed.

DOJ/Criminal has an additional reason for wanting to appeal. Courts in the Ninth Circuit have been whittling away at established case law concerning bail in extradition cases, particularly by expanding the concept of "special circumstances." They want a Ninth Circuit ruling that reverses that trend. While DOJ/Criminal advocates appeal, it acknowledges that it is a close

question. The case is not a sure win (IRA extradition cases have drawn vociferous dissents in the Ninth Circuit), particularly in view of the time the individuals have served already in jail. A loss at the Ninth Circuit level will encourage the trend DOJ is seeking to reverse. Even though the delay was of their own making, judges are going to be uncomfortable with the fact that these individuals have been in jail for two years without an extradition hearing.

My Analysis

DOJ/Criminal is right that the district court got it wrong. They are also right to be looking for a case to take to the Ninth Circuit to stop the erosion of established case law in this area.

But, in my view, this is the wrong case to take up. It is far from a sure winner, and a loss will be very damaging to extradition law and practice.

Moreover, one of the key reasons for denying bail -- foreign policy -- does not appear to be present in this case. The State Department informs us that the U.K. Embassy has indicated that it is satisfied with the bail conditions, does not consider the individuals a serious flight risk given the bail, and does not intend to make an issue over whether to appeal. The State Department has confirmed that this remains the U.K. view after the Friday IRA bombing. (DOJ/crim says that it continues to hear through police channels that the U.K. wants bail denied, but we are entitled to rely on the embassy for statements of U.K. position.)

I therefore think we should discourage DOJ from appealing this case. However, we would need to accept that if there is no appeal, the individuals, who have been convicted of serious crimes and who have already fled prison once, may skip bail. I would, therefore, make sure any letter from us acknowledges that DOJ, not we, must evaluate the flight risk.

Concurrence by: Mary Ann Peters *by AK*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to send the attached letter to the Justice Department

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Letter to the Solicitor General

Tab II Justice Analysis

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.40)
KBH 4/11/2023

Dear Solicitor General Days:

I am writing to convey our view, which has been coordinated with the Counsel to the President, on the issue of whether the USG should appeal the granting of bail to three extradition defendants in In the Matter of Extradition of Artt, Brennan & Kirby. (U)

The Supreme Court determined in Wright v. Henkel that there is no presumption of bail in extradition cases and that bail will be granted only under "special circumstances." Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903). This holding is grounded in our important foreign relations interest in fulfilling extradition obligations. Moreover, its application is important to our ability on a reciprocal basis to urge other countries to deny bail in extradition cases of interest to us. (U)

127
4
We agree that the district court erred in its application of the "special circumstances" doctrine to this case, for the reasons identified in the Criminal Division's memorandum. We also understand that there has been other erosion of this important doctrine by courts in the Ninth Circuit and that it would be useful to have a Ninth Circuit decision reestablishing the proper principles to be applied to bail requests in extradition cases. (U)

Nonetheless, our sense is that this is the wrong case to use for that purpose. As the Criminal Division memorandum notes, this is a close call. The case is not a sure winner on appeal, particularly taking into account the length of time the individuals have, for whatever reason, been in jail. A loss at the Ninth Circuit level will reinforce exactly the trends we are seeking to reverse. (U)

One additional fact contributes substantially to our view. The Supreme Court's holding in Wright is based primarily on foreign policy grounds, namely the foreign policy reaction if we fail to produce an individual under our extradition treaty. However, other courts have noted that where this consideration is not dominant, bail may be granted without any damage to the Wright principle. (See, e.g., United States v. Messina, 566 F. Supp. 740, at 742 (1983): "One court surveyed the more contemporary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify on: 2/14/01

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

reported cases and reported that "granting of bail pending completion of the extradition proceedings has been the rule rather than the exception." (cites omitted). The mere frequency with which bail has been granted, however, may not indicate any change in the test of Wright v. Henkel. It may be due to lack of strong opposition by the government in particular cases, perhaps after consultation with officials of the requesting government.") (U)

In this case, we understand from the State Department that the embassy of the United Kingdom, the requesting State, has indicated that it is satisfied with the bail conditions, that it considers the flight risk minimal in this case given the bail imposed and that it does not intend to make an issue of the appeal. While we understand that Justice Department officials may be hearing things differently through law enforcement channels, we believe we are entitled to rely on the statements of the embassy for the position of the United Kingdom. Given the foreign policy underpinning of Wright v. Henkel, we believe that the position of the United Kingdom should be relevant to our own analysis of whether to appeal this case for misapplication of the "special circumstances" doctrine. (U)

We understand, however, that in reaching your decision you must also take into account factors such as flight risk which we are not in a position to evaluate. (U)

Sincerely,

Alan Kreczko
Special Assistant to the President
and Legal Adviser

The Honorable Drew S. Days III
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Room 5143
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INITIAL HERE 5.1/0
AUTH | DRAFT: 70
CLEAR 1 24 2 24
3 24 4 _____ 5 _____
6 _____ 7 _____ 8 _____

ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/NE:MEPARMLY:MXP
12/07/93 7-6556 SENE 5532
P:PTARNOFF

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2011-0355-F (2.41)
KBH 4/11/2023

EUR:MAPETERS
EUR/WE:EHEAPHY
S/S:

EUR/NE:JFTEFFT
P:DRUSSELL
NSC:

EUR

IMMEDIATE ROME

ROUTINE LONDON, DUBLIN, BELFAST

ROME FOR THE VATICAN - AMBASSADOR FLYNN FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK, VT, US

SUBJECT: FURTHERING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: ROME 20996

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOUR COMMENTS ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE, WITH A RANGE OF IDEAS ON HOW TO HELP THE PROCESS ALONG, WERE MUCH APPRECIATED HERE IN WASHINGTON. INDEED, MANY OF YOUR SUGGESTIONS MATCH CLOSELY WHAT WE ARE ALREADY WORKING ON. YOUR COMMENTS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE RIGHT ON THE MARK. WE ARE LOOKING AT DIFFERENT WAYS OF HELPING IN THAT IMPORTANT AREA, AND WILL FACTOR IN YOUR SUGGESTIONS.

3. AS YOU HAVE CORRECTLY NOTED, RELIGIOUS LEADERS COULD PLAY AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT ROLE. WE HAVE BEEN PURSUING COURSES OF ACTION THAT REFLECT THAT REALITY. IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR, THE LEADERS OF THE CATHOLIC AND THREE MAJOR PROTESTANT CHURCHES IN THE UK AND IRELAND WERE RECEIVED AT A SENIOR LEVEL HERE IN THE DEPARTMENT FOR A DISCUSSION OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CONFIDENTIAL

We will give some thought to your proposal to bring the religious leaders together to work toward reconciliation.
2

(including our Ambassadors)

THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM. OUR EMBASSIES IN DUBLIN AND LONDON ARE IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE ROMAN CATHOLIC AND ANGLICAN LEADERSHIPS. AS YOU POINT OUT, THE CHURCH LEADERS IN THE TWO COMMUNITIES ARE CONTINUING WITH THEIR CONTACTS. ~~WE PREFER TO LEAVE THE INITIATIVE WITH THEM,~~

while continuing to make known our full support.

4. AS YOU WELL KNOW, THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAS STAYED ACTIVELY ENGAGED ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE. IN JUST THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, HE MET WITH IRISH FM DICK SPRING, AND SPOKE ON NOVEMBER 24 WITH UK PM MAJOR ON THE SUBJECT. THE SECRETARY HAS BEEN SIMILARLY INVOLVED.

5. THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN RECENT WEEKS, AND STATED PUBLICLY ON OCTOBER 30, THAT WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. IN THOSE STATEMENTS, THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED THE READINESS OF THE U.S. TO HELP THE PROCESS IN ANY WAY ^{appropriate} ~~THE TWO SIDES FEEL IS APPROPRIATE.~~ OUR SENSE IS THAT FOR THE MOMENT, OUR MOST VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION IS TO SUPPORT THE COURAGEOUS AND DETERMINED EFFORTS OF THE ~~IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS AIMED AT~~ ^{parties involved} RESOLVING THE PROBLEM. ~~THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE TOLD US PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY HOW MUCH THEY APPRECIATE THE U.S. STICKING TO THAT LINE. THEY ALSO CONTINUE TO INDICATE THAT NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR APPOINTMENT OF A U.S. SPECIAL~~

~~ENVOY.~~ 6. We will keep our policy under regular review and appreciate suggestions of new ideas, especially in light of the fast-moving developments on the Northern Ireland front. We will keep in close contact with ~~you~~, particularly in view of the Vatican's interest.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

<DIST>PRT: BERGER FUERTH GEARAN ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT(C2) SODERBERG
SIT: BLEICKEN FILE KUPCHAN SUM2 VAX WALKER

<PREC>IMMEDIATE<CLAS>~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI>RUEHRO<DTG>061941Z DEC 93
<ORIG>AMEMBASSY ROME
<TO>RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0247
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8485
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3282

<SUBJ> FURTHERING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 020996
WHITE HOUSE FOR COMMUNICATIONS DIR GEARAN
FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O: 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, VT

SUBJECT: FURTHERING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: SOURCES HERE CONFIRM THAT, ALTHOUGH THE USG CANNOT ITSELF SOLVE THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, IT SHOULD PLAY A POSITIVE, RESPONSIBLE, AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE NEW DIALOGUE AMONG THE PARTIES. AFTER MONTHS OF DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE WITH LEADERS IN ROME, RECENT CONVERSATIONS HERE WITH VATICAN OFFICIALS SUGGEST THAT THE USG COULD MOVE NOW TO SUPPORT INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND TO RE-ENFORCE THE ACTIONS BY UK AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS TO BEGIN A NEW PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. ECONOMIC INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND BY U.S. BUSINESSES COULD BE KEY ACCORDING TO NUMEROUS BRITISH OFFICIALS.END SUMMARY.
3. THE DEBATE AROUND THE "IRISH QUESTION" IS NOT NEW, BUT IT HAS RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE NEW ATTENTION OVER THE PAST WEEKS. IN NO SMALL PART THE HISTORIC ISRAEL/PLO AGREEMENT AND PRESIDENT CLINTON'S ACTION TO BRING THE TWO PARTIES TOGETHER AT THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE BOOSTED HOPES FOR PEACE WORLDWIDE. PREVIOUSLY A SOLUTION TO THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAS ESCAPED POLITICAL OFFICIALS OF ALL PARTIES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PUBLIC INTEREST, EXPRESSED DURING THE CAMPAIGN, WAS RECEIVED ENTHUSIASTICALLY NOT ONLY BY THE ACTIVE IRISH-AMERICAN COMMUNITY BUT ALSO BY ALL OTHERS COMMITTED TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE BE IT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR NORTHERN IRELAND.
4. UPON ARRIVING IN ROME IN JULY, I ESTABLISHED EARLY RELATIONS WITH U.K., IRISH AND VATICAN OFFICIALS INCLUDING THE POPE ON PRESIDENT CLINTON'S COMMITMENT TO HELP END THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND BRING PEACE. MY MOST RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH VATICAN OFFICIALS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF ALL SIDES, AND WITH THE AMBASSADORS HERE OF IRELAND AND THE U.K. HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVE. THESE CONVERSATIONS HAVE IDENTIFIED A WORTHWHILE INITIATIVE. THIS WOULD INVOLVE BRINGING RELIGIOUS LEADERS TOGETHER IN ARMAGH TO WORK TOWARDS RECONCILIATION. THIS MEETING COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.42)
KBH 7/11/2023

SIMILAR MEETING IN WASHINGTON WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE U.S. TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE.

5. THE PRESS HAS REPORTED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SUPPORT FOR RENEWED DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE. THIS DISPUTE CANNOT BE SOLVED BY OUTSIDERS, BUT OUTSIDERS HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPPORT DIALOGUE AND GIVE IT CREDIBILITY. WE CANNOT ALLOW VIOLENCE TO CONTINUE UNNOTICED, AND NOW WE HAVE A CHANCE TO SUPPORT STEPS THAT CAN LEAD TO PEACE.

6. CARDINAL DALY AND ARCHBISHOP AMES OF THE CHURCH OF IRELAND ARE PRIMATES FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE CHURCHES THROUGHOUT ALL OF IRELAND. AMCIT WILLIAM FRANKLIN TOLD ME LAST MONTH THAT THE ANGLICAN CENTER IN ROME, A LONG-ESTABLISHED OFFICE DEALING WITH ECUMENICAL RELATIONS WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, MIGHT BE A MEETING PLACE FOR CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT LEADERS WHERE DIALOGUE COULD BE ENCOURAGED.

7. THE GOVERNORS OF THE ANGLICAN CENTER, INCLUDING A VATICAN REPRESENTATIVE, MET RECENTLY TO DISCUSS THIS IDEA. THEY WERE FAVORABLE BUT RECOMMENDED A NEUTRAL LOCATION WOULD BE BETTER. THEY AGREED ARMAGH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. BOTH THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY -- WHO HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON THIS PLAN -- AND ARCHBISHOP AMES OF IRELAND WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED.

8. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROPOSAL WITH MY COUNTERPARTS IN ROME AMBASSADOR BROIN OF IRELAND AND PALMER OF GREAT BRITAIN. THE AMBASSADORS ARE INTERESTED AND WILL BE REPORTING TO THEIR CAPITALS.

9. ON FRIDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 3, 1993, I MET WITH CARDINAL CASSIDY WHO HAS AN IMPORTANT PORTFOLIO HERE FOR ECUMENICAL DIALOGUE. HE HAD ALREADY BEEN PLANNING TO BE IN ARMAGH IN MID-JANUARY TO ATTEND A PEACE VIGIL.

HE GAVE SUPPORT TO THE IDEA OF MEETINGS OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN ARMAGH AND WASHINGTON. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD BRING THIS MATTER TO THE HOLY FATHER'S ATTENTION AND THAT, PERHAPS, THE PONTIFF, AS A SUGESTION, MIGHT BE INCLINED TO HOLD AN ECUMENICAL UNITY PRAYER SERVICE WITH ALL THE RESPECTIVE RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN ITALY AS WELL. HE MENTIONED ASSISI AS A POSSIBLE SITE FOR SUCH A SERVICE WHICH
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 020996
WHITE HOUSE FOR COMMUNICATIONS DIR GEARAN
FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O: 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, VT

SUBJECT: FURTHERING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND MIGHT BE MODELED ON THE PRAYER SERVICES THE POPE HELD FOR THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA. CARD. CASSDY ALSO SAID THE POPE MIGHT MENTION THIS INITIATIVE IN HIS ANNUAL ADDRESS TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS JANUARY 15.

10. MY EXPERIENCE IN RECENT YEARS WITH NORTHERN IRISH RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAS CONVINCED ME THAT AN ECUMENICAL MEETING WOULD HELP FOSTER RECONCILIATION. WE SHOULD REVIVE THIS IDEA. A SUBSEQUENT MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON THE SAME THEME COULD COMPLEMENT EFFORTS ELSEWHERE, AND INDICATE STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR PEACE IN ITS BROADEST SENSE.

11. AS WE LOOK FOR WAYS TO FOSTER PEACE EFFORTS, NEW

THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE COMMITMENT TO APPOINT
A SPECIAR ENVOY — THIS ENVOY COULD ACT AS A
FACILITATOR TO ENCOURAGE THE PROCESS AND TO SUPPORT
THE TENTATIVE STEPS NOW BEING TAKEN BY ELECTED AND
RESPONSIBLE PARTIES. A BASIC PROBLEM WITH PEACE
EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN TO DATE IS THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE.
ALL PARTIES AT THE TABLE FEEL THAT THEY ARE FIXED
INTO THEIR POSITIONS, AND THE UNIONISTS AND SEINN
FEIN ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY ANY OF THE POSSIBLE
PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS. AN ENVOY COULD SERVE THE
CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS IN THE MIDDLE WHO WANT
PEACE, AND HELP MOVE THE EXTREMES TOWARD THE MIDDLE.

12. I HAVE BEEN TOLD CONSISTENTLY BY BRITISH
OFFICIALS THAT U.S. BUSINESS INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN
IRELAND IS KEY TO SUSTAINING ANY PEACE THERE. JOBS
NOT BOMBS WILL BRING ABOUT PROGRESS AND PEACE THEY
HAVE SAID. MUCH OF THE TROUBLE HAS ITS ROOTS IN POOR
CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS FIGHTING FOR JOBS. WE NEED
TO ENLARGE THE ECONOMIC PIE FOR BOTH SIDES. HAVING
WORKED ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND
FOR SEVERAL YEARS THROUGH BOSTON-IRELAND VENTURES, I
CONCUR. SUCH COMMON ECONOMIC INTERESTS COULD BE THE
"RAY OF HOPE" CITED IN A NOVEMBER 27TH ARTICLE IN THE
ECONOMIST AND COULD PROVIDE THE ENTREE FOR THE USG TO
CONSTRUCTIVELY PROMOTE AND SUPPORT THE PEACE
PROCESS.

FLYNN
NNNN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN>0996<STOR>931206145201 M0762141
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN>0996<STOR>931206145304 M0762143
<TOR>931206150559

OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INITIAL HERE 5.17.

ORIGINAL

AUTH	1	DRAFT	2
CLEAR	1	2	2
3	4	5	
6	7	8	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/NE:MEPARMLY:MXP
12/07/93 7-6556 SENE 5532
P:PTARNOFF

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.43)
KBH 4/11/2023

EUR:MAPETERS
EUR/WE:EHEAPHY
S/S:

EUR/NE:JFTEFFT
P:DRUSSELL
NSC:

EUR

IMMEDIATE ROME

ROUTINE LONDON, DUBLIN, BELFAST

ROME FOR THE VATICAN - AMBASSADOR FLYNN FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK, VT, US

SUBJECT: FURTHERING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: ROME 20996

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOUR COMMENTS ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE, WITH A RANGE OF IDEAS ON HOW TO HELP THE PROCESS ALONG, WERE MUCH APPRECIATED HERE IN WASHINGTON. INDEED, MANY OF YOUR SUGGESTIONS MATCH CLOSELY WHAT WE ARE ALREADY WORKING ON. YOUR COMMENTS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE RIGHT ON THE MARK. WE ARE LOOKING AT DIFFERENT WAYS OF HELPING IN THAT IMPORTANT AREA, AND WILL FACTOR IN YOUR SUGGESTIONS.

3. AS YOU HAVE CORRECTLY NOTED, RELIGIOUS LEADERS COULD PLAY AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT ROLE. WE HAVE BEEN PURSUING COURSES OF ACTION THAT REFLECT THAT REALITY. IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR, THE LEADERS OF THE CATHOLIC AND THREE MAJOR PROTESTANT CHURCHES IN THE UK AND IRELAND WERE RECEIVED AT A SENIOR LEVEL HERE IN THE DEPARTMENT FOR A DISCUSSION OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CONFIDENTIAL

We will give some thought
to your proposal to bring the religious
leaders together to work toward reconciliation.

(including our Ambassadors)

THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM. OUR EMBASSIES IN DUBLIN AND LONDON ARE IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE ROMAN CATHOLIC AND ANGLICAN LEADERSHIPS. AS YOU POINT OUT, THE CHURCH LEADERS IN THE TWO COMMUNITIES ARE CONTINUING WITH THEIR CONTACTS. ~~WE PREFER TO LEAVE THE INITIATIVE WITH THEM,~~

while continuing to make known our FSH support

4. AS YOU WELL KNOW, THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAS STAYED ACTIVELY ENGAGED ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE. IN JUST THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, HE MET WITH IRISH FM DICK SPRING, AND SPOKE ON NOVEMBER 24 WITH UK PM MAJOR ON THE SUBJECT. THE SECRETARY ~~HAS BEEN~~ SIMILARLY INVOLVED.

appropriate

5. THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN RECENT WEEKS, AND STATED PUBLICLY ON OCTOBER 30, THAT WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. IN THOSE STATEMENTS, THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED THE READINESS OF THE U.S. TO HELP THE PROCESS IN ANY WAY, ~~THE TWO SIDES FEEL IS APPROPRIATE.~~ OUR SENSE IS THAT FOR THE MOMENT, OUR MOST VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION IS TO SUPPORT THE COURAGEOUS AND DETERMINED EFFORTS OF THE ~~IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS AIMED AT~~ RESOLVING THE PROBLEM. ~~THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE TOLD US PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY HOW MUCH THEY APPRECIATE THE U.S. STICKING TO THAT LINE. THEY ALSO CONTINUE TO INDICATE THAT NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR APPOINTMENT OF A U.S. SPECIAL~~

parties involved

~~ENVOY.~~ 6. We will keep our policy under regular review and appreciate suggestions of new ideas, especially in light of the fast-moving developments on the Northern Ireland front. We will keep in close contact with you, particularly in view of the Vatican's interest.

And the National Security Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

<DIST>PRT: BERGER FUERTH GEARAN ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT(C2) SODERBERG
SIT: BLEICKEN FILE KUPCHAN SUM2 VAX WALKER

<PREC>IMMEDIATE<CLAS>~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI>RUEHRO<DTG>061941Z DEC 93
<ORIG>AMEMBASSY ROME
<TO>RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0247
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8485
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3282

<SUBJ> FURTHERING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 020996
WHITE HOUSE FOR COMMUNICATIONS DIR GEARAN
FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O: 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, VT

SUBJECT: FURTHERING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: SOURCES HERE CONFIRM THAT, ALTHOUGH THE USG CANNOT ITSELF SOLVE THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, IT SHOULD PLAY A POSITIVE, RESPONSIBLE, AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE NEW DIALOGUE AMONG THE PARTIES. AFTER MONTHS OF DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE WITH LEADERS IN ROME, RECENT CONVERSATIONS HERE WITH VATICAN OFFICIALS SUGGEST THAT THE USG COULD MOVE NOW TO SUPPORT INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND TO RE-ENFORCE THE ACTIONS BY UK AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS TO BEGIN A NEW PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. ECONOMIC INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND BY U.S. BUSINESSES COULD BE KEY ACCORDING TO NUMEROUS BRITISH OFFICIALS.END SUMMARY.
3. THE DEBATE AROUND THE "IRISH QUESTION" IS NOT NEW, BUT IT HAS RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE NEW ATTENTION OVER THE PAST WEEKS. IN NO SMALL PART THE HISTORIC ISRAEL/PLO AGREEMENT AND PRESIDENT CLINTON'S ACTION TO BRING THE TWO PARTIES TOGETHER AT THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE BOOSTED HOPES FOR PEACE WORLDWIDE. PREVIOUSLY A SOLUTION TO THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAS ESCAPED POLITICAL OFFICIALS OF ALL PARTIES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PUBLIC INTEREST, EXPRESSED DURING THE CAMPAIGN, WAS RECEIVED ENTHUSIASTICALLY NOT ONLY BY THE ACTIVE IRISH-AMERICAN COMMUNITY BUT ALSO BY ALL OTHERS COMMITTED TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE BE IT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR NORTHERN IRELAND.
4. UPON ARRIVING IN ROME IN JULY, I ESTABLISHED EARLY RELATIONS WITH U.K., IRISH AND VATICAN OFFICIALS INCLUDING THE POPE ON PRESIDENT CLINTON'S COMMITMENT TO HELP END THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND BRING PEACE. MY MOST RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH VATICAN OFFICIALS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF ALL SIDES, AND WITH THE AMBASSADORS HERE OF IRELAND AND THE U.K. HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVE. THESE CONVERSATIONS HAVE IDENTIFIED A WORTHWHILE INITIATIVE. THIS WOULD INVOLVE BRINGING RELIGIOUS LEADERS TOGETHER IN ARMAGH TO WORK TOWARDS RECONCILIATION. THIS MEETING COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.44)
KBH 4/11/2023

SIMILAR MEETING IN WASHINGTON WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE U.S. TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE.

5. THE PRESS HAS REPORTED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SUPPORT FOR RENEWED DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE. THIS DISPUTE CANNOT BE SOLVED BY OUTSIDERS, BUT OUTSIDERS HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPPORT DIALOGUE AND GIVE IT CREDIBILITY. WE CANNOT ALLOW VIOLENCE TO CONTINUE UNNOTICED, AND NOW WE HAVE A CHANCE TO SUPPORT STEPS THAT CAN LEAD TO PEACE.

6. CARDINAL DALY AND ARCHBISHOP AMES OF THE CHURCH OF IRELAND ARE PRIMATES FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE CHURCHES THROUGHOUT ALL OF IRELAND. AMCIT WILLIAM FRANKLIN TOLD ME LAST MONTH THAT THE ANGLICAN CENTER IN ROME, A LONG-ESTABLISHED OFFICE DEALING WITH ECUMENICAL RELATIONS WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, MIGHT BE A MEETING PLACE FOR CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT LEADERS WHERE DIALOGUE COULD BE ENCOURAGED.

7. THE GOVERNORS OF THE ANGLICAN CENTER, INCLUDING A VATICAN REPRESENTATIVE, MET RECENTLY TO DISCUSS THIS IDEA. THEY WERE FAVORABLE BUT RECOMMENDED A NEUTRAL LOCATION WOULD BE BETTER. THEY AGREED ARMAGH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. BOTH THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY -- WHO HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON THIS PLAN -- AND ARCHBISHOP AMES OF IRELAND WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED.

8. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROPOSAL WITH MY COUNTERPARTS IN ROME AMBASSADOR BROIN OF IRELAND AND PALMER OF GREAT BRITAIN. THE AMBASSADORS ARE INTERESTED AND WILL BE REPORTING TO THEIR CAPITALS.

9. ON FRIDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 3, 1993, I MET WITH CARDINAL CASSIDY WHO HAS AN IMPORTANT PORTFOLIO HERE FOR ECUMENICAL DIALOGUE. HE HAD ALREADY BEEN PLANNING TO BE IN ARMAGH IN MID-JANUARY TO ATTEND A PEA

CE VIGIL. HE GAVE SUPPORT TO THE IDEA OF MEETINGS OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN ARMAGH AND WASHINGTON. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD BRING THIS MATTER TO THE HOLY FATHER'S ATTENTION AND THAT, PERHAPS, THE PONTIFF, AS A SUGESTION, MIGHT BE INCLINED TO HOLD AN ECUMENICAL UNITY PRAYER SERVICE WITH ALL THE RESPECTIVE RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN ITALY AS WELL. HE MENTIONED ASSISI AS A POSSIBLE SITE FOR SUCH A SERVICE WHICH
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 020996
WHITE HOUSE FOR COMMUNICATIONS DIR GEARAN
FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O: 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, VT

SUBJECT: FURTHERING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND MIGHT BE MODELED ON THE PRAYER SERVICES THE POPE HELD FOR THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA. CARD. CASSDY ALSO SAID THE POPE MIGHT MENTION THIS INITIATIVE IN HIS ANNUAL ADDRESS TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS JANUARY 15.

10. MY EXPERIENCE IN RECENT YEARS WITH NORTHERN IRISH RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAS CONVINCED ME THAT AN ECUMENICAL MEETING WOULD HELP FOSTER RECONCILIATION. WE SHOULD REVIVE THIS IDEA. A SUBSEQUENT MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON THE SAME THEME COULD COMPLEMENT EFFORTS ELSEWHERE, AND INDICATE STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR PEACE IN ITS BROADEST SENSE.

11. AS WE LOOK FOR WAYS TO FOSTER PEACE EFFORTS, NEW

THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE COMMITMENT TO APPOINT
A SPECIAR ENVOY THIS ENVOY COULD ACT AS A
FACILITATOR TO ENCOURAGE THE PROCESS AND TO SUPPORT
THE TENTATIVE STEPS NOW BEING TAKEN BY ELECTED AND
RESPONSIBLE PARTIES. A BASIC PROBLEM WITH PEACE
EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN TO DATE IS THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE.
ALL PARTIES AT THE TABLE FEEL THAT THEY ARE FIXED
INTO THEIR POSITIONS, AND THE UNIONISTS AND SEINN
FEIN ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY ANY OF THE POSSIBLE
PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS. AN ENVOY COULD SERVE THE
CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS IN THE MIDDLE WHO WANT
PEACE, AND HELP MOVE THE EXTREMES TOWARD THE MIDDLE.
12. I HAVE BEEN TOLD CONSISTENTLY BY BRITISH
OFFICIALS THAT U.S. BUSINESS INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN
IRELAND IS KEY TO SUSTAINING ANY PEACE THERE. JOBS
NOT BOMBS WILL BRING ABOUT PROGRESS AND PEACE THEY
HAVE SAID. MUCH OF THE TROUBLE HAS ITS ROOTS IN POOR
CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS FIGHTING FOR JOBS. WE NEED
TO ENLARGE THE ECONOMIC PIE FOR BOTH SIDES. HAVING
WORKED ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND
FOR SEVERAL YEARS THROUGH BOSTON-IRELAND VENTURES, I
CONCUR. SUCH COMMON ECONOMIC INTERESTS COULD BE THE
"RAY OF HOPE" CITED IN A NOVEMBER 27TH ARTICLE IN THE
ECONOMIST AND COULD PROVIDE THE ENTREE FOR THE USG TO
CONSTRUCTIVELY PROMOTE AND SUPPORT THE PEACE
PROCESS.

FLYNN
NNNN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN>0996<STOR>931206145201 M0762141
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN>0996<STOR>931206145304 M0762143
<TOR>931206150559

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 0996 MSGID: M0767077

0AACZYUW RUEHROA0996 3401941-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

(CCY RECATEGORIZATION -AD0D1581-MSI8072-510)

O 061941Z DEC 93

FM: AMEMBASSY ROME

TO: RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0247

INFO: RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8485
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3282

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (2.45)

KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ROME 020996

NODIS

CORRECTED COPY - RECATEGORIZING TO NODIS
PER STATE 369415

WHITE HOUSE FOR COMMUNICATIONS DIR GEARAN
FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, VT

SUBJECT: FURTHERING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: SOURCES HERE CONFIRM THAT, ALTHOUGH THE
USG CANNOT ITSELF SOLVE THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND, IT SHOULD PLAY A POSITIVE, RESPONSIBLE, AND
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE NEW DIALOGUE
AMONG THE PARTIES. AFTER MONTHS OF DISCUSSING THIS
ISSUE WITH LEADERS IN ROME, RECENT CONVERSATIONS HERE
WITH VATICAN OFFICIALS SUGGEST THAT THE USG COULD
MOVE NOW TO SUPPORT INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND TO
RE-ENFORCE THE ACTIONS BY UK AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS TO
BEGIN A NEW PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. ECONOMIC
INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND BY U.S. BUSINESSES
COULD BE KEY ACCORDING TO NUMEROUS BRITISH
OFFICIALS.END SUMMARY.

3. THE DEBATE AROUND THE "IRISH QUESTION" IS NOT
NEW, BUT IT HAS RECEIVED CONSIDERABGE NEW ATTENTION
OVER THE PAST WEEKS. IN NO SMALL PART THE HISTORIC
ISRAEL/PLO AGREEMENT AND PRESIDENT CLINTON'S ACTION
TO BRING THE TWO PARTIES TOGETHER AT THE WHITE HOUSE

HAVE BOOSTED HOPES FOR PEACE WORLDWIDE. PREVIOUSLY A SOLUTION TO THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAS ESCAPED POLITICAL OFFICIALS OF ALL PARTIES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PUBLIC INTEREST, EXPRESSED DURING THE CAMPAIGN, WAS RECEIVED ENTHUSIASTICALLY NOT ONLY BY THE ACTIVE IRISH-AMERICAN COMMUNITY BUT ALSO BY ALL OTHERS COMMITTED TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE BE IT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR NORTHERN IRELAND.

4. UPON ARRIVING IN ROME IN JULY, I ESTABLISHED EARLY RELATIONS WITH U.K., IRISH AND VATICAN OFFICIALS INCLUDING THE POPE ON PRESIDENT CLINTON'S COMMITMENT TO HELP END THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND BRING PEACE. MY MOST RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH VATICAN OFFICIALS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF ALL SIDES, AND WITH THE AMBASSADORS HERE OF IRELAND AND THE U.K. HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVE. THESE CONVERSATIONS HAVE IDENTIFIED A WORTHWHILE INITIATIVE. THIS WOULD INVOLVE BRINGING RELIGIOUS LEADERS TOGETHER IN ARMAGH TO WORK TOWARDS RECONCILIATION. THIS MEETING COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A SIMILAR MEETING IN WASHINGTON WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE U.S. TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE.

5. THE PRESS HAS REPORTED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SUPPORT FOR RENEWED DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE. THIS DISPUTE CANNOT BE SOLVED BY OUTSIDERS, BUT OUTSIDERS HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPPORT DIALOGUE AND GIVE IT CREDIBILITY. WE CANNOT ALLOW VIOLENCE TO CONTINUE UNNOTICED, AND NOW WE HAVE A CHANCE TO SUPPORT STEPS THAT CAN LEAD TO PEACE.

6. CARDINAL DALY AND ARCHBISHOP AMES OF THE CHURCH OF IRELAND ARE PRIMATES FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE CHURCHES THROUGHOUT ALL OF IRELAND. AMCIT WILLIAM FRANKLIN TOLD ME LAST MONTH THAT THE ANGLICAN CENTER IN ROME, A LONG-ESTABLISHED OFFICE DEALING WITH ECUMENICAL RELATIONS WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, MIGHT BE A MEETING PLACE FOR CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT LEADERS WHERE DIALOGUE COULD BE ENCOURAGED.

7. THE GOVERNORS OF THE ANGLICAN CENTER, INCLUDING A VATICAN REPRESENTATIVE, MET RECENTLY TO DISCUSS THIS IDEA. THEY WERE FAVORABLE BUT RECOMMENDED A NEUTRAL LOCATION WOULD BE BETTER. THEY AGREED ARMAGH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. BOTH THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY -- WHO HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON THIS PLAN -- AND ARCHBISHOP AMES OF IRELAND WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED.

8. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROPOSAL WITH MY COUNTERPARTS IN ROME AMBASSADOR BROIN OF IRELAND AND

PALMER OF GREAT BRITAIN. THE AMBASSADORS ARE INTERESTED AND WILL BE REPORTING TO THEIR CAPITALS.
9. ON FRIDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 3, 1993, I MET WITH CARDINAL CASSIDY WHO HAS AN IMPORTANT PORTFOLIO HERE FOR ECUMENICAL DIALOGUE. HE HAD ALREADY BEEN PLANNING TO BE IN ARMAGH IN MID-JANUARY TO ATTEND A PEA

CE VIGIL. HE GAVE SUPPORT TO THE IDEA OF MEETINGS OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN ARMAGH AND WASHINGTON. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD BRING THIS MATTER TO THE HOLY FATHER'S ATTENTION AND THAT, PERHAPS, THE PONTIFF, AS A SUGGESTION, MIGHT BE INCLINED TO HOLD AN ECUMENICAL UNITY PRAYER SERVICE WITH ALL THE RESPECTIVE RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN ITALY AS WELL. HE MENTIONED ASSISI AS A POSSIBLE SITE FOR SUCH A SERVICE WHICH MIGHT BE MODELED ON THE PRAYER SERVICES THE POPE HELD FOR THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA. CARD. CASSIDY ALSO SAID THE POPE MIGHT MENTION THIS INITIATIVE IN HIS ANNUAL ADDRESS TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS JANUARY 15.

10. MY EXPERIENCE IN RECENT YEARS WITH NORTHERN IRISH RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAS CONVINCED ME THAT AN ECUMENICAL MEETING WOULD HELP FOSTER RECONCILIATION. WE SHOULD REVIVE THIS IDEA. A SUBSEQUENT MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON THE SAME THEME COULD COMPLEMENT EFFORTS ELSEWHERE, AND INDICATE STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR PEACE IN ITS BROADEST SENSE.

11. AS WE LOOK FOR WAYS TO FOSTER PEACE EFFORTS, ~~NEW~~ THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE COMMITMENT TO APPOINT A SPECIAL ENVOY. THIS ENVOY COULD ACT AS A FACILITATOR TO ENCOURAGE THE PROCESS AND TO SUPPORT THE TENTATIVE STEPS NOW BEING TAKEN BY ELECTED AND RESPONSIBLE PARTIES. A BASIC PROBLEM WITH PEACE EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN TO DATE IS THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE. ALL PARTIES AT THE TABLE FEEL THAT THEY ARE FIXED INTO THEIR POSITIONS, AND THE UNIONISTS AND SEINN FEIN ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY ANY OF THE POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS. AN ENVOY COULD SERVE THE CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS IN THE MIDDLE WHO WANT PEACE, AND HELP MOVE THE EXTREMES TOWARD THE MIDDLE.

12. I HAVE BEEN TOLD CONSISTENTLY BY BRITISH OFFICIALS THAT U.S. BUSINESS INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS KEY TO SUSTAINING ANY PEACE THERE. JOBS NOT BOMBS WILL BRING ABOUT PROGRESS AND PEACE THEY HAVE SAID. MUCH OF THE TROUBLE HAS ITS ROOTS IN POOR CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS FIGHTING FOR JOBS. WE NEED TO ENLARGE THE ECONOMIC PIE FOR BOTH SIDES. HAVING WORKED ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND FOR SEVERAL YEARS THROUGH BOSTON-IRELAND VENTURES, I

CONCUR. SUCH COMMON ECONOMIC INTERESTS COULD BE THE
"RAY OF HOPE" CITED IN A NOVEMBER 27TH ARTICLE IN THE
ECONOMIST AND COULD PROVIDE THE ENTREE FOR THE USG TO
CONSTRUCTIVELY PROMOTE AND SUPPORT THE PEACE
PROCESS.

FLYNN

BT

#0996

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

SIT: BLEICKEN HOLL WALKER WHSR_SPECIAL

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 0996 MSGID: M0767077

Draw - A copy w on Nancy's Chair

OAACZYUW RUEHROA0996 3401941-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

(CCY RECATEGORIZATION -AD0D1581-MSI8072-510)

O 061941Z DEC 93

FM: AMEMBASSY ROME

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (2.46)
KBH 4/11/2023

TO: RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0247

INFO: RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8485
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3282

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ROME 020996

NODIS

CORRECTED COPY - RECATEGORIZING TO NODIS
PER STATE 369415

WHITE HOUSE FOR COMMUNICATIONS DIR GEARAN
FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, VT

SUBJECT: FURTHERING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: SOURCES HERE CONFIRM THAT, ALTHOUGH THE USG CANNOT ITSELF SOLVE THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, IT SHOULD PLAY A POSITIVE, RESPONSIBLE, AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE NEW DIALOGUE AMONG THE PARTIES. AFTER MONTHS OF DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE WITH LEADERS IN ROME, RECENT CONVERSATIONS HERE WITH VATICAN OFFICIALS SUGGEST THAT THE USG COULD MOVE NOW TO SUPPORT INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND TO RE-ENFORCE THE ACTIONS BY UK AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS TO BEGIN A NEW PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. ECONOMIC INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND BY U.S. BUSINESSES COULD BE KEY ACCORDING TO NUMEROUS BRITISH OFFICIALS.END SUMMARY.
3. THE DEBATE AROUND THE "IRISH QUESTION" IS NOT NEW, BUT IT HAS RECEIVED CONSIDERABGE NEW ATTENTION OVER THE PAST WEEKS. IN NO SMALL PART THE HISTORIC ISRAEL/PLO AGREEMENT AND PRESIDENT CLINTON'S ACTION TO BRING THE TWO PARTIES TOGETHER AT THE WHITE HOUSE

HAVE BOOSTED HOPES FOR PEACE WORLDWIDE. PREVIOUSLY A SOLUTION TO THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAS ESCAPED POLITICAL OFFICIALS OF ALL PARTIES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PUBLIC INTEREST, EXPRESSED DURING THE CAMPAIGN, WAS RECEIVED ENTHUSIASTICALLY NOT ONLY BY THE ACTIVE IRISH-AMERICAN COMMUNITY BUT ALSO BY ALL OTHERS COMMITTED TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE BE IT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, OR NORTHERN IRELAND.

4. UPON ARRIVING IN ROME IN JULY, I ESTABLISHED EARLY RELATIONS WITH U.K., IRISH AND VATICAN OFFICIALS INCLUDING THE POPE ON PRESIDENT CLINTON'S COMMITMENT TO HELP END THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND BRING PEACE. MY MOST RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH VATICAN OFFICIALS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF ALL SIDES, AND WITH THE AMBASSADORS HERE OF IRELAND AND THE U.K. HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVE. THESE CONVERSATIONS HAVE IDENTIFIED A WORTHWHILE INITIATIVE. THIS WOULD INVOLVE BRINGING RELIGIOUS LEADERS TOGETHER IN ARMAGH TO WORK TOWARDS RECONCILIATION. THIS MEETING COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A SIMILAR MEETING IN WASHINGTON WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE U.S. TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE.

5. THE PRESS HAS REPORTED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SUPPORT FOR RENEWED DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE. THIS DISPUTE CANNOT BE SOLVED BY OUTSIDERS, BUT OUTSIDERS HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPPORT DIALOGUE AND GIVE IT CREDIBILITY. WE CANNOT ALLOW VIOLENCE TO CONTINUE UNNOTICED, AND NOW WE HAVE A CHANCE TO SUPPORT STEPS THAT CAN LEAD TO PEACE.

6. CARDINAL DALY AND ARCHBISHOP AMES OF THE CHURCH OF IRELAND ARE PRIMATES FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE CHURCHES THROUGHOUT ALL OF IRELAND. AMCIT WILLIAM FRANKLIN TOLD ME LAST MONTH THAT THE ANGLICAN CENTER IN ROME, A LONG-ESTABLISHED OFFICE DEALING WITH ECUMENICAL RELATIONS WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, MIGHT BE A MEETING PLACE FOR CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT LEADERS WHERE DIALOGUE COULD BE ENCOURAGED.

7. THE GOVERNORS OF THE ANGLICAN CENTER, INCLUDING A VATICAN REPRESENTATIVE, MET RECENTLY TO DISCUSS THIS IDEA. THEY WERE FAVORABLE BUT RECOMMENDED A NEUTRAL LOCATION WOULD BE BETTER. THEY AGREED ARMAGH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. BOTH THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY -- WHO HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON THIS PLAN -- AND ARCHBISHOP AMES OF IRELAND WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED.

8. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROPOSAL WITH MY COUNTERPARTS IN ROME AMBASSADOR BROIN OF IRELAND AND

PALMER OF GREAT BRITAIN. THE AMBASSADORS ARE INTERESTED AND WILL BE REPORTING TO THEIR CAPITALS.

9. ON FRIDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 3, 1993, I MET WITH CARDINAL CASSIDY WHO HAS AN IMPORTANT PORTFOLIO HERE FOR ECUMENICAL DIALOGUE. HE HAD ALREADY BEEN PLANNING TO BE IN ARMAGH IN MID-JANUARY TO ATTEND A PEACE VIGIL.

HE GAVE SUPPORT TO THE IDEA OF MEETINGS OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN ARMAGH AND WASHINGTON. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD BRING THIS MATTER TO THE HOLY FATHER'S ATTENTION AND THAT, PERHAPS, THE PONTIFF, AS A SUGGESTION, MIGHT BE INCLINED TO HOLD AN ECUMENICAL UNITY PRAYER SERVICE WITH ALL THE RESPECTIVE RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN ITALY AS WELL. HE MENTIONED ASSISI AS A POSSIBLE SITE FOR SUCH A SERVICE WHICH MIGHT BE MODELED ON THE PRAYER SERVICES THE POPE HELD FOR THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA. CARD. CASSIDY ALSO SAID THE POPE MIGHT MENTION THIS INITIATIVE IN HIS ANNUAL ADDRESS TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS JANUARY 15.

10. MY EXPERIENCE IN RECENT YEARS WITH NORTHERN IRISH RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAS CONVINCED ME THAT AN ECUMENICAL MEETING WOULD HELP FOSTER RECONCILIATION. WE SHOULD REVIVE THIS IDEA. A SUBSEQUENT MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON THE SAME THEME COULD COMPLEMENT EFFORTS ELSEWHERE, AND INDICATE STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR PEACE IN ITS BROADEST SENSE.

11. AS WE LOOK FOR WAYS TO FOSTER PEACE EFFORTS, NEW THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE COMMITMENT TO APPOINT A SPECIAL ENVOY. THIS ENVOY COULD ACT AS A FACILITATOR TO ENCOURAGE THE PROCESS AND TO SUPPORT THE TENTATIVE STEPS NOW BEING TAKEN BY ELECTED AND RESPONSIBLE PARTIES. A BASIC PROBLEM WITH PEACE EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN TO DATE IS THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE. ALL PARTIES AT THE TABLE FEEL THAT THEY ARE FIXED INTO THEIR POSITIONS, AND THE UNIONISTS AND SEINN FEIN ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY ANY OF THE POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS. AN ENVOY COULD SERVE THE CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS IN THE MIDDLE WHO WANT PEACE, AND HELP MOVE THE EXTREMES TOWARD THE MIDDLE.

12. I HAVE BEEN TOLD CONSISTENTLY BY BRITISH OFFICIALS THAT U.S. BUSINESS INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS KEY TO SUSTAINING ANY PEACE THERE. JOBS NOT BOMBS WILL BRING ABOUT PROGRESS AND PEACE THEY HAVE SAID. MUCH OF THE TROUBLE HAS ITS ROOTS IN POOR CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS FIGHTING FOR JOBS. WE NEED TO ENLARGE THE ECONOMIC PIE FOR BOTH SIDES. HAVING WORKED ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND FOR SEVERAL YEARS THROUGH BOSTON-IRELAND VENTURES, I

CONCUR. SUCH COMMON ECONOMIC INTERESTS COULD BE THE
"RAY OF HOPE" CITED IN A NOVEMBER 27TH ARTICLE IN THE
ECONOMIST AND COULD PROVIDE THE ENTREE FOR THE USG TO
CONSTRUCTIVELY PROMOTE AND SUPPORT THE PEACE
PROCESS.

FLYNN

BT

#0996

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

SIT: BLEICKEN HOLL WALKER WHSR_SPECIAL

AUTH WST DRAFT WST
CLEAR 1 WST 2 WST
3 — 4 — 5 WST
6 — 7 WST 8 WST

ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/NE:KSTEPHENS:DKS
12/23/93 78027 SENEUK 2806
EUR:SOXMAN

P:LBUTLER
NSC:
CA/VO/L/C:LYONTZ
EUR:MAPETERS

EUR/NE:MPARMLY
S/S:
S/S-0:
L/CA:RHENDERSON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.47)
K8H 4/11/2023

EUR, EUR/NE

IMMEDIATE DUBLIN

IMMEDIATE LONDON

MODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR SMITH FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY OXMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, CVIS, EI, UK

SUBJECT: GERRY ADAMS VISA ISSUE

REF: A) DUBLIN 7365 (NOTAL) B) DUBLIN 7366
C) DUBLIN 7396 (NOTAL)

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIMELY REPORTS ON YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS, SEAN O'HUIGINN, AND JOHN HUME (REFTELS). WE AGREE WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS THAT ISSUANCE OF A VISA SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF BEING HELPFUL TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THAT IS THE CLEAR MESSAGE BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 22 COMMENTS TO THE IRISH TIMES, WHERE HE LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO REVIEW THE ISSUE IN LIGHT OF GERRY ADAMS' RESPONSE TO THE REYNOLDS-MAJOR INITIATIVE.

2. THE NEXT STEP IS UP TO GERRY ADAMS. [IF HE RENOUNCES VIOLENCE AND TAKES STEPS TO JOIN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE A NEW LOOK AT THE RATIONALE FOR A WAIVER THE NEXT TIME HE APPLIES FOR A U.S. VISA.] GRANTING GERRY ADAMS A VISA IS ONE OF THE MOST VISIBLE PIECES OF LEVERAGE WE HAVE TO USE WITH SINN FEIN/PIRA TO ENCOURAGE THEIR JOINING THE PEACE PROCESS. WE WANT TO BE SURE, AS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEAN O'HUIGINN PUT IT SO APTLY TO YOU, THAT WE "MAXIMIZE REWARDS." WE HOPE THE CARROT OF A U.S. VISA WILL PROVIDE ADDED INCENTIVE TO GERRY ADAMS TO MOVE AWAY FROM VIOLENCE. YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OF STATE

INITIAL HERE 5.
 AUTH DRAFT
 CLEAR 1 2
 3 4 5
 6 7 8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGINAL

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2011-0355-F (2.48)
 KBH 4/11/2023

EUR/NE:MEPARMLY:MXP
 01/03/94, 7-6556 SENE 5532
 P:PTARNOFF

EUR:MAPETERS
 EUR/WE:EHEAPHY
 S/S:

EUR/NE:JFTEFFT
 P:DRUSSELL
 NSC:

EUR

IMMEDIATE ROME

ROUTINE LONDON, DUBLIN, BELFAST

ROME FOR THE VATICAN - AMB, FLYNN FROM U/S TARNOFF

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK, VT, US

SUBJECT: FURTHERING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: ROME 20996

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOUR COMMENTS ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE, WITH A RANGE OF IDEAS ON HOW TO HELP THE PROCESS ALONG, WERE MUCH APPRECIATED HERE IN WASHINGTON. MANY OF YOUR SUGGESTIONS MATCH CLOSELY WHAT WE ARE WORKING ON. YOUR COMMENTS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE RIGHT ON THE MARK. WE ARE LOOKING AT DIFFERENT WAYS OF HELPING IN THAT IMPORTANT AREA, AND WILL FACTOR IN YOUR SUGGESTIONS.

3. AS YOU HAVE CORRECTLY NOTED, RELIGIOUS LEADERS COULD PLAY AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT ROLE. WE HAVE BEEN PURSUING COURSES OF ACTION THAT REFLECT THAT REALITY. IN FEBRUARY *last* ~~OF THIS~~ YEAR, THE LEADERS OF THE CATHOLIC AND THREE MAJOR PROTESTANT CHURCHES IN THE UK AND IRELAND WERE RECEIVED AT A SENIOR LEVEL HERE IN THE DEPARTMENT FOR A DISCUSSION OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CONFIDENTIAL

THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM. OUR EMBASSIES, INCLUDING OUR AMBASSADORS, IN DUBLIN AND LONDON ARE IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE ROMAN CATHOLIC AND ANGLICAN LEADERSHIPS. AS YOU POINT OUT, THE CHURCH LEADERS IN THE TWO COMMUNITIES ARE CONTINUING WITH THEIR CONTACTS. WE WILL GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO YOUR PROPOSAL TO BRING THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS TOGETHER TO WORK TOWARD RECONCILIATION.

4. THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAS STAYED ACTIVELY ENGAGED ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE. YOU NO DOUBT SAW THE STATEMENT THE PRESIDENT ISSUED ON DECEMBER 15 WELCOMING THE REYNOLDS-MAJOR INITIATIVE ANNOUNCED THAT DAY. SINCE THEN, HE HAS WRITTEN TO THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS EMPHASIZING OUR READINESS TO BE OF ANY APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE TO THE EFFORTS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, including earlier, THE PRESIDENT MET WITH IRISH FM DICK SPRING ON NOVEMBER 16 AT THE WHITE HOUSE, AND SPOKE ON NOVEMBER 24 WITH PM MAJOR ON THE SUBJECT. THE SECRETARY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY INVOLVED.

sending to a U.S. representative to press for peace. and December

5. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE TOLD US REPEATEDLY HOW MUCH THEY APPRECIATE THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT, AND THE POSITION WE HAVE SET OUT. OUR SENSE IS THAT FOR THE MOMENT, OUR MOST VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION IS TO SUPPORT THE COURAGEOUS AND DETERMINED EFFORTS OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED AIMED AT RESOLVING THE PROBLEM.

6. WE WILL KEEP OUR POLICY UNDER REGULAR REVIEW, AND APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS OF NEW IDEAS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE FAST-MOVING DEVELOPMENTS ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND FRONT. WE WILL KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOU, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE VATICAN'S INTEREST.

yy

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Album e d

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

3/22

To Neal -

*Make sure to
peel before*

Dush meeting

on Wed.

no

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

*2011-0355-F (2.50)
KBH 4/11/2023*

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLL LEBOURGEOIS SUM2 VAX WALKER

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 162129Z MAR 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8955

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 1501

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 004554

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: GERRY ADAMS ON DOWNING
STREET DECLARATION AND POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

REF: BELFAST 112

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT:
SUMMARY

2. PROVISIONAL SINN FEIN (PSF) PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS' INTERVIEW (REFTEL) IN THE MARCH 8 "BELFAST TELEGRAPH" (A MODERATE UNIONIST AFTERNOON DAILY WITH THE LARGEST CIRCULATION IN THE PROVINCE) IS INTERESTING IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. LARGELY AN EFFORT TO RECAST THE GENERALLY NEGATIVE TONE OF HIS SPEECH AT THE PARTY'S "ARD FHEIS" (CONFERENCE), IT CONTAINS SIGNIFICANT LANGUAGE ON POSSIBLE SEPARATE POLITICAL STRUCTURES FOR PROTESTANTS IN A UNITED IRELAND (AN APPARENT REVERSION TO AN OLD SINN FEIN POLICY ADAMS HAD OVERTURNED) AND ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE THE NEED FOR PROTESTANT "ALLEGIANCE" TO A NEW IRELAND WITH REJECTION OF A "UNIONIST VETO" ON UNIFICATION. THE RHETORIC CAN BE FUDGED, BUT NOT THE MECHANICS; AND THAT IS THE STICKING POINT. END SUMMARY.
SPIN CONTROL

3. IN THE INTERVIEW, ADAMS APPEARS TO BE TRYING TO SOFTEN THE GENERALLY NEGATIVE REACTION TO THE PSF ARD FHEIS FROM LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA, CLAIMING IT AS HMG'S BAD BEHAVIOR, NOT PSF INTRANSIGENCE, THAT LED TO INTERPRETATION OF HIS "CRITICAL REVIEW" OF THE PAST YEAR AS A "NEGATIVE MESSAGE."
SEPARATE INSTITUTIONS?

4. ADAMS' STATEMENT THAT UNIONISTS MIGHT HAVE "SOME FORM OF SEPARATE INSTITUTIONS" TO PROTECT THEIR IDENTITY IN A UNITED IRELAND, AND THAT "ALL MODELS FOR A NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM" WOULD BE ON THE TABLE AFTER A BRITISH

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

WITHDRAWAL, ARE POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT COMMENTS. IF INTENDED SERIOUSLY, THEY REPRESENT A CURIOUS REGRESSION TO THE PRE-1981 PSF POLICY OF "EIRE NUA," IN WHICH FOUR REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS WERE ENVISIONED FOR THE FOUR TRADITIONAL PROVINCES OF IRELAND.

5. THE EIRE NUA POLICY WAS LARGELY THE AFFLATUS OF THE 1970'S PROVISIONAL MOVEMENT LED BY RUAIRI O BRADAIGH AND DAITHI O CONAILL (NOW BOTH WITH THE SPLINTER REPUBLICAN SINN FEIN). IT WAS DESIGNED TO EASE UNIONIST FEARS OF A UNITED CATHOLIC CONFESSONAL STATE AND TO BOLSTER THE PROVISIONAL MOVEMENT'S CLAIMS TO BE NON-SECTARIAN. EIRE NUA WAS FORMALLY SCRAPPED BY THE PSF AT THE 1982 ARD FHEIS -- AT THE INSISTENCE OF ITS THEN VICE PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS -- AS PART OF A LARGER INTERNAL FIGHT WITHIN THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT THAT ADAMS AND THE "NORTHERNERS" WON. IT IS IRONIC THAT, AS ADAMS NOW SEES THE NEED AT LEAST TO ADDRESS UNIONIST CONCERNS, HE HAS RETURNED TO IDEAS HE SCOTCHED OVER A DECADE AGO.
HOW MUCH CONSENT?

6. THE INTERVIEW HIGHLIGHTS THE IMPORTANCE OF APPARENTLY SUBTLE NUANCES IN POLITICAL RHETORIC IN ADAMS' TORTUOUS ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THE NEED FOR "ALLEGIANCE AND AGREEMENT OF THE IRISH PEOPLE" AND HIS REJECTION OF ANY "UNIONIST VETO" OVER CONSITUTIONAL CHANGE. ADAMS CLAIMS THAT THE HUME-ADAMS "DOCUMENT" CONTAINED THE IRA'S TERMS FOR ENDING VIOLENCE, AND THAT THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION FELL SHORT OF THIS -- THUS THE NEED FOR "CLARIFICATION." ADAMS AND HUME HAVE SAID THAT ANY FUTURE SOLUTION REQUIRED THE "ALLEGIANCE AND AGREEMENT OF THE IRISH PEOPLE." ADAMS REPEATED THAT PHRASE IN THIS INTERVIEW, BUT ALSO REITERATED THAT HMG HAD TO END THE "UNIONIST VETO" OVER CONSTITUTIONAL HANGE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

7. IN OTHER WORDS, ADAMS IS WILLING TO CONCEDE THAT ANY "END PRODUCT" OF IRISH SELF-DETERMINATION WOULD REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF THE UNIONISTS (AS PART OF THE "IRISH PEOPLE"), BUT HE REJECTS THEIR RIGHT TO EXERCISE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE SIX COUNTIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS IS WHY PSF CANNOT ACCEPT THE KEY SENTENCE IN ARTICLE FOUR OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION: "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AGREE THAT IT IS FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE ISLAND OF IRELAND ALONE, BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO PARTS RESPECTIVELY, TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION ON THE BASIS OF CONSENT, FREELY AND CONCURRENTLY GIVEN, NORTH AND SOUTH, TO BEING ABOUT A UNITED IRELAND."

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

8. ADAMS KNOWS THAT HMG HAS MADE A CONCESSION IN TALKING ABOUT "THE PEOPLE OF THE ISLAND OF IRELAND ALONE," SINCE THIS PHRASE REFLECTS A CORE DOGMA OF REPUBLICAN THEOLOGY -- THAT IRISH MEN AND WOMEN ALONE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 004554
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: GERRY ADAMS ON DOWNING STREET DECLARATION AND POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE MUST DECIDE IRISH DESTINY. BUT PSF BALKS AT THE REST OF THE SENTENCE BECAUSE THE MECHANISM OF SELF-DETERMINATION IS SPLIT INTO "TWO PARTS RESPECTIVELY" AND "CONCURRENT" MEANS THAT UNIONIST "AGREEMENT" IS TO BE MEASURED VIA THE ARITHMETIC OF SIX COUNTIES, NOT THIRTY-TWO. FOR PSF THIS IS A "VETO" -- AND MUST BE "CLARIFIED" OUT OF EXISTENCE BY HMG.

LIMITS TO FUDGE

9. DEFINITIONS CAN BE PUSHED AND STRETCHED; "ALLEGIANCE AND AGREEMENT OF THE IRISH PEOPLE" CAN MEAN ALMOST ANYTHING, INCLUDING A NEW PSF TWIST HEARD IN BELFAST LATELY -- "MAXIMUM CONSENT POSSIBLE." MECHANICS, HOWEVER, ARE A DIFFERENT MATTER; IN THE END, THERE IS NO REAL WAY TO FUDGE HOW PREFERENCES ARE TO BE EXPRESSED -- EITHER ISLAND-WIDE OR SPLIT BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH, "RESPECTIVE" AND "CONCURRENT."

10. ADAMS AND HIS PARTY WANT THE MECHANICS ALTERED. THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS THUS ARE WHETHER HMG WOULD EVER AGREE TO DO SO, OR ALTERNATIVELY WHETHER THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT CAN BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION AS IT STANDS. SEITZ

BT

#4554

NNNN

<MSGID> M0938796

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLL LEBOURGEOIS SUM SUM2 VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 301642Z MAR 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4974
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1961
RUSNSTB/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 001836
LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, EI, UK
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND AND AN EASTER BREAKTHROUGH?
REF: (A) LONDON 05410
(B) DUBLIN 01660

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.51)
KBH 4/11/2023

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DAVID DONOGHUE, DEPUTY HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' (DFA) ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, COMMENTED TO US ON MARCH 30 THAT DFA WAS UNAWARE OF ANY SINN FEIN/IRA PLANS FOR AN EASTER SUNDAY OR MONDAY (ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1916 UPRISING) PRONOUNCEMENT OR OTHER "BREAKTHROUGH" (REF. A). ALTHOUGH HE SAID SPECULATION ABOUT THAT POSSIBILITY WAS NATURAL, HE ATTRIBUTED THE PLETHORA OF RUMORS TO THAT EFFECT TO JOHN HUME'S STATEMENT TO THE MEDIA (BELOW) AND TO EASTER MONDAY'S STATUS AS THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1916 UPRISING AGAINST THE BRITISH.
3. SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME WAS QUOTED IN THE MARCH 26-27 MEDIA AS SAYING THAT HIS "PERSONAL DEADLINE" FOR A SINN FEIN/IRA RESPONSE TO THE JOINT DECLARATION WAS APRIL 3, EASTER SUNDAY. WHEN ASKED WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN THE EVENT OF SINN FEIN/IRA'S FAILURE TO RESPOND, HUME REPORTEDLY REPLIED THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD THEN GO AHEAD WITH NEW TALKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND WITH THE NORTHERN CONSTITUTIONAL PARTIES. DFA'S DONOGHUE, HOWEVER, SAID THAT HUME HAD BEEN MISQUOTED AND THAT HE HAD SAID ONLY THAT HE "HOPED" THAT THERE WOULD BE A SINN FEIN/IRA RESPONSE AT EASTER.
4. LOCAL RUMOR HAS IT THAT HUME IS ALSO CONSIDERING PUBLICATION OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS, POSSIBLY CONNECTED TO THE HUME-ADAMS INITIATIVE, IF THERE IS NO RESPONSE FROM SINN FEIN/IRA BY EASTER.

COMMENT

5. (C) IN THE EVENT OF A TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE (REFTELS), THE IRISH GOVERNMENT MIGHT DECIDE TO USE IT AS A PRETEXT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

FOR AN INVITATION TO SINN FEIN TO PARTICIPATE IN THE "FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION" MENTIONED IN THE JOINT DECLARATION. IF SO, THE IRISH WOULD BE CAREFUL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A DISCUSSION AMONG NATIONALISTS AND NEW ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD PROBABLY INTERPRET THE PROCLAMATION OF A TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE AS ANOTHER SMALL STEP TOWARDS AN ULTIMATE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, STRESSING THAT THE PROCESS WILL BE LONG AND DIFFICULT, FULL OF UPS-AND-DOWNS. THE IRISH BELIEVE THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO RESPOND IN A POSITIVE MANNER TO MEANINGFUL GESTURES BY SINN FEIN/IRA AND TO HELP FILL THE POLITICAL VACUUM IN REGARD TO NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH APPEARS LIKELY TO PERSIST FOR THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. SMITH

BT

#1836

NNNN

<MSGID> M0964966

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 6, 1994

To: Tony
From: Nancy *W*

Rod called me after you left. See attached.

In addition he said "Reynolds is in danger of destabilizing the process by shaking Adams' hand 6 days after the cease-fire."

They also learned of the Reynolds-Adams meeting through the press which really pissed them off. They hope we don't give Adams the red carpet treatment when/if he comes and asked that he not come the week of October 10-15 during their party conference. I said Adams had tentatively indicated a desire to come the week of September 19. Rod said he understood the pressures on us to let Adams come and the best time from their perspective would be the last week of September. He also asked if we could make the visa conditional on Adams saying the cease-fire is for good, it's over, etc. I said we'd been urging Adams to go further towards permanent but I wasn't sure about linking it to the visa.

Generally, Rod would prefer that we wait until either Adams says more or they have more evidence that the situation on the ground has changed. I said we are in no hurry and will work closely with them on it and keep them fully informed on visa requests and decisions.

I asked what the earliest would be that Unionists could come to the US, he said he wasn't sure when Molyneaux would return; he thought two weeks but in any case other Unionists could come. We talked about the need to keep Hume involved and that it might make sense to have the Unionists, Hume and then Adams visit the U.S.

Rod's off to Holland and Belgium but asked that we stay in touch through Phillippa.

UPDATE 9/7

Leon Fuerth called to relay the details of his meeting with Reynolds. Reynolds thinks Major is stalling for time because he was caught off guard. Seems to have little sympathy for his politics. The VP offered to call Molyneaux and had a good conversation with him from AF2. The VP suggested a private

Reynolds-Molyneaux meeting while they are both in Australia later this month. Molyneaux said he'd give it some thought and let us know if he wants us to broker it. The VP asked Molyneaux what the reaction would be to an Adams visa and Molyneaux replied, "it would be very negative, people would be incensed."

Leon thought it was fine if you followed up with a call to Molyneaux to invite him to the US and to reference the VP's conversation.

Lastly, Sandy Berger got a read out last night of Crowe's call with the President. Generally the same points as Rod's only Major apparently told Crowe it could be very difficult if we let Adams come anytime before their party conference. Rod has told me just not during or in the week preceding.

cc: SB, Stevens, Vershbow

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 6, 1994

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.56)
KBH 4/11/2023

MEMO TO: Leon Fuerth

FROM: Nancy Soderberg *NS*

RE: Message from Major re: Reynolds meeting

John Major's national security advisor (or the equivalent) Rod Lyne called me tonight at 8pm (i.e., very late his time) to send several points to the Vice President regarding his meeting with Reynolds.

They are generally concerned about bringing the Unionist community on board and feel the series of Irish-US-Sinn Fein meetings and contacts are exacerbating the angst level in the Unionist community. We had the Clinton-Spring meeting, the Reynolds-Adams-Hume meeting and now the VP-Reynolds meeting -- but no Unionist meeting. While we have made a point about reaching out to the Unionists (TL called Molyneaux, Crowe met with him and we've invited him to D.C.), there have been no public meetings. They ask that the VP low-key the meeting to the extent possible.

As you probably know, the Brits have been pushing Adams to say the word permanent. You will hear from Reynolds that Adams has come pretty darn close -- especially following today's statement with Reynolds, Hume and Adams saying they are all "totally and absolutely committed" to peace. The Brits feel they need a bit more (i.e., "it's over for good") from Adams. Reynolds is probably losing patience with the Brits but their problems with the Unionists is real. We've privately been pushing Adams to do more. The Brits ask that you urge Reynolds to push Adams to go a bit further so they have something real to take back to the Unionists. To the extent the VP's statement following the meeting can use the "it's over for good/permanent" terminology the Brits would appreciate it. FYI, the Brits are also watching the IRA activity on the ground and while there are still some problems they are seeing positive signs.

The Brits are concerned about cooperation with the Irish following the IRA cease-fire. They generally want a higher level of cooperation. They are not as upbeat as Reynolds about the cease-fire and point out that many tough issues remain, not least of which is their need to bring the Unionists along. They are

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CLINTON~~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

upset that Reynolds shook Adam's hand only six days after the cease-fire -- they prefer to wait and be sure the situation on the ground is real.

The British request was basically "get word to the Vice President's party to be cautious about what comes out of the meeting. And don't sign up to anything."

I asked if anything in particular would be helpful for the VP to say if he got asked and Lyne replied:

"Urge the IRA to make it permanent, reach out to both sides, this is only the early days, we need to consolidate the cease-fire and ensure that the balance of the cease-fire has been preserved."

Hope this is helpful. Also, Crowe (and I suppose Smith) would appreciate a read out as soon as feasible.

Feel free to call me this evening at home (202-232-3198) or through the White House operator if you want to discuss anything further.

You all made us proud in Cairo and I'm glad those Hizbullah's didn't get you! Look forward to seeing you upon your return. Lot's of great issues await you -- enjoy the Irish one while you can!

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon Between President Clinton and British Prime Minister Major

NOTE TAKERS: Katherine O'Loughlin, Anne Alexander, Ted Seigny and Thorn Turner

DATE/TIME: 31 August 1994, 0804-0809 EDT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (1.57)
KBH 4/11/2023

Prime Minister Major: Hello, is that you Bill?

President Clinton: Yes, hello.

Prime Minister Major: Sorry, you suddenly disappeared. How are you?

President Clinton: I'm fine. I hope you are pleased with the statement. I know it is not everything you wanted. It shows the courage and vision you have all shown. I hope everything works out.

Prime Minister Major: It looks very promising, doesn't it? It doesn't say quite what we hoped, but Adams may say that in the press conference. The comment on the cessation of violence is a very good thing. What we need him to say is that it is a permanent thing, but this is the most encouraging we've seen.

President Clinton: I'm very encouraged by the events. I want to work with you and Albert on this. Lake tried to call Molyneux yesterday.

Prime Minister Major: I'm meeting with him in a couple of hours.

President Clinton: I've been speaking with Crowe and keeping up on this. I hope the Unionist Community will support it. We have been developing an assistance package designed to reach out to the communities. We need to work together on this. We must be in lock step.

Prime Minister Major: Well that's very kind of you. I appreciate what you've done, what you're doing and what you've just said. We only hope that the last half step will be taken in the press conference. I understand their difficulty in using the word "permanent" because it's a British word, but we hope they can say it in another way.

President Clinton: Well, I'm going to issue a statement this morning, but I wanted to talk to you first. It welcomes the ceasefire, but stresses that it has to deliver what is promised.

Prime Minister Major: Well I think that is immensely helpful. I've issued a preliminary statement that the IRA has put out a declaration of cessation of violence but it needs to be made permanent. ...I think your statement is very helpful.

President Clinton: Good.

Prime Minister Major: Well Bill, that is tremendous. I'm very grateful. We must keep in touch on this. I look forward to hearing from you soon.

President Clinton: I'll proceed. Let me know if there is anything I can do. I've been in touch with Crowe and he will be in touch with you. We'll keep working on our side to help both sides make this thing work.

Prime Minister Major: Good to hear from you.

President Clinton: Great John. Goodbye.

Prime Minister Major: Take care. Goodbye.

Darby, M. Brooke

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.
To: Darby, M. Brooke; Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Saunders, Richard M.; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: Hume-Adams history [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Tuesday, September 20, 1994 11:25AM

. Please pass to Nancy Soderberg:

I looked into your question about the history of Hume-Adams talks. As you already know (and I didn't) Hume-Adams had secret talks in the '80s -- I've found no one who knows precisely when they began (if you've heard '86 from Hume himself that sounds plausible - though Jonathan Powell at the British Embassy has a vague impression they started much earlier); they ended in 1988 when they became public. The talks were restarted in 1992 and became public in 1993. Hume draws a relation between the later talks and the earlier ones.

Darby, M. Brooke

From: Kreczko, Alan J.
To: Darby, M. Brooke; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Baker, James E.; LeBourgeois, Julien D.; Stephens, Kathleen D.
Subject: [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Wednesday, September 21, 1994 7:00PM

Brooke, please pass to Nancy:

1. We have worked out inter-agency a cable on what constitutes fund-raising. DOJ, INS, and State have cleared. It is being cross-hatched over.

—I have previewed it with Neal O'Dowd. He initially resisted the third item — no fund-raising at any event Adams attends — but in subsequent calls he seemed to accept it. He has asked whether second point — which would permit charging admission to cover expenses of a meeting — can include Adams' travel-related expenses. I'm checking inter-agency; I told him I'd get back to him tomorrow.

2. Re PLO, State says they will have tomorrow a paper describing the evolution of our visa relationship with the PLO. It is clear that for the first year and a half after the PLO renounced violence, during which time we conducted a political dialogue with the PLO in Tunis, (1988-1990), we maintained a very rigorous visa practice. We did let a few PLO members come to attend academic conferences. But they were clearly limited to the particular event, and fundraising was out.

When the US-PLO dialogue was terminated in 1990 because of PLO resumed involvement in terrorism, our visa practice stiffened again, with few admittances other than for humanitarian reasons (e.g. to visit a sick relative.) There was some relaxation immediately before the Madrid conference, to get out the pro-peace view, and then again after the Madrid conference, in terms of letting in a few more PLO officials to support the Palestinian negotiating team. While fundraising was not explicitly proscribed in their visas at the time, it was made clear that their entry was limited to the particular purpose approved and that we would not have tolerated fundraising.

Since the Arafat-Rabin agreement, we have relaxed further, in terms of letting PLO officials now come rather freely for conferences, speeches, etc. In April this took another step forward, with the decision to grant some multiple entry visas to certain PLO officials. These visas are not restricted. State says the fundraising issue has not presented itself and they therefore have not had to pronounce on it. They are aware of no fundraising by PLO officials visiting here, although they suspect some small scale stuff may take place. They are certainly aware of no case where a senior PLO official has sought to come for a tour in order to raise funds for the PLO. If asked about such a possibility, they (Kurtzer) think they would deny because of the likely adverse public reaction.

3. Regarding Kiernan Staunton, Justice has cleared my talking to Morrisson, notwithstanding the on-going litigation. However, we've missed each other. Will try again tomorrow.

4. Regarding the Smith extradition case, Justice is going slow, despite UK urging a quick appeal. Their current inclination remains that Smith is not a flight risk, and therefore they don't need to make an urgent decision. Instead, they may simply seek to negotiate a bail agreement with Smith. As to whether to appeal, they have not reached a conclusion. The criminal division of Justice is recommending an appeal. The SG's office is leaning that way also, on grounds the court interpreted the treaty erroneously. They know we want to be consulted before any decisions are made.

Signed,

Alan O'Kreczko

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 161108Z SEP 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6193
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 005030

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.4b)
KBH 7/11/2023

NODIS

FOR P, EUR AND EUR/NE

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

PASS TO LONDON AND BELFAST

PASS TO BONN FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: VISAS FOR GERRY ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN
OFFICIALS

REF: DUBLIN 4973

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. JUST TO CLARIFY AND NSURE THAT THERE IS NO CONFUSION
OVER THE INTENTIONS OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THE ISSUE
OF VISA WAIVERS FOR GERRY ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES, I
REPEAT WHAT I REPORTED IN REFTTEL, "MARTIN MANSERGH, THE
PRIME MINISTER'S SPECIAL ADVISOR RESPONSIBLE FOR NORTHERN
IRELAND, ASKED ME SEPTÉMBER 14 TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE
TO FACILITATE THE ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO GERRY ADAMS AND
TWO OF HIS ASSOCIATES WHO WILL APPLY AT CONGEN BELFAST IN
THE NEAR FUTURE. MANSERGH STATED THAT PRIME MINISTER
REYNOLDS AND FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING ARE IN COMPLETE
AGREEMENT THAT PROMPT ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO THE SINN FEIN
LEADERS WILL BE A CRITICALLY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO
THE PEACE PROCESS."

3. THIS UNSEEMLY DELAY IN WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A
ROUTINE MATTER IS PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE THAT
QUESTION THE SINCERITY OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE AND FOR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

WHATEVER REASON ARE THREATENING THE CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS BY THEIR NIT-PICKING AND GRUDGERY. THE DELAY IS CAUSING CONFUSION OVER OUR INTENTIONS AND GOOD WILL. WE APPEAR TO BE ACCEPTING OVER EXAGGERATED CLAIMS OF THE IMPACT THIS VISIT IS GOING TO HAVE EITHER AT HOME OR ABROAD BY THOSE WHO ARE SEEKING VIRTUALLY ANY REASON TO SCUTTLE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A ROUTINE, ADMINISTRATIVE FINDING.

4. OUR CONCERN SHOULD BE FIRST AND FOREMOST, WHAT IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THE PRESIDENT HAS CLEARLY DEFINED THAT TO BE PEACE AND AN END TO VIOLENCE. THE SINN FEIN/IRA HAVE DONE THEIR PART. NOW IT IS INCUMBENT ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT THEIR COMMITMENT TO PEACE. TO STRENGTHEN AND SOLIDIFY THEIR COMMITMENT TO PURSUING THEIR OBJECTIVES DEMOCRATICALLY THROUGH THE POLITICAL PROCESS, WE MUST CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE RANK AND FILE OF THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY THAT THE PEACEFUL PURSUIT OF POLITICAL ENDS BRINGS ACCEPTANCE AND INCLUSION. THIS DELAY IS SIMPLY SUPPLING AMMUNITION TO THOSE WHO WOULD ARGUE THAT THE NATIONALISTS ARE STILL BE TREATED AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS AND THAT THE PEACEFUL, DEMOCRATIC OPTION IS NOT BEARING THE PROMISED FRUIT.

5. I HAVE BEEN ASSURED AGAIN THIS MORNING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND SPEAKS AS ONE, WITH NO DISSSENT, IN SUPPORTING THE IMMEDIATE GRANTING OF VISAS TO GERRY ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THAT THIS PEACE MUST BE BUILT ON AND CEMENTED. THIS IS A MEANINGFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CAN PLAY. IT IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST AND ONE WHICH WE SHOULD NOT SHIRK. ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE HELD OFF IN APPLYING FOR THEIR VISAS OUT OF CONCERN OVER THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT SHOULD THEY BE DENIED. HOWEVER, TIME IS NOW SHORT AND COMMITMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE ON THEIR BEHALF AROUND THE U.S. THUS, IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR ADVICE FROM ONE OF THEIR INTERLOCUTORS, THIS MORNING, I SUGGESTED THAT THEY PROCEED WITH THEIR APPLICATIONS SO THAT THEY MAY BE PREPARED TO TRAVEL AS SOON AS THE WAIVERS ARE GRANTED. I REQUEST THAT THE DECISION BE MADE URGENTLY TO GRANT THESE WAIVERS AND ALLOW THIS PSYCHOLOGICALLY VITAL VISIT TO TAKE PLACE ASAP. AS I NOTED IN REFTTEL, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WHATEVER COMMITMENTS MR. ADAMS MAKES IN REGARD TO THIS WAIVER, E.G. STAYING ON THE WEST COAST AND OUT OF WASHINGTON WHILE OTHERS ARE THERE, ETC., WILL BE KEPT.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

6. PLEASE ADVISE URGENTLY. SMITH

BT

#5030

NNNN

<MSGID> M1255976

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1994

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.41)
KBH 4/11/2023

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a decision memo from Tony Lake on whether and under what conditions to grant a new visa to Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein.

Adams wants to come from September 21 through October 9. The British prefer waiting until after Prime Minister Major's party conference October 10-15. Tony presents three options: (1) approve a visa from September 24 to October 7, which would shorten Adams visit and delay it until after John Hume and a high-level Unionist delegation have come here (both scheduled for next week before the 24th); (2) approve a visa starting October 17, as the British would prefer; (3) accept Adams's request for a visa from September 21 to October 9. For reasons spelled out in the memo, Tony recommends option (1).

On a second issue, Tony recommends that we lift the existing ban on official U.S. contacts with Sinn Fein, but that we hold off for now on deciding the precise level and nature of these contacts.

Tony also joins Ambassador Crowe in recommending that you call Prime Minister Major before your decision is announced.

Leon Panetta and George concur with Tony's recommendations. Leon Fuerth has reviewed the memo and is going to discuss it with the Vice President tonight, so you can discuss it with the Vice President tomorrow. He'll be with you at the Pentagon.

John Podesta
Todd Stern

JP
T

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

7313

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

September 16, 1994

94 SEP 16 P4:07

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland: Gerry Adams Visa and Contact Issues

Purpose

To decide if, when, and under what conditions we issue another visa to Gerry Adams, and whether and at what level the Administration meets with him in Washington.

Background

Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has indicated he plans to apply for a U.S. visa to visit the United States September 21 to October 9. He expects to visit New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Hartford, Albany, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco and possibly Washington, D.C. Detroit and Kansas City are also possibilities. He expects to bring his press officer and speechwriter with him and we are checking whether they, too, have visa eligibility problems. It is not yet clear what, if any, fundraising activities he plans. He hopes to at least charge admission for his talks to cover the cost of his trip.

There is general agreement at the State Department, support from the Irish and acceptance by the British, that we should look favorably upon a visa application from Adams at some point following the IRA cease-fire.

Adams' trip will garner enormous publicity in Britain and Ireland: when he comes, what he says, and how he is received here could have a major impact on the peace process. On the one hand, an Adams trip will bolster the IRA's moves toward peace and political engagement; at the same time, an early and warm embrace of Adams could further exacerbate tensions in the Unionist Community. The Irish support a visit by Adams within the general timeframe he has requested; the British have urged you to wait until after Prime Minister Major's party conference October 10-15. If we do allow Adams in before the Party conference, the British urge that we limit his stay to six days and do not receive him at the White House. Senator Biden has indicated a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(2.62)
KBH 4/11/2023

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

desire to host Adams in the Senate, perhaps with Hume. Dodd and Kennedy have pushed for us to agree to Adams' request.

Timing: There are four separate visits that need to be juggled: by Adams, by John Hume, by the Unionists and by Deputy Prime Minister Dick Spring. In addition, we need to consider the timing of the congressional schedule and Major's party conference. Adams' people claim his early timing is dictated by his need to solidify U.S. support for the cease-fire before meeting with IRA hard-liners back home in early October. He also wants to visit before Congress is scheduled to adjourn on October 7 and wants to be back in Ireland by mid-October when Reynolds will hold preparatory talks for the peace negotiations at the end of October.

John Hume has made it clear that he wants to be the first to visit the U.S. following the cease-fire and is planning to come next week. The Vice President, as well as a variety of Members of Congress, will most likely see him. Although the Unionist leader, James Molyneaux, is traveling in Australia, we have arranged for a high-level Unionist visit September 22-23. Dick Spring plans to visit September 29-October 1.

Other visits to keep in mind are: Reynolds in New York October 6 and 7, Yeltsin Summit September 27 and 28 and Mandela October 4-5. We have been encouraging the Unionist leader Jim Molyneaux to visit Washington and will push him again to come in early October. At this point, he has been noncommittal. Finally, the controversial Unionist leader Ian Paisley has indicated he plans to visit in late October. He is not a constructive force for peace but is pushing for high-level U.S. government meetings. We can hold off on a decision for now.

Attached is a letter and statement from John Major. He made a surprise announcement and visit to Northern Ireland today and announced the end of the Broadcast ban on Sinn Fein and the IRA and the opening of ten border crossings. In addition, he reiterated he would enter into talks with the IRA within three months of a permanent cease-fire and that he hoped the IRA would do more to clarify its positions on the permanency of its cease-fire. He also announced that he would hold a referendum on any results of the negotiations. These moves are significant and will help boost the process significantly. Until today, Adams had little tangible response to his cease-fire.

There are basically three options:

1. Approve a visa after the Unionists depart, starting September 24 and ending October 7: Delay Adams' visit a few days until

after Hume and the Unionists have visited Washington but allow him to come prior to Major's party conference.

Pros: Allows Adams to demonstrate support for his cease-fire by visiting the United States relatively early on, thus consolidating support among his hard-liners and ensuring continued progress toward peace.

Will avoid embarrassment to Adams by minimizing the change in his planned schedule, most of which is well known.

Will enable Adams to meet with Members of Congress, thereby increasing support for any possible aid package.

Would minimize problems with Major trimming Adams' request on both ends, especially ensuring he doesn't depart the 9th on the eve of Major's Party Conference on the 10th.

Cons: Prime Minister Major will be annoyed.

Depending on how the Unionist visit goes, the Adams' visit could inflame Unionist fears and insecurities, thus undermining the peace process.

Some may argue that the visit should be held off until the cease-fire has been in effect for another month or two to help ensure its permanency.

2. Approve a visa starting October 17: Adams would visit the U.S. only after Major's party conference.

Pros: Major and the Unionists would be pleased.

Could boost the Unionists who support peace.

Cons: Would cause a real embarrassment for Adams and could undermine cease-fire.

Would annoy Prime Minister Reynolds and John Hume.

Could open you to criticism of taking Major's internal domestic politics too much into account in our decisionmaking.

Could cause Adams to miss key talks with Reynolds in the lead-up to the peace talks, although Reynolds could probably delay the talks until Adams' return.

Could annoy members of Congress who want to see Adams and show support for an aid package.

3. Approve request to come September 21 - October 9 but only to D.C. after Hume and the Unionists have come and gone.

Pros: Would enable Adams to carry out his planned itinerary and optimize his support here and at home.

Would enable Hume and the Unionists to come to D.C. first, thus underscoring our support for them.

Would please some in Congress who support Adams' request and enable Adams to meet with members.

Would help galvanize early support for an aid package.

Cons: Despite no physical presence in Washington, his presence in the country will be a major press story which could overshadow the visits by Hume and the Unionists.

Would greatly annoy the British and Major, in particular.

Could undermine efforts to bring Unionists into the peace process.

On balance, I recommend you agree to option 1 as it strikes the best balance between the needs of Adams, Major and the Unionists. It enables you to push Adams a bit and warmly welcome the Unionists before an Adams visit, thus helping to mitigate to some extent Major's political problems with the Unionists. We will have to once again work to ensure Major understands our reasoning, but I believe any problems will be manageable.

Conditions: We are reviewing what, if any, conditions to place on a possible visit. The Attorney General does not object to the visa waiver if we determine Adams' entry serves foreign policy purposes. She strongly opposes any fundraising. I believe it is important to permit a return visit by Adams to keep the momentum for peace within the IRA moving forward. The more he is exposed to hard questions and hard scrutiny, as he was in January, the better. The fundraising issue is a bit complex. Clearly, outright fundraising for his party or the IRA should be prohibited. The IRA remains a heavily-armed paramilitary group which has not yet disarmed. We are still reviewing the questions of whether to allow Adams to raise funds to help defray the cost

of his trip; we are skeptical that he could not come up with the funds for that purpose on his own.

Contacts: We also need to decide whether to end the long-standing U.S. policy of no substantive contact with Sinn Fein/IRA officials. Ambassador Crowe recommends that when we open an official channel to Sinn Fein/IRA, we do it initially through our Consul General in Belfast. Crowe feels strongly that it is too early to arrange official, high-level meetings for Adams in Washington. Ambassador Smith in Dublin has requested permission to initiate contacts with Adams and other Sinn Fein officials in Dublin. Unlike Crowe, she favors official appointments for Adams in Washington. On the Hill, it appears the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is considering an informal meeting with Adams. Speaker Foley is reviewing the possibility of a meeting and has said publicly he intends to do so.

I recommend we lift the ban on contacts with Sinn Fein when Adams comes to the U.S. so that Administration officials at some level and location can meet with Adams and other Sinn Fein officials. We need to continue to work through whether and how he should be received at the White House and State Department. The Irish are concerned if we do not, it would be perceived as the White House snubbing Adams. One issue is how to calibrate his visit with that of the Unionist leaders and Hume. The Vice President and I have met in the White House with Catholic leader John Hume and Unionist leader Molyneaux, who represent Northern Ireland's two largest parties. As the politics of the issue with the British and others are still evolving, we shall hold off on a decision until closer to the visit.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That Gerry Adams' application for a U.S. visa (requiring a waiver of his existing ineligibility on terrorist grounds) be approved for the period beginning September 24-October 7, after the Hume and Unionist visits but before Major's party conference.

Approve Disapprove

Alternatively, that Adams' application be approved for the two and a half week period beginning October 17, after Major's party conference.

Approve Disapprove

Alternatively, that Adams' application be approved as submitted for the two and a half week period beginning September 21.

Approve Disapprove

2. That we lift the ban on official contacts with Adams, with the nature of these contacts to be determined closer to the event.

Approve Disapprove

3. Ambassador Crowe strongly urges you to call Major before your decision is announced. I suggest you call him this afternoon. (Suggested talking points are at Tab C.)

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab A Letter from Major and His Remarks
- Tab B Cable
- Tab C Talking Points for Call to Major

PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

16 September 1994

Dear Bill,

I know that Haiti is taking up a great deal of your time at the moment, but I wanted to keep you abreast of the important steps I am taking today over Northern Ireland.

I shall shortly be announcing a commitment to hold a referendum in Northern Ireland on the outcome of the process of political talks which we began in 1991. This is the process which Sinn Fein will in due course be able to enter so long as they demonstrate a permanent commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic methods.

I shall at the same time lift the restrictions on broadcasting which were imposed in 1988 to prevent terrorist organisations from exploiting our media. This will be seen as a very significant recognition of the changed situation in Northern Ireland following the IRA's ceasefire.

In the background to these political moves, the police and army commanders have felt it right to take a number of operational decisions, easing certain security measures as a result of the reduced threat from terrorism. One of their recent decisions has been to open some border crossing points between Northern Ireland and the Republic which IRA activities obliged us to close over the years.

My full statement, which I attach, sets out the position in more detail.

PERSONAL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PERSONAL

- 2 -

I am very keen to move the peace process forward as fast as I sensibly can, but ensuring at every stage that we are carrying the main body of opinion in Northern Ireland with us. I believe that my announcement today will have this effect. But, as I have said in my statement, Sinn Fein must make it unambiguously clear that they and the IRA have decided to give up violence for good. It would be very helpful if your Administration could continue to emphasise this.

When I have assessed the effect of this announcement, and depending of course on Sinn Fein's actions and the situation on the ground, there are other forward steps I shall wish to make in the days and weeks ahead. I can only do so if we establish a sufficient level of confidence in Northern Ireland. As Roderic Lyne has explained to Tony Lake and Nancy Soderberg, I am concerned that a premature visit by Gerry Adams to the United States could impede this. A triumphal procession by Adams across the United States risks destabilising the majority community, and undermining all of the parties which have followed the constitutional path (including John Hume's SDLP).

I would much prefer it for Adams not to visit the United States until after mid-October. This would give me the necessary breathing space to build up confidence and establish the ceasefire more securely. Were Adams to pay an earlier visit to the United States, I very much hope that its length and profile could be strictly limited in the way suggested by Roderic Lyne to the NSC. I would greatly appreciate your support in this.

*Your sincerely,
Tony*

The President of the United States of America

*ie no
write now,
6 days*

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 161422Z SEP 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6196
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO //

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 005039

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.64)

KRM 4/11/2023

NODIS

FOR P, EUR AND EUR/NE

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

PASS TO LONDON AND BELFAST

PASS TO BONN FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: VISAS FOR GERRY ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN
OFFICIALS

REF: DUBLIN 5030

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AN TAOISEACH/PRIME MINISTER ALBERT REYNOLDS CALLED ME THIS MORNING FROM HONG KONG TO EXPRESS HIS DEEP CONCERN OVER THE VISA WAIVERS FOR GERRY ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES. REYNOLDS SAID DENYING SINN FEIN VISAS NOW WOULD SEND THE WORST POSSIBLE SIGNAL TO THE NATIONALISTS. IT WOULD BE PERCEIVED THAT THE U.S.G. WAS SOMEHOW BOWING TO UNIONIST AND BRITISH PRESSURE. IT WOULD BE SEEN AS A PERVERSE EXTENSION OF THE "UNIONIST VETO".

3. REYNOLDS REITERATED AGAIN THAT CONFIDENCE IN PEACE IN THESE EARLY STAGES IS EXTREMELY FRAGILE. HE ARGUED THAT SINN FEIN MUST BE SEEN TO BE FAIRLY TREATED BY THE AMERICANS. IRISH POLICY SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF VIOLENCE BY THE IRA HAS BEEN TO TREAT THE SINN FEIN/IRA LIKE ANY OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY, WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION. HE FORCEFULLY UNDERScoreD

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

THAT TO DATE, NEITHER THE UNIONISTS OR BRITISH HAVE DONE ANYTHING TO UNDERPIN THE PEACE PROCESS. LOYALIST PARA-MILITARIES CONTINUE THEIR VIOLENCE.

4. REYNOLDS ALSO REITERATED THAT ADAMS HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF TO STAY AWAY FROM WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK WHILE OTHER VISITORS ARE THERE AND TO ADJUST HIS ITINERARY AS WE FEEL APPROPRIATE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTS ADAMS' PARTICIPATION IN EVENTS AIMED AT FUNDRAISING WITHIN APPROPRIATE PARAMETERS. SINN FEIN IS NOW A CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY DEDICATED TO PARTICIPATING IN THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESS. THE PARTY HAS LEGITIMATE EXPENSES AND CAN NOT BE CUT OFF FROM NORMAL SOURCES OF FUNDING. REYNOLDS CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT SINN FEIN WANTS TO PLAY THE ROLE OF A NORMAL, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PARTY AND NOT BE PUSHED AROUND BY THOSE OPPOSED TO THEIR INCLUSION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

5. COMMENT: REYNOLDS ALSO EXPRESSED HIS DISMAY, WHICH I SHARE, THAT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR HAS REACTED SO NEGATIVELY TO ONE OF THE FEW POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF HIS BELEAGUERED PRIME MINISTERSHIP. THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF VIOLENCE BY THE IRA SHOULD BE SEEN AS A VICTORY BY MAJOR, NOT AS A THREAT TO HIS POLITICAL SURVIVAL. I TRUST THAT HIS LACK OF VISION WILL NOT KEEP US FROM DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO PROMOTE THE PRESIDENT'S GOAL OF BRINGING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION TO NORTHERN IRELAND. END COMMENT. - SMITH

BT

#5039

NNNN

<MSGID> M1256332

Points for Major

- Thank you for your letter. As you know, I value our close contacts on Northern Ireland.
- Congratulations on your announcement on lifting the broadcast ban on the IRA and the opening of border crossings. These are important steps that will help move the process forward.
- I share your concern over the need to bring the Unionist community along. We have worked hard to get a good group to Washington as soon as possible.
- Unfortunately, Jim Molyneaux (Mull-en-no) is in Australia but Ambassador Crowe has managed to pull a good group together who will be visiting the United States September 21-23. [Willie Ross, Ken MacInnis, David Trimble, Jeffrey Donaldson].
- We'll go out of our way to ensure they receive red carpet treatment. (Probably VP drop by a meeting in Tony's office or a VP meeting.)
- I wanted to let you know what I have decided on Gerry Adams' request to visit the United States.
- I am extremely sensitive to your own needs to balance the Unionists' politics. But I also have to ensure we don't set Mr. Adams back so soon after his announcement on the cease-fire.
- I think we've come up with a compromise that will meet your needs and those of the Irish and Adams.
- We will allow Adams to arrive the 24 of September -- the day after the Unionists depart -- and make sure he leaves a few days before your party conference begins, on October 7. This shortens his request on both ends. (He originally requested September 21 - October 9).
- This will enable us to see John Hume first, then the Unionists, then Dick Spring -- and then Adams.
- Again, congratulations on your trip to Belfast today and your courageous announcements.
- We'll certainly keep in close contact as events unfold.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Participation in the White House Conference
for Trade and Investment in Ireland, May 24-26

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.66)
KRH 4/11/2023

OVERVIEW

The White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland is unique in the history of U.S. relations with Ireland and with the United Kingdom. It is a tangible, dramatic demonstration of your commitment to seizing the opportunity for political and economic revitalization in Ireland that the cease-fire has created. The Irish-American community is thrilled with the Conference and will be well-represented. Every significant political party in Northern Ireland and the Republic will be represented at a high level, although the leaders of the two largest Unionist parties, James Molyneaux of the UUP and Ian Paisley of the DUP, have announced they are not attending, citing concerns that the business aims of the Conference will be overshadowed by politics (i.e., too much attention to Gerry Adams).

The key aim of the Conference is to demonstrate to U.S. business leaders that peace in Northern Ireland is real and that it opens opportunities for trade and investment in Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic most affected by the violence. U.S. business response to the Conference has been positive but not overwhelming; while acknowledging its advantages as a potential EU gateway, many American business leaders view the Irish market -- north or south -- as simply too small to deserve major attention. Nonetheless, the Conference has attracted a solid turn-out of over 300 U.S. business leaders and an impressive collection of 100 British and Irish business leaders, in addition to an extraordinary range of British and Irish governmental, political and community leaders from across the political and social spectrum. Indeed, the Conference will bring together for the first time key figures from each of Northern Ireland's political parties, including Sinn Fein and the political arms of the loyalist paramilitaries, as well as the larger constitutional parties. They will be joined by a large contingent of Irish figures from the Republic, particularly the border counties.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

We have emphasized two points in the run-up to the Conference: It is a business, not political, event, and it is a milestone in an ongoing process of promoting economic regeneration in the region rather than an end in itself. That said, press attention will focus on the politics of the occasion, particularly Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams' first meeting -- which the British are terming "informal" -- with British Secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Highlight to American business leaders the improved opportunities for trade and investment in Ireland created by peace.
- o Underscore the critical relationship between economic hope and political progress, between investment and fair employment, and between jobs and peace.
- o Remind the disparate political and community leaders present at the Conference of their shared interest in fostering increased trade and investment in their communities, and encourage them to work together on these issues.
- o Reach out to the Unionists represented at the Conference, assuring them of our commitment to a just settlement in Northern Ireland that enjoys the support and democratic consent of both communities.
- o Advance our economic initiatives in Ireland, making clear the deep and abiding commitment of the Administration to supporting peace and economic progress.

BACKGROUND

The Conference. You announced your intention to hold this Conference on November 1, 1994 as part of a package of economic initiatives to support peace in Northern Ireland. On December 1, 1994, you appointed Senator George Mitchell to be Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Economic Initiatives in Ireland. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown traveled to Belfast in mid-December 1994 to attend British Prime Minister John Major's investment conference; Brown also visited Dublin.

The Conference is designed to focus on areas of special potential in the economy of Northern Ireland and the border counties, including tourism, tradeable services, manufacturing and information technologies. We will report on the progress made on

SECRET

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

the Administration's economic initiatives and announce follow-up actions, including your visit to the area later this year if you so decide.

The Peace Process. A British junior minister, Michael Ancram, joined talks with Sinn Fein on May 10. The British have also extended invitations to the other political parties of Northern Ireland (with the exception of Sinn Fein and the loyalist paramilitary parties, who are still in "exploratory dialogue") to start bilateral discussions on the future of Northern Ireland, using the Framework Documents announced earlier this year as the basis for talks. They have begun individual meetings with the Unionists and Hume's SDLP and had the first "multilateral" meeting last Thursday between Major, Unionist leader Molyneux and Hume.

Sinn Fein believes it is stuck in exploratory talks and is now insisting on full parity with other parties in bilateral talks with the British. They have held several mostly peaceful protests on this issue. British Secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew has offered to meet "informally" with Gerry Adams at the beginning of the Washington Conference; we are telling Sinn Fein this should give them enough to keep them in dialogue with the junior minister.

Prime Minister Major has stated that Sinn Fein's entry into roundtable talks with mainstream political parties depends on Sinn Fein gaining "the confidence of other parties by making a commitment to progressive disarmament and by beginning a verifiable process of decommissioning." He claims the Unionists will not agree to join talks with Sinn Fein absent progress on decommissioning. The British do not expect a wholesale surrender of IRA arms, but they do expect Sinn Fein to agree that stockpiles must be verified and dismantled in stages. The British and Irish governments have indicated that a third party, perhaps a Nordic country, might be invited to oversee the process.

We need to continue to push Sinn Fein to stay engaged in the current round of talks and to make some confidence-building gestures on the decommissioning issue. At the same time, we should urge the British and the Unionists to recognize that substantial decommissioning of weapons is likely to come much later in the political process and that, with the cease-fire approaching its first anniversary in August, it is important to get all-party talks underway as soon as possible.

Although Irish Prime Minister Bruton emphasized the importance of progress on decommissioning earlier this month when he met with Major in Moscow, the British are irate over recent Irish

SECRET

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

government suggestions to the press that British insistence on even a token IRA gesture on arms before substantive talks was neither practical nor helpful. HMG feels it has no more room to maneuver on decommissioning and that Irish dismissal of even a token gesture of decommissioning only encouraged hardliners on both sides.

Unionist leader Jim Molyneaux pulled out of the conference on Friday following Sir Patrick Mayhew's announcement of his planned "informal" meeting with Gerry Adams at the conference. We are pushing him to reverse that decision but are unlikely to succeed. There will be second-tier Unionists at the conference, however, and we will make sure they receive high level attention.

Conference "Deliverables." We will issue on May 25, the morning of your speech to the plenary session, a press announcement which updates and expands upon the economic initiatives program you announced November 1, 1994 (Draft of May 25 announcement is attached). Your speech will highlight a few of these initiatives; Commerce Secretary Brown will use his remarks (which precede yours) to go into more detail on them. The "deliverables" we will announce include:

- Your intention to visit the UK and Ireland later this year (if you approve);
- George Mitchell's continuing as Special Advisor for Economic Initiatives in Ireland (Mitchell has committed to staying at least until the end of 1995; his office at the State Department will be staffed and engaged on this issue at least through 1996);
- A renewal of your commitment to increase U.S. funding for the International Fund for Ireland in FY96 and 97 (although in the current climate on the Hill IFI we may have to settle for retaining the \$19.6 level of recent years);
- Our proposal to the IFI that they establish a Technology Trust Fund for Peace, inspired by John Cullinane's idea of a BIRD-type program which would support R&D joint ventures;
- A number of new Commerce Department programs, including a new management intern program bringing Northern Ireland and border counties managers to work in U.S. firms, a new Business Information Center for Northern Ireland and the border counties accessible by 24-hour flash-fax, and a permanent Commerce Department presence in Belfast;

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

- Several new USIA, SBA, USDA and other agency initiatives, including increased exchanges and grants for Northern Ireland projects;
- A hoped-for signing of a joint communique on tourism cooperation between the U.S., Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.
- A number of follow-on trade missions.

VISAS

We have granted 3 month multiple-entry visas with no fundraising restrictions to about ten individuals -- both Sinn Fein and loyalist paramilitaries. There is little press interest in the issue now since the Adam's visa was resolved in March. However, the access to the U.S. to officials on both sides is an important confidence building measure.

EVENTS

Speech to the Plenary Session. You will speak to the 1,000-plus participants in the Conference during the morning plenary session on May 25. Your speech is being billed in the UK and Ireland as the first substantive address by an American President devoted specifically to Ireland and will be exhaustively analyzed. We will have the speech ready for your review on Monday.

White House Reception. You are hosting a reception on the South Lawn for the Conference participants. We have prepared short talking points for use with the main Northern Ireland political leaders who will be present.

Drop-by on Spring-Mayhew Meeting. You are tentatively scheduled to drop by a meeting that the Vice President or I will have with Irish Deputy Prime Minister Dick Spring and British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Sir Patrick Mayhew, the two ranking Irish and British government representatives at the Conference. I recommend that you try and drop by in order to underscore your commitment to the peace process and continuing engagement in it. Pressure for progress needs to be maintained on all fronts.

Drop-by Columnists. We also recommend you drop-by a meeting on Tuesday in the Roosevelt Room with columnists who follow the Irish issue. Suggested talking points and Q & A's are attached.

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

MEETING WITH
IRISH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DICK SPRING AND
BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND PATRICK MAYHEW

CONTEXT OF MEETING

You will drop by a meeting hosted by the Vice President or Tony Lake with the two ranking Irish and British government representatives at the Conference, Dick Spring and Sir Patrick Mayhew. Both men will want to express their appreciation to you for the personal attention you have devoted to the Conference and to encouraging U.S. businesses to invest in the area.

There is a gap developing between the British and Irish governments over the question of progress on arms decommissioning as the price of admission for Sinn Fein (and the loyalist paramilitaries) to all-party talks. Some elements of the Irish government believe the British are insisting on something Sinn Fein/IRA can never deliver, and that even if a token handover of weapons occurred, it would only whet Unionist demands for more.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- Urge the British and Irish to continue to work together closely and to keep their disagreements private.
- Discuss your possible visit to the United Kingdom and Ireland later in the year, as well as a possible stop in Northern Ireland.

CORE POINTS

- Both of your governments have made courageous efforts to achieve peace in Northern Ireland.
- Job creation through trade and investment is the key to cementing the cease-fire and giving people an interest in maintaining peace.
- This Conference is only the beginning of our efforts to attract business to Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland. Senator Mitchell and his staff intend to continue working with the Commerce Department to follow up on the Conference.
- We will continue to push Sinn Fein on decommissioning.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (2.67)

KBH 4/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

September 6, 1994

To: Tony
From: Nancy *VP*

Rod called me after you left. See attached.

In addition he said "Reynolds is in danger of destabilizing the process by shaking Adams' hand 6 days after the cease-fire."

They also learned of the Reynolds-Adams meeting through the press which really pissed them off. They hope we don't give Adams the red carpet treatment when/if he comes and asked that he not come the week of October 10-15 during their party conference. I said Adams had tentatively indicated a desire to come the week of September 19. Rod said he understood the pressures on us to let Adams come and the best time from their perspective would be the last week of September. He also asked if we could make the visa conditional on Adams saying the cease-fire is for good, it's over, etc. I said we'd been urging Adams to go further towards permanent but I wasn't sure about linking it to the visa.

Generally, Rod would prefer that we wait until either Adams says more or they have more evidence that the situation on the ground has changed. I said we are in no hurry and will work closely with them on it and keep them fully informed on visa requests and decisions.

I asked what the earliest would be that Unionists could come to the US, he said he wasn't sure when Molyneaux would return; he thought two weeks but in any case other Unionists could come. We talked about the need to keep Hume involved and that it might make sense to have the Unionists, Hume and then Adams visit the U.S.

Rod's off to Holland and Belgium but asked that we stay in touch through Phillippa.

UPDATE 9/7

Leon Fuerth called to relay the details of his meeting with Reynolds. Reynolds thinks Major is stalling for time because he was caught off guard. Seems to have little sympathy for his politics. The VP offered to call Molyneaux and had a good conversation with him from AF2. * The VP suggested a private

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2011-0355-F, 2.68]

Reynolds-Molyneaux meeting while they are both in Australia later this month. Molyneaux said he'd give it some thought and let us know if he wants us to broker it. The VP asked Molyneaux what the reaction would be to an Adams visa and Molyneaux replied, "it would be very negative, people would be incensed."

Leon thought it was fine if you followed up with a call to Molyneaux to invite him to the US and to reference the VP's conversation.

Lastly, Sandy Berger got a read out last night of Crowe's call with the President. Generally the same points as Rod's only Major apparently told Crowe it could be very difficult if we let Adams come anytime before their party conference. Rod has told me just not during or in the week preceding.

cc: SB, Stevens, Vershbow

October 3, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

FROM: BROOKE DARBY

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: Telephone Call Between Nancy Soderberg and Gerry Adams (1st Official Contact Between U.S. Official and Sinn Fein Representative)

3:25 - 4:15 P.M., SATURDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1994

- Hi, Nancy Soderberg here.
- Yeah, nice to meet you by phone.
- Likewise, how's the trip going?
- Who do you think was behind the murder attempt and other....?
- When was that?
- Yeah, it's something I've been following for a long time when I was with Senator Kennedy's Office -- plastic bullets and shoot to kill. It's something people here have a long standing issue with the British over.
- Yeah, he told me about it.
- OK, I'll pass that on.
- I think he has every intention of continuing to do that.
- This is a very naughty thing.
- Let me tell you where we are on your trip to D.C. I know you've been talking to Niall (O'Dowd) -- who has been great. He's really first class and can keep things to himself -- which is all too rare.

I think he's filled you in on where we are on the meeting. It's problematic. What we trying to do is balance your needs with those of the British and the Unionists so we can push all sides to move forward to help those who have taken courageous steps, including yourself.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2011-0355-F, 2.70]

- This should have been handled differently.
- You got some misinformation in the beginning.
- We didn't get into the process until your trip was already planned. It was important for you to keep to your original itinerary but it was not the best timing for us.
- It is hard for you to understand our nuances of bureaucracy.
- We wanted to try to keep our strong support of you and our good relations with the Unionists and British to allow us to push them forward.
- What was important was that you maintained your timeframe and we appreciated the political sensitivities of the British and Unionists given the short timeframe between timing since the ceasefire.
- To keep the British from going off the deep end, we needed you to come and to calibrate the reciprocity of who you'd see in D.C. with the distance from the ceasefire -- the longer away you get from the ceasefire, the higher level the visit. You would be received at a level commensurate with how long it is away from the ceasefire.
- For you to come for 2 weeks with your itinerary, be received by Members of Congress, meet with people at State and from the White House, announce the lifting of the ban.....
- The President's goal is to support you strongly and keep us in a position to push the British when we need to.
- I appreciate that.
- That's true, right.
- That's why we were thinking your visit would be further down the road so we could work it out ahead of time.
- I would have wanted to avoid this situation.
- The context of how the people here view the situation -- that's the fundamental problem and why we want to put distance at receiving at this level. There needs to be a time lag between coming to the White House and renouncing violence.
- . Let me tell you the politics.

- There is a strong culture in the U.S. against those involved in violence.
- It was two years from the time the PLO announced violence that they came here.
- It was a major heavy lift to get the visa.
- That's not how people look at it here.
- Yes, you've done what we asked and made a courageous step forward.
- Here, the ultimate prestige presence is the prestige of walking through the White House doors needs to be calibrated as part of a process we're getting moving.
- We've done a lot getting you here, lifting the ban, getting you meetings with Administration officials. We support you politically and are sending strong support and visible acceptance.
- This is part of a process. First you get received officially. We went through this with the President last night. He said we can do more next time -- that this is part of a process.
- We know the problem is with the Unionists and with Hume having met with the President. But the Unionists are seen as not involved in violence.
- I said we should have had this done 3 weeks ago and told people that we wanted to avoid this kind of discussion.
- There are a couple of ways to look at this. Part of it is how the press is playing it up because we haven't been able to say what we're doing.
- I think this situation is unfortunate but we are where we are. We spend about six hours yesterday on this. None of us are comfortable on this but we're trying to make the best of it.
- Niall has been extraordinarily helpful.
- With respect to how we play this -- I want to announce the ban is lifted on talking to Sinn Fein and the meeting with you at the State Department in a White House press release. They'll be regular meetings in Belfast and Dublin and dialogues with you directly. You'll be able to present your

case at the State Department. It will be useful for you to develop a dialogue with the State Department who does the diplomacy (not just with me).

- My only rebuttal is that I understand the situation. But this is the beginning of the relationship and of a process. You have the support of the White House and we are pushing the other parties.
- We got jammed on your planning your trip before we could work it.
- Tony Lake negotiated with Major on how to keep them on board. It is important to coordinate your trip with making decisions on where and by whom you'd be received. To go back against the British will undercut us in going back to the British on some of the things you may need.
- They're in a bind.
- This should have been worked out well before you got on a plane.
- I did. I was pretty clear.
- I heard the Belfast thing didn't go too well. Niall mentioned that, which is unfortunate.
- In Val's defense, that was State's formal instructions -- he had no choice.
- We wanted to clearly work out the fundraising issue before you got here.
- My best advice is -- this is a bad situation. It's unfortunate and should have been avoided. But now you have 2 choices: to agree to a meeting or not.

If you agree, we can talk to the Unionists and Major and keep Alderdice away. We can make a big deal of lifting the ban and the meeting with White House and State people, including the Vice President's National Security Advisor.

The Vice President has been very helpful. Without him, you wouldn't have gotten the visa in February.
- It is a worse negative to have no meeting. They can say they've won -- that there's friction between us.

- Or we can say this is part of a process. We can get our press operation to make this a big deal.
- You don't want to minimize the magnitude of your walking in the doors of the State Department and letting our press operation work it.
- I recommend announcing this as soon as possible. I can't say anything now. I don't want to say anything until you've agreed.
- The difference is and this is where you have credibility -- they have had a dialogue with us for some time, so they have meetings with us at a higher level.

But this is a first step and we can the press to spin this. This is the first time we've talked to you in 25 years. That's no minor action.

- I understand the problems with the Unionist access.
- You're beginning to change perceptions. This is the first stage in a process that will continue.

The President said yesterday that we will do more next time and I think he means it. You have a friend in moving forward.

- You shouldn't minimize the fact that we want a chip for going back to the British --- to say that we've held up our end and now you do your part.
- I was very straightforward with Niall on this and I was hopeful we could change this.
But the reality is that everything was set in stone when...
- He is from the same hometown as Tony Lake -- he's been very helpful in talking to Tony about this.
- We aren't going to do anything until you're comfortable with it.
- Saturday.
- All I would say -- let me leave you with -- let's start it on Monday and we can build from there.
- I think we can do that with this meeting: lifting the ban and make clear that's exactly what we're doing.

- Likewise.
- You should talk to me later and I'll fill him in.
- You should know that we spent a lot of time going back and forth on this.
- I've been formally prohibited from talking to you until today.
- OK.
- Let me give you a number for this evening if you want to talk again (gave home number). I'll be here 'til 6:00 and then home.
- We can talk later tonight or tomorrow morning.
- I'm going to talk to him right now.
- I called you.
- Do you want to set a time to talk again, or just when you're ready?
- I'll leave it with you and let me know what you want to do.
- If you want to do it tomorrow, it would be helpful to formally announce whatever we agree on.
- Do you mean to lift the ban without addressing the meeting?
- We announce....
- It would be helpful for you if we announced the ban without addressing the meeting.
- OK, let me see if we can do that.
- Is there someone I can talk to while you're at the reception?
- Historic first contact.
- I'll let him know either way -- I'll go talk about it right now.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Oifig an Taoiseach
Office of the Taoiseach.

20 November, 1995.

The Right Honourable John Major, MP,
Prime Minister.

Dear John

Thank you for your letter. I appreciate the thought you have put into your response. Likewise I have examined your proposals very carefully with Dick Spring, Proinsias de Rossa and our officials. I do believe some limited changes and elaborations are necessary before we can go ahead. I enclose an amended communiqué and a draft answer to questions about Washington Three, which we can consider in our next phone conversation. They can provide the principal focus for our discussions.

I share your concern at the ominous signs of increasing polarisation evident in the situation since last August. There are disquieting signs within the nationalist community of serious disillusionment at the failure to build on the momentum of the peace, with obvious consequences for the authority of those who called and sustain their ceasefire. It is now more vital - and urgent - than

Oifig an Taoiseach, Tithe an Rialtais, Balle Átha Cliath 2.
Office of the Taoiseach, Government Buildings, Dublin 2.

[2011-0355 - F, 2.71]

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

-2-

ever to build political momentum so as to underpin the unique opportunity of this peace with a lasting political settlement.

I do not share your assessment of the impact of my speech last Saturday week.

You acknowledged in your earlier letter, and my public record abundantly confirms, that I have always taken extraordinary pains to take account of unionist concerns myself, and to encourage others to do so. Indeed the unprecedented emphasis I gave to this dimension gave rise to some misconception on the nationalist side that it was at the cost of neglect of their legitimate and equally important concerns.

I was at pains to make clear in my speech that I am fully concerned for both, and to set out in detail my views in that regard.

Both our Governments have formally and explicitly recognised, in the Joint Declaration and the Joint Framework Document, that a totally new dispensation is needed in relation to Northern Ireland. We affirm the principle of consent as the key protection of unionist rights, but we equally acknowledge the need for extensive change and totally new political structures if nationalists in Northern

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

-3-

Ireland are also to have ownership of the institutions governing them - a requirement equally necessary for justice and stability.

Indeed I think it would be helpful on your side to make clear that the British Government, in the exercise of a wider responsibility which transcends the unionist agenda, remains committed to the balanced approach and the philosophy underlying these documents. It would in particular be helpful if you could find an early occasion to reassure nationalists that their political future and rights are not once again being decided, as they still fear, as a function of unionist requirements. We must both show clearly, as I did in my London speech, that our intergovernmental agenda remains resolutely dedicated to reconciling the rights of both communities.

I accept that, while unionists do not have a veto, there can be no settlement without them. Nor can there be a settlement without broad nationalist support.

As regards an elected body, I made clear in my last letter that David Trimble's proposals should be given a respectful and constructive hearing and I will work to ensure this. At the same time you will be aware of the very strong nationalist opposition to such an approach.

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

-4-

We must, therefore, ensure that David Trimble's proposals are treated in a way which does not prejudice the prospect of a constructive hearing but, equally, which does not weigh the scales against the general nationalist view. I might add that there will be a strong onus on David Trimble to allay nationalist fears that his proposal resiles from the position established in the 'Brooke Talks', particularly as regards the role of the two sovereign Governments, and to address the practical objections in terms of the potential for increased polarisation of such an election campaign, excess of negotiating numbers and so forth.

As to the remaining difficulties:

I consider the International Body will be of value in direct proportion to whether it offers to transcend the present impasse, as opposed to merely postponing it for a few weeks. That impasse centres mainly on "Washington Three". For that reason it must be agreed between us that the Body will deal with this aspect and that, at a minimum, there is an open mind on your side on the possibility of an alternative approach, and a readiness to consider such an alternative on its merits, and that this will be made clear in your public statements.

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

-5-

I agree that we are looking at a date that is a firm aim, rather than a fixed date, but there is an understandable scepticism across the nationalist spectrum about unionist intentions in this regard, and the ability of the Governments to reach that objective. For that reason, we should spell out more fully the proactive role that the two Governments will play in the preparatory talks to lend conviction to the objective. I believe we should also agree, to underline the seriousness of our resolve, to meet jointly with the parties to review the situation and to consider the way forward, when we have the mid-January report of the International Body and the results of our first round of political contacts.

On the question of arms, I believe there is a general acceptance that there should be no equivalence between paramilitary and security force weaponry; that it is accepted that Sinn Féin may put, and the Body take cognisance, as it sees fit, of Sinn Féin's views on this issue generally; and that a diminishing threat gives scope for constructive responsive measures on the British side.

I believe the formula "the removal of arms now silenced" might reflect this position without prejudice to the fundamental positions on either side.

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

-6-

As to punishment beatings, I have condemned these publicly on several occasions and they have been frequently raised in our contacts with Sinn Féin, including most recently at a meeting which Dick Spring had on Thursday last with Martin McGuinness. They are an abomination by any civilised standards.

I believe, subject to our being able to reach agreement on the outstanding points identified in this letter and attachments, that our Summit meeting should be in Ireland and, if we can finalise agreement, I would be agreeable to either 24th or 25th November with a preference for the meeting to be on the 24th. I would be happy if our officials would meet on Wednesday afternoon. I suggest that the meeting should be in the Butler/Teahon format.

I agree with you that the process needs, at this stage, to be led by the two Governments, working as closely as possible together. I am sure you will appreciate that a decision to go ahead carries very significant political risks for my Government and me, given the public stance recently taken by the SDLP and Sinn Féin. Their public stance has been reinforced in even stronger terms in private meetings.

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

-7-

I agree completely with you on the crucial importance of the support of the United States for our common endeavour. I am, therefore, sending a copy of the amended communiqué on an equally private basis to the President.

I look forward to our phone conversation tomorrow afternoon.

With warmest personal regards

Yours sincerely,


Taoiseach

3. summary. according to trimble, the twin track approach to the peace process advocated by hmg and the irish government is dead. unionist parties will not participate unless sinn fein begins decommissioning weapons. unionists do not believe this will happen. therefore, the unionist proposal for an elected assembly where elected representatives from all parties can talk and learn to cooperate is the way forward. a commission on decommissioning can proceed in parallel. reactions to

this proposal from other parties has been good. even sinn fein has not been negative. john hume, but not other sdlp members, gave a knee-jerk negative reaction to the proposal.

4. hume is now the problem to the peace process and his influence with the irish department of foreign affairs is excessive, especially over irish fm spring. irish pm bruton is more balanced. the president's visit will be a success regardless of any breakthrough in the peace process if it is a balanced program. so far, the president's schedule is discouraging to the uup.

end summary.

twin track approach to peace process

5. trimble told u/s tarnoff that the twin track approach had died in september when sinn fein issued an ultimatum to the government of ireland [goi]. the goi and hmg have been trying to revitalize this approach, but they are not going to get away with the fudge this time. the twin track had an element of fudge in it, but the public is now aware of it and will ask the hard questions. paisley's democratic unionist party [dup] will never participate and the uup most likely would not. so the uup doesn't believe this is the best way to proceed.

uup proposal for an elected assembly

6. in order to overcome the present stalemate, the uup has put forward its proposal for an elected assembly. the assembly will not negotiate a peace settlement, but it will make inquiries, conduct investigations, take testimony, etc., on the way forward. it will enable all of the parties to learn to work together and discover the possibilities for cooperation. the elections and the assembly can be set up using the powers under existing legislation [1982 government of northern ireland act].

7. trimble said that john hume of the social democratic and labor party [sdlp] has described the proposal as an internal solution, but this was a knee-jerk reaction. the uup has tried to get together with hume to meet and discuss the issues. the uup is encouraged by the reactions of the dup, the alliance party, the GOI, and HMG

[2011-0355-F, 2.72]

DRAFT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

to these proposals. while sinn fein is suspicious of the the proposals, they are not as negative as the sdlp. when the sdlp starts to look closer at the proposals, they may revise the party position.

8. an elected assembly would give the parties a clear mandate and allow them to explain their programs. Sinn Fein would be forced to come up with an electoral program and stand for election on that program. trimble stated that he was not convinced that sinn was really committed to peace, much less wants to deal with decommissioning.

decommissioning on track with elected assembly

9. according to trimble, the decommissioning track of the twin track approach could still proceed. the assembly would not directly be tied to progress on the decommissioning track, although actual progress toward decommissioning, as well as actual decommissioning, would be reflected in the degree of cooperation and the atmosphere among the representatives elected to the assembly.

10. maginnis added that a commission on decommissioning would definitely fit in with the elected assembly proposal. the uup knows that sinn fein/ira will not give up the guns. that is why the uup came up with the idea of an international forum on decommissioning. the reason the ira called the ceasefire was because they found themselves out in the cold after the downing street declaration. with the goi and hmg cooperating, the u.s. nsc was enthusiastic that they could get adams into the political process and get him to decommission weapons. now the nsc has been deflated and admits they can't get anything from adams. they want to ask us, the unionists, to do something. the nsc has lost sight of the fact that you have to change the mind set of these people. until you do, they are not going to hand in guns, even to an international forum.

elected assembly as the only game left in town?

11. u/s tarnoff asked trimble what if sinn fein and the sdlp continue to resist an elected body or assembly. trimble said that would be a definite statement, but he is encouraged by signals coming from sinn fein that it will

DRAFT

not come to that, especially if sinn fein is convinced that the twin track is not going to deliver the unionist parties to the table.

ceasefire will hold

12. responding to u/s tarnoff's query about the stability of the current ceasefire, trimble stated that there is no risk in the short term. sinn fein doesn't want to lose the political gains they have won vis-a-vis other parties in northern ireland, ireland, and the u.s. the ira has a discipline that is holding. adams had briefed his followers that real gains in the process could take several years. on the loyalist side there are rumblings, but that is because they do not have the political gains to point to that sinn fein does. maginnis added that the loyalists feel they have a "walk on, walk off" part in the process. they are brought out as needed to give balance.

13. smyth added that under the present situation of a ceasefire, what we are seeing is the threat of violence used as a political lever. adams uses the excuse that if the weapons are given up, the nationalist community will be attacked by the british army.

goi views on elected assembly and uup views on the goi

14. u/s tarnoff asked if there was a difference between the views of irish pm bruton and irish fm spring on an elected assembly. trimble responded that the real problem is sdp leader john hume personally. certain members of the irish department of foreign affairs [dfa] work closely with hume and then have too strong an influence over fm spring. hmg officials had raised the idea of an elected assembly in one of the recent meetings of hmg-goi civil servants. the dfa officials immediately dismissed the idea and have been attempting to influence spring to keep this line.

15. u/s tarnoff complimented trimble on his recent meeting with pm bruton and asked if the dialogue was important. trimble stated that the dialogue was a part of the peace process, but it was not real important. trimble did not seem to think the GOI had any fresh ideas.

16. trimble added that he didn't believe pm bruton had

DRAFT

much influence over sinn fein. bruton had tried to form a relationship at the beginning, but sinn fein does not trust him--that is because bruton is basically a decent man who tries to be a fair and genuine arbiter. it is the dfa and the ira that have solid contacts. trimble believes a "wee bit of coolness" between dublin and sinn fein is not a bad thing at this time.

president's visit

17. trimble said it is probably too close to the president's visit to solve the decommissioning problem, but that is not critical to a successful visit to northern ireland. u/s tarnoff made the point that the occasion of a visit can sometimes push a process forward. trimble took the point, but said he was skeptical of any breakthrough.

18. smyth expressed concern that the present schedule for the president was too nationalistic. other events were scheduled for dup constituencies. u/s tarnoff responded that the president's schedule was a work in progress and the uup concerns would be taken into account. trimble admitted the schedule was probably not certain, but he was not encouraged by what he had seen to date. \\

DRAFT

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 051628Z SEP 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3361
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 3333
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 012355

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.13)
KBH 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: SUMMIT POSTPONEMENT LIKELY

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH THE SITUATION IS FLUID, AN NIO OFFICIAL TELLS US IT IS "INCREASINGLY IMPROBABLE" THAT THE MAJOR-BRUTON SUMMIT WILL TAKE PLACE SEPT 6 AS SCHEDULED. THE KEY PROBLEM IS DUBLIN, UNDER PRESSURE FROM SINN FEIN, "WOBBLING" ON THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON DECOMMISSIONING IN THE ABSENCE OF IRA AGREEMENT. IN LIGHT OF THIS, MAJOR WILL CONVENE AN IN-HOUSE MEETING THIS EVENING TO DISCUSS WHETHER TO GO FORWARD WITH THE MEETING AND, IF NOT, HOW TO PROCEED. END SUMMARY

3. NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY PETER BELL TOLD US SEPT 5 THAT PATRICK MAYHEW AND IRISH FM DICK SPRING FAILED TO RESOLVE REMAINING DIFFERENCES AT THEIR "FULL AND CORDIAL" MEETING IN DUBLIN YESTERDAY. THE KEY UNRESOLVED ISSUE IS WHETHER TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON DECOMMISSIONING EVEN THOUGH THE IRA HAS INDICATED IT WILL NOT COOPERATE WITH THAT BODY. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS RELUCTANT TO LAUNCH THE COMMISSION IN THE ABSENCE OF IRA ACQUIESCENCE, BELIEVING THERE IS SCANT CHANCE FOR ITS SUCCESS IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO ARGUE THAT SOME GESTURE ON DECOMMISSIONING MUST BE MADE SO THAT POLITICAL TALKS CAN PROCEED.

4. REFERRING TO A SINN FEIN "FULL COURT PRESS," BELL SAID HMG APPRECIATES THE INTENSE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE TAOISEACH. HE DESCRIBED BRUTON AS BEING BETWEEN THE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

ROCK OF "THE INTRINSIC LOGIC OF THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH" AND THE HARD PLACE OF HAVING TO EXPOSE HIMSELF AND HIS PARTY TO CRITICISM FROM JOHN HUME AND OTHERS AS HAVING "SOLD OUT" TO THE BRITISH. BELL CONTRASTED MAYHEW'S "CIVIL" SEPT 4 MEETING WITH SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP, IN WHICH ADAMS, AND PARTICULARLY MCGUINNESS STRONGLY CRITICIZED BUT DID NOT REJECT OUTRIGHT THE NOTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, TO THAT BETWEEN SPRING AND ADAMS, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "BRUTAL." IN THAT MEETING, ACCORDING TO HMG'S INFORMATION, SINN FEIN SAID "PEOPLE WILL DIE" IF THE COMMISSION IS ESTABLISHED AND ASSERTED THAT BRUTON WILL BE BLAMED FOR RUINING THE PEACE PROCESS.

5. BELL SAID THAT EVEN AFTER THE MAYHEW-SPRING MEETING FAILED TO "SET THE TABLE," MAJOR HAD CONSIDERED USING THE MEETING TO PERSUADE BRUTON OF THE VIRTUES OF THE COMPROMISE WHICH HAD BEEN HAMMERED OUT AT WORKING LEVEL LAST WEEK. HOWEVER, HMG HEARD FROM DUBLIN THIS MORNING THAT BRUTON MAY WISH TO POSTPONE THE MEETING.

6. AS IT APPEARS UNLIKELY TO HMG THAT BRUTON WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE THAT POLITICAL STEP TOMORROW, BELL TOLD US THAT IT IS "INCREASINGLY IMPROBABLE" THE SUMMIT WILL BE HELD AS SCHEDULED. DESCRIBING THE SITUATION IN THE LATE AFTERNOON AS FLUID, BELL SAID THE PRIME MINISTER WILL CONVENE AN IN-HOUSE MEETING THIS EVENING TO DISCUSS WHETHER TO GO FORWARD WITH THE SUMMIT AND, IF NOT, HOW TO PROCEED. HOLDING A WORKING LEVEL MEETING INSTEAD IS ONE OPTION.

7. BELL SAID HMG DOES NOT THINK DUBLIN'S "WOBBLE" INDICATES BRUTON WANTS TO ABANDON THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. BELL SAID BRITISH AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO POLITICAL TALKS BEFORE ANY WEAPONS WERE ACTUALLY DECOMMISSIONED WAS A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION WHICH THE IRISH SIDE RECOGNIZES. WITHOUT THE COMMISSION EVEN BEING LAUNCHED, HE SAID, HMG HAS NO BASIS FOR ENTERING POLITICAL TALKS. NOTING THE INDICATIONS OF THIS POSSIBILITY ALL ALONG, BELL SAID HMG THINKS BRUTON SIMPLY NEEDS MORE TIME TO SELL THE IDEA.

8. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION THIS AFTERNOON, NIO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS TOLD US HMG IS TUDYING THE TEXT OF A NEW PROPOSAL WHICH IT HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. IN IT, THE IRISH PROPOSED DOING AWAY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION IN FAVOR OF A SINGLE ARBITER, SPECIFICALLY SENATOR

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

MITCHELL. THOMAS SAID INITIAL BRITISH REACTION IS NOT POSITIVE AS THIS IN ESSENCE WOULD MEAN HANDING OVER THE PROBLEM AND BRITISH AUTHORITY TO A THIRD PARTY. THOMAS SAID HE ALSO EXPECTS THE SUMMIT TO BE POSTPONED, BUT DID NOT KNOW HOW THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE.

9. BELL SAID THAT SCRUBBING THE SUMMIT AT LAST MINUTE WILL SEND A "WRONG SIGNAL." HOWEVER, A SUMMIT MEETING THAT PULLS BACK FROM THE WIDELY EXPECTED DEAL MIGHT BE EVEN WORSE. HE WORRIED THAT THIS MIGHT STIFFEN UNIONIST RESISTANCE AND COULD STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF "NO-BRAINER HARDLINER" CANDIDATES IN THE UPCOMING UUP LEADERSHIP ELECTION. THOMAS, EVEN MORE THAN BELL, WAS CRITICAL OF DUBLIN'S INABILITY TO HOLD TO ITS EARLIER CHOEN COURSE UNDER PRESSURE FROM SINN FEIN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 012355

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: SUMMIT POSTPONEMENT LIKELY

10. COMMENT: WHETHER OR NOT THE SUMMIT TAKES PLACE TOMMOROW -- AND IT APPEARS IT WILL NOT -- A TWIN-TRACK APPROACH WHICH LAUNCHES POLITICAL TALKS IN PARALLEL WITH AN EFFORT ON DECOMMISSIONING OFFERS THE ONLY REAL CHANCE TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS TO THE NEXT PHASE. ALTHOUGH HMG, CITING PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, WILL NOT YET AGREE TO A SPECIFIC DATE FOR AN ALL-PARTY ROUNDTABLE, IT DOES AGREE THAT THIS IS THE NEXT STEP. IT IS A STEP WHICH COULD BE TAKEN WITHIN MONTHS. THIS APPARENTLY SATISFIES SINN FEIN'S NEED FOR PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. HOWEVER, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SIMPLY CANNOT CONSIDER THAT SIDE OF THE EQUATION WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO POINT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WORKING ON THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE. END COMMENT.

CROWE

BT

#2355

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

NNNN

<MSGID> M1840115

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: FETIG HARMON LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 281106Z NOV 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

Put in my book

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6339
INFO RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 7733
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 015928

EXDIS

NSC FOR LAKE

STATE FOR U/S TARNOFF

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.74)
KBH 4/11/2023

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/95

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: ON THE EVE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT BRUCE
MORRISON BLAMES THE BRITISH

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. *(e)* I WANT TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO A SERIES OF TV
INTERVIEWS BROADCAST HERE YESTERDAY EVENING AND THIS
MORNING WITH BRUCE MORRISON. MORRISON, WHO IS VARIOUSLY
DESCRIBED AS "A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE CLINTON
ADMINISTRATION WHO ADVISES ON IRISH AFFAIRS" OR "ONE OF
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S KEY AIDES," SQUARELY BLAMES THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR THE CURRENT IMPASSE BETWEEN
LONDON AND DUBLIN OVER THE PEACE PROCESS. WHILE I
UNDERSTAND THAT MORRISON HOLDS A POSITION IN THE
ADMINISTRATION, IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR TO ME THAT HE HAS
A FORMAL BRIEF ON NORTHERN IRELAND, LET ALONE THAT HE IS
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLIC SPOKESMAN ON THIS ISSUE.

4. *(e)* THE POINT HERE IS THAT MORRISON, ALLEGEDLY
SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION, HAS PUBLICLY
TAKEN SIDES WITH SINN FEIN AND DUBLIN AGAINST THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON AN ISSUE OF UTMOST SENSITIVITY.
IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT SUCH REMARKS (SEE BELOW)
HAVE NOT HELPED THE ATMOSPHERE HERE LESS THAN 24 HOURS
EFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

5. *(e)* I NEED TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORRISON'S REMARKS AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION. IN THE MEANTIME, I AM INSTRUCTING MY SPOKESMAN TO RESPOND TO PRESS QUERIES BY STATING THAT WHILE MR. MORRISON IS A MEMBER OF THE ADMINISTRATION, THE VIEWS HE EXPRESSED WERE PERSONAL ONES THAT DO NOT REFLECT THE POLICY OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION.

6. (S) AMONG THE ON-CAMERA COMMENTS MADE BY MORRISON INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: "QUITE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO FIND FAULT WITH EVERY MOVE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS MADE TO SHAPE THIS PROCESS SUCCESSFULLY"... "I THINK ALL PARTIES HAVE MOVED EXCEPT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH SEEMS TO BE ABOUT WHERE IT WAS FIVE MONTHS AGO"... "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CAN STAND ITS GROUND ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT DISARMAMENT IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE PEACE PROCESS BUT THEY HAVE BEEN OFFERED MECHANISMS TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD WHICH THEY HAVEN'T ACCEPTED. I THINK THEY SHOULD BE MORE OPEN MINDED"... "THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS WAS PUT FORWARD AS A WAY IN WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD MAINTAIN ITS PRINCIPLE ON DECOMMISSIONING BUT THEY HAVEN'T TAKEN UP ON THE VERY PROCESS WHICH WAS CREATED TO GET THEM OUT OF A BIND"... "THERE HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN NOT ONLY GERRY ADAMS BUT ALL THE POLITICAL LEADERS WITH THE WHITE HOUSE"... "THE TWIN TRACK PROCESS AS BEING OFFERED THROUGH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT CAME ABOUT THROUGH CONCESSIONS BY A NUMBER OF PARTIES INCLUDING SINN FEIN WHICH WENT FURTHER THAN IT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE GONE"... "THE SYMBOLIC TURNOVER OF WEAPONS IS NOT THE POINT HERE"....CROWE

BT

#5928

NNNN

<MSGID> M1970673

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 06

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: PETERS SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 071740Z SEP 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3460

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3357

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 012503

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.75)
KBH 4/11/2023

EXDIS

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS; PLS PASS OVP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: AMBASSADOR MEETING WITH MAYHEW

REF: LONDON 12448 (NODIS)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: PATRICK MAYHEW IS LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN NO. 10 ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON DECOMMISSIONING. HOWEVER, AT THIS POINT, HMG DOES NOT HAVE A FOLLOW-ON PLAN AND IS WAITING FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SORT OUT ITS POLICY IN THE WAKE OF THE POSTPONED SUMMIT. MAYHEW TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE SUDDEN CHANGE IN BRUTON'S POSITION. HE PRODUCED THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATING DOCUMENTS TO BOLSTER HIS ARGUMENT THAT HMG HAD NEVER MOVED AWAY FROM ITS STANCE ON DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS AND THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FULLY AWARE OF THAT POSITION AT THE TIME THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE WAS AGREED. WITH FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS CERTAIN OVER THE COMING WEEKS, MAYHEW SAID THERE IS NO REASON NOW TO FACTOR THE ABORTED SUMMIT INTO PLANNING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND. END SUMMARY.

3. THE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW SEPT 7 FOR A 75-MINUTE MEETING TO REVIEW THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS IN THE WAKE OF THE POSTPONED ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT. MAYHEW OPENED BY NOTING THAT MICHAEL ANCRAM WOULD BE HEADING TO WASHINGTON THIS AFTERNOON FOR WHAT HMG HOPES WILL A USEFUL EXCHANGE WITH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 06

THE ADMINISTRATION. THE AMBASSADOR WELCOMED THE VISIT AND SAID HE UNDERSTANDS HIGH-LEVEL APPOINTMENTS AT THE NSC AND THE DEPARTMENT ARE BEING ARRANGED.

THE POSTPONEMENT

4. MAYHEW SAID THAT SINN FEIN'S THREAT TO RETURN TO VIOLENCE HAD "DEEPLY SHAKEN" THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND HAD HAD A "DEVASTATING EFFECT" ON BRUTON. HE SPECULATED THAT THIS, IN PART, IS BECAUSE IRISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO DEALING DIRECTLY AND ADVERSELY WITH THIS ASPECT OF THE IRA. HE ALSO EXPRESSED SOME SYMPATHY FOR BRUTON WHO FOUND HIMSELF IN A POLITICAL VISE, UNABLE TO WITHSTAND THE COMBINED PRESSURE OF ADAMS, HUME, REYNOLDS, ET AL. IN SHORT, MAYHEW SAID, BRUTON BACKED AWAY FROM PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS BECAUSE HE "HAD A GUN WAVED IN HIS FACE."

5. MAYHEW HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE TAOISEACH NOW APPEARS TO BE IN GOOD SHAPE AND "BACK ON AN EVEN KEEL." FOLLOWING A COURTEOUS BUT POINTED EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTERS YESTERDAY, PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRUTON AND MAJOR REMAIN GOOD. BRUTON TOLD MAJOR THAT HIS COALITION COLLEAGUES HAVE BEEN SUPPORTIVE AND MAYHEW SAID HE HIMSELF HAD DETECTED NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BRUTON AND DICK SPRING.

HMG STICKS TO THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION

6. TURNING TO THE CAUSE OF THE POSTPONEMENT, MAYHEW SAID HMG HAD BEEN TAKEN COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE BY THE LAST MINUTE IRISH CHANGES. HMG DID NOT FIND THE SUGGESTION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION BE CHANGED TO A SINGLE ARBITER WITH INDEPENDENT POLITICAL AUTHORITY O BE A HELPFUL ONE. NOT ONLY WOULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE TROUBLE DELEGATING ITS AUTHORITY, BUT THE UNIONISTS WOULD NEVER ACCEPT A SOLE ARBITER, PARTICULARLY ONE WITH A POLITICAL AND NOT A MILITARY BACKGROUND.

7. RESPONDING TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUERY ABOUT HMG'S POSITION ON DECOMMISSIONING, MAYHEW EMPHASIZED THAT HMG "HAS NEVER MOVED AWAY FROM THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION" AND HAS NO POLITICAL ROOM TO DO SO EVEN IF IT WERE SO INCLINED. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SUMMIT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 06

COMMUNIQUE WOULD HAVE REFERRED ONLY TO THE FIRST TWO CONDITIONS, I.E. ESTABLISHING A COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DECOMMISSIONING AND OUTLINING MODALITIES FOR ACCOMPLISHING IT. MAYHEW SAID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS CONTENT TO DROP REFERENCE IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO THE NECESSITY OF SOME WEAPONS BEING DECOMMISSIONED AS A CONDITION FOR COMMENCEMENT OF ALL-PARTY TALKS. HOWEVER, THIS DID NOT INDICATE A RELAXATION OF ITS POSITION. HMG BELIEVES ADHERENCE TO THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION IS NECESSARY TO BUILD THE CONFIDENCE REQUIRED SO THAT ALL PARTIES WILL COME TO THE TABLE. THE UNIONISTS SIMPLY WILL NOT ATTEND WITHOUT THAT CONDITION BEING MET.

8. MAYHEW SAID THAT HMG ALSO HAD AGREED TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO WHATEVER RECOMMENDATIONS THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION MAY GIVE. SHOULD THE COMMISSION ADVISE, AFTER IT CONFERS WITH THE RELEVANT PARAMILITARIES, THAT SOMETHING OTHER THAN BEGINNING THE ACTUAL PROCESS OF DECOMMISSIONING WEAPONS WOULD GENERATE SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE TO ALLOW THE ROUNDTABLE TO BEGIN WITHOUT FEAR OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE, HMG WILL FAIRLY CONSIDER THAT ADVICE ON ITS MERITS. HOWEVER, MAYHEW SAID, AT THIS POINT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANYTHING OTHER THAN DECOMMISSIONING COULD PRODUCE SUCH CONFIDENCE.

9. MOREOVER, MAYHEW CONTINUED, BOTH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND SINN FEIN ALL ALONG HAVE BEEN WELL AWARE OF THE BRITISH POSITION. MAYHEW GAVE THE AMBASSADOR A COPY OF THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AND OF THE CHILCOT-DALTON MINUTE ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO BOLSTER HIS ARGUMENT THAT HMG'S POSITION HAS BEEN CLEAR AND CONSISTENT. (TEXTS BELOW IN PARAS 12-13.) HE ALSO READ FROM THE MEMCON OF HIS MEETING WITH SINN FEIN LEADERS TO HOW THAT HE UNAMBIGUOUSLY HAD MADE THE POINT TO ADAMS. THE IDEA OF DECOMMISSIONING PREDATES THE CEASEFIRE, WAS AMPLY BRIEFED TO ALL PARTIES -- INCLUDING MSSRS. ADAMS AND REYNOLDS -- BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE JOINT DECLARATION, AND IS NOT A SUDDEN OR WHIMSICAL DEMAND OF HMG, MAYHEW EMPHASIZED.

NEXT STEPS

10. MAYHEW SAID HE IS NOT AS PESSIMISTIC AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 06

COMMISSION (REFTEL). ALTHOUGH BOTH GOVERNMENTS REMAIN OPEN TO OTHER IDEAS, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS NOW NO SERVICEABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE COMMISSION. HOWEVER, MAYHEW SAID, WE MUST "LET THE MUD SETTLE" BEFORE WE CAN SEE OUR WAY FORWARD. MAYHEW TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE NEXT STEP IS UP TO THE IRISH, AS THEY ARE THE ONES WHO WITHDREW. SO FOR NOW LONDON WILL WAIT, AS IT UNDERSTANDS BRUTON NEEDS SOME TIME TO GET "THE OTHERS" LINED UP. AT THIS MOMENT THERE ARE NO LIAISON GROUP OR OTHER CONTACTS SCHEDULED, ACCORDING TO MAYHEW. HE EXPECTS, HOWEVER, THAT AT SOME POINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE THE PRIME MINISTERS WILL COMMISSION A GROUP OF SENIOR OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS HOW TO PUT THE PIECES BACK TOGETHER.

11. SECONDING COMMENTS BY DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS, MAYHEW SAID THAT IF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS STAND FIRM, SINN FEIN WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO COOPERATE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. ANCRAM WILL BE MAKING THIS POINT FORCEFULLY IN WASHINGTON, HE SAID. ANCRAM ALSO WILL TAKE THE MESSAGE THAT THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUMMIT SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. THERE ARE CERTAIN TO BE MANY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN NOW AND THEN, MAYHEW POINTED OUT.

12. TEXT OF DRAFT COMMUNIQUE PREPARED FOR SEPT 6 SUMMIT

BEGIN TEXT:

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER TO CREATE CONDITIONS SO THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS, AIMED AT EACHING IN ROUND TABLE FORMAT AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BASED ON CONSENT, COULD COMMENCE BEFORE THE END OF 1995. A SERIES OF MEETINGS WILL NOW BE JOINTLY CONVENED BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS WITH ALL PARTIES TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THESE TALKS.

BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHARE THE AIM OF CREATING CONDITIONS IN WHICH ALL THE RELEVANT PARTIES WILL ATTEND THESE TALKS AND WILL PARTICIPATE ON THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE POSSIBLE BASIS.

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL DECOMMISSIONING COMMISSION. THIS COMMISSION WILL HAVE THE INITIAL AND LIMITED REMIT OF

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 06

REPORTING TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS BY MID-NOVEMBER 1995, ON WHETHER IT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT A CLEAR COMMITMENT EXISTS ON THE PART OF THE RELEVANT PARAMILITARY ORGANISATIONS TO THE FULL AND VERIFIABLE DECOMMISSIONING OF ALL ILLEGALLY HELD ARMS IN THE APPROPRIATE CONTEXT AND MANNER. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AIM TO MEET AGAIN BEFORE THE END OF NOVEMBER 1995, TO AGREE THE APPROPRIATE WAY FORWARD.

END TEXT

13. CHILCOT-DALTON CONFIDENTIAL MINUTE

BEGIN TEXT:

TASK OF COMMISSION

(11) AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ALREADY REFERRED TO, THE GROUP ENVISAGE THAT, AS A FIRST STEP A COMMISSION WOULD BE INVITED TO DEVELOP A SCHEME FOR DECOMMISSIONING IN CONSULTATION WITH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER RELEVANT PARTIES. ON THE BASIS OF THOSE CONSULTATIONS, THE COMMISSION WOULD REPORT BACK TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE MODALITIES FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS WHICH IN ITS VIEW WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE DECOMMISSIONING. SUBSEQUENTLY THE COMMISSION COULD, IF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SAW ADVANTAGE IN IT, BE REQUESTED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO ASSIST IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY DECOMMISSIONING SCHEME.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

(12) THE GROUP BELIEVES THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD BE GIVEN AS MUCH FLEXIBILITY AS POSSIBLE IN TAKING FORWARD ITS WORK ON MODALITIES. THE GROUP THEREFORE SEES A NEED FOR TERMS OF REFERENCE WHICH WILL ENABLE THE COMMISSION TO RESPOND TO THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROCESS ITSELF. IT RECOMMENDS TERMS OF REFERENCE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

-- TO CONSULT WITH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER RELEVANT PARTIES, INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, THOSE PARTIES WHICH WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS ON THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS, ON THE TERMS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT APPLY FOR A SCHEME FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS; TO REPORT TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS,

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 06

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSULTATIONS, ON THE PROGRESS OF ITS WORK AND ON HOW THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS MIGHT BE TAKEN FORWARD, AND TO MAKE PROPOSALS OUTLINING THE MODALITIES FOR A SCHEME ON WHICH AGREEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE;

-- TO CARRY OUT SUCH OTHER TASKS AS MAY BE ASSIGNED TO IT FROM TIME TO TIME BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS JOINTLY AND, IN PARTICULAR, IF REQUESTED, TO:

O ASSIST THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO PUT IN PLACE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS MAY BE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE SCHEME FOR DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS; AND

O PARTICIPATE IN THE SUPERVISION AND VERIFICATION OF THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS ITSELF INCLUDING, IF APPROPRIATE, ACCEPTING WITHIN ITS CONTROL ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS.

CROWE
BT
#2503

NNNN
<MSGID> M1854982

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 5430 MSGID: M1937597

0AACZYUW RUEHDLA5430 3101559-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 061559Z NOV 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8962

INFO: RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST IMMEDIATE 3706
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3476

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.76)
KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 005430

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/1997

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, GOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: BRUTON LETTER TO MAJOR: SUMMIT SUGGESTED FOR LATE
NOVEMBER TO LAUNCH THE TWIN-TRACK PROCESS

1. CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY SMITH. REASON:
1.5 (B) .

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

2. (C) TAOISEACH JOHN BRUTON HAS WRITTEN TO UK PRIME
MINISTER MAJOR TODAY (NOVEMBER 6) SUGGESTING THAT THE TWO
OF THEM HOLD A SUMMIT IN THE THIRD WEEK OF NOVEMBER TO
LAUNCH THE LONG-DELAYED TWIN-TRACK PROCESS. IN THE LETTER,
A COPY OF WHICH WAS PASSED TO US BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (FULL TEXT AT PARA 4), BRUTON OUTLINES WHAT
HE SEES AS THE SIX KEY ISSUES AND "THE SOLUTION WITHIN OUR
GRASP ON EACH OF THEM":

-- DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS: THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD SET
A "REASONABLE TARGET DATE WITH A CLEAR COMMITMENT TO MAKE
THE UTMOST ENDEAVORS IN GOOD FAITH TO REACH IT." THE DATE
SHOULD BE SIX WEEKS FROM THE TIME THE INTERNATIONAL BODY
BEGINS ITS WORK.

-- PROCEDURE FOR PREPARATORY TALKS: PROCEED AS PROVIDED FOR
IN THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE OF THE POSTPONED SEPTEMBER 6

2-3 months

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SUMMIT.

-- BASIS FOR POLITICAL PARTIES SPEAKING AUTHORITATIVELY ABOUT PARAMILITARY ARMS: A "REASONABLE" FORMULATION IS THAT THE RELEVANT POLITICAL PARTIES WILL BE "SPEAKING TO THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AUTHORITATIVELY ON THE POSITION OF IRA/LOYALISTS WEAPONS AND THE ISSUE OF HOW THE ARMS CAN BE TAKEN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS."

not nec. public.

-- DESCRIPTION OF THE ARMS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL ADDRESS: LEAVE THE REFERENCE TO ARMS AMBIGUOUS (I.E. NO ADJECTIVE SUCH AS ILLEGAL, PARAMILITARY, OR UNAUTHORIZED) AND "ALLOW ALL SIDES TO SAY WHAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH."

? tough

-- EXTENT OF INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REMIT: THE INTERNATIONAL BODY SHOULD "TAKE THE ENTIRE WEAPONS ISSUE WITHIN ITS PURVIEW, NOT JUST WASHINGTON 1 AND 2."

✓

-- POSSIBILITY OF AN ELECTED BODY: THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE GIVEN "A RESPECTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE HEARING," BUT ANY MENTION OF IT IN A JOINT TEXT MUST REFLECT THE OPPOSITION OF NORTHERN NATIONALISTS TO "ANY PROCESS WHICH GIVES PRIMACY OR PRIVILEGE TO THE INTERNAL STRAND."

✓

3. (C) COMMENT: BRENDAN SCANNELL, COUNSELLOR FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS IN DFA'S ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, TOLD US THAT THE LETTER HAD ALSO BEEN SHARED WITH OPPOSITION PARTY FIANNA FAIL, BUT WAS OTHERWISE BEING CLOSELY HELD. HE SAID THE PROPOSALS IN THE LETTER WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT A MEETING OF THE ANGLO-IRISH LIAISON GROUP ON NOVEMBER 8. WITH THE FAILURE OF SINN FEIN AND THE BRITISH TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS AT THEIR NOVEMBER 3 MEETING, DUBLIN FEELS IT MUST NOW RE-ENGAGE TO RESTORE FORWARD MOMENTUM TO THE PEACE PROCESS. BRUTON SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN TO HEART GERRY ADAMS'S ARGUMENT TO HIM LAST WEEK THAT THE UK AND SINN FEIN ARE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO WORK THIS OUT ON THEIR OWN. WHILE IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE IRISH WILL BE ABLE TO DO IN THIS REGARD, THEY NEVERTHELESS SEE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AS A VALUABLE SOURCE OF LEVERAGE TO PRESS SINN FEIN AND LONDON TO COMPROMISE ON THEIR LONG-HELD POSITIONS, AND DO NOT WANT TO SEE THIS UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY SLIP BY. END COMMENT.

4. (C) FULL TEXT OF BRUTON'S LETTER TO MAJOR:

6 NOVEMBER, 1995

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOHN MAJOR, MP,
PRIME MINISTER.

DEAR JOHN,

I AM WRITING TO YOU TO GIVE YOU MY VIEWS ON THE CURRENT POSITION IN OUR DISCUSSIONS ON NORTHERN IRELAND AND MY VIEWS ON HOW WE CAN NOW MOVE SPEEDILY FORWARD WITH A JOINT APPROACH, THAT WILL LEAD TO A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES.

OUR CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS SO FAR HAS BEEN BASED ON OUR ADOPTING A JOINT APPROACH, AND ON PRIOR CONSULTATION BEFORE THE TAKING OF

ANY IMPORTANT INITIATIVE. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND I REGRET TO HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT I WAS SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED TO LEARN THAT YOUR "BUILDING BLOCKS" PAPER, WHICH WAS DISCUSSED IN THE LIAISON GROUP SPECIFICALLY AS AN AID TO YOUR ON-GOING DISCUSSION WITH SINN FEIN, WAS SENT TO ALL THE PARTIES, AND TO THE U.S., AND WAS MADE PUBLIC ON FRIDAY, ALL WITHOUT OUR PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OR AGREEMENT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 DUBLIN 005430

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/1997

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, GOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: BRUTON LETTER TO MAJOR: SUMMIT SUGGESTED FOR LATE NOVEMBER TO LAUNCH THE TWIN-TRACK PROCESS

I NEED HARDLY ELABORATE ON THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH CAN BE CAUSED BY A UNILATERAL DEFINITION, ON EITHER SIDE, OF WHAT PURPORTS TO BE - AND INDEED CAN ONLY BE - A BILATERAL AND AGREED PROCESS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

WE BOTH CAME TO THE TABLE AT CANNES WITH PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BODY. FOR MY PART I PUT IT FORWARD IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME THE PROLONGED AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS STALEMATE I FORESAW ARISING FROM YOUR UNILATERAL INSISTENCE ON "WASHINGTON THREE" AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND MY OWN CONCLUSION, WHICH I ARRIVED AT RELUCTANTLY AND ONLY AFTER SERIOUS EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE SITUATION, THAT THAT PRE-CONDITION WAS NOT ACHIEVABLE.

THE VALUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL BE DIRECTLY PROPORTIONATE TO THE PROSPECT THAT ITS WORK WILL TRANSCEND THIS IMPASSE, AND NOT MERELY POSTPONE IT. SIR PATRICK MAYHEW AT THE LAST ANGLO-IRISH CONFERENCE ENCOURAGINGLY INVOKED THIS POSSIBILITY, ADMITTEDLY WITH SOME PERSONAL SCEPTICISM. I HAVE DONE WHAT I CAN IN THE BACKGROUND TO PROMOTE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF SINN FEIN ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES ALSO.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

AS I SEE IT THERE ARE SIX KEY ISSUES AND I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE SOLUTIONS WITHIN OUR GRASP ON EACH OF THEM.

THESE SIX ISSUES ARE

A DATE FOR ALL PARTY, ROUND TABLE TALKS

THE PROCEDURE FOR HOLDING PREPARATORY (SIC) TALKS

THE BASIS FOR POLITICAL PARTIES SPEAKING AUTHORITATIVELY ABOUT PARAMILITARY ARMS

THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ARMS THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL DEAL WITH

THE EXTENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REMIT IN TERMS OF THE "WASHINGTON" CONDITIONS, AND

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ELECTED BODY.

ON A DATE FOR ROUND TABLE TALKS THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THAT A REASONABLE TARGET DATE SHOULD BE SET WITH A CLEAR COMMITMENT TO MAKE THE UTMOST ENDEAVOURS IN GOOD FAITH TO REACH IT. I BELIEVE THE DATE SHOULD BE ~~SIX WEEKS~~ FROM THE DATE THE INTERNATIONAL BODY COMMENCES WORK. 2-3

ON PREPARATORY TALKS I BELIEVE WE WOULD PROCEED AS IN HE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE FOR THE POSTPONED 6 SEPTEMBER SUMMIT, I.E.

no "THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER TO ~~CREATE CONDITIONS~~ SO THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS IN ROUND TABLE FORMAT AIMED AT REACHING AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BASED ON CONSENT, COULD COMMENCE (REFER TO SIX WEEKS). A SERIES OF MEETING (SIC) WILL NOW BE JOINTLY CONVENED B BOTH GOVERNMENTS WITH ALL PARTIES TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THESE TALKS.

BOTH GOVERNMENT SHARE THE AIM OF CREATING CONDITIONS IN WHICH ALL THE RELEVANT PARTIES WILL ATTEND THESE TALKS AND WILL PARTICIPATE ON THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE POSSIBLE BASIS."

THERE SHOULD BE A COMPLETELY OPEN AGENDA FOR THOSE TALKS.

ON POLITICAL PARTIES AND ARMS I BELIEVE THE FORMULA OF THE RELEVANT POLITICAL PARTIES "SPEAKING TO THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AUTHORITATIVELY ON THE POSITION OF IRA/LOYALISTS WEAPONS AND THE ISSUE OF HOW THE ARMS CAN BE TAKEN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS" REPRESENTS A REASONABLE BASIS FOR MOVING

FORWARD.

ON THE DESCRIPTION OF ARMS/THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY ISSUE, I BELIEVE THE OPTION ~~ON MICHAEL ANGRAM PUT TO~~ ??
MARTIN MCGUINNESS OF HAVING NO ADJECTIVE
(ILLEGAL/PARAMILITARY/UNAUTHORISED) IN THE COMMUNIQUE TEXT
AND ALLOWING ALL SIDES TO SAY WHAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH
REPRESENTS THE WAY FORWARD. I UNDERSTAND YOU, ON BEHALF OF
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL SAY THE ISSUE IS ONE OF
PARAMILITARY ARMS. WE WILL NOT DISAGREE WITH YOU ON THIS
BUT WILL UPHOLD SINN FEINN'S RIGHT TO PUT ITS OWN POSITION
ON THIS ISSUE TO THE
BODY AS IT SEES FIT.

ON 'WASHINGTON' 1, 2 AND 3 I BELIEVE THE INTERNATIONAL BODY
SHOULD TAKE THE ENTIRE WEAPONS ISSUE WITHIN ITS PURVIEW,
AND NOT JUST 'WASHINGTON' 1 AND 2, AS YOUR "PRESS LINE" HAS
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 DUBLIN 005430

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/1997

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, GOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: BRUTON LETTER TO MAJOR: SUMMIT SUGGESTED FOR LATE
NOVEMBER TO LAUNCH THE TWIN-TRACK PROCESS

IT IN THE "BUILDING BLOCKS" PAPER.

A POSSIBLE WAY OF DEALING, IN PRACTICE, WITH BOTH THE
'WASHINGTON' CONDITIONS AND THE DESCRIPTION OF ARMS, IS TO
DESCRIBE THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AS REPORTING ON
THE ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY FOR THE REMOVAL OF ARMS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR OR OPPOSITION TO POLITICAL AIMS
AND ACTIVITIES.

ON THE POLITICAL TRACK, THE IRISH SIDE IN THE LIAISON GROUP

MADE CLEAR WE EXPECTED THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL
TRACK TO BE MORE PROACTIVE THAN IN YOUR PAPER. THE CHANGES
SUBSEQUENTLY MADE DID NOT REFLECT THIS, BUT INSTEAD FLAGGED
AN ELECTED BODY.

I HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION, AND ENCOURAGED OTHERS TO ACCEPT,
THAT UNIONIST PROPOSALS FOR SUCH A BODY SHOULD BE GIVEN A
RESPECTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE HEARING.

YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT OPPOSITION TO AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT
IS A COMMON RALLYING POINT FOR NORTHERN NATIONALISTS
(COMPARABLE IN THIS RESPECT TO A UNITED IRELAND PROPOSAL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

FOR UNIONISTS). CONSEQUENTLY, THEY ARE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO ANY PROCESS WHICH GIVES PRIMACY OR PRIVILEGE TO THE INTERNAL STRAND. IF AN ELECTED BODY IS TO BE FLAGGED THEN ANY JOINT TEXT MUST ALSO ADEQUATELY REFLECT THE CONSISTENT VIEW OF NORTHERN NATIONALISTS I HAVE TOUCHED ON ABOVE.

I BELIEVE YOU AND I SHOULD NOW MOVE QUICKLY TO HOLDING A SUMMIT, SAY IN THE THIRD WEEK OF NOVEMBER, AND HAVING A REASONABLE JOINT POSITION TO PUT TO ALL SIDES.

I WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A TELEPHONE DISCUSSION WITH YOU ON THESE MATTERS BEFORE YOUR DEPARTURE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. I WOULD PARTICULARLY WELCOME AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE UNIONIST POSITIONS AND INTENTIONS, IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR CONTACTS WITH THEM.

YOURS SINCERELY,

JOHN BRUTON
TAOISEACH

END TEXT OF BRUTON LETTER. SMITH
BT
#5430

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 071550Z NOV 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5711
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 3607
RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 7622
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 015174

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355 - F (2.77)
KBH 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/05

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INITIAL HMG REACTION TO
BRUTON LETTER

REF: DUBLIN 5430

1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL J. HABIB, POLITICAL MINISTER
COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5 (B).

2. (C) NIO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT HEAD CLARE
CHECKSFIELD TOLD US HMG VIEWS THE NOV 6 LETTER FROM
TAOISEACH JOHN BRUTON TO PM JOHN MAJOR (REF) AS PART OF
THE ON-GOING EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, AND
NOT, AS THE BRITISH PRESS HAS PORTRAYED IT, A PROPOSAL
FOR A DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGH. SHE SAID HMG HAS YET TO
FORM A CONSIDERED REACTION TO THE LETTER BUT EXPECTS TO
DISCUSS THE VARIOUS IDEAS IN SOME DETAIL AT THE NOV 8
ANGLO-IRISH LIAISON GROUP MEETING.

3. (C) AS A PRELIMINARY REACTION, CHECKSFIELD SAID THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT DISSENT FROM THE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE SIX KEY ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED.
AND, SHE SAID, THE SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY PM BRUTON DO
NOT, IN THE MAIN, DEPART FROM IDEAS PREVIOUSLY
DISCUSSED. CHECKSFIELD OFFERED THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS
ON SOME OF THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS:

-- TARGET DATE: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT OBJECT
TO SETTING A REASONABLE TARGET DATE FOR COMMENCEMENT OF
LL-PARTY TALKS IN THE NOT DISTANT FUTURE. WHILE HMG IS
WILLING TO DISCUSS THE IRISH PROPOSAL, IT IS "NOT
CONVINCED" THAT SIX WEEKS IS SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

INTERNATIONAL BODY TO DO ITS WORK. CHECKSFIELD SAID HMG UNDERSTANDS THE PROPOSAL TO MEAN SIX WEEKS FROM THE TIME THE BODY ACTUALLY BECOMES OPERATIONL, NOT FROM THE TIME OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF IT MEMBERSHIP AND FORMATION.

-- REMIT: HMG CAN BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT THE WORDING OF THE JOINT DECLARATION REGARDING THE DESCRIPTION OF ARMS, IF THE BASIC CONCEPT IS CLEAR TO THE PARTIES. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT BELIEVE AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT HAS BEEN REACHED. AT THE NOV 3 MEETING IN BELFAST, MCGUINNESS TOLD ANCRAM THAT THE BODY'S REMIT MUST INCLUDE BRITISH ARMY WEAPONS, AND NOT ONLY "PARAMILITARY" WEAPONS, HOWEVER DESCRIBED. WHILE HMG DOES NOT OBJECT TO SINN FEIN PUTTING ITS OWN POSITION TO THE BODY AS IT SEES FIT, IT CANNOT ACCEPT A REMIT WHICH INCLUDES ARMS OF THE SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT. HMG EXPECTS THAT SUCH A REMIT WOULD GIVE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT PROBLEMS AS WELL.

-- WASHINGTON THREE: CHECKSFIELD SAID IT IS UNCLEAR HOW THE IRISH PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE BODY WOULD OPERATE IN PRACTICE. SHE SAID HMG WOULD SEEK FURTHER CLARIFICATION AT THE LIAISON GROUP MEETING.

4. (K) CHECKSFIELD CONFIRMED THAT MAJOR AND BRUTON DID EXCHANGE A FEW WORDS IN JERUSALEM. NIO SO FAR HAS HAD NO READ OUT FROM NO. 10 STAFF WHO JUST RETURNED AND ARE PREPARING TO DEPART MOMENTARILY FOR NEW ZEALAND. NIO IS OPERATING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT HAD THE BRIEF DISCUSSION CONTAINED NEW POINTS, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY NOW.

CROWE

BT

#5174

NNNN

<MSGID> M1940103

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 21, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT:

Message to Prime Minister Major

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.78)
KBM 4/11/2023

Purpose

To reply to Major's message of October 19 on Northern Ireland.

Background

Major sent you a message immediately following my consultations with Rod Lyne and Northern Ireland Office officials in London (Tab B). His message says that I was "disappointed" by my latest conversation with Gerry Adams, which took place over the phone on October 17. Actually, I still believe Adams has accepted in principle the "twin-track" approach and the need to engage on the issue of decommissioning paramilitaries' weapons. The British Government and Sinn Fein now need to negotiate face-to-face on the remaining issues. Your reply to Major reviews where we think the process stands and cautions that Sinn Fein's agreement to participate in the twin track is not open-ended.

Major warns that the need to bring the unionist parties on board could slow the process down. We have urged the the British to consult closely with the unionists, especially new UUP party leader David Trimble, without giving them a veto over moving the process forward. Your draft reply to Major indicates that you will try to drop by the Vice President's meeting with Trimble next week. The drop-by is an option on your schedule that I strongly recommend you do.

Major also says that he still believes it should be possible to launch the twin track before your visit to Northern Ireland. This is what we are aiming for, in order to avoid pressure during the trip. Your reply, however, assures Major that we expect the trip to be successful in any event, which we do.

RECOMMENDATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Mary Ann Peters

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 1.6(b)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

That you approve the transmittal of the message at Tab A to Prime Minister Major.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Message to Major

Tab B Incoming message from Major

FROM: WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMB LONDON

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

FOR AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 19 ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. I'M GLAD YOU FOUND TONY'S VISIT HELPFUL. HE HAS REPORTED TO ME THAT HE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT SINN FEIN'S CURRENT POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH AND BELIEVES ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE VERY CLOSE TO SIGNING ON. IN FACT, ADAMS TOLD TONY OVER THE PHONE THAT HE IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS IRA ARMS AUTHORITATIVELY WITH AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, WHICH WE SEE AS THE KEY COMMITMENT SINN FEIN NEEDS TO MAKE. I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTY OF CLEARING THE REMAINING HURDLE OF FINDING WORDING FOR THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT SINN FEIN'S AGREEMENT TO THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH IS CERTAINLY A STEP FORWARD.

AS TONY TOLD ROD LYNE AND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW, OUR SENSE IS THAT SETTING A TARGET DATE IS A VERY IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN SINN FEIN'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH AND THAT ADAMS WILL NEED TO SHOW PROGRESS TOWARD TALKS TO KEEP HIS CONSTITUENCY ON BOARD. THAT IS WHY WE ARE ENCOURAGING SINN FEIN TO ENGAGE FULLY WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT TO WORK OUT THE REMAINING PROBLEMS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO AS LONG AS IT IS USEFUL TO YOU AND JOHN BRUTON.

I SHARE YOUR VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF BRINGING ALONG THE UNIONIST PARTIES, PARTICULARLY DAVID TRIMBLE AND THE UUP. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL CERTAINLY DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO MAKE HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON A SUCCESS. I WILL TRY TO FIND THE TIME TO DROB BY HIS MEETING WITH AL GORE TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO AGENDA FOR NORTHERN IRELAND BEYOND SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF ITS PEOPLE AND THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO REACH A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.

FINALLY I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT I TOO AM LOOKING FORWARD TO MY VISIT TO THE UK AND IRELAND IN LATE NOVEMBER-EARLY DECEMBER, AND HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WILL BE A SUCCESS. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN NEW YORK.

WARM REGARDS,

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 151511Z NOV 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5951
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3624
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 015469

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(2.81)
K8H 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/05

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: MAYHEW

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR..
REASON 1.5(B).

2. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: SIR PATRICK MAYHEW TOLD THE AMBASSADOR NOV 14 THAT THE WAY FORWARD ON THE PEACE PROCESS IS "NOT TERRIBLY CLEAR" AT THIS MOMENT. REAFFIRMING HMG'S COMMITMENT TO PRESS AHEAD, MAYHEW SAID HE BELIEVES THAT PROSPECTS FOR EVENTUALLY REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ARE GOOD, BUT NOTED THAT MANY LOOSE ENDS REMAIN TO BE TIED UP. THIS INCLUDES DOING SOME WORK WITH THE UUP TO ENSURE IT WILL NOT REJECT OUTRIGHT THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH. ACCORDING TO MAYHEW, BRUTON'S LONDON SPEECH HAS "DONE SOME DAMAGE" BY FEEDING UNIONIST DOUBTS ABOUT DUBLIN'S ROLE. ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTS PM MAJOR TO SPEAK BY PHONE WITH PM BRUTON "SHORTLY," MAYHEW DEMURRED WHEN ASKED FOR MORE SPECIFICS ON THE TIMING AND CONTENT OF THE CALL. END SUMMARY

3. THE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW ON NOV 14 TO REVIEW THE STATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. MAYHEW WAS JOINED BY MINISTER MICHAEL ANCRAM, INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT HEAD CLARE CHECKSFIELD AND HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY. POLOFF ACCOMPANIED THE AMBASSADOR.

4. MAYHEW SAID HE WISHED HE COULD BE MORE OPTIMISTIC AS HE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT APPROACHES. HE SAID HE DOES NOT FEEL PESSIMISTIC, BUT THE WAY FORWARD AT THIS MOMENT IS "NOT TERRIBLY CLEAR" SO IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

ENCOURAGING. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID, HMG IS ANXIOUS TO PRESS AHEAD ON THE PEACE PROCESS, AS THE GOVERNMENT "HASN'T COME THIS FAR JUST TO PRESS IT INTO THE SAND."

5. BRUTON'S SPEECH, MAYHEW SAID, WAS OBJECTIONABLE ON MANY GROUNDS, NOT LEAST THAT HE CHOSE LONDON AS THE VENUE FROM WHICH TO DELIVER HIS "EXTRAORDINARY" REMARKS. FOR EXAMPLE, MAYHEW CONTINUED, BRUTON HAD THE GALL TO COME TO LONDON TO COMPARE THE ABSENCE OF A BRITISH APOLOGY FOR ITS SECURITY FORCES' ACTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE LACK OF AN APOLOGY BY JAPAN FOR ITS ACTIONS IN BUILDING THE SIAM RAILROAD WITH POW LABOR. MAYHEW ADDED QUICKLY THAT WHAT IS PROBLEMATIC IS NOT THE HURT SENSIBILITIES, BUT THE FACT THAT IT HAS "DONE SOME DAMAGE" IN RELATIONS WITH THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY. MAYHEW SAID THAT IAN PAISLEY, WHO HAD IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE AMBASSADOR IN A MEETING IN MAYHEW'S OFFICE, ASKED HIM "HOW CAN OUR PEOPLE BE EXPECTED TO UNDERSTAND EVEN PREPARATORY TALKS WITH AN IRISH GOVERNMENT LIKE THIS."

6. MAYHEW SAID THE "DISCOURAGING STANCE" HE ENCOUNTERED FROM PAISLEY IS NOT UNEXPECTED, AND THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT NECESSARILY EXPECT TO BRING THE DUP ALONG. BUT THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT AFFORD TO GNORE THE OFFICIAL UNIOISTS. IT IS NOT A MATTR, HE EMPHASIZED, OF GIVING THE UNIONISTS A VETO. ANCRAM SAID THAT HMG IS NOT LOOKING FOR THE UUP TO SIGN UP TO THE TEXT OF A JOINT DECLARATION, BUT IT MUST HAVE SOME REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT IT WILL NOT REJECT IT OUTRIGHT. HE SAID TRIMBLE REMAINS SOLD ON HIS ASSEMBLY PROPOSAL AND HAS NOT SIGNED ON TO THE TWIN TRACK. MAYHEW SAID HMG DOES NOT DISCOURAGE HIM FROM MAKING SUCH A PROPOSAL, BUT HAS AND WILL ARGUE THAT ITS ONLY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS IS IF IT IS PROMOTED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POLITICAL TRACK DISCUSSION. OTHERWISE, THERE CAN BE NO CHANCE AT ALL OF GAINING AY SUPPORT FROM THE NATIONALISTS. MORE WORK MUT BE DONE WITH TRIMBLE, HE SAID.

7. MAYHEW AND ANCRAM BOTH SAID THAT PROSPECTS FOR EVENTUALLY REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THE TWO REMAINING OUTSTANDING ISSUES ARE GOOD. THERE S ESSENTIAL AGREEMENT ON THE DESCRIPTION OF WEAPONS COVERED BY THE REMIT, AND THE SIDES ARE NOT SO FAR APART ON A "TARGET" DATE. BUT BOTH SAID THEY WERE CAUTIOUS ABOUT MAKING PROPOSALS BEFORE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS MADE UP ITS MIND, WHICH THEY BELIEVE IT HAS NOT DONE YET. MAYHEW SAID THE NEXT STEP WILL BE A PHONE CALL

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

BETWEEN MAJOR AND BRUTON. HOWEVER, HE NOTED, THERE ARE MANY ISSUES FACING THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM NEW ZEALAND AND REPEATED THAT HMG MUST ALSO HAVE A BETTER SENSE OF WHERE THE UUP IS BEFORE IT CAN MOVE AHEAD. MAYHEW DID NOT OFFER ADDITIONAL SPECIFICS WHEN ASKED BY THE AMBASSADOR FOR DETAILS ON WHEN SUCH A CALL MIGHT BE PLACED OR WHAT THE PM MIGHT SAY.

CROWE

BT

#5469

NNNN

<MSGID> M1951760

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

KB put in book

PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 071109Z SEP 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3415
INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 012448

NODIS

OVP FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
MAJOR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (283)
KBH 4/11/2023

REF: LONDON 12431

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ROD LYNE ASKED ME IN LATE AFTERNOON SEPTEMBER 6 FOR A DISCUSSION ON NORTHERN IRELAND. AFTER SOME TWENTY MINUTES WITH LYNE, WE JOINED THE PRIME MINISTER TO CONTINUE THE MEETING. BOTH MEN SPOKE PRIMARILY OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUMMIT, ALONG LINES SIMILAR (BUT MORE EXPLICIT) TO THOSE BRIEFED BY MAYHEW SEVERAL HOURS EARLIER (REFTEL). BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND LYNE ASKED THAT WE HOLD THEIR REMARKS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.

3. IN THE MEETING WITH LYNE, THE PM'S AIDE BEGAN BY STRESSING THAT LONDON AND DUBLIN HAD ESSENTIALLY SIGNED OFF ON THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE, WHICH INCLUDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON DECOMMISSIONING, ON SEPTEMBER 1. SINN FEIN HAD, HOWEVER, CONCLUDED THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION. ADAMS, MCGUINNESS AND FATHER ALEX REED HAD VERBALLY "ROUGHED UP" IRISH OFFICIALS AT A BELFAST MEETING. THEY HAD THREATENED THAT PURSUING THE COMMISSION IDEA WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO ENDING THE PEACE PROCESS. IT WOULD LEAD TO "BODIES IN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

THE STREETS," AND THE GOI WOULD BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM. AS HAD MAYHEW EARLIER, LYNE SAID JOHN HUME, IN SEPARATE TALKS WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND USING ADAMS' ARGUMENTS, HAD STRONGLY OPPOSED PROCEEDING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. HIS ROLE HAD BEEN CRUCIAL IN CAUSING DUBLIN TO BACK OFF FROM THE COMMISSION.

4. BY SEPTEMBER 5, DUBLIN'S SUPPORT FOR THE COMMISSION HAD UNRAVELED. AFTER PROPOSING A SERIES OF UNACCEPTABLE CHANGES TO THE COMMISSION, DUBLIN HAD FLOATED THE CONCEPT OF ONE COMMISSIONER, I.E., SENATOR MITCHELL. THIS HAD BEEN REJECTED BY HMG. LYNE SAID LONDON FELT STRONGLY THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO "EXPOSE" ONE INDIVIDUAL TO DEAL WITH THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE. MOREOVER, IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE COMMISSION HAVE MEMBERS (PROBABLY TWO) WITH A MILITARY BACKGROUND WHO COULD VIEW DECOMMISSIONING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERTS.

5. CONTINUING, LYNE SAID THE PROSPECTIVE COMMISSION WOULD LOOK AT THE DEGREE OF COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE IRA AND THE LOYALISTS TO PARTICIPATE IN DECOMMISSIONING AS WELL AS THE MODALITIES. IN A SECOND PHASE, THE COMMISSION MIGHT PLAY A ROLE IN THE ACTUAL DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS. THE COMMISSION WOULD NOT, LYNE UNDERSCORED, TAKE POLITICAL DECISIONS. THESE WOULD BE RESERVED FOR LONDON AND DUBLIN. THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, HE NOTED, HAD CONTAINED NO REFERENCE TO THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION, I.E., A BEGINNING TO DECOMMISSIONING. IN RECOGNITION OF DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON AND ANXIOUS TO PREVENT A START TO DECOMMISSIONING FROM BEING AN OBSTACLE, LONDON HAD "PARKED OUR VIEW ON THIS DOWN THE ROAD."

6. LYNE SAID THAT JOHN BRUTON HAD TOLD MAJOR HE STILL HOPED TO HOLD THE SUMMIT NEXT WEEK AND WOULD SEEK TO REVIVE THE CONCEPT OF A COMMISSION. LYNE WAS SKEPTICAL. HE NOTED THAT MAJOR HAD EARLIER IN THE DAY WRITTEN BRUTON SUMMARIZING BRITISH VIEWS OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE. THE BRITISH EXPECTED BRUTON TO RESPOND WITH SOME IDEAS FOR MOVING THE PROCESS FORWARD. LYNE ADDED, WITHOUT ELABORATION, THAT DOWNING STREET HAD SOME IDEAS ON THIS SCORE AS WELL.

7. WE THEN WENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRIVATE CHAMBERS TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION. MAJOR OPENED BY SAYING THAT THE SUMMIT POSTPONEMENT HAD BEEN "BAD BUSINESS." JOHN BRUTON HAD BEEN SHAKEN OFF COURSE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

PRIMARILY BY THREATS OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE BY INN FEIN. MAJOR ALSO EXPRESSED IRRITATION WITH THE ROLE PLAYED BY JOHN HUME, NOTING THAT THE SDLP LEADER HAD PROPOSED IDEAS ON THE PEACE PROCESS TO BRUTON WHICH MAJOR HAD EMPHATICALLY REJECTED IN A PREVIOUS MEETING WITH HUME.

8. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT. SINN FEIN HAD LITERALLY DESTROYED THE LONDON-DUBLIN AGREEMENT TO AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. THIS IDEA NOW WOULDN'T WORK. A PAUSE AND SOME QUIET CONTEMPLATION WERE NOW NECESSARY. MAJOR STRESSED THAT WHILE DISAPPOINTED THAT JOHN BRUTON HAD BACKED OFF THE COMMISSION, HE WAS FULLY UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFICULTY OF HIS POLITICAL POSITION WHEN PRESENTED BY A UNITED FRONT OF SINN FEIN, JOHN HUME, AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 012448

NODIS

OVP FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

9. MAJOR THEN, AS HAD MAYHEW, LYNE AND SEVERAL NIO OFFICIALS, STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT SINN FEIN'S THREATS OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE HAD FULLY CONVINCED HIM OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S STANCE THAT SOME DECOMMISSIONING WAS NECESSARY. SINN FEIN COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO COME TO THE TABLE AND THREATEN A RETURN TO VIOLENCE IF IT DID NOT ACHIEVE ITS AGENDA IN NEGOTIATIONS. (MAJOR REFERRED TO SINN FEIN/IRA NOTING THAT BOTH ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS WERE MEMBERS OF THE IRA ARMY COUNCIL.) THE STORY OF THE LAST FEW DAYS WAS THAT SINN FEIN HAD USED THE THREAT OF AN END TO THE CEASE-FIRE TO DRIVE JOHN BRUTON OFF A POSITION, I.E., SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, THAT THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER PERSONALLY FAVORED.

10. WHEN I ASKED MAJOR HOW LONDON AND DUBLIN MIGHT DEAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

WITH SINN FEIN'S TACTICS, HE BLUNTLY REPLIED THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATES COULD PREVENT ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS FROM REPEATING THIS SCENARIO. HE ASKED THAT WE MAKE CLEAR TO THEM THAT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR.

11. MAJOR SAID THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS SHOULD HAVE NO IMPLICATIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. THE LATTER WAS STILL SEVERAL MONTHS OFF AND IT WAS VERY LIKELY THAT THE PICTURE WOULD LOOK DIFFERENT BY THE END OF NOVEMBER.

12. AS I WAS LEAVING, MAYHEW AND ANCRAM ARRIVED FOR A RAINSTORMING SESSION ON NEXT STEPS. I HOPE TO SEE MAYHEW LATER TODAY TO GET A READ-OUT ON THAT MEETING.

13. THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION IN MY PRESENCE OF ANCRAM'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO ELABORATE ON BRITISH VIEWS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. I RECOMMEND THAT ANCRAM SEE THE VICE PRESIDENT, TONY LAKE, AND STROBE TALBOTT OR PETER TARNOFF.

14. ANCRAM IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MAJOR, SAID JOHN TAYLOR AND WILLY ROSS SEEMED TO HAVE THE INSIDE TRACK IN THE UUP LEADERSHIP ELECTION TO BE HELD SEPTEMBER 8. FROM THE BODY LANGUAGE, I SENSED THAT TAYLOR WAS DOWNING STREET'S FAVORITE SON.

15. COMMENT. THE MOOD AMONG THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS SENIOR OFFICIALS IS CLEARLY ONE OF DEEP IRRITATION THAT SINN FEIN WAS ABLE TO USE THREATS OF VIOLENCE TO MOVE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT OFF A COURSE AGREED UPON WITH LONDON. IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THEY ARE MIGHTY UNHAPPY WITH THE ROLE PLAYED BY JOHN HUME. I BELIEVE THEY PULLED SOME PUNCHES IN DESCRIBING HUME'S ACTIVITIES IN DEFERENCE TO THE HIGH ESTEEM IN WHICH HE IS HELD BY MANY IN THE US. I SENSED NO ANIMOSITY TOWARD JOHN BRUTON. ON THE CONTRARY, MAJOR APPEARS TO REGARD HIM AS A STRAIGHT SHOOTER WHO WAS CAUGHT IN A POLITICAL VISE -- A SITUATION HE IS VERY FAMILIAR WITH.

16. THOUGH THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUMMIT AND ADAMS' WILLINGNESS TO THREATEN A RETURN TO THE GUN ARE REASONS FOR SERIOUS CONCERN, I AM CONVINCED THAT MAJOR WITH HIS ENORMOUS STAKE IN THE PEACE PROCESS WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH DUBLIN TO MOVE IT FORWARD. MAJOR IS ALSO AWARE OF THE PRESSURE TO HAVE THE PROCESS BACK ON TRACK BY THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND WILL MAKE EVERY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

EFFORT TO DO SO. AT THE SAME TIME, I FULLY SHARE THE VIEW THAT ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS, WHO I GATHER ARE ABOUT TO VISIT THE US, MUST HEAR FROM ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS THAT WE WILL IN NO WAY COUNTENANCE THREATS OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE. THIS PEACE PROCESS WILL NOT SUCCEED IF SINN FEIN IS ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITH THAT TACTIC.

CROWE

BT

#2448

NNNN

<MSGID> M1843283

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON JENSEN LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 191728Z SEP 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3880
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3437
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 012993

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.84)
KBH 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH
UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE VISITED THE EMBASSY TO MEET THE AMBASSADOR ON SEPT 19. TRIMBLE SAID HE HOPES TO VISIT WASHINGTON IN LATE OCTOBER OR EARLY NOVEMBER AND LOOKS FORWARD TO MEETING THE VICE PRESIDENT. HE ALSO EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE FOR A BRIEF PHOTO OP WITH THE PRESIDENT. TRIMBLE SAID SINN FEIN HAS YET TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL METHODS AND MANY UNIONISTS VIEW THE IRA CEASEFIRE AS MERELY A TACTICAL MOVE TO GAIN CONCESSIONS. ACCORDING TO TRIMBLE, SINN FEIN MUST MAKE "QUITE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES," OF WHICH DECOMMISSIONING WEAPONRY IS ONE PART, BEFORE UNIONISTS WILL HAVE CONFIDENCE IN ITS COMMITMENT TO PEACE. WARNING OF "SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES" IF THE PEACE PROCESS IS RUSHED, TRIMBLE SAID WE SHOULD EXPECT IT TO TAKE TIME TO RESOLVE THE INTRACTABLE ISSUES INVOLVED. TRIMBLE WELCOMED THE LATE NOVEMBER VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT TO NORTHERN IRELAND AND OFFERED TO WORK WITH US ON IT. END SUMMARY.

TRIMBLE VISIT TO WASHINGTON

3. NEWLY ELECTED UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE VISITED THE EMBASSY SEPT 19 FOR AN INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR. TRIMBLE WAS UNACCOMPANIED. AFTER OFFERING CONGRATULATIONS ON HIS ELECTION AS NEW LEADER OF THE UUP, THE AMBASSADOR TOLD TRIMBLE THAT THE U.S. IS VERY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING A DIALOGUE WITH HIM AND HIS FELLOW UNIONIST LEADERS. EMPHASIZING THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THE UNIONIST VIEWPOINT BE HEARD IN WASHINGTON, AND THAT U.S. POLICY BE PUT CLEARLY TO UNIONIST PARTY MEMBERS, THE AMBASSADOR URGED TRIMBLE TO VISIT WASHINGTON AS SOON AS HIS SCHEDULE PERMITS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT WOULD BE ABLE TO RECEIVE TRIMBLE.

4. TRIMBLE REPLIED THAT HE WELCOMES THE INVITATION TO VISIT WASHINGTON AND LOOKS FORWARD TO A MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT, WHO HE HAD MET ON AN EARLIER OCCASION AND FOR WHOM HE EXPRESSED A HIGH REGARD. HE WAS AWARE THAT PROSPECTIVE DATES HAD BEEN PASSED TO HIS STAFF, BUT TRIMBLE DID NOT KNOW PRECISELY WHAT THEY ARE. CITING THE OPENING OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION, THE UUP PARTY CONFERENCE AND OTHER COMMITMENTS, TRIMBLE SAID THAT LATE OCTOBER OR EARLY NOVEMBER WOULD PROBABLY WORK BEST FOR HIS CALENDAR. HE REITERATED THAT HE IS EAGER TO GO AND WOULD BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE WHEN CONSIDERING DATES.

5. APOLOGIZING FOR RAISING A "BIT OF AWKWARDNESS," TRIMBLE SAID HE WOULD HAVE A PROBLEM WITH HIS ELECTORATE IF HE DOES NOT GET A HANDSHAKE OR PHOTO OP WITH THE PRESIDENT. TRIMBLE SAID THAT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, FAILURE TO HAVE ANY CONTACT WITH THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS A SNUB BY COMPARISON TO THE RECEPTION ACCORDED GERRY ADAMS AND JOHN HUME. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD TRIMBLE'S SITUATION AND WOULD REPORT HIS COMMENT TO WASHINGTON WITH A FAVORABLE RECOMMENDATION BUT COULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT IN THAT REGARD.

PEACE PROCESS: PROGRESS WILL TAKE TIME

6 TURNING TO THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS, TRIMBLE SAID THAT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HIS PARTY, SINN FEIN HAS YET TO DEMONSTRATE THE COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL METHODS AND TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS WHICH IS REQUIRED BY THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. INDEED, HE DECLARED, THERE HAS BEEN A COMPLETE ABSENCE OF SUCH COMMITMENT." TRIMBLE SAID UNIONISTS VIEW THE IRA CEASEFIRE AS A TACTICAL GAMBIT DESIGNED TO WRING CONCESSIONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM; IF IT DOES NOT GET THE CONCESSIONS IT WANTS, IT WILL REVERT TO VIOLENCE. RECENT REPORTS OF SINN FEIN THREATS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

TO IRISH OFFICIALS OF "BODIES IN THE STREETS" IF THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE WAS SIGNED REINFORCED HIS MEMBERS VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF A COMMITMENT.

7. TO PERSUADE UNIONISTS THAT SINN FEIN IS COMMITTED TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL METHODS WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, TRIMBLE SAID "QUITE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES" NEED TO BE MADE, OF WHICH DECOMMISSIONING WEAPONRY IS ONE PART. TRIMBLE ADMITTED HE DID NOT HAVE IN MIND SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO ELIMINATE THE "CONFIDENCE GAP" IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HOWEVER, HE CONTINUED, IF THE IRA IS IN FACT COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL METHODS, HIS MEMBERS WOULD EXPECT TO BEGIN TO SEE EVIDENCE OF IT. STRUCTURES FOR PARAMILITARY RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING WOULD BE DISMANTLED; PUNISHMENT BEATINGS AND ENFORCEMENT OF IRA RULES BY INTIMIDATION IN CATHOLIC AREAS WOULD CEASE.

11

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 012993

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE

BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THIS, SO UNIONISTS CONTINUE TO DOUBT SINN FEIN SINCERITY. HE NOTED THAT HE HAS RECEIVED NO CRITICISM FROM WITHIN THE UUP FOR BRINGING IRISH MINISTER PROSINIAS DE ROSSA INTO PARTY HEADQUARTERS, EVEN THOUGH HE ONCE HAD BEEN A MEMBER OF THE IRA. HE SAID THAT IS BECAUSE UNIONISTS KNOW DE ROSSA BELIEVES IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

7
true?

What did he do/say.

8. TRIMBLE WARNED THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF AN IRA COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL METHODS, THERE WOULD BE "SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IF WE ARE RUSHED INTO TALKS WITH SINN FEIN." UNIONISTS, HE ASSERTED, ARE NOT SKEPTICAL FOR THE SAKE OF BEING SKEPTICAL. BUT NEITHER WILL HIS MEMBERS SIMPLY ACT ON BLIND FAITH. SAYING IT TAKES TIME FOR ATTITUDES -- IN ALL CAMPS -- TO CHANGE, TRIMBLE ARGUED THE PEACE PROCESS SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO TAKE TIME. THE LONGER IT TAKES, HE SAID, THE EASIER IT WILL BE. IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY AND INTRACTABLE NATURE OF THE PROBLEMS, TRIMBLE SAID HE BELIEVES PROGRESS WILL BE MADE IN A SERIES OF SMALL STEPS AND NOT IN MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

PRESIDENT'S VISIT

9. AFTER SKETCHING OUT THE BROAD OUTLINES OF OUR PLANNING IN NON-SPECIFIC TERMS, THE AMBASSADOR ASKED TRIMBLE FOR SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT MIGHT BE ORGANIZED TO ENHANCE THE CLIMATE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO ENSURE PARTICIPATION BY ALL KEY PLAYERS. TRIMBLE AGREED THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MEET A GOOD MIX OF POLITICAL LEADERS, COMMUNITY ACTIVISTS, AND ORDINARY CITIZENS. HE SAID THAT PERSONS IN BOTH COMMUNITIES WILL BE INSPECTING THE PRESIDENT'S EVERY MOVE FOR INDICATIONS OF BIAS OR FAVORITISM. IN THAT CONTEXT, HE RECOMMENDED THAT ALL EVENTS BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED TO ENSURE BALANCE AND IMPARTIALITY.

10. TRIMBLE SAID THE PRESIDENT WILL RECEIVE A WARM WELCOME AND THAT HE DOUBTS THERE WILL BE ANY SERIOUS SECURITY THREAT. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, HOWEVER, HE SUGGESTED THAT SITES WHERE THE PRESIDENT MIGHT SHAKE HANDS OR GREET ORDINARY CITIZENS BE SELECTED WITH GREAT CARE. HE SAID IT IS BETTER TO DO ONE EVENT IN A CATHOLIC AREA AND ONE IN PROTESTANT NEIGHBORHOOD THAN TO HOLD ONE AT WHICH THE COMMUNITIES MIGHT MIX. THE COMPETITION AMONG THE CROWD FOR THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION COULD LEAD TO PROBLEMS, HE SUGGESTED. TRIMBLE SAID HE PERSONALLY WELCOMES THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND OFFERED TO WORK WITH US TO MAKE THE VISIT A SUCCESS.

COMMENT

11. THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, IN DISTINCT CONTRAST TO OUR ENCOUNTERS WITH HIS PREDECESSOR, TRIMBLE WAS RELAXED, CONFIDENT AND ELOQUENT. HE CLEARLY IS READY TO MAKE A TRIP TO WASHINGTON AND PREPARED TO PRESENT FORCEFULLY THE UNIONIST VIEW. WE WELCOME THE PROPOSED MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT AND, IF A CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY CAN BE FOUND, RECOMMEND THE PRESIDENT DROP BY.

12. TRIMBLE IS LIKELY TO SET THE EVIDENTIARY BAR FAIRLY HIGH ON THE ISSUE OF IRA COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL METHODS, BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR HE IS WILLING TO ENGAGE IN THE EFFORT TO FIND A WAY FORWARD. HE WAS FRANK IN SAYING HE DID NOT HAVE NEW IDEAS FOR MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS PAST THE CURRENT IMPASSE ON DECOMMISSIONING. IN FACT, ON HIS WAY OUT OF THE EMBASSY, TRIMBLE MENTIONED THIS HAD BEEN

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

HE MAIN TOPIC OF HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER EARLIER IN THE DAY. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH MAJOR HAD NO NEW IDEAS EITHER AND NO PROPOSALS SURFACED DURING THE MEETING AT NO. 10, THE TWO AGREED TO CONTINUE TO CONSIDER OPTIONS.

CROWE
BT
#2993

NNNN
<MSGID> M1862291

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 09

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 231724Z OCT 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8862

INFO RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 3681

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3443

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 DUBLIN 005216

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.85)
RKH 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/97

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: ANCRAM - MCGUINNESS MEETING OCTOBER 20

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. CLASSIFIED BY DENNIS A. SANDBERG, DCM, 1.5 (D).

2. SUMMARY: SINN FEIN'S MARTIN MCGUINNESS PROVIDED US WITH THE FOLLOWING READOUT OF HIS MEETING WITH NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MICHAEL ANCRAM, OCTOBER 20, 1995. TEXT OF REPORT FOLLOWS.

3. BEGIN QUOTE: REPORT OF A MEETING BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, FRIDAY 20 OCTOBER, 1995.

THIS REPORT AIMS TO PROVIDE ACCURATE INFORMATION ON TODAY'S MEETING AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE. IT SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS EITHER COMPREHENSIVE OR CONTAINING ALL OF THE RELEVANT DETAIL.

SINN FEIN WAS REPRESENTED BY MARTIN MCGUINNESS AND GERRY KELLY. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS REPRESENTED BY MICHAEL ANCRAM AND QUENTIN THOMAS. THE MEETING COMMENCED AT 4:00 P.M. AND CONCLUDED AT 5:25 P.M.

A. SINN FEIN'S PURPOSE IN THE MEETING WAS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF FINDING AGREEMENT ON A WORKABLE AND EFFECTIVE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE.

SINN FEIN BROUGHT FORWARD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THE FOLLOWING

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 09

IS THE PROPOSAL INTRODUCED BY SINN FEIN:

1. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO LAUNCH THE PREPARATORY PHASE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS IN THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH WILL, NOT LATER THAN 30 NOVEMBER, LEAD INTO SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, IN ROUND TABLE FORMAT, TO REACH AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
2. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE ALSO AGREED TO ASK GEORGE MITCHELL TO HEAD UP AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, TO ASCERTAIN AND ADVISE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC METHODS OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH WILL BE PARTICIPATING IN THE ROUND TABLE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE REMOVAL OF ALL WEAPONS FROM IRISH POLITICS.

THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL ALSO BE ASKED TO ASCERTAIN AND ADVISE ON HOW THE QUESTION OF ARMS, NOW (THANKFULLY) SILENCED, CAN BE FINALLY AND SATISFACTORILY SETTLED.

GEORGE MITCHELL WILL BE ASSISTED BY TWO OTHER FIGURES OF INTERNATIONAL STANDING LIKELY TO INSPIRE WIDESPREAD CONFIDENCE.

3. ACCORDINGLY, THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL HAVE THE DUTY OF REPORTING, BY (-----) ON WHETHER IT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT A CLEAR COMMITMENT EXISTS ON THE PART OF THE RESPECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES TO AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, ACHIEVED THROUGH DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO THE SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION. BHET9_XL REPORT TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WHO WILL UNDERTAKE TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY ANY RECOMMENDATIONS HE (SIC) MAKES AND TO GIVE THEM DUE WEIGHT. END OF SINN FEIN PROPOSAL.

END OF SINN FEIN PROPOSAL

B. THE SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES SOUGHT TO ENGAGE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN A NUMBER OF AREAS INCLUDING:

1. ENSURING THAT THE POLITICAL TRACK WOULD BE A GENUINE PROCESS AIMED AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. A SERIOUS DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTION OF ARMS.
3. RESPECTIVE ATTITUDES TO A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, SHOULD ONE BE SET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 09

UP.

4. A DISCUSSION ON PRACTICAL MATTERS CONCERNING SUCH A BODY. THAT IS SUCH MATTERS AS HOW IT WOULD WORK, A TIMETABLE AND SO ON.

C. MARTIN MCGUINNESS MADE A NUMBER OF POINTS IN OPENING THE SINN FEIN END OF THE DISCUSSION.

1. THIS IS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT BY SINN FEIN TO EXPLORE A WAY THROUGH AN IMPASSE WHICH IS NOT OF SINN FEIN'S MAKING.

2. WE HAVE LISTENED CLOSELY, EXAMINED AND CONSIDERED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 DUBLIN 005216

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/97

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: ANCRAM - MCGUINNESS MEETING OCTOBER 20

CAREFULLY EVERYTHING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS SAID ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE IMPASSE.

3. HAVING DONE SO, IT REMAINS OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, THAT THE IMPASSE ARISES OUT OF THE FACT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS TURNED AN OBJECTIVE OF THE PEACE PROCESS - REMOVING THE GUN FOREVER FROM THE POLITICAL EQUATION IN IRELAND - INTO A PRECONDITION WHICH HAS BECOME A BARRIER TO PROGRESS.

4. IN STATING THIS IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION TO RECRIMINATE. RATHER IT IS TO DEAL WITH A REALITY AS WE KNOW IT. THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF A SURRENDER OF WEAPONS BY ANY PARTY TO THE CONFLICT AT THIS TIME.

FURTHERMORE, OUR DEMOCRATIC ELECTORAL MANDATE REQUIRES THAT WE CAN NOT AND WILL NOT ACCEPT A PRE-CONDITION ON OUR RIGHT TO REPRESENT SINN FEIN VOTERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL SHAPE THE FUTURE OF THE IRISH PEOPLE.

5. THAT SAID, OUR MEETING TODAY, AS IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS, IS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO FIND A WAY AROUND THIS IMPASSE; AND IN SO DOING TO SPECIFICALLY FOCUS ON A TWIN TRACK APPROACH AS A POTENTIALLY VIABLE MEANS TO THAT END.

6. I MUST SAY, HOWEVER - AND AGAIN THERE IS NO RECRIMINATION IN WHAT I SAY - THAT THIS CONCEPT WHEN MOOTED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 09

EARLIER IN THE YEAR WAS - WHATEVER ITS MERITS - SCUPPERED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO TURN AN INTERNATIONAL BODY INTO A COLLECTION AGENCY FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. WE COULD HAVE NO PART IN SUCH AN EXERCISE THEN. WE COULD HAVE NO PART IN SUCH AN EXERCISE NOW.

7. IN EXAMINING THE TWIN TRACK CONCEPT NOW WE DO SO ON A CLEAR BASIS:

(A) THE NEED FOR THE SETTING OF A DATE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS THE ESSENTIAL NEXT STEP.

(B) THE NEED TO HAVE THE PRE-CONDITION ON SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS REMOVED.

(C) THE NEED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR ANY INTERNATIONAL BODY ARE SUCH THAT SINN FEIN CAN PROVIDE ITS FULL AND WHOLEHEARTED CO-OPERATION.

8. IN ANTICIPATION THAT THE JOINT LABORS, BY ALL INVOLVED IN THE EXAMINATION OF A TWIN TRACK APPROACH, PROVE FRUITFUL, WE HAVE COMMISSIONED A PAPER WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A SINN FEIN SUBMISSION TO SUCH A BODY.

WE HAVE DIRECTED THAT THE PAPER ADDRESS ALL ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY AND INCLUDES A RESPONSE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S MODALITIES PAPER. WE MUST, OF COURSE, BE FREE TO ADDRESS ALL OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES LIKEWISE. ✓

9. IN SO DOING ANYTHING STATED WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF OUR FIRMEST BELIEF AND CONVICTION.

10. AND, OF COURSE, SUBJECT TO REACHING A WORKABLE FORMULA ON ALL OF THIS INCLUDING A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF HOW ALL OF THIS WOULD WORK WE WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY ON ITS MERITS.

D. MARTIN MCGUINNESS STRESSED THAT THE POLITICAL TRACK NEEDED TO BE A GENUINE PROCESS AIMED AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THIS REQUIRES THAT THE POLITICAL TRACK INVOLVES A SERIOUS AND GENUINE ENGAGEMENT BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO ENSURE THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS BEGIN NOT LATER THAN THE END OF NOVEMBER. IT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO BE USED AS A VETO BY ANY POLITICAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 09

PARTY, OR AS A FURTHER DEVICE TO STALL THE COMMENCEMENT OF ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS.

SINN FEIN'S CO-OPERATION WITH AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, IF AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA INVOLVING SUCH A BODY CAN BE FOUND, WILL CLEARLY BE ON THE BASIS THAT IT IS ONE OF TWO TRACKS DESIGNED TO BRING US ALL INTO ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. SO WHILE THE POLITICAL TRACK MUST BE A SERIOUS AND GENUINE POLITICAL PROCESS ITS PURPOSE OF ARRIVING AT ALL-PARTY TALKS BY THE STATED DATE MUST ALSO BE SERIOUS AND GENUINE.

E. ON THE ISSUE OF A TIMETABLE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, MARTIN MCGUINNESS STATED: IT IS OUR VIEW THAT A PERIOD OF 2/3 WEEKS IS MORE THAN ADEQUATE TO ALLOW FOR SENSIBLE DISCUSSION AND DELIBERATION OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED ONCE AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON ITS REMIT AND TERMS OF REFERENCE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 DUBLIN 005216

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/97

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: ANCRAM - MCGUINNESS MEETING OCTOBER 20

IT IS THEREFORE OUR VIEW THAT THE END OF NOVEMBER IS A REALISTIC DATE FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF ALL PARTY TALKS.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES ARGUED FOR A PROLONGED TIMETABLE ESTIMATING THAT IT WOULD TAKE AT LEAST THREE MONTHS, BRINGING US WELL INTO 1996 AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DEFINITE DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS. ALSO THAT THE THREE MONTHS PERIOD COULD NOT BEGIN UNTIL THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY.

F. A WITHOUT PREJUDICE DISCUSSION ON HOW AN INTERNATIONAL BODY WOULD WORK TOOK PLACE. MARTIN MCGUINNESS POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS IN RELATION TO THIS.

1. WHO WOULD BE ON SUCH A BODY?
2. HOW LONG WOULD IT SIT?
3. WOULD IT'S HEARINGS BE PUBLIC/PRIVATE?
4. WHO WOULD IT INVITE TO MAKE SUBMISSIONS?

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM.

PAGE 06 OF 09

5. WHERE WOULD IT SIT?

6. HOW WOULD IT TAKE SUBMISSIONS -
VERBALLY/WRITTEN/QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS/A COMBINATION?

7. TERMS OF REFERENCE:

ON THE BODY BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES ONLY HAD ONE
NAME SO FAR - GEORGE MITCHELL.

PUBLIC OR PRIVATE SUBMISSION ARE MATTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
BODY.

INVITES TO GIVE SUBMISSIONS WAS UP TO BODY BUT BRITISH
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED - AS NARROW AS
REPUBLICANS AND LOYALISTS. SINN FEIN MADE POINT THAT ALL
POLITICAL PARTIES AND TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE GIVEN
OPTION AS THEY HAVE OPINIONS.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARGUED TO NARROW THE REMIT OF THE
BODY DOWN TO DEALING WAS (SIC) QUOTE ILLEGAL END QUOTE
WEAPONS. BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES SAID THEY
DIDN'T KNOW HOW LONG POLITICAL LEG OF TRACK WOULD TAKE.
BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT JOINT
COMMUNIQUE COULD BE IN DAYS.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY
WILL NOT EQUATE BEGIN QUOTE ILLEGAL AND LEGAL END QUOTE
ARMS. THEY STATED IN FACT THAT THE REMIT OF BODY WOULD BE
ARMS HELD BY PARAMILITARIES.

SINN FEIN EXPLAINED WHY IT WAS NECESSARY FROM NATIONALIST
PEOPLE POINT OF VIEW THAT BRITISH AND UNIONIST USE OF ARMS
AND DRACONIAN LAWS MUST BE ADDRESSED AS MANY HAVE LOST
THEIR LIVES.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES INSISTED ON NARROW
REMIT.

(BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES EVENTUALLY AGREED TO
LOOK AT WORDS TO SEE WHAT WAS POSSIBLE)

BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES INVOKED DUBLIN
GOVERNMENT ON BEGIN QUOTE LEGAL ARMS END QUOTE ARGUMENT.

MARTIN MCGUINNESS ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S PRE-CONDITION TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 09

THAT IS:

IS WASHINGTON 3 QUOTE OFF THE SCREEN END QUOTE WHERE AN INTERNATIONAL BODY WOULD BE CONCERNED?

WOULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ACCEPT RECOMMENDATIONS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL BODY WHICH DISAGREE WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S SETTING OF PRE-CONDITIONS IN THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS?

BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES REITERATED THAT THEIR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POSITION REMAINS THAT W 3 IS THE ONLY WAY TO ALL-PARTY TALKS BUT CONCEDED THAT AN INTERNATIONAL BODY MAY PRODUCE A WAY AROUND WHICH NEITHER SIDE COULD SUGGEST TO EACH OTHER AT THIS TIME.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES ASKED ABOUT AN ANSWER TO THE BEGIN QUOTE NON-DOCUMENT END QUOTE AND WERE TOLD THAT IT WAS CONTAINED IN THE DOCUMENT WE HANDED OVER AT THIS MEETING.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES MADE IT CLEAR THAT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 DUBLIN 005216

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/97

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: ANCRAM - MCGUINNESS MEETING OCTOBER 20

THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WOULD NOT BE A COLLECTION AGENCY FOR ARMS. THAT IT SHOULD ONLY DEAL WITH THE WAY.

IN A STATEMENT TO THE MEDIA FOLLOWING THE MEETING, SINN FEIN SAID: BEGIN QUOTE AT THEIR LAST MEETING MARTIN MCGUINNESS AND MICHAEL ANCRAM AGREED TO A FURTHER MEETING. THIS MEETING TOOK PLACE AT 4:00 P.M. AND LASTED AN HOUR AND A HALF.

THEIR DISCUSSIONS ARE PART OF THE ONGOING EFFORTS TO END THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN THE PEACE PROCESS BY FINDING A FORMULA ACCEPTABLE TO EVERYONE.

TO THIS END SINN FEIN MADE FIRM PROPOSALS TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH WE BELIEVE CAN END THE IMPASSE.

CLEARLY WHAT IS REQUIRED IS A DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS AND THE REMOVAL OF PRE-CONDITIONS TO INVOLVEMENT IN THOSE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 08 OF 09

TALKS. END QUOTE.

THE FOLLOWING ARE INITIAL COMMENTS FROM THE MEETING WHICH AIM TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE MEETING IN AS TIMELY A WAY AS IS POSSIBLE.

FOR THAT REASON IT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE COMPREHENSIVE. IN LIKE MANNER, AND FOR THE SAME REASON, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE LIMITED IN SCOPE.

THAT SAID, THERE ARE THREE ISSUES ARISING FROM THE MEETING WHICH CAUSE GREAT CONCERN AND DO NOT GIVE RISE TO OPTIMISM.

1. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT VIEW OF A TIMETABLE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BODY, TO GET TO THE POINT OF BRINGING ITS REPORT FORWARD, IS THAT A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS COULD BE INVOLVED. THAT IS, AS THINGS ARE PROGRESSING AT PRESENT, FEBRUARY 96.

IN OUR VIEW THIS WOULD BE POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS TO A PROCESS IN WHICH CONFIDENCE HAS ALREADY SERIOUSLY WANED AND WHICH ALREADY HAS A CREDIBILITY DEFICIT.

2. COMMENTS BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES TODAY WERE QUITE EXPLICIT ABOUT ONLY QUOTE RELEVANT END QUOTE PARTIES MAKING SUBMISSIONS TO OR CO-OPERATING WITH AN INTERNATIONAL BODY.

SINN FEIN COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO DEFEND WITH OUR CONSTITUENCY SUBJECTING OURSELVES TO SUCH A BEGIN QUOTE TEST END QUOTE.

3. COMMENTS BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES SUGGEST THAT WHATEVER AN INTERNATIONAL BODY MIGHT SAY ABOUT WASHINGTON 1 AND 2, THAT WASHINGTON 3 WILL REMAIN INTACT.

EVERYONE HAS TO TAKE RISKS IN THIS PROCESS. SINN FEIN HAS TAKEN ITS SHARE AND IS PREPARED TO TAKE FURTHER RISKS. BUT WE MUST BE SURE WE ARE DEALING WITH RISKS RATHER THAN PREDETERMINED CONCLUSIONS. END OF REPORT

SMITH
BT
#5216

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 09 OF 09

NNNN

<MSGID> M1915303

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*PGT in
Book
CABLES
Also -
lets add
RAB -
US smts.
pls c. Meek
from Jan 93
a -*

PAGE 01 OF 06

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 071740Z SEP 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3460

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3357

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 012503

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (2.86)

KBH 4/11/2023

EXDIS

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS; PLS PASS OVP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: AMBASSADOR MEETING WITH MAYHEW

REF: LONDON 12448 (NODIS)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: PATRICK MAYHEW IS LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN NO. 10 ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON DECOMMISSIONING. HOWEVER, AT THIS POINT, HMG DOES NOT HAVE A FOLLOW-ON PLAN AND IS WAITING FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SORT OUT ITS POLICY IN THE WAKE OF THE POSTPONED SUMMIT. MAYHEW TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE SUDDEN CHANGE IN BRUTON'S POSITION. HE PRODUCED THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATING DOCUMENTS TO BOLSTER HIS ARGUMENT THAT HMG HAD NEVER MOVED AWAY FROM ITS STANCE ON DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS AND THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FULLY AWARE OF THAT POSITION AT THE TIME THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE WAS AGREED. WITH FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS CERTAIN OVER THE COMING WEEKS, MAYHEW SAID THERE IS NO REASON NOW TO FACTOR THE ABORTED SUMMIT INTO PLANNING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND. END SUMMARY.

3. THE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW SEPT 7 FOR A 75-MINUTE MEETING TO REVIEW THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS IN THE WAKE OF THE POSTPONED ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT. MAYHEW OPENED BY NOTING THAT MICHAEL ANCRAM WOULD BE HEADING TO WASHINGTON THIS AFTERNOON FOR WHAT HMG HOPES WILL A USEFUL EXCHANGE WITH

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 06

THE ADMINISTRATION. THE AMBASSADOR WELCOMED THE VISIT AND SAID HE UNDERSTANDS HIGH-LEVEL APPOINTMENTS AT THE NSC AND THE DEPARTMENT ARE BEING ARRANGED.

THE POSTPONEMENT

4. MAYHEW SAID THAT SINN FEIN'S THREAT TO RETURN TO VIOLENCE HAD "DEEPLY SHAKEN" THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND HAD HAD A "DEVASTATING EFFECT" ON BRUTON. HE SPECULATED THAT THIS, IN PART, IS BECAUSE IRISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO DEALING DIRECTLY AND ADVERSELY WITH THIS ASPECT OF THE IRA. HE ALSO EXPRESSED SOME SYMPATHY FOR BRUTON WHO FOUND HIMSELF IN A POLITICAL VISE, UNABLE TO WITHSTAND THE COMBINED PRESSURE OF ADAMS, HUME, REYNOLDS, ET AL. IN SHORT, MAYHEW SAID, BRUTON BACKED AWAY FROM PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS BECAUSE HE "HAD A GUN WAVED IN HIS FACE."

5. MAYHEW HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE TAOISEACH NOW APPEARS TO BE IN GOOD SHAPE AND "BACK ON AN EVEN KEEL." FOLLOWING A COURTEOUS BUT POINTED EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTERS YESTERDAY, PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRUTON AND MAJOR REMAIN GOOD. BRUTON TOLD MAJOR THAT HIS COALITION COLLEAGUES HAVE BEEN SUPPORTIVE AND MAYHEW SAID HE HIMSELF HAD DETECTED NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BRUTON AND DICK SPRING.

HMG STICKS TO THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION

6. TURNING TO THE CAUSE OF THE POSTPONEMENT, MAYHEW SAID HMG HAD BEEN TAKEN COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE BY THE LAST MINUTE IRISH CHANGES. HMG DID NOT FIND THE SUGGESTION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION BE CHANGED TO A SINGLE ARBITER WITH INDEPENDENT POLITICAL AUTHORITY O BE A HELPFUL ONE. NOT ONLY WOULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE TROUBLE DELEGATING ITS AUTHORITY, BUT THE UNIONISTS WOULD NEVER ACCEPT A SOLE ARBITER, PARTICULARLY ONE WITH A POLITICAL AND NOT A MILITARY BACKGROUND.

7. RESPONDING TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUERY ABOUT HMG'S POSITION ON DECOMMISSIONING, MAYHEW EMPHASIZED THAT HMG "HAS NEVER MOVED AWAY FROM THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION" AND HAS NO POLITICAL ROOM TO DO SO EVEN IF IT WERE SO INCLINED. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SUMMIT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 06

COMMUNIQUE WOULD HAVE REFERRED ONLY TO THE FIRST TWO CONDITIONS, I.E. ESTABLISHING A COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DECOMMISSIONING AND OUTLINING MODALITIES FOR ACCOMPLISHING IT. MAYHEW SAID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS CONTENT TO DROP REFERENCE IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO THE NECESSITY OF SOME WEAPONS BEING DECOMMISSIONED AS A CONDITION FOR COMMENCEMENT OF ALL-PARTY TALKS. HOWEVER, THIS DID NOT INDICATE A RELAXATION OF ITS POSITION. HMG BELIEVES ADHERENCE TO THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION IS NECESSARY TO BUILD THE CONFIDENCE REQUIRED SO THAT ALL PARTIES WILL COME TO THE TABLE. THE UNIONISTS SIMPLY WILL NOT ATTEND WITHOUT THAT CONDITION BEING MET.

8. MAYHEW SAID THAT HMG ALSO HAD AGREED TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO WHATEVER RECOMMENDATIONS THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION MAY GIVE. SHOULD THE COMMISSION ADVISE, AFTER IT CONFERS WITH THE RELEVANT PARAMILITARIES, THAT SOMETHING OTHER THAN BEGINNING THE ACTUAL PROCESS OF DECOMMISSIONING WEAPONS WOULD GENERATE SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE TO ALLOW THE ROUNDTABLE TO BEGIN WITHOUT FEAR OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE, HMG WILL FAIRLY CONSIDER THAT ADVICE ON ITS MERITS. HOWEVER, MAYHEW SAID, AT THIS POINT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANYTHING OTHER THAN DECOMMISSIONING COULD PRODUCE SUCH CONFIDENCE.

9. MOREOVER, MAYHEW CONTINUED, BOTH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND SINN FEIN ALL ALONG HAVE BEEN WELL AWARE OF THE BRITISH POSITION. MAYHEW GAVE THE AMBASSADOR A COPY OF THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AND OF THE CHILCOT-DALTON MINUTE ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO BOLSTER HIS ARGUMENT THAT HMG'S POSITION HAS BEEN CLEAR AND CONSISTENT. (TEXTS BELOW IN PARAS 12-13.) HE ALSO READ FROM THE MEMCON OF HIS MEETING WITH SINN FEIN LEADERS TO HOW THAT HE UNAMBIGUOUSLY HAD MADE THE POINT TO ADAMS. THE IDEA OF DECOMMISSIONING PREDATES THE CEASEFIRE, WAS AMPLY BRIEFED TO ALL PARTIES -- INCLUDING MSSRS. ADAMS AND REYNOLDS -- BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE JOINT DECLARATION, AND IS NOT A SUDDEN OR WHIMSICAL DEMAND OF HMG, MAYHEW EMPHASIZED.

NEXT STEPS

10. MAYHEW SAID HE IS NOT AS PESSIMISTIC AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 06

COMMISSION (REFTEL). ALTHOUGH BOTH GOVERNMENTS REMAIN OPEN TO OTHER IDEAS, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS NOW NO SERVICEABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE COMMISSION. HOWEVER, MAYHEW SAID, WE MUST "LET THE MUD SETTLE" BEFORE WE CAN SEE OUR WAY FORWARD. MAYHEW TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE NEXT STEP IS UP TO THE IRISH, AS THEY ARE THE ONES WHO WITHDREW. SO FOR NOW LONDON WILL WAIT, AS IT UNDERSTANDS BRUTON NEEDS SOME TIME TO GET "THE OTHERS" LINED UP. AT THIS MOMENT THERE ARE NO LIAISON GROUP OR OTHER CONTACTS SCHEDULED, ACCORDING TO MAYHEW. HE EXPECTS, HOWEVER, THAT AT SOME POINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE THE PRIME MINISTERS WILL COMMISSION A GROUP OF SENIOR OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS HOW TO PUT THE PIECES BACK TOGETHER.

11. SECONDING COMMENTS BY DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS, MAYHEW SAID THAT IF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS STAND FIRM, SINN FEIN WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO COOPERATE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. ANCRAM WILL BE MAKING THIS POINT FORCEFULLY IN WASHINGTON, HE SAID. ANCRAM ALSO WILL TAKE THE MESSAGE THAT THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUMMIT SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. THERE ARE CERTAIN TO BE MANY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN NOW AND THEN, MAYHEW POINTED OUT.

12. TEXT OF DRAFT COMMUNIQUE PREPARED FOR SEPT 6 SUMMIT

BEGIN TEXT:

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER TO CREATE CONDITIONS SO THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS, AIMED AT EACHING IN ROUND TABLE FORMAT AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BASED ON CONSENT, COULD COMMENCE BEFORE THE END OF 1995. A SERIES OF MEETINGS WILL NOW BE JOINTLY CONVENED BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS WITH ALL PARTIES TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THESE TALKS.

BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHARE THE AIM OF CREATING CONDITIONS IN WHICH ALL THE RELEVANT PARTIES WILL ATTEND THESE TALKS AND WILL PARTICIPATE ON THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE POSSIBLE BASIS.

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL DECOMMISSIONING COMMISSION. THIS COMMISSION WILL HAVE THE INITIAL AND LIMITED REMIT OF

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 06

REPORTING TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS BY MID-NOVEMBER 1995, ON WHETHER IT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT A CLEAR COMMITMENT EXISTS ON THE PART OF THE RELEVANT PARAMILITARY ORGANISATIONS TO THE FULL AND VERIFIABLE DECOMMISSIONING OF ALL ILLEGALLY HELD ARMS IN THE APPROPRIATE CONTEXT AND MANNER. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AIM TO MEET AGAIN BEFORE THE END OF NOVEMBER 1995, TO AGREE THE APPROPRIATE WAY FORWARD.

END TEXT

13. CHILCOT-DALTON CONFIDENTIAL MINUTE

BEGIN TEXT:

TASK OF COMMISSION

(11) AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ALREADY REFERRED TO, THE GROUP ENVISAGE THAT, AS A FIRST STEP A COMMISSION WOULD BE INVITED TO DEVELOP A SCHEME FOR DECOMMISSIONING IN CONSULTATION WITH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER RELEVANT PARTIES. ON THE BASIS OF THOSE CONSULTATIONS, THE COMMISSION WOULD REPORT BACK TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE MODALITIES FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS WHICH IN ITS VIEW WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE DECOMMISSIONING. SUBSEQUENTLY THE COMMISSION COULD, IF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SAW ADVANTAGE IN IT, BE REQUESTED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO ASSIST IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY DECOMMISSIONING SCHEME.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

(12) THE GROUP BELIEVES THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD BE GIVEN AS MUCH FLEXIBILITY AS POSSIBLE IN TAKING FORWARD ITS WORK ON MODALITIES. THE GROUP THEREFORE SEES A NEED FOR TERMS OF REFERENCE WHICH WILL ENABLE THE COMMISSION TO RESPOND TO THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROCESS ITSELF. IT RECOMMENDS TERMS OF REFERENCE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

-- TO CONSULT WITH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER RELEVANT PARTIES, INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, THOSE PARTIES WHICH WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS ON THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS, ON THE TERMS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT APPLY FOR A SCHEME FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS; TO REPORT TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS,

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 06

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSULTATIONS, ON THE PROGRESS OF ITS WORK AND ON HOW THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS MIGHT BE TAKEN FORWARD, AND TO MAKE PROPOSALS OUTLINING THE MODALITIES FOR A SCHEME ON WHICH AGREEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE;

-- TO CARRY OUT SUCH OTHER TASKS AS MAY BE ASSIGNED TO IT FROM TIME TO TIME BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS JOINTLY AND, IN PARTICULAR, IF REQUESTED, TO:

O ASSIST THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO PUT IN PLACE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS MAY BE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE SCHEME FOR DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS; AND

O PARTICIPATE IN THE SUPERVISION AND VERIFICATION OF THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS ITSELF INCLUDING, IF APPROPRIATE, ACCEPTING WITHIN ITS CONTROL ILLEGALLY-HELD ARMS.

CROWE

BT

#2503

NNNN

<MSGID> M1844011

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 06

PRT: BASS BERGER FUERTH LAKE SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HOTLINE_IN LAKEA SUM2

<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 161300Z SEP 95

FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TO THE WHITE HOUSE
INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(2.88)
KBH 4/11/2023

MESSAGE TO BE SENT VIA CABINET OFFICE/WHITE HOUSE DIRECT LINK TO
MR. ANTHONY LAKE FROM RODERIC LYNE ON SATURDAY 16 SEPTEMBER

DEAR TONY,

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE, WHICH WE DISCUSSED YESTERDAY EVENING.
YOU ASKED FOR A QUICK REACTION, AND THAT IS WHAT THIS IS. I HAVE
CONSULTED NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE MINISTERS, BUT IN THE TIME
AVAILABLE WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO PUT A FORMED POSITION TO THE
PRIME MINISTER. THE FOLLOWING IS OF COURSE SUBJECT TO HIS VIEWS.
PERHAPS I COULD FIRST SAY THAT EVERYONE HERE IS ENCOURAGED BY THE
PROGRESS YOU HAVE REPORTED. WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE TIME AND SKILL
YOU HAVE DEVOTED TO THIS, AND EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EFFORTS.
THERE SEEMS NOW TO BE A REAL HOPE OF GETTING THE TWIN TRACK
INITIATIVE UP AND RUNNING. THAT WOULD GIVE A TREMENDOUS BOOST TO
THE PEACE PROCESS AFTER THE RECENT SETBACK. SO ALL POWER TO YOUR
ELBOW?

THERE ARE NATURALLY A NUMBER OF POINTS OF DETAIL AND OF DRAFTING IN
YOUR TEXT WHICH WE MAY WISH TO EXPRESS DIFFERENTLY. WE ARE READY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 06

TO GO TO WORK ON THIS RAPIDLY NEXT WEEK, WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND IN CONSULTATION WITH JOHN HUME AND OTHERS, IF AS A RESULT OF YOUR WORK THERE IS NOW THE PROSPECT OF LAUNCHING THE TWIN-TRACK INITIATIVE. SO THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION FOR US, AND I ASSUME THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, IS TO KNOW WHETHER SINN FEIN WILL NOW AGREE TO THE KEY ELEMENTS IN THE INITIATIVE, AND WILL ACCORDINGLY SECURE FULL COOPERATION IN BOTH TRACKS. ANY ASSURANCE GIVEN TO YOU WILL OF COURSE CARRY WEIGHT WITH US.

THESE ELEMENTS ARE:

- LAUNCHING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A SERIES OF MEETINGS INVOLVING ALL PARTIES TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR SUBSTANTIVE ROUND-TABLE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. THESE INCLUSIVE PREPARATORY TALKS WOULD BE IN BILATERAL, TRILATERAL, OR MULTILATERAL FORMAT, ACCORDING TO THE WISHES OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, AND WOULD BE DESIGNED TO SECURE ALL-PARTY AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS, PARTICIPATION AND AGENDA FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS YOU SAY, WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE PROSPECT OF MOVING TO A ROUND-TABLE FORMAT IN THE PREPARATORY PHASE IF THE PARTICIPANTS ASKED FOR IT.

- IN PARALLEL, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WOULD ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL BODY OR COMMISSION OF THREE PEOPLE OF APPROPRIATE STANDING, AND LIKELY TO ENJOY WIDESPREAD CONFIDENCE, WHICH WE HOPE WOULD BE CHAIRED BY A DISTINGUISHED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 06

AMERICAN. (THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO MAKE A CAREFUL JUDGMENT ON THE SORT OF PEOPLE WHO WOULD COMMAND WIDE ACCEPTANCE, BUT WE WOULD NOT WISH TO GIVE THE PARTIES A VETO BY USING THE TERM 'ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES'. THAT WOULD MAKE IT ALL TOO EASY FOR A PARTY ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER TO BLOCK PROGRESS, AS WE HAVE LEARNED FROM PAST EXPERIENCE.) THE COMMISSION WOULD BE ASKED TO ADVISE AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON WHETHER AND BY WHAT MEANS THE QUESTION OF ILLEGAL ARMS CAN BE 'SETTLED TO THE SATISFACTION OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS'. (THIS LAST PHRASE WAS SUGGESTED TO US BY JOHN HUME, AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAS AGREED IT WITH GERRY ADAMS.)

- WE WOULD ASK THE COMMISSION TO MAKE A REPORT BY A PARTICULAR DATE. IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WE HAD SETTLED ON MID-NOVEMBER. IF, WITH THE TIME THAT HAS BEEN LOST, THIS IS NOW SETTING TOO TIGHT A DEADLINE, WE SHOULD CERTAINLY CONSIDER A LATER DATE, PERHAPS ON THE LINES YOU HAVE INDICATED. MUCH WILL DEPEND, OF COURSE, ON THE COOPERATION OF THE PARAMILITARIES ON BOTH SIDES. SO WE HOPE YOU CAN SECURE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING FROM GERRY ADAMS THAT THE REPUBLICANS WILL COOPERATE. WE ARE CONFIDENT FROM CURRENT INDICATIONS THAT THE LOYALISTS WILL DO SO.

- AS WE HAVE ALREADY SAID, HMG WOULD CONSIDER THE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 06

RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE COMMISSIONS REPORT SERIOUSLY ON THEIR MERITS. (AS MICHAEL ANCRAM AGREED WITH YOU, IF WE ARE ASKED, WE SHALL OF COURSE STAND BY OUR EXISTING APPROACH TO DECOMMISSIONING. WE SHALL EXPLAIN, IN A POSITIVE SPIRIT, THAT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS AS WE HAVE DEFINED IT ON DECOMMISSIONING IS THE ONLY WAY THAT WE CAN AT PRESENT SEE TO GENERATE THE CONFIDENCE TO ENSURE PARTICIPATION BY ALL THE RELEVANT PARTIES IN THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS.)

- WE WOULD SET A TARGET DATE FOR THE BEGINNING OF SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS IN ROUND-TABLE FORMAT, ASSUMING THAT THROUGH THIS INITIATIVE WE HAD, WITH THE COOPERATION OF SINN FEIN AND OTHER PARTIES, BY THEN ACHIEVED THE APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES BY GENERATING THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES. WE HAD AGREED WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THAT WE WANTED TO BE ABLE TO CONVENE ROUND-TABLE TALKS BEFORE THE END OF 1995. HOWEVER, AS I INDICATED TO YOU, WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER BRINGING THIS FORWARD, PERHAPS TO MID-DECEMBER. THE CRUCIAL THING IS TO MAKE THE NECESSARY PROGRESS, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO DO THAT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS WOULD MEET WHEN THEY HAD RECEIVED THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, AND WOULD CONSIDER BOTH THAT REPORT AND THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS. WE SEE NO DIFFICULTY IN AGREEING WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON A SUITABLE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 06

TIME FOR THAT MEETING.

THIS IS NOT DRAFTING LANGUAGE, BUT THESE, AS I SAY, ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS AND REFLECT WHAT WE PREVIOUSLY AGREED WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. THE TITLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OR BODY IS TO US A SECONDARY QUESTION, AND CERTAINLY A MATTER ON WHICH THERE IS SCOPE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. YOU TOLD ME THAT YOU HAD MADE ENCOURAGING PROGRESS WITH GERRY ADAMS, AND WERE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT OBTAINING HIS AGREEMENT TO THE TWIN-TRACK INITIATIVE. IF YOU HAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT SINN FEIN ENVISAGE COOPERATING FULLY IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS AND THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY, THIS IS EXCELLENT NEWS. YOU SAID THAT GERRY ADAMS WANTED A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS POSITION. WE WOULD BE HAPPY FOR YOU TO EXPRESS OUR POSITION IN TERMS OF THE POINTS I HAVE SET OUT ABOVE, STRESSING THAT WE HAVE NOT AT THIS STAGE REFORMULATED THEM IN PRECISE DRAFTING LANGUAGE. WE THINK THIS WOULD BE A BETTER APPROACH THAN PUTTING A DRAFT TEXT TO HIM AT THIS STAGE, AS A TEXT WOULD INEVITABLY BE DELAYED WHILE I SECURED CABINET LEVEL APPROVAL AND THE AGREEMENT OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. AS SOON AS YOU TELL US THAT SINN FEIN ARE CONTENT TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS BASIS, WE SHALL PRODUCE A FULL DRAFT, DRAWING ON THE HELPFUL ADVICE WHICH JOHN HUME GAVE SIR PATRICK MAYHEW LAST WEEK. (I UNDERSTAND THAT HUME WAS IN TURN LIAISING WITH ADAMS.) WE SHALL

FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 06

PUT THE TEXT TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, AND CAN THEN DISCUSS IT WITH SINN FEIN THROUGH THEM, THROUGH JOHN HUME, OR DIRECTLY. WE SHALL ALSO TAKE SOUNDINGS WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED, SINCE THE CONFIDENCE WHICH YOU HAVE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED WITH GERRY ADAMS IS A VITAL ASSET.

PLEASE LET US HAVE SINN FEINS CONFIRMED POSITION AS SOON AS YOU CAN, EITHER DIRECTLY TO ME OR THROUGH OUR EMBASSY. I SHALL SEND A COPY OF THIS TO JOHN KERR SO THAT HE IS FULLY IN THE PICTURE.

MANY THANKS, AS I SAY, FOR ALL THAT YOU ARE DOING. LETS HOPE THAT THIS WILL NOW GET US ONTO THE HOME STRAIGHT.

YOURS EVER

RODERIC

#0001

NNNN

<MSGID> M1858607

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:131759Z OCT 95

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8818

RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 3675
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3430

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2011-0355-F (2.89)
KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 005104

NSC FOXR/PaE.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, EI, UK
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: TRYING TO MOVE
TOWARD LAUNCH OF THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH

REF: LONDON 14032

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
/-----

2. DUBLIN EXPECTS MICHAEL ANCRAM AND MARTIN MCGUINNESS TO MEET EARLY NEXT WEEK IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES THAT STAND IN THE WAY OF LAUNCHING THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. A KEY ISSUE TO BE ADDRESSED IS WHETHER SINN FEIN WOULD SPEAK FOR THE IRA IN PROVIDING ASSURANCES TO AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. LIKewise, FINDING CREATIVE LANGUAGE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN REPUBLICANS AND LONDON ON LEGAL VS. ILLEGAL WEAPONS REMAINS A PROBLEM. DUBLIN BELIEVES MCGUINNESS IS CURRENTLY RUNNING THE SHOW ON THIS ASPECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

END SUMMARY
/-----

3. I MET WITH DFA ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION CHIEF SEAN O'HUIGINN ON OCTOBER 13 TO REVIEW THE BIDDING ON THE PEACE

PROCESS. HE APPEARED WEARY AT THE CURRENT IMPASSE AND THE CONSTANT RETURN TO THE SAME ISSUES. "EVERYONE ACCEPTS THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH," HE SAID; THE KEY ISSUE NOW IS "HOW, NOT WHETHER," TO MOVE FORWARD. THE IRISH, FOR THEIR PART,

ARE READY TO GET THINGS MOVING: "WE WANT TO GET THE DAMN SHOW ON THE ROAD," O'HUIGINN SAID.

FACE TO FACE

/-----

4. FROM DUBLIN'S PERSPECTIVE, SINN FEIN AND HMG NOW NEED TO SIT DOWN FACE-TO-FACE TO WORK OUT THEIR DIFFERENCES CONCERNING THE TEXT OF A POSSIBLE JOINT COMMUNIQUE LAUNCHING THE TWIN TRACK PROCESS. DUBLIN REMAINS PREPARED TO SERVE AS A BROKER, O'HUIGINN INDICATED, BUT THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS WAY TO MOVE FORWARD AT THIS STAGE IS FOR THE TWO SIDES TO DEAL WITH EACH OTHER DIRECTLY. IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAN MICHAEL ANCRAM AND MARTIN MCGUINNESS MET LAST WEEK, AND ANOTHER MEETING IS EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THESE TWO, PERHAPS ON MONDAY (OCTOBER 16). JOHN HUME IS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN SOME OF THESE EXCHANGES.

THREE PROBLEM AREAS

/-----

5. O'HUIGINN OUTLINED THREE AREAS THAT REMAIN PROBLEMATIC:

-- TARGET DATE: HMG IS STILL RELUCTANT TO SET A SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE START OF ALL-PARTY TALKS, PREFERRING TO PUT FORWARD A TARGET DATE INSTEAD. SINN FEIN WOULD PREFER A DATE CERTAIN, BUT O'HUIGINN BELIEVES SINN FEIN IS LIKELY TO SETTLE FOR A TARGET DATE IN THE END.

-- AUTHORITATIVE ASSURANCES ON WEAPONS DECOMMISSIONING: DUBLIN IS CONCERNED BY INCREASING SIGNS THAT SINN FEIN IS DISTANCING ITSELF FROM THE IRA ON THE MATTER OF PROVIDING ASSURANCES TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION REGARDING DISPOSAL OF WEAPONS. O'HUIGINN SAID THE IRISH HAVE MADE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR TO SINN FEIN THAT IT WOULD BE "COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC" TO EXPECT THE COMMISSION TO ISSUE A REPORT CONTAINING ASSURANCES ON ARMS, ONLY TO HAVE IT EMERGE THAT THE COMMISSION'S INTERLOCUTORS CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE ANY ARMS UNDER THEIR CONTROL OR BE SPEAKING FOR ANY OF THE PARAMILITARY GROUPS THAT DID. STILL, O'HUIGINN THINKS THERE ARE "TACTFUL WAYS" TO OVERCOME THIS PROBLEM. COMMITMENTS ALONG THE LINES MADE IN GERRY ADAMS' OCTOBER 9 "NO THREATS" SPEECH, OR ASSURANCES PROVIDED THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES SUCH AS FATHER REID, COULD HELP BRIDGE THE GAP. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS THAT THE INTERLOCUTORS BE ABLE TO SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY, AND THAT SENATOR MITCHELL BE ABLE TO CHECK THE COMMITMENT OF ALL PARTIES TO REMOVE ARMS FROM IRISH POLITICS.

-- LEGAL VS. ILLEGAL ARMS: SINN FEIN REMAINS DETERMINED TO SEEK SOME FORM OF EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN PARAMILITARY WEAPONS AND BRITISH MILITARY/POLICE ARMS. THE BRITISH WILL NEVER ACCEPT THIS, O'HUIGINN OBSERVED. ARTFUL LANGUAGE HAS TO BE

FOUND TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM OR PUSH IT DOWN THE ROAD.

MCGUINNESS IS KEY

/-----

6. O'HUIGINN INDICATED THE IRISH BELIEVE GERRY ADAMS HAS GIVEN MARTIN MCGUINNESS THE LEAD ON DECISIONS RELATING TO ARMS ISSUES. IT IS MCGUINNESS, RATHER THAN ADAMS, WHO
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 005104

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, EI, UK

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: TRYING TO MOVE TOWARD LAUNCH OF THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH

RESISTS IRISH ARGUMENTS THAT THE COMMISSION'S INTERLOCUTORS MUST BE ABLE TO SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY ON WEAPONS DECOMMISSIONING. LIKEWISE, MCGUINNESS IS THE ONE WHO TENDS TO GET EMOTIONAL WHEN TALKING ABOUT THE MORAL EQUIVALENCE OF IRA AND BRITISH WEAPONS, CITING CONSTITUENTS WHO REMAIN VERY ANGRY BECAUSE THEIR RELATIVES WERE KILLED BY BRITISH GUNS. O'HUIGINN'S ASSESSMENT IS THAT MCGUINNESS HAS THE LEAD ON THESE MATTERS, AND WILL NOT TRUST ANYONE TO BROKER FOR HIM -- "CERTAINLY NOT DUBLIN, PERHAPS HUME, BUT MOST LIKELY ONLY HIMSELF." FROM DUBLIN'S VIEWPOINT, THAT IS FINE, JUST SO MCGUINNESS "GETS ON WITH IT." THUS, THE HOPE IS THAT MCGUINNESS AND ANCRAM WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS WHEN THEY MEET EARLY NEXT WEEK.

ASSEMBLY

/-----

7. O'HUIGINN MADE CLEAR DUBLIN WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE DAVID TRIMBLE'S PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY COURTEOUS CONSIDERATION, AT LEAST PUBLICLY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PROPOSAL IS CONSIDERED A NON-STARTER IN NATIONALIST CIRCLES. THE VERY DEFINITION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNIONISTS AND NATIONALISTS, HE EMPHASIZED, IS THAT NATIONALISTS REJECT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH SUCH ELECTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT, WHEREAS UNIONISTS ACCEPT IT. ANY EXERCISE WHICH REINFORCED THIS DIFFERENCE RISKED MOVING THINGS BACKWARD. TRIMBLE'S PROPOSAL COULD PERHAPS BE USED "CREATIVELY" IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT IT REPRESENTED A "CLEVER, RATHER THAN STATESMANLIKE" APPROACH, AND WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY NATIONALISTS.

SHORT WINDOW

/-----

8. REFERRING TO THE TORY PARTY CONFERENCE, O'HUIGINN EXPRESSED THE CONCERN THAT ONLY A SHORT WINDOW OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPPORTUNITY MAY REMAIN TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. SIGNALS FROM THE PARTY CONFERENCE SUGGESTED THAT THE CONSERVATIVES WERE GETTING READY TO "GO BACK INTO ELECTION MODE" EARLY NEXT YEAR, AT WHICH POINT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BECOME BOGGED DOWN IN ELECTIONEERING. HE URGED THE U.S. TO KEEP UP PRESSURE ON BOTH SIDES. SINN FEIN SHOULD BE PRESSED REGARDING THE NEED FOR "AUTHORITATIVE" STATEMENTS ON WEAPONS TO THE COMMISSION. LONDON SHOULD BE PRESSED NOT TO TRY TO DRAW THINGS OUT IN AN ATTEMPT TO "PLAY CHICKEN" WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT, AS THIS COULD PLACE THE ENTIRE PEACE PROCESS AT RISK.

SMITH
BT
#5104

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SSN>5104
<^TOR>951013141939 M1900847
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
<^SSN>5104
<^TOR>951013142209 M1900859

FROM:
SITREPRT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:131658Z OCT 95

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8815

RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 3674
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3429

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2011-0355-F (2.90)
KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 005100

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10-13-97
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, EI, UK
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: THE LATEST FROM ADAMS AND HUME

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. GERRY ADAMS CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING, OCTOBER 13, TO EXPLAIN THAT HE HAD COME TO DUBLIN FOR A JOINT MEETING WITH JOHN HUME AND THE TAOISEACH JOHN BRUTON. HOWEVER, BRUTON CANCELLED THE MEETING CITING UNIONISTS' SENSITIVITIES. HE PROPOSED INSTEAD TO MEET WITH ADAMS AND HUME SEPARATELY. ADAMS DECIDED, HOWEVER, TO RETURN TO BELFAST AND HUME WAS SICK.

3. DURING HIS BRIEF VISIT, ADAMS SEEMED VERY RELAXED AND CALM ABOUT THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS. HE REITERATED THAT THERE WILL BE NO START TO DECOMMISSIONING AS A PRE-CONDITION, BUT UNDERLINED THAT HE SUPPORTS THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH AND ADDED THAT HE IS OPEN TO TALKING ABOUT THE NORTHERN ASSEMBLY IDEA FLOATED BY UUP PRESIDENT DAVID TRIMBLE. HE ALSO RAISED THE DOCUMENT DISCUSSED WITH NANCY SODERBERG, DURING HER RECENT VISIT. THE INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPHS HAVE BEEN DROPPED AND IT NOW JUST CONSISTS OF THE FIVE POINTS. THIS CURRENT VERSION HAS BEEN APPROVED BY JOHN HUME WHO MADE NO CHANGES TO IT. HE ASSUMES THAT THE DOCUMENT WILL BE DISCUSSED DURING THE MEETINGS TONY LAKE WILL HAVE IN LONDON ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 16.

4. JOHN HUME ALSO CALLED ME THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. ALTHOUGH SUFFERING FROM THE FLU, HUME HAS AGREED TO MEET WITH TONY LAKE AND PARTY ON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MONDAY, OCTOBER 16, IN LONDON. HE HAS ALSO REQUESTED A MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 19. HE IS CONFIDENT THAT MAJOR WILL BE AMENABLE TO MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD.

5. HUME NOTED THAT HE WILL BE GOING TO WASHINGTON AT THE END OF OCTOBER/EARLY NOVEMBER WITH A GROUP OF EURO-PARLIAMENTARIANS. THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT IS TO SOLIDIFY LINKS WITH DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND TO INVITE THE PRESIDENT TO ADDRESS THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. WITH THIS GOAL IN MIND HE HOPES THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WILL BE ABLE TO CALL ON VICE PRESIDENT GORE. HE STRESSED THAT THEIR VISIT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THAT THEY WOULD BE THRILLED TO BE ABLE TO MEET WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT.

SMITH

BT

#5100

NNNN

<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN> 5100

<^TOR> 951013131740 M1900693

FROM:

SITREPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*Jodi -
R6
Decomm 3/11*

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER COMM LAKE SIT SODERBERG
SIT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT LAKEA SIGLER SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 121645Z NOV 95

FM WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(2.91)
KBH 4/11/2023

TO CABINET OFFICE
INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (EYES ONLY) VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ANTHONY LAKE EYES ONLY TO
RODERIC LYNE THROUGH EDWARD OAKDEN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

BEGIN TEXT:

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM ANTHONY LAKE FOR RODERIC LYNE

DEAR ROD:

LIKE YOU, WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE ANCRAM-MCGUINNESS TALKS
DID NOT RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES RELATED TO THE TWIN-TRACK
STRATEGY. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THERE IS A DANGER OF STALEMATE
SETTING IN WITH THE PEACE PROCESS. I THINK YOU AND I NEED TO
DISCUSS THIS ISSUE IN DETAIL AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY. IN THE
MEANTIME, I WOULD LIKE TO LAY OUT FOR YOU OUR CUURENT THINKING ON
THE STATUS OF THE PROCESS AND HOW IT MIGHT BE MOVED FORWARD. I
UNDERSTAND THAT PRIME MINISTER BRUTON'S SPEECH IN LONDON LAST
EVENING MAY HAVE NARROWED THE OPTIONS, BUT I HOPE IT WILL NOT BE
SEEN AS PRECLUDING ANY ACTION IN THE COMING WEEKS.

IN SPITE OF THE DEADLOCK IN THE ANCRAM MCGUINNESS TALKS, I REMAIN
CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE TWIN TRACK
APPROACH. SINN FEIN HAS, IN FACT, ALREADY AGREED TO THE
ESSENTIAL POINT -- THAT IT WILL COOPERATE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
BODY AND SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY ON THE ISSUE OF IRA WEAPONS. ON
THE OTHER KEY ISSUE, THE TARGET DATE, YOU AND DUBLIN DO NOT SEEM
TOO FAR APART. IF DUBLIN IS PROPOSING SIX WEEKS FROM WHEN THE
INTERNATIONAL BODY BEGINS ITS WORK, AND YOUR GOVERNMENT IS STILL
PREPARED TO OFFER TWO AND A HALF TO THREE MONTHS FROM THE
LAUNCHING OF THE TWIN TRACK, THE WINDOW FOR THE TARGET DATE WOULD
BE BETWEEN MID-JANUARY AND MID-FEBRUARY. I WOULD THINK WE COULD
CONVINCE SINN FEIN THAT A TARGET DATE IN THAT PERIOD, FOR
INSTANCE JANUARY 31, WOULD BE REASONABLE.

ON THE "REMIT" ISSUE, IN OUR VIEW YOU HAVE ALREADY ACHIEVED

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

AGREEMENT THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE BODY IS TO DEAL WITH PARAMILITARY ARMS. SINN FEIN'S CONCERN IS WITH THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION, RATHER THAN THE ESSENCE OF THE MANDATE.

SINCE, IN SUBSTANCE, AGREEMENT ON THE TWIN TRACK IS WITHIN REACH, I HOPE WE CAN ENSURE THAT THIS ISSUE DOES NOT DOMINATE THE AGENDA FOR THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING VISIT TO THE UK. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT A POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD ON THE TWIN TRACK, WHICH WOULD NOT REQUIRE ANY COMPROMISE BY YOUR GOVERNMENT, WOULD BE TO ISSUE A VERY SHORT ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE LAUNCHING OF THE TWIN TRACK, WITHOUT FANFARE AND WITHOUT A SUMMIT. THIS COULD BE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

"THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE DECIDED TO CONVENE BY XXX THE TWIN TRACK PROCESS TO ADVANCE THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

PARALLEL TO PREPARATORY TALKS WITH THE PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, AN INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING AND WILL BE HEADED BY A DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN, ASSISTED BY TWO OTHER PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS WHO INSPIRE WIDESPREAD CONFIDENCE.

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY ON THEIR MERITS. THE GOAL IS TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE CONVENING OF TALKS IN AN ALL-PARTY FORMAT NOT LATER THAN (JANUARY 31/FEBRUARY 1, 1996)."

SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD OBTAIN THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE THE DETAILS OF A FORMAL COMMUNIQUE. IT WOULD BE LEFT TO YOU AND TO DUBLIN TO BRING ALONG OTHER PARTIES. WE, OF COURSE, WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP AS NEEDED. YOUR GOVERNMENT COULD UNDERSCORE FOR THE PRESS THAT THE BODY IS BEING SET UP TO ADDRESS DECOMMISSIONING OF PARAMILITARY WEAPONS. WE AND GEORGE MITCHELL COULD HELP MAKE CLEAR THAT THE BODY'S PURPOSE IS TO DEAL WITH PARAMILITARY WEAPONS, WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT SINN FEIN WOULD BE FREE TO RAISE OTHER ISSUES.

I FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE LAUNCHING OF THE TWIN TRACK STRATEGY, BY WHATEVER MEANS, LEAVES YOU WITH THE PROBLEM OF BRINGING THE UNIONISTS ON BOARD. BUT I DO THINK IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE UUP, SINCE THEY ARE NOT BEING ASKED TO DO ANYTHING AT THIS STAGE BUT CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT. INCLUDING THE PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY IN THE POLITICAL TRACK WOULD MAKE IT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNIONISTS. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE POLITICAL TRACK COULD DISCUSS A WHOLE RANGE OF IDEAS, SUCH AS HAVING AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY NAME NEGOTIATORS FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

I ALSO WANTED TO RAISE WITH YOU THE SITUATION IN NIGERIA. WE ARE ALL DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE EXECUTIONS OF KEN SARO-WIWA AND HIS EIGHT COLLEAGUES. WE APPRECIATE THE PRIME MINISTER'S STRONG REMARKS CONDEMNING THE ACTION. WE WERE ALSO ENCOURAGED BY THE STRONG STEPS TAKEN TODAY BY THE COMMONWEALTH. WE HAVE ANNOUNCED A SERIES OF OUR OWN MEASURES AND WILL BE DISCUSSING AT THE UN WHAT ADDITIONAL MEASURES MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE EARLY NEXT WEEK. I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING OUR CLOSE COOPERATION ON THIS ISSUE.

I HOPE WE CAN FIND AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND.

WARM REGARDS,

TONY

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#7301

NNNN

<MSGID> M1946722

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, TRIP, SIT;
HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:010936Z JUL 95

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0570

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3158

*Nancy -
See especially
#10.
not*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 009277

DEPT FOR P, EUR AND EUR/UBI

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI
SUBJECT: FURTHER SINN FEIN RESPONSE TO DECOMMISSIONING
DEMARCHE

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (2.92)
KBH 4/11/2023**

REFS: (A) STATE 154004, (B) DUBLIN 3081, (C) LONDON 9077

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR REINFORCED REF A POINTS WITH SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS JUNE 28, STRESSING THAT USG DECISIONS HAD BEEN BASED ON CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS AND WE NEEDED TO KNOW WHETHER THOSE ASSUMPTIONS WERE CORRECT. ADAMS SOUGHT TO REASSURE US THAT HIS PARTY WAS COMMITTED TO THE PEACE PROCESS, INCLUDING EVENTUAL DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS ON ALL SIDES, BUT HE CONTINUED TO RULE OUT EVEN A TOKEN GESTURE BEFORE ALL-PARTY TALKS AND SAID OUR TALKING POINTS WERE ILL-INFORMED. HE COMPLAINED AT LENGTH ABOUT HMG, BUT SAID HE WAS TRYING TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS THROUGH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT.
3. THE FIRMNESS OF THE DEMARCHE CLEARLY GRABBED ADAMS' ATTENTION, AND MAY GENERATE SOME DEBATE WITHIN THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT. IF HE WANTS, ADAMS COULD USE IT AS LEVERAGE WITH IRA HARDLINERS. BUT HE HAS HIS OWN AGENDA, WHICH INCLUDES U.S. SUPPORT BUT NOT NECESSARILY ACCOMMODATION WITH OUR INTERESTS. WE SUGGEST LETTING THE DEMARCHE PERCOLATE FOR A WHILE BEFORE TRYING ANY FURTHER/OTHER APPROACH. END SUMMARY.
4. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SENATOR MITCHELL'S PREVIOUSLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SCHEDULED MEETING WITH GERRY ADAMS AND HIS OWN VISIT TO AN IRISH STUDIES CONFERENCE IN BELFAST, AMBASSADOR CROWE MET BRIEFLY WITH ADAMS AT THE CONSULATE GENERAL JUNE 28 TO FOLLOW UP ON AMBASSADOR SMITH'S CONVERSATION THE DAY BEFORE (REF B). OTHERS PRESENT WERE SINN FEIN NATIONAL CHAIRMAN MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN, PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER RICHARD MCAULEY, WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE MAIREAD KEANE, ACTING PRINCIPAL OFFICER POZORSKI AND LONDON POLOFF ROBINSON.

5. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE KNEW ADAMS HAD SEEN OUR TALKING POINTS AND DISCUSSED THEM WITH AMBASSADOR SMITH. HE DID NOT WANT TO REPLICATE THAT CONVERSATION, BUT WANTED ADAMS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE DEMARCHE WAS FULLY AUTHORITATIVE, AND REPRESENTED THE POSITION OF THE ADMINISTRATION. IT WAS NOT DESIGNED TO PUT PERSONAL PRESSURE ON ADAMS OR EMBARRASS HIM, AND WE HAD NO INTENTION OF MAKING IT PUBLIC. ADAMS EXPRESSED RELIEF AT THE LAST STATEMENT, SAYING A PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT THE USG WAS "LECTURING" SINN FEIN WOULD BE HARMFUL.

6. NOTING THE TALKING POINT RECOUNTING NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR LAKE'S MARCH 14 MEETING WITH ADAMS, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT DECISIONS HAD BEEN BASED ON AN ASSUMPTION THAT SINN FEIN WAS PREPARED TO ADDRESS SERIOUSLY THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE. WE NEEDED TO KNOW WHETHER THAT ASSUMPTION WAS CORRECT. THINGS WE EXPECTED TO HAPPEN HAD NOT HAPPENED, AND THE MOOD IN THE U.S. HAD SHIFTED SOMEWHAT AFTER THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING. ADAMS REPLIED THAT OUR ASSUMPTIONS WERE NOT ONLY INCORRECT BUT ILL-INFORMED. ANY "DOUBT ABOUT REPUBLICAN ULTIMATE INTENTIONS" WAS TOTALLY WRONG. THE IRA CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN A CONSIDERABLE ACHIEVEMENT, MADE POSSIBLE NOT LEAST BY U.S. ENGAGEMENT; IT WAS NOT AN END IN ITSELF, BUT A WAY TO MOVE THE PROCESS ALONG.

7. ADAMS COMPLAINED AT LENGTH, IN STANDARD (AND TIRING) TERMS, ABOUT BRITISH GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INACTIONS. SINN FEIN WANTED TO "GET TO THE POINT OF GETTING THE GUN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS," BUT NONE OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S ARMED GROUPS -- THE IRA, THE LOYALISTS, THE POLICE OR THE BRITISH ARMY -- WAS PREPARED TO DISARM AT THIS STAGE. WHEN THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE USG COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY EQUATION BETWEEN ILLEGAL PARAMILITARIES AND OFFICIAL STATE SERVICES, ADAMS REITERATED THAT HE WANTED TO GET TO THE POINT WHERE ALL OF THEM COULD DISARM.

8. ADAMS SAID HE WAS STILL TRYING TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD, AND HAD MET WITH IRISH PRIME MINISTER BRUTON AND FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING THE PREVIOUS WEEK IN AN EFFORT TO FIND A WAY. BUT HE HAD TOLD TONY LAKE IN WASHINGTON, AND NANCY SODERBERG IN BELFAST, THAT DECOMMISSIONING WAS NOT POSSIBLE NOW. AFTER DETAILING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANOTHER LIST OF BRITISH AND LOYALIST INIQUITIES, ADAMS SAID: "THESE ARE THE REALITIES FOR THOSE OF US WHO ARE TRYING TO GET THE IRA TO DISARM. WE WENT TO THEM, BUT THEY SAID NO." HE SAID SINN FEIN WOULD KEEP TRYING, AND WOULD ULTIMATELY SUCCEED

9. ADAMS INSISTED THAT SINN FEIN HAD TAKEN ITS EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE DISCUSSIONS ON DECOMMISSIONING WITH HMG VERY SERIOUSLY. NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MAYHEW HAD ESTABLISHED A "WASHINGTON TEST" OF THREE POINTS.
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 009277

DEPT FOR P, EUR AND EUR/UBI

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: FURTHER SINN FEIN RESPONSE TO DECOMMISSIONING DEMARCHE

SINN FEIN AGREED IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NEED FOR DISARMAMENT, AND THAT MODALITIES WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT. BUT ANY DECOMMISSIONING AT THIS POINT WOULD BE SEEN AS SURRENDER, AND THAT WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

10. ROBINSON NOTED THAT THE IRA WAS NOT, AS WAS SOMETIMES CLAIMED, BEING ASKED TO SURRENDER ALL ITS WEAPONS BEFORE TALKS COULD BEGIN. THE ONLY CONCRETE ACTION NEEDED AT THIS POINT WAS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING GESTURE. NORTHERN IRELAND MINISTER MICHAEL ANCRAM HAD ASKED HIM TO PASS ON THE MESSAGE THAT HMG HAD NO DESIRE TO PUT ADAMS ON THE SPOT OR HUMILIATE HIM. IT WAS PREPARED TO MOVE QUICKLY ON A RANGE OF OTHER ISSUES, BUT NEEDED SOME MOVEMENT ON DECOMMISSIONING TO MAKE THIS POSSIBLE. SIMILARLY, THE USG WAS NOT TRYING TO INJECT ITSELF INTO THE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS MEANT WE HAD OUR OWN STAKE IN THE SUCCESS OF THE PEACE PROCESS. WE SAW AGREEMENT ON DECOMMISSIONING AND AT LEAST A TOKEN CONCRETE GESTURE AS AN ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT BUT MODEST STEP THAT WOULD PRODUCE GREAT BENEFITS FOR EVERYONE.

Here it is.

//

11. COMMENT: ADAMS WAS CLEARLY SOMEWHAT SHAKEN BY THE IRMNESS OF THE POINTS IN OUR DEMARCHE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS OF OUR POINTS WITH COLLEAGUES. WE HAVE GOTTEN HIS ATTENTION, AND PERHAPS GENERATED SOME USEFUL DEBATE WITHIN THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT. ADAMS GAVE THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD TRIED TO PERSUADE THE IRA TO OFFER A GESTURE ON DISARMAMENT BUT FAILED. IF SO, HE MAY BE ABLE TO USE OUR DEMARCHE AS JUSTIFICATION FOR ANOTHER ATTEMPT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12. COMMENT, CONTINUED: AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, ADAMS CLEARLY HAS HIS OWN STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING REPUBLICAN GOALS. THIS CERTAINLY INCLUDES SUSTAINING SUPPORT FROM SOME AMERICANS AND UNDERSTANDING FROM THE USG; THERE IS MUCH LESS REASON TO BELIEVE IT INCLUDES A WILLINGNESS TO ACCOMMODATE U.S. INTERESTS AND CONCERNS. WE ARE NOT SURE WHETHER HE EVER REALLY INTENDED TO FOLLOW UP ON THE ASSURANCES HE GAVE IN OBTAINING FUNDRAISING PERMISSION, OR WHETHER THERE WAS A GENUINE DIFFERENCE OF PERCEPTION AND INTERPRETATION. FRANKLY, THIS MEETING SUGGESTED THE FORMER. IN ANY EVENT, IN FUTURE DEALINGS WITH ADAMS, WE SHOULD REALIZE THAT WITHOUT A FIRM AND SPECIFIC COMMITMENT IN ADVANCE, WE CANNOT EXPECT HIM TO DO WHAT HE IS UNWILLING -- OR POSSIBLY UNABLE -- TO DO. HE HAS BEEN IN THIS BUSINESS FOR A LONG TIME AND IS A SKILLED MANIPULATOR. WE MUST NOT FORGET THAT. CROWE

BT

#9277

NNNN

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02

<^SSN>9277

<^TOR>950701053409 M1745265

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

<^SSN>9277

<^TOR>950701053410 M1745266

FROM:

SITREPRT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

GAIL ~~Office~~ → 171 973 9019

h. 171 229 7956

HAP → ~~7035 27 7865~~
7035 34 7561

Embassy 0171 408 8115 emb
499.9000 swit + 4

Leathig - x 2800

9. 01. 232. 643. 495

4894
~~495~~

Blair Hall

44. 171. 289, 7591

Metropole Hotel 0860-602559

Geary 01232 / 1234
601444
Alans 003537455
266

Dick Spring 0035316766557

Hume 01504 265 321 / 340

10/4

- Nigeria Anthony Goodenough
Asst Undersecretary for Africa
- David McLennan - West Africa

New Zealand Commonwealth
Leads of Govt CHOGAM
2 yrs.

Nov 11-13 Two years (Chif Anikwa) away
Under a military govt - would have
2 yrs to hold election. No participation
in Administrative meetings of Commonwealth
If after 2 yrs, no ministerial meetings
(including PM). Nigeria, Gambia, Senegal.

- no measures now
- look at shortening timetable
- Major letter
- review steps to take if measures not met
- keep current measures in place.
- look at other steps to take.

for German EU.

- VISAS

- military force.

-> touch the event all agree.

- reasonable steps, wave it up.

- ways to test it - process is sincere

- look at Mandela, co-vest

- problem is ~~trans~~ no transfer of
power at end

- they (SAs) were way of pressing
for Abinla + Obasanjo's rebare ally,
prefer to focus on transition to
democracy.

NOTES from Adams/American

(Cable)

"13642"

Int'l Body based on 1+2;

16-20

political, not military project

appropriate context + manner - implicit on 3.

Status of Mayhew moves → 50% remission +

allowing prisoners to NI; Patrick Kelly (skin cancer)

- Terms of reference.

IRA - accepted twin track provided 1) there is

a target date 2) body is political project

(IRA not involved, SF offers make submissions)

3) no preconditions.

All lead out in joint Communiqué

100 this / 400 next year.

end of year.

Transfer to South.

Potts / Trimble.

Robinson/ Donaldson -

Bob McCartney - was be election

5-1030-
Quinter Thomas, Rodney, Michael Ancrum
Paul Lopez, Clair Checkfield (new Dir
NIO, Int. Dept.)
Crawe, Blair Hall Michael Flabib

Ancrum asked

Adams

Oct 4 5-645pm

1. ICA neutralized
2. Date

wanted to hear how we thought
he should move forward.

- filled him in on Ancram/Pod meeting
Oct 3. Said Ancram fussed on
whether we thought Adams could do
Twin Track, what does political
project mean
- Adams said he'd participate
in decommission by laying out
total disarmament needs, ie his
list of requirements for draft. Said
he doesn't care what loyalists do
- fussed on where paper Home had
given us came from. Thought
Home had said Lyne but he
didn't seem to know who that was.
A said he'd laid out proposal
(ie ICA neutralized) + Ancram just
sat there - no response

thought maybe was because
Owen's Thomas was there. [God seems
to be trying to control press].

- A seemed very distrustful of where
paper had come from.

- I suggested he call Ancrem
re: [McJinniss] He said he'd get
~~McJinniss~~ to do tomorrow. I pushed
him on why McJinniss couldn't
do Thursday. A didn't say,
simply that he was out of town.
I pointed out that time was wasting
& he agreed Ancrem would be
called tomorrow

- He asked me re: my thoughts on
his role in Alconomy - said he
to be more than literary, needs
to have proposals on conditions
A asked - include Army?

- I said yes, they'll disagree on
when but he needs to provide
concrete ideas. I suggested the propose

at least when he'd do ~~symp~~ symtast
determines

- He said non starter. My people would
hate me. (Not sure how' was used but general idea)
- ~~was~~ suggested he would get a bad
M from the crowd unless he had
specific proposals. Agree he doesn't
have reputation but they should
talk to those that do i.e.
El Salvador, UN, SA
- A - S. ANS says if SDU has
their weapons

A - He timing

- "I said getting harder to
meet Dec 15, A seemed to
accept that but underscored big
problem for him if after end of
year.
- 2 weeks announce Joint Commission
(Gary conf UN, work
then announce when over

A accepted he ^{Major} couldn't announce
during conference

- 2 weeks to get commission going
 - 6 weeks probably not realistic
as target date, perhaps
end of year.
-

A said some of my people take a
pretty hard time lived effort
of 15 yrs.

- relaxed, seemed to be thinking
through. said should have gone to
Colorado to see Crow (radio
broadcasts of meetings in background)
- Asked what role we would play,
would it come out,
likes name but he can't push
Brits, agreed since Brits

using Home, to keep But keep
us informed + we can make periodic
calls.

- A seems to really want US involved.

- Also discussed trip, Macke
plant problem - discrimination
- peace well, no one thinks about
- Speech - Wray Hall.
- Andrew Jackson good unionist.

- see on SAT, hell review paper

UOP - elections to assembly would
not obstruct the need for decann
vs twin track b/c Ups level
of dialogue they are in, starts
process could not stop.
vs Macke b/c in way neighborhood
- aged to think @ unionists + evat

DUP Robinson pointed out
Parsons already been in
meeting with Adams.

- founded in vcsis, 1 sided Nat'l
war. Spring 172 but
not there.

~~Clinton~~ Justice

Decommissioning part of equation since last
Oct. But never precondition.

flexibility, legal issues, commission
train track since last June -
modifies in 1st phase. Equal i -
begin to discuss how (ie hand in, destroy
themselves) + legal provisions for those
who turn in.

British did not agree to have talks
primary talks after 1st phase.

McQuire - far from running

Richard Johnson.

Transfer of Prisons

Drugs.

SAT 10-12 Adams

Ancrans → 12:00 Friday
McGinnis. OK to Monday
meeting + no Monday.

Once have a target date, preconditions
removed.

Hume's a cover/buffer w/ British
1 1/2 page back to Hume / you on
response to joint.
Can't take position from me.

Angel paper - probe / explore w/ Irish

have total @ 6 groups of
weapons, IRA, loyalist etc
RUC + Army.

conditions for ceasefire gone. One
thing holding together is Adams
saying US says Brit will fall off
Wash 3. Only Martin + (one holding together)

Wants all parties to engage
Commission/body on all 6 armed
operations.

I said didn't think we'd get
Buto to agree to language that
excluded paramilitaries, illegal
weapons.

Asked whether he could keep
acquiescence of IRA/SF if had a target
date for all party talks, had joint
communiqué that referred to paramilitaries/
illegal arms + had understanding
that Adams would engage on
all 6.

- wasn't sure could do
- asked whether could take paper
bits gave last spring on decommissioning
+ answer pt by pt.
- wasn't sure.
- wanted US to press Adams to
talk (met Monday)

Jean - re: Substantive meetings
in Wata.

nothing happened, no problem.
course of your business, if there
is a problem, have your speak to me.

Adams - also said will
make statement later 162 day
reiterating commitment to
peaceful means.

TV Bosnia

Brits to hold implementation
conference

Now US conf + final
conference Paris.

Grachev Perry Sunday

Arms control + Russia

implementation BRITS (RUSSIAN, GERMAN, ITALY)

Piffin announce on Tues.

Final touches of W.C. in PARIS

930-4433 Anoram

Thanks -

Crowe

Jean

Kathy

Blair Hall (London)

? Belfast

Dublin Rick Norland

Anoran

Rod

Sean Donohue - Lunch in Dublin

Spring - breakfast in Dublin.

ACTION ITEMS

1. Jean does not accept prohibition on substantive meetings in U. said to have POTUS speak to her if there's a problem. told me none of my business.
ACTION:?? Perhaps to to speak to POTUS then Jean?
2. Adams - needs to accept language in Joint Communiqué w/ Paramilitary/illegal/terrorist arms/parties. Work out better channel of communication with ANCRAM.
3. Commission - Mitchell, Canadian, Fin/Scandinavia Plus staff. Try to have in place by time Joint Communiqué is announced.
4. Look at some language on Ireland in London speech. Sean Donlon feels important to encourage Brits to take the issue seriously.
5. Finalize plans for Churchill ship.
Cmt needs to let families know.
6. Set POTUS/Trinkle drop by.
7. Set Dail remarks, themes.
8. ~~After~~ Need to respond to Sean Donlon/Michael

suggestion of producing a show during POTUS
visit to Trinity.

9. Get details on prisoner issue. Press. for resolution before November trip.
10. Take note of Irish taking EU presidency
fall 96 / unemployment / ^{crisis} / FAMINE ?
11. FACT SHEET ON POTUS / US involvement in
peace process.
12. Adams said conditions for ceasefire gone
He + McGinnis only thing holding together.
Esp. his assurance to IRA that US
believed Brits looking for a way out of
Wash 3.
13. Social Welfare Minister request for POTUS
to stop by community development project
re: unemployment. Perhaps HRC.
14. Transfer of Prisoners Convention. US Party?
US prisoners will be raised. Need from possession.
Alan K. should update, Humanitarian flexibility?
State vs. federal issue
15. Get Adams' public statement on non-violence /
no threat,

16. Who pays for Mitchell/Staff. get UK/Ireland to reimburse?
17. Patrick Kelly - cancer IRT prisoner -
Irish Prisoners in Britain total 27
? of respect for sentence terms. ¹⁰⁰ remit 95 400 96
18. Security in NI should be decreased.
19. Who does PORS want to play golf with him. Tom Watson? Tom's favorite course is Ballybunion
20. Kenny McLinton request for visa waiver. convicted in 1979 for 2 1977 murders. since renounced violence, ^{active} christian actively opposes sectarian terrorism.
Early Release in '91
21. In meeting, Ancrem agreed commission could include a political dimension + process of decommissioning.

-
- T2 - Commissioners. Who pays for staff.
- Prisoners / Kenny McLinton
 - staff for Mitchell
 - Political update

Hume 10/15

H/ Hume read Adam's paper last week.

will meet again with Anwar.

IRA is puritanical; killed a lot of people
but wrap flag @; esp in ghettos. our
generation 1st to get educated, due to people.
People divided, not territory.

Unimist mindset still hasn't d'd;

Afrikaaner

Barney Cousins show - among unimists; internal
debate.

Timble + I agreed to work w/ each other
on economic front

R/ You + I trying to get this done. we have
a community of i.

Less time than commonly appreciated
to get it done.

Target date is key for Adams

w/ bits - had 2 1/2 months

Need date on ~~the~~ Adams out deliver

Mitchell in Asia 1st 2 weeks of November

4 These IRA guys met talker to rest of world
to keep out, all bits doing is long fingery
us, after 14 months, politics
have gotten us nothing
don't rule out elected assembly
as part of settlement but not
useful to elect assembly to shut it
each other. Don't need 85 people to
decide wages.

Thatcher 1st to stand up to Drange
and (Unionist threat of violence)

Kam can't solve problem w/out them
so they need to understand they can't
solve problem w/out you.

If they say don't trust Bits; why not
try & trust us

not a united Ireland, but an
agreed Ireland, whatever form.

New Ireland in a form of 2

In Bosnia, why not get agreed that there'll
always be Croats, Muslims & Serbs; need
institutions to keep that

H. W. Assembly - institutions / sort for NTJ.

as well as N-S, UK-NI

- everyone knows that once process begins,
features will be made

R - handed paper

H - certainly a massive important

Prisoners McLaughlin

Commissioners. → Judge McMurtrie

Dienzbier

Zimbabwe → former chief Justice 88'89

Two ~~pages~~ pages. Bosnia

Helm - may not have votes

Jerusalem - don't have votes

Nigeria - sticks

Ben Sale / repair mil. food + ser.

- broaden USA ban to include military officers & families
- oppose IMF loan credit + debt relief
- campaign Nigerian officials to 25 miles out into sea
- press for critical resolution in UNHRC
- use Niger critical public stmt. considered
- consider assets freeze
- consider ^(FL) aggressively oppose all future Nigerian projects before

Libya - roll over in end of Nov

- expand existing oil related
sanctions

- need technical amendment to
existing

reasonable hit short; timetable to be set
when Mullen returns.

Carrots

- more air pat income for.
- Drugs -
- High level visits
- flexible USA restrictions.
- rest. limited mil. mil.
- consider high level visits to Geneva.

Nigeria to do

- shorten time table, announce by end of yr.
- unconditional release of political prisoners, includes Obasanjo, Abacha
- legalize pol. parties + activities, ~~to~~
- barbers corpus + indep. judicial process
- lifting labor restrictions
- intl observers throughout process.

Top 3 key.

Naval Aegis Destroyer.

Rod Lyne 10/16 Paul Lever, 15.1 Oaktm.

- Colvartia

- UN Dec. / Reform - (6-7)

R → Canadians want to run with

Nigeria. ~~we're stuck~~, ~~keep com~~
agree should wait more comth
lets keep sticks in reserve

10-12 November.

-- well in good cop mode.

-- agree to coordinate

-- Commonwealth meeting - denying right to
come to pickup

Commonwealth - Rarotonga protocols. SPNFZ

Unilateral → ??

R - keep testing pressure on french
this

Rod → We agree w/ NZealand on nuker's

they're giving us hard time for not circulating
French testing

- so far today, you're fine on policy (no declared
- atom of nuker on ships)

Provide Comfort → w/ Turkish joint failure, problem?

Cyprus IGC - 6 months after last IGC -
Cypriots can make another Push for EU

Libya - UNSC seat - Egyptian seat vs
Libya, over 100 votes but secret
November roll over → oil related equipment.

Rod → there get into conflict of i, have to
get into fine print.

Sweet's Fanny - Ann - Qaddafi keeps
promising to say how much Semtex
to IRA

Rosina London Conference → Timing?

- Not great if dummy does this
- hold off on date until see how proximity talks
- Think fine if dummy's air conf.
- You shouldn't ~~talk~~ expect Paris to be
final conf.

Pope not substantive, but harmless,
helps bring them along, helps domestically
or / Greek or ^{Pro}Box priest - will do them
no good, do no harm.

- we need lift early in arms embargo.

Red - Paradise to begin peace process by lifting
arms embargo.

→ Ireland res. Nit / Major - probably not,
awkward w/ which meetings do do, which to
not.

R - we'll bat at whenever you want

- Problem of time - ~~Mitchell~~ target date
~~essential~~ great importance to Adams

gets harder for him to sell formal form of
wants to ICA, need movement

Mitchell - gone 2 wks in Nov.

→ Need two or 3 months.

↳ each side agree to consider seriously for necessity

- get going to build confidence

- keep unionists talking, engaged

↳ get twin tracks going

Lyle thanks for role, helps.

Thought of decommissioning last Feb
Ken McGinnis suggested decommissioning.

John Taylor - Irish angle, hope his with Trimble
- Pick in the hatch -

- Robin Scames - Unionists Reverend.

Psychologically important to get engaged in
this issue

→ as ready to go now - Ken in twin
track

→ we want to get to cell party talk

- avoid abstentionism;

- can't afford to ignore unionists

- can get them to join process in twin track

Trimble is not wild @ idea

→ if he & Paisley will be given fair run,
may come in.

- any assembly/convention very difficult

re 2-3 months? cell ball park

→ just a target

Real but don't want to send signal that

concrete; don't know what is realistic

In Sept Mayhew Ancram thought
end of year was pushing it. Need process
Paul - provided they [IRA] SF] are
tied in.

Rod so they can get to next stage
- we've been waiting for few weeks
- SF to say ok, will come in &
engage in this process in a serious
way.
- Don't deal now with Wash 3
→ he needs to agree to reply to questions
orally

Reimble of John Taylor

- John Taylor → Jim Molyneux / old Linnear
- R- 1. no US plan. passionately indifferent to future, as long as w/c asset
 - 2. large credibility on some words w/ all parties
 - 3. We applaud twin tracks going.

with as little as possible prejudice
- look seriously at proposal of decommunism

John - why are you involved in our internal affairs

RJ - all sides feel confident

T- even in campaign, said special envoy
- Morrison & others. Keen idea of decommunism was to oversee actual process of decomming. getting close to special envoy

- twin track - if its a fudge for them to climb down, will be exposed. Parley will tear into us.

R- if you agree to freeze, won't have a process

? Does Tumble have to participate
immediately in ~~the~~ twin track

T - if talking @ agenda, talk @ substance
↳ chances of them becoming fully aware
that ~~there~~ doesn't start

T if someone has a better signal, fine, well
- Para 10 has to be dealt with
to the satisfaction of the ~~public~~ people
in NI > could be satisfied in a
number of ways

→ can't enter into talks w/ SF

until problem w/ see SF has changed

T - will reserve our presence until
we see progress.

Problem with Assembly is Home.

Can't get a meeting w/ him on some issues
Re: elected body - limited time of function.

1982 Prior Assembly. Sat 82-84

consultative body, could have Irish govt
making representations

DUP would have to participate.

SF election ~~arrangements~~, debate, test
whether serious.

By Easter bic shuts down the next election

- MAC continue

- Spatter

UNHCR or name & number

~~- add story keep to Tracy~~
~~SPRZ - when from USA~~

- Press clips

- more Brooke blends

- dinner w/ staff?

- speech UN???

→ Jill Sh.

[Anthony R Gubbay
Zimbabwe

Lynn R Oct 17

Brits think we're part of SF
front to take Bites of British
apple.

goes ~~forward~~ further than British
non-papers

Rufus Wender

(de) → add 1

Russia - keep command (post, radio, circuit)
1 level of operational control.

proximity - US; Paris Final tracks
- strategy on 1) implem force 2)
ecm recast 3) OSCE supervision of
electronic, return of refugees etc.

after proximity talks have concluded
London -

add off on date, Not start
London till proximity talks
concluded

Paris → implem/withdraw → Paris conclusions
key is avoid gaps.

Why not have Lond + Paris simultaneously.
if supportive

[Paris did say thought final Spang on Blair]

Guide Summit kick-off in Moscow

Atkins replacement - Bildt?

Ekens model, makey, does some
part of unscam.

R/Arm + Iran? against whom?

Paratryce - has a joint
announcement on interest, but no date.

| Joint study - eminent persons - btw
Europe + North Amer.

Mayhew

Irish/UK talks

dangerous impasse, need to find way
@ it. Only way, twin tracks.

- need to work on Trimble for participation
in political track.

We need to show to him that
distinction is b/w preliminary & round
table. all put fwd their ideas
T said a possibility.

- ^{Robinson}~~Robinson~~ says I'm a serial ~~time~~ betrayer
& expects ~~to~~ me to be nice + normal.

Taylor ~~possible~~ + ~~to~~ capable of
taking moderate stands.

Trimble sees himself as PM of NI +
needs Assembly. Knows will need talks.

Th - SF prepared to accept down track

- Maglinis will come wed/Thurs
- still some hang ups on wed.

- sensible position

- really prepared to seriously cooperate

→ need to see it out

- political track

→ figured if you're here w/ us. bleed details
in party.

→ Wed

- Home non paper basis

→ Hawley Timble

- Political / para

Mayhew

- want more fast bc of Trimble
- Not helpful to have you in next term bc of party problems
- Need to have paramilitary engaged, not political
- no target date by end of year

- Engage seriously on arms issue
- Consider seriously the recommendations of commissions
- Political track a genuine position
- timetable has to be sufficient to allow a sensible discussion.

TL-Spring -

Margrie - Labor shadow for Sec.

Agency.

Target Date

- Terms of reference will shift
SF concerned.

UUP would be happy to use target
date + be miss it.

Target date not very British

White more - Loward

Adams

IL - concerned that they're not
hearing from McGinnis what
we're hearing from you. Needs to
reiterate: - consider seriously in
comments; - willing to discuss content
& seriously, in cloudy law, where &
where.

- they'll talk about angel paper

A early next week will give paper
on modalities → answer to that
paper.

(Regular weapons - ?
→ Cent do paramilitaries

- you will speak authoritatively
- no equivalence
- I can raise Brits arm, with respect to
paper

TZ - Aueron

- > we hear things from Adams
you've not heard yet from
McGinnis.
- good news - putting together a response
to your paper. like a talking
dog - not so much what says but
that says at all.
- would speak authoritatively on
issue of ICA arms, &
- TZ - I said how, when & where, didn't agree
- hope McGinnis says.
you can raise issue of British arms

Bad news - Had next with his people yesterday
while he can do, in public communique,
they can't accept arms held by personnel
=> if there was a more general stmt,
not saying arms equivalent,
+ if Goits would say what it meant
he could not take issue with it.

Mumme - Hold paper (Severely damaged)
- SF + British
→ all in Nov

engage seriously in process.

Pauline Neville-Jones

TL - lift arms embargo

P - no real diff

problem of constitutional talks

Bosnia Serbs don't see equality in state

TL - we need to stay engaged w/ Fednations

to keep Croats etc engaged

- ~~etc~~ ensure balance in ground

enhance stability - ie lift

- economic reconstruction

- won't know for some yrs whether

it's viable

P / Russians - their policy is to be visibly engaged

TL - first major

R think they are moving

P - no good if they send Zartor

R - easier to have photo ops

Moscow to kick it off.

Whinge / wine

P - need someone like Cherkin.

- re: lift - arms embargo + economic embargo

' both have to be lifted in UNSC

bc of veto.

R - of course

P package.

- can't leave state of armies in Bosnia until

proximity talks

Need to know level of arms,

ie. lift + regulate

R - when solution ^{is} implemented

lift arms emb. - sanctions - not linked but

at same time when get settled

Q- need an arms control regime
b/c ~~not~~ dist link to arms control
regime b/c size of arm -

hope set context

Q- Think Milosovic abandoning E. Slavonia
wait push autonomy b/c of
implications for Kosovo
he says true autonomy

Q- I'd worry more @ Tadjik than Moscow

P want to get Sautsky guy in
translate relationship - free order

Q → Push

→ Tadjik could do

Dec 9-11 w/ free B-14 Dec

Oct 31 + Nov 1 Tadjik

Embassy secure fax

after hours

408.8140

011 44171 629 2295 >>>>>

298-7100 Barbara Fonky →

605 399 2400

9/19 TZ → Miread

spoke to London, general impression is that
 Brits want to get this going. more flexible.
 heartfelt conversation on how to bring along
 the Unionists. They have their problem on other
 side.

re: whether ICA required to work with
 commission, or neutrality while ~~at~~ so
 part. not rigid, practicality not
 labely. Need dialogue with someone who
 can take positions, conduct authoritative
 position. If it made it easier to follow
 arrangement Jerry mentioned. no problem.

leaves? of what he'd be speaking about,
 suggest you lead that fuzzy now. Jerry's
 not it, he can conduct dialogue as he
 wishes. lets park issue that & start
 building confidence.

Said a # of times don't want ICA sounds &
 want to start building confidence.

Miread I'll pass that over & organize for Jerry to
 call you. Will be briefing people in next
 few days.

TZ I think we have a real opportunity to get

M appreciate all your help

9/28 Overcom + R

Constructive meeting. McGinnis. Want to find a way thru impasse. Committed to peace process. Came up for Kelly, to rehearse why I thought twin track best way. allowing us to look at recommendations, on merits. Anxious re: terms of reference.

Anxious @ target date. we'd consider if could get twin track.

R re: cost?

lost some time.

meet again next week.

said he'd go away + talk over weekend. have any words.

we still maintain our position, just as they do theirs.

didn't raise papers. Home raising words.

wait until next week

R re: judgments vs. precondition

A. supporter of panel looks at way, each side retains own judgment

NR trip- useful. More can ~~be~~ make unicorns

9/28 TL/Adams

11/20/88

political process - decommissioning

n But issues to be considered up to bodies

A Adams - terms of reference agreed in 2 track process

TL need to work out terms of reference

b/w 2 part w/ ref. to all of you.

I've been pressing for as broad & fuzzy terms as possible. My impression is that Brits are still allegedly to talk @ target date at time of agreement on twin track. We'd be glad to help get one that's satisfactory.

-very encouraging, so far so good.

A) killing of 3 IRA people violation - approval decision by EC court.

meeting this morning useful, frank. talked @

political way @, indicated a willingness to

negotiate but on what basis is to be seen. no

satisfactory outcome on key issue of all party talks.

Meeting lasted an hour. They talked @ After MASS.

They argued 1, 2, 3 Wash. on positions.

Body based on 1, 2, would ded w/ how. Recs not binding on Brits, retain right to veto.

SF. need to proceed as political as + military project. Have as a private engagement + then issued ~~that~~ some that meeting had taken place.

Didn't realize could consider seriously as next.

If every day counts like at a certain point they have a practical argument. Will get back to you next week

A a considerable achievement to set twin track, lot more to be done

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

A got them to back, if British navy now...

begin

A considerable achievement, people of ICA have accepted twin track provided 1) there is a target date 2) decommissioning Commission ~~also~~ as a political project; (i.e. ICA not involved, SF + other parties make submissions 3) no preconditions placed on parties re: ~~working~~ with the Commission. All to be reflected in joint comm. file.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: OCTOBER 6, 1995 TIME: 4-5:00 P.M.

LOCATION: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DUBLIN, IRELAND

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

NANCY SODERBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
JEAN KENNEDY SMITH, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND
RICHARD NORLAND, POLITICAL OFFICER, AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

IRELAND

NORA OWEN, MINISTER OF JUSTICE
TIM DALTON, SECRETARY OF MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
LINDA O'SHEA FARREN, PROGRAM MANAGER, MIN. OF JUSTICE
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE STAFF

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: FOCUS ON
 DECOMMISSIONING AND PRISONER ISSUES

Minister Owen outlined the Justice Department's role in the Anglo-Irish negotiations. Whereas the Garda (police) had previously concentrated on stopping illegal arms and terrorist training, these concerns had eased with the ceasefire. The opening of the border meant significant improvements in people's lives. Nevertheless, the Department still kept an eye on areas of perceived threat; "the arms are still there." She expressed appreciation for the significant U.S. role in lessening the level of violence. U.S. help was now needed to bring the UK and Sinn Fein closer together. Decommissioning should not be a roadblock.

DALTON-CHILCOT GROUP

Department of Justice Secretary Tim Dalton described the activities of the Dalton-Chilcot group, which has focussed on counter-terrorism structures (in the past) and decommissioning issues (more recently -- especially since the ceasefire). Dalton said the previous Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, and John Major had discussed the need to tackle arsenals in October 1994. Modalities had been a problem. But it was never the Irish government position that decommissioning should be a precondition to all-party talks. This would have not only prevented the talks from starting, but would have prevented arms from being turned in as well.

Dalton said that agreement was reached in December 1994 on the general principle of flexibility, on legal arrangements and on third party involvement -- the need for the latter had already been foreseen. When the Prime Minister and Taoiseach met at

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2011-0355-F, 2.97]

Cannes on June 27, 1995, they started discussion of an international commission. The Dalton-Chilcot group began looking at this issue seriously. The group proposed three phases: discussions with the paramilitaries, discussion of how to accomplish the decommissioning, and an implementation phase. Decommissioning had to be a voluntary act by the paramilitaries, it was agreed.

The aim was to report back on modalities by the end of the preparatory phase of political talks, Dalton said. The paramilitaries signalled an interest in decommissioning and began to discuss how this would take place (e.g., would they hand weapons in or turn them over to someone else?). Legal protections were also discussed. Sinn Fein believed the British would be prepared to cover these issues in the preparatory phase, prior to all-party talks, but this did not happen.

The British "body language," Dalton said, was such that the Irish felt a "powerful report" from an international party, conveying (1) a strong commitment to non-violence on the part of the paramilitaries and (2) workable modalities, would "put the British over the Third Washington Condition." But the British were divided on this, even though Chilcot himself was flexible.

DECOMMISSIONING

In Dalton's view, the British were looking for a way to get to all-party talks without a physical handover of weapons. Instead, decommissioning became a major stumbling block when Mayhew -- quite by surprise -- raised it in his speech in Washington. This was attributable to unionist pressure on John Major at the time. "But Major is more secure now," Owen added. Owen said that recent talks with Michael Ancram supported Dalton's view. The British won't let go of the Third Washington Condition, she said, but they would accept something that takes its place. The U.S. could help achieve this. "The issue isn't decommissioning, it's how to get to all-party talks."

Asked by Ms. Soderberg how to get "out of the box," Dalton replied that the British were pulled in two directions. On the one hand, they needed to protect John Major, who had said that arms must be turned over before talks. On the other hand, if the British persisted in their current stance, they risked losing the huge benefits of peace for the sake of the "mere icing on the cake" represented by a physical gesture on arms. Dalton observed that while Sinn Fein leaders are not under threat now, there is a sense that "time is limited." The recent Sinn Fein conference (September 30 in Dublin) showed real disillusionment with the peace process, according to police sources. What is needed is language that will enable an international commission to report positively, that the paramilitaries are ready to address arms and are committed to non-violent methods. The latter is more important than decommissioning itself, since the paramilitaries retain the technology to construct new weapons.

Returning to this theme later in the meeting, Soderberg emphasized the need to bridge the gap between the parties on the arms issue. The UK and Sinn Fein were moving in the right direction. Perhaps a revised joint communique launching the twin-track approach could help. The U.S. would remain engaged in trying to find a process acceptable to both sides. She asked whether any thought had been given to the composition of an international commission, other than Senator Mitchell. Dalton responded that no specific names had come up, though Canada, South Africa and the Scandinavian countries had been mentioned as possible sources of qualified members. Some thought was being given to the need for commission staff to come from countries other than the UK or Ireland. Soderberg agreed strongly.

PRISONERS

Owen noted that 32 PIRA prisoners had been released by Ireland. Several Irish National Liberation Army prisoners were now seeking compassionate parole. Dublin was looking for a way to achieve this in return for prisoner support for the peace process. Dalton indicated a difficult hunger strike -- "that could have threatened the peace process" -- involving these prisoners had recently been resolved with Father Alec Reid's help. He criticized British Home Secretary Michael Howard for the UK stance on treatment of prisoners. Ireland hoped prisoners in the UK would be allowed to finish their terms in Ireland after November 1, when the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons comes into force.

Approximately 12 Irish prisoners are in the U.S., and Ireland hopes they will also be returned, as this could have a positive effect on the British approach. Soderberg indicated this could be a problem, as these prisoners had broken U.S. laws. If anything, the U.S. position on this issue could end up reinforcing the British position. Owen indicated there would be increased political pressure after November 1 to do something for the prisoners, with possible intervention from the Dail. The prisoners were a key issue, as some of them had been instrumental in securing the ceasefire. Perhaps their return could be justified on humanitarian grounds.

PRESIDENT'S VISIT

Owen accepted an invitation to consider issues of interest to the Department of Justice that might be relevant to the President's visit. She noted that Ireland's number one problem is illegal drugs. Heroin is the main problem, and there is a huge growth in use of "ecstasy" tablets. Ireland is clearly seen by some narcotics traffickers as a logical distribution center for West Europe.

SUBJECT: SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
DICK SPRING

1. SUMMARY. ON OCTOBER 6, DEPUTY NSC ADVISOR NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH TANAISTE/FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING OVER BREAKFAST AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING TRIP TO IRELAND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. ACCOMPANYING SODERBERG WERE AMBASSADOR SMITH AND EMBASSY POLOFF. ON THE IRISH SIDE, SPRING WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SEAN O'HUIGINN, SECOND SECRETARY OF DFA AND HEAD OF ITS ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, AS WELL AS COUNSELLOR FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BRENDAN SCANNELL AND AMERICAN DESK OFFICER ORLA O'HANRAHAN. END SUMMARY.

POSITIVE ON TRIMBLE

2. SODERBERG BEGAN BY GIVING A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF HER MEETINGS IN LONDON AND BELFAST. SHE NOTED THAT DESPITE HIS HARD-LINE REPUTATION, NEW UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE SEEMED LIKE SOMEBODY WITH WHOM WE COULD DO BUSINESS. IF NOTHING ELSE, TRIMBLE WAS AT LEAST WILLING TO TALK, SOMETHING THAT HIS PREDECESSOR HAD BEEN VERY RELUCTANT TO DO. SHE ALSO NOTED THAT TRIMBLE HAD BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO TAKE ANY PUBLIC POSITIONS THAT MIGHT HAMPER HIS FLEXIBILITY LATER. THAT WAS A GOOD SIGN. STILL, THE UNIONISTS WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE READY TO ENGAGE RIGHT AT THE START IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS THAT ARE ENVISIONED UNDER THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN. THEY WOULD NEED MORE TIME. SHE NOTED THAT THE CURRENT UNIONIST LINE IS THAT, UNTIL IRA WEAPONS ARE DECOMMISSIONED, THEY CANNOT SIGN ON TO ANY PROCESS THAT PUTS SINN FEIN ON AN EQUAL STATUS.

3. SPRING AGREED THAT TRIMBLE WAS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER MOLYNEAUX, WHOM ONE IRISH PARTICIPANT LATER CHARACTERIZED AS A "POLITICAL HERMIT." HE SAID IT WAS A GOOD SIGN THAT TRIMBLE WAS SEEKING ACCESS TO THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND THAT HE WAS PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON. HE SUPPORTED GIVING TRIMBLE AS MUCH PUBLICITY AS POSSIBLE, INCLUDING A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. ON THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN, SPRING SAID THAT NOTHING WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN UNTIL AFTER NEXT WEEK'S TORY PARTY CONFERENCE. EVEN THEN, HOWEVER, IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE BRITISH WERE READY TO "MOVE DOWN THIS ROAD." HE SAID THE IRISH ARE WAITING FOR "STRONG INDICATIONS" FROM THE BRITISH THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO DO SO.

GOING FORWARD WITH AN OPEN-ENDED INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

4. SODERBERG SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR FROM HER MEETINGS IN LONDON THAT THE BRITISH ARE NOT READY AT THIS TIME TO FALL OFF THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION (W3), EITHER PRIVATELY OR PUBLICLY. SHE SAID IT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT SINN FEIN REMAINED WEDDED TO ITS POSITION. AS A RESULT, THE BEST WAY FORWARD WAS FOR BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT AN OPEN-ENDED INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, IN WHICH THIS ISSUE COULD BE THRASHED OUT. SHE SAID THAT WHILE THE BRITISH

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2011-0355-F, 2.98]

REFUSE TO ABANDON W3 AT THIS TIME, THEY HAVE SOFTENED THEIR LANGUAGE RECENTLY, NOTING THAT W3 IS SIMPLY THEIR "JUDGMENT" ABOUT HOW TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS AND THAT THERE MAY BE OTHER WAYS OF ACHIEVING SUCH CONDITIONS IF "CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE." HOPEFULLY, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION'S REPORT WOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SUCH A "CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES."

5. SODERBERG ACKNOWLEDGED THAT AN OPEN-ENDED INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WOULD BE A RISK FOR BOTH SIDES BECAUSE IT WOULD START A PROCESS WHOSE OUTCOME WAS NOT ASSURED. SHE SAID SHE FELT THE BRITISH WERE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN THE COMMISSION ON THIS BASIS, BUT THAT SINN FEIN STILL HAD "A LITTLE WAY TO GO." SODERBERG SAID THAT GERRY ADAMS'S DEMAND THAT THE COMMISSION ADDRESS LEGAL AS WELL AS ILLEGAL ARMS WAS OBVIOUSLY A NON-STARTER. SINN FEIN ALSO HAD TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEAK "AUTHORITATIVELY" ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING WITH A FAIR AMOUNT OF SPECIFICITY. SINN FEIN DID NOT HAVE TO ACCEPT W3, BUT IT DID HAVE TO ENGAGE SERIOUSLY ON THE MODALITIES -- WHAT, WHEN, AND TO WHOM. IT WAS INCUMBENT ON SINN FEIN TO THINK CREATIVELY ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE. PERHAPS ONE WAY FORWARD WAS FOR SINN FEIN TO RESPOND TO THE BRITISH PAPER ON DECOMMISSIONING THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION.

GETTING THE BRITS OFF THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION

6. SPRING SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT SINN FEIN HAD SIMPLY "RUN OUT OF THINKING." HE SAID THEY CERTAINLY NEED HELP ON THAT SCORE. HE LAMENTED THAT SINN FEIN/IRA HAD NOT FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO TURN IN A TOKEN AMOUNT OF SEMTEX OR WEAPONS EARLIER IN THE PROCESS, ALLOWING THEM TO TAKE "THE HIGH ROAD." O'HUIGINN SAID THE U.S. WAS IN A GOOD POSITION TO PUT PRESSURE ON BOTH THE BRITISH AND SINN FEIN. HE SAID THAT W3 WAS "TOTALLY UNREALISTIC." HE SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE U.S. "CONDITIONED" THE BRITISH TO START THINKING ABOUT DECOMMISSIONING AS AN "OBJECTIVE" OF NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN A "PRECONDITION." CONTINUING TO HIGHLIGHT THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE WAS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. HE CLAIMED THAT AS RESULT OF THE CURRENT STALEMATE, MANY SINN FEIN CONSTITUENTS HAD ALREADY LOST CONFIDENCE IN THE PEACE PROCESS; THE ONLY THING HOLDING THINGS TOGETHER WAS CONTINUED CONFIDENCE IN THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP. *h*

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

7. SODERBERG NOTED THAT IF THERE WAS ANY HOPE OF GETTING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION UNDER WAY BY THE END OF NOVEMBER, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD START THINKING NOW ABOUT WHO SHOULD BE ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AND WHAT ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE SHOULD BE. SPRING REPLIED THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO APPROACH ANYONE FORMALLY ABOUT SERVING ON THE COMMISSION UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR THAT SINN FEIN WOULD AGREE TO

COOPERATE WITH IT. SPRING AND O'HUIGINN SAID THAT THE IRISH WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF A THREE-COUNTRY COMMISSION LED BY SENATOR GEORGE MITCHELL. THE OTHER TWO COUNTRIES WOULD BE CANADA -- WHICH THE UNIONISTS SEE AS SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR POSITION -- AND SOUTH AFRICA -- WHICH WOULD FIND FAVOR WITH NATIONALISTS. SPRING ALSO MENTIONED FINLAND AS A POSSIBLE COMMISSION MEMBER. SODERBERG NOTED THAT, WITH REGARD TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, THE BRITISH UNFORTUNATELY SEE THE U.S. AS BEING ON THE "NATIONALIST SIDE" OF THE EQUATION.

FINANCING THE COMMISSION

*Unionist
and would. plus want
a Canadian to handle*

8. SODERBERG RAISED THE ISSUE OF FINANCING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. SPRING INDICATED THAT THIS WAS NOT A BIG PROBLEM. QUOTING MARGARET THATCHER, SPRING SAID IF THE PROBLEM OF NORTHERN IRELAND WAS SIMPLY ONE OF MONEY, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SOLVED LONG AGO. COMPARED TO THE AMOUNT OF MONEY POURED INTO NORTHERN IRELAND OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS, THE COST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WOULD BE MINUSCULE.

*Said I govts would pay. Perhaps
some St Dept stuff for Mitchell, they could
perhaps reimburse*

PRISONERS

9. SPRING SAID IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE BRITISH MOVED ON THE PRISONER ISSUE. HE SAID IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE THAT THE UK HAD NOT MADE ONE GESTURE IN THIS REGARD SINCE LAST YEAR'S CEASEFIRE. HE DISMISSED MAYHEW'S AUGUST SPEECH, AND ITS PROMISE OF INCREASING THE PRISON REMISSION RATE, AS "A BIT OF A WAFFLE." HE COMPLAINED THAT THE CONDITIONS FOR REPUBLICAN PRISONERS IN BRITISH JAILS WERE WORSE THAN EVER. HE CITED THE CASE OF PATRICK KELLY AS AN EGREGIOUS EXAMPLE OF POOR TREATMENT. O'HUIGINN PUT THE BLAME SQUARELY ON UK HOME SECRETARY MICHAEL HOWARD, WHO WANTED TO SHOW THAT HIS "TORY RED BLOOD CELL COUNT WAS VERY HIGH." WHILE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF HOWARD, BOTH O'HUIGINN AND SPRING INDICATED THAT THEY THOUGHT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRISONER ISSUE. UNFORTUNATELY, HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO OVER-RULE HOWARD.

10. NOTING THAT THE CONVENTION ON THE TRANSFER OF SENTENCED PERSONS COMES INTO EFFECT FOR IRELAND ON NOVEMBER 1, O'HUIGINN SAID THAT THE UK SHOULD IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER TO NORTHERN IRELAND OR THE REPUBLIC ALL THE REPUBLICAN PRISONERS CURRENTLY SERVING IN BRITISH JAILS. O'HUIGINN PUT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPUBLICAN PRISONERS IN BRITAIN AT 27. HE SAID THAT JAILS IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARE IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO DEAL WITH REPUBLICAN PRISONERS THAN ONES IN MAINLAND BRITAIN BECAUSE THEY UNDERSTAND THE REPUBLICAN "THEOLOGY" AND HAVE MUCH GREATER EXPERIENCE. IN ORDER TO FORCE THE BRITS TO MOVE, O'HUIGINN SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. TELL THE UK THAT IT EXPECTS THE TRANSFER ISSUE TO BE SOLVED BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE BRITS WOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT HOW THE IRISH WOULD RESPECT SENTENCE TERMS FOR CERTAIN EGREGIOUS OFFENDERS, BUT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT A "MIDDLE GROUND."

POINTS ON PRESIDENT'S TRIP

11. SODERBERG REVIEWED THE TENTATIVE PLANS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP AND THEN SOLICITED IDEAS. SOME OF THE MAJOR POINTS MADE BY SPRING AND OTHERS:

-- SPRING SAID THE U.S. SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT THE SECURITY FOR THE PRESIDENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS "DISCREET." IT WOULD NOT BE A GOOD IMAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO BE SEEN BEHIND "AN RUC RING OF STEEL."

-- SPRING DID NOT THINK IT WAS "ALL THAT IMPORTANT" FOR THE PRESIDENT TO STAY OVERNIGHT IN BELFAST. HE SAID THE DECISION ON OVERNIGHTING SHOULD BE BASED ON LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

-- BOTH SPRING AND O'HUIGINN PICKED UP ON SODERBERG'S COMMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT DID NOT PLAN TO DELIVER A "MAJOR POLICY ADDRESS" IN DUBLIN AS HE WAS PLANNING TO DO IN LONDON AND BELFAST. O'HUIGINN SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH TO THE PARLIAMENT TO BE "SUBSTANTIVE."

-- THE STATE DINNER AT DUBLIN CASTLE WILL ACCOMMODATE, AT MOST, ABOUT 240 GUESTS TOTAL -- HALF OF WHICH WILL BE IRISH. GIVEN THE LARGE SIZE OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, THE IRISH SUGGESTED A PRE-DINNER RECEPTION THAT EVERYBODY WOULD ATTEND. (LATER, IN A SEPARATE MEETING, TAOISEACH ADVISOR SEAN DONLON SUGGESTED THAT THERE BE A POST-DINNER ENTERTAINMENT EVENT TO WHICH EVERYONE WOULD BE INVITED.)

-- SPRING SAID THAT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET TOM WATSON TO PLAY GOLF WITH THE PRESIDENT AT BALLYBUNION, IF THE PRESIDENT WAS SO INCLINED. HE CLAIMED THAT BALLYBUNION WAS WATSON'S FAVORITE COURSE.

SUBJECT: SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH SOCIAL WELFARE
MINISTER PROINSIAS DE ROSSA

1. SUMMARY. ON OCTOBER 6, DEPUTY NSC ADVISOR NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH SOCIAL WELFARE MINISTER PROINSIAS DE ROSSA AT HIS OFFICE TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING TRIP TO IRELAND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. ACCOMPANYING SODERBERG WERE AMBASSADOR SMITH AND EMBASSY POLOFF. ON THE IRISH SIDE, DE ROSSA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS PROGRAM MANAGER PATRICK NOLAN. END SUMMARY.

BRIEFING ON LONDON AND BELFAST MEETINGS

2. SODERBERG BEGAN BY GIVING A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF HER MEETINGS IN BELFAST AND LONDON. SHE SAID THAT THE TWIN-TRACK PROCESS STILL SEEMED TO BE THE MOST PROMISING WAY FORWARD. ONCE THAT IS UP AND RUNNING, THE NEXT CHALLENGE WILL BE BRINGING THE UNIONISTS ONBOARD. THE UUP PROBABLY WON'T PARTICIPATE RIGHT AWAY IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS THAT ARE ENVISIONED UNDER THE TWIN-TRACK PROPOSAL. TRIMBLE FEELS THAT, AT THIS POINT ANYWAY, HE CANNOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY PROCESS THAT GIVES SINN FEIN EQUAL STATUS UNLESS IRA WEAPONS ARE FIRST DECOMMISSIONED.

CEASEFIRE IS SECURE

3. DE ROSSA SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEW, THE IRA CEASEFIRE REMAINED QUITE SECURE. HE SAID MOST REPUBLICANS AND NATIONALISTS ARE "EXREMELY ANXIOUS" THAT THE IRA NOT RETURN TO VIOLENCE. HE SAID THE OVERWHELMING VIEW IS THAT THE PEACE IS "THE BEST THING" THEY HAVE GOING FOR THEM. THEY FOUGHT "A WAR" FOR 25 YEARS AND GOT NOTHING; SINCE THE CEASEFIRE, THEY ARE BEING TREATED AS ALMOST EQUALS BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP IN THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT; THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS IS THE "ONLY GAME IN TOWN." WHILE NOT RULING OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME SMALL, MAVERICK ELEMENT COULD GO BACK TO VIOLENCE AT SOME POINT, DE ROSSA SAID THE CHANCES WERE PRACTICALLY "NIL" THAT THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP WOULD GO THAT WAY.

NEED FOR A "BALANCED ACCOMMODATION"

4. ASKED WHAT THE PRESIDENT COULD DO DURING HIS VISIT TO FACILITATE THE PEACE PROCESS, DE ROSSA SAID THAT HE SHOULD STRESS THE NEED FOR A "BALANCED ACCOMMODATION." HE SAID THE PRESIDENT SHOULD ALSO IMPORE PEOPLE BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH TO PUT ASIDE THE "GREIVANCE POLITICS OF THE PAST" AND LOOK TOWARD THE FUTURE. DE ROSSA NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAS A GREAT DEAL OF LEVERAGE WITH THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT, WHICH COULD BE VERY USEFULLY EMPLOYED TO BRING REPUBLICANS ALONG IN THE PROCESS.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2011-0355-F, 2.99]

PREDICTING AN EASY "YES" FOR DIVORCE

5. DE ROSSA PREDICTED THAT THE NOVEMBER 24 REFERENDUM TO REMOVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL BAN ON DIVORCE WOULD WIN EASILY. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE "YES" VOTE WOULD BE CLOSE TO 60 PERCENT. HE SAID HIS CONFIDENCE WAS PARTLY BASED ON A RECENT POLL THAT SHOWED 2-TO-1 SUPPORT FOR DIVORCE, WITH ONLY NINE PERCENT OF THOSE SURVEYED INDICATING THAT THEY MIGHT CHANGE THEIR MIND BEFORE REFERENDUM DAY. NOLAN POINTED OUT THAT RECENT TROUBLES WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH HAD UNDERMINED MUCH OF ITS MORAL AUTHORITY AND REDUCED ITS EXPECTED INFLUENCE ON THE REFERENDUM. HE SAID MUCH HAD CHANGED IN IRISH SOCIETY SINCE 1986, WHEN A SIMILAR DIVORCE REFERENDUM WAS OVERWHELMINGLY DEFEATED. FOR ONE, A WHOLE STRUCTURE OF FAMILY LAW WAS NOW IN PLACE TO ADDRESS COMMON CONCERNS ABOUT DIVORCE. BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, THERE HAD BEEN A REVOLUTION IN THE ROLE OF FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN IRELAND. FOR EXAMPLE, IRELAND NOW HAD A LOWER BIRTH RATE THAN SWEDEN, AND 20 PERCENT OF ALL IRISH BIRTHS WERE OUTSIDE OF MARRIAGE.

FOCUS ON UNEMPLOYMENT

6. ASKED WHAT ISSUES PRESIDENT MIGHT RAISE WHILE HE IS IN IRELAND, DE ROSSA FOCUSED ON THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT. HE NOTED THAT DESPITE SEVERAL YEARS OF HEALTHY ECONOMIC GROWTH, IRELAND STILL HAD VERY HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT. EVEN MORE WORRISOME, THE LEVEL OF LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT CONTINUED TO RISE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT STOP BY A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT TO SEE HOW THE GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO COPE WITH THIS PROBLEM. SODERBERG NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S TIGHT SCHEDULE WOULD PROBABLY PRECLUDE SUCH A VISIT, BUT HELD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE FIRST LADY MIGHT INCLUDE THAT IN HER PROGRAM.

SUBJECT: SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH FIANNA FAIL LEADER
BERTIE AHERN

1. SUMMARY. ON OCTOBER 6, DEPUTY NSC ADVISOR NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH FIANNA FAIL LEADER BERTIE AHERN ON THE MARGINS OF THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION AT DUBLIN CASTLE. THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING TRIP TO IRELAND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. ACCOMPANYING SODERBERG WERE AMBASSADOR SMITH AND EMBASSY POLOFF. AHERN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MARTIN MANSERGH, HIS SPECIAL ADVISOR ON NORTHERN IRELAND. END SUMMARY.

MEETING WITH TRIMBLE

2. AHERN NOTED THAT HIS RECENT MEETING IN DUBLIN WITH UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE HAD BEEN "SURPRISINGLY FRIENDLY." ALTHOUGH TRIMBLE HAD TAKEN TOUGH STANDS ON MANY ISSUES, THE FACT THAT HE WAS EVEN WILLING TO COME TO DUBLIN TO TALK TO FIANNA FAIL, THE "GREENEST PARTY" IN THE REPUBLIC, WAS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD. HE SAID TRIMBLE "TOOK PAINS" TO MAKE A FEW POINTS, ONE OF WHICH WAS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULDN'T TELL HIM WHAT TO DO. TRIMBLE SEES A NEW LABOR GOVERNMENT COMING TO POWER WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR, SO HE HAS DECIDED HE WILL NOT LET PRIME MINISTER MAJOR DICTATE TO HIM. FOR HIS PART, AHERN SAID HE IS NOT LOOKING FORWARD TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE TORY GOVERNMENT. HE SAID HE HAD "FAR MORE FAITH" IN JOHN MAJOR'S COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS THAN TONY BLAIR'S.

3. AHERN SAID TRIMBLE WAS PERSONABLE DURING THE ENTIRE ONE-HOUR MEETING, EXCEPT WHEN HE WAS ASKED HOW HE FELT ABOUT THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT. AHERN SAID TRIMBLE WENT "A LITTLE GAH-GAH" AT THAT POINT. AT THE OTHER EXTREME, AHERN SAID TRIMBLE SOUNDED LIKE HE HAD COMPLETELY ADOPTED THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION AND MADE IT HIS OWN.

ELECTED ASSEMBLY PROPOSAL

4. AHERN SAID JOHN HUME WAS WORRIED THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SEEM DISPOSED TO TAKING UP TRIMBLE'S PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY. HUME, OF COURSE, HAS MANY MISGIVINGS WITH THE PROPOSAL AND COULD NOT SUPPORT IT. AHERN NOTED THAT TRIMBLE HAD NOT PUSHED THE IDEA TOO HARD IN THEIR RECENT TALKS.

TWIN-TRACK APPROACH

5. AHERN AGREED THAT THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH WAS THE BEST WAY FORWARD AT THE MOMENT ("THERE'S NOTHING ELSE"). HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT TRIMBLE HAD BLUNTLY REJECTED FIANNA FAIL'S PROPOSED TIME SCHEDULE OF BEGINNING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, WITH A VIEW TOWARD BEGINNING ALL-

PARTY TALKS TWO WEEKS AFTER THE VISIT. NONETHELESS, AHERN SAID HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT DECOMMISSIONING WOULD "GET LESS IMPORTANT" AS TIME WENT ON, AND THAT TRIMBLE WOULD MOVE INEXORABLY TOWARD TALKS.

THE BRITISH/HUME NON-PAPER

6. MANSERGH SAID HE WENT THROUGH THE BRITISH NON-PAPER ON ESTABLISHING THE TWIN-TRACK PROCESS WITH SINN FEIN "LINE BY LINE." HE SAID SINN FEIN WAS READY TO COMPROMISE. ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THE DOCUMENT, MANSERGH SAID IT WAS "WEAK" IN SOME AREAS. HE PARTICULARLY MENTIONED THE LAST PARAGRAPH, WHICH HE SAID SHOULD INCLUDE STRONGER LANGUAGE ON DEMILITARIZATION (I.E., REMOVING WATCH TOWERS, ETC.).

FRUSTRATION OF WORKING WITH SINN FEIN

7. ECHOING IRISH GOVERNMENT COMPLAINTS, MANSERGH SAID IT WAS SOMETIMES VERY FRUSTRATING WORKING WITH SINN FEIN BECAUSE THEY OPERATE IN A "VERY SLOW AND BUREAUCRATIC FASHION." THERE IS CLEARLY A "COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP" THAT MUST VET ALL SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS. ADAMS CLEARLY FEELS THE NEED TO "CLEAR HIS BACK" BEFORE COMMITTING HIMSELF TO ANYTHING. IN THAT RESPECT, SINN FEIN STILL OPERATES LIKE AN UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATION.

VIABILITY OF THE CEASEFIRE

8. AHERN SAID HE THOUGHT ADAMS WOULD NOT HAVE ANY TROUBLE SUSTAINING THE IRA CEASEFIRE THROUGH PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT. BUT IF THINGS DRIFTED PAST CHRISTMAS AND INTO FEBRUARY WITHOUT MORE MOVEMENT, HE COULD START COMING UNDER PRESSURE. AHERN SAID THE KEY THING WAS GETTING A TARGET DATE SET FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS. WHILE ADAMS WAS PUSHING FOR TALKS TO START BY YEAR'S END, THAT WAS LESS IMPORTANT THAN GETTING A DATE SET, EVEN IF THAT DATE EXTENDED INTO NEXT YEAR.

GOING FORWARD WITHOUT THE UNIONISTS

9. AHERN AND MANSERGH SAID THEY THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO CONTEMPLATE ALL-PARTY TALKS WITHOUT TRIMBLE AT THE TABLE. MANSERGH RECALLED THAT THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES HAVE MADE THREATS ABOUT RETURNING TO VIOLENCE IF THAT WERE TO HAPPEN.

PRESIDENT'S VISIT

10. AHERN SUGGESTED THAT ONE OBVIOUS THEME FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT IS THE FAMINE. THIS YEAR MARKS THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE START OF THE FAMINE, WHICH BROUGHT TWO MILLION IRISH IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS THE BASIS FOR THE

STRONG IRISH-AMERICAN CONNECTION THAT EXISTS TODAY. IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT THE PRESIDENT ADDRESS THE FAMINE IN SOME SIGNIFICANT WAY DURING HIS VISIT.

SUBJECT: SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH TAOISEACH ADVISOR
SEAN DONLON

1. SUMMARY. ON OCTOBER 6, DEPUTY NSC ADVISOR NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH TAOISEACH ADVISOR SEAN DONLON OVER LUNCH IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING TRIP TO IRELAND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. ACCOMPANYING SODERBERG WERE AMBASSADOR SMITH AND EMBASSY POLOFF. ON THE IRISH SIDE, DONLON WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL DERMOT GLEESON AND MINISTER OF STATE AUSTIN CURRIE. END SUMMARY.

DONLON BRIEFING

2. DONLON BEGAN BY BRIEFING SODERBERG ON THREE NORTHERN IRELAND CONTACTS THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD HAD OVER THE PAST WEEK: (1) A 2-1/2-HOUR MEETING WITH GERRY ADAMS ON SEPTEMBER 29, (2) A MEETING WITH UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE IN DUBLIN ON OCTOBER 2, AND (3) A COUPLE OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR.

SINN FEIN SEEN AS MOVING

3. WITH REGARD TO SINN FEIN, DONLON SAID THAT THE IRISH DETECTED "SOME MOVEMENT" IN THE PAST WEEK. HE CLAIMED THAT SINN FEIN WAS "MORE POSITIVE" ON THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH THAN IT HAD BEEN. AS BEFORE, SINN FEIN WAS INSISTING THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION BE A "POLITICAL BODY." THAT BEING THE CASE, IT WOULD BE SINN FEIN -- NOT THE IRA -- THAT WOULD INTERACT WITH THE COMMISSION. IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER SINN FEIN WOULD "SPEAK FOR" THE IRA. HE SAID THE FOCUS OF EFFORTS WAS ON THE BRITISH NON-PAPER THAT HAD BEEN PASSED THROUGH JOHN HUME.

"DEPRESSING" MEETING WITH TRIMBLE

4. DONLON SAID HE FOUND THE TAOISEACH'S MEETING WITH TRIMBLE TO BE "DEPRESSING" BECAUSE IT CONFIRMED HIS WORST FEARS ABOUT TRIMBLE'S HARD-LINE STANCE. DONLON NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT TRIMBLE HAD BEEN VERY "CLEVER" TO GIVE HIMSELF FLEXIBILITY TO CHANGE HIS POSITION LATER.

MIXED REVIEW ON BRITISH STANCE

5. DONLON SAID THE LATEST EVOLUTION OF THE BRITISH POSITION HAD POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ELEMENTS. ON THE PLUS SIDE, THE BRITISH REMAINED COMMITTED TO WORKING ON THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. ON THE MINUS SIDE, MAJOR SEEMED TO BE "LATCHING" ONTO TRIMBLE'S IDEA OF AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY, WHICH THE IRISH SAW AS A NON-STARTER. SODERBERG SAID SHE GOT THE IMPRESSION FROM HER MEETINGS IN LONDON THAT THE BRITISH, IN FACT, WERE NOT THAT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2011-0355-F, 3.01]

PROPOSAL, BUT WANTED TO BE SEEN GIVING IT FULL AND SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

U.S. RECOMMENDING AN OPEN-ENDED COMMISSION

6. DONLON SAID PRIME MINISTER MAJOR HAD BEEN "VERY UPSET" WITH STORIES COMING OUT OF WASHINGTON THIS PAST WEEK ABOUT FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. SODERBERG SAID SHE HAD ASSURED LONDON THAT THE U.S. HAD, IN FACT, NOT AGREED TO PURSUE A COMMISSION THAT WOULD LOOK ONLY AT WASHINGTON CONDITIONS ONE AND TWO. THE U.S., INSTEAD, FAVORED AN OPEN-ENDED COMMISSION THAT WOULD LET BOTH SIDES MAINTAIN THEIR CURRENT POSITIONS. SODERBERG ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS "A RISK FOR EVERYONE INVOLVED" BECAUSE IT MEANT PARTICIPATING IN A PROCESS "WHOSE OUTCOME IS NOT ASSURED." NONETHELESS, IT SEEMED LIKE THE BEST WAY FORWARD.

PROSPECTIVE COMMISSION MEMBERS

7. DONLON SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, THE BRITISH HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO SEE SENATOR MITCHELL "ALONE." THEY ARE STILL LOOKING TO STAFF THE COMMISSION WITH SOME "MILITARY TECHNICIANS." DONLON SAID THAT WHEN THE TAOISEACH WAS ON HIS STATE VISIT TO CANADA LAST WEEK, HE HAD ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED A LIST OF CANADIANS WHO MIGHT BE SUITABLE TO SERVE ON THE COMMISSION. DONLON NOTED THAT THE UNIONISTS ARE PRE-DISPOSED TO HAVING A CANADIAN ON THE COMMISSION, BELIEVING THAT HE OR SHE WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC TO THE UNIONIST VIEWPOINT. DONLON SAID THAT ONE HIGHLY TOUTED CANADIAN CANDIDATE (MACKENZIE-SP?) WAS PROBABLY OUT BECAUSE HE "TAKEN THE GREEN SHILLING" IN WORKING PREVIOUSLY FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON CONTRACT. SODERBERG STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF BEGINNING TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT WHO SHOULD SERVE ON THE COMMISSION. OTHERWISE, THERE WAS LITTLE HOPE OF GETTING IT UNDER WAY BEFORE THE END OF NOVEMBER.

AFTER TWIN-TRACK IN PLACE -- THEN WHAT?

8. THE CONVERSATION THEN SHIFTED TO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN ONCE THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN WAS IN PLACE AND OPERATING. HOW WOULD THE GOVERNMENTS GET THE UNIONISTS ONBOARD? THE IRISH THOUGHT TRIMBLE'S UPCOMING VISIT TO THE U.S. (OCT 28-30) WAS ONE WAY TO DO THIS. THEY ENCOURAGED THE U.S. TO GIVE TRIMBLE AS MUCH PROMINENCE AS POSSIBLE. GLEESON ARGUED THAT THE KEY WAS GIVING TRIMBLE "OWNERSHIP" OF THE PROCESS. UNIONIST VIEWS MUST BE SEEN TO COUNT. DONLON ARGUED THAT IN THIS RESPECT, THE GOVERNMENTS HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT SETTING A DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS. IF A DATE WAS SET THAT TRIMBLE "DOES NOT HAVE OWNERSHIP OF," HE SIMPLY WON'T COME. DONLON CLAIMED THAT TRIMBLE WANTS TO HOLD UP ANY PROGRESS ON TALKS UNTIL AFTER PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THE VISIT "TILTS THE BALANCE" AGAINST HIM.

THE BRITISH/HUME NON-PAPER

9. DONLON ASKED SODERBERG WHAT SHE UNDERSTOOD THE STATUS OF THE BRITISH NON-PAPER TO BE. SHE RESPONDED THAT ADAMS OWED MAJOR AND HUME A RESPONSE. WHILE ADAMS "WOULD LOVE TO DRAW US IN," THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT ADAMS HAD TO WORK OUT WITH HUME AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DIRECTLY. DONLON REPORTED THAT THE IRISH HAD FOUND IT "VERY DIFFICULT" TO ENGAGE ADAMS ON THE DOCUMENT. NONETHELESS, THEY HAD GONE THROUGH IT WITH HIM PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN HUME SOME SUGGESTED "AMENDMENTS," BUT THOUGHT IT WAS GENERALLY A GOOD BASIS FOR AGREEMENT.

ancrom

NO LEVERAGE WITH SINN FEIN

10. DONLON CLAIMED THAT THE IRISH HAD NO LEVERAGE WITH SINN FEIN BECAUSE ALBERT REYNOLDS HAD ALREADY "SOLD THE STORE." THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT WAS SIMPLY IN THE POSITION OF DELIVERING THINGS THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN PROMISED. DONLON SAID HE FELT LIKE HE HAD MORE LEVERAGE WITH THE UK THAN WITH SINN FEIN.

PRISONERS

11. DONLON EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRISONER ISSUE WAS THREATENING TO BECOME MUCH MORE SERIOUS OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS. WITH HOME SECRETARY MICHAEL HOWARD HOLDING THE REINS, THE BRITISH WERE STEADFASTLY REFUSING TO MOVE. MAJOR HAD A MUCH MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE ON THIS ISSUE, BUT EVEN AS PRIME MINISTER, HE WAS NOT IN A STRONG POSITION TO GET HOWARD TO MOVE. DONLON SAID THAT WHILE MAJOR'S COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS WAS UNDOUBTED, THIS WAS CLEARLY NOT THE CASE WITH MICHAEL HOWARD -- OR WITH SIR PATRICK MAYHEW FOR THAT MATTER.

TIMELINE

12. DONLON, GLEESON AND CURRIE QUESTIONED SODERBERG CLOSELY ABOUT WHAT TIMELINE SHE ENVISIONED FOR THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN AND ALL-PARTY TALKS. GIVING THE OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO, SODERBERG SAID SHE THOUGHT THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN COULD BE APPROVED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WITHIN TWO WEEKS OF THE END OF THE TORY PARTY CONFERENCE, AND THAT THE COMMISSION COULD BE UP AND OPERATING THREE WEEKS AFTER THAT. THAT WOULD MEAN THAT THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN WOULD ^{be} IN PLACE BY MID- TO LATE-NOVEMBER, BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. FOR THIS TO COME TO FRUITION, HOWEVER, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAD TO GET MOVING ON FINALIZING PLANS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION.

BALL IN SINN FEIN'S COURT

13. SODERBERG SAID SHE THOUGHT THE "KEY MOVEMENT" REQUIRED FOR GETTING THE TWIN-TRACK PLAN OFF THE GROUND WAS FOR SINN FEIN TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS READY TO SPEAK "AUTHORITATIVELY" FOR THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING AND THAT IT WOULD DO SO WITH A "FAIR AMOUNT OF SPECIFICITY." SHE SAID THAT SINN FEIN HAD TO FOCUS LESS ON THE "WHEN" OF DECOMMISSIONING (IN OTHER WORDS, STOP BEING PREOCCUPIED WITH BRITISH DEMANDS FOR THE PROCESS TO START BEFORE ALL-PARTY TALKS) AND LOOK MORE CLOSELY AT THE "HOW." IN ORDER FOR THE COMMISSION TO WORK, SODERBERG SAID THERE HAD TO BE A "SERIOUS DISCUSSION." SINN FEIN, SHE SAID, IS "NOT THERE YET."

SUGGESTIONS FOR PRESIDENT'S TRIP

A major or policy address
14. DONLON SAID IT WOULD BE "VERY HELPFUL" IF THE PRESIDENT MADE A "SERIOUS POLICY STATEMENT" WHILE HE IS IN THE REPUBLIC. SODERBERG SAID ~~THIS~~ WAS PROBABLY UNLIKELY AS HE WAS ALREADY SCHEDULED TO DELIVER MAJOR ADDRESSES IN LONDON (ON EUROPEAN SECURITY) AND BELFAST (ON PEACE/INVESTMENT). IT WOULD BE ~~"TOO~~ *difficult* ~~"HARD"~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT TO GIVE THREE MAJOR SPEECHES IN THREE CONSECUTIVE DAYS. DONLON ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT, IN HIS SPEECH AT WESTMINSTER, TALK ABOUT IRELAND AND THE PEACE PROCESS. HE ARGUED THAT THIS WOULD HIGHLIGHT AN ISSUE WHICH IS VERY MARGINALIZED IN BRITISH POLITICS AND SOCIETY. FINALLY, DONLON PROPOSED THAT THE PRESIDENT STOP AT SOME AMERICAN INVESTMENT SITE WHILE HE IS IN THE COUNTRY. DONLON SAID THAT A SIMPLE 10-MINUTE DROP-BY WOULD GENERATE GOOD PUBLICITY FOR IRELAND AND COULD ENCOURAGE FURTHER INWARD INVESTMENT FROM THE U.S.

SUBJECT: SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRAT LEADER MARY HARNEY

1. SUMMARY. ON OCTOBER 6, DEPUTY NSC ADVISOR NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRAT LEADER MARY HARNEY ON THE MARGINS OF THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION AT DUBLIN CASTLE. THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING TRIP TO IRELAND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. ACCOMPANYING SODERBERG WERE AMBASSADOR SMITH AND EMBASSY POLOFF. HARNEY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DES O'MALLEY, THE PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATIC SPOKESMAN ON NORTHERN IRELAND. END SUMMARY.

ISSUES FOR PRESIDENT'S VISIT

2. AFTER BRIEFLY DISCUSSING EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THE PRESIDENT'S IRISH LINEAGE, SODERBERG ASKED HARNEY AND O'MALLEY WHAT THEMES WOULD RESONATE HERE IN THE REPUBLIC DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. HARNEY MENTIONED THE ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY UNEMPLOYMENT. O'MALLEY STRESSED THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION AS WELL, NOTING THAT IRELAND TAKES OVER THE EU PRESIDENCY DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1996, WHEN THE EU IS EXPECTED TO BE DEEP INTO ITS MAASTRICHT REVIEW CONFERENCE. AS THE EU STRENGTHENS ITS COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, IRELAND WILL COME UNDER PRESSURE TO MOVE AWAY FROM ITS STRICT ADHERENCE TO NEUTRALITY, WHICH COULD PROVE QUITE CONTROVERSIAL.

PRAISE FOR U.S. ROLE

3. O'MALLEY PRAISED THE PRESIDENT FOR TAKING SUCH AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. HE SAID IT HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS ACHIEVED THUS FAR.

TRIMBLE

4. BOTH HARNEY AND O'MALLEY WERE VERY COMPLIMENTARY OF NEW UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE. HARNEY SAID HE WAS A CHARISMATIC LEADER WHO COULD CARRY UNIONISTS, AND WAS SOMEBODY WITH WHOM OUTSIDERS COULD DO BUSINESS. O'MALLEY THOUGHT IT WAS VERY POSITIVE THAT TRIMBLE WAS WILLING TO ENGAGE PARTIES FROM THE SOUTH IN DIALOGUE. THAT WAS A BIG CHANGE FROM HIS PREDECESSOR, WHO HAD BEEN A "POLITICAL HERMIT." IT WAS ALSO GOOD THAT TRIMBLE WAS GOING TO THE U.S., WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN VIEWED AS A "NATIONALIST ALLY." THIS WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. TO DISPEL NOTIONS THAT IT IS A PART OF THE "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT."

ALL-PARTY TALKS COULD TAKE YEARS

5. HARNEY SAID THAT EVEN IF ALL-PARTY TALKS CAN BE STARTED SOON, A LASTING PEACE AGREEMENT IS PROBABLY YEARS AWAY. IT WOULD BE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

VERY DIFFICULT TO "SQUARE THE CIRCLE," GIVEN THAT NATIONALIST AND UNIONIST VIEWPOINTS AND ASPIRATIONS WERE SO DIFFERENT. SHE THOUGHT IT COULD TAKE 3 TO 5 YEARS TO COMPLETE TALKS.

ELECTED ASSEMBLY PROPOSAL

6. O'MALLEY SAID HE HAD MIXED VIEWS ON TRIMBLE'S PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY. ON ONE HAND, IT WAS COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDABLE WHY PEOPLE WANTED TO HAVE AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY. BUT WITHOUT EXECUTIVE POWERS, THE PROPOSED 85-MEMBER ASSEMBLY WAS UNLIKELY TO AMOUNT TO VERY MUCH. EACH REPRESENTATIVE WOULD, OF COURSE, WANT TO HAVE HIS OR HER SAY ON ANY PARTICULAR ISSUE, MAKING THE BODY EXTREMELY UNWIELDY AS A NEGOTIATING FORUM. O'MALLEY SAID THE IDEA OF THE ASSEMBLY WAS TO GIVE PEOPLE ELECTORAL "MANDATES," BUT THIS WOULD PROBABLY PROVE TO BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, THE CANDIDATES FROM EACH TRADITION WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE FORCED INTO ADOPTING EXTREME POSITIONS IN ORDER TO WIN VOTES. THAT WOULD NOT AUGUR WELL FOR A COOPERATIVE, POST-ELECTION ATMOSPHERE. HARNEY SAID THAT NO MATTER HOW IT WAS "DRESSED UP," THE ASSEMBLY WOULD BE SEEN AS "OLD STORMONT."

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 10

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC PETERS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 101602Z OCT 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4658

INFO RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 7488

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3488

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 013957

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/10/2000

TAGS: PREL OVIP UK EI

SUBJECT: DNSA AND AMBASSADOR LUNCH WITH THE ULSTER
UNIONIST PARTY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F(3.04)
KBH 4/11/2023

REF: LONDON 13642

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: VISITING DNSA NANCY SODERBERG AND AMBASSADOR CROWE LUNCHEDED OCTOBER 4 IN BELFAST WITH DAVID TRIMBLE AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY. THE UNIONISTS DISCUSSED THEIR VIEWS ON THE PEACE PROCESS, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE THEY CONTINUE TO PLACE ON THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONDITION -- WHICH THEY REFERRED TO AS WASHINGTON 3 -- REQUIRING SOME ACTUAL DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS BEFORE SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN INTER-PARTY TALKS. TRIMBLE EXPLAINED THE UUP'S PROPOSAL THAT A NEW NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY BE THE SECOND TRACK IN A "TWIN-TRACK" APPROACH TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE UUP ALSO EXPRESSED ITS CONCERN THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT BE BALANCED BETWEEN LOCATIONS AND EVENTS OF A NATIONALIST AND UNIONIST CHARACTER. END SUMMARY.

3. ON OCTOBER 4, BELFAST CONSUL GENERAL HOSTED LUNCH AT HER HOME FOR VISITING DSNA NANCY SODERBERG AND AMBASSADOR CROWE WITH OFFICIALS OF THE ULSTER UNIONIST ARTY. REPRESENTING THE UUP WERE RECENTLY ELECTED PARTY LEADER AND UPPER BANN MP DAVID TRIMBLE, FERMANAGH AND SOUTH TYRONE MP KEN MAGINNIS, UNIONIST COUNCIL PRESIDENT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 10

JOSIAS CUNNINGHAM, PARTY SECRETARY JIM WILSON, AND HONORARY SECRETARY JEFFREY DONALDSON. BELFAST VICE CONSUL ATTENDED AS NOTETAKER.

THE PEACE PROCESS -- DECOMMISSIONING AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

4. MAGINNIS RAISED THE QUESTION OF DECOMMISSIONING, ASKING SODERBERG WHETHER HER DISCUSSIONS WITH ADAMS INDICATED ANY FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION, AND PARTICULARLY ON THE "WASHINGTON 3" CONDITION THAT THERE BE SOME ACTUAL DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS. SODERBERG EXPLAINED THAT THE USG BELIEVES THAT THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH HAS POTENTIAL IN THAT IT WOULD PERMIT FORWARD MOVEMENT WHILE STILL RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF DECOMMISSIONING. WHILE THE PARTIES STILL SEEM QUITE FAR APART, SINN FEIN IS BEGINNING TO SHOW A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE DECOMMISSIONING QUESTION, PROVIDED THERE IS RECOGNITION THAT NO GESTURE ON DECOMMISSIONING WILL BE FORTHCOMING IN ADVANCE OF FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

5. TRIMBLE RESPONDED THAT THIS RESERVATION ON SINN FEIN'S PART -- ITS REFUSAL TO ADDRESS OR PERMIT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO ADDRESS WASHINGTON 3 -- REMAINED UNACCEPTABLE TO UNIONISTS. TO UNIONISTS, THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH REPRESENTED AN UNACCEPTABLE "FUDGE" ON WASHINGTON 3. IT MUST CONTINUE TO BE MADE CLEAR, TRIMBLE MAINTAINED, THAT WASHINGTON 3 WAS STILL OUT THERE AND MUST BE ADDRESSED BEFORE SINN FEIN COULD PARTICIPATE IN "INTERPARTY TALKS."

6. (COMMENT. IN A WHISPERED ASIDE, CUNNINGHAM POINTED OUT TO CONSUL GENERAL THAT TRIMBLE USED THE TERM "INTERPARTY TALKS" IN CONTRAST TO THE TERM "ALL-PARTY TALKS" WHICH SODERBERG HAS USED. AS THE CONVERSATION CONTINUED, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT TRIMBLE WAS MAKING THIS DISTINCTION WITH GREAT CARE. ALL-PARTY TALKS IS GENERALLY TAKEN TO MEAN TALKS IN WHICH ALL NORTHERN IRELAND PARTIES, INCLUDING SINN FEIN, WOULD SIT AROUND A TABLE AND NEGOTIATE TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IN SAYING THAT SINN FEIN MUST ADDRESS WASHINGTON 3 BEFORE PARTICIPATING IN "INTER-PARTY TALKS," TRIMBLE INTENDED A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH'S PROPOSAL THAT SINN FEIN ENGAGE IN "EXPLORATORY" BILATERAL OR TRILATERAL TALKS IN PARALLEL WITH SUBSTANTIVE TALKS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 10

TAKING PLACE SEPARATELY WITH EACH OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARTIES. TRIMBLE REJECTED SUCH A PROPOSAL. END COMMENT.)

7. TRIMBLE ASSERTED THAT PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION EXPLICITLY SET OUT PRECONDITIONS TO TALKS. PARAGRAPH 10 STATED THAT ONLY PARTIES WHICH HAD ESTABLISHED A COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS TO BE ORGANIZED TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. TRIMBLE SAID THAT HE KNEW OF NO BETTER WAY FOR SINN FEIN TO ESTABLISH ITS COMMITMENT THAN THROUGH THE DECOMMISSIONING OF IRA ARMS. ADDITIONALLY, SINN FEIN HAD BEEN TOLD FROM THE BEGINNING THAT IT MUST ADDRESS THE "PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES" OF THE CESSATION OF VIOLENCE, AN UNAMBIGUOUS REFERENCE TO DECOMMISSIONING.
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 LONDON 013957

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/10/2000

TAGS: PREL OVIP UK EI

SUBJECT: DNSA AND AMBASSADOR LUNCH WITH THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY

8. WITH REGARD TO ESTABLISHING SINN FEIN'S COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS, TRIMBLE SAID THAT THE WASHINGTON 3 CONDITION WAS A NECESSARY MINIMUM CONDITION, BUT MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT BE A SUFFICIENT ONE. OTHER STEPS THAT MIGHT NEED TO TAKE PLACE TO ESTABLISH THAT COMMITMENT WERE FOR SINN FEIN TO ACCEPT THE CONSENT PRINCIPLE OF THE DECLARATION AND TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS (I.E. THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN TRIMBLE'S PROPOSED ASSEMBLY). ALTHOUGH ELIMINATION OF THE PUNISHMENT BEATINGS OR A DECLARATION OF NO FIRST STRIKE WOULD BOTH BE WELCOMED STEPS, PARTICULARLY A NO FIRST STRIKE ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE THAT MUCH TO ESTABLISHING SINN FEIN'S BASIC COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL MEANS.

9. MAGINNIS POINTED OUT THAT NORTHERN IRELAND HAD EXPERIENCED REPEATED IRA CEASE-FIRES, NONE OF WHICH REPRESENTED A FUNDAMENTAL RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE. THE UUP AND THE OTHER POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE "97 PERCENT" OF NORTHERN IRELAND PEOPLE WHO WERE PEACEFUL AND LAW-ABIDING, HAD AN OBLIGATION TO GUARANTEE THE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 10

SAFETY OF THOSE PEOPLE AND THE PERMANENCE OF THE PEACE. DECOMMISSIONING WAS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THAT. TRIMBLE ECHOED MAGINNIS' SENTIMENTS AND EXPLAINED THAT HE REJECTED THE COMMON ARGUMENT THAT DECOMMISSIONING HAD NO SIGNIFICANCE FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT A LARGE PORTION OF IRA ATTACKS INVOLVED IMPROVISED OR READILY OBTAINED WEAPONRY, TRIMBLE POINTED TO THE SEMTEX EXPLOSIVES AND DETONATORS -- USED IN THE MOST DEVASTATING IRA BOMBINGS, THE "SPECTACULARS" -- AS ITEMS THE IRA COULD NOT READILY REPLACE. FURTHERMORE, SECURITY SERVICES HAD A VERY GOOD IDEA HOW MUCH SEMTEX AND DETONATORS THE IRA HAD, AND WITHOUT THIS ORDINANCE, THE IRA COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY LAUNCH A LARGE SCALE BOMBING CAMPAIGN. APART FROM REASSURING UNIONISTS, MOST IMPORTANTLY SUCH A STEP WOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO REPUBLICAN AND IRA RANK-AND-FILE THAT THE IRA WAS SERIOUS AND INTENDED THE WAR TO BE OVER.

10. MAGINNIS REMINDED US THAT HE WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED THE CONCEPT OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO ADDRESS THE DECOMMISSIONING OF PARAMILITARY WEAPONS. HE HAD CONCEIVED OF THE COMMISSION AS A BODY TO WHICH THE IRA COULD HAND OVER ITS GUNS, SO AS NOT TO REQUIRE THE IRA TO "SURRENDER" THEIR ARMS TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. HE HAD ENVISIONED THE COMMISSION AS BEING COMPRISED OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS AND BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENT OBSERVERS. TRIMBLE ECHOED MAGINNIS' CONCERN THAT CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR SUCH A COMMISSION DEVIATED FROM THIS CONCEPTION OF ITS ROLE AND FUNCTION. TRIMBLE INSISTED THAT THE COMMISSION'S REMIT MUST INCLUDE WASHINGTON 3 AND THAT THE COMMISSION MUST HAVE A ROLE IN OBSERVING HANDOVERS OF ARMS. MAGINNIS SAID THE COMMISSION MUST ESTABLISH: 1) THE COMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSION, 2) THE QUANTITIES OF ARMS TO BE HANDED OVER, 3) MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING, AND STEMMING FROM THE FIRST THREE, 4) THE SCHEDULE FOR DECOMMISSIONING.

TWIN TRACK APPROACHES -- WHY YES TO AN ASSEMBLY BUT NO TO TALKS

11. TRIMBLE CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THE PROPOSED TWIN TRACK APPROACH BY WHICH, IN TRACK 1, SINN FEIN AND THE OTHER PARTIES WOULD PARTICIPATE IN TALKS WITH HMG IN PREPARATION FOR EVENTUAL ALL-PARTY TALKS. IMULTANEOUSLY, IN TRACK 2, AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WOULD ADDRESS DECOMMISSIONING. TRIMBLE SAID THAT SINN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 10

FEIN WOULD CONTINUE TO DRAG THE DECOMMISSIONING TRACK TO A SNAILS PACE, WHILE INSISTING THAT THE POLITICAL TRACK MOVE AHEAD AT BREAKNECK SPEED. SODERBERG ASKED, GIVEN THAT ALL PARTY TALKS WOULD REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE DISCUSSION ON THE NATURE OF AND AGENDA FOR SUCH TALKS, WHY NOT PERMIT SINN FEIN TO ENGAGE IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS, EVEN IN ADVANCE OF SINN FEIN'S HAVING ESTABLISHED ITS QUALIFICATIONS FOR ALL PARTY TALKS. IN REPLY, JEFFREY DONALDSON POINTED OUT THAT SINN FEIN HAD BEEN IN EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR ALMOST A YEAR AND ASKED, RHETORICALLY, HOW THE "EXPLORATORY" TALKS ENVISIONED IN THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH WERE DIFFERENT FROM THESE TALKS. TRIMBLE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE WHOLE INTENTION OF THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH WAS THAT SUCH TALKS WITH SINN FEIN WOULD BE ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH OTHER PARTIES AND WOULD CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT SINN FEIN WAS ALREADY IN INTERPARTY TALKS. MAGINNIS FOLLOWED ON, SAYING THAT, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCESS, SINN FEIN HAD CONTINUALLY BEEN MOVING

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 LONDON 013957

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/10/2000

TAGS: PREL OVIP UK EI

SUBJECT: DNSA AND AMBASSADOR LUNCH WITH THE ULSTER
UNIONIST PARTY

THE GOAL POSTS WITHOUT MOVING ANY CLOSER TO RENOUNCING VIOLENCE. WHILE STILL THREATENING TO RETURN TO VIOLENCE, SINN FEIN NOW USED EVERY PRIOR STEP AS EVIDENCE THAT OTHER PARTIES ALREADY RECOGNIZED ITS MANDATE AND ITS COMMITMENT TO PEACE.

12. TRIMBLE SAID THAT THE UUP HAD NO FURTHER ROOM TO MANEUVER ON DECOMMISSIONING. THE PARTY HAD ALREADY BEEN VERY PATIENT AND TOLERANT OF HMG, AND ALSO THE USG, ON THE ISSUE AND HAD BORNE A GREAT DEAL OF CRITICISM FROM ITS CONSTITUENTS AND RIVALS AS A RESULT. NOW, HOWEVER, THE PARTY COULD NOT GIVE ANY FURTHER GROUND ON THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE. NOR COULD IT PRETEND THAT THERE IS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ALL PARTY TALKS AND SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN "PARALLEL TALKS". MAGINNIS ALSO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE TWIN TRACK APPROACH DRAGGED UNIONISTS BLINDLY FORWARD ON THE POLITICAL TRACK WITH NO CLEAR WAY FORWARD ON THE DECOMMISSIONING TRACK.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 10

13. THE UUP'S COUNTERPROPOSAL ON THE POLITICAL TRACK WAS A LOCAL ASSEMBLY. TRIMBLE EXPLAINED THAT HIS PROPOSAL ENVISIONED AN ASSEMBLY WITH ACTUAL, THOUGH PROBABLY LIMITED, LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. HE EXPLAINED THAT SUCH AN ASSEMBLY COULD BE ESTABLISHED UNDER EXISTING LEGISLATION AND COULD BE IN PLACE AS QUICKLY AS A MONTH, ALTHOUGH CUNNINGHAM POINTED OUT THAT ALL OF THE LOCAL POLITICAL PARTIES WOULD PREFER MUCH MORE TIME IN WHICH TO SELECT CANDIDATES AND MOUNT CAMPAIGNS. TRIMBLE INSISTED THAT HE DID NOT VIEW THE ASSEMBLY PROPOSAL AS A FINAL STEP OR AS AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT BUT AS AN INTERMEDIATE STEP ALONG THE WAY TO AN EVENTUAL OVERALL SETTLEMENT.

14. AN ASSEMBLY WOULD PERMIT DEBATE WHICH, TRIMBLE ARGUED, IS IMPORTANT TO POLITICAL PROGRESS EVEN IF IT IS DIFFERENT FROM NEGOTIATION. MOREOVER, SUCH AN ASSEMBLY WOULD PERMIT SINN FEIN TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. TRIMBLE PREFERRED AN ASSEMBLY WITH REAL LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO A CONVENTION OR OTHER MERE DEBATING SOCIETY. AN ASSEMBLY WOULD BOTH ENABLE AND INSPIRE NORTHERN IRELAND'S POLITICAL PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN POSITIVE AND EFFECTIVE WAYS, WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EXEMPLARY FUNCTION OF DEMONSTRATING THAT THE TWO COMMUNITIES CAN WORK TOGETHER AND GOVERN THEMSELVES.

15. MOREOVER, AN ASSEMBLY WOULD MAKE FOR "REAL DEMOCRATIC MATHEMATICS." THIS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF FORCING SINN FEIN TO FACE UP TO ITS OWN, QUITE LIMITED, DEMOCRATIC MANDATE, AND TO CLIMB DOWN FROM THE INFLATED LIMITED, DEMOCRATIC MANDATE ITS RHETORIC CLAIMED AND ITS GUNS ENFORCED. MAGINNIS BELIEVED THAT AN ASSEMBLY WOULD DRAW SINN FEIN INTO ORDINARY, MUNDANE, PEACEFUL POLITICS AND SEND A MESSAGE TO THE REPUBLICAN RANK AND FILE THAT THE MOVEMENT HAD ENTERED A NEW DEMOCRATIC PHASE OF POLITICS AND WAS NOT SIMPLY ENGAGED IN A BRIEF HIATUS FROM VIOLENCE.

16. TRIMBLE REMARKED THAT HE HAD FOUND IT QUITE INTERESTING THAT SINN FEIN HAD REACTED IN A MUCH MORE OPEN-MINDED WAY TO HIS ASSEMBLY PROPOSAL THAN HAD THE SDLP. TRIMBLE SAID THAT JOHN HUME, THROUGH "HIS MOUNTPIECE MARK DURKAN," HAD REACTED IN A "KNEE-JERK" FASHION AND REJECTED THE SUGGESTION. SINN FEIN, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN VERY RESTRAINED IN ITS RESPONSE AND MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN HAD CALLED IT A PROPOSAL WORTHY OF FURTHER STUDY. TRIMBLE BELIEVED THAT HUME WOULD NOT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 10

ACCEPT ANYTHING IN NORTHERN IRELAND UNTIL THE PROVINCES FIRST BECAME A CONSTITUTIONAL "HALFWAY HOUSE" BETWEEN THE UK AND THE IRISH REPUBLIC.

THE UUP'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON AND THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO NORTHERN IRELAND

17. TRIMBLE PLANS TO VISIT THE U.S. AT THE END OF OCTOBER. HE AND HIS DELEGATION WILL ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 29, SPEND OCTOBER 30-NOVEMBER 1 ON MEETINGS IN THE CAPITAL AND NOVEMBER 2 ON MEETINGS IN NEW YORK CITY. TRIMBLE PUSHED STRONGLY TO MEET THE PRESIDENT ALTHOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD THE SCHEDULING DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED. THE OFFICIALS EXPRESSED THEIR HOPES THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO GENERATE SIGNIFICANT MEDIA ATTENTION DURING THEIR U.S. VISIT AND TO EXPLAIN UNIONIST POSITIONS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH TRIMBLE WILL CEREMONIALLY OPEN THE PARTY'S U.S. OFFICE DURING HIS STOP IN WASHINGTON, IT IS ALREADY UP AND RUNNING. TRIMBLE AND THE OTHERS ALL EXPRESSED THEIR GRATIFICATION THAT THE PARTY WAS FINALLY ENGAGING U.S. PUBLIC OPINION AND ASSERTING ITS POSITIONS AGAINST SINN

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 LONDON 013957

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/10/2000

TAGS: PREL OVIP UK EI

SUBJECT: DNSA AND AMBASSADOR LUNCH WITH THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY

FEIN'S U.S. OPERATION.

18. SODERBERG TOLD TRIMBLE THAT THE USG WAS DETERMINED TO STRIKE A BALANCE DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND AND WOULD WELCOME ANY SUGGESTIONS OR VIEWS HE OR HIS PARTY MIGHT HAVE ON HOW TO ACCOMPLISH THAT, TRIMBLE ADVISED THAT ANY TIME SPENT IN LONDONDERRY WOULD BE VIEWED AS A "NATIONALIST JAMBOREE", WHATEVER "TOKEN PROTESTANTS THE LONDONDERRY CITY COUNCIL MIGHT WAVE AROUND". HE ADDED THAT LONDONDERRY COULD NOT BE BALANCED BY VISITS TO STORMONT OR WITH THE NIO, THE PRESIDENT HAD TO VISIT WITH UNIONISTS AND NEEDED TO GET OUTSIDE OF BELFAST TO VISIT PROTESTANT TOWNS. SODERBERG SUGGESTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED THROUGH A VISIT TO

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 08 OF 10

CARRICKFERGUS WHICH WOULD EMPHASIZE THE ULSTER-SCOTS LINK AND THE WARTIME COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE U.S. THROUGH THE ANDREW JACKSON HOMESTEAD AND THE U.S. RANGERS CENTER. WHILE EXPRESSING SOME ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS PROPOSAL, TRIMBLE NOTED THAT CARRICKFERGUS HAD AN ALLIANCE MAYOR AND SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD VISIT A DISTRICT WITH A UUP MAYOR.

19. MAGINNIS SAID THAT ONE ESPECIALLY BAD IDEA FLOATING AROUND WAS THE SUGGESTION THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD VISIT ROSSLEA (IN MAGINNIS' PARLIAMENTARY DISTRICT). AGINNIS AND TRIMBLE BOTH EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE GENEALOGICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE TOWN WAS WHOLLY SPURIOUS AND THAT A VISIT THERE WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS "CLOWNING UP" THE VISIT. (MAGINNIS SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED CONGEN OCTOBER 9 TO SAT THAT, AS A RESULT OF SUMMERTIME MARCHING DISPUTES, LOCAL PROTESTANTS WERE BOYCOTTING ROSSLEA SHOPS.)

20. THE UUP OFFICIALS WERE ALSO CHARY OF THE NOTION THAT THE PRESIDENT WALK ALONG THE WEST BELFAST PEACE LINE, CALLING IT "GHOULISH" AND AS PROJECTING A NEGATIVE IMAGE AND EMPHASIZING DIVISION. THEY SUGGESTED A WALKABOUT TAKE PLACE IN THE ROYAL AVENUE - DONEGAL PLACE SHOPPING DISTRICT IN BELFAST CITY CENTER. AS A PLACE WHICH WOULD SYMBOLIZE THE COMMERCIAL VIBRANCY OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND BE A PLACE WHERE THE COMMUNITIES CAME TOGETHER RATHER THAN ONE WHERE THEY HAD TO BE KEPT APART.

21. IN THE UUP'S OPINION, MACKIES WOULD BE A PROBLEMATIC VENUE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MAIN SPEECH. THEY BELIEVED THAT THE COMPANY WAS THOUGHT OF AS BEING IN A NATIONALIST AREA AND AS HAVING DIFFICULT ACCESS FOR PROTESTANT WORKERS. (NOTE. IN A LUNCH OCTOBER 5 (SEPTTEL), WEST BELFAST COMMUNITY WORKERS TOLD DNSA THAT NATIONALISTS AND UNIONISTS IN WEST BELFAST EACH SAW MACKIES AS BEING AN ENCLAVE OF THE OTHER COMMUNITY BUT THAT NATIONALIST SENSITIVITIES ON THE SUBJECT WERE PROBABLY GREATER THAN UNIONIST. END NOTE.) THEY SUGGESTED THE ULSTER HALL OR KING'S HALL AS ALTERNATIVE VENUES, WHILE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE ULSTER HALL WAS ASSOCIATED WITH MANY IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF UNIONISM AND MIGHT BE OBJECTIONABLE TO NATIONALISTS.

22. TRIMBLE SAID THAT IT WAS PREFERABLE IF THE PRESIDENT CAME TO BELFAST BEFORE LONDONDERRY, BUT THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAT HE SPEND AT LEAST AS MUCH

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 09 OF 10

TIME IN BELFAST AND PARTICIPATE IN EVENTS OF AT LEAST AS MUCH SUBSTANCE AND IMPORTANCE. HE RECOGNIZED THAT LOGISTICS AND TIMING MIGHT MAKE IT DESIRABLE TO GO TO LONDONDERRY FIRST BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT MAKE A FIRST STOP AT LANGFORD LODGE NEAR THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BEFORE HEADING OFF FOR LONDONDERRY. LANGFORD LODGE IS THE SITE OF A WORLD WAR II AIRBASE USED EXTENSIVELY BY U.S. FORCES. IT NOW HOUSES A SMALL WARTIME HERITAGE CENTER.

23. COMMENT. TRIMBLE'S PUBLIC POSITION ON THE "TWIN-TRACK" IS SLIGHTLY MORE FLEXIBLE THAN THE ONE HE STAKED OUT FOR US PRIVATELY IN THE LUNCH. TRIMBLE GAVE A PRESS INTERVIEW OCTOBER 6 IN WHICH HE SAID HE KEPT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF SINN FEIN PROVING ITS COMMITMENT TO PEACE WITHOUT WEAPONS BEING DECOMMISSIONED, BUT ADDED HE DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS POSSIBLE. TRIMBLE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION "UNDERSTOOD" THE UUP'S POSITION, LEAVING IT TO HIS DEPUTY, JOHN TAYLOR, TO ISSUE A WARNING TO THE U.S.: IN AN OCTOBER 7 SPEECH, TAYLOR SAID THAT THE UUP WOULD NOT BE "FORCED" INTO TALKS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT IN ORDER TO GIVE THE PRESIDENT A "PROPAGANDA COUP." WHILE GERRY ADAMS' "NO VIOLENCE PLEDGE" OF OCTOBER 9 MAY GO SOME WAY IN REASSURING THE BROADER COMMUNITY HERE, THE UUP, WHILE WELCOMING THE FORMATION OF A DECOMMISSIONING PANEL, WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT FOR MORE BEFORE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 LONDON 013957

NSC FOR SODERBERG/PETERS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/10/2000

TAGS: PREL OVIP UK EI

SUBJECT: DNSA AND AMBASSADOR LUNCH WITH THE ULSTER
UNIONIST PARTYAGREEING TO TALK ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH SINN FEIN. END
COMMENT.24. DNSA SODERBERG DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR
THIS CABLE.

CROWE

BT

#3957

IMMEDIATE

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 10 OF 10

NNNN
<MSGID> M1894268

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

NSI - Do you mean to cut State out of distrib. R

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: LAKE

SIT: LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 071539Z OCT 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 004983

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(3.05)
KBH 7/11/2023

FOR LAKE AND PETERS ONLY FROM SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: NANCY SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH PD LEADER MARY HARNEY

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH IRISH OFFICIALS IN DUBLIN OCTOBER 5-7. THE FOLLOWING IS A MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF HER MEETING WITH PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADER MARY HARNEY.

3. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: OCTOBER 6, 1995 TIME: 12:45-1 P.M.

LOCATION: ON THE MARGINS OF THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION AT DUBLIN CASTLE

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

NANCY SODERBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
JEAN KENNEDY SMITH, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND
WILLIAM MOELLER, POLITICAL OFFICER, AMERICAN EMBASSY DUBLIN (NOTETAKER)
IRELAND

MARY HARNEY, LEADER, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS
DES O'MALLEY, NORTHERN IRELAND SPOKESMAN, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

ISSUES FOR PRESIDENT'S VISIT

AFTER BRIEFLY DISCUSSING EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THE PRESIDENT'S IRISH LINEAGE, SODERBERG ASKED HARNEY AND O'MALLEY WHAT THEMES WOULD RESONATE HERE IN THE REPUBLIC DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. HARNEY MENTIONED THE ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY UNEMPLOYMENT. O'MALLEY STRESSED THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION AS WELL, NOTING THAT IRELAND TAKES OVER THE EU PRESIDENCY DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1996, WHEN THE EU IS EXPECTED TO BE DEEP INTO ITS MAASTRICHT REVIEW CONFERENCE. AS THE EU STRENGTHENS ITS COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, IRELAND WILL COME UNDER PRESSURE TO MOVE AWAY FROM ITS STRICT ADHERENCE TO NEUTRALITY, WHICH COULD PROVE QUITE CONTROVERSIAL.

PRAISE FOR U.S. ROLE

O'MALLEY PRAISED THE PRESIDENT FOR TAKING SUCH AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. HE SAID IT HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS ACHIEVED THUS FAR.

TRIMBLE

BOTH HARNEY AND O'MALLEY WERE VERY COMPLIMENTARY OF NEW UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE. HARNEY SAID HE WAS A CHARISMATIC LEADER WHO COULD CARRY UNIONISTS, AND WAS SOMEBODY WITH WHOM OUTSIDERS COULD DO BUSINESS. O'MALLEY THOUGHT IT WAS VERY POSITIVE THAT TRIMBLE WAS WILLING TO ENGAGE PARTIES FROM THE SOUTH IN DIALOGUE. THAT WAS A BIG CHANGE FROM HIS PREDECESSOR, WHO HAD BEEN A "POLITICAL HERMIT." IT WAS ALSO GOOD THAT TRIMBLE WAS GOING TO THE U.S., WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN VIEWED AS A "NATIONALIST ALLY." THIS WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. TO DISPEL NOTIONS THAT IT IS A PART OF THE "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT."

ALL-PARTY TALKS COULD TAKE YEARS

HARNEY SAID THAT EVEN IF ALL-PARTY TALKS CAN BE STARTED SOON, A LASTING PEACE AGREEMENT IS PROBABLY YEARS AWAY. IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO "SQUARE THE CIRCLE," GIVEN THAT NATIONALIST AND UNIONIST VIEWPOINTS AND ASPIRATIONS WERE SO DIFFERENT. SHE THOUGHT IT COULD TAKE 3 TO 5 YEARS TO

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

COMPLETE TALKS.

ELECTED ASSEMBLY PROPOSAL

O'MALLEY SAID HE HAD MIXED VIEWS ON TRIMBLE'S PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY. ON ONE HAND, IT WAS COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDABLE WHY PEOPLE WANTED TO HAVE AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY. BUT WITHOUT EXECUTIVE POWERS, THE PROPOSED 85-MEMBER ASSEMBLY WAS UNLIKELY TO AMOUNT TO VERY MUCH. EACH REPRESENTATIVE WOULD, OF COURSE, WANT TO HAVE HIS OR HER SAY ON ANY PARTICULAR ISSUE, MAKING THE BODY EXTREMELY UNWIELDY AS A NEGOTIATING FORUM. O'MALLEY SAID THE IDEA OF THE ASSEMBLY WAS TO GIVE PEOPLE ELECTORAL "MANDATES," BUT THIS WOULD PROBABLY PROVE TO BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, THE CANDIDATES FROM EACH TRADITION
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 004983

FOR LAKE AND PETERS ONLY FROM SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: NANCY SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH PD LEADER MARY HARNEY

WOULD

ALMOST CERTAINLY BE FORCED INTO ADOPTING EXTREME POSITIONS IN ORDER TO WIN VOTES. THAT WOULD NOT AUGUR WELL FOR A COOPERATIVE, POST-ELECTION ATMOSPHERE. HARNEY SAID THAT NO MATTER HOW IT WAS "DRESSED UP," THE ASSEMBLY WOULD BE SEEN AS "OLD STORMONT."

4. SODERBERG DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THIS MESSAGE BEFORE DEPARTING DUBLIN. SMITH

BT

#4983

NNNN

<MSGID> M1892399

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA RICE SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 031652Z OCT 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4434
INFO RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3289
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY 3113
RUEHOSB/USLO ABUJA PRIORITY 0097
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 8429
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 013685

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.06)
KBH 4/11/2023

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W - JOYCE LEADER
PARIS FOR ROGER MORAN - PASS TO AF/DAS BUSHNELL
NSC FOR SUSAN RICE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL NI UK

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH SENIOR FCO OFFICIAL ON
REACTION TO ABACHA'S OCTOBER 1 STATEMENT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. ON OCTOBER 3 VISITING NSC STAFF DIRECTOR NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH FCO ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY FOR AFRICA ANTHONY GOODENOUGH AND EQUATORIAL AFRICA DEPARTMENT HEAD DAVID MACLENNAN FOR AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF OFFICIAL REACTIONS TO ABACHA'S OCTOBER 1 SPEECH. EMBASSY POLOFF ACCOMPANIED AS NOTETAKER.

3. PREFACING HIS REMARKS WITH A CAVEAT THAT MINISTERIAL INPUT WOULD BE NEEDED TO FINALIZE HMG'S REACTION BEFORE THE QUADRILATERAL MEETING (UK, US, FRANCE, AND GERMANY) TO BE HELD OCTOBER 4 IN LONDON, GOODENOUGH SAID THE FCO SAW GOOD AND BAD ELEMENTS IN ABACHA'S SPEECH. ON THE PLUS SIDE THERE WOULD BE NO EXECUTIONS AND THERE WAS NOW A TIMETABLE FOR A TRANSITION. ON THE DOWN SIDE, THE TRANSITION WAS CLEARLY TOO LONG, CENTRAL AUTHORITY WAS NOT TRANSFERRED UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT, AND THERE WAS SOME BACKSLIDING IN ABACHA'S COMMENTS ON ABIOLA. FOR THE MOMENT, THE FCO WANTED TO STUDY THE TEXT THOROUGHLY, CONSULT WITH ALLIES, AND GAUGE REACTIONS WITHIN NIGERIA AND FROM NIGERIA'S NEIGHBORS.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

4. GOODENOUGH SAID THERE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE A MESSAGE FROM JOHN MAJOR TO ABACHA REACTING TO THE TRANSITION AND DECISION ON THE COUP PLOTTERS (A PHONE CALL OR WRITTEN MESSAGE, WITH GOODENOUGH MAKING CLEAR HE PREFERRED A WRITTEN MESSAGE). HE WOULD BE TRAVELING TO NIGERIA ON OCTOBER 15 AND MIGHT CARRY A PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGE TO DELIVER PERSONALLY TO ABACHA.

5. GOODENOUGH SHARED IN CONFIDENCE THE STATE OF THOUGHT WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH ORGANIZATION ON HOW TO HANDLE NIGERIA AT THE NOVEMBER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN NEW ZEALAND (CHOGM). WHILE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO ENDORSE THE DECISION, IT APPEARED THAT COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL ANYAOKU WOULD ANNOUNCE AN AGREEMENT THAT MEMBERS UNDER MILITARY RULE WOULD HAVE A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS (TILL THE NEXT CHOGM) TO HOLD ELECTIONS. DURING THAT TWO YEAR PERIOD, THOSE STATES WOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING IN ADMINISTRATIVE AND WORKING LEVEL COMMONWEALTH MEETINGS. IF AT THE END OF THE TWO YEAR PERIOD THERE HAD BEEN NO ELECTIONS, MEMBERS UNDER MILITARY RULE WOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM HAVING MINISTERIAL OR POLITICAL LEVEL CONTACTS WITH OTHER COMMONWEALTH STATES. IN RESPONSE TO SODERBERG'S QUESTION, GOODENOUGH SAID IT WOULD BE VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE COMMONWEALTH WOULD AGREE TO OTHER FORMS OF SANCTION AGAINST NIGERIA (VISA, ARMS SALES) BECAUSE OF THE POSITIONS OF AFRICAN MEMBER STATES.

6. SODERBERG ASKED GOODENOUGH WHAT HMG HOPED TO ACHIEVE AT THE QUAD MEETING ON OCTOBER 4. GOODENOUGH SAID HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE AGREEMENT TO KEEP CURRENT MEASURES AGAINST NIGERIA IN PLACE AS A SIGN OF DISPLEASURE OVER THE TIMETABLE, AGREEMENT THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT TAKE ADDITIONAL MEASURES IMMEDIATELY AGAINST ABACHA UNTIL WE HAD A BETTER SENSE OF WHAT WE MIGHT ACHIEVE VIA FURTHER PRESSURE AND DIALOGUE, AND A CONSENSUS THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO CONVINCING ABACHA THROUGH EVERY AVAILABLE CHANNEL THAT HE NEEDED TO SHORTEN THE TRANSITION TIMETABLE.

7. THIS MESSAGE NOT CLEARED BY SODERBERG BEFORE TRANSMISSION.

CROWE

BT

#3685

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

NNNN

<MSGID> M1885017

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*NES -
good work
R*

PAGE 01 OF 06

PRT: LAKE SIT

SIT: LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 071553Z OCT 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 004985

FOR LAKE AND PETERS ONLY FROM SODERBERG

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.07)
KSH 4/11/2023

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: NANCY SODERBERG'S
OCTOBER 7 MEETING WITH SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY
ADAMS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS NANCY SODERBERG MET WITH IRISH OFFICIALS AND
POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS IN DUBLIN OCTOBER 5-7. THE
FOLLOWING IS A MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF HER MEETING
WITH SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS.

3. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: OCTOBER 7, 1995 TIME: 10-12 A.M.

LOCATION: AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, DUBLIN, IRELAND

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

NANCY SODERBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
JEAN KENNEDY SMITH, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND
WILLIAM MOELLER, POLITICAL OFFICER, AMERICAN EMBASSY DUBLIN
(NOTETAKER)
SINN FEIN

GERRY ADAMS, PRESIDENT
RITA O'HARE, PRESS OFFICER

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 06

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: DISCUSSION OF
BRITISH NON-PAPER AND PLANS FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

ADAMS BEGAN BY NOTING THAT THE BRITISH, IN RECENT DAYS,
HAVE SEEMED RELUCTANT TO MEET HIM. ADAMS SPECIFICALLY
CITED A MEETING THAT HE WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE ON OCTOBER 9
WITH NIO MINISTER MICHAEL ANCRAM. ONE MINUTE THE MEETING
WAS ON, ANOTHER MINUTE IT WAS OFF, AND STILL LATER, IT HAD
BEEN CHANGED TO A PHONE CALL. ADAMS SAID THAT EVEN NOW, HE
WASN'T SURE WHAT THE STATUS OF THE MEETING WAS. SODERBERG
SUGGESTED THAT THE CURRENT BRITISH AMBIVALENCE ON MEETINGS
WAS PROBABLY RELATED TO NEXT WEEK'S TORY CONFERENCE. SHE
SAID THAT ANCRAM HAD TOLD HER THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DO
ANYTHING BEFORE THAT CONFERENCE. SODERBERG ASSURED ADAMS,
HOWEVER, THAT THE BRITISH WERE VERY INTERESTED IN TALKING
TO SINN FEIN. ANCRAM, IN FACT, HAD ARGUED TO HER THAT SINN
FEIN -- NOT LONDON -- WAS THE RELUCTANT INTERLOCUTOR.

BRITISH NON-PAPER

ADAMS ASKED IF SODERBERG KNEW THE STATUS OF THE BRITISH
NON-PAPER ON THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. SODERBERG REPLIED
THAT HER UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE NON-PAPER HAD BEEN A
COLLECTIVE EFFORT BY ANCRAM AND ROD LYNE. ITS PURPOSE WAS
TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION AND ESTABLISH THE PARAMETERS OF AN
EVENTUAL JOINT LONDON-DUBLIN COMMUNIQUE ON THE TWIN-TRACK
APPROACH. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS SPECIFICALLY
INTERESTED IN FINDING OUT WHAT SINN FEIN AND THE REPUBLICAN
MOVEMENT "COULD LIVE WITH."

ADAMS WORRIED THAT BECAUSE THIS "ANGEL" PAPER HAD NO
OFFICIAL STATUS, THE UK COULD, DOWN THE ROAD, WALK AWAY
FROM IT AND LEAVE SINN FEIN HANGING. HE CITED CASES WHERE
THIS HAD HAPPENED IN THE PAST. SODERBERG SAID SHE THOUGHT
IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO HAVE THE BRITISH FORMALLY
TABLE THE NON-PAPER. IT WOULD LOCK-IN THE BRITISH POSITION
AND MAKE THEM MORE RELUCTANT TO NEGOTIATE CHANGES TO THE
TEXT. SODERBERG ASSURED ADAMS THAT WITH THE U.S. WATCHING,
THE UK WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SIMPLY WALK AWAY FROM THE NON-
PAPER.

BRITISH CLARIFICATIONS

REFERRING TO THE NON-PAPER, SODERBERG NOTED THAT DURING HER
RECENT MEETING WITH ANCRAM, SHE HAD ASKED HIM TO FLESH OUT
WHAT THE BRITISH MEANT BY THE TERM "PARTICIPATION" IN THE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 06

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. ANCRAM INDICATED THAT THE UK DID NOT EXPECT SINN FEIN TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF WEAPONS OR ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION. BUT SINN FEIN DID HAVE TO BE ABLE TO SPEAK "AUTHORITATIVELY" ON THE DECOMMISSIONING OF IRA ARMS AND TO BE "FAIRLY SPECIFIC" ON THE MODALITIES. ANCRAM SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED AS A GOOD STARTING POINT THE PAPER ON DECOMMISSIONING WHICH HE HAD GIVEN MARTIN MCGUINNESS DURING EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE TALKS IN MARCH. SODERBERG

G SUGGESTED THAT SINN FEIN SIT DOWN WITH ANCRAM AND GO THROUGH THAT PAPER "PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH" TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS.

SODERBERG ALSO SAID SHE HAD TOLD ANCRAM ABOUT SINN FEIN'S OBJECTION TO THE WORD "CONDITIONS" IN THE NON-PAPER, WHICH
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 DUBLIN 004985

FOR LAKE AND PETERS ONLY FROM SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: NANCY SODERBERG'S
 OCTOBER 7 MEETING WITH SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY
 ADAMS

THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT TRANSLATED AS MEANING "PRECONDITIONS." SHE SAID THAT ANCRAM WAS OPEN TO COMING UP WITH A NEW FORM OF WORDS THAT WAS LESS OBJECTIONABLE. SHE SAID THAT A RECENT LETTER FROM MAYHEW TO HUME CONTAINED SOME GOOD LANGUAGE IN THAT REGARD.

ADAMS'S NOTE TO HUME

ASKED TO GIVE HIS VIEWS ON THE NON-PAPER, ADAMS RESPONDED BY PULLING OUT A 1-1/2 PAGE NOTE THAT HE JUST WRITTEN TO JOHN HUME, WHICH PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD PLANNED TO SEND SODERBERG A COPY OF THE NOTE EARLY NEXT WEEK, AFTER HUME HAD HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW AND COMMENT ON IT. HE SAID THE ADVANTAGE OF WORKING THROUGH HUME WAS THAT IT GAVE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT "COVER" FOR ACCEPTING SINN FEIN LANGUAGE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE BRITISH TO SIGN UP TO A JOINT COMMUNIQUE THAT HE HAD WRITTEN.

REDEFINING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 06

ADAMS POINTED OUT, FIRST OF ALL, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION MUST BE SET IN THE CONTEXT OF A "FIRM DATE" FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS. SODERBERG INTERJECTED THAT SINN FEIN WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE SATISFIED WITH A "TARGET DATE" INSTEAD. ADAMS SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS REPLYING "FAIR ENOUGH." ADAMS THEN SHOWED SODERBERG A COPY OF HIS NOTE, WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, PROPOSED TO ELIMINATE ANY EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO "ILLEGAL WEAPONS" IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION.

SODERBERG FLAGGED THIS DEMAND AS A POTENTIAL SHOW-STOPPER. SHE SAID SHE WAS VERY WORRIED THAT "THIS WHOLE THING WILL FALL APART" UNLESS ADAMS IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WOULD DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH ILLEGAL PARAMILITARY WEAPONS. SHE SAID SHE UNDERSTOOD SINN FEIN'S DESIRE TO ADDRESS THE "DEMILITARIZATION" ISSUE, BUT THIS COULD BE COVERED IN ALL-PARTY TALKS.

ADAMS CLAIMS HE HAS NO FLEXIBILITY

ADAMS ARGUED THAT IT HAD BEEN A "MASSIVE ACHIEVEMENT" JUST TO GET THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT ONBOARD WITH THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. HE WAS NOW AT HIS LIMIT. BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING DEADLOCK, THERE WAS A LOT OF DISAFFECTION IN THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT. IF LAST MONTH'S SINN FEIN CONFERENCE HAD BEEN AN IRA CONFERENCE INSTEAD, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A "TOTALLY DIFFERENT OUTCOME." ADAMS CLAIMED THAT THE BASIS OF LAST YEAR'S CEASEFIRE "NO LONGER EXISTS." HE SAID THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT HAD BEEN PROMISED THREE THINGS IN EXCHANGE FOR THE CESSATION OF VIOLENCE: (1) A SPEEDY MOVE TO ALL-PARTY TALKS, (2) EQUALITY OF TREATMENT, AND (3) HELP IN BRINGING THE UNIONISTS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ADAMS SAID NONE OF THOSE PROMISES HAD BEEN KEPT. HE SAID THE ONLY REASON THE CEASEFIRE CONTINUED WAS BECAUSE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT.

DESIRE FOR AMBIGUITY

AS A RESULT, ADAMS SAID HE COULD NOT SIGN UP TO A COMMISSION THAT WAS EXPLICITLY MANDATED TO ADDRESS ONLY ILLEGAL WEAPONS. IN ITS PUBLIC PRESENTATION, THE COMMISSION HAD TO BE BROADER THAN THAT. OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THE COMMISSION'S SCOPE HAD TO BE AMBIGUOUS ENOUGH TO LEAVE IT OPEN TO INTERPRETATION. THE IRA WAS JUST ONE OF SIX ARMED GROUPS IN NORTHERN IRELAND; IT WAS "UNFAIR" TO IGNORE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 06

THE 120,000 PRIVATELY-OWNED WEAPONS, OR THOSE ARMS HELD BY THE RUC AND BRITISH ARMY.

ADAMS SAID HE DID NOT EXPECT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO EXPLICITLY MANDATE THE COMMISSION TO ADDRESS ALL ARMS LOCATED IN NORTHERN IRELAND, LEGAL AND ILLEGAL. HE SAID HE ACCEPTED THAT THE BRITISH WOULD NEVER ALLOW THE LEGAL WEAPONS OF THE SECURITY FORCES TO BE EQUATED TO THOSE HELD ILLEGALLY BY THE PARAMILITARIES. THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE TO BE AMBIGUOUS ENOUGH SO THAT SINN FEIN WOULD BE FREE, IN ITS SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION, TO ADDRESS LEGAL AS WELL AS ILLEGAL ARMS.

PLEA FOR SINN FEIN TO RE-CONSIDER

SODERBERG REITERATED HER VIEW THAT THE BRITISH WOULD NOT ACCEPT WHAT SINN FEIN WAS PROPOSING. SHE FELT THAT LONDON WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN DROPPING COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE THAT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION'S MANDATE WAS TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 DUBLIN 004985

FOR LAKE AND PETERS ONLY FROM SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: NANCY SODERBERG'S OCTOBER 7 MEETING WITH SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS

ILLEGAL WEAPONS. SODERBERG SAID THAT IT WAS IN SINN FEIN'S OWN INTEREST TO MOVE ON THIS ISSUE. CONTINUING OBJECT TO THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE WOULD DELAY THE START-UP OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, AND PUSH ALL-PARTY TALKS INTO NEXT YEAR.

SODERBERG REMINDED ADAMS THAT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WOULD BE COMING FROM THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, NOT SINN FEIN. SINN FEIN DID NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BUY OFF ON EVERY ELEMENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT SINN FEIN BE WILLING TO ENGAGE SERIOUSLY ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING IRA WEAPONS. IF IT WANTED TO DO THAT IN A BROADER CONTEXT -- BY ALSO ADDRESSING WEAPONS HELD BY THE RUC AND BRITISH ARMY -- THAT WOULD BE OKAY. SINN FEIN COULD SIMPLY REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH BOTH LONDON AND DUBLIN AHEAD OF TIME THAT THIS WAS THE WAY IT PLANNED, BUT PROMISED TO CONSIDER

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 06

SODERBERG'S SUGGESTION.

4. SODERBERG DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THIS
MESSAGE BEFORE DEPARTING DUBLIN. SMITH

BT

#4985

NNNN

<MSGID> M1892405

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STA 10/03/95
THE AMBASSADOR
POL: BPHALL
POL: M HABIB DCM: TDEAL NSC: NSODERBERG
POLX TWI

ID: 40427
APV:
DRF:
CLR:
1.
2.
3.
4.

AMEMBASSY LONDON
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMCONSUL BELFAST

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/03/00
TAGS: PGOV PREL UK EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: SODERBERG MEETING WITH ANCRAM

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: *twin track approach* The ~~decommissioning~~ issue, David Trimble's leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party, and the President's visit to Northern Ireland were the key topics discussed at the Oct 3 meeting between ~~NSC Staff~~ *the Ambassador* ~~Director~~ Nancy Soderberg and Northern Ireland Minister Michael Ancram. Soderberg said she had the sense that differences between Sinn Fein and HMG on decommissioning are bridgeable. Ancram agreed it may be possible to craft language acceptable to both sides, but warned that it must be defined sufficiently so that the process does not proceed on the basis of a misunderstanding. Ancram said UUP actions under Trimble suggest the party is approaching the point of engagement, even if it has not reached that point yet. Although Trimble remains skeptical of the ~~two-track~~ *two-track* approach, Ancram said HMG will continue to ~~try~~ *try* to persuade him because it would be difficult to construct an effective process without the unionists involved. He suggested that it would be helpful for the President to greet Trimble when he visits Washington later this month. Soderberg noted that we are mindful of the need for balance in the program for the President's visit to Northern Ireland. She said we would welcome HMG's suggestions for using the visit to advance the peace process. End Summary. *Deputy NSC*

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.08)
KBH 4/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DUSA

3. NSC Staff ~~Director~~ Nancy Soderberg met with Michael Ancram for a one-hour session at the Northern Ireland Office on October 3. Ancram was joined by Roderick Lyne, PM's foreign policy adviser, Paul Lever of the Cabinet Office Secretariat, NIO A/US Quentin Thomas and NIO officer Clare Checksfield. Soderberg was accompanied by the Ambassador, POLMINCOUNS and embassy notetaker.

peace process

4. in the course of a detailed discussion of the peace process, ancram said hmg stands by the third washington condition requiring a start to decommissioning. he said he made this clear in recent discussions with martin mcguinness, but also indicated to mcguinness that he recognizes sinn fein cannot accept that condition at this time. that being the case, he said, hmg is willing to keep the focus of the decommissioning commission on the first two conditions, i.e., a willingness to decommission and the modalities of doing so. washington III would be a point of judgement later in the process.

ancram said there is no need for the commission at this stage to get into details of the types and numbers of arms that would be decommissioned. it could instead engage in a more general discussion on the details of decommissioning. lever commented that describing the commission as a "political project" rather than a military one does not cause hmg any particular problem, as long as sinn fein will be able to engage authoritatively with the commission. that is, it cannot subsequently talk only in generalities about "getting the gun out of politics" while disclaiming any responsibility for discussing practical modalities. ancram agreed that the commission's remit can include a political dimension but it also must deal with the process of decommissioning. thomas said hmg remains uncertain whether sinn fein can commit to this.

5. ancram asked for soderberg's assessment of the twin-track approach. she said the differences between sinn fein and hmg appear to be bridgeable even though the wording of any understanding necessarily will have

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

to be somewhat fuzzy. both sides will have to accept some risk and, although neither now can show any give on the third washington condition. both should agree to publicly state their position on the third washington condition and consider the commission's recommendations on their merits. angram said this coincided with hmg's view of the commission. his impression, too, was that progress is achievable. however, he cautioned, hmg does not want the language to be so fuzzy that the end result is something unintended. he said we must not proceed on the basis of a misunderstanding of the other side's intentions.

6. angram then described several key points which guide british thinking on the peace process: first, it must be inclusive -- all parties must participate. secondly, it cannot be concerned with only an internal settlement. the process must also cover the other two strands: relations between northern ireland and the republic and relations between the uk and ireland. finally, it must move forward by broad consensus among all parties. complete agreement is unlikely, but no progress is possible unless steps receive broad support across the political spectrum.

unionism under trimble

7. soderberg asked angram how the election of david trimble would affect the unionist participation in the process. angram said that since Trimble assumed leadership of the ulster unionist party last month he has been a constructive force, not an obstructive one. in angram's view, the unionists under trimble are trying in their own way to engage. he cited the uup's implicit acceptance of the downing street declaration as a legitimate document and trimble's relatively measured statements on decommissioning as evidence that they have moved. this suggests, he said, that the unionists may get to a point at which they will begin to engage fully in the peace process -- although they are not there yet and it is not clear when they might get there.

8. angram recognized that trimble has doubts about the twin-track approach. he said unionist reluctance to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

participate in political talks stems from worries about a "slippery slope." mirroring sinn fein's concerns about the decommissioning commission, unionists worry that they will be drawn into a process over which they exercise little control. lever pointed out that although the uup already talks to hmg and the irish government, dealing with issues as agenda items in a political process in which sinn fein is a participant would change the context of discussion. having just assumed the leadership, ancram said, trimble is mindful that unionist opinion does not change rapidly and that earlier uup leaders such as O'Neill and Faulkner who moved too far ahead of it quickly found themselves out of a job. the more confidence trimble has in his position, the easier it will be for him to move forward. ancram suggested that a greeting by the president during trimble's late october visit to washington be helpful in this regard. such a drop-by would have great symbolic impact, he said, and could go a long way toward knocking down a "unionist prejudice" which holds that the administration favors the nationalist side.

the unionists and the twin track

9. when asked by the ambassador whether hmg would move forward on the two-track approach even without unionist acquiescence, ancram replied obliquely that he hopes to persuade them to come on board. he said hmg seeks to avoid having to make such a decision but noted, in the event, that it would be "difficult to envisage an effective two-track approach ~~without trimble's participation.~~" it would, ancram also pointed out, not be possible to move to all party talks without the unionists. he admitted that hmg has been focusing on defining the outlines of the approach and so has not yet explored with unionists to what degree they might become involved. thomas offered his view that the third washington condition remains key. should the unionists perceive that hmg is abandoning that condition, they would likely fall back to an absolutist position of rejection of the process.

presidential visit

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10. soderberg said the president is looking forward to his trip to northern ireland at the end of november. Responding to a comment from ancram, she noted that we are mindful of the need for balance and will work to ensure that all reasonable observers perceive the President's role as impartial and even-handed. In this light, she said, the White House is considering starting the program with a speech and other public events in Belfast and then going to Londonderry rather than the other way around as had been suggested by HMG. Ancram, who said he has not been involved in planning for the visit, offered his impression that logistical and transportation considerations weighed into HMG's recommendation and re-emphasized that programmatic balance is the key, whatever the order of the day's events might be.

11. soderberg confirmed that a presidential overnight in belfast remains under consideration. thomas, saying the symbolism of such a stay would be quite positive, welcomed the prospect of an overnight. he noted, however, that accommodating the large delegation, which might include business leaders and membes of congress, would be challenging. in closing, soderberg reiterated that the objective of the president's visit is to further the peace process. she said we welcome suggestions from HMG for structuring the president's program to achieve that goal.

CROWE##

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Baldwin, Kenneth

*Kew
put in
back*

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: ADams memcon; other issues ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~
Date: Thursday, November 02, 1995 10:18AM

NES

Here is the memcon of TL's conversation with Adams yesterday. You know, I think TL's suggestion could work. If you think about it, the phrase "unauthorised arms now thankfully silent" contains the word "unauthorised", which could make it acceptable to the Brits, but since Adams says the the British presence itself is "unauthorised", the republicans could see it as applying to those arms too. Coupled with a Mitchell statement, I think SF might buy it. But will the Brits?

Another idea would be to go back to "decommissioning". I know Adams told us they don't like that word much, but at least they have used it. If the communique were brief and just said that the international body will deal with "decommissioning", it would be obvious what is meant, but the SF could claim the term is being used, as they in fact used it on March 8, as an element of total demilitarization.

On another issue, State tells me they think the McClinton visa waiver will be granted. <<File Attachment: TLGACON.DOC>>

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.09)
KBM 4/11/2023**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMCON OF MR. LAKE'S CONVERSATION WITH GERRY ADAMS, NOV 1

Adams: We opened the meeting saying we were seeking a response to our proposals; we stressed we are willing to cooperate on the twin track, and we told them we would deal authoritatively with the international body, though we would want to put forward our own analysis and views on the issue of other weapons. We said we are preparing a paper; the core would deal with modalities and British concerns. We also said we wanted to engage on the language of the joint communiqué.

They said they wanted to deal only with a shared understanding of what would happen after the communiqué. We went through four points:

- the political track;
- the practical arrangements for talks;
- the international body; and,
- we tried to get to the joint communiqué issue.

They told us they are not prepared to convene all-party talks without the agreement of all parties; that gives the unionists a veto and reneges on the British commitment. They said that situation would remain even if there is a positive outcome to the twin track. They refused to set even target date. After a tight discussion they offered notionally 3 months after the announcement of the joint communiqué. On the body, they refused to allow any ambiguity at all. We offered various formulas, even saying we would accept having them say they interpret it to mean illegal weapons while we would say it meant all weapons.

By the way, we had tried to get a meeting last week and they would not, citing scheduling problems. Because we had told you and Dublin we were anxious to meet we wrote to them and told them we wanted to hold a conclusive discussion and move forward. In response they sent a document dated 10/26 which they said had the support of Dublin. They also sent it to you. Dublin contacted us and said this was bad faith on the part of the British -- the document had been dealt with as a non-paper, and the discussion of it had been inconclusive. The Brits had not had permission to send it around. The British also sent it to the unionist parties which is just like making it public. They told us they had agreement from Dublin, but Dublin says they didn't. In our view the document is worse than the Washington principles.

We will be seeing them again Friday and see a need for your good offices. I will be seeing PM Bruton tomorrow; we think the British are trying to spin this out. They have no interest in moving ahead. They have neutralized Dublin. We have had all of

90 minutes with them since you left. When you have a domestic or personal crisis, you talk till it's resolved.

They refused to move on the two main points: the date and the terms of reference for the body. We need them to move on both-- we have moved considerably and could move more but we can't if they don't. There is impatience on the ground.

Mr. Lake: Tell me more about the "assured" understanding.

Adams: No, "shared". As I understand it, our people said we want a response to our proposals on the twin track and then we want to deal with the joint communique. They wanted only a shared understanding; they did not want to engage in detail, though subsequently they did in the course of 3 1/2 hours. They acknowledged that our willingness to deal authoritatively with the body and the paper we are preparing are new, positive elements in our position. This is what Ancram meant when he said publicly there were some positive points. I myself think they are putting a spin on it and are just trying to spin the whole thing out. I don't know how "au fait" you are but they appeared ready to use the unionist position as a cover for themselves. We accept that it is a hurdle that must be got over but instead of applying themselves to crossing it, they are using it as an excuse for inertia. It is true that only the unionist leadership can deliver the unionists, but they will only seek to do it if governments honor their positions. All-in-all it was not a good outcome and I am depressed about the potential.

Mr. Lake: They did send us a copy of their paper; I have not gone over it in detail...

Adams: I will formally ask Dublin to inform you of the misuse of the discussion paper.

Mr. Lake: I hadn't heard anything about the Irish Government angle. My impression (and we do not want to get into negotiating) is that they were making an effort. I'm glad there will be a meeting on Friday. They did tell me that if you engage on that paper, they will respond. They do not see it as take-it-or-leave-it. I will talk with them about spending sufficient time with you. You said you would accept their saying the remit deals with illegal weapons and they accept that you can raise whatever you want, including British Army weapons. Since this is a document of the British and Irish governments, you are not committed to it.

Adams: I recognize that but I must stress that the terms of reference must not be "sectional", i.e., referring to only one section of the weapons. They can take a sectional view. Whether

the word is "unauthorised", "illegal" or "paramilitary", the fact is the intention is to deal with demilitarization in a sectional way.

Mr. Lake: That is their position and this is their statement. They will not argue if you say you intend to raise all weapons.

Adams: We couldn't live with that. It's been 15 months and we have now reached the point where terms of reference not dealing with weapons are a problem. We have no target date. The situation could implode. We need ambiguity of language but the British interpretation can be specific. They understand that and that we will accept their interpretation, but the terms of reference have to be acceptable.

Mr. Lake: This is becoming a bigger issue than it needs to be. Everybody can state their view of what it means.

Adams: It is important for the republicans to deal with a body whose terms of reference are not so rigid. We need ambiguity in the public description. We are seeking to move forward; we are dealing with their issue.

Mr. Lake: I think the word "unauthorised" was an effort on their part. Do you have a formula?

Adams: "The arms now thankfully silenced". I don't intend to take you through Irish history but many believe that the British presence in Northern Ireland is unauthorised. What is required is not a description of a particular section of the weapons but a broader view.

Mr. Lake: I can't speak for anyone and this is not a U.S. proposal but what if the British and Irish statement said "the unauthorised arms now thankfully silent" and then Mitchell makes a statement saying that anyone can discuss anything and then you say what your position is.

Adams: Any formula like that we would look at positively. A statement from the chair that had the breadth we are looking for would have a positive impact and it is something we would have to be thinking about.

Mr. Lake: That is off the top of my head; I haven't talked to anyone else about it.

Adams: We need ambiguity.

Mr. Lake: The trouble is the British hate ambiguity. Let me urge them to devote time and urgency to this.

Adams: Even the Bosnians are sitting around a table and we are not there. This is a precondition that has not worked in any other situation.

Mr. Lake: I think you should reach agreement on everything else and then argue about the target date. I'll get back to them. I do think they are making a good faith effort that could become the basis for agreement. They are prepared to respond to further work. Let me counsel flexibility and speed. I hope it goes well on Friday.

Adams: I will be in Dublin tomorrow, until Friday. If it would be useful, you can get me through Ambassador Smith.

Mr. Lake: Good.

Adams: Regards to David Trimble. I had a speaking engagement at a university in the U.S. but I cancelled it because of the situation. I am thinking of rescheduling it.

Mr. Lake: There is a lot of travel at the end of this month. We will be going to Asia for the APEC meeting.

Adams: I will ask Mairead to talk to you about your schedule.

End of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.13)
KRM 4/11/2023

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT Mr. Lake's September 14 Meeting with Gerry Adams

PARTICIPANTS: Mairead Keane, Richard McAuley, Nancy Soderberg, Mary Ann Peters

LOCATION, DATE, TIME: One Washington Circle Hotel, September 13, 1995, 6:00 p.m.

Adams began by saying there had been a story on television in Belfast, on UBT, that Gerry Adams had been "summoned" to the White House, and that the reporter, Ken Reid, had confirmation from Nancy Soderberg.

Soderberg said she had called Reid, who had denied that he had said it and alleged that he had gotten the confirmation from Sinn Fein itself. She had spoken with Reid the previous evening and given him the same readout she gave everyone -- that Lake and Adams had had a good conversation.

Adams said a number of others had claimed to have gotten the meeting confirmed at the White House. This is a problem, though he doesn't take it personally. Mr. Lake pointed out that it is not in our interest to have this come out. He wanted it to remain private to give Adams running room. That is why we were there. He said he had full confidence in Nancy. Adams said that Conor O'Clery had told him that he had White House confirmation of a meeting -- did the fact that there would not be one mean a crisis? O'Clery had added that it would be hard to reset the headline "White House Fails to Broker Agreement", to which McAuley had responded that they had never expected a headline that read "White House Brokers Agreement".

Mr. Lake said that our press guidance would be that we had talked to Adams and to Ancram and that we remain in touch with all the parties. We would refuse to say more. Adams said he did not want to spend too much time on the issue, though it is a matter of confidence. There is a familiar tactic, in his view erroneous, of setting deadlines to corral people -- the British do it all the time. Sinn Fein is left with a double dilemma. It is not a problem for Sinn Fein to say there was no meeting at the White House, though they remain in contact (with the White House). The fact is the story is out there with the word "summoned" -- though that was probably Ken Reid's own sense of

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

it. This was the situation he had sought to avoid. Adams added that he would prefer to cobble together a solution rather than make headlines.

Mr. Lake said he had been accused by of being Greata Garbo when he travelled all over Europe on Bosnia without talking to reporters. We cannot lie to them, but only a few people know about this meeting. Adams said that Senator Kennedy knows. Mr. Lake asked whether he knew about this meeting and Adams replied that Trina had phoned Sinn Fein to assure Kieran that they would make sure Adams was finished with his meeting with Kennedy in time to get to the White House. Mr. Lake said that if this meeting leaks, he'll have the FBI on it, and the next meeting would be just the two of them somewhere in Newfoundland. Adams' confidence is important to him. Mr. Lake added that the Administration is engaged on lots of issues, for the purpose of getting them resolved, not getting credit. He said he understands that the British need room on this and Sinn Fein needs room with the IRA.

On the issue at hand, Adams said he had passed from Mairead to Mary Ann what he needed from this meeting. One thing he wanted to stress, as he had yesterday, was that the IRA have set their head against any dealing with or accepting a commission. He had told Hume and possibly the Taoiseach, but no one else, that he had gone to the IRA about 10-12 weeks ago, because from his perspective it is Sinn Fein that has to keep pushing the process forward -- no one else will do it. (They'd said) okay, what if we get the Brits headed down the track and the movement lasts for 1-3 months and the ground shifts a bit, but at the end the Brits still insist on the third condition?

The British have hammered on decommissioning so long that the IRA thinks this is just a British ruse, Adams continued. Sinn Fein has very little room to maneuver on this. Of course if there were forward movement, then all parties would feel freer. The IRA is not going to give up weapons without a process working, without actually having a settlement or being on the eve of a settlement. What they fear is that if they move to bilateral or trilateral talks the British will keep them hanging until the urgency goes out of the situation, after the President's trip. In 3-4 months the British will say they will not move to all-party talks and the process is stalled again. As (senior GOI official) Sean O'Huiginn says, it is a matter of judgment -- either you believe the Brits want a fig leaf and want to change this from an obstacle to an objective, in which case they will continue to shout about the condition but everyone knows they

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET

will get off it, or they will not move and will jam the condition on again in 2-3 months.

Mr. Lake asked whether there was not a third alternative, though it might not be consistent with the way the IRA thinks. What if the current situation extends into the future and it continues to appear that Sinn Fein is refusing to go along with the commission? That is less attractive than the second scenario Adams outlined, of the British not going along.

Adams responded that he was mindful of what the Vice President had said and what an Irish Times editorial had said about a "vacuum" hanging over us. People are impatient. He stressed that it is very, very important for people to understand that there is an alternative that could work. Mr. Lake responded, "Let's make it work." Adams added that if we knew how tightly people are screwed (wound) up on this ... He asked Mr. Lake to put himself inside the mind of someone who believed in the armed struggle, and imagine their view of the British. It would not suit Sinn Fein to have a PLO-like situation in which there is a separate, more militant faction. On the British, if this is screwed up, and if the (IRA) representatives still retain confidence in him, even if there was never a friendlier Administration, he'd need to be putting it back together again. If it breaks down, after having a nervous breakdown, Adams said he would be back trying, because there has to be something.

"So what is required," Adams asked. He said he would like to go back with something in writing in order to have a firm proposal to show. It should contain the kernel of what has been brokered. Adams said he did not need it that day, necessarily, but it would be useful if he had it. Second, if the British are prepared to go down the road, and if he wants to avoid a situation where the commission brings back its recommendations and the British reject them, can the U.S. act as a guarantor? In a private dimension? Given the opposition to the word "commission" Adams had looked it up in the dictionary, an American edition and talked it over with Hume. He personally had liked the word "arbiter", but also "monitor" and "forum". Mr Lake asked whether the term "Brits" was invidious, to which Adams replied that they refer to themselves that way when they are being partonizing. Finally, Adams said that if a way could be found to move, it should not fall foul of a failure to communicate; there should be a way to keep in contact.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Lake explained that our general principle was not to get involved in actual negotiations. He understands that Adams is committed to peace and needs to bring others along. For our part, he said, we need to maintain good relations with the British, with whom we work on Iraq, Bosnia, etc. Our commitment to peace helps us with the Irish-American community. It is not in our interest to get so deeply involved that we can be blamed if it fails, or to do so in such a way that one side or the other says we did not act in confidence. All of us, I myself, Nancy, Mary Ann, and the President and Vice President do what we are doing to see progress made. I have the sense that now is the time for progress, that the positions are not that far apart. We would not be trying if we did not see a possibility of success. This is not something we expect will bring immediate credit to us, though we may get some credit someday. That is why I am annoyed about the leak. I have told the President to expect stories in the press about lack of a breakthrough.

Adams said that he recognized that the Vice President's attendance at the meeting was an important step. Mr. Lake added that it had come in advance of anything new. Adams said he wanted to get into the details of what is required. No Irish republican, including himself, will make a leap of faith in the British even to allow them to move off their position and offer talks. It would be a different situation if the U.S. says it, though Adams understood that the U.S. does not want to get in the middle. Mr. Lake said, "Unless absolutely necessary, in certain situations".

Adams asked Mr. Lake to explain the terms of reference for the Mitchell entity. Would the parties, Sinn Fein, the SDLP, etc. be expected to make statements to the commission? Would the IRA be expected to? Mr. Lake said that he would think anyone who wanted to do so would be able to, and it would be in their interest to make their views known. Adams said it would have to be the political parties, not the armed groups, who would talk about how demilitarization should be done. Soderberg said that this is where the other track comes in -- if those talks go far enough, the decommissioning track is less important. Adams said that he would be asked by the IRA what they would have to do and he wanted to be able to reply, "Nothing."

Adams then said he had half arranged to meet with Mitchell again prior to leaving the U.S. He'd felt inhibited in their previous meeting because there had been so many people present. Mr. Lake said he would not talk to Mitchell before Adams did. He'd known Mitchell for 25 years -- he is a man who cares about his integrity. Adams added, "As long as the Brits don't catch his

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

great cousin having an affair", but admitted that he was perhaps being paranoid. Mr. Lake related the anecdote about the French ambassador compromised by the KGB who, when confronted with photos of himself "in flagrante delicto", had responded that he would like to order copies.

Adams said he has known Mitchell a relatively short time but has a sense of Mitchell's integrity; it would be taking a chance but risks have to be taken. Mr. Lake amended his previous decision not to talk to Mitchell before Adams' conversation with him, saying he felt he should brief Mitchell first on where the process stands.

Adams said he keeps coming back to the question of whether this is the right road. He is not negative personally because to do anything one has to be flexible, but the IRA has ruled out cooperating with a commission for very good reasons. When he and John Hume had cobbled together their formula, he had talked informally with 1-2 IRA men. They had indicated that if Hume and Adams worked out the terms of reference so they would be different from what the Brits had wanted, they wouldn't rule it out. That is Adams' answer. He thinks people are intelligent. If this doesn't work then he will get another word. What is required is a date for all-party talks. Mr. Lake added, "Target date."

Adams said the compromise is a formula for dealing with a commission. This is the best answer he could give. It would be a mistake to think he can deliver this, though he can run with it. He had been thinking and talking about it but got nowhere. He would not want us to think he is upbeat about it. Whether he gets it or not, he will call, so he needs a way to communicate. He can give us a commitment to let us know in advance what the response will be so we will not be surprised or deceived.

Adams added that he does need something in writing to take back. Mr. Lake said he would see if we could get the British and the Irish to work on that. Adams said that he would like to have in writing if possible and would keep absolutely confidential an outline of the proposal Mr. Lake had put to him. Mr. Lake said he would rather not provide that but would prefer to work on a document that would eventually be made public. Adams said what he had in mind was something actually expressed that way, saying here's where we are. Mr. Lake said we should think about a secure means of communicating. He would talk to Mairead.

Adams returned to the question of who knew about the meeting. He said Senator Dodd might, as he had asked Adams to phone him at home that evening. Mr. Lake said there was no way around the fact that it was known a meeting had been planned. The

question was who knew about this meeting? Adams said he had explained to Trina that there would be some contact -- either a meeting or a phone call. That's all who know. A good cover for the contact is that Sinn Fein has a mission in Washington and the White House maintains regular contact through Mairead Keane. We can say we have had contact or that we are always in contact.

Mr. Lake said that his impression --and Adams should tell him if it should be more nuanced -- is that for Sinn Fein the issue of a date for all-party talks is at least as important as the commission, if not more so. The British had accepted the notion of calling it a target date; more needs to be done on this because it goes to the issue of "creating conditions" for talks to take place. Adams interjected that by conditions the Brits meant their Washington principles. Mr. Lake said that the British had told him that if everything else were moving, they would give sympathetic consideration to going forward (with all-party talks). Mr. Lake had asked if that meant movement in the trilateral talks and in the commission and they had said yes. He added that he didn't know whether they would be willing to say that now. Adams said that Mayhew's letter to Hume should give us insight -- he couldn't remember exactly what it said, but it was a considered, written reply. The fact that they were writing to Hume at all indicates that they want their view on the record. Mr. Lake said the British would be talking with Hume.

On the terms of reference, in essence, the British cannot explicitly say that the "when" is included, but they would ask the Mitchell "x" to make recommendations that might include when decommissioning would take place. Mr. Lake had said that in his view, the communique language about "appropriate context and manner" did not rule out "when". If the commission cannot look at "when", then what is the point? The British had agreed that a broad interpretation would not be excluded. In Mr. Lake's view that is a better position for Sinn Fein because the British will have to take account of the commission's recommendations on the issue. Mr. Lake added that no one would be bound by the outcome, and both could restate their positions in the interim, though he hoped neither would do so too often. Ancram had used the phrase "if asked", but then added that he is always asked. It would help encourage trust if some of the voluntary statements were not made, Mr. Lake said.

Adams told Mr. Lake that in a meeting with the three Irish coalition partners and senior GOI officials about 10 days ago, they had said there was no guarantee what the British would do. But when it came to the crunch, the British had backed off. Adams had a sense of déjà vu. The Irish government had been reading the same signs. Mr. Lake said that at the risk of appearing immodest, that had been before the U.S. got involved.

We are the new factor. Adams agreed, saying that the entire dynamic in Ireland wasn't enough to move the process forward -- only "you yourselves" could do it.

Mr. Lake said the British had agreed that the commission's recommendations would be considered on their merits. Neither Sinn Fein nor the British would be bound in advance. The British would maintain their current position while the commission starts its work. The other track would begin and over the next few months, this would develop confidence and address the issue of creating a new reality. Mr. Lake had never talked to Mitchell about it but he hoped the commission could make recommendations all parties could buy off on. This is the simple, clear way to get going without forcing either side to back off. Mr. Lake said this is what he had gotten from London. The Prime Minister had been in meetings all day and had not signed off, but this is a sense of where they are. Mr. Lake would be back in touch to work on a joint communique text. The British would want to get back to the Irish on the communique.

The name did not seem to be a stumbling block. The British have a problem with the word "forum" but had said twice that they would find another word. In response to Adams' question on who had said that, Mr. Lake said he had been talking with Ancram, but Adams should keep that private. Soderberg said that the problem with "forum" is that there is already an entity in the south using the term.

On the composition, Mr. Lake said the British have no problem with Mitchell and two others. They will find acceptable people-- they won't get anyone who is anathema to any of the parties.

Adams said that the language Hume had suggested to the British differed slightly from the version he and Hume had worked out, but it was "not bad". He said that perhaps what he had said about what was required sounded like a shopping list, but it was what he had to deal with.

Mr. Lake said that his goal it is to try and wind up the train so it can go down the track without his having to drive it, though he wanted to stay involved. He wanted to jumpstart the process. If Mitchell heads the commission, it would be better for us not to be in the middle. That said, we do need to stay in touch and we need to find a way to communicate so that we can be helpful as necessary. He asked Adams whether that made sense and Adams said it did, absolutely. Mr. Lake said he did not rule out another meeting. He saw the joint communique as a way to have a document to move forward -- we would work with both governments on it. Adams said there would be no problem with the Irish.

Mr. Lake returned to the question of a guarantee. We have to be precise. The whole notion is that there would be no guarantee of what the British or Sinn Fein will or will not do. We do not know how the Mitchell Commission will turn out, but all would agree to consider its recommendations seriously on their merits.

How do we proceed, Adams asked, through your ambassador to Ireland? He added that he thought he should have a final proposal before leaving the country on Saturday. Mr. Lake said we would need a way to communicate. Adams mentioned Hume's proposal to the British, to which he had gotten a positive response from Mayhew. Soderberg said she had the Mayhew letter. Adams said that with Hume involved, there were four channels of communication going. He saw a danger of a mix-up in that and suggested that Sinn Fein and the USG stay in direct contact. He added that the press was liable to be asking why there had been no meeting and we should say we are in touch. O'Clery will say that there have been private meetings over the last week that are ongoing.

Mr. Lake asked how he should be in touch. It was agreed that he would call Mairead. Adams reiterated his request for a clear "view" of the proposal. It was agreed there could be a meeting in New York Friday or Saturday.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Adams, dr

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.14)
KBH 4/11/2023

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon Between Anthony Lake and Gerry Adams
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein
Notetaker: Mary Ann Peters

DATE, TIME: September 28, 1995
AND PLACE: Mr. Lake's Office

Following is a summary of the conversation. The line was bad, and points had to be made several times. (U)

Adams began by saying that he had persuaded the IRA to accept the twin track approach in principle, a considerable achievement from his point of view. The acceptance was conditioned on four provisos:

- a target date for all-party talks;
- agreement that the commission would be a "political project" that would receive submissions from political parties as opposed to the armed groups;
- agreement that no preconditions would be placed on the parties (in their cooperation with the commission); and
- a joint communique reflecting the above. *(✓)*

Adams emphasized the importance of the having the body be purely political, as opposed to military. The IRA would not be involved with it at all. He also said the terms of reference would have to be reflected in the joint communique. Mr. Lake said he had pressed for broad, fuzzy terms of reference. On the target date, his impression of the British position was that they are still willing to talk about a target date when the twin track begins, but with the passage of time, it is not clear what that date would be. Mr. Lake offered to be helpful if necessary on this issue. *(✓)*

Adams told Mr. Lake that his next goal is to was to see if he can get a consensus on the Irish side, among Sinn Fein, John Hume and Dublin, around the position he had just described. The Irish Government needs to "do the rowing" on this, he said. Adams said that the IRA might make a statement on these matters; if it did,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

the statement would wish Sinn Fein well in its efforts to break the impasse in the peace process but would also reiterate that no disarmament was possible except as part of a negotiated settlement. (Note: Such a statement was subsequently issued.)

(C)

Mr. Lake noted that Adams and Hume have a close relationship, but said he would be willing to talk to Dublin if Adams wished. Adams said Martin McGuinness was to brief Dick Spring. He commended Spring's speech at the UNGA in which he called for the UK to drop Washington Three. Adams said he has no room to maneuver on the military side, on talk of surrender, but if he is given the breathing room of a political project, he will be as creative and flexible as anyone. (C)

On the IRA statement, Mr. Lake reminded Adams that the less said about current positions the better. Adams said the British have been stressing their position in public statements by Major and Mayhew. The court decisions on the killing of the three IRA men on Gibraltar and the unlawful holding of 5 IRA prisoners had hardened the republican mood and made an IRA statement almost certain. He added that Sinn Fein would be holding a conference over the weekend that would assess Sinn Fein leadership's handling of the peace process. It would have been better to hold it earlier in the summer, but that had not been possible. Now the republicans were all "cheesed off". But this is his own problem, Adams added. (C)

Adams then gave Mr. Lake a readout on the just-concluded meeting between McGuinness and Ancram. McGuinness had told him it had been friendly, frank and useful. He had stated Sinn Fein's willingness to negotiate a political way around the present impasse. The British had indicated a willingness to negotiate too, though it remained to be seen on what basis. There had been no satisfactory outcome on a target date. Ancram had indicated it could be before Christmas, but then had said that given the passage of time, it might now slip until after Christmas. Ancram had reiterated the three Washington tests. He had said the remit for the international body would be criteria one and two -- how as opposed to when. Ancram had made clear that the recommendations of the body would not be binding on HMG. (C)

According to McGuinness' notes, Adams said, Ancram had neither accepted nor rejected Sinn Fein's view that the commission would proceed as a political project as opposed to a military one. There had been some question of whether to keep the fact of the meeting private; in the end the British had made it public in spite of Sinn Fein's preferences. There was to be another meeting at the end of the following week. (C)

Mr. Lake asked whether the language on considering seriously the recommendations of the body on decommissioning had been mentioned. Adams replied that there was no mention of it in

McGuinness' notes. Mr. Lake said he had been told the British would reiterate that; he would check on it. He noted that the meeting had been positive and consistent with our previous discussions. Adams said McGuinness had not been disconcerted by Ancram's reiteration of the British position or by the fact that Ancram had neither accepted nor rejected Sinn Fein's view that the body would have to proceed as a political project rather than a military one. He then read the closing sentence from McGuinness' notes, which said that in McGuinness' view, the meeting had shown crucial engagement and marked the first time the British had been engaged in active negotiation since the cease-fire. The crucial step is to get agreement on the central point that the process will be a political project as opposed to a military one. (C)

Adams then gave a brief readout of what the other Sinn Fein representative in the meeting, Gerry Kelly, had had to say. Kelly had noted that neither side had changed its position; and that Sinn Fein had pushed ahead for a resolution. He thought that the British had left open the option of agreeing to proceed on the basis outlined. (C)

Mr. Lake pointed out that it all came down to the words about the terms of reference. There might also be a difficulty about the target date. He would recommend reserving for now the argument over what that date should be. Adams replied that it was important for those republicans who had been brought to agree to the twin track in principle that the target date that had been mentioned be kept to. It would be disconcerting for them to see it moved backward. They would see that as more stalling. Mr. Lake pointed out that that is all the more reason why every day counts. At a certain point the British would have a practical argument for postponing the date. (C)

Adams said he would get back to Mr. Lake on Wednesday or Thursday of next week and would work on a formula of words and talk to Hume and Dublin in the interim. He stressed that even though it had been a considerable achievement to get agreement on the twin track, there was still a lot more to be done, and it would be all the more risky if the British were to slide off. Mr. Lake said he understood and it had been a good piece of work on Adams' part. He said he pass on to Mairead in a secure manner the content of Adams' message. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.15)
KBH 7/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary of Phone Conversation between Mr. lake and Michael Ancram, September 30, 1995

Ancram told Mr. Lake he had a constructive meeting with Sinn Fein's Martin McGuinness (accompanied by Joe Kelly) , which began with McGuinness stressing SF's desire to find a way through the present impasse by means of debate and discussion. Ancram thought it significant that McGuinness had not warned of a possible return to violence. Ancram had said HMG is also committed to finding a way through, and believes the twin track, especially in terms of the commission, offers the means to look at all the different sensitivities. Neither SF nor HMG would be required to make a commitment to the commission's outcome. Both would stand by their present positions, but would agree to consider the commissions recommendations on their merits. Ancram said the discussion had been very much along the lines he and Mr. Lake had been discussing.

Ancram said that he and McGuinness had discussed the proposal in some detail, including terms of reference and composition of the commission. McGuinness was anxious about the target date -- Ancram had told him HMG would certainly consider it , though not until the twin track was clearly working. They would consider announcing the target date at the same time they announced the twin track. In response to Mr. Lake's question about a possible 12/15 target date, Ancram said they had lost a little time and it might not be possible for the commission to complete its work in time for that. He added that McGuinness wants to meet again next week.

Mr. Lake asked whether McGuinness had indicated whether he had talked with his people (in the IRA); Ancram said he had not indicated how much he had already talked with them, but had said he would take back what he and Ancram had discussed. Ancram mentioned the SF convention to be held in Dublin 9/30. Ancram said McGuinness is interested in the words that would be used (the communique) and would like to negotiate that with Ancram. They remain in touch with Hume on this. Today's meeting, according to Ancram, was not the time for that kind of detail. He emphasized that the atmosphere was good; and the next thing was to analyze the meeting in detail and wait and see what McGuinness comes back with. He told Mr. Lake he had made no bones about the fact that HMG's position had not changed -- McGuinness seemed to accept that that had to be worked through.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Mr. Lake returned to the question of the piece of paper, and agreed with Ancram that there may be too many floating about. He reminded Ancram that we had not told Adams or anyone else about the draft we had sent Ancram, and said Ancram is welcome to use it as he sees fit. Ancram said thank you and repeated that it had been easier to leave that issue to the next meeting. Mr. Lake also told Ancram he had had a brief conversation with SF's Washington representative, who had said the same thing about SF's readiness to be constructive.

Mr. Lake recalled that Ancram has said the Washington criteria were not doctrinal and asked whether there was flexibility in the formula to make the third criteria a judgment rather than a condition. Ancram responded that he thought both sides would be happier if the panel were to look at ways and leave the judgments to the sides. The terms of reference would be general, along the lines of "context and manner" and would cover criteria one and two, though the panel would hear evidence on three. Mr. Lake said he found Trimble's proposal for an elected assembly somewhat vague; what would such body do? Ancram said he thought it was still vague in Trimble's mind, but there had been other (similar) suggestions from other quarters and HMG needed to give the concept some thought. They did not want to rule out any idea put forward in a constructive manner, but he wouldn't rank it higher than "possible" at present. Ancram said that Major had recently met with both Hume and Paisley and both meetings had been conducted in a positive atmosphere.

Mr. Lake said he would be hearing from Sinn Fein later in the day and would let Ancram know of any glitches. He also raised the idea of a trip by Nancy Soderberg and Ambassador Crowe to Belfast and a possible trip by himself to London. Ancram thought his trip would be useful, depending on the response Nancy and Crowe get.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.16)
KBH 4/11/2023

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon between Anthony Lake and Gerry Adams

PARTICIPANTS: Anthony Lake
Nancy Soderberg
Kathleen Stephens (in Belfast)
Notetaker: Mary Ann Peters (NSC staff)

Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein
Mairead Keane (in Mr. Lake's office)

DATE, TIME: September 21, 1995, 11:15 a.m.
AND PLACE: Mr. Lake's Office

Mr. Adams: Do you have any news for me?

Mr. Lake: I am waiting for news from you. I talked to the British about the question of whether the IRA would have to have contact with the commission or panel. I got a good response -- what matters to them is practicality, not labeling, as long as the commission is talking to someone in authority. I underscored the point about IRA neutrality. That leads to the question of what is talked about. I strongly urged that it not be defined now, but as things go along. The objective is to get the damn thing going and park the issue in an international body. I thought that got a constructive reception.

Mr. Adams: Right. The reality of the situation is that all we can see is for people to be neutral, and we are prepared to undertake and give some sort of commitment on the basis of this being part of the all-party talks process. We want to have a meeting between Ancram and Martin McGuinness, but it is not being processed properly -- we're having some difficulty reaching them, and Mayhew is in Australia this morning. And what I have in terms of our last conversation is that it will not be a runner. I talked to one or two people informally and they have enough goodwill to be neutral if there is a clear date for all-party talks. The Brits are saying they want people to speak with authority on this. What does that mean? Does it mean details or, as it should be, what is necessary to make progress and move forward. We have a bad line.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Mr. Lake: Please repeat the last part, the last third of what you said.

Mr. Adams: What do they mean by someone who can speak with authority on these issues? I think it means points one and two and fuzzy on three because there is no possibility of persuading people to be anything but neutral.

Mr. Lake: My strong impression is that they want to see movement forward. You should take what you've got. They are saying that you should engage with the panel and the IRA is neutral, as you noted. Neutral means the IRA doesn't have to support it but doesn't oppose your participation. You don't have to try to corner them now by saying what the body will not address, just as I urged the British not to be saying what the body has to address. You have the deal you are looking for.

Mr. Adams: You have said twice that they can be neutral and Sinn Fein or I will be involved. The difficulty that was pointed out to me informally was that if they are neutral on the twin track and if the British continue to insist on preconditions, on a report back from the body before all-party talks, and if the body comes up with a position similar to the British one, the whole republican leadership will be discredited with the republicans. We see that as a real danger.

Mr. Lake: The British have a sincere problem with the unionists, as you do with your constituents. The point I would urge on you both is that all you have to say is, "We are prepared to engage with the body on this issue." You have repeatedly said you would engage on decommissioning. You would not necessarily be bound by the outcome but would treat it seriously. If it comes out the wrong way, you can say that your position has not changed. It is your choice. You can say now that your policy remains the same, but I hope you will say it less.

Mr. Adams: I missed the last bit.

Mr. Lake: You would say that you would not be bound by what the body says, though you would treat it seriously. I don't see how that discredits you if you say it at the beginning. I am concerned that a refusal to deal with the body will let the British corner you and hurt your credibility, and ours.

Mr. Adams: OK.

Mr. Lake: As I said, I have been acting on the belief that you want peace.

Mr. Adams: That goes without saying.

Mr. Lake: To me, yes, but if it appears that you are blocking an approach that would park this issue while you would get to work on the first phase of all-party talks, then it is hard to sustain that position.

Mr. Adams: Anything more in terms of a firm description like the name?

Mr. Lake: No, I would welcome your thoughts. I think the "Mitchell Panel" is not bad. The British are flexible on this.

Mr. Adams: Anything further on who the others would be?

Mr. Lake: I did not discuss anything except that one issue, where I think they came back with a flexible answer. To return to the date, we do have them talking about a target date, which is a step forward. On the issue of membership, it would be a group of three of "appropriate standing, likely to enjoy widespread confidence."

Mr. Adams: Do you have names?

Mr. Lake: No, I would suggest that we get started on the basis of that formula. We would stay involved and weigh in, or George Mitchell would, to make sure the dice were not loaded, that they do not insist on qualifications that would load the dice. We would have to work on it.

Mr. Adams: Let me tell you what I will do, subject to your advice. We are trying to organize a meeting for Martin MaGuinness with Michael Ancram. When is the question-- hopefully as soon as possible. We first called them last evening; Martin is to phone back today. I am also hopeful that we will be consulting with the Irish Government people. I will come back to you after the meeting with Ancram, if there is any light between what he says to us and what he is saying to you. And I will take your point about not pressing too hard on some issues. I would like to talk again. I will put the issue formally to the IRA and I will talk to you before then.

Mr. Lake: Would you like me to call London to encourage Ancram to meet with you as soon as possible?

Mr. Adams: We couldn't find them at all. It would be helpful.

Mr. Lake: I will do that.

Mr. Adams: Can we keep the point about formally putting it to the IRA between ourselves? I know you are doing your best. We do see it as step forward, but it will be very much an uphill battle. A small number see the Brits as getting everyone on a hook. I understand and accept the White House role, but the Brits are having success tactically by digging in behind this. We are 13 months down the road and the process is still dominated by a single new precondition, which is causing annoyance. I want to stress that it will be uphill. As I already told you, I will come back to you after the meeting with Ancram. I want to go to them with a full proposal. If something is revised in what Ancram tells Martin, perhaps you could take it up for us?

Mr. Lake: What I have told you about speaking with authority, I got from beyond Ancram, from someone not always noted for flexibility, so I hope we are making progress on that side. I agree they are doing well tactically -- and I urge you to deflect that and take the high ground.

Mr. Adams: The difficulty is that what people will sign on for is what is in a joint communique. You can't expect them to read between the lines. At the end of the day, the U.S. cannot act as guarantor or even broker. It is whatever the Brits are saying in consultations with us that is relevant. We cannot explain it as "Tony Lake said."

Mr. Lake: My aim is to get as explicit as possible, but I don't want to make it too detailed now. We talk to the British too. If they tell us something, it has some validity because of our relationship. It is just the same when you tell me something. Let me talk to them and if there is anything new, I will let you know.

Mr. Adams: I will be in Dublin until Saturday morning -- if you have some message that is the way to get me, to set up a call through the ambassador.

Mr. Lake: I am going to Haiti and will be back Saturday around noon, but Nancy will be here.

Mr. Adams: I will not be back to you until after the meeting with Ancram unless there is something new, or you have news for me.

-- End of Conversation --

CONFIDENTIAL

As Put in Book

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, SODERBERG, FLANAGAN, GARDNER, NSC, PETERS, SCHMIDT, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 311254Z AUG 95

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8585

RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 3628
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3327

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 004285

LONDON PLEASE PASS BELFAST

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, IR
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS ON NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE
- PROCESS

REF: (A) DUBLIN 4234 (B) DUBLIN 3436

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

/-----

2. I MET WITH TAOISEACH JOHN BRUTON ON AUGUST 30. HE EXPLAINED THE RECENT STEPS TAKEN BY THE IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS TO BREAK THE LOGJAM OVER DECOMMISSIONING. HIS VIEWS SEEM TO DIFFER FROM WHAT WAS ARTICULATED ON AUGUST 29 BY HIS ADVISER PADDY TEAHON (REF A). CLEARLY THE TAOISEACH FEELS THAT AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON DECOMMISSIONING SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AND SHOULD WORK IN PARALLEL WITH THE POLITICAL TALKS. HE EXPECTS THAT HE AND JOHN MAJOR WILL BE ABLE TO ISSUE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT IN LONDON ON SEPTEMBER 6. HE WAS DELIBERATELY VAGUE, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE TIMING OF THE COMMISSION'S ACTIVITIES, SAYING ONLY THAT THIS SHOULD REMAIN AMBIGUOUS AND THAT IT WOULD BE THE "POLITICAL GESTURE" OF ESTABLISHING THE COMMISSION THAT THE BRITISH WERE LOOKING FOR. AT THE SAME TIME, TALKS WOULD BEGIN -- BILATERAL, TRILATERAL, AND EVENTUALLY ALL-PARTY TALKS TARGETTED FOR LATE NOVEMBER. HE WENT ON TO OUTLINE SOME STEPS THE U.S. COULD TAKE THAT HE BELIEVES WOULD HELP ADVANCE THE PEACE PROCESS.

*RES -
Note requests for U.S. support on p 3
All look do-able to me. Local Sinn Fein office confirms Adams will be here 9/12-14. Mairead will be in touch next week w/ requests for meetings.
That*

DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.17)
KBH 4/11/2023

END SUMMARY

/-----

3. THE TAOISEACH HOSTED A LUNCH FOR ME ON AUGUST 30. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SPECIAL ADVISER SEAN DONLON, AND I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY POLOFF. BRUTON HAS BEEN DEEPLY ENGAGED IN THE PEACE PROCESS IN RECENT DAYS. HE HELD SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS WITH GERRY ADAMS ON AUGUST 28 AND WITH ALLIANCE PARTY REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 29, AND HAS SPOKEN BY PHONE TO JOHN MAJOR. BRUTON TOLD ME THAT WHILE DIFFICULTIES REMAIN IN CONVINCING SINN FEIN/IRA TO GO ALONG WITH DUBLIN'S APPROACH, HE FULLY ANTICIPATES BEING ABLE TO PROCEED WITH THE SUMMIT MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR IN LONDON ON SEPTEMBER 6. BRUTON EXPECTS THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT (1) ON TALKS WITH ALL THE PARTIES, WITH THE GOAL OF ALL-PARTY TALKS COMMENCING IN NOVEMBER, AND (2) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DECOMMISSIONING COMMISSION. WHEN DISCUSSING THE VENUE FOR THE SUMMIT, WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY SLATED FOR DUBLIN BUT NOW MOVED TO LONDON, BRUTON SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTIES THE UNIONISTS WOULD HAVE WITH THE SUMMIT RESULTS EMANATING FROM DUBLIN. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE THOUGHT LONDON A BETTER CHOICE.

DECOMMISSIONING

/-----

4. BRUTON TOLD ME THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION WOULD BE TO (A) VERIFY THE PARTIES' COMMITMENTS TO DECOMMISSIONING AND (B) DISCUSS MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING. HE WAS NOT SEEKING A "PHYSICAL" GESTURE AT THIS POINT. IT WAS HIS HOPE THAT, IN THE PROCESS OF THE DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE COMMISSION AND WITHIN THE POLITICAL TALKS SIMULTANEOUSLY UNDERWAY, SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE WOULD DEVELOP AMONG THE PARTIES THAT THE ISSUE OF A "GESTURE" WOULD LESSEN IN SIGNIFICANCE. IDEALLY, THE UNIONISTS MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO ATTEND ALL-PARTY TALKS WITHOUT AN ACTUAL TURNOVER OF WEAPONS, IF THEY WERE CONVINCED BY THEN THAT SINN FEIN/IRA DID NOT INTEND TO USE ARMS AGAIN. CONTRARY TO OUR IMPRESSION OF AUGUST 29 (REF A), BRUTON EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNIONISTS "WOULD NOT ACCEPT" BEING TOLD THAT NO DECOMMISSIONING WOULD OCCUR UNTIL THE VERY END OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

5. WHEN I ASKED HIM HOW TO SELL SINN FEIN ON THIS APPROACH, BRUTON REPLIED: "ON THE BASIS THAT IT'S A PROCESS, AND THAT THEY DON'T HAVE TO PUT ALL THEIR CARDS ON THE TABLE -- JUST ONE," WHICH I INTERPRETED TO MEAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE FORMATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. BRUTON ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ISSUE OF PRECISELY WHEN THE IRA WOULD BE ASKED TO TURN IN WEAPONS WAS BEING LEFT VAGUE, BUT ASSERTED THAT THIS DEGREE OF AMBIGUITY WAS DESIRABLE IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORDER TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND "BUY A SPACE FOR DIALOGUE."

U.S. ROLE

/-----

6. BRUTON TOLD ME THAT THE U.S. COULD PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN THE COMING DAYS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. -- ~~A WHITE HOUSE PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE SEPTEMBER 6 BRUTON-MAJOR SUMMIT WOULD BE GREATLY~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 004285

LONDON PLEASE PASS BELFAST

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, UK, IR

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS ON NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE

- PROCESS

APPRECIATED.

2. -- ~~U.S. EFFORTS TO REACH OUT TO THE UNIONISTS -- MOST OF WHOM BELIEVE WE FAVOR THE NATIONALISTS -- COULD HELP IN DEVELOPING THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE NEEDED TO BRING THEM ON BOARD. SPECIFICALLY, BRUTON URGED THE PRESIDENT TO TELEPHONE WHOMEVER IS ELECTED TO REPLACE JAMES MOLYNEAUX AS LEADER OF THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY, AND PERHAPS INVITE THAT INDIVIDUAL TO THE U.S. (BRUTON AND SEAN DONLON SPECULATED THAT WHEREAS KEN MAGINNIS OR JOHN TAYLOR MIGHT BE THE MORE PRAGMATIC INTERLOCUTORS TO DEAL WITH IN THE PEACE PROCESS, WILLIAM ROSS WAS MORE LIKELY TO WIN GIVEN THE INTRICACIES OF THE SELECTION PROCESS.)~~

3. -- IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF SENATOR MITCHELL, SHOULD HE BE SELECTED TO SERVE AS CHAIRMAN OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, WOULD ASSUME A ROLE IN BROACHING THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE WITH SINN FEIN AND THE UNIONIST SIDE. NOTING THAT KEN MAGINNIS HAD RECENTLY PROVIDED AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE THAT BROKE IT DOWN INTO VARIOUS COMPONENTS (PRINCIPLES, MODALITIES, INVENTORY, SCHEDULE, ETC.), BRUTON SUGGESTED THIS WOULD BE A PRODUCTIVE AREA FOR SENATOR MITCHELL TO EXPLORE WITH SINN FEIN.

COMMENT

/-----

7. THE DETAILS OF THE IRISH PROPOSAL REMAIN VEXINGLY VAGUE -- PERHAPS DELIBERATELY SO -- BUT ONE THING IS CLEAR: BRUTON IS DETERMINED TO PROCEED WITH AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO BREAK THE LOGJAM, AND THAT EFFORT WILL CONTINUE TO DEVOTE AT LEAST AS MUCH EFFORT TO ADDRESSING UNIONIST CONCERNS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ABOUT WEAPONS AS IT DOES TO ADDRESSING IRA CONCERNS ABOUT THE "TRAP" OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. BRUTON IS FRUSTRATED WITH SINN FEIN/IRA ("I'VE SPENT SO MUCH TIME WITH GERRY ADAMS RECENTLY THAT I KNOW HIS VOICE BETTER THAN MY OWN WIFE'S"). HE INTENDS TO GO AHEAD WITH A SUMMIT IN LONDON ON SEPTEMBER 6 WHETHER SINN FEIN AGREES TO DUBLIN'S LATEST FORMULATION OR NOT. THE GOVERNMENT WILL MEET WITH SINN FEIN TODAY (AUGUST 31), AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS MAY TAKE PLACE OVER THE WEEKEND AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS COUNTING VERY MUCH ON AMERICAN SUPPORT BECAUSE OF THE DISTRUST THAT SINN FEIN HAS ABOUT DECOMMISSIONING, WHICH IS STILL VIEWED AS "SURRENDER" TO THE BRITISH. THE GOVERNMENT IS RELYING ON US TO HELP PERSUADE SINN FEIN THAT THIS IS NOT A "TRAP" BUT A VIABLE WAY TO GO FORWARD.

SMITH
BT
#4285

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SSN>4285
<^TOR>950831085653 M1834284
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
<^SSN>4285
<^TOR>950831085657 M1834286

FROM:
SITREPT

Baker, Jane E.

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Vershbow, Alexander R.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: FW: Thoughts on Peace Process [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Saturday, September 09, 1995 12:32PM

*KB -
put in
with
over SMTR
MS*

Here, finally, is the final version of this message.

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Vershbow, Alexander R.; Soderberg, Nancy E.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: FW: Thoughts on Peace Process [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Saturday, September 09, 1995 12:25 PM

Please ignore earlier version.

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Thoughts on Peace Process [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Saturday, September 09, 1995 12:08 PM

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.18)
KRM 4/11/2023**

NES--

The formulation of the British position that Acram used is that the UK "would consider seriously any recommendations within the terms of reference of the commission on their merits". He also said that the NIO had responded to Sinn Fein's concerns about being asked by the commission itself to hand over weapons up front by assuring them that the timing of decommissioning would be beyond the commission's mandate. This is odd, because the draft agreement (not the communique but the diplomatic minute) says under "terms of reference" that the commission would consult with the parties and governments on the terms of arrangements for decommissioning, report on how the decommissioning process might be taken forward, and make proposals outlining the modalities for a scheme on which agreement might be possible. Coupled with the communique's language on "appropriate context and manner" as quoted by Amb Kerr yesterday, it's clear to me that the mandate does include timing. Trina, by the way, also reported that Sinn Fein is worried that the commission itself will recommend a symbolic gesture; I have told her that we cannot limit the commission's mandate by proscribing certain outcomes -- on this one, SF will just have to trust Mitchell.

Which brings us back to what I think is still the crux of the matter -- how to get Sinn Fein to "trust" the British. Once we clarify that the mandate does include timing, then we have to push the British to harden their commitment to consider seriously the commission's recommendations. I see two ways forward:

--First, we would need to get them to add language saying that they would seriously consider the commission's recommendation as THE way to go forward, a tacit promise not to add additional conditions of their own.

--Second, we need to work with Ancram's insistence that the three Washington criteria are "not doctrinal" but reflect HMG's judgment of the practical steps that need to be taken to get the unionists to the table. We should get the Brits to acknowledge explicitly that the commission will indeed "create a new reality" in that a distinguished body will have taken the time to become experts themselves on this knotty issue, and they will then be as competent as HMG is now to define what needs to be done on decommissioning to build the confidence necessary for talks.

As you have said, the other aspect is to get the British themselves to work with the unionists to define in broader or different terms the kind of climate they need for talks.. Trimble's election reduces the chances they will engage on this, but we should still press the Brits to try and do what we can ourselves.

On the Adams visit, do you think we could ask for a public statement from Sinn Fein on their willingness to consider the concept of an international body on decommissioning as an implied condition for a meeting with the Vice President.?

Finally, it might be useful to suggest to JKS Monday that she engage with Hume on the substance of our proposal to the British.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1995

*Ks
put in book*

MEMORANDUM

TO: SENATOR
FR: TRINA
RE: DISCUSSION WITH JOHN HUME

John Hume just called me (10:30 a.m.) with his latest version of language. This is very confidential -- I'm only sharing this with Jean and the White House.

John suggested the two governments announce the following:

"We are now beginning the all-party talks phase of the peace process which will lead to round table talks involving all parties by an early November date.

Parallel to this process, both governments have asked Senator George Mitchell to act as an international arbiter to insure that the question of all arms, now thankfully silent, is settled to the satisfaction of both governments."

This new language is an attempt by John to amend his previous language that the British Government rejected. A significant difference from a few days ago is that John dropped the paragraph which called for all-party pre talks as the first step. For Sinn Fein, he's added the "early November date."

John also says that the British want the word "illegal" inserted before the word "arms" in the second paragraph. Tonight at 6:00 p.m., John will talk to Adams and ask him if he'll agree to that language if the governments also add something to the effect of "this will be followed by a necessary removal of troops and necessary movement to civil policing." [This could be read two ways. If it means the order in which which Mitchell will take those two issues up in the commission will be illegal arms first and troops second, maybe that can fly. But if the language is read to mean the actual demilitarization will happen in that order, I doubt that will fly with Adams. I always assumed you'd have some paramilitary weapons handed in and then some troops removed and that it would go back and forth -- I can't believe the IRA will agree to hand in all weapons before the beginning of troops withdrawal. As troops have already begun to be withdrawn, I'm giving that sentence the former interpretation, but that will have to be clarified..

John will also ask Adams if the IRA could possibly agree to a gesture before Clinton arrives -- i.e. let people know where a cache can be found in a field. Again, given all we've heard from Sinn Fein, I don't see it happening but it's always worth a try.

John says Mitchell doesn't like the idea of him alone being mentioned rather than a commission. John says Mitchell would be free to appoint advisers and it would, in effect, be a commission.

cc: Amb. Smith, Carey, Nancy, Mary Ann Peters

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WJ

Kessinger, Jodi

From: Peters, Mary A.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; Soderberg, Nancy E.
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Revised Ground Rules Paper [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Friday, April 12, 1996 12:36PM
Priority: High

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F(3.20)
KBH 4/11/2023

TO: TL
NES
FROM: MAP

What we received from Dermot yesterday is the Irish Government's comments on the British redraft of the ground rules paper that was given to the parties on March 15. (Faxed to TL and NES.) The Irish additions to the new British text are underlined.

The changes proposed by the British do not affect the parts of the paper of most concern to nationalists -- the assurances that the agenda will be comprehensive and that the governments will use their influence to ensure that all agenda items are fully addressed and to overcome any obstacles that arise (paras 12-13 of new draft).

The main change the British made in response to Trimble is to adjust the language on the format of the talks to allow the same people to participate in the negotiations on all three strands -- in other words the meetings will not overlap. The Irish have proposed changes to the British wording on this issue but the net effect is the same -- Trimble can be sure of not being sold out behind his back (maybe to his face...) The British also proposed allowing the parties to participate in Strand 3 but the Irish want to walk that back to consultation and liaison.

There are some phrases still bracketed, but that is the essence of the proposed changes.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

18-30 22/11/96
to [unclear]

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 November 1996

I have been reflecting on the position we have reached following our phone conversation on 6 November.

Since the summer when I first discussed this matter with John Hume and in my recent discussions with you, I have had two concerns. First, the IRA's actions on the ground, and what we know of their future plans, are incompatible with what we have been told is Mr. Adams' readiness to guarantee a permanent ceasefire immediately following a Government statement which, as I have said throughout, can only repeat existing policy positions. But, secondly, I am determined that the peace process should continue because that is what the people of Northern Ireland want and deserve. We have therefore kept the door open for Sinn Fein to join the negotiations if there is a genuinely unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire. But each atrocity the IRA has committed has widened the credibility gap to be bridged in the event of a new ceasefire.

As I have repeatedly made clear, I cannot - and will not - negotiate Government policy in exchange for a ceasefire. All along, I have said I will stick strictly to what is existing Government policy as set out on the public record. The text I was given by John Hume on 10 October departs from existing Government policy in places. I cannot accept it as it stands.

When we spoke following the text we showed you on 5 November, we agreed that any ceasefire declaration needed to offer more credible guarantees

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2011-0365-F, 3.21]

than the last one. I made clear we would need to be convinced that a new ceasefire would be intended to last and that we also looked for more commitment to the consent principle and parallel decommissioning. You therefore agreed to ask Sinn Fein for the terms of an IRA ceasefire declaration. I said that if these were sufficiently clear and dependable this would create a new situation, and we might be prepared to reconsider the language used in our text of 5 November about the terms of entry for Sinn Fein following a ceasefire.

I am very grateful for your determined efforts but, as I understand it, Sinn Fein have failed to respond with any language. I am told Sinn Fein said they were not prepared to spell out the bottom line of their language until they were sure what we would say in our statement.

Let there be no doubt I want progress and not stalemate, if that is achievable. Since Sinn Fein failed to respond to your efforts, we have now reached the point where it is right for me to set out our firm position so that Sinn Fein are in no doubt of it and can respond accordingly. The attached text does this.

I believe it is a reasonable and fair position, consistent with our existing policy and with our obligations under the law. It does what John Hume originally told us would deliver an IRA ceasefire - a ceasefire which would be for good this time. It sets out key reassurances on the basis of our existing policy. It takes account of the suggested approach you put to us on 5 November and sets out a process of entry to the negotiations which seeks to take account of the political realities on all sides. I know you understand these realities - created by the IRA's own actions. It is neither credible nor deliverable to ignore them.

What this text cannot, of course, do - not least because Sinn Fein have refused to tell you - is take account of what the IRA will say if they declare a

ceasefire and how that will be reflected on the ground. If there is a new ceasefire, our reaction to it will depend crucially on both of these things.

We now need urgently to establish whether a genuine and dependable ceasefire will be delivered if the British Government sets out its existing policy position on the negotiations and how Sinn Fein may join them in the terms attached. It should lead straightaway to an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire, which should never have been abandoned. That would greatly enhance the prospects for lasting peace and an overall political settlement.

But if the IRA chooses not to take this route to inclusive negotiations, it should be under no illusions. The IRA will not bomb Sinn Fein to the negotiating table, now or in the future - further violence will simply expose Sinn Fein's words about peace as a cynical ploy which commands no credibility. As you and I have both made clear, the talks will go forward without Sinn Fein.

If Mr. Adams is serious, the clear position set out in the attached text offers the basis on which Sinn Fein can set out the terms of an IRA ceasefire, in which case I hope we can quickly bring this to the conclusion which we all desire. Christmas then offers a natural break over which all can reflect on the new situation. But if not, then to end the current uncertainty and speculation, I believe I must set out our position in public before the end of this month.

I shall be writing shortly in similar terms to John Hume.

*Yours Ever,
Tony*

Mr. John Bruton, T.D.

[2011-0355-F, 3.22]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

2/17 Adams/TZ 815am → 845

Ancrum was asked @ SF in election process.

Crucially SF excluded from elections or sign some pledge re: details of Mitchell report or consent clause.

Good meeting w/ Irish, spelt out package, meeting Home this afternoon

Dublin was trying to get us + UK support prior talks, election going into negotiations

• Their vision of election one that led quickly + directly into talks

Dublin - right - only reason for elections the Unionists want them + back unionists into talks + put British in position of having to make them happen

Have't heard T. Mills talk @ negotiations guarantees @ key need to be public + clearly stated. Obviously, I presume if you/we get over all difficulties - is clearer

Have to persuade IRA on clearer

• Hope negotiations, will get clearer - Some give
won

will talk to John

If Assata had remained in place, 1st scenario not disadvantageous - US on moral high ground, Okinawa tail wagging dog

RJ - pursue clearer idea + define it in a way

- SF would have been in position of leader
Br + CIA

- end of ceasefire → urgency in getting package together, . did have many of moral high ground.

- If have package, huge, huge difficulty in persuading CIA to stop if have assurances negotiations will start

Don't know if can of bad faith of Okinawa

18 months have s'd people's perceptions.

in most have got + rest, here have so many diff elements, armed faction

RE: CIA - only thing I can do is pursue option

of trying to get a package together + try to persuade ICA to swallow. Even if not, still need to get ICA to clarify

R. Every time bomb, price goes up + ICA

H - I don't have any control. bombs being sent out at 10:00 - ICA attacking me.

Just try + get back on course by dint of leadership + personality what is being given up re US, US. Militant campaign in what have tolerance - some row ble of how Brits handled it.

at that pt. I have to make a very personal decision, if I fail, I have to tell you.

R. well all have choices.

A. can't be waiting for next bomb, if I can't get back on board, we may have to put it which I don't want + I have personal choices.

Pauline + ICA people - Summit is a date @ which these things have to be judged.

6

Peter King - Howell

"Convinced Howell / SF want to reinstate ceasefire
 realize realize have to accept elections post bomb
 need date for ~~the~~ negotiations.

show real all party talks w/out wyle room fr

Brits

- undercut ~~prob~~ Adams on Unit.
- as far as getting ceasefire, grand gesture
 is. Mitchell going over - temporary ceasefire

some fatalistic.

A IWA gave plenty of times. Silliness that Dublin
can hardly argue for inclusion when excluding

Why Hume opposed to elections - if no support in broad
Catholic community bc of 50 yrs of deplorable use of
power if church keep Co County power with
become a shunting match

Spring made good speech ^{reads us} why 'electors'

Need Guarantee, certification of 2 parts to start
~~election~~ negotiation

Q after elections

A People jumped into swim track, Mitchell report

Q we can help playing a role in helping them guarantee
will be sharing of you

A- you should pray

Q if you can use some Protestant prayers

A- clergy - we need more than the holy spirit
will call late Monday evening after Dublin

I accept your need to take pragmatic judgment /
hope nothing else happens

R - when talk to John, combine referendum + elective process
idea.

A - No one quite understands referendum idea

R - hope John doesn't set so hard on that Laissez
faire -

A - referendum has no effect on process, I want to
R - unless it keeps him in,

A - anyone would vote for non-violence then go on beating
them over. If IRA committed to violence, will go on
could say 90% - very few who pursue war is at
language of reluctant involvement

Unionists ruled out entirely. Some needs for Govt

R - Not saying a good idea - but if it's John's price.

A - I'm keen to work out of John's financial requirements
+ then seek to sell it to IRA. Package will be complicated
with elections. → But give them an offer they can't refuse
give them a negotiation + they have to stop.

While this very high debt

R - has to be a package sold to the 250,000 in Ballpark
children + eff. strong impression what have talks, equal
unless there are ~~talk~~ ceasefire. Have said will lead to talks
+ IRA will cease. If hadn't been for devices, could
have been otherwise. IRA ~~for talk~~

72104

Code 1743

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TL - Adams, Trimble, Hume, Crowe, Jean
Majn, Irish goats.

Adams Call

- shortly before
- sympathy for victims.

Deeply shocked, saddened
POTUS STMT.

underscore need to ensure process not derailed
R spoken Doing what we can.
POTUS to call Majn.

Terrorist incidents in ME
enemies.

Neel

Total Surplus

830 am CA meeting.

McQuinnis was told last weekend
this would happen, thought he'd
stopped it.

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Prime Minister Major

LOCATION: Residence

NOTETAKERS: Daniel Flessas, Kathi Guekel, Deuce Martinez and Katherine O'Loughlin

DATE/TIME: 9 February 1996, 1813-1823 EST

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0350-F (3.23)
KBH 4/11/2023

President Clinton: John?

Prime Minister Major: Hi Bill.

President Clinton: I'm really sorry man.

Prime Minister Major: It's bad news, really bad news. Not just the event; it's difficult to see where you put the train on the tracks.

President Clinton: Well, it's hard to explain. I had no inclination of it.

Prime Minister Major: Nor we.

President Clinton: Adams was here and Dick Spring was here yesterday. I talked to them and I didn't see it coming. I feel badly. He was grousing around and I told him that he could say what he wanted to say about what John Major said, but the fact remains he found a way to at least offer you an alternative...possible permutations of the election proposal.

Prime Minister Major: What was frustrating, as far as elections, is that we faced a dilemma and I could see a way through it. It was absolutely clear that Trimble and Paisley would not join talks without decommissioning. Adams wouldn't or couldn't. We had to find a way around it and the only way I could conceive was the election route. What I said to Hume, which he grotesquely misrepresented, was that what we need is an election to a body with no legislative powers, no administrative authority, and time-limited so it could not be the old Just a passport to commit the Unionists to sit down with Adams. I had a whole series of meetings with Hume, Trimble and Paisley and also with Michael Ancram and we were close to getting a formula that all the parties could have accepted. We could have had the elections in six weeks and had them sitting down talking in eight weeks. Now this makes it unlikely, almost impossible I think.

President Clinton: Where do we go from here?

Prime Minister Major: At this moment I'm unsure. I'm very grateful for your statement and the speed in which it was made. I intend to dampen things down. I spoke to Bruton

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

and I will speak with him tomorrow and Sunday. I think we just have to see what the ramifications are. It's a curious situation we just can't fathom. The codeword was a bona fide IRA codeword indicating the bombing was a Provisional Army Council effort. We no longer think that it's a splinter group. It was a mainstream Provisional Army Council effort. Yet the journalists who know Sinn Fein well said many of the people in Sinn Fein were caught flatfooted. Adams and McGuinness are PIRA council members and it's very surprising that Sinn Fein would be caught flatfooted. I suspect we will know soon enough. Maybe for some reason Adams and McGuinness didn't know - that is unlikely. Maybe they didn't tell anybody - that's more likely. Maybe they knew about it, but not the timing. Maybe there is some other explanation. In any event, I think we are going to see how to keep the show on the road. First, we must make sure that the British and Irish governments lock arms and I think Bruton and I will be able to do that. Then we can assess things. Trimble is on his way to you I think.

President Clinton: Yes he is, but he may think it will be a wasted trip now. I hope he still comes.

Prime Minister Major: I hope he still comes to you. Paisley has softened his position a great deal. We're surprised to the extent he has been accommodating, very surprised. I hope Trimble still goes to see you and you have a good talk with him and I can get a good readout from you or Tony.

President Clinton: We'll do that. Tony is talking to Holmes. I just wanted to say I was sorry. If there is anything I can do. We need to send a message to the Irish that we are pissed.

Prime Minister Major: And directly to Adams. Did you see Adam's statement?

President Clinton: Yes, it was a chicken-shit statement. That's not a very diplomatic statement!

Prime Minister Major: That's a good way to describe it.

President Clinton: He was here and seemed ill at ease. It's not like I had a premonition about this, but I had the feeling it was like he didn't know what to do. He didn't agree with elections, but I told him you clearly wanted a peace agreement.

Prime Minister Major: The argument that infuriates me is that I've taken these actions to get Unionist votes in the House of Commons. The reality is that if I wanted Unionist votes, I wouldn't have started this enterprise. You also saw that Molyneaux of the Unionists led a vote of confidence. You saw that the Unionists voted against it and the government almost fell. It's pretty bizarre. It is becoming a piece of legend, but it is untrue. If they had been at any meetings with the Unionists, they would know that.

President Clinton: Well it seems to me that it's not rational for them to assume you don't want to do this or you wouldn't have. Yes, well.

Prime Minister Major: I'm grateful for what you have done and let's keep in touch.

President Clinton: If you can think of anything else, let me know. I'll rack my brain.

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Prime Minister. OK, God bless. If we think of anything, we'll be in touch.

President Clinton: Thank you John.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Prime Minister Bruton

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.24)
KBM 4/11/2023

LOCATION: Residence

NOTETAKERS: Daniel Flessas, Kathi Guekel, Deuce Martinez and Katherine O'Loughlin

DATE/TIME: 9 February 1996, 1849-1853 EST

President Clinton: Hello.

Prime Minister Bruton: Hello Bill.

President Clinton: I just wanted to call and tell you how sorry I am about what happened.

Prime Minister Bruton: It is dreadful really. It was completely sudden and unexpected. Thank you for your statement. It touched a lot of people. It appears a lot of Sinn Fein's leadership was taken by surprise.

President Clinton: Adams was just here a few days ago you know.

Prime Minister Bruton: I know. Since then I met with him and it seemed to be a normal meeting. He seems completely taken aback by what has happened, but it may be an act. His statement hasn't condemned or disassociated themselves from it, he just said regret which is what they used in statements during the height of violence.

President Clinton: Blaming the British under these circumstances is pretty gutless.

Prime Minister Bruton: No proportionality. In any event, the idea that we have been putting forth on proximity talks was beginning to gain some ground, beginning to bring the British opinion around. We will land it soon enough. This of course puts this on the back burner. We obviously have a huge number of decisions to take from the security perspective and what attitude to take with Sinn Fein. We don't want to rush into it, but we can't reverse the course. We have to keep hope alive.

President Clinton: Yes, I agree with that. We don't want to overreact. It is sad and troubling.

Prime Minister Bruton: Yes I know.

President Clinton: I just wanted to call and check in with you and tell you if you have any ideas about what we ought to do, just give us a call and let us know what to do and we'll do it.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Prime Minister Bruton: Yes, I'd like to take the opportunity to call in a week or so if you have the time when things are a little clearer.

President Clinton: Oh, sure. I know you've got to think through this. I just didn't want this day to go by without talking to you.

Prime Minister Bruton: I appreciate it. Thank you very much indeed.

President Clinton: Thank you, friend.

Prime Minister Bruton: Good-bye.

President Clinton: Good-bye, thanks.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2/14/96

96 FEB 13 08:53

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.25)

KBH 7/11/2023

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Northern Ireland

Agree - Treaty

-end violence

We are dealing with two main issues as we seek to get the peace process back on track in the wake of the London bombing: how to keep all parties focused on the goal of substantive negotiations, and how to handle U.S. contacts with Adams and other Sinn Fein members.

Negotiations

Prime Ministers Bruton and Major are tentatively scheduled to meet February 21, at which time we hope they will announce a package for getting talks back on track. Major made a helpful statement in Parliament yesterday in which he left open the door to Sinn Fein participation if the cease-fire is restored. The question is what other conditions are placed on Sinn Fein's return to the table. The package must be saleable to Sinn Fein/IRA, while not appearing to reward violence by easing the terms for all-party talks. In the wake of the bombing it must recreate a measure of confidence among unionists.

We think such a package would contain the following elements:

- the *sine qua non* of a restored cease-fire;
- an elective process as a door to all-party talks;
- an elected body that would meet periodically while negotiations continue but would have no legislative or administrative powers, nor any role in negotiations;
- acceptance by Sinn Fein of the Mitchell Report, including the six principles of nonviolence and, in principle, the proposal for decommissioning in parallel with talks; and
- some kind of proximity talks of the kind proposed by the Irish Government before the bombing, in which the parties would ratify the package.

SF. cont.

More difficult than we are

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 2/13/06

referendum

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

The only element that was not part of the likely package before the bombing is the co-existence of an elected body with the negotiations. While it is not intrinsically necessary to the process, it probably represents the price the unionists will exact for staying engaged. The key will be getting SDLP leader John Hume to go along. We have invited him to come here as soon as possible.

I will be in touch with the Irish and British governments to urge them to agree on this or a similar package before the Major-Bruton Summit. If it will help get their agreement, I will ask you to call both prime ministers later in the week. Senator Mitchell expects to see both Major and Bruton when he is in Europe on other business next week; we will consider whether it would be useful for him to have other meetings as well.

Adams/Sinn Fein Contacts

There is great interest in whether the USG will revoke the visa waivers and fundraising permission given to Gerry Adams and other Sinn Fein members in the context of the peace process. There are four Sinn Fein members who would otherwise be ineligible to enter the U.S. who have valid visa waivers. At least one of them is in the U.S. now lobbying on behalf of Sinn Fein. It is unclear whether he is seeking to raise funds. We could seek his voluntary departure from the U.S. to facilitate the peace process. If, however, we revoke his visa and seek to compel his departure, or curtail his activities, we may be challenged in court on First Amendment grounds. Adams, by far the most visible, just applied for a new waiver last week to replace the one that expired February 12. He wants to come here for several weeks in early March and plans to raise funds while here.

The key decision is whether to renew Adams' waiver and if so, whether to reimpose the prohibition on fundraising. Justice is inclined to revoke the fundraising permit on all outstanding visas and Congress is likely to raise the issue also. My sense is we should defer a decision until we can judge whether he is having any success getting the cease-fire restored. If nothing changes in the next few weeks, one option is to ask him voluntarily to defer his travel. We will consult with the Attorney General in the next few days and work out an agreed approach for your consideration. We will need to make decisions on the issues well before the St. Patrick's Day events begin March.

I THINK THIS IS PROBABLY A MISTAKE
 I think this is probably a mistake
 AGREE
 agree
 agree
 AGREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

2 113196

0845
S. DECKER
96 FEB 11 PB: 02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 11, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Strategy for Northern Ireland Peace Process

Purpose

To decide how to try to keep the peace process moving in the wake of the Canary Wharf bombing of February 9.

POLICY

Objective:

The IRA has now claimed responsibility for the bomb, which took the lives of two people and injured scores. Our objective is to keep the peace process moving in spite of this setback. This requires simultaneously pursuing three priorities:

- We must stand with the British and Irish Governments in condemning terrorism and making clear our revulsion at the resort to violence by the IRA.
- At the same time, we must keep alive hope in the peace process. This implies that the Administration needs to remain actively engaged.
- We must give Gerry Adams incentive to try to restore the consensus of the IRA leadership for a political solution rather than a campaign of violence. Adams is the only person with the stature to do this, if it can be done at all. Giving Adams some room to maneuver while not being seen to condone the bombing or his failure to condemn it will be tricky -- but very important.

Without a cease-fire and Sinn Fein's participation, negotiations might achieve a political settlement -- but not peace. Therefore we must do what we can to keep Sinn Fein involved in the process and move to all-party talks as soon as possible. The key issue is what additional steps, beyond the sine qua non of a restored cease-fire, will be required for Sinn Fein to have a seat at the table. Our view is that going through an elective process has now become a minimum requirement. NIO Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5d

Declassify On: 2/11/06

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.26)

KBH 4/11/2023

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Mayhew and (privately) even Deputy Prime Minister Spring think that agreeing to decommissioning in parallel with the talks (a suggestion in the Mitchell report) may now also be necessary. Other elements that might be included are a total renunciation of violence and acceptance of the Mitchell principles by Sinn Fein. Some type of proximity talks, perhaps with Sinn Fein at one remove, are also a possibility. We will be urging the players to avoid locking themselves into a particular formula at this point.

At some point, if the cease-fire is not restored and Sinn Fein does not distance itself from the resumption of violence (which would in effect mean a split in the IRA), we will want to pursue the second-best option, which is negotiations without Sinn Fein's participation.

ISSUES:

One issue that must be addressed is whether we should join with the British and Irish Governments in refusing to conduct business as usual with Adams until the cease-fire is restored. We do not want to undercut whatever influence Adams has in the IRA by publicly taking away one of his "cards," his access to us. We propose to say that we plan to continue to talk to all parties about how to move the peace process forward, but we have no current plans to meet with Adams. (This would not now preclude telephone calls to Adams.)

A second question is whether the permission that was granted to Sinn Fein to raise funds in this country was contingent on the cease-fire. We are pursuing this urgently with Justice. If the privilege did automatically expire, we will announce that fact.

The related issue is whether to revoke Adams' visa waiver. At present we would plan to discourage him from seeking to come to the U.S., so as not to have to decide between undercutting him (and taking heat from the Irish-American community) and appearing to condone terrorism. We are looking into the legal status of other Sinn Fein representatives who have visa waivers.

Finally, we will be asked whether Adams will be invited to the annual St. Patrick's Day event. Publicly we will say the guest list has not been decided. At present we do not see how he can be invited unless the cease-fire is restored.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO KEEP THE PROCESS GOING:

Senator Mitchell will be Europe February 21-22 for non-Ireland-related business. We recommend that we ask him to meet with Prime Ministers Major and Bruton to discuss where we go from here. Beyond that, there are a number of other options for

diplomatic activity, including a Hume visit here later this week (Nancy has invited him); inviting other Irish and British officials here; or a trip by Nancy and/or me to the UK and Ireland in a week or so.

We would also work on how to orchestrate an expression of popular support for peace. One option, which intrigues John Hume, would be to hold a referendum to allow people to express opposition to violence and support for negotiations. We will work on this and other ideas, such as a rally or letter-writing campaign.

Ron Brown has proposed a follow-up trade and investment conference that would focus very specifically on the commercial aspect and firm-to-firm "matchmaking." We would go ahead and announce this conference, probably to take place in the U.S. in June.

CONGRESSIONAL/DIPLOMATIC/PUBLIC LIAISON:

If you approve this strategy, we will consult with London and Dublin about what we plan to do. We will also need to keep key members of Congress and Irish-Americans informed.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the strategy outlined above.

Approve

Disapprove

*Brainstorming
ideas*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.27)
KBH 4/11/2023

POINTS FOR CALL TO JOHN HOLMES

- Had a useful meeting with Dick Spring today. Just as President did yesterday, focused on getting them engaged on elective process idea.
-
- Want to talk to you about how to move things along and how we can be helpful.
- Irish have a legitimate concern about end of February; need to see something happening by then. Planned Major-Bruton summit offers opportunity to announce a package deal.
- Doubtful we can get there in the Mayhew Spring channel- even if additional meetings were to be scheduled before summit. My impression is that they talk past each other.
- Prepared to quietly talk to all sides, keeping in close touch with you, to make this happen.
- Key Irish concern is link between elective process and all-party talks; they do not hear that link from Mayhew, though we have heard it so clearly in Prime Minister's statement, from you and from Ancram.
- Want to know that if they persuade nationalists to go through an elective process, talks will definitely be convened. Need package deal, with dates for an election and for talks announced at same time, preferably at Summit.
- Will fax you three assurances Spring would need, preferably in writing.
- Have the impression that they would drop the proximity talks proposal if they could be sure of talks. We have made the point that proximity talks would not be necessary if a deal can be reached.
- Also have impression that Spring will not insist on Trimble meeting him prior to all-party talks.
- This is scenario you and I and Ancram have been discussing, implicit in Prime Minister Major's statement. It means bringing Trimble along, and committing to all party talks

once we get agreement on elections. Can not give Trimble a Veto

- Interestingly, Spring's staff commented in an aside that the paper you passed to them on possible election modalities was a good basis, if they could be sure the process will lead to talks.
- **If necessary** : Understand that talks without Trimble would not be useful, but having set the elective process as a gateway, HMG cannot be seen to be deflected by Trimble or the process will lose credibility with all sides.
- Will be seeing Trimble Monday for lunch: President will see him that afternoon. Propose to stress need for him to be prepared to participate in all-party talks via an elective process.
- What other points would it be useful to make?
- If helpful, will be prepared to host people here to get down to specifics, or to travel to London or Dublin.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 08

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: HARMON LAKEA NSC PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 211911Z FEB 96

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9176
INFO RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 8182
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 4081
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC//CT//
RUEAWJA/DOJ WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.32)
KBH 7/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 002197

STATE FOR P, EUR, EUR/UBI, S/CT AND CA/VO

NSC FOR LAKE, SODERBERG AND PETERS

JUSTICE FOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL GORELICK AND INS
COMMISSIONER MEISNER

JOINT EMBASSY/CONGEN BELFAST MESSAGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/01
TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: U.S. POLICY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE
BREAKDOWN

REF: A) LONDON 1806 B) LONDON 2064 C) DUBLIN 694

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
REASON 1.5 (D).

2. *(c)* SUMMARY: IN THE COMING DAYS, WE WILL HAVE TO
MAKE CHOICES ABOUT U.S. POLICY ON CONTACTS WITH SINN
FEIN AND ON ISSUANCE OF VISAS AND FUND RAISING
PRIVILEGES. NOW THAT IT IS CLEAR THE IRA CEASEFIRE IS
FINISHED AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS HAS
ENTERED A NEW PHASE, THIS MESSAGE (FOLLOWING UP POINTS
MADE IN REF A) RECOMMENDS THE U.S IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE
ADJUSTMENTS TO ITS POLICIES.

3. *(c)* A KEY OBJECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY OVER THE LAST TWO
YEARS HAS BEEN TO ENCOURAGE THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT TO
SE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL MEANS OF EXPRESSION RATHER THAN
TERRORIST TACTICS. THIS SHOULD REMAIN OUR POLICY; TO
CUT OFF ALL POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN COULD

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 08

ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO SEE VIOLENCE AS THE ONLY MEANS OF ACHIEVING THEIR POLITICAL GOALS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THERE CAN BE NO RELAXTION OF OUR FIRM POLICY AGAINST TERRORISM. IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR THAT THERE ARE DEMONSTRABLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT RESULTING FROM THE IRA'S RETURN TO VIOLENCE. WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS BY MAINTAINING LOWER LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WITH SINN FEIN BUT REFUSING HIGH-LEVEL, HIGH-PROFILE CONTACT. SINN FEIN MEMBERS, INCLUDING GERRY ADAMS, WHO REQUIRE WAIVERS OF VISA INELIGIBLITY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS FOR SINGLE-ENTRY ADMITTANCE, AS WAS THE CASE BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE. THE CIRCLE OF SINN FEIN OFFICIALS WHO ROUTINELY HAVE BEEN GRANTED WAIVERS FOR TRAVEL ON PARTY BUSINESS SHOULD BE NARROWED. FUND RAISING PRIVILEGES FOR SINN FEIN MEMBERS WHO REQUIRE VISA WAIVERS SHOULD BE SUSPENDED BUT SINN FEIN SHOULD NOT BE ADDED TO THE LIST OF PROSCRIBED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THESE ALL ARE INTERMEDIATE STEPS WHICH COULD BE RATCHETTED UP OR DOWN IN THE FUTURE TO ADJUST TO DEVELOPING CIRCUMSTANCES. END SUMMARY

CEASEFIRE DEAD, PEACE PROCESS WOUNDED

4. ~~(S)~~ THE IRA CEASEFIRE APPEARS TO BE FINISHED, AT LEAST FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. ANY LINGERING HOPE THAT THE FEB 9 CANARY WHARF BOMB MIGHT HAVE BEEN A "ONE-OFF" INCIDENT HABEEN BURIED BY THE BOMB PLANTED IN THE WEST END THEATER DISTRICT AND BY THE LETHAL BLAST WHICH DESTROYED A LONDON BUS ON FEB 18. SECURITY OFFICIALS HERE ARE BRACED FOR MORE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL AND IN OTHER CITIES AROUND BRITAIN. THEY ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE VIOLENCE SOON COULD RETURN TO NORTHERN IRELAND, AS POLITICAL AND LOGISTICAL OBSTACLES MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE IRA TO SUSTAIN A TERRORIST CAMPAIGN EXCLUSIVELY ON THE BRITISH MAINLAND. LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES THUS FAR HAVE SHOWN RESTRAINT, BUT THEY COULD CITE ANY INCIDENT -- AND CERTAINLY ANY ATTACK IN A PROTESTANT AREA OF NORTHERN IRELAND -- AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR OWN RETURN TO VIOLENCE.

5. ~~(S)~~ THE PEACE PROCESS IS NOT DEAD. THE GOVERNMENTS IN BOTH LONDON AND DUBLIN CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR A WAY TO BRING ALL PARTIES TOGETHER FOR TALKS AIMED AT FINDING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER, THE RESUMPTION OF THE IRA'S TERRORIST CAMPAIGN HAS ENORMOUSLY COMPLICATED THE PROCESS, NOT LEAST BY CASTING SEVERE DOUBT ON SINN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 08

FEIN'S COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL METHODS AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. POINTING TO PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION, MANY IN THE UK -- NOT LEAST UNIONIST LEADERS WHO BELIEVE THEIR SUSPICIONS HAVE BEEN VALIDATED -- ARGUE THAT SINN FEIN HAS FORFEITED ITS RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

6. (✓) MAJOR AND MAYHEW, WHILE REFUSING CONTACT WITH REPUBLICAN LEADERS, HAVE CAREFULLY AVOIDED "SLAMMING THE DOOR" ON ALL DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. BY REACHING AGREEMENT WITH DUBLIN ON A BROADLY-ACCEPTABLE ELECTIVE PROCESS THAT WILL PERMIT A DIRECT MOVE TO ALL-PARTY TALKS, HMG HOLDS OUT HOPE THAT THE IRA CEASEFIRE CAN BE REINSTATED AND THAT SINN FEIN WILL USE THE ELECTION TO
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 LONDON 002197

STATE FOR P, EUR, EUR/UBI, S/CT AND CA/VO

NSC FOR LAKE, SODERBERG AND PETERS

JUSTICE FOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL GORELICK AND INS COMMISSIONER MEISNER

JKINT EMBASSY/CONGEN BELFAST MESSAGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/01

TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: U.S. POLICY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE
 BREAKDOWN

DEMONSTRATE ITS DEMOCRATIC MANDATE.

U.S. CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN

7. (✓) THE END OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE REINFORCES THE EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDATION (REF A) REGARDING USG CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN. BY PROVIDING VISIBLE PUBLIC SUPPORT TO SINN FEIN IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO AND DURING THE CEASEFIRE, OUR POLICY HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT TO USE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL MEANS OF EXPRESSION AND STOP RESORTING TO TERRORIST TACTICS. WE DO NOT RECOMMEND THAT THE U.S. NOW CUT OFF ALL POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN, AS THAT COULD GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO THOSE WHO SEE VIOLECE AS THE ONLY VIABLE MEANS OF ACHIEVING THEIR POLITICAL GOALS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE CANNOT ACT AS IF NOTHING HAS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 08

HAPPENED; THAT THERE ARE DEMONSTRABLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT WHICH FLOW FROM THE IRA'S RETURN TO VIOLENCE MUST BE MADE CLEAR. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND HALTING HIGH-LEVEL, HIGH-PROFILE MEETINGS WITH ADAMS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP. THIS IS CRUCIAL TO KEEPING THE U.S. IN STEP WITH DUBLIN AND LONDON, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE MADE A CALCULATION THAT TALKS WITH SINN FEIN CANNOT BE CONDUCTED ON A BUSINESS-AS-USUAL BASIS.

8. (X) UNLESS AND UNTIL THE IRA REINSTATES THE CEASEFIRE AND SINN FEIN CREDIBLY DEMONSTRATES ITS COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL METHODS, SINN FEIN LEADERS MUST NOT BE RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE. U.S. OFFICIALS BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER WHO MEET WITH ADAMS SHOULD DO SO AT A VENUE OTHER THAN THE WHITE HOUSE/OEOB. A PHOTO OF ADAMS WALKING INTO THE WHITE HOUSE, NO MATTER WHOM HE IS SCHEDULED TO MEET, WOULD SET A MATCH TO THE COMBUSTIBLE ELEMENTS OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION. THIS HAS OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING OF A WHITE HOUSE CELEBRATION OF ST. PATRICK'S DAY; IN OUR VIEW, ADAMS SHOULD NOT BE INVITED. THE BRITISH, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC, SIMPLY WOULD NOT COMPREHEND AN ADAMS APPEARANCE AND WE DOUBT WHETHER THE TAOISEACH WOULD WANT TO BE SEEN IN A ROOM WITH HIM EITHER.

9. (X) BRITISH OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THEY WANT NO HINT OF THE KIND OF TRANSATLANTIC DISCORD WHICH FOLLOWED THE INITIAL U.S. DECISION TO GRANT A VISA TO ADAMS. THEY HAVE WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE BOMBINGS AND DEEPLY APPRECIATE CONTINUING U.S. SUPPORT. THEIR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE IS TO MAINTAIN "TRILATERAL" SOLIDARITY, AND HMG -- LIKE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, NO DOUBT -- WILL GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO AVOID ANY CRITICISM OF USG ACTION. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH A SPLIT WOULD GIVE NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. HOWEVER, HOSTILE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ADMISSION OF SINN FEIN LEADERS TO THE WHITE HOUSE UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD BE PUT TO MAJOR IN PARLIAMENT. HIS RESPONSES COULD NOT BE FAVORABLE.

10. (X) THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THE UTILITY OF MAINTAINING CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN. EVEN THOUGH ADAMS' ABILITY TO INFLUENCE IRA HARDLINERS APPEARS MARGINAL AND ALTHOUGH MAYHEW IN PARLIAMENT ON FEB 19 DENOUNCED ADAMS'S APPROACH AS "DISGUSTINGLY HYPOCRITICAL," HMG RECOGNIZES THAT AT THIS POINT THERE

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 08

IS NO OTHER FIGURE AVAILABLE AS A CONDUIT TO THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT. WE ALSO SHOULD CONTINUE BEHIND THE SCENES CONTACT WITH SINN FEIN LEADERS IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

VISAS

11. (C) AS NOTED IN REFTTEL, WE HAVE A WIDE ARRAY OF OPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO OUR TREATMENT OF SINN FEIN REQUESTS FOR VISAS. THE USG HAS A LONG-STANDING POLICY OF DENYING WAIVERS TO INELIGIBLE APPLICANTS WHO ARE INVOLVED IN SUPPORTING TERRORISM. HOWEVER, REFUSING ADAMS A VISA MAY BE INTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION THAT WE ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN SERIOUS POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT. OUR DESIRE TO DEMONSTRATE OUR REJECTION OF VIOLENCE MUST BE TEMPERED BY -- AS
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 LONDON 002197

STATE FOR P, EUR, EUR/UBI, S/CT AND CA/VO

NSC FOR LAKE, SODERBERG AND PETERS

JUSTICE FOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL GORELICK AND INS COMMISSIONER MEISNER

JOINT EMBASSY/CONGEN BELFAST MESSAGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/01

TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: U.S. POLICY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE
BREAKDOWN

REPUBLICAN SOURCES EMPHASIZE TO US -- THE NECESSITY OF NOT CLOSING THE DOOR ON THOSE IN SINN FEIN WHO MAY STILL BE KEY TO RESTORING PEACE. WITHOUT GOING AS FAR AS REFUSING ADAMS AND OTHER KEY SINN FEIN MEMBERS AT THIS TIME, SCALING BACK THE FAVORABLE TREATMENT ACCORDED THEIR VISA APPLICATIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE CLEARLY WOULD SIGNAL OUR REJECTION OF ANY ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY THE IRA'S RETURN TO VIOLENCE. THERE ARE TWO ACTIONS WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED: 1) ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, RESTRICTING VALIDITY OF VISAS ISSUED TO SINN FEIN OFFICIALS AND 2) NARROWING THE CIRCLE OF SINN FEIN OFFICIALS WHO ROUTINELY HAVE BEEN GRANTED WAIVERS FOR TRAVEL ON PARTY BUSINESS.

12. (C) ADAMS FIRST WAS GRANTED A WAIVER IN FEBRUARY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 08

126

1994 BECAUSE HE WAS INTERPRETED AS HAVING ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. OTHER SINN FEIN MEMBERS (E.G., CAHILL AND TREANOR) WHO ALSO WOULD HAVE BEEN INELIGIBLE BECAUSE OF THEIR TERRORIST HISTORIES WERE ISSUED VISAS ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF BUILDING SUPPORT FOR THE CEASEFIRE. AFTER INITIALLY ISSUING WAIVERS FOR SINGLE-ENTRY VISAS TO ADAMS AND OTHERS, IT WAS OUR STANDARD POLICY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE TO GRANT SINN FEIN OFFICIALS VISAS VALID FOR MULTIPLE ENTRIES OVER A THREE-MONTH PERIOD, CONDITIONAL ON THE USG BEING NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF THE ITINERARY TO BE FOLLOWED DURING ANY SUCH US TRAVEL. THIS ISSUANCE OF MULTIPLE-ENTRY VISAS WAS PERCEIVED HERE AS A SYMBOLICALLY SIGNIFICANT STEP UP FROM THE INITIAL SINGLE-ENTRY ISSUANCES.

13. (X) TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. CONCERN, WE RECOMMEND ADAMS' CURRENT APPLICATION AND OTHER APPLICATIONS BY SINN FEIN MEMBERS WHICH REQUIRE A WAIVER OF INELIGIBILITY BE CONSIDERED ONLY FOR ISSUANCE OF SINGLE-ENTRY VISAS. THIS WOULD BE A RETURN O THE STATUS QUO BEFORE THE AUGUST 1994 DECLARATION OF THE CEASEFIRE, AT WHICH TIME ADAMS HELD ONLY SINGLE-ISSUE VISAS. IT REPRESENTS AN INTERMEDIATE STEP THAT COULD BE TIGHTENED OR LOOSENED, DEPENDING ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.

14. (X) PUBLIC ATTENTION HAS CENTERED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE VISAS GRANTED TO GERRY ADAMS AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, TO SIMILARLY HIGH-PROFILE PARTY REPRESENTATIVES SUCH AS JOE CAHILL AND MARTIN MCGUINNESS. HOWEVER, THE LIST OF NAMES SUBMITTED BY SINN FEIN LAST YEAR WITH A REQUEST FOR FAVORABLE WAIVER CONSIDERATION WAS SIGNIFICANTLY BROADER IN SCOPE. SINCE THEN, SINN FEIN HAS REQUESTED VISAS FOR A NUMBER O ADDITIONAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES NOT INCLUDED O THIS LIST. WHILE THE IRA MAINTAINED ITS CEASEFIRE, WAIVERS HAD BEEN GRANTED IN ALL OF THESE CASES. FOLLOWING THE BOMBING, THE USG COULD DENY WAIVERS TO ALL SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES OR ELSE NARROW THE CIRCLE OF REPRESENTATIVES WHO RECEIVE WAIVER APPROVAL.

15. (X) THE CIRCLE COULD BE IMMEDIATELY TIGHTENED TO INCLUDE ONLY ADAMS AND SIMILARLY SENIOR LEADERS, OR COULD BE NARROWED INCREMENTALLY OVER TIME SHOULD THE IRA CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN ACTS OF TERRORISM. IF THE LATTER, AN INITIAL STEP COULD BE TO APPROVE VISAS ONLY FOR THOSE SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES ON THE LIST, OR OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY DEFINE WHICH REPRESENTATIVE WOULD RECEIVE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 08

VISAS -- FOR EXAMPLE, LIMITING VISAS ONLY TO SINN FEIN MEMBERS WHO HOLD AN ELECTIVE OFFICE AND THUS CAN BE SAID TO HAVE A DEMOCRATIC MANDATE. AS APPROPRIATE, THIS CIRCLE COULD BE REDUCED FURTHER OVER TIME. ALTERNATIVELY, WE MAY REVIEW EACH APPLICATION ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SENIORITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL APPLYING, THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF THE TRIP, AND THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE TRAVEL WOULD PROMOTE THE RESTORATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

FUND RAISING

16. (C) PERMISSION TO RAISE FUNDS WAS GRANTED TO GERRY DAMS IN MARCH 1995 -- MORE THAN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE IRA DECLARED ITS CEASEFIRE. AT THE TIME THAT THIS PERMISSION WAS GRANTED, A KEY CONCERN WAS THAT THERE BE GUARANTEES THAT SUCH FUNDS WOULD NOT SUPPORT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. GIVEN THE FUNGIBILITY OF SUCH FUNDS, THESE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 LONDON 002197

STATE FOR P, EUR, EUR/UBI, S/CT AND CA/VO

NSC FOR LAKE, SODERBERG AND PETERS

JUSTICE FOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL GORELICK AND INS COMMISSIONER MEISNER

JOINT EMBASSY/CONGEN BELFAST MESSAGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/01

TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: U.S. POLICY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE
BREAKDOWN

GUARANTEES WERE ALWAYS VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM. MORE IMPORTANTLY WITH THE REACTIVATION OF THE IRA TERRORISM CAMPAIGN, WE NOW FACE THE MORALLY DISTURBING POSSIBILITY THAT BRITISH CITIZENS (AND POSSIBLY AMERICANS) WILL BE MURDERED BY IRA WEAPONRY FINANCED BY CONTRIBUTIONS COLLECTED IN THE UNITED STATES.

17. (C) IN A SERIES OF ARTICLES FEB 21 AND 22, THE FINANCIAL TIMES REPORTED THAT THE BULK OF THE ESTIMATED \$1.12 MILLION RAISED BY SINN FEIN IN THE U.S. HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO BANK ACCOUNTS IN IRELAND AND THAT AUDITORS ARE UNABLE TO MONITOR THE ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF THE FUNDS AFTER THEY ARE DISPERSED OUTSIDE THE U.S.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 08 OF 08

IN LIGHT OF THE IRA'S RESUMPTION OF VIOLENCE, SUCH REPORTS IN THE MAINSTREAM PRESS WILL FUEL VEHEMENT PUBLIC OPPOSITION IN BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO CONTINUED US FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN OFFICIALS. IT WILL UNDERMINE UNIONIST CONFIDENCE THAT USG POLICY IS BALANCED AND IMPARTIAL. UUP MP KEN MAGINNIS TELEPHONED BELFAST CONSUL GENERAL FEB 18 SPECIFICALLY TO UNDERSCORE THIS POINT.

18. (C) AT LEAST UNTIL THERE IS A RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE, WE RECOMMEND BARRING FUND RAISING BY ALL SINN FEIN OFFICIALS REQUIRING VISA WAIVERS, INCLUDING GERRY ADAMS. THE AMBASSADOR PERSONALLY EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS RECOMMENDATION. TO PERMIT FUND RAISING ON THE PART OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WOULD IN NO WAY SQUARE WITH OUR CONDEMNATION OF THE BOMBINGS. SINN FEIN OFFICIALS NOT NEEDING WAIVERS WOULD REMAIN FREE TO RAISE FUNDS. SHOULD THE CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE CONTINUE AND WE WISH TO IMPLEMENT ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON SINN FEIN FUNDRAISING IN THE U.S., WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER DECLARING SINN FEIN A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION TO BAN ALL FUNDRAISING UNDER ANTI-TERRORIST STATUTES. FOR NOW, WE BELIEVE IT SUFFICIENT TO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO PRIOR TO MARCH, 1995. THIS MAKES IT CLEAR TO SINN FEIN THAT THERE ARE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORISM, BUT DOES NOT DELEGITIMIZE THE ORGANIZATION AS A POLITICAL ENTITY.

19. (C) COMMENT: WE VIEW THESE RECOMMENDATIONS AS PRAGMATIC REPOSSES TO THE CURRENT SITUATION WHICH KEEP US ON-SIDE WITH THE GOVERNMENTS IN LONDON AND DUBLIN. THESE ARE INTERMEDIATE STEPS WHICH COULD BE RATCHETTED UP OR DOWN IN THE FUTURE TO ADJUST TO DEVELOPING CIRCUMSTANCES.

CROWE
BT
#2197

NNNN
<MSGID> M2091429

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.33)

KRM 4/11/2023

FEBRUARY 16, 1996

-1-

*FVZ: I gather
Sean O'h Uigim
got a similar
lead from Adams
today.*

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

TO: SENATOR
FR: TRINA
RE: **MEETING WITH TED HOWE**

I met this morning with Ted Howe of Sinn Fein from 9:30 a.m. until 10:45 a.m. in the Secret Harbor Bistro at the Shelburne Hotel at 37th and Lexington in New York.

Ted's bottom line: We should not assume more bombs won't go off. The IRA went into the cease-fire with the understanding that they would be in all-party negotiations soon, and that didn't happen for 17 months, and they did not believe they were about to happen. The only way to restore the cease-fire is by restoring the commitment -- a date for all-party talks.

Ted arrived with Ciaran Staunton who works for Sinn Fein in New York. Ciaran, through Niall O'Dowd knew that I was going to let Ted have it and as soon as Ciaran looked at me he said he had to go do some errands and he would be back in 10 minutes. He stayed away during most our meeting.

I spent half of the time verbally abusing Ted. In a nutshell, I told him the following: EMK, Jean, Clinton and others had gone out on a limb and were betrayed. Sinn Fein is in very serious danger of losing Irish America for 30 years. No one separates Sinn Fein and the IRA. [I actually do think there is some level of separation which is evident by Adams' surprise by the bombing.] If anyone did this (end the cease-fire) thinking this could help their cause, they made a serious miscalculation. What they've done only plays into the hands of the British Government and Unionists. Whatever justification Sinn Fein/IRA try to give, none of it can be balanced with two innocent people being killed. I also told him that I hope they catch whoever did the London bombing and that I will make it my personal mission to make sure that if there is a lasting peace agreement, and if prisoner releases are part of the package, that those responsible for this particular bombing are never part of any package. I told Howe I expected him to take all of this back to the IRA and let them know how absolutely pissed off we are. I told him they had to restore the cease-fire.

I asked Ted a series of questions. At all times, like Adams, he says that what he's saying is what he thinks but that he can't speak for the IRA.

Ted says he too was surprised and angry when he heard about the bombing. He was at a bar that night and says the first he heard of it was when someone came up to him and told him. He also said he had been talking to Adams just a few hours before and he does not believe Adams had any idea it was coming. Despite his

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

surprise he added, "admittedly, this had been coming for some time." (There had been indications prior to Clinton's visit that the cease-fire would end.) Ted said he knew of two occasions before the actual bombing that the IRA had "marched them to the top of hill and back down again."

I told Ted that even if they had decided to end the cease-fire, did they realize how absolutely stupid their timing was -- the end of February talks deadline hadn't passed. Ted thinks they felt that if they didn't move now, they would just get sucked into another 6 - 8 months of stalling over the elections issue.

I asked him when the decision was made. Ted thought it was made after the announcement of the Mitchell report. I told him I found it hard to believe that it wasn't being planned before that. Ted conceded that they could have been preparing for Mitchell's report to come out with the one thing they couldn't live with (handing in of weapons prior to talks). I pointed out to Ted that the report did not demand that. Ted said he believes that the straw that broke it was the "indecent haste with which Major responded to the Mitchell report". He said the report came out at 11:00 a.m. and that Major had discarded it by 3:30 p.m.

AP While we were on the Mitchell report, I asked Ted if it was something the IRA could live with. He said that "politically, it's something we can work with." I asked again if it could be accepted and he said "with some difficulty, yes -- if the process has forward movement."

I told him that I didn't like Martin McGuinness' comments to Vincent Browne (Irish Times) which indicated that Sinn Fein might not necessarily accept the outcome of a democratic process. Ted feels confident they can accept whatever comes out of a genuine process.

I asked about the Army Council's decision to end the cease-fire -- Ted said he expects there was internal disagreement about it but all it takes is quorum to do it. [Niall, after talking to Ted, said Belfast was not part of this decision. South Armagh "does London" and they did this without telling Belfast in advance.]

Ted said it wasn't that Adams "persuaded" the IRA to go into a cease-fire. Rather, Adams presented the IRA with a package which included the Irish Government, Hume and Irish America. And part of that package were "talks in a relatively short period of time". He also mentioned the prisoners issue but that clearly was of less significance.

Ted indicated that they (both Sinn Fein and the IRA) have no confidence in Bruton dating back to Bruton's visit to the US in March '95 (that's when Bruton stunned Adams and the IRA by talking about decommissioning). Ted says Sinn Fein told Bruton on several occasions that this was not the deal the IRA had agreed to.

Bruton's response is always a legal and academic lecture about Irish government sovereignty.

Ted said that if the White House had not so quickly rowed in behind the British on the elections idea, it "could" have made a difference. I told Ted I was particularly angry that people like you and Dodd weren't given the opportunity to try to persuade Clinton directly on this matter. They never let us know the return was imminent. Ted said Sinn Fein was also angry that we didn't have that opportunity but they didn't know.

I asked Ted why we should continue to deal with Sinn Fein if they can't be relied on to speak for the IRA. I said why shouldn't we deal directly with the IRA? Ted said the Army Council wouldn't let us near it.

I asked what it would take to restore the cease-fire and he said a restoration of the original deal -- a commitment to all-party talks.

I pressed him on whether or not they would accept elections as part of a package. He would not commit but said it might be a "possibility" only with a commitment to talks a clear structure for the talks within a time frame.

When I asked about willingness to decommission while negotiations were going on, Ted thought that was "possible". He reminded me that when we talked in Belfast in August he told me that a "change in conditions can change possibilities". (I checked my notes from our August meeting and Ted had said that "a change of conditions can change people's position.")

The thing I found most surprising is that Ted said Sinn Fein has not met with the IRA since the bombing. He said he has been with Adams most of the time since the bombing and he doesn't believe he has spoken with them either. I asked, why, after the bombing, Adams didn't demand a meeting to demand what the hell happened? Ted said you can't just call the IRA on the phone, you have to arrange for some meeting at "some hole in the arse cottage in Ireland." Ted said they've (Sinn Fein) has had to spend their time defending their position because "the IRA pulled us in on the back of a fait accompli." I argued that Gerry's time would be better spent talking to the IRA rather than giving interviews.

I asked why we should ever believe them again. Ted again argued that the IRA had an agreement (re: talks) and that the agreement was broken. Ted said anything the IRA's said it would do, it has done.

I asked if there would be more bombs. Ted said the IRA called the cease-fire over so we have to assume that there will be. I asked if bombs would just be in London or would they strike Northern Ireland. Ted said he didn't know. He called the situation a "bleak scenario without real negotiations." He said

that everyone keeps telling the IRA what it has to do but never are the Unionists told by the British Government what they have to do.

At about this point Ciaran returned. Since Ciaran is always calling me on the prisoners issue, I reiterated what I told Ted -- if there are ever any deals on prisoners and if the bombers from last Friday are ever caught, I'll do everything I can to make sure they're not part of any deal.

I told Ted he had better explain to the IRA that if more bombs go off, it's more unlikely that they'll get to negotiations. Thinking that way is counter-intuitive. He said he understands that but he noted that the IRA has before "done A hoping to get to B and instead wound up with C".

Ted noted that they have confidence in Spring but not Bruton. They feel Spring has been trying to move the process forward whereas Bruton has just tried "to manage the IRA cease-fire". In a crunch, Ted says Spring gets side-lined.

Ted said that Adams would be meeting today with Sean O hUiginn and Paddy Teahon in Dublin. He said they've requested meetings with the British but there's been no indication that they would meet. Ted expects they won't meet above the Quentin Thomas level (i.e. no Ancram or Mayhew).

I asked him about Hume's referendum idea. He said Hume is "casting about" and that he didn't consult with Sinn Fein on that. He does not believe that Hume is under pressure for continuing to talk to Adams (he said Catholics in Northern Ireland blame the British for stalling).

Ted also brought up Dermot Gallagher's name and complained that they have the impression that Gallagher is just "sitting back" over here while the British are influencing the White House.

On other matters:

Ted said he thought something was up when he arrived at JFK because he was asked for his passport and that didn't happen before -- the passport is checked in Dublin.

He said that Gerry had talked to Jean by phone yesterday. He said Gerry had hoped to meet her but she was leaving for the US. (I don't know if that's true or if Jean is avoiding him by choice or instructions.)

Regarding the recent draft report of the Forum which Sinn Fein refused to sign on to, Ted said there are things they can deal with practically but they can't accept partition as a matter of "principle" which is what he says they were being asked to do.

On the issue of visas and fundraising, I told Ted that while there appears to be a general understanding about keeping the lines of communication open, I don't think anyone would object if they (the White House) pull fundraising. I also told him I know that Gerry has a pending visa application for March and a decision will have to be made about that. I suggested that maybe Adams should be assessing if it's wise for him to even try to come at that time. Ted said they hadn't made a firm decision (he realizes the decision isn't theirs) but he said they also can't be seen to be running away.

I asked who else he would be seeing and he mentioned Peter King. (I already knew he would be seeing Niall, Flynn, Feeney, and Doherty of the Comptroller's office.)

Ted said he understood my message loud and clear and he would take it back.

Ted said that all things are possible and that they (Sinn Fein) weren't giving up.

While I only gave Ted the hardest line possible, I have to say that I am somewhat sympathetic -- not with what the IRA did but the thinking behind it. The British Government has created hurdle after hurdle to keep Sinn Fein out of all-party talks (the 3 month "decontamination" period went on for 17 months). The IRA felt they had lived up to their part of the bargain but the other side didn't. Sinn Fein/IRA also don't have the faith in Bruton that they had in Reynolds and they were concerned by the White House's quick support for the vague elections proposal.

I've just returned to the office to type this up. I haven't read today's clips yet but Niall tells me there's a poll in the Irish Independent which says that 85% of the people in the South want all party talks now and 56% in the North want all party talks now -- and that is without the IRA even restoring the cease-fire.

Niall also informed me that Bruton called him today to ask his advice. Niall told him proceed directly to all-party talks and that a possible way to do so might be the Gary McMichael plan which McMichael told me and I passed on. Niall said Bruton sounded "manic."

cc: Amb. Smith, Nancy

12/02/06 11:17

11-FEB-98 SUN 22:21

TAOISEACH'S OFFICE

TEL NO. 353 1 8764048

NO. 650 002

P. 02

11-FEB-96 21:14

TAOISEACH'S OFFICE

FAX NO. ... 353 1 8764048

P. 02



Offic an Taoiseach
Office of the Taoiseach

February, 1996.

11 February

Right Honourable John Major, MP,
Prime Minister.

Dear John, *John*

I found our phone conversation this afternoon very useful. I agree fully on the desirability of maintaining the closest possible co-operation between our two Governments at this difficult time. I am also glad that we are in agreement on the need for an early meeting between us. As I said, it would be helpful if we could both see clearly the likely outcome of such a meeting before making an announcement.

Firstly our Summit must avoid any outcome which can be presented as going ahead regardless, without Sinn Féin. Our priority now is to stop the IRA campaign. This means that, if we cannot have the ceasefire reinstated before our meeting, we must make an announcement at the meeting that offers a positive way forward. This way forward must be one that Sinn Féin could

Offic an Taoiseach, Tíobha an Rialtais, Baile Átha Cliath 2.
Office of the Taoiseach, Government Buildings, Dublin 2.

[2011-0355-F, 3.34]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

12/02/95 11:18

11-FEB-96 SUN 22:21

TAOISEACH'S OFFICE

FAX NO. 353 1 8764048

NO. 650 003
P. 03 _____

Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

- 2 -

honourably join, and into which they would be accepted by the other participants, once the IRA campaign is over. In other words, we should aim to announce a contingent package or process, the contingency being the end of violence.

*! electin →
tallo*

As to the content of the package, we discussed a number of possible elements. You told me that you had been close to agreement with the Unionists on how an elected body would lead directly and immediately into inclusive negotiations, in which the Unionists would agree in advance to participate. I am glad that you still believe such a package is achievable and that you are determined to work for it.

Ann

You mentioned that the consent principle was a problem for the Unionists in this regard. We would need to consider how this problem could be overcome in so far as it is relevant to the process of negotiation. As you know, the consent principle has been accepted by all parties in our Forum for Peace and



Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

- 3 -

Reconciliation, with the exception of Sinn Féin. I do not see any short term prospect of Sinn Féin's view changing on this point. There is, however, a realistic awareness on the part of the Sinn Féin leadership that this consent principle will be fundamental in the approach of all other parties to the negotiations. It will therefore inevitably be reflected in the outcome of the negotiations.

Talks / SF

It is also important, from a number of points of view, that the election should flow from talks of some kind. These initial talks would serve the purpose, at the very minimum, of enabling the two Governments to clear up doubts and misunderstandings in the minds of the participants about what was proposed. These initial talks would also enable us to discuss how the principles and modalities of the Mitchell Report would fit into the "elective process/negotiations" scenario. Unless there is some general understanding on this issue in advance, there is a real danger that decommissioning-type stand-offs will completely paralyse the negotiations. We would not want



Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

- 4 -

decommissioning issues to become the sole focus of an election campaign. It would therefore be best to have some understanding about them beforehand - at least between ourselves and preferably between the parties.

There will also be the question of North/South relations in the context of any elected body. It is important that we should be clear in advance as to how such a body would meet the criteria so carefully set out in the Mitchell Report.

North/South relations must be independent of and not contingent on majority agreement within the body. This will require careful planning.

Then there is a matter of the system of election. There are a wide variety of options being canvassed. Each party has its own preference.

I cannot tell you exactly what the SDLP's preference would be, but I believe it is at the moment radically different from what is envisaged by the Unionists.



Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

- 5 -

Announcing any proposal for an election without a settled approach on this point could be very dangerous.

As I have said earlier, we feel that it will be difficult to achieve agreement on all the complex issues involved unless we bring parties into one convenient venue, to allow intensive consultations, without, however, face-to-face meetings except among those who want them. If there is a speedier and more effective way of doing this, we are, of course, open to that.

I would stress that many of the issues you were negotiating with the Unionist parties are also of great concern to the Irish Government, and we would not wish to be faced with any fait accompli on issues of such importance to us.

Because of the importance of our close co-operation, I believe we must also pay great attention to the presentational aspects which arise in each of our constituencies. I have drawn clear lines between my approach to Sinn Féin in



Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

- 6 -

a ceasefire situation, and the one I take when a ceasefire is revoked. At the same time, as we agreed, neither of us is in the business of unnecessarily slamming doors. The presentation of the election process needs to take account of the justifiable fears of nationalist politicians in Northern Ireland, who, as the people who would actually have to stand for election, will have the final say. The elective approach should not be presented as a foregone conclusion, or a policy to be imposed.

Before we meet, we should try to reach agreement on these and all other relevant points. This could be quite difficult, not least because some of the work to be done is technically complex.

For these reasons, I would prefer if the necessary preparatory work for our Summit was further advanced by our officials before any announcement of a precise date.

11-FEB-96 SUN 22:24

TAOIS

NO. 353 1 6764048

NU. 650

008

11-FEB-96 21:15

TAOIS OFFICE

FAX NO. ...

P. 08



Óifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

- 7 -

I hope you will find a means, in your address to Parliament tomorrow, to take account of the sensitivities I mentioned to you about matters such as an election and proximity talks. We need to ensure that we have the maximum convergence of language on these matters.

With warmest regards

Yours sincerely,

John
Taoiseach

November 7, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Your Call to Rod Lyne on Northern Ireland

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.39)
KBH 4/11/2023

There have been several developments since Nancy's and my memo of November 3. On Saturday, the New York Times published an article, reportedly picked up by the International Herald Tribune, which says that Adams plans to put the IRA's case to you and Nancy and hopefully to the President later this month. In fact, Adams has requested, through Mairead, a meeting with you on November 15. Reuters reports that Bruton discussed the Northern Ireland peace process with both Prime Minister Major and the President on the margins of the Rabin funeral. Most important, Bruton has sent a letter to Major (see attached cable) outlining what the GOI sees as the six key issues and the solution to each of them. Bruton proposes that the twin track be launched at a summit the third week of November.

The tone of the letter is undiplomatic in part ("your unilateral insistence on 'Washington Three'"), but the substance of the six points is not bad. The main problems are an unrealistic target date six weeks after the international body's first meeting and the absence of the "seriously consider" language. (From the cable traffic out of Dublin it is clear that no one besides Adams--including in our own embassy--understands the concept that both HMG and Sinn Fein would maintain their current positions on Washington Three while the body does its work.) There are several other problems with the Bruton letter, which are flagged in the attached talking points.

Now that Dublin is back in the game, we have a choice between urging Rod to respond quickly and positively to Bruton's letter and suggesting the draft we sent you on Friday as an alternative.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: November 7, 2005

The advantage of our draft is that it is shorter than what would emerge from the Bruton suggestions and therefore will attract fewer objections. The disadvantage is having our fingerprints on it. If you decide to proffer our draft, we suggest you talk Rod through it, rather than faxing it.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Dublin 5430

Tab C November 3 Memo with Draft Announcement

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR OVERSEAS AFFAIRS ROD LYNE

- Sorry we did not connect earlier -- I of course have been in Israel.
- We are deeply disappointed that the Ancram-McGuinness talks have not resolved the issues. See need to move process back to two governments -- at highest levels.
- We are concerned less about the President's trip that about the danger of stalemate setting in with the whole process.
- It is doubly disappointing because the basic agreement on substance already exists.
- Understand PM Bruton has written to PM Major. Agree with premise that twin track is still doable.
- Before last Friday's meeting, Sinn Fein had already agreed to speak authoritatively on the issue of IRA weapons.
- Adams had also agreed that the main remit of international body would be to deal with paramilitary arms, though Sinn Fein does not want the communiqué to say so.
- HMG agreed that Adams can discuss additional issues with the body, including his views on other categories of arms.
- Issues of date and remit still outstanding. Six weeks from first meeting of body, as proposed by Bruton, seems unrealistic.
- As Ancram has noted, remit issue is one of presentation. Should be able to find way around it.
- (If you decide to describe our proposed text): Since we are so close, one way forward would be a very short announcement, to be made jointly but without fanfare of a summit.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 7, 2005

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0355-F (3.40)
KBH 4/11/2023

- Narrow language would get around the cumbersome negotiation of a communiqué and leave it to the two governments to bring along the other parties.
- It would be useful to move this as soon as possible. The President's visit will be a success in any case, but better not to have it overshadowed by uncertainty and fear of stagnation.
- It could simply say: (See text at Tab B.) Date for start of twin track up to you and Dublin.
- If a date is named, unlikely Sinn Fein will reject twin track over a question of a few weeks.
- (If you do not mention our text): Bruton's six suggestions offer basis for progress. Pleased Dublin is back in the game.
- First: date. Six weeks unrealistic, but Dublin unlikely to insist on that.
- Second: preparatory talks. Sinn Fein will not like the reference to creating conditions for all-party talks. Perhaps not necessary to address this.
- Third: speaking authoritatively. Our view is that this issue has been resolved.
- Fourth: remit. Bruton suggests having no adjective. HMG would clarify that remit deals with paramilitary arms. (FYI: Bruton says Ancram proposed this, which does not square with our understanding.) Dropping adjective easiest way forward. Everybody know the body is being created to deal with paramilitary arms anyway.
- Fifth: mandate: Bruton proposes Washington 1,2,&3, not just 1&2. We've always thought 3 should be included at least tacitly, but the important thing is the commitment to seriously consider the body's recommendations.
- Sixth: elected body. Bruton says any mention of the idea must reflect nationalist opposition. No reason to prejudge it now -- could be mentioned as one of many ideas to be discussed in political track.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:061559Z NOV 95

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8962

RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST IMMEDIATE 3706
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3476

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 005430

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/1997

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, GOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: BRUTON LETTER TO MAJOR: SUMMIT SUGGESTED FOR LATE NOVEMBER TO LAUNCH THE TWIN-TRACK PROCESS

1. CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY SMITH. REASON: 1.5 (B)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

2. ~~(S)~~ TAOISEACH JOHN BRUTON HAS WRITTEN TO UK PRIME MINISTER MAJOR TODAY (NOVEMBER 6) SUGGESTING THAT THE TWO OF THEM HOLD A SUMMIT IN THE THIRD WEEK OF NOVEMBER TO LAUNCH THE LONG-DELAYED TWIN-TRACK PROCESS. IN THE LETTER, A COPY OF WHICH WAS PASSED TO US BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (FULL TEXT AT PARA 4), BRUTON OUTLINES WHAT HE SEES AS THE SIX KEY ISSUES AND "THE SOLUTION WITHIN OUR GRASP ON EACH OF THEM":

- DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS: THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD SET A "REASONABLE TARGET DATE WITH A CLEAR COMMITMENT TO MAKE THE UTMOST ENDEAVORS IN GOOD FAITH TO REACH IT." THE DATE SHOULD BE SIX WEEKS FROM THE TIME THE INTERNATIONAL BODY BEGINS ITS WORK.

- PROCEDURE FOR PREPARATORY TALKS: PROCEED AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE OF THE POSTPONED SEPTEMBER 6 SUMMIT.

- BASIS FOR POLITICAL PARTIES SPEAKING AUTHORITATIVELY ABOUT PARAMILITARY ARMS: A "REASONABLE" FORMULATION IS THAT THE RELEVANT POLITICAL PARTIES WILL BE "SPEAKING TO THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AUTHORITATIVELY ON THE POSITION OF IRA/LROYALISTS WEAPONS AND THE ISSUE OF HOW THE ARMS CAN BE TAKEN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS."

- DESCRIPTION OF THE ARMS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL ADDRESS: LEAVE THE REFERENCE TO ARMS AMBIGUOUS (I.E. NO ADJECTIVE SUCH AS ILLEGAL, PARAMILITARY, OR UNAUTHORIZED) AND "ALLOW ALL SIDES TO SAY WHAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH."

- EXTENT OF INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REMIT: THE INTERNATIONAL BODY SHOULD "TAKE THE ENTIRE WEAPONS ISSUE WITHIN ITS PURVIEW, NOT JUST WASHINGTON 1 AND 2."

- POSSIBILITY OF AN ELECTED BODY: THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE GIVEN "A RESPECTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE HEARING," BUT ANY MENTION OF IT IN A JOINT TEXT MUST REFLECT THE OPPOSITION OF NORTHERN NATIONALISTS TO "ANY PROCESS WHICH GIVES PRIMACY OR PRIVILEGE TO THE INTERNAL STRAND."

3. ~~(S)~~ COMMENT: BRENDAN SCANNELL, COUNSELLOR FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS IN DFA'S ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, TOLD US THAT THE LETTER HAD ALSO BEEN SHARED WITH OPPOSITION PARTY FIANNA FAIL, BUT WAS OTHERWISE BEING CLOSELY HELD. HE SAID THE PROPOSALS IN THE LETTER WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT A MEETING OF THE ANGLO-IRISH LIAISON GROUP ON NOVEMBER 8. WITH THE FAILURE OF SINN FEIN AND THE BRITISH TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS AT THEIR NOVEMBER 3 MEETING, DUBLIN FEELS IT MUST NOW RE-ENGAGE TO RESTORE FORWARD MOMENTUM TO THE PEACE PROCESS. BRUTON SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN TO HEART GERRY ADAMS'S ARGUMENT TO HIM LAST WEEK THAT THE UK AND SINN FEIN ARE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO WORK THIS OUT ON THEIR OWN. WHILE IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE IRISH WILL BE ABLE TO DO IN THIS REGARD, THEY NEVERTHELESS SEE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AS A VALUABLE SOURCE OF LEVERAGE TO PRESS SINN FEIN AND LONDON TO COMPROMISE ON THEIR LONG-HELD POSITIONS, AND DO NOT WANT TO SEE THIS UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY SLIP BY. END COMMENT.

4. ~~(S)~~ FULL TEXT OF BRUTON'S LETTER TO MAJOR:

6 NOVEMBER, 1995

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOHN MAJOR, MP,
PRIME MINISTER.

DEAR JOHN,

I AM WRITING TO YOU TO GIVE YOU MY VIEWS ON THE CURRENT POSITION IN OUR DISCUSSIONS ON NORTHERN IRELAND AND MY VIEWS ON HOW WE CAN NOW MOVE SPEEDILY FORWARD WITH A JOINT APPROACH, THAT WILL LEAD TO A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES.

OUR CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS SO FAR HAS BEEN BASED ON OUR ADOPTING A JOINT APPROACH, AND ON PRIOR CONSULTATION BEFORE THE TAKING OF ANY IMPORTANT INITIATIVE. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND I REGRET TO HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT I WAS SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED TO LEARN THAT YOUR "BUILDING BLOCKS" PAPER, WHICH WAS DISCUSSED IN THE LIAISON GROUP SPECIFICALLY AS AN AID TO YOUR ON-GOING DISCUSSION WITH SINN FEIN, WAS SENT TO ALL THE PARTIES, AND TO THE U.S., AND WAS MADE PUBLIC ON FRIDAY, ALL WITHOUT OUR PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OR AGREEMENT.

I NEED HARDLY ELABORATE ON THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH CAN BE CAUSED BY A UNILATERAL DEFINITION, ON EITHER SIDE, OF WHAT PURPORTS TO BE - AND INDEED CAN ONLY BE - A BILATERAL AND AGREED PROCESS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

WE BOTH CAME TO THE TABLE AT CANNES WITH PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BODY. FOR MY PART I PUT IT FORWARD IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME THE PROLONGED AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS STALEMATE I FORESAW ARISING FROM YOUR UNILATERAL INSISTENCE ON "WASHINGTON THREE" AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND MY OWN CONCLUSION, WHICH I ARRIVED AT RELUCTANTLY AND ONLY AFTER SERIOUS EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE SITUATION, THAT THAT PRE-CONDITION WAS NOT ACHIEVABLE.

THE VALUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL BE DIRECTLY PROPORTIONATE TO THE PROSPECT THAT ITS WORK WILL TRANSCEND THIS IMPASSE, AND NOT MERELY POSTPONE IT. SIR PATRICK MAYHEW AT THE LAST ANGLO-IRISH CONFERENCE ENCOURAGINGLY INVOKED THIS POSSIBILITY, ADMITTEDLY WITH SOME PERSONAL SCEPTICISM. I HAVE DONE WHAT I CAN IN THE BACKGROUND TO PROMOTE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF SINN FEIN ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES ALSO.

AS I SEE IT THERE ARE SIX KEY ISSUES AND I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE SOLUTIONS WITHIN OUR GRASP ON EACH OF THEM.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0353-F (3.41)
KBM 5/11/2023

THESE SIX ISSUES ARE

- A DATE FOR ALL PARTY, ROUND TABLE TALKS
- THE PROCEDURE FOR HOLDING PREPARATORY (SIC) TALKS
- THE BASIS FOR POLITICAL PARTIES SPEAKING AUTHORITATIVELY ABOUT PARAMILITARY ARMS
- THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ARMS THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL DEAL WITH
- THE EXTENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REMIT IN TERMS OF THE "WASHINGTON" CONDITIONS, AND
- THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ELECTED BODY.

ON A DATE FOR ROUND TABLE TALKS THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THAT A REASONABLE TARGET DATE SHOULD BE SET WITH A CLEAR COMMITMENT TO MAKE THE UTMOST ENDEAVOURS IN GOOD FAITH TO REACH IT. I BELIEVE THE DATE SHOULD BE SIX WEEKS FROM THE DATE THE INTERNATIONAL BODY COMMENCES WORK.

ON PREPARATORY TALKS I BELIEVE WE WOULD PROCEED AS IN HE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE FOR THE POSTPONED 6 SEPTEMBER SUMMIT, I.E.

"THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER TO CREATE CONDITIONS SO THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS IN ROUND TABLE FORMAT AIMED AT REACHING AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BASED ON CONSENT, COULD COMMENCE (REFER TO SIX WEEKS). A SERIES OF MEETING (SIC) WILL NOW BE JOINTLY CONVENED BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS WITH ALL PARTIES TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THESE TALKS.

BOTH GOVERNMENT SHARE THE AIM OF CREATING CONDITIONS IN WHICH ALL THE RELEVANT PARTIES WILL ATTEND THESE TALKS AND WILL PARTICIPATE ON THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE POSSIBLE BASIS."

THERE SHOULD BE A COMPLETELY OPEN AGENDA FOR THOSE TALKS.

ON POLITICAL PARTIES AND ARMS I BELIEVE THE FORMULA OF THE RELEVANT POLITICAL PARTIES "SPEAKING TO THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AUTHORITATIVELY ON THE POSITION OF IRA/LOYALISTS WEAPONS AND THE ISSUE OF HOW THE ARMS CAN BE TAKEN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS" REPRESENTS A REASONABLE BASIS FOR MOVING FORWARD.

ON THE DESCRIPTION OF ARMS/THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY ISSUE, I BELIEVE THE OPTION MICHAEL ANCRAM PUT TO MARTIN MCGUINNESS OF HAVING NO ADJECTIVE (ILLEGAL/PARAMILITARY/UNAUTHORISED) IN THE COMMUNIQUE TEXT AND ALLOWING ALL SIDES TO SAY WHAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH REPRESENTS THE WAY FORWARD. I UNDERSTAND YOU, ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL SAY THE ISSUE IS ONE OF PARAMILITARY ARMS. WE WILL NOT DISAGREE WITH YOU ON THIS BUT WILL UPHOLD SINN FEINN'S RIGHT TO PUT ITS OWN POSITION ON THIS ISSUE TO THE BODY AS IT SEES FIT.

ON 'WASHINGTON' 1, 2 AND 3 I BELIEVE THE INTERNATIONAL BODY SHOULD TAKE THE ENTIRE WEAPONS ISSUE WITHIN ITS PURVIEW, AND NOT JUST 'WASHINGTON' 1 AND 2, AS YOUR 'PRESS LINE' HAS IT IN THE "BUILDING BLOCKS" PAPER.

A POSSIBLE WAY OF DEALING, IN PRACTICE, WITH BOTH THE 'WASHINGTON' CONDITIONS AND THE DESCRIPTION OF ARMS, IS TO DESCRIBE THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AS REPORTING ON THE ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY FOR THE REMOVAL OF ARMS AS

INSTRUMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR OR OPPOSITION TO POLITICAL AIMS AND ACTIVITIES.

ON THE POLITICAL TRACK, THE IRISH SIDE IN THE LIAISON GROUP MADE CLEAR WE EXPECTED THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL TRACK TO BE MORE PROACTIVE THAN IN YOUR PAPER. THE CHANGES SUBSEQUENTLY MADE DID NOT REFLECT THIS, BUT INSTEAD FLAGGED AN ELECTED BODY.

I HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION, AND ENCOURAGED OTHERS TO ACCEPT, THAT UNIONIST PROPOSALS FOR SUCH A BODY SHOULD BE GIVEN A RESPECTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE HEARING.

YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT OPPOSITION TO AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT IS A COMMON RALLYING POINT FOR NORTHERN NATIONALISTS (COMPARABLE IN THIS RESPECT TO A UNITED IRELAND PROPOSAL FOR UNIONISTS). CONSEQUENTLY, THEY ARE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO ANY PROCESS WHICH GIVES PRIMACY OR PRIVILEGE TO THE INTERNAL STRAND. IF AN ELECTED BODY IS TO BE FLAGGED THEN ANY JOINT TEXT MUST ALSO ADEQUATELY REFLECT THE CONSISTENT VIEW OF NORTHERN NATIONALISTS I HAVE TOUCHED ON ABOVE.

I BELIEVE YOU AND I SHOULD NOW MOVE QUICKLY TO HOLDING A SUMMIT, SAY IN THE THIRD WEEK OF NOVEMBER, AND HAVING A REASONABLE JOINT POSITION TO PUT TO ALL SIDES.

I WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A TELEPHONE DISCUSSION WITH YOU ON THESE MATTERS BEFORE YOUR DEPARTURE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. I WOULD PARTICULARLY WELCOME AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE UNIONIST POSITIONS AND INTENTIONS, IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR CONTACTS WITH THEM.

YOURS SINCERELY,

JOHN BRUTON
TAOISEACH

END TEXT OF BRUTON LETTER, SMITH

FROM:
SITREPR