

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Secretary's Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary (6 pages)	01/23/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
002. cable	re: NATO Expansion: Getting Here to There (6 pages)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
003. cable	re: The Secretary's Meeting with EU Presidency/French Foreign Minister Juppe... (9 pages)	02/01/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
004. cable	re: Ukrainian Views on NATO Expansion; Ukraine and PFP (3 pages)	02/15/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
005. cable	re: NATO Enlargement Study: Where Are We? (5 pages)	03/02/1995	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: NATO Expansion: U.S. Views on Military Implications (4 pages)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
007. cable	re: Holbrooke and Kovacs: A Meeting on the Minds (4 pages)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
008. cable	re: DFM Tarasyuk Discusses PFP, GOU Internal Problems (4 pages)	03/06/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
009. cable	re: NATO: NMA Contributions to Chapter III, V (16 pages)	03/06/1995	P1/b(1)
010. cable	re: Mamedov Visit: February 22 Sessions... (7 pages)	03/14/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
011. cable	re: Mamedov Reiterates Russian Sensitivities Over NATO Expansion (4 pages)	03/18/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
012. cable	re: Night Note from Geneva, Wednesday, March 22, 1995 (2 pages)	03/22/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[01/23/1995-09/29/1995]

2015-0792-M
rs1264

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re: Czech Foreign Minister Zieleniec Addresses NATO Membership with Permraps (4 pages)	03/29/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/12/2022
014. cable	re: Secretary Christopher's Meeting with Andrei Kozyrev, April 26 (12 pages)	05/01/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/12/2022
015. cable	re: 5/24 Meeting of DoD Deputy Assistant Secretary Kruzcl and NSC Senior Director Fried with Slovak President Kovac (4 pages)	05/25/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/12/2022
016. cable	re: NAC Ministerial at Noordwijk (7 pages)	05/28/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/12/2022
017. cable	re: Karaganov Elaborates on his Russia NATO "Theses"... (6 pages)	06/28/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/12/2022
018. cable	re: Demarcho: Polish Formin Bartoszewski on NATO (3 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/12/2022
019. cable	re: Bartoszewski and the Clinton Administration: What the Foreign Minister Meant to Say (4 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/12/2022
020. cable	re: NATO Enlargement: September 28 Collective Briefing to Partners (14 pages)	09/29/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA6931 0231732-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZEX
LINE3: O P 231726Z JAN 95
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 231726Z JAN 95
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO: NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0000
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0000
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0000
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0000
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0000
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0000
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0000
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH UK FOREIGN SECRETARY
TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 016931

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0792-m(1.01)
KBH 3/12/2020

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PREL, PGOV, UK, RS, SR
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH UK FOREIGN SECRETARY
. HURD, JANUARY 16, 1995, WASHINGTON, DC

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA, USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. PARTICIPANTS: U.S. - THE SECRETARY, U/S TARNOFF, EUR A/S HOLBROOKE, PA/PRESS JOHNSON, EUR/UBI LEKSON (NOTETAKER). UK - FOREIGN SECRETARY HURD, AMB. RENWICK, POLITICAL DIRECTOR NEVILLE-JONES, PRIVATE SECRETARY SAWERS DCM GREENSTOCK. VENUE: THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE, 6:30-7:30 PM, JANUARY 16, 1995.
3. SUMMARY. THE SECRETARY OUTLINED HIS PLANS FOR HIS GENEVA MEETINGS WITH KOZYREV. WE MUST NOT OFFER THE RUSSIANS CONCESSIONS, HE SAID, BUT WILL INSTEAD MAKE CLEAR TO THEM THAT YELTSIN MUST RETURN TO REFORM AND RECONCILIATION IF HE IS NOT TO FORFEIT THE WEST'S GOOD WILL. ON BOSNIA, HURD SUGGESTED THAT A SINGLE SENIOR FIGURE TAKE ON THE CONTACT GROUP'S NEGOTIATING TASKS. THE SECRETARY SAID THE CONTACT GROUP IS USEFUL AND EFFECTIVE AS CURRENTLY CONSTITUTED; WE CAN LOOK AT THIS IDEA AT A LATER STAGE. HURD SAID BOSNIAN HARDLINERS MIGHT STONEWALL

NEGOTIATIONS, EXPECTING AMERICAN AID. THE SECRETARY SAID WE NEED TO THINK NOW ABOUT WHAT TO DO THIS SPRING IF NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT SUCCEED.

4. HURD EXPRESSED DEEP GRATITUDE FOR THE U.S. HOLDING THE LINE ON SINN FEIN FUNDRAISING. HE AND THE SECRETARY AGREED ON THE NEED FOR SOME ACTION BY THE IRA ON DISARMAMENT. THEY ALSO AGREED TO RESIST LIFTING SANCTIONS ON IRAQ. HURD HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. "INFORM/CONSULT" POLICY ON ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. WILL CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE UK ON THIS, NOTING U/S TARNOFF'S PLANNED TRIP TO LONDON. THE SECRETARY AND HURD EXCHANGED ASSESSMENTS OF ALGERIA, AGREEING TO MONITOR CLOSELY THE MERITS OF MAINTAINING EMBASSIES THERE. HURD BRIEFED THE SECRETARY ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN, FOCUSING ON POSSIBLE ELECTIONS IN KASHMIR. END SUMMARY.

RUSSIA

5. AT HURD'S REQUEST, THE SECRETARY OUTLINED HIS PLANS FOR GENEVA. AT DINNER JANUARY 17 HE WILL PRESS FOR KOZYREV'S PERCEPTION OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN MOSCOW, AND WHO IS INFLUENCING YELTSIN. HE WILL SEEK TO DRAW HIM OUT AT LENGTH ON MOSCOW'S PLANS FOR CHECHNYA, INCLUDING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. HURD NOTED THE GRAVE DAMAGE DONE TO RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. RUSSIA CANNOT GET WHAT IT WANTS -- PARTIAL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO ALONG THE LINES OF FRANCE OR SPAIN -- BUT WE NEED TO GIVE THEM SOMETHING SHORT OF THAT. IS IT POLITICALLY FEASIBLE TO PROCEED ON THIS NOW?

6. THE SECRETARY SAID WE MUST BE VERY CAREFUL NOT TO BE SEEN AS RUNNING AFTER THE RUSSIANS, OFFERING THEM CONCESSIONS ON THE RUSSIA/NATO RELATIONSHIP TO GET THEM TO DO WHAT THEY TOLD US THEY WOULD DO IN DECEMBER. OVER THE LONG TERM, WE CAN GET THAT RELATIONSHIP RIGHT WITHOUT CONCESSIONS. IN GENEVA, THE SECRETARY WILL SIMPLY SOUND KOZYREV OUT. HURD ASKED IF THERE WAS PRESSURE TO CUT BACK ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. THE SECRETARY SAID NUNN-LUGAR FUNDING WAS SO CLEARLY TIED TO U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS THAT IT SHOULD BE SAFE. OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE WOULD HAVE TROUBLE. MORE THAN HALF OF OUR AID PACKAGE GOES TO OTHER EX-SOVIET STATES, AND MUCH OF THE MONEY GOES TO NGOS, BUT THE OVERALL POLITICAL ATTITUDE IS THAT FOREIGN AID SHOULD BE CUT, SO MONEY FOR RUSSIA WOULD NOT BE

EXEMPT. HURD SAID SOME EUROPEAN MONEY COULD BE DISBURSED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION -- OR HELD UP, AS VAN DEN BROEK IS SUGGESTING. THE UK DISAGREES WITH HIM IN THIS CASE.

7. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT CHERNOMYRDIN AND KOZYREV BOTH MADE CONCILIATORY STATEMENTS ABOUT CHECHNYA, BUT ARE THEY BASED IN REALITY? YELTSIN HAS FORFEITED MUCH WESTERN GOOD WILL, SEEMING EITHER OUT OF CONTROL OR CONSCIOUSLY LYING. IF HE MOVES QUICKLY TO REESTABLISH A REFORM COALITION AND ACT WITH CONCILIATION, HE CAN REGAIN MUCH OF THE GROUND HE HAS LOST HERE. BUT IF HE GOES THE OTHER WAY, SUPPORT FOR

HIM IN THE WEST WILL CONTINUE TO ERODE. HURD SAID THE SECRETARY MUST MAKE THIS POINT FORCEFULLY TO KOZYREV.

EX-YUGOSLAVIA

8. HURD RAISED CROATIA. THE SECRETARY SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD WRITTEN TUDJMAN TO ASK HIM TO RECONSIDER HIS DECISION TO END UNPROFOR'S MANDATE. A CROATIAN DELEGATION HAD SEEMED TO HAVE NO ROOM FOR MANEUVER. WE HAVE SOME TIME BUT THE SITUATION IS VERY DANGEROUS. HURD CONCURRED.

9. HURD SAID IT WAS EQUALLY CRUCIAL TO USE TIME WISELY IN BOSNIA. WE NEED TO THINK ABOUT HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE CONTACT GROUP PROCESS TO MEET THE NEGOTIATING CHALLENGES AHEAD. AS CURRENTLY CONFIGURED, IS IT UP TO THE TASK? BALLADUR WOULD LIKE A SENIOR "EUROPEAN" (WHICH HURD THOUGHT MEANT "FRENCH") FIGURE OF APPROPRIATE STATURE TO DIRECT THE NEGOTIATIONS. HURD THOUGHT A CASE COULD BE MADE FOR THAT PERSON TO BE A SENIOR AMERICAN.

10. THE SECRETARY SAID THE CONTACT GROUP'S EXISTING STRUCTURE WAS OF REAL VALUE. HE AND HURD HAD BOTH BEEN LOBBIED BY BOUTROS GHALI TO GIVE STOLTENBERG A LEADING ROLE. THIS WOULD NOT WORK. THE CONTACT GROUP IS DOING WELL IN GETTING THE PARTIES INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE SHOULD NOT TINKER WITH IT NOW. WHEN WE MOVE ON TO THE NEXT STAGE, WE CAN TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT HURD'S IDEA. BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO JEOPARDIZE RUSSIA'S CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT, AND GERMAN PARTICIPATION IS ESPECIALLY CRUCIAL GIVEN DEVELOPMENTS IN CROATIA.

11. HURD SAID HARDLINERS IN SARAJEVO MAY BE THINKING THEY SHOULD STONEWALL UNTIL SPRING, IN THE HOPE THAT THE U.S. WILL LIFT THE EMBARGO AND PROVIDE THEM "FULL BACKING IN ALL ASPECTS." THIS COULD DOOM OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORT. TO CORRECT THIS PERCEPTION, IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE U.S. TO BE IN THE DIPLOMATIC LEAD. HOW ELSE CAN WE DISCOURAGE

THIS? THE SECRETARY SAID SILAJDZIC'S VISIT HERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY. THE HARD-LINE REPUTATION HE IS BUILDING CAN HELP HIM NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. HE AND OTHERS NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE REAL LIMITS ON ANY HELP THEY CAN EXPECT FROM THE U.S.

12. THE SECRETARY SAID WE ALSO NEED TO THINK ABOUT WHAT TO DO THIS SPRING IF WE DO NOT GET A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT. SENATOR NUNN'S IDEA OF A BUILD-DOWN IS A GOOD ONE, BUT HARD TO ACHIEVE. HURD AGREED THAT WE ARE IN DANGER OF CONCENTRATING ALL OUR EFFORTS ON A DIPLOMATIC PROCESS THAT HAS NO GUARANTEE OF SUCCESS. IN THE SPRING, ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER MAY SEE WAR AS ITS BEST OPTION. NEVILLE-JONES SAID THAT FOR THAT EVENTUALITY, WE MUST DEVELOP A POLICY FRAMEWORK INVOLVING THE SURROUNDING COUNTRIES TO TRY TO CONTAIN THE CONFLICT.

13. HURD MENTIONED OWEN'S IDEA, WHICH NO ONE LIKED, OF MOVING UNPROFOR HEADQUARTERS TO MACEDONIA. HOLBROOKE SAID WE ALSO NEED TO GET A NEGOTIATING PROCESS GOING FOR

CROATIA. TUDJMAN WILL NOT ACCEPT A BOSNIA SETTLEMENT THAT IGNORES KRAJINA. THE CONTACT GROUP IS GOING BACK TO THE FIELD THIS WEEK. THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE WE CAN GET NEGOTIATIONS UNDER WAY BY MARCH, WHICH COULD HELP TAMP DOWN THE VIOLENCE. HOLBROOKE REINFORCED THE SECRETARY'S POINT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONTACT GROUP TO RUSSIA, WHICH IS STARTING TO SEE NEW VALUE IN PRESERVING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

NORTHERN IRELAND

14. HURD OFFERED HIS HEARTFELT THANKS FOR THE U.S. POSITION ON FUNDRAISING BY SINN FEIN. HMG NEEDS SOME PROGRESS ON IRA ARMS. NO ONE IS ASKING THEM TO TURN EVERYTHING IN, "BUT THEY HAVE A LOT OF SEMTEX." IF THEY WANT TO BE TREATED AS A POLITICAL PARTY, THEY MUST ACT LIKE ONE. UK RELATIONS WITH DUBLIN ARE GOOD. PM BRUTON'S OWN STRONG PERSONAL PREFERENCE FOR AN EQUITABLE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WITHOUT ANY INSISTENCE ON CLAIMING THE NORTH, MEANS THAT HE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO SEEM TOO ACCOMMODATING TO LONDON. IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS IF IN OPPOSITION FIANNA FAIL REVERTED TO STRONG NATIONALISM AT THE EXPENSE OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. THE SECRETARY SAID WE ARE ON A SOUND POLICY LINE. DISARMAMENT IS ALSO KEY TO US. SENATOR MITCHELL WILL DO A GREAT JOB FOR THE INVESTMENT CONFERENCE. HURD AGREED, AND REITERATED UK GRATITUDE FOR USG UNDERSTANDING.

IRAQ

15. HURD NOTED THAT NEITHER HMG NOR THE USG HAS ANY APPETITE FOR RELAXING SANCTIONS. BUT WE MAY BE RUNNING OUT OF VOTES. SADDAM IS EVIL AND WHOLLY DECEITFUL. THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF A MODUS VIVENDI. THE UK IS LOBBYING OTHER EUROPEANS NOT TO FOLLOW THE FRENCH EXAMPLE, BUT NOT ALWAYS SUCCESSFULLY. KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA ARE NOT AS STALWART AS THEY SHOULD BE. THE SECRETARY SAID THE FRENCH HAVE CREATED A PRECEDENT THAT OTHERS CAN USE FOR THEIR COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE. HE AGREED WITH HURD: WE MUST BE ABSOLUTELY FIRM. THERE IS NO GROUND FOR LIFTING SANCTIONS.

ARGENTINA

16. HURD SAID UK/ARGENTINE RELATIONS HAVE GOTTEN MUCH BETTER. BUT EVEN MENEM SAYS HE WILL GET THE FALKLANDS BACK BY 2000. DI TELLA IS TRYING FRUITLESSLY TO WOO THE ISLANDERS. HURD VISITED THE ISLANDS LAST SPRING. THE FALKLANDERS SIMPLY WILL NOT BECOME ARGENTINE. AS THE GOA CONTINUES TO PURSUE ITS IMPOSSIBLE DREAM, WE MAY BE IN FOR A ROUGH PATCH. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE "INFORM/CONSULT" POLICY IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE UK. HMG HOPES IT CAN BE SUSTAINED.

17. THE SECRETARY SAID WE UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE TO THE UK OF OUR CURRENT "INFORM/CONSULT" POLICY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ARGENTINES HAVE BECOME VERY HELPFUL TO US IN THE HEMISPHERE. U/S TARNOFF WILL BE IN LONDON NEXT MONTH AND SHOULD DISCUSS THIS FURTHER WITH HMG. THE U.S.

AND UK WILL WALK DOWN THIS ROAD TOGETHER.

ALGERIA

18. HURD SAID BALLADUR BELIVES THERE IS AN ANGLO/AMERICAN LINE OF PRESSING FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE FUNDAMENTALISTS, BUT THIS IS NOT FRENCH POLICY. IN FACT, THE FRENCH DON'T HAVE A REAL POLICY. THEY DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY WANT, BEYOND NOT NEGOTIATING WITH THE FUNDAMENTALISTS OUT OF FEAR THAT TIS WILL SPREAD DISRUPTION DOWN THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL AND DEEPER INTO AFRICA. PERHAPS THEY WANT OTHER EUROPEANS TO SEND MONEY THERE. THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OF THE RISK TO PERSONNEL IN WESTERN EMBASSIES.

19. THE SECRETARY SAID ALGERIA IS IN A DOWNWARD SPIRAL. THE FRENCH SAY THEY WILL TALK TO MODERATES. THIS IS FINE BUT WE DO NOT HAVE HIGH HOPES. WE HAVE NOT SATISFIED

OURSELVES THAT WE CAN MAINTAIN OUR EMBASSY THERE, BUT HAVE NOT YET DECIDED TO PULL IT OUT. IT IS BEING ASSESSED ON A DAILY BASIS.

20. U/S TARNOFF ADDED THAT THERE ARE TWO FRENCH POLICIES, THAT OF THE QUAI, WHICH IS MUCH LIKE OURS, AND THE BALLADUR/PASQUA POLICY, WHICH IS MUCH MORE CONFRONTATIONAL. OUR DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE IN AN EXPOSED POSITION BUT ARE NOT AS DIRECTLY TARGETTED AS THE FRENCH. BUT IF THE THREAT DOES INCREASE, ANY FURTHER CUTBACK MAY WELL BE TO ZERO. HURD SAID THAT WAS ALSO THE UK SITUATION. NEVILLE-JONES SAID THE EFFECT OF A U.S. OR UK PULLOUT WOULD BE DRAMATIC. HURD SAID THE U.S. AND UK MUST KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS.

KASHMIR

21. HURD SAID IN HIS RECENT VISIT, HE FOUND PM BHUTTO MORE RELAXED THAN HER MINISTERS, AND MUCH MORE RELAXED THAN HER PRESS, OVER EXPLORING THE IDEA OF ELECTIONS IN KASHMIR. RAO IS GOING TO BE PUSHING THIS, BUT HIS PARTY IS UNWILLING TO ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS. HURD STRESSED TO BOTH SIDES THAT ELECTIONS MUST BE CREDIBLE. IT IS HARD TO HAVE A POLITICAL PROCESS FOR KASHMIR IF THERE ARE NO DEMOCRATICALLY CHOSEN KASHMIRIS.

22. THERE IS NO IMMINENT INDIA/PAKISTAN CRISIS. BHUTTO IS NOT VISCERALLY ANTI-INDIAN, BUT WHILE BOTH SHE AND RAO COULD WELL REACH AN AGREEMENT IF IT WERE UP TO THEM ALONE NEITHER HAS THE POLITICAL SUPPORT TO DO SO. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO VISIT INDIA AND PAKISTAN SEQUENTIALLY AND NOT GET IN TROUBLE WITH THE PRESS OF AT LEAST ONE OF THE TWO.

END TEXT.

CHRISTOPHER

BT

#6931

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 6931

TOR: 950123125602 M1472981

DIST:

SIT: BEYRLE BURNS CLARKER FORSYTHE GARDNER KERRICK NSC PIFER RICE
SAUNDERS STEPHENS STERN VERSHBOW

Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: RAACZYUW RUEHNOA0287 0252242-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: R 252242Z JAN 95
LINE4: FM USMISSION USNATO
OSRI: RUEHNO
DTG: 252242Z JAN 95
ORIG: USMISSION USNATO
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9497
INFO: RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3128
RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAF//
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 2883
RUCBTEC/USLO SAACLANT NORFOLK VA
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//POLAD//
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD/N5/N52//
RHFQAAA/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC-ATA/AEAGC-EX//
RUSNTCA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPLAD/ECJ5/ECJ5-J//
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 2884
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 2396
RUEKJCS/ BRATISLAVA 0136
ZEN/USDELMEC BRUSSELS BE
SUBJ: NATO EXPANSION: GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2015-0792-M (1.02)
KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:

////////////////// INCOMPLETE MESSAGE //////////////////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000287

EXDIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

STATE FOR EUR-HOLBROOKE, D-TALBOTT, P-TARNOFF, T-DAVIS,
S/NIS-COLLINS, PM, IO

STATE ALSO PASS NSC FOR BERGER, VERSHBOW; OVP FOR FUERTH

DEFENSE FOR DEPSEC(DEUTCH), USD(P)SLOCOMBE, ASD(ISP)CARTER,
ASD(ISA)NYE, ASD(S&R)WARNER, DASD(EUR)KRUZEL,
DASD(RU&E)SHERWOOD, ODASD(EUR)NATO(JUHL & HERR)

JCS FOR GEN SHALIKASHVILI, LTG CLARK, LTG CHRISTMAN

USUN FOR HUME

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL : OADR

TAGS: NATO, MARR, PREL, XH

SUBJECT: NATO EXPANSION: GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE

REF: (A) 94 USNATO 4876, (B) USNATO 0247, (C) STATE 08688

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE NATO STUDY/PRESENTATION ON EXPANSION NEEDS TO BE VIEWED FIRST AND FOREMOST AS A CONFIDENCE BUILDING EXERCISE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO CONVERT CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT EXPANSION INTO SUPPORT. BASED ON EXPERIENCE, THIS INCLUDES OUR ACCEPTING THE PREFERENCE OF ALL THE OTHER ALLIES THAT THE STUDY BE PRODUCED FIRST, WITH RELEVANT PARTS THEN RAPIDLY EXTRACTED FOR THE PRESENTATION TO PARTNERS. IN TERMS OF MECHANICS, WE ARE MOST LIKELY TO MEET OUR TARGETS IF WE ACCEPT THE EIGHT TOPICS (CHAPTERS) IN THE DECEMBER 23 TERMS OF REFERENCE, INSERT OUR IDEAS IN THE RELEVANT CHAPTERS (WITHOUT TRYING TO WRITE A FULL, NEW OUTLINE), AND PROPOSE A "ROLLING" 3-STEP PROCESS OF WRITING, DISCUSSING, AND AGREEING TEXT, CHAPTER BY CHAPTER. THE U.S. SHOULD WORK WITH KEY ALLIES ON DIFFICULT DRAFTING ISSUES, AND CONTRIBUTE THE RESULTS FOR FORMAL I.S. SUBMISSION TO THE SPC/R. A KEY GOAL SHOULD BE A COMPLETED TEXT, EVEN IF BRACKETED, BY THE MAY 30-31 NAC MINISTERIAL AND THE JUNE 8-9 DPC, WITH AS MANY KEY POLITICAL DECISIONS AS POSSIBLE TAKEN AT THE NAC MINISTERIAL. IN MISSION'S JUDGMENT, THE PROCESS PROPOSED BELOW IS MOST LIKELY TO GAIN U.S. OBJECTIVES AND TO DEVELOP THE POLITICAL SUPPORT NEEDED FOR ALLIED CONSENSUS ON ACTUAL EXPANSION DECISIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. AT THE DECEMBER 1 NAC MINISTERIAL, WE SUCCEEDED IN GAINING A COMMITMENT TO NATO EXPANSION THAT LOCKED IN THE DECISION OF THE JANUARY 1994 SUMMIT, ALONG WITH AGREEMENT ON THE WAY AHEAD -- AN "EXTENSIVE STUDY" AND A PRESENTATION OF THE "RESULTS OF OUR DELIBERATIONS" TO "INTERESTED PARTNERS" BEFORE THE DECEMBER 1995 MINISTERIAL.

4. WE SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS, HOWEVER, THAT ALL 16 ALLIES ARE YET FULLY PREPARED TO TAKE THE NEXT CRUCIAL STEP, THE "WHEN AND WHO" OF ENLARGEMENT. MOST DO NOW SEE THIS AS INEVITABLE, BUT FOR MANY ALLIES THIS UNDERSTANDING IS DRIVEN LESS BY THEIR VIEWS ON SECURITY THAN BY EITHER THE PARALLEL PROCESS OF ENLARGING THE EUROPEAN UNION OR PERCEPTIONS THAT SOME NATO EXPANSION WILL BE NECESSARY TO PRESERVE VIGOROUS U.S. INTEREST IN EUROPEAN SECURITY. FEW ALLIES ARE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT EXPANSION, AND SEVERAL WILL DRAG THEIR FEET ON GETTING THE NECESSARY WORK DONE THIS YEAR, WHETHER OUT OF INERTIA OR OUT OF A HOPE THAT, SOMEHOW, THEY WILL NOT HAVE TO CROSS THIS PARTICULAR RUBICON.

5. WE NEED, THEREFORE, TO VIEW THE WORK THIS YEAR ON THE "HOW AND WHY" OF EXPANSION NOT AS A TECHNICAL EXERCISE OF WORKING THROUGH THE DETAILS OF A ROBUST NATO DECISION, BUT PRIMARILY AS A PROCESS OF BUILDING POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE TAKING OF ACTUAL DECISIONS ON ENLARGEMENT IN TERMS OF REAL

COUNTRIES AND REAL DATES. WHAT WE ARE DOING THIS YEAR IS THUS A CONFIDENCE BUILDING EXERCISE. IT NEEDS TO GET ALLIES USED TO THE IDEA OF HAVING NEW ALLIES, COMFORTABLE WITH THE FACT THAT THE ALLIANCE WHICH EMERGES AFTERWARD WILL NOT SOMEHOW BE WEAKENED, AND CONFIDENT THAT ENLARGEMENT WILL NOT

HELP TO BRING INTO BEING RENEWED THREATS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY.

6. TO THIS END, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE EXPANSION STUDY IS BEING FLANKED BY TWO OTHER CRITICAL PROCESSES, EACH OF WHICH MEETS KEY REQUIREMENTS OF ENLARGEMENT AND DEALS WITH THE WIDESPREAD ALLIED CONCERN TO KEEP ENLARGEMENT FROM DRAWING A NEW LINE OF DIVISION THROUGH THE CONTINENT. FIRST IS PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, WHICH IS NECESSARY LESS AS A MEANS FOR GETTING EASTERN COUNTRIES READY TO JOIN NATO THAN AS A PERMANENT INSTRUMENT FOR LETTING COUNTRIES WHICH NEVER JOIN, OR JOIN LATE, HAVE A CLOSE AND EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO. SECOND IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP THAT WILL MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES THAT WHAT NATO DOES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WILL NOT ITSELF EITHER CONTRIBUTE TO THE END OF THE RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT, PLACE ANY CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRY IN THE RUSSIAN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, OR HELP BRING INTO BEING PERCEPTIONS OF A NEW RUSSIAN "THREAT." BOTH PFP AND THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP -- DEVELOPED IN PARALLEL WITH THE EXPANSION STUDY, BUT CONDUCTED SEPARATELY AND WITHOUT LINKAGE -- THUS ARE PART OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING WITH THE ALLIES.

7. EVEN THOSE ALLIES DISPOSED TO ACCEPT EXPANSION LOOK TO THE UNITED STATES TO MANAGE THE PROCESS AND TO KEEP IT MOVING; INDEED, WITHOUT OUR CONSTANT LEADERSHIP, THE STUDY WILL NOT GET COMPLETED ON TIME. THIS PUTS A PREMIUM ON OUR GETTING RIGHT BOTH THE POLITICS AND THE MECHANICS OF THE PROCESS.

8. THE POLITICS FOCUS ON OUR BUILDING CONFIDENCE WITH THE ALLIES, ESPECIALLY THE EXPANSION-SKEPTICS, THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO THE STUDY "BY THE NUMBERS". OBVIOUSLY, NATO HAS TO TRANSLATE KEY ELEMENTS INTO A FORM THAT CAN BE PRESENTED TO PARTNERS. BUT IF WE GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT OUR EMPHASIS IS "PRESENTATION FIRST, STUDY LATER", WE WILL UNNECESSARILY COMPLICATE OUR TASK. INDEED, WE ARE NOW COMPLETELY ISOLATED ON THIS POINT AT NATO (15-1), AND THAT FACT, MATCHED AGAINST OUR EMPHASIS ON THE PRESENTATION, IS ALREADY LEADING ALLIES TO SLOW DOWN WORK.

9. IN FACT, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "STUDY" AND "PRESENTATION" IS MORE SEMANTIC THAN SUBSTANTIVE, SINCE -- PRIOR TO TAKING DECISIONS ON "WHO AND WHEN" -- THE ALLIANCE WILL CLEARLY HAVE TO REACH CONCLUSIONS ON SOME ISSUES (E.G., ON INTERNAL ADAPTATION) THAT ARE NEITHER NEEDED NOR APPROPRIATE FOR SHARING WITH PARTNERS. FURTHERMORE, WHOLE ELEMENTS OF ANY SERIOUS STUDY COULD BE LIFTED OUT VIRTUALLY INTACT FOR USE IN A PRESENTATION. OF COURSE, THERE IS A RISK THAT PUTTING THE STUDY FIRST COULD BECOME AN EXCUSE BY SOME ALLIES TO SLOW EVERYTHING DOWN; BUT OUR TRYING TO FOCUS

SOLELY ON PRESENTATION IS ALREADY HAVING THAT EFFECT. THERE SHOULD BE NO GREAT DIFFICULTY IN PURSUING THE STUDY, WHILE CONTINUALLY PAYING ATTENTION TO THOSE MODULES THAT COULD EASILY BE EXTRACTED LATER TO FORM THE PRESENTATION. ADOPTING THIS PROCESS IS LIKELY TO PAY MAJOR DIVIDENDS IN TERMS OF ALLIED CONFIDENCE. IT MAY BE THE ONLY WAY TO GET

THE ALLIES TO COMPLETE THE ENTIRE PROCESS BY THE DEADLINES MANDATED IN THE DECEMBER 1 COMMUNIQUE.

10. AFTER THE FIRST FEW MEETINGS OF THE SPC/R, IT IS NOW POSSIBLE TO REACH SEVERAL JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE PROCESS. FIRST, THERE IS BROAD ACCEPTANCE THAT THE DECEMBER 23 TERMS OF REFERENCE (REFTEL A) DO INDEED PROVIDE A SOUND BASIS FOR MOVING FORWARD. SECOD, THERE IS BROAD ACCEPTANCE THAT THE TOTAL WORK PRODUCT CAN ADEQUATELY BE DIVIDED INTO THE EIGHT DIVISIONS OR "CHAPTERS" SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THAT DECISION SHEET, BASED ON UK SUGGESTIONS, NAMELY:

- PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS;
- BROADER EURO-ATLANTIC POLITICAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS;
- STRENGTHENING THE ALLIANCE;
- ROLE OF PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE;
- IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW MEMBERS;
- IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE;
- MODALITIES OF EXPANSION; AND
- MODALITIES OF PRESENTATION TO PARTNERS.

THIRD, THERE IS GREAT RELUCTANCE TO TRY TO REFINER THESE POINTS FURTHER BEFORE ACTUAL DRAFTING BEGINS -- THAT IS, TO DO A COMPREHENSIVE OUTLINE -- IN LARGE PART BECAUSE OF FEARS THAT THIS WOULD LEAD TO ALL THE KEY STRUGGLES TAKING PLACE BEFORE THERE WERE EITHER CONTEXT OR SPECIFIC TEXT, THUS CAUSING MAJOR DELAYS. OF COURSE, THERE IS RECOGNITION THAT WORK ON EACH OF THESE TOPICS NEEDS TO LOOK AT PARTICULAR SUB-TOPICS. THUS THE QUESTIONS POSED BY THE UK ON JANUARY 18 (REFTEL B) WERE SEEN AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROCESS OF UNDERSTANDING WITHOUT REQUIRING ALL WORK TO STOP UNTIL THE RELEVANCE OF THE QUESTIONS OR SPECIFIC ANSWERS WERE FORMULATED. FOURTH, IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT THERE MUST BE A CLEAR WORK PLAN IF THE TASK IS GOING TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. THE PROCEDURE SO FAR -- ACTUALLY TO DELVE INTO DISCUSSION ON TEXT (NOW BEGUN WITH "PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF ENLARGEMENT") -- WILL NOT SUFFICE, UNLESS THERE IS ALSO CLARITY ON HOW THE WHOLE PROCESS WILL BE CONDUCTED. FINALLY, THERE IS BEGINNING TO BE UNDERSTANDING THAT MOST IF NOT ALL MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUES MUST BE OUT ON THE TABLE, DEBATED, AND RIPE FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION (AND HOPEFULLY DECISION) BY THE NORDWIJK MEETING ON MAY 30-31, AS WELL AS BY THE DPC MINISTERIAL ON JUNE 8-9. THIS IS SO BECAUSE MANY ISSUES WILL BE OF MINISTERIAL QUALITY, AND NO ONE SEEMS DISPOSED TO REQUIRE A SPECIAL NAC MINISTERIAL IN THE MIDDLE OF THE YEAR.

11. THIS BACKGROUND ARGUES FOR THE FOLLOWING APPROACH:

O WORKING WITH THE EIGHT TOPICS IN THE DECEMBER 23 TOR, ENLIGHTENED BY THE UK QUESTIONS OF JANUARY 18 (VETTED TO KNOCK OUT THOSE WHICH ARE CLEARLY INAPPROPRIATE) AND ADAPTED TO CONTAIN RELEVANT PARTS OF THE U.S. SUGGESTIONS OF JANUARY 12 (REFTEL C). INDEED, THIS U.S. MATERIAL LENDS ITSELF TO DIVISION IN THIS WAY AND COULD, IF DESIRED, BE USED TO CHANGE THE ORDER IN WHICH THE TOPICS ARE ADDRESSED;

O ADOPTING A "ROLLING" PROCESS OF DRAFTING, AS THOUGH THIS WERE A SERIES OF SEQUENTIAL NAC COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING EXERCISES. NOTIONALLY, THE SPC/R COULD WORK TO CLOSURE ON TOPIC 1 ("PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF ENLARGEMENT") WHILE ALSO HOLDING PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS ON TOPIC 2, WHILE THE I.S. IS DRAFTING TOPIC 3, AND SO FORTH. THUS, AT ANY POINT, THREE TOPICS WOULD BE IN PROCESS, ACCORDING TO A SET TIMETABLE THAT WOULD HAVE MAY 30 AS ITS DEADLINE.

O PREPARING THE I.S. DRAFT TEXTS THROUGH A COMBINATION OF A) I.S. ORIGINAL MATERIAL; B) TEXT DEVELOPED BY USNATO IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH WASHINGTON; AND C) TEXT FROM CAPITALS, ESPECIALLY WASHINGTON. EXCEPT FOR BOILER-PLATE SECTIONS, CONSOLIDATION AND FIRST VETTING OF DRAFT TEXT COULD BE DONE BY THE FOUR KEY ALLIES, FOR INSERTION BY ONE OR ANOTHER OF THEM INTO THE I.S. PROCESS OR, IF NEED BE, DIRECTLY INTO THE SPC/R AS A "NATIONAL" CONTRIBUTION.

O ENSURING THAT, AS THESE TEXTS ARE BEING PREPARED INFORMALLY BEFORE BEING ADOPTED AND REFINED BY THE I&S., WASHINGTON'S PRELIMINARY CLEARANCE (OR ORIGINATION) WOULD BE SOUGHT AND, OF COURSE, FURTHER WASHINGTON CLEARANCE WOULD BE SOUGHT DURING THE TWO DRAFTING PHASES FOR EACH TOPIC.

O USING THE REGULAR MEETINGS OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS TO GUIDE AND FOCUS THE WORK AT APPROPRIATE STAGES.

12. THIS METHOD, WHILE CUMBERSOME, SEEMS TO BE THE MOST EFFICIENT WAY OF KEEPING THE PROCESS MOVING, PROVIDING LATITUDE FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP, INCREASING THE CHANCES THAT TEXT WILL PASS MUSTER AT 16, AND AVOIDING THE DELAY WHICH WOULD ENSUE IF, INSTEAD, THE I.S. TRIED TO WRITE A COMPLETE TEXT AT THE BEGINNING. IT WOULD ALSO HELP US TO GAIN PARTNERS AMONG KEY ALLIES, WHICH WILL HAVE ADDED IMPORTANCE BECAUSE OF THE SLOW "CONSENSUS" STYLE OF THE SPC/R'S CHAIRMAN. OF COURSE, FOR USNATO TO BE ABLE TO EXERCISE NEEDED LEADERSHIP, WE WILL UTILIZE THE VERY CLOSE LIAISON BETWEEN OUR MISSION-DELEGATION EXPANSION TASK FORCE AND THAT IN WASHINGTON. THIS WILL HELP TO ENSURE OUR GETTING REGULAR, TIMELY GUIDANCE AND INSTRUCTIONS OF THE KIND THAT ARE USUALLY ONLY NEEDED IN THE FINAL STAGES OF NAC COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING.

13. FINALLY, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THERE CAN BE NO GUARANTEE THAT THIS PROCESS WOULD BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE MAY 30 DEADLINE. SOME ALLIES MAY TRY TO DELAY THE STUDY'S COMPLETION UNTIL THE VERY LAST MOMENT THIS FALL, AND THERE CERTAINLY WILL BE A LARGE NUMBER OF CRITICAL POLITICAL

ISSUES TO BE SORTED OUT THROUGH OTHER MEANS, INCLUDING INTERVENTION IN CAPITALS. AT THE VERY LEAST, HOWEVER, THIS METHOD PROMISES TO DELIVER BY THE SPRING MINISTERIALS A COMPLETE TEXT, HOWEVER HEAVILY BRACKETED, ALONG WITH HIGHLIGHTING OF MOST OF THE CRITICAL ISSUES THAT WILL REQUIRE MINISTERIAL DECISION. IT IS ALSO MOST LIKELY TO ENABLE US BOTH TO LEAD ON THIS PROJECT AND TO BUILD THE ALLIED CONFIDENCE NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT THE DECEMBER 1994 NATO

DECISION-IN-PRINCIPLE.

14. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

HUNTER

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05

SSN: 0287

TOR: 950125191803 M1478202

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PREC: IMMEDIATE

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LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC

OSRI: RUEHC

DTG: 010245Z FEB 95

ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

INFO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000
 RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0000
 RUEHSQ/USLO SKOPJE 0000
 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0000
 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0000
 RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAV 0000
 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0000
 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0000
 RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0000
 RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0000
 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0000
 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0000
 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0000

SUBJ: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH EU PRESIDENCY/
 FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JUPPE AND EUROPEAN COMMISSIONER
 BRITTAN, JANUARY 26, 1995 AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 025603

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EUN, US

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH EU PRESIDENCY/
 FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JUPPE AND EUROPEAN COMMISSIONER
 BRITTAN, JANUARY 26, 1995 AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 26 WORKING LUNCH WITH FRENCH EU PRESIDENCY/FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JUPPE AND EU COMMISSIONER BRITTAN CENTERED ON DISCUSSION OF THE U.S.-EU RELATIONSHIP, EUROPEAN STRUCTURES, AND RUSSIA. JUPPE REVIEWED FRENCH EU PRESIDENCY GOALS AND ARGUED THAT U.S.-EU RELATIONS AT THIS STAGE SHOULD FOCUS ON IMPROVING DIALOGUE WITHIN THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK, RATHER THAN CREATING A NEW TREATY. JUPPE SAID FRANCE WOULD CONTINUE THE WORK OF THE EXPERTS GROUPS BUT ADDED THAT THESE GROUPS SHOULD NOT BECOME PERMANENT. HE SAID FRENCH MFA SECRETARY GENERAL DUFOURCQ HAD BEEN NAMED THE FRENCH PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE GROUPS; PARIS WANTED TO COMPLETE THE GROUPS' RECOMMENDATIONS BY APRIL, TO ALLOW FOR

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 PER E.O. 13526

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KBH 3/12/2020

MINISTERIAL REVIEW BEFORE THE U.S.-EU SUMMIT. THE SECRETARY AND FM JUPPE COMPARED VIEWS OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING EU ENLARGEMENT, THE N, ,

RELATIONSHIP OF THE WEU TO NATO, AND LINKAGES AMONG EUROPEAN STRUCTURES. ADDRESSING EU EFFORTS TO INTEGRATE F(R)THER, JUPPE AND BRITTAN SAID THAT DEFINITIVE CHANGES WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE 1996 IGC, BUT THAT ELEMENTS OF INTEGRATION -- SUCH AS EMU AND MORE DEVELOPED CFSP AND THIRD PILLAR POLICIES -- COULD BE PURSUED NOW, UNDER THE MAASTRICHT TREATY.

3 ON ISSUES RELATING TO EUROPEAN NON-MEMBERS OF THE EU, DISCUSSION BRIEFLY TOUCHED ON EU RELATIONS WITH NORWAY AND SWITZERLAND, AND MORE EXTENSIVELY ON CE/BALTIC RELATIONS. THE SECRETARY, JUPPE, AND BRITTAN REVIEWED GREECE'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND AGREED THAT PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY BEATTIE SHOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH EU COUNTERPARTS SOON, TO DISCUSS HOW TO STIMULATE PROGRESS ON CYPRUS AND THE EU-TURKEY CUSTOMS UNION.

4. ON THE EFFECTS OF CHECHNYA, THE SECRETARY AND FM JUPPE SHARED A SIMILAR ANALYSIS OF THE SCALE OF THE CRISIS AND ITS NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON YELTSIN'S STANDING. U.S. AND EU APPROACHES WERE ALSO SIMILAR, PENDING A MORE DEFINITIVE INDICATION OF CONTINUED RUSSIAN COMMITMENT TO REFORM. AS TO ITS CONSEQUENCE FOR RELATIONS WITH NATO, THE SECRETARY AFFIRMED U.S. COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE WITH THE CURRENT PLAN FOR 1995 (INTERNAL NATO STUDY AND PRESENTATION TO INTERESTED PARTNERS BEFORE THE DECEMBER NAC MINISTERIAL). JUPPE SAID THE CHECHNYA CRISIS MADE HIM EVEN MORE CONVINCED THAT NATO MUST NOT BE WEAKENED. JUPPE NOTED THAT THERE WOULD BE AN INCREASE IN PRESSURE FROM THE CENTRAL EUROPEANS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP; HE THOUGHT NATO ENLARGEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE LINKED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WITH RUSSIA.

5. THE U.S. RAISED EURATOM TALKS, URGING PROGRESS TO AVOID A LAPSE IN THE AGREEMENT. BRITTAN SAID THE COMMISSION WOULD RECOMMEND ACCEPTANCE OF A TEXT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF RELEVANT U.S. LEGISLATION, BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY OF THE U.S. "POLITICAL" POSITIONS NOT ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED BY U.S. LAW. HE STATED THAT THE EU APPROACH WOULD ACCEPT WHAT IS IN U.S. LAW AND WOULD "BROADLY" ACCEPT FOR THE U.S. AGREEMENT THE POSITIONS IT HAS ACCEPTED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. MORE BRIEFLY, CHRISTOPHER AND JUPPE AGREED ON THE NEED TO SUPPORT THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE, WITH THE SECRETARY UNDERSCORING OUR SUPPORT FOR A MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA DEVELOPMENT BANK. THEY AGREED THE U.S. WOULD PROVIDE A BRIEFING BEFORE JUPPE LED A TROIKA MINISTERIAL DELEGATION TO THE REGION, ABOUT TEN DAYS

HENCE. JUPPE PRESSED FOR RESOLUTION ON BANANAS, A DISPUTE, HE ARGUED, THAT WAS BEING BLOWN OUT OF PROPORTION. HE AND BRITTAN REITERATED THE EU'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR RENATO RUGGIERO'S CANDIDACY FOR WTO DIRECTOR

GENERAL. END SUMMARY.

U.S./EU RELATIONS

6. THE SECRETARY ASKED JUPPE FOR A REVIEW OF THE FRENCH EU PRESIDENCY AGENDA, NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-EU RELATIONS AND THE NEED TO PREPARE FOR THE JUNE SUMMIT. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT THE U.S.-EU EXPERTS GROUPS WERE IMPORTANT IN THAT REGARD AND COMMENTED THAT THE SIDES HAD NOT CAPITALIZED ON THEM AS FULLY AS THEY OUGHT TO HAVE.

7. FM JUPPE OUTLINED THE FRENCH WORK PROGRAM AS PRESENTED TO EU MEMBERS IN EARLY JANUARY -- GROWTH/EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL QUESTIONS, SECURITY ISSUES, EXTERNAL RELATIONS (INCLUDING CE AND MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSIONS), AND CULTURAL ISSUES (INCLUDING AUDIOVISUAL AND LANGUAGE). JUPPE PLEDGED PARIS WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO GIVE MAXIMUM SUBSTANCE TO THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK CONTAINED IN THE 1990 TRANSATLANTIC DECLARATION. JUPPE REMARKED THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH POINT IN FURTHER COMPLICATING THE RELATIONSHIP WITH A NEW INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM; ON THE CONTRARY, STREAMLINING AND MAKING MORE EFFICIENT MECHANISMS ALREADY IN PLACE SHOULD BE THE GOAL. JUPPE NOTED THAT IF SOME MEETINGS IN THIS CONTEXT HAD BECOME "CUMBERSOME," RESULTS OF THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE (IGC) MIGHT IMPROVE THEM.

8. IN THE SHORTER TERM, JUPPE SAID PARIS WOULD TRY TO MAXIMIZE OUTPUT OF THE EXPERTS GROUPS. MR. BERTRAND DUFOURCQ, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE FRENCH MFA, WOULD BE COORDINATING THE GROUPS FROM PARIS AND WAS READY TO WORK WITH HIS OPPOSITE NUMBER. JUPPE SAID THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY GOAL WAS TO HAVE A DRAFT REPORT ON THE GROUPS' RECOMMENDATIONS COMPLETED IN APRIL AND SUBMITTED FOR MINISTERS' REVIEW BEFORE THE U.S.-EU SUMMIT IN JUNE. JUPPE NOTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL TO MAINTAIN THE GROUPS INDEFINITELY, AND THAT IF THEY WERE CONTINUED IN SOME FORM, THEY SHOULD TAKE UP OTHER THEMES. HE SAID FRANCE HAD BEEN EXPLORING SUCH POSSIBILITIES.

9. COMMISSIONER BRITTAN NOTED THE RESTRUCTURING OF COMMISSION PORTFOLIOS AND MENTIONED A PAST PRACTICE OF U.S. CABINET MEETINGS WITH THE COMMISSION, WHICH HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN RESURRECTING. HE CITED A SIMILAR

FORMAT USED IN TALKS WITH JAPAN IN NOVEMBER 1994 AS THE BASIS FOR HIS SUGGESTION.

EUROPEAN STRUCTURES

10. JUPPE REVIEWED THE STATUS OF EU ENLARGEMENT TO THE EAST: EU INTENT HAD BEEN CLEARLY DEFINED SINCE THE COPENHAGEN COUNCIL, WHICH DREW UP A LIST OF POTENTIAL EU CANDIDATES -- SIX CENTRAL EUROPEANS, THE THREE BALTIC STATES, SLOVENIA, AND CYPRUS AND MALTA. A TIMETABLE HAD ALSO BEEN DEFINED: DISCUSSIONS ON ACCESSION TO BEGIN NOT BEFORE CONCLUSION OF THE 1996 IGC PROCESS. JUPPE SAID

THAT THE EU NEEDED TO GET ITS OWN HOUSE IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE 25-PLUS MEMBERS, AND THAT THE CE CANDIDATES ALSO NEEDED BETTER PREPARATION TO ADOPT THE SEVEN DISCIPLINES WHICH EU MEMBERSHIP ENTAILED. THE COMMISSION WAS PRODUCING A PAPER ON INTEGRATING CE COUNTRIES INTO THE SINGLE MARKET.

11. IN THE MEANTIME, THE EU WAS PURSUING A STRUCTURED, REGULAR DIALOGUE WITH THE CE IN A FIFTEEN-PLUS-SIX FORMAT, AS A PREPARATORY EXERCISE FOR CE ACCESSION. JUPPE NOTED THAT ESPECIALLY FOR FRANCE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THOSE WHO CAN BE EU MEMBERS AND THOSE WHO ARE POTENTIAL EU PARTNERS (E.G., RUSSIA). BRITTAN ADDED THAT EU ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE -- INCLUDING THROUGH ADAPTATION OF THE PHARE PROGRAM -- WAS PART OF THE PROCESS OF HELPING CENTRAL EUROPEANS MAKE INFRASTRUCTURE AND OTHER CHANGES NECESSARY FOR EU MEMBERSHIP.

12. JUPPE SAID THE WEU WAS DESIGNED TO BECOME THE SECURITY ARM OF THE EU; THEREFORE, IT WAS LOGICAL THAT EU AND WEU MEMBERSHIP WOULD BE CONSISTENT. THIS RAISED A RELATED QUESTION AS TO WHETHER JOINING THE WEU WOULD MEAN AUTOMATIC ACCESS TO NATO. JUPPE SAID THE FRENCH HAD CONSIDERED THIS AND DECIDED THAT WEU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP SHOULD HAPPEN AT THE SAME TIME. IT WAS HARD TO SEE HOW THE BENEFITS OF ARTICLE V OF THE WEU TREATY COULD BE MAINTAINED IF THIS WERE NOT THE CASE. BRITTAN INTERJECTED THAT WITH FOUR EU STATES NOW NOT IN NATO, THE SITUATION WAS BECOMING MORE COMPLICATED. ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER WEU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP SHOULD BE "SIMULTANEOUS" OR MORE FLEXIBLE, JUPPE SAID THE FRENCH WERE OPEN TO FURTHER DISCUSSION.

13. RESPONDING TO THE SECRETARY'S QUESTION ABOUT FURTHER EU INTEGRATION, JUPPE SAID THE SITUATION WOULD BE CLEARER AFTER THE 1996 IGC. NEVERTHELESS, THERE WERE MEASURES WHICH COULD BE TAKEN NOW, UNDER THE MAASTRICHT TREATY.

FOR EXAMPLE, IMPLEMENTATION OF A SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY, BETTER IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, AND IMPROVED COORDINATION ON THIRD PILLAR ISSUES, ALL COULD BE ACHIEVED IN THEORY UNDER THE TREATY NOW. JUPPE NOTED THAT DURING HIS EU PRESIDENCY TOUR OF EU CAPITALS, THERE WAS MUCH LESS SKEPTICISM THAN BEFORE ABOUT A SINGLE CURRENCY, AND A GENERAL DESIRE TO STICK TO THE MAASTRICHT TREATY'S SCHEDULE AND CRITERIA FOR CONVERGENCE.

14. BRITTAN HEARTILY ENDORSED JUPPE'S COMMENTS ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, BUT HE SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR THE U.S. TO ASSUME THAT STRENGTHENED EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DEPENDED ONLY ON "CONSTITUTIONAL" CHANGES. THERE WAS, IN FACT, SUCH POTENTIAL IN CURRENT EU STRUCTURES, IF ONLY THERE WERE STRICTER OBSERVANCE OF RULES -- SUCH AS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINGLE MARKET. BRITTAN CITED THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS AS ANOTHER INITIATIVE WHICH COULD ENHANCE INTEGRATION EVEN BEFORE THE END OF THE 1996 IGC PROCESS, BY MAKING THE CONCEPT OF A EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SPACE A REALITY.

RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES

15. ANSWERING THE SECRETARY'S QUESTION ABOUT RELATIONS WITH OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES, JUPPE SAID THE EU WAS TRYING TO REFORMULATE ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH NORWAY IN THE WAKE OF THE "NO" VOTE ON EU MEMBERSHIP. HE APPEARED HOPEFUL THAT ACCEPTABLE MEASURES ENSURING A SINGLE ECONOMIC SPACE COULD BE AGREED. SWITZERLAND, WITH ITS DIFFICULT CANTONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM WAS MORE PROBLEMATIC, HE NOTED, AND IT WAS UNCLEAR THAT THE SWISS POSSESSED THE POLITICAL AND EMOTIONAL WILL EVENTUALLY TO JOIN THE EU.

16. ON GREECE'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, JUPPE OPINED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A SLIGHT DETENTE WITH FYROM. THOUGH ATHENS HAD BEEN DIFFICULT, GLIGOROV HAD BEEN THE MORE INTRANSIGENT. GLIGOROV CLAIMED THAT HE WOULD HAVE MORE LEEWAY AFTER FYROM ELECTIONS, BUT THIS REMAINED TO BE SEEN. JUPPE ADVISED THE U.S. TO PRESS GLIGOROV NOW, EMPHASIZING THAT THE GREEKS WERE READY TO MAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE MOVE ON THE ISSUE.

TURKEY/CYPRUS

17. ON TURKEY AND CYPRUS, JUPPE ALSO THOUGHT THERE WAS AN OPENING FOR SOME PROGRESS, THANKS IN LARGE PART TO EFFORTS

OF THE GERMAN EU PRESIDENCY. GIVEN ITS ROLE AS THE VITAL LINK IN THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAIN, TURKEY'S "'MISBEHAVIOR" ON HUMAN RIGHTS MUST NOT SLAM THE DOOR ON THE EU-TURKEY CUSTOMS UNION, HE SAID. TECHNICALLY, THE CUSTOMS UNION WAS READY. WHILE IT WOULD ENTAIL MORE ECONOMIC NEGATIVES THAN POSITIVES FOR THE TURKS OVER THE LONG TERM, ITS COMPLETION WAS A POLITICAL NECESSITY FOR TURKEY.

18. JUPPE SUMMARIZED THE LATEST GREEK POSITION: IF THE EU SENT A SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR MESSAGE TO CYPRUS THAT IT WOULD APPROVE CYPRUS ACCESSION DISCUSSIONS, THEN ATHENS WAS PREPARED TO LIFT ITS VETO OF THE EU-TURKEY CUSTOMS UNION. THE EU WAS TRYING TO FIND A COMPROMISE, FOR INSTANCE THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BEGIN "X" NUMBER OF MONTHS AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE 1996 IGC. JUPPE HOPED SUCH A FORMULATION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL, AND HE EMPHASIZED THE USEFULNESS OF JOINT U.S.-EU PRESSURE ON TURKEY (TO GET ANKARA TO PRESS DENKTASH), AS WELL AS ON GREECE. THE EU HOPED TO HOLD AN ASSOCIATION COUNCIL MEETING WITH TURKEY TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT IN MARCH.

19. THE SECRETARY ASSURED JUPPE THAT THE U.S. WANTED TO WORK CLOSELY ON THIS WITH THE EU, AND HE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY ON CYPRUS BEATTIE TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE EU PRESIDENCY TO COORDINATE STRATEGIES.

RUSSIA/CHECHNYA (AND EFFECTS ON EUROPEAN STRUCTURES)

20. JUPPE SAID THE EU DID NOT QUESTION THAT CHECHNYA WAS PART OF RUSSIAN TERRITORY BUT DEPLORED RUSSIAN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS THERE. HE TERMED RUSSIAN ACTIONS "A BUNGLED AMATEUR OPERATION, CARRIED OUT WITH GREAT VIOLENCE" AND CITED EU ESTIMATES OF 400,000 DISPLACED PERSONS AND 20,000 KILLED. THOSE WHO SUPPORTED DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN RUSSIA COULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH ACTIVITY. RECENT EU CONTACTS WITH GAYDAR AND OTHER RUSSIAN REFORMERS HAD CONVINCED THE EU IT NEEDED TO BE VERY CLEAR ABOUT ITS OPPOSITION. THE EU TRIED TO BE AS SUPPORTIVE AS POSSIBLE OF ACTIONS UNDER OSCE, TO WHICH RUSSIA HAD NOW MADE COMMITMENTS IT MUST ABIDE BY.

21. JUPPE NOTED THAT THERE WAS A RANGE OF VIEWS WITHIN THE EU AS TO HOW SHARPLY TO REACT (E.G., WHETHER TO THREATEN ECONOMIC/TRADE SANCTIONS, OR BRING THE EU-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND INTERIM AGREEMENT INTO QUESTION). EVENTUALLY THOSE WHO PREFERRED

A MORE MUTED RESPONSE HAD WON OUT; NEVERTHELESS, THE EU WOULD REMAIN OPEN TO FURTHER MEASURES IF THE SITUATION WARRANTED. IN ANY EVENT, RUSSIA WAS NOT OUT OF THE QUAGMIRE, THE GUERRILLA WAR WOULD LAST, AND THE LINGERING ISSUE OF YELTSIN'S POLITICAL VIABILITY HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED. RUSSIAN ADHERENCE TO ELECTORAL TIMETABLES WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT MEASURE OF THE OVERALL SITUATION.

22. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH JUPPE'S ANALYSIS AND NOTED THE SIMILARITY OF U.S. AND EU APPROACHES. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT IN PREVIOUS CRISES, YELTSIN'S INSTINCT FOR REFORM HAD SO FAR WON OUT; WHETHER THAT WOULD HAPPEN NOW REMAINED TO BE SEEN. YELTSIN WAS DEFINITELY WEAKENED, THE ONLY QUESTION WAS HOW MUCH. S/NIS COLLINS ADDED THAT FM KOZYREV HAD RECENTLY ASSURED THE SECRETARY QUITE CATEGORICALLY THAT ELECTIONS WOULD NOT BE DELAYED.

----- EFFECTS ON EUROPEAN STRUCTURES -----

23. JUPPE ASKED IF THE CHECHNYA CRISIS WOULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE, SPECIFICALLY WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD WANT TO PUSH ON NATO ENLARGEMENT OR TAKE A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH. THE SECRETARY SAID CHECHNYA HAD INCREASED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE CURRENT APPROACH ON NATO ENLARGEMENT WAS THE RIGHT ONE. IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH KOZYREV IN GENEVA THE PREVIOUS WEEK, HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO CLARIFY THE RUSSIAN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT NATO'S 1995 WORKPLAN ON ENLARGEMENT WAS, AND WHAT IT WAS NOT. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT SLOWER MOVEMENT ON THE ANNOUNCED WORKPLAN ON ENLARGEMENT WOULD AROUSE CE CONCERN.

24. JUPPE SAID HE THOUGHT CHECHNYA WOULD INCREASE CE PRESSURE TO MOVE FASTER ON NATO ENLARGEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, CHECHNYA STRENGTHENED HIS OWN CONVICTION THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST NOT BE WEAKENED. BUT, AS WITH THE EU, HOW COULD NATO ENLARGE WITHOUT WEAKENING? JUPPE SUGGESTED THAT THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE HAD BEEN HASTILY RELEGATED TO THE BACK BURNER; IT WAS WORKING WELL, OR HAD THE

POTENTIAL TO WORK WELL. JUPPE AGREED ON THE NEED TO KEEP THE PRESENT COURSE, WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES TO THE WORK PROGRAM, UNTIL THE REVIEW AT THE NEXT NATO SUMMIT. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, JUPPE RETURNED TO THIS THEME, SEEKING EXPLICIT CONFIRMATION THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT PLANNING TO TRY TO ACCELERATE THE 1995 WORK PROGRAM. THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE BUT WARNED THAT A NEW CONGRESSIONAL BILL, IF SIGNED INTO LAW, MIGHT AFFECT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSTURE.

25. THE SECRETARY RELATED THAT IN THE NEW REPUBLICAN-] DOMINATED CONGRESS, A HIGH PRIORITY WAS BEING GIVEN TO SPECIFICALLY NAMING THE VISEGRAD FOUR AS THE NEXT NATO MEMBERS, WITH A DATE CERTAIN FOR ENTRY BY 2000. CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT IN HEARINGS EARLIER IN THE DAY HE HAD STRONGLY OPPOSED THIS AND BELIEVED THERE MIGHT BE SOME GROWING SUPPORT FOR HIS VIEW AMONG REPUBLICAN MEMBERS. DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WERE DEAD-SET AGAINST SUCH AN APPROACH. U/S TARNOFF AGREED THAT THE OUTLOOK FOR DEFEATING THE BILL LOOKED GOOD AT PRESENT. HE ADDED THAT THE CHANGE OF POLICY TOWARD NATO MEMBERSHIP BY THE NEW SLOVAK GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO ALTERED THE SITUATION SOMEWHAT.

26. JUPPE ASKED IF THE U.S. HAD GIVEN FURTHER THOUGHT TO A POSSIBLE NATO-RUSSIA AGREEMENT OF SOME KIND, BUT NOT A TREATY. THE SECRETARY SAID THIS HAD COME UP IN HIS GENEVA TALKS WITH KOZYREV. HE SAID ONE MIGHT VIEW THE CONCEPT AS A NATURAL OUTGROWTH OF THE AGREEMENTS WITH NATO WHICH RUSSIA HAD ALMOST APPROVED IN DECEMBER AND NOTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE EXPLORING THE IDEA FURTHER WITH THE ALLIES AND NATO LEADERSHIP. A RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES MIGHT BE CONSIDERED -- FROM A FULL, FORMAL AGREEMENT, TO A MORE INFORMAL COMMITMENT TO JOINT CONSULTATIONS. THE SECRETARY CITED THE U.S.-EU RELATIONSHIP AS PROVIDING A POSSIBLE ANALOGY FOR RUSSIA AND NATO.

27. JUPPE SAID IT WAS CLEAR THE ALLIES COULD NOT LEAVE THE CENTRAL EUROPEANS IN A GREY AREA. THEREFORE, NATO ENLARGEMENT MUST BE LINKED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF RUSSIAN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. JUPPE AND THE SECRETARY ALSO AGREED THAT UKRAINE'S SITUATION MUST NOT BE IGNORED IN THE EQUATION.

EURATOM

28. THE U.S. SIDE SOUGHT TO IMPRESS ON BRITTAN AND JUPPE THAT TIME WAS EXTREMELY SHORT IF WE ARE TO AVOID A LAPSE IN (U.S.-EURATOM AGREEMENT COVERAGE, STRESSING THAT EVEN A SHORT LAPSE WOULD HAVE SERIOUS POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL CONSEQUENCES. TIME REMAINING TO ENSURE AGAINST A LAPSE WAS MEASURED IN WEEKS, GIVEN THE COMPLEX USG (INCLUDING CONGRESSIONAL) REVIEW PROCESS, EVEN THOUGH THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WOULD NOT EXPIRE UNTIL DECEMBER 31, 1995. ALSO, FAILURE TO AGREE WOULD SEND THE WRONG POLITICAL SIGNAL IN A YEAR IN WHICH THE NPT WAS UP FOR REVIEW. U/S DAVIS SAID WE WERE PLEASED THE EU NOW SEEMED PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE AN

AGREEMENT THAT INCLUDED RECIPROCAL CONSENT RIGHTS OVER REPROCESSING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES, WITH THE APPROVALS GIVEN ON A ONE-TIME BASIS IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. SHE SOUGHT TO ASSURE THE EU THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT USE SUCH CONSENT RIGHTS TO INTERFERE IN EURATOM'S CIVIL NUCLEAR PROGRAM, INCLUDING ACTIVITIES INVOLVING REPROCESSING AND PLUTONIUM USE, RECOGNIZING EURATOM'S SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO MAKE THESE DECISIONS FOR ITSELF.

29. DAVIS SAID THAT PRECISELY BECAUSE WE NOW APPEARED TO HAVE A COMMON BASIS FOR CONCLUDING A NEW AGREEMENT, WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE NEGOTIATING ROUND IN EARLY JANUARY MADE SO LITTLE PROGRESS. VERY DIFFICULT ISSUES REMAINED TO BE RESOLVED, WITH LITTLE TIME. SHE RECALLED THAT COOPERATION ON THESE ISSUES DATED BACK TO THE VERY EARLIEST DAYS OF THE U.S.-EU RELATIONSHIP, AND URGED THE EU TO REMAIN AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE, PLEDGING THAT THE U.S. WOULD DO THE SAME.

30. BRITTAN ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR URGENCY AND SAID THAT THE COMMISSION WAS NOW PREPARED TO RECOMMEND TO THE COUNCIL A TEXT MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 1978 U.S. NONPROLIFERATION ACT, GOING FURTHER THAN THE EU HAD GONE BEFORE. HE UNDERScoreD THE DIFFICULTY OF THIS STEP FOR THE EU.

31. DAVIS NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD SOUGHT RENEGOTIATION BECAUSE THE 1978 LAW MANDATED IT. THE ADMINISTRATION WAS TRYING TO FIND THE RIGHT BALANCE ON THE CONSENT RIGHTS ISSUE, AND A RESOLUTION WAS ON THE HORIZON. SHE ADDED THAT WE RECOGNIZED SURVIVAL OF CONSENT RIGHTS IF THE NEW AGREEMENT WERE TERMINATED WAS NOT A U.S. LEGAL REQUIREMENT. BUT IT WAS OUR STRONGLY-HELD POLICY, AND ONLY COMMON SENSE, SINCE THE NUCLEAR MATERIALS WILL EXIST FOR CENTURIES. THE EU HAD ACCEPTED THIS IN ITS AGREEMENTS WITH CANADA AND AUSTRALIA.

32. BRITTAN REITERATED THAT THE EU WAS WILLING TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF U.S. LEGISLATION, BUT NOT THE U.S. "AMBITIOUS INTERPRETATION." HE THEN CONCLUDED WITH THE COMMENT THAT THE EU WOULD BE PREPARED BROADLY TO DO WHAT IT HAD DONE FOR OTHER COUNTRIES.

33. JUPPE SAID THE WEST SHOULD NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS CONSIDERING A MORE RIGOROUS, RESTRICTIVE POSITION ON PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS WHEN IT ALSO WAS SEEKING TO CONVINCe A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES TO CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THE NPT. THAT WOULD SIMPLY ENCOURAGE COUNTRIES NOT TO SIGN (BECAUSE THEY WOULD HAVE

FEWER BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION IN EXCHANGE FOR GIVING UP THEIR RIGHT TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS).

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

34. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT ABANDONING SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AS LONG AS THE PARTIES WERE CONTINUING TO PURSUE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

ACKNOWLEDGING EU RESERVATIONS AND BAD PAST EXPERIENCES WITH BANKS, HE URGED THE EU TO REVIEW THE MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA DEVELOPMENT BANK CONCEPT, IN LIGHT OF THE VERY STRONG POSITION IN SUPPORT OF IT TAKEN BY THE REGIONAL PARTIES. JUPPE SAID THE EU SHARED THESE CONCERNS. MUBARAK HAD MET WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND THE PREVIOUS WEEK AND MANIFESTED A "VERY BAD FRAME OF MIND" VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL. JUPPE ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE LEADING A MINISTERIAL TROIKA DELEGATION TO THE REGION IN ABOUT TEN DAYS AND SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONSULT WITH THE U.S. BEFORE DEPARTURE. THE SECRETARY AGREED TO PROVIDE A BRIEFING TO MINISTERS.

WTO DIRECTOR GENERAL

35. JUPPE SAID THE U.S. AND EU MUST BREAK THE CURRENT DEADLOCK. HE REITERATED THE EU'S GREAT RESPECT FOR RENATO RUGGIERO, WHO ALSO WAS CLEARLY IN THE LEAD. BRITTAN ECHOED JUPPE'S REMARKS, NOTING THE URGENCY OF THE MATTER (SUTHERLAND'S TERM EXPIRES MARCH 15, AND THE WTO WANTS A DECISION BY FEBRUARY 15) AND THE FACT THAT NEITHER THE U.S. NOR EU HAD SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS WITH THE CANDIDACIES OF RUGGIERO AND CARLOS SALINAS. TO CONTINUE THE STALEMATE, HE SAID, WOULD RISK ULTIMATE SELECTION OF A FOURTH OR FIFTH COMPROMISE CHOICE, WHO WOULD NOT BE ANYONE'S FIRST CHOICE. BRITTAN NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE RAISING THIS IN HIS MEETINGS WITH USTR KANTOR.

BANANAS

36. JUPPE RAISED THIS BRIEFLY. WHAT WAS AT STAKE WAS NOT WORTH THE BATTLE, HE SAID. A REASONABLE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED WITH FOUR OF THE FIVE LATIN AMERICAN PRODUCERS AND SHOULD NOT BE REOPENED ON THE BASIS OF RELATIVELY MINOR ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS.

CHRISTOPHER
BT
#5603

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 5603

TOR: 950131220354 M1489398

DIST:

SIT: GARDNER NSC VERSHBOW

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PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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RUCBTEC/USLO SAACLANT NORFOLK VA
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPLAD/ECJ5-E/ECJ5-J/ECJ3//
ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE//POUCH//
SUBJ: UKRAINIAN VIEWS ON NATO EXPANSION; UKRAINE AND
PFP

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0792-M(1.04)
KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000633

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, S/NIS AND EUR/ISCA

DEFENSE FOR ISA(EUR-NATO), PDUSD(A&T) LONGUEMARE,
OUSD(A&T) DES (VOLKMAN), OUSD(A&T) ID&PP (BRUCE) AND
ISP(RU&E)

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: NATO, NACC, PARM, UP

SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN VIEWS ON NATO EXPANSION; UKRAINE AND
PFP

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ON FEBRUARY 14, THE UKRAINIAN EMBASSY
BRIEFED US ON UKRAINE'S VIEWS TOWARD NATO ENLARGEMENT.
UKRAINE HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO ENLARGEMENT AS LONG AS IT
AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES WERE CONSULTED. WE PRESSED

FOR UKRAINIAN ACTION TO FACILITATE MORE ACTIVE
PARTICIPATION IN PFP. END SUMMARY.

UKRAINIAN VIEWS ON ENLARGEMENT

3. ON FEBRUARY 14, UKRAINIAN FIRST SECRETARY OSNATCH BRIEFED US ON UKRAINIAN VIEWS ON NATO EXPANSION, NOTING THAT KIEV HAD INSTRUCTED SUCH BRIEFINGS IN KEY CAPITALS/POSTS. READING FROM HIS INSTRUCTIONS, OSNATCH MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- O UKRAINE UNDERSTANDS THE REASONS WHY CERTAIN CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES ARE SEEKING NATO MEMBERSHIP.
- O NO COUNTRY HAS THE RIGHT TO OBJECT TO STATES WHICH WANT TO JOIN MILITARY ALLIANCES IN THE PURSUIT OF THEIR OWN SECURITY.
- O EVERY STATE SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF OTHER STATES, ESPECIALLY NEIGHBORING STATES.
- O IN PRINCIPLE, UKRAINE DOES NOT OBJECT TO NATO ENLARGEMENT AS LONG AS UKRAINIAN INTERESTS ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

4. OSNATCH ALSO REFERRED TO FOREIGN MINISTER UDOVENKO'S STATEMENT AT THE DECEMBER 2, 1994, NACC MINISTERIAL MEETING. NOTING THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT WAS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS, UDOVENKO SAID THERE SHOULD BE THOROUGH CONSULTATIONS AMONG ALL INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING UKRAINE, AND ENLARGEMENT SHOULD NOT RESULT IN NEW DIVIDING LINES IN EUROPE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE PROCESS SHOULD NOT BE ARTIFICIALLY ACCELERATED.

5. ON NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS, OSNATCH SAID THAT KIEV WAS INTERESTED IN BI- AND MULTI-LATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO THAT MIGHT BE PART OF A SPECIAL NATO-UKRAINE "PARTNERSHIP."

UKRAINE AND PFP

6. NOTING OUR VERY STRONG INTEREST IN SEEING UKRAINE BECOME AN ACTIVE PFP PARTNER, WE RAISED WITH OSNATCH UKRAINE'S FAILURE TO CONCLUDE SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS WITH NATO. HE ATTRIBUTED UKRAINE'S SLOW ACTION TO BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES IN KIEV. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENT (FOR RENTING AN OFFICE AT NATO) HAD TO BE APPROVED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND THE SECURITY AGREEMENT REQUIRED MINISTERIAL APPROVAL. HE THOUGHT THAT BOTH MIGHT BE APPROVED WITHIN THREE TO FOUR WEEKS. (COMMENT: FAILURE TO CONCLUDE THE SECURITY AGREEMENT MAY SOON IMPACT ON UKRAINIAN REPS' FREE ACCESS TO NATO AND ACCESS TO PFP CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS. END

COMMENT.)

7. WE ALSO RAISED UKRAINE'S FAILURE SINCE EARLY NOVEMBER TO PROVIDE COMMENTS ON ITS DRAFT IPP. OSNATCH SAID THE MOD HAD PROVIDED TO THE EMBASSY DRAFT COMMENTS ON ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USNATO 000633

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, S/NIS AND EUR/ISCA

DEFENSE FOR ISA (EUR-NATO), PDUSD (A&T) LONGUEMARE, OUSD (A&T) DES (VOLKMAN), OUSD (A&T) ID&PP (BRUCE) AND ISP (RU&E)

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: NATO, NACC, PARM, UP

SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN VIEWS ON NATO EXPANSION; UKRAINE AND PFP

MILITARY ACTIVITIES BUT THEY HAD TO BE TRANSLATED. HE WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER THESE COMMENTS WERE "FINAL" OR COMPLETE. (COMMENT: UKRAINE'S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE DRAFT IPP FOR THREE MONTHS RAISES QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO ACTIVE PARTICIPATION. END COMMENT.)

8. OSNATCH VOLUNTEERED THAT HE HOPES TO RECEIVE TWO NEW MFA COLLEAGUES: ONE TO WORK AT UKRAINE'S NATO LIAISON OFFICE AND ONE TO ASSIST AT THE EMBASSY. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT FUNDING LIMITATIONS AND COMPETING REQUIREMENTS HAD SO FAR BLOCKED FIRM ASSIGNMENTS. HE ADMITTED THAT UKRAINE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF PFP AND ITS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO WITHOUT ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL IN BRUSSELS.

HUNTER

BT

#0633

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 0633

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. cable	re: NATO Enlargement Study: Where Are We? (5 pages)	03/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[01/23/1995-09/29/1995]

2015-0792-M
rs1264

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZEX
 LINE3: O P 030548Z MAR 95
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 OSRI: RUEHC
 DTG: 030548Z MAR 95
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0000
 INFO: EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 SUBJ: NATO EXPANSION: U.S. VIEWS ON MILITARY
 IMPLICATIONS

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2015-0792-M (1.06)
 KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 052655

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO
 SUBJECT: NATO EXPANSION: U.S. VIEWS ON MILITARY
 IMPLICATIONS

REF: USNATO 803

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ONE OF THE CENTRAL ELEMENTS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT WILL BE THE IMPACT ON NATO'S MILITARY CREDIBILITY OF ADMITTING NEW MEMBERS. THIS QUESTION IS NOT EXPLICITLY ADDRESSED BY ANY OF THE CHAPTERS OF THE SPC/R STUDY, BUT IS CLEARLY RELEVANT TO MANY OF THEM, INCLUDING THE CHAPTERS ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT ALLIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ALLIES. MISSION SHOULD USE THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IN LAYING OUT U.S. VIEWS ON THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS WHERE APPROPRIATE IN THE COURSE OF PREPARING THE ALLIANCE STUDY. WASHINGTON APPROVES OF THE APPROACH RECOMMENDED REFTEL. MISSION SHOULD INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS IN THAT APPROACH AT THE MARCH 3 SPC/R DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW MEMBERS.

INTRODUCTION

3. AS NATO ENLARGES, THE TASK BECOMES ONE OF FINDING THE CRITICAL ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE A CREDIBLE MILITARY CONFIGURATION THAT CAN BE SUSTAINED BY THE AVAILABLE RESOURCES OF CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS. THIS CONFIGURATION SHOULD THEN PROVIDE A BASELINE AGAINST WHICH THE ALLIANCE JUDGES THE MILITARY RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FOR POST-EXPANSION CREDIBILITY. THIS WOULD INCLUDE THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND OBLIGATIONS OF NEW MEMBERS, AS WELL AS

THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND OBLIGATIONS OF CURRENT ALLIES AND ALLIANCE STRUCTURES.

4. IN ADDITION TO AVAILABLE RESOURCES, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS HAVE TO BE EVALUATED IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL THREATS AND MISSIONS THE ALLIANCE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO UNDERTAKE. BASIC GUIDANCE IS ESTABLISHED BY THE ALLIANCE'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND SUBSEQUENT ALLIANCE AGREEMENTS.

5. THE ALLIANCE'S MILITARY STRUCTURE IN AN ENLARGED NATO HAS TO BE DESIGNED TO OPERATE WITHIN THESE PARAMETERS. SEVERAL PRELIMINARY, BUT FUNDAMENTAL, CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DERIVED FROM THIS LEVEL OF ANALYSIS. MOST IMPORTANTLY WHILE THERE IS NO A PRIORI REQUIREMENT TO STATION EITHER FORCES OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEMBERS, WHETHER SUCH STATIONING IS REQUIRED MUST BE AN ALLIANCE DECISION. THERE CAN BE NO LEGAL OBSTACLE TO STATIONING SHOULD THE ALLIANCE DECIDE IT IS NECESSARY.

6. WE HAVE DEVELOPED AN ILLUSTRATIVE "CREDIBLE MILITARY CONFIGURATION FOR AN ENLARGED NATO," DERIVED FROM THE ABOVE AS A STIMULUS TO DISCUSSION. THIS BASELINE IS INTENDED TO REFLECT THE MINIMUM COMMITMENT A NEW MEMBER SHOULD MAKE IN MAINTAINING NATO AS AN ALLIANCE CAPABLE OF FULFILLING ITS SECURITY OBLIGATIONS TO AN EXPANDED MEMBERSHIP. KEY ELEMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

ELEMENTS OF A CREDIBLE MILITARY CONFIGURATION

A. FORCE STRUCTURE

--MULTI-NATIONAL NATO TROOPS OCCASIONALLY FORWARD DEPLOYED ON NEW MEMBER TERRITORY;

--NO OBSTACLE TO NOR A PRIORI REQUIREMENT FOR PERMANENT BASING OF FORWARD DEPLOYED UNITS

--SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SPECIALIZED UNITS CAPABLE OF REINFORCING NATO FORCES AND BEING REINFORCED BY NATO UNITS

--INCREASED POMCUS IN KEY AREAS, INCREASED POMSS IN KEY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS

--ENHANCEMENT OF EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE

--INCREASE IN STRATEGIC AND INTRA-THEATER LIFT

B. INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE

--FULL INTEGRATION

--NEW ALLIES PARTICIPATE IN EXISTING HQ'S

--SELECT/LIMITED NEW NATO HQ'S IN CRITICAL AREAS;
EXISTING HQ'S COVER NEW AOR'S

--OPERATIONS CONTROLLED UNDER ESTABLISHED CJTF'S AND NATO
HQ'S

--NATIONAL HQ'S ADHERE TO NATO SOP'S

--C2 EQUIPMENT FULLY COMPATIBLE

C. INTEROPERABILITY

--ALL NEW MEMBERS EXPECTED TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MEET
STANDARDS IN MOST AREAS

--DEVELOP NEW CAPABILITIES IN SELECT UNITS

--CORNERSTONE UNITS IN SELECT AREAS ESTABLISHED, FULLY
INTEROPERABLE WITH NATO UNITS

--NATO STANDARD PROCEDURES FULLY INCORPORATED INTO
NATIONAL PROCEDURES IN SELECT AREAS

--SCHOOLING/TRAINING IN PLACE TO BRING ALL FORCES INTO
INTEROPERABILITY WITH NATO IN A REASONABLE TIMEFRAME

D. TRAINING AND EXERCISES

--EXERCISES INCLUDE THOSE FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

--MEDIUM SIZE EXERCISES HELD ROUTINELY ON NEW MEMBERS'
TERRITORY

--INCREASED ATTENDANCE AT NATO SCHOOLS

--NEW MEMBERS ADAPT TO NATO DOCTRINE ACROSS A BROAD
SPECTRUM OF ACTIVITIES

E. NUCLEAR POSTURE

--NUCLEAR GUARANTEE EXTENDED TO NEW MEMBERS

--NEW MEMBERS CONSULT FULLY IN NPG

--NO A PRIORI REQUIREMENT FOR NOR OBSTACLES TO FORWARD
STATIONING OF WEAPONS

--LIMITED NUCLEAR TRAINING

--ABILITY FOR NATO TO DEPLOY DCA FORWARD IN A CRISIS

F. INTELLIGENCE

--FULL INTEGRATION INTO THE MC 161 PROCESS

--HIGH LEVEL OF INTEL SHARING IN ALL AREAS CONSISTENT WITH
NATIONAL MEANS

--KGB/GRU AFFILIATED LEADERS REMOVED FROM NEW ALLIES '
INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURES. CHRISTOPHER

BT

#2655

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2655

TOR: 950303005423 M1544098

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SIT: BEYRLE FRIED KERRICK NSC VERSHBOW

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PREC: PRIORITY
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 RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
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 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
 SUBJ: HOLBROOKE AND KOVACS: A MEETING OF THE MINDS
 TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 002063

DEPT FOR EUR - A/S HOLBROOKE
 NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRIED
 TREASURY FOR DAS LIPTON

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR
 TAGS: PREL, HU
 SUBJECT: HOLBROOKE AND KOVACS: A MEETING OF THE MINDS

1. SUMMARY: ON FEBRUARY 24 IN BUDAPEST, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE, NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FRIED, AMBASSADOR BLINKEN, AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR WILLIAM SIEFKEN (NOTETAKER) MET WITH HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER LASZLO KOVACS. A/S HOLBROOKE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE IF THE GOH WANTS TO JOIN NATO AND THE EU. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ALSO UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF HUNGARY MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING RESOLVING MINORITY RIGHTS ISSUES (REPORTED SEPTTEL). FOREIGN MINISTER KOVACS REAFFIRMED PRIME MINISTER HORN'S COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE GOH'S INTENT TO ESTABLISH A FIRM BASIS FOR GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

 PM HORN FIRMLY COMMITTED TO ECONOMIC REFORM

2. A/S HOLBROOKE ASKED FOREIGN MINISTER KOVACS WHETHER THE GOH WOULD STAY THE COURSE IN IMPLEMENTING THE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM. KOVACS INTERJECTED THAT THE ANSWER IS A CLEAR QUOTE YES END QUOTE AS PRIME MINISTER

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2015-0792-M (1.07)
 KSH 3/12/2020

Document:holkov ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ POL E
HORN IS COMMITTED TO ECONOMIC REFORM. HOLBROOKE COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO BE HELPFUL, NOT ALARMIST. KOVACS RESPONDED THAT CONFIDENCE BUILDING AMONG INVESTORS IS NECESSARY, AND THE GOH WANTS U.S. SUPPORT. DAN FRIED SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH KOVACS' DEPUTY, ISTVAN SZENT-IVANYI, IN WASHINGTON EARLIER IN THE WEEK AND HAD STRESSED THAT THE DAMAGE OF THE HUNGARHOTELS FIASCO WAS COMPOUNDED BY ITS COINCIDENCE IN TIMING WITH THE CLEVELAND CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT. FRIED FELT THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF BOKROS AND SURANYI WOULD RESULT IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST TO INVESTORS, GIVING HUNGARY A BREATHING SPACE TO PUT ITS HOUSE IN ORDER. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE A POSITIVE FOLLOW-UP. KOVACS AGREEF.

NATO GAME PLAN

3. ON THE SUBJECT OF NATO, A/S HOLBROOKE RECALLED THAT IN THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON AT THE CSCE SUMMIT, PRESIDENT GONCZ HAD STRESSED HE WAS SPEAKING WITH BIPARTISAN SUPPORT IN ASSURING THE U.S. OF HUNGARY'S DESIRE TO JOIN NATO. SINCE THAT MEETING, A HALF HOUR AFTER YELTSIN'S QUOTE COLD PEACE END QUOTE SPEECH, THERE HAS BEEN MUCH PROGRESS. HOLBROOKE NOTED THAT THREE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS HAVE TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN U.S. AND RUSSIAN OFFICIALS AND THERE IS A NOW MUCH GREATER RUSSIAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. GAME PLAN. IN 1995, THE FOCUS WILL BE ON THE ALLIES' DISCUSSIONS OF ENLARGEMENT. NATO WILL CONSIDER RUSSIA'S CONCERNS, BUT IT WILL MOVE STEADILY FORWARD AND THERE WILL BE NO RUSSIAN VETO. NATO WILL ENGAGE RUSSIA IN A DIALOGUE ON ENLARGEMENT, AND RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA WILL MOVE FORWARD IN PARALLEL WITH ENLARGEMENT. FOREIGN MINISTER KOVACS SAID THAT ENGAGEMENT WITH RUSSIA IS THE KEY. THERE MUST BE A PARALLEL PROCESS.

4. ELABORATING ON THE NATO PROCESS, NSC DIRECTOR FRIED SAID THAT NATO MUST COMPLETE ITS STUDY AND BRIEFINGS TO THE PARTNERS BY THE DECEMBER SUMMIT. THE FIRST HALF OF 1995 WILL BE DEDICATED TO THE STUDY ON ENLARGEMENT. A/S HOLBROOKE COMMENTED THAT THE EMBASSY WILL FIELD A TEAM TO WORK WITH THE GOH IN PREPARATION FOR THE NATO BRIEFING TEAM VISIT. THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR, FRIED SAID, WILL SEE THE BRIEFINGS OF ALL INTERESTED PFP PARTNERS.

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THE NATO TEAMS WILL BOTH BRIEF THE GOVERNMENTS AND TAKE QUESTIONS. FOLLOWING THE BRIEFINGS NATO WILL REFLECT AND ESTABLISH ITS 1996 GOALS AT THE DECEMBER SUMMIT.

5. FRIED REMINDED HIS INTERLOCUTORS THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT REQUIRES THE APPROVAL OF TWO-THIRDS OF THE U.S. SENATE AND, AS THE DISCUSSION ABOUT ENLARGEMENT GETS MORE SERIOUS, THE QUESTIONS POSED BY THE SENATE WILL GET

HARDER. THE SENATE WILL TAKE A LONG HARD LOOK AT NATO CANDIDATES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GENERAL PRECEPTS ALREADY OUTLINED BEFORE VOTING TO EXTEND ARTICLE FIVE GUARANTEES.

6. FOREIGN MINISTER KOVACS COMMENTED THAT POLAND WILL BE MORE IMPORTANT AND MORE DELICATE, HUNGARY LESS SO.
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BUDAPEST 002063

DEPT FOR EUR - A/S HOLBROOKE
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRIED
TREASURY FOR DAS LIPTON

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR

TAGS: PREL, HU

SUBJECT: HOLBROOKE AND KOVACS: A MEETING OF THE MINDS

HOLBROOKE RESPONDED THAT THE ISSUE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT TURNS ON POLAND. HISTORICALLY, POLAND'S SITUATION HAS REFLECTED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA. THIS RELATIONSHIP, HE SAID, NOW BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA, CARRIES A LOT OF HISTORY. WE DO NOT WANT CENTRAL EUROPE TO BE THE SEEDBED OF FUTURE PROBLEMS IN EUROPE. THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IN CLEVELAND, HE SAID, WAS A BENCHMARK. THE A/S ALSO PROMISED THAT THE EMBASSY WOULD PROVIDE COPIES OF HIS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARTICLE TO THE GOH ASAP.

7. NSC DIRECTOR FRIED SAID THAT AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT AN ISSUE WILL BE NATO'S RELATIONSHIP TO THOSE STATES NOT INCLUDED IN THE FIRST GROUP TO JOIN. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NATO EXPANSION BE HANDLED CAREFULLY IN LIGHT OF THE CONTINUING NATO RELATIONSHIP WITH UKRAINE, ROMANIA, THE BALTICS, ETC. KOVACS SAID THAT LEAVING ROMANIA OUT WAS NOT IN HUNGARY'S INTEREST. HOLBROOKE COMMENTED THAT THE UKRAINE IS THE MOST DELICATE ISSUE. UKRAINE, HE SAID, HAS A LOT OF SORTING OUT TO DO. HE SAID THAT WHILE UKRAINE IS IN THE PFP PROGRAM, IT ESSENTIALLY HAS THREE CHOICES OR MODELS FOR THE FUTURE: POLAND, BELARUS, OR FINLAND DURING THE COLD WAR. KOVACS CAUTIONED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS IF IT APPEARED THAT NATO WAS DRAWING NEW LINES OF DIVISION. HOLBROOKE ADDED THAT THE KEY ELEMENT IN AVOIDING DRAWING NEW LINES WILL BE TO INSURE THAT THE FIRST EXPANSION CLEARLY IS NOT THE LAST. GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATES IN THE REGION WOULD BE THE IMPORTANT.

8. IN CONCLUSION, KOVACS SAID THAT HUNGARY, TODAY A

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PARTNER, WANTS TO BECOME AN ALLY. HOLBROOKE SAID THAT THE U.S. IS VERY ENCOURAGED BY THE PROGRESS THAT HUNGARY HAD MADE IN IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER HORN. THE A/S ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE WILL BE BACK IN HUNGARY ON MAY 29 FOR THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY. IN THE MEANTIME, HE INDICATED THAT THERE WILL BE A HIGH LEVEL DELEGATION IN BUDAPEST FOR THE OPENING OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMY ON 24

APRIL.

COMMENT

9. EMBASSY COMMENT: A/S HOLBROOKE'S POINTS WERE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD, AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOVACS AGREED WITH THEM. THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS WELL AWARE OF THE STEPS HUNGARY MUST TAKE TO JOIN NATO.

END TEXT.

BLINKEN

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#2063

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02

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SSN: 2063

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TOR: 950303121802 M1545446

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ORIG: AMEMBASSY KIEV
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4257
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 RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ5-E/ECJ7/POLAD//
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0551
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
SUBJ: DFM TARASYUK DISCUSSES PFP, GOU INTERNAL
 PROBLEMS

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PER E.O. 13526
 2015-0792-m (1.08)
 KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 001752

DOD FOR ISA (NYE AND KRUZEL)/ISP (CARTER AND SHERWOOD)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, MASS, PINR, UP
 SUBJECT: DFM TARASYUK DISCUSSES PFP, GOU INTERNAL
 PROBLEMS

REF: USNATO 721

1. *ℓ* - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. DURING A FEBRUARY 28 DISCUSSION, UKRAINIAN FIRST
 DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TARASYUK TOLD POLCHIEF THAT GOU
 DELAYS IN MOVING AHEAD WITH PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
 (PFP), DESCRIBED REFTTEL, HAVE BEEN DUE TO INTERNAL
 BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS. TARASYUK HAD ONLY RECENTLY
 BECOME AWARE OF THE DELAYS AND EXPRESSED DETERMINATION
 TO GET THINGS BACK ON TRACK. HE FLATLY STATED
 "PRIVATELY" (AS HE HAS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS WITH
 AMBASSADOR MILLER AND AMBASSADOR COLLINS), UKRAINE'S
 DESIRE TO JOIN NATO, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE GOU'S PUBLIC
 STATEMENTS. TARASYUK ALSO BRIEFLY DESCRIBED SOME
 STAFFING/ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS WITHIN MFA AND MOD.
 END SUMMARY.

PROBLEMS WITH PFP

3. DURING A CHANCE MEETING FEBRUARY 28 IN VIENNA AIRPORT, POLCHIEF HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE REFTEL CONCERNS WITH UKRAINIAN FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TARASYUK. TARASYUK WAS ON HIS WAY TO BRUSSELS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH NATO OFFICIALS ON PFP AND NATO EXPANSION. TARASYUK ACKNOWLEDGED THE GOU'S TARDINESS IN MOVING FORWARD WITH ITS IPP; WITH PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE PLANNING AND REVIEW PROCESS; AND WITH FINALIZING A SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT FOR OPERATIONS AT NATO HQ, AND GAVE THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATION:

-- LAST FALL, HE, TARASYUK, TASKED OUT TO VARIOUS OFFICES WITHIN MFA AND OTHER AGENCIES FOLLOWUP STEPS ON THE ABOVE MATTERS. DURING THE SAME PERIOD, HOWEVER, TARASYUK HIMSELF WAS PROMOTED TO FIRST DEPUTY FM AND THE OTHER TWO SUBSTANTIVE DFMS WERE REMOVED, AND NOT REPLACED. TARASYUK HAD TO TAKE ON ALL OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AS WELL AS HIS OWN, AND CONSEQUENTLY WAS UNABLE TO KEEP TRACK OF DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING PFP AND A NUMBER OF OTHER TOPICS ON WHICH HE HAD, PREVIOUSLY, RIDDEN HERD.

-- WITHOUT TARASYUK OR SOME OTHER SENIOR OFFICIAL FOLLOWING UP, THE VARIOUS WORKING LEVEL OFFICES IN MFA AND OTHER AGENCIES HAD PUSHED PFP TO THE SIDE AND NOT ACTED. IT WAS A CASE, HE SAID, OF NO ONE WANTING TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING DECISIONS AND EVERYONE TRYING TO PASS THE MATTER OFF TO ANOTHER OFFICE OR AGENCY.

-- TARASYUK SAID THAT HE HAD ONLY VERY RECENTLY BECOME AWARE THAT, INSTEAD OF MOVING FORWARD WITH PFP ARRANGEMENTS, THE GOU HAD DROPPED THE BALL. HE IMPLIED THAT HE HAD ONLY FOUND THIS OUT THE PREVIOUS DAY, WHEN HE WAS UNEXPECTEDLY TASKED WITH GOING IMMEDIATELY TO BRUSSELS WITH A GOVERNMENT/PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION FOR TALKS AT NATO HQ. TARASYUK SAID THAT THE DELEGATION WAS ORIGINALLY SUPPOSED TO BE HEADED BY VOLODYMYR HORBULIN, SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT THAT HORBULIN FOR UNEXPLAINED REASONS HAD CANCELLED AT THE LAST MINUTE AND TARASYUK WAS INSERTED IN HIS PLACE. IT APPEARED THAT TARASYUK ONLY THEN GOT THE DETAILS ON THE STATUS OF THE IPP, ETC.

4. TARASYUK SAID THAT HIS TASK NOW IS TO GET MATTERS BACK ON TRACK, AND HE STRONGLY UNDERScoreD THE GOU'S INTEREST, AT SENIOR POLICY LEVELS, IN TAKING PFP SERIOUSLY AND IN SOLIDIFYING UKRAINIAN PARTICIPATION. TARASYUK EXPRESSED OPEN ANGER AND DISGUST AT THE BUREAUCRATIC FUMBLING WHICH HAD CHARACTERIZED GOU ACTIONS TO DATE, AND TOOK UPON HIMSELF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING IT DOES NOT RECUR.

NATO MEMBERSHIP

5. POLCHIEF AT ONE POINT REFERRED TO THE GOU'S PUBLIC

POSITION THAT UKRAINE DOES NOT WANT TO JOIN ANY MILITARY/SECURITY BLOC. TARASYUK RESPONDED THAT THE GOU'S "PUBLIC POSITION, AND WHAT WE SAY IN OFFICIAL MEETINGS," IS EXACTLY THAT: NO BLOC MEMBERSHIP. "PRIVATELY," HOWEVER, TARASYUK ADDED, "NO MATTER WHAT WE SAY PUBLICLY, I CAN TELL YOU THAT WE ABSOLUTELY WANT ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 KIEV 001752

DOD FOR ISA (NYE AND KRUZEL)/ISP (CARTER AND SHERWOOD)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, MASS, PINR, UP
SUBJECT: DFM TARASYUK DISCUSSES PFP, GOU INTERNAL PROBLEMS

TO JOIN NATO."

MFA AND MOD

6. IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBLEMS IN SUPERVISING DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING PFP, POLCHIEF NOTED THAT THE LACK OF OTHER DEPUTY FMS HAS SPREAD TARASYUK VERY THIN, AND ASKED WHEN ADDITIONAL DEPUTIES WILL BE NAMED TO SHARE THE BURDEN. TARASYUK ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAS BEEN OVERWHELMED BY THE NEED TO COVER THE WHOLE WORLD AND TO FOCUS ON AREAS OF WHICH HE HAS LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OR INTEREST. HE SAID THAT SINCE THE FALL HE HAS GENERALLY WORKED SEVEN DAYS A WEEK AND RARELY GETS HOME BEFORE ONE OR TWO IN THE MORNING. "IT IS AN IMPOSSIBLE SCHEDULE," TARASYUK SAID, "AND I CAN NOT KEEP IT UP MUCH LONGER." HE NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WHEN HE WAS SUDDENLY ASSIGNED TO GO TO BRUSSELS, HE HAD TO DROP PREPARATIONS FOR UPCOMING TRIPS TO MOSCOW AND TOKYO, AND SAID HE WAS NOT CERTAIN IF HE COULD MAKE UP THE PREPARATION TIME UPON HIS RETURN TO KIEV.

7. SOME HELP MAY BE ON THE WAY, HOWEVER. TARASYUK SAID THAT A NAME HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO KUCHMA FOR APPOINTMENT AS AN ADDITIONAL DFM, AND ONLY AWAITS THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL (HE WOULD NOT DISCLOSE THE NAME). HE SAID THAT THIS SHOULD ENABLE HIM TO CONCENTRATE MORE ON HIS OWN PRIMARY AREAS OF INTEREST, I.E. NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE AND SECURITY-RELATED MATTERS. WHEN ASKED WHY IT HAD TAKEN SO LONG TO FILL THE SENIOR MFA VACANCIES, TARASYUK ATTRIBUTED THE DELAY TO FOREIGN MINISTER UDOVENKO. UDOVENKO IS "A VERY GOOD CHIEF," BUT OLD SCHOOL. "HE LIKES TO HAVE PEOPLE AROUND HIM IN SENIOR POSITIONS OF WHOM HE IS 100 PERCENT SURE AND WITH WHOM HE IS 100 PERCENT COMFORTABLE. IT TAKES A LONG TIME FOR HIM TO FEEL THAT WAY ABOUT SOMEONE," HENCE THE DELAY IN NEW APPOINTMENTS.

8. TARASYUK ALSO BRIEFLY REFERRED TO ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS AT MOD. WHEN POLCHIEF NOTED THE HIGH EXPECTATIONS WHICH HAD EARLIER GREETED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SHMAROV'S APPOINTMENT LAST FALL AS DEFENSE

MINISTER, AND A CERTAIN SUBSEQUENT BEWILDERMENT AT HOW SLOWLY SHMAROV HAS PROCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING HIMSELF AND HIS STAFF AT MOD, TARASYUK SHRUGGED AND DRYLY COMMENTED THAT "SHMAROV WILL DO THINGS IN HIS OWN TIME." HIS TONE AND EXPRESSION CLEARLY INDICATED THAT TARASYUK WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH SHMAROV'S FAILURE TO TAKE THE REINS AT MOD.

COMMENT

9. IN THIS PRIVATE, CHANCE CONVERSATION, TARASYUK WAS CLEARLY A VERY ANGRY MAN, AND HIS ANGER WAS DIRECTED AT HIS OWN PEOPLE. HE ALSO GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING VERY TIRED. THE CONVERSATION ENDED WHEN TARASYUK WAS MET IN THE AIRPORT LOUNGE BY UKRAINIAN AMBASSADOR TO AUSTRIA (AND TARASYUK'S PREDECESSOR AS FIRST DFM) MAKAREVYCH. BY THEIR VERY WARM GREETINGS, IT APPEARED THAT THE TWO ARE PERSONALLY CLOSE.

MILLER

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#1752

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
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009. cable	re: NATO: NMA Contributions to Chapter III, V (16 pages)	03/06/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[01/23/1995-09/29/1995]

2015-0792-M

rs1264

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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 TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
 INFO: EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 SUBJ: MAMEDOV VISIT: FEBRUARY 22 SESSIONS OF THE
 - U.S.-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY GROUP

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0792-17 (1.10)
 KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 062120

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PARM, NATO, RS
 SUBJECT: MAMEDOV VISIT: FEBRUARY 22 SESSIONS OF THE
 - U.S.-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY GROUP

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV TRAVELED TO WASHINGTON FOR A FEBRUARY 22-23 MEETING OF THE U.S.-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY GROUP (SSG), WHICH HE COCHAIRS WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT. IN TWO SESSIONS ON FEBRUARY 22 THE GROUP DISCUSSED EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE QUESTIONS AND VARIOUS ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. THIS REPORT OF THE TWO FEBRUARY 22 SSG SESSIONS IS PROVIDED FOR POSTS' INFORMATION ONLY. NATO ALIES AND NON-NATO EUROPEAN STATES HAVE ALREADY BEEN BRIEFED IN WASHINGTON (SEPTTEL, WHICH WILL ALSO PROVIDE POINTS FOR POSTS TO USE IN RESPONSE TO HOST GOVERNMENT INQUIRIES). END SUMMARY.

 OPENING INTERVENTIONS

3. BEFORE TURNING TO SPECIFIC EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AT THE FEBRUARY 22 OPENING SESSION, BOTH DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV MADE INTERVENTIONS REGARDING THE WORK OF THE STRATEGIC STABILITY GROUP (SSG). AFTER REITERATING U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT CHECHNYA AND ITS NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS ON RUSSIAN REFORM AND U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, TALBOTT EMPHASIZED THAT U.S. GOALS REMAIN THE SAME AS THEY WERE WHEN THE SSG FIRST MET:

TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF STABLE, DEMOCRATIC, MARKET-ORIENTED RUSSIAN STATE, SECURE IN ITS BORDERS, AT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE. THE U.S., TALBOTT EXPLAINED, ALSO WANTS TO SEE RUSSIA APPROPRIATELY INTEGRATED INTO KEY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, SUCH AS THE OSCE, GATT, APEC, THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM, MTCR, ETC., BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY THOSE INSTITUTIONS WHICH DEFINE THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER.

4. IN HIS INITIAL INTERVENTION, MAMEDOV EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR TALBOTT'S REITERATION OF SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN REFORM; HE POINTED TO YELTSIN'S RECENT STATE OF THE FEDERATION ADDRESS AND SAID A TELLING INDICATION OF THE ADDRESS'S IMPACT WAS THAT THOSE WHO OPPOSE REFORM WERE ANGERED BY YELTSIN'S COMMENTS, WHILE THOSE LIKE GAYDAR APPLAUDED THE ADDRESS. MAMEDOV URGED THE U.S. TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN CHECHNYA AND THE STATE OF RUSSIAN REFORM; POINTING TO MEXICO HE SAID A STATE CAN BE DEMOCRATIC AND STILL NOT BE FULLY AT PEACE WITH ITS PEOPLE.

EUROPEAN SECURITY

5. MAMEDOV SAID HE WAS PERSONALLY OPTIMISTIC THAT ALL THE MAJOR ELEMENTS WERE IN PLACE FOR SOLIDIFYING THE NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP; HE SAID HE WAS LESS AMBITIOUS THAN SOME WHO HAD SUGGESTED A "STRATEGIC TREATY" ARRANGEMENT. THAT SAID, HE URGED ACTION ON SOME SORT OF FORMAL ACCORD BY THE END OF 1995; HE SAID RUSSIA WANTED TO HAVE IN PLACE A "SECURITY SAFETY NET" BEFORE THE 1996 POLITICAL SEASON AND THAT YEAR'S SERIES OF OSCE AND OTHER EUROPEAN MEETINGS. MAMEDOV NOTED THAT SOME IN MOSCOW FELT THAT AGREEMENT ON A NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP SO QUICKLY WOULD ONLY GIVE NATO A PRETEXT FOR QUICK EXPANSION; MAMEDOV SAID HIS ANALYSIS WAS THAT NATO EXPANSION WOULD TAKE AT LEAST FIVE YEARS. (COMMENT: POSTS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE U.S. POSITION IS THAT NATO'S FUTURE EXPANSION SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN PARALLEL WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS. MAMEDOV'S NOTION OF A FORMAL ACCORD BY THE END OF 1995, WELL BEFORE THE FIRST NEW NATO MEMBERS WILL BE ADMITTED, IS NOT

CONSISTENT WITH THIS APPROACH. END COMMENT.)

6. REGARDING THE ELEMENTS OF A NATO-RUSSIA ARRANGEMENT, MAMEDOV SUGGESTED THEY COULD INCLUDE:

-, A STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, AS SUGGESTED BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY;

-- CERTAIN "GUARANTEES" DURING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD; THE GUARANTEES WOULD INCLUDE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE SOIL OF NEW MEMBERS, NO STATIONING OF NATO FORCES ON THE SOIL OF NEW MEMBERS, AND NO PROHIBITION OF RUSSIAN ARMS SALES TO NEW OR PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS; AND

-- AN EXPLICIT STATEMENT THAT RUSSIA WAS NOT EXCLUDED FROM EVENTUAL NATO MEMBERSHIP.

7. ALTHOUGH TALBOTT, UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS AND EUR ACTING A/S KORNBLUM REPEATEDLY URGED THE RUSSIANS TO ACCEPT THE TWO NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENTS KOZYREV REFUSED TO APPROVE ON DECEMBER 1, MAMEDOV DID NOT COMMIT HIMSELF; HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT CLINTON-TO-YELTSIN LETTER WENT A LONG WAY TOWARD MEETING RUSSIAN NEEDS BUT HE WAS VAGUE AS TO WHEN THE TWO DOCUMENTS WOULD ULTIMATELY BE APPROVED.

CFE "EXCLUSION ZONE" IN CHECHNYA

8. MAMEDOVASKED GENERAL DMITRI KHARCHENKO, HEAD OF THE RUSSIAN MOD'S NEWLY-CREATED INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION, TO DISCUSS CFE FLANK QUESTIONS. KHARCHENKO PROPOSED CREATING AN "EXCLUSION ZONE" IN THE SOUTHEAST PORTION OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS MILITARY DISTRICT (NCMD) WHERE OPERATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED AGAINST THE INSURRECTION THERE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRECISE LANGUAGE WAS STILL UNDER REVIEW, BUT HE SAID THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROBABLY TABLE A FORMAL PROPOSAL WITHIN THE VIENNA JCG BY THE END OF MARCH. TREATY LIMITED EQUIPMENT (TLE) IN THE ZONE WOULD NOT COUNT UNDER THE CFE TREATY'S FLANK LIMITS; EQUIPMENT ELSEWHERE IN RUSSIA WOULD BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE FLANK LIMITS.

9. KHARCHENKO SAID THE 42ND CORPS, PRESENTLY HEADQUARTERED IN VLADIKAVKAZ, WOULD BE REINFORCED BY ONE DIVISION OR TWO BRIGADES TO BECOME THE 58TH ARMY, WITH APPROXIMATELY 450 TANKS, 1700 APCS, AND 400 ARTILLERY PIECES. HE OFFERED TO

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOLDINGS TWICE YEARLY, PLUS ALLOW INSPECTIONS BY CFE STATES (SUBJECT TO SECURITY RESTRICTIONS AS REQUIRED BY THE CONTINUED FIGHTING). CHECHNYA WOULD ONLY BE A SMALL PART OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE. THE ZONE WOULD COVER MOST OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS (AREAS INHABITED BY THE ETHNIC GROUPS COMPOSING THE "CONFEDERATION OF CAUCASUS MOUNTAIN PEOPLES") AND WOULD INCLUDE MOST MAJOR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN NCMD.

10. KHARCHENKO INDICATED THAT THE RUSSIAN MILITARY SEES THE PROBLEM AS MORE THAN JUST CHECHNYA AND EXPECTS TO NEED AN INDEFINITE MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS TO DEAL WITH CONTINUING INSURRECTION; MAMEDOV LATER CLARIFIED THAT THE MILITARY WOULD HAVE TWO TASKS: DISARM THE CHECHEN REBELLION AND SEAL THE BORDERS TO PREVENT NEW ARMS FROM GETTING IN OR THE INSURGENCY FROM SPREADING. KHARCHENKO SAID TLE IN THE EXCLUDED ZONE WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS THE LEVEL OF CONFLICT IS REDUCED, BUT MADE NO COMMITMENT AS TO TIMING RUSSIA WOULD COMPLY WITH THE FLANK LIMITS WHEN THE MILITARY EFFORT IN THE EXCLUSION ZONE WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY AND WAS ELIMINATED.

11. IN A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE DELIVERED AT THE OPENING OF THE FEBRUARY 22 AFTERNOON SESSION, WE REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING THE

CFE TREATY AND OUR STRONG MUTUAL INTEREST IN MAINTAINING ITS IMPORTANT ROLE IN BUILDING NEW SECURITY STRUCTURES IN EUROPE. WE SAID WE WOULD CAREFULLY EXAMINE THE PROPOSALS MADE EARLIER BY GENERAL KHARCHENKO (WHICH REPLACE YELTSIN'S EARLIER PROPOSAL IN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON) REGARDING A CFE EXCLUSION ZONE IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS BUT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY IN NOVEMBER.

12. MAMEDOV WOULD NOT PREDICT WHETHER RUSSIA WOULD BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH FLANK LIMITS COME NOVEMBER; THAT DEPENDED ON THE SITUATION IN CHECHNYA. HE SAID THE EXCLUSION ZONE IS TRANSITIONAL, DESIGNED TO RECOVER TLE FROM SECESSIONIST FORCES AND TO SEAL OFF THE AREA. RUSSIA CANNOT PREDICT WITH PRECISION HOW LONG THE EXCLUSION ZONE WOULD BE NEEDED; HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THAT THE MISSION COULD BE COMPLETED BY NOVEMBER. HOWEVER, MAMEDOV DID NOT THINK THE EXCLUSION ZONE DEPLOYMENTS COULD MEET TREATY ALLOWANCES FOR "TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENTS." HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SECURITY CONCERNS GIVING RISE TO THIS PROPOSAL COME FROM WITHIN RUSSIA NOT FROM, E.G., IRAN, TURKEY OR AFGHANISTAN.

13. WE REPLIED THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION NOW IS TO ACHIEVE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY; WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER RUSSIA'S LONG-TERM CONCERNS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 1996 REVIEW CONFERENCE. WE ARE STILL WILLING TO PURSUE OUR PROPOSAL OF FORMING A SMALL GROUP IN THE JCG TO DISCUSS FLANK ISSUES; THE COMPOSITION OF SUCH A GROUP, HOWEVER, REMAINS IN QUESTION. MAMEDOV SAID RUSSIA WOULD PRESENT PROPOSALS ON ADDITIONAL, "UNCONVENTIONAL" REDUCTION METHODS. (NOTE: SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION OF CFE TOOK PLACE AT THE SSG'S FEBRUARY 23 MEETING. END NOTE.)

ABM TREATY/TMD

14. IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION, WE EMPHASIZED OUR COMMON INTERESTS BOTH IN THE PRESERVATION OF THE ABM TREATY AND IN EFFECTIVE THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE (TMD). WE SAID WE WOULD PROCEED TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY TMD THAT DO NOT THREATEN THE RUSSIAN DETERRENT O UNDERCUT THE ABM TREATY. WE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF COMING TO CLOSURE ON DEMARCATION NEGOTIATIONS, IN ORDER TO DEFEND THE ABM TREATY IN CONGRESS AND TO PROVIDE CONFIDENCE REGARDING TMD DEPLOYMENTS. THERE HAD BEEN CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE TO END THE DEMARCATION NEGOTIATIONS BUT THE ADMINISTRATION INSISTED THEY WERE IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE.

15. MAMEDOV EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT POTENTIAL TMD DEPLOYMENTS CLOSE TO DUSSIA, THE UNILATERAL U.S. DECISION TO PROCEED WITH THAAD TESTING, CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES, THAAD TESTING, POSTPONEMENT OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC), U.S. COOPERATION WITH ALLIES ON AIR AND SJORT-RANGE MISSILE DEFENSE, AND U.S. VACILLATION ON COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA ON MISSILE DEFENSE, AS EVIDENCE OF A GAP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIA ON THIS ISSUE. MAMEDOV

INDICATED THAT RUSSIAN RATIFICATION OF START II COULD BE JEOPARDIZED BY U.S. TMD EFFORTS. GENERAL KHARCHENKO INDICATED THAT TMD INTERCEPTORS WITH VELOCITIES IN EXCESS OF THREE KM/SECOND WOULD VIOLATE THE ABM TREATY, AND HE REJECTED OUR CONTENTION THAT VELOCITY WAS NOT THE KEY PARAMETER IN ASSESSING WHETHER A TMD SYSTEM COULD HAVE CAPABILITIES PROHIBITED BY THE ABM TREATY.

16. WE DESCRIBED THE STATE OF PLAY IN CONGRESS THE DOD PROCESS FOR APPROVAL OF THAAD TESTING (CERTIFYING THAT IT WAS ABM-LEGAL), THE AGREEMENT WITH ALLIES ON AIR DEFENSE AND SHORT-RANGE MISSILE DEFENSE (ALSO ABM-LEGAL, WITH SIMILARITIES TO THE RUSSIAN SA-12) AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH RUSSIANS ON BMD, INCLUDING A JOINT TMD

EXERCISE IN 1996. WE STRESSED THAT SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS ARE PREPARED TO MEET WITH MOD OFFICIALS WHEN THEY ARE READY TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE.

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NPT EXTENSION/CTBT

17. THE TWO SIDES DISCUSSED BRIEFLY STEPS THAT NEEDED TO BE TAKEN TO HELP ENSURE A LARGE MAJORITY VOTE IN FAVOR OF INDEFINITE AND UNCONDITIONAL NPT EXTENSION AT THE APRIL NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE: MEETING OF UNSC TO DISCUSS SECURITY ASSURANCES; STATEMENT BY NUCLEAR POWERS ON FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY AND CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR EXPLOSIVES; PROGRESS ON CTBT. BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY TO ENSURE A POSITIVE OUTCOME, I.E., AT LEAST A MAJORITY BY THE BEGINNING OF THE REVCON, BUILDING TO A LARGE MAJORITY WHEN THE DECISION IS TAKEN.

18. WE AGREED THAT THE UN SOCIAL CONFERENCE IN COPENHAGEN WILL PROVIDE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR LOBBYING VICE PRESIDENT GORE MAY REPRESENT THE U.S. WE ASSURED MAMEDOV THAT WE WERE NOT CONSIDERING FALLBACK POSITIONS; HE SAID RUSSIA HAD BEGUN TO CONSIDER FALLBACK POSSIBILITIES. MAMEDOV SAID THE RUSSIANS EXPECT A DIFFICULT EXTENSION CONFERENCE AND HAVE MOVED KOZYREV'S PLENARY STATEMENT FROM NEAR THE FRONT TO NEAR THE END IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH ANY "UNPLEASANT" DEVELOPMENTS. MAMEDOV EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT OUR "FIFTY PERCENT PLUS ONE" STRATEGY, BUT SEEMED REASSURED WHEN WE EXPLAINED THAT WE INTENDED TO BUILD ON THAT BASE AT THE CONFERENCE WITH THE GOAL OF A STRONG MAJORITY FOR INDEFINITE EXTENSION. MAMEDOV SAID RUSSIA WOULD LOBBY IRAN TO SUPPORT INDEFINITE EXTENSION.

19. ON CTBT, MAMEDOV ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. HAD FURTHER CONSIDERED MOVING TOWARD THE REST OF THE P-5 ON ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED BY THE CTBT. MAMEDOV ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE U.S. NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY AND WHETHER RUSSIAN COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. WAS POSSIBLE IN THAT AREA. WE SAID THE FACILITY WAS AN OPEN, PHYSICS EXPERIMENTATION FACILITY, ONLY INDIRECTLY RELATED TO THE EXPERIMENTS ISSUE, AND THAT WE COULD THINK ABOUT COOPERATION IN THIS AREA.

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START II

20. WE GAVE MAMEDOV A REPORT ON FOLLOW-UP ON ALL OF THE COMMITMENTS MADE IN THE SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT ON SECURITY ISSUES AND DISCUSSED IN THAT CONTEXT START II CW AND TRANSPARENCY AND IRREVERSIBILITY. MAMEDOV SAID HE WAS BECOMING MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR RATIFICATION OF START II BUT SAID THAT THE GOR WOULD SEEK TO HAVE THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION RATIFIED FIRST. MAMEDOV SAID IT WAS UNLIKELY START II WOULD BE RATIFIED BY THE NEXT U.S.-RUSSIA SUMMIT, AS CALLED FOR AT THE LAST SUMMIT, BUT HE NOTED THAT THE LONGER TERM PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT WERE IMPROVING -- NO ONE IN RUSSIA WANTED NUCLEAR STATES ON ITS BORDERS OR LARGE STOCKPILES IN-COUNTRY.

21. WE NOTED THAT THE START II RATIFICATION PROCESS HERE WAS MOVING RAPIDLY AND ASKED MAMEDOV TO LET US KNOW IF THERE WAS ANYTHING WE COULD DO TO ASSIST THE GOR IN OBTAINING RATIFICATION. MAMEDOV SAID A SMOOTH RATIFICATION IN THE U.S. WOULD HELP THE EFFORT IN RUSSIA; NUNN-LUGAR SUPPORT FOR STRATEGIC ARMS ELIMINATION ALSO WOULD HELP.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

22. THE U.S. SIDE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF RUSSIA MEETING ITS WYOMING MOU DATA EXCHANGE OBLIGATIONS, PARTICULARLY FOR MAINTAINING SSD FUNDING. MAMEDOV SAID RUSSIA RETAINED ITS INTEREST IN NUNN-LUGAR FUNDING FOR CW DESTRUCTION, NOTING THAT SINCE ALL CW WAS BEING ELIMINATED, THERE WAS LESS CONCERN ABOUT INTRUSIVE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN DESTRUCTION EFFORTS. MAMEDOV DESCRIBED BUREAUCRATIC AND FUNDING PROBLEMS RELATED TO RUSSIAN CW DESTRUCTION EFFORTS. HE BELIEVED THERE WERE VERY PERSUASIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ARGUMENTS THAT COULD BE USED WITH DUMA AND PUBLIC ON CW DESTRUCTION.

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SAFEGUARDS, TRANSPARENCY AND IRREVERSIBILITY (STI)
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23. MAMEDOV SAID RUSSIA HAD TAKEN A GOVERNMENTAL DECISION TO PROCEED WITH THE U.S. ON TRANSPARENCY AND IRREVERSIBILITY, AND WAS FORMING A DELEGATION TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE U.S. ON STI; AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S COUNTERPART LIKELY WOULD BE ONE OF MFA DISARMAMENT DIRECTOR KISLYAK'S DEPUTIES. MAMEDOV SAID DELAYS HAD BEEN CAUSED BY INTERNAL GOR DELIBERATIONS, BEING LED BY PM CHERNOMYRDIN' ON NEW

LEGISLATION REGARDING NUCLEAR SAFETY. IN VIEW OF COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN AT THE LAST SUMMIT, WE STRESSED THE NEED FOR THESE TALKS TO PROCEED AND FOR AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. MAMEDOV REPLIED THAT

THE U.S.-PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION WAS TOO
AMBITIOUS AND WOULD HAVE TO BE CUT BACK. WE NOTED THAT
GOOD PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN DOD-MOD DISCUSSIONS ON
NUCLEAR SECURITY. DR. DAVIS INVITED THE NEW RUSSIAN STI
DELEGATION TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR
GOODBY.

TALBOTT

BT

#2120

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2120

TOR: 950313211334 M1562247

DIST:

SIT: BEYRLE BLACKER BRANSCUM NSC PIFER

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
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OSRI: RUEHMO
DTG: 180901Z MAR 95
ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6044
INFO: ////
SUBJ: MAMEDOV REITERATES RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES
OVER NATO EXPANSION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0792-M(1.11)
KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 009127

NODIS

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, RS
SUBJECT: MAMEDOV REITERATES RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES
OVER NATO EXPANSION

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. DEPUTY FM MAMEDOV STRESSED TO AMBASSADOR MARCH 17 RISING RUSSIAN ANXIETY ABOUT "ACCELERATION" OF NATO EXPANSION. NOTING THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAD TOLD THE MFA IN A MEETING WITH ITS SENIOR LEADERSHIP MARCH 15 THAT IT NEEDS TO BE "MORE VIGILANT" IN AVOIDING "HASTY" EXPANSION, MAMEDOV UNDERScoreD THAT KOZYREV WILL WANT TO HAVE "A VERY FRANK EXCHANGE" WITH THE SECRETARY ON THIS SUBJECT IN GENEVA. MAMEDOV'S INITIAL REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WAS THAT THE RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONSHIP "NEEDS MORE BEEF" THAN THE LETTER CONTAINS. END SUMMARY.
3. THE AMBASSADOR DISCUSSED A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES DURING A TWO HOUR MEETING WITH DEPUTY FM MAMEDOV LATE ON THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 17. MAMEDOV, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED TO THE OFFICE AFTER TWO WEEKS ON MEDICAL LEAVE, LOOKED RESTED, ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED HE WAS NOT LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS LONG TRIP NEXT WEEK TO VANCOUVER FOR SHERPA MEETINGS. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD JUST HAD A LONG CONVERSATION WITH FM KOZYREV, AND WOULD BE SEEING HIM AGAIN LATER THIS EVENING. HE SAID KOZYREV HAD ASKED HIM IN PARTICULAR TO STRESS TO THE AMBASSADOR "OUR GROWING CONCERN" ABOUT THE PACE OF NATO EXPANSION (OTHER SUBJECTS SEPTELS).

YELTSIN IN A SUSPICIOUS MOOD ON NATO

4. MAMEDOV REPORTED THAT KOZYREV HAD GOTTEN AN EARFUL FROM PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN BOTH A PRIVATE SESSION AND A GROUP MEETING WITH THE MFA COLLEGIUM ON MARCH 15 ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S SUSPICIONS THAT THE MFA IS TAKING "A SOFT LINE" ON THE QUESTIONS OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONSHIP. ACCORDING TO MAMEDOV (WHO WAS NOT AT THE SESSION WITH YELTSIN AND SAID HE HEARD THIS FROM KOZYREV AND OTHERS), YELTSIN HAD VOICED CONCERN THAT THE OPENING OF RUSSIA'S DIALOGUE WITH NATO WAS BEING "MISCONSTRUED" AS "BLESSING" RAPID NATO EXPANSION. YELTSIN SUGGESTED THAT THE MFA HAD BECOME TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH THE RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONSHIP, WHICH COULD BE A DIVERSION TO DISTRACT RUSSIAN ATTENTION FROM ACCELERATED NATO ENLARGEMENT.

5. ASKED BY THE AMBASSADOR WHERE YELTSIN MIGHT BE GETTING SUCH IDEAS, WHICH WERE ENTIRELY MISTAKEN, MAMEDOV RESPONDED THAT IT WAS HARD TO BE SURE HOW INFORMATION FLOWED TO THE PRESIDENT. BUT THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY YELTSIN REFLECTED A STRONG BODY OF OPINION ACROSS THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL SPECTRUM, WHICH WOULD ONLY GET STRONGER AS THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS APPROACHED. MOREOVER, MAMEDOV ADDED, "SOME OF YOUR EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE TELLING US AGAIN THAT YOU'RE PUSHING THEM HARDER ON EXPANSION THAN YOU'RE TELLING US, JUST AS THEY CLAIMED BEFORE BRUSSELS AND BUDAPEST LAST YEAR."

6. THE NET RESULT, MAMEDOV SAID, IS THAT KOZYREV HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO HAVE A "VERY FRANK" EXCHANGE WITH THE SECRETARY ON THE NATO ISSUE IN GENEVA NEXT WEEK. THIS WILL BE AT THE TOP OF THE MINISTER'S AGENDA FOR THE MARCH 22 ONE ON ONE DINNER. ACCORDING TO MAMEDOV, KOZYREV WILL BE LOOKING FOR A "STRAIGHTFORWARD" ASSESSMENT OF WHERE THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY WOULD LIKE TO GO ON NATO EXPANSION OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR YEAR AND A HALF (I.E., THROUGH THE PERIOD OF RUSSIAN ELECTIONS). MAMEDOV STRESSED THAT KOZYREV WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION COULD MAKE NO GUARANTEES ON OUTCOMES OR TIMING, GIVEN DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND ALLIANCE REALITIES, BUT WHAT HE WILL WANT TO KNOW -- AT YELTSIN'S SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION -- IS WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE, AND WHEN.

THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER

7. TURNING TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON THE RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONSHIP, WHICH THE AMBASSADOR CONVEYED, MAMEDOV SAID HIS FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THE RELATIONSHIP WOULD NEED "MORE BEEF" THAN THE LETTER CONTAINED. THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT THE LETTER

WAS MEANT TO OPEN AND FRAME A DIALOGUE ON RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONS -- NOT TO BE THE END POINT IN THE RELATIONSHIP. DETAILS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT OVER TIME. MAMEDOV ASKED IF THAT MEANT THAT SOME OF THE IDEAS THAT KOZYREV HAD RAISED IN HIS MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR LAST WEEK COULD STILL BE DISCUSSED; THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT WE COULD OBVIOUSLY OFFER NO GUARANTEES THAT RUSSIAN CONCERNS WOULD BE ADDRESSED TO ~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 009127

NODIS

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, RS
SUBJECT: MAMEDOV REITERATES RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES
OVER NATO EXPANSION

KOZYREV'S COMPLETE SATISFACTION, BUT HE WAS CERTAINLY WELCOME TO PURSUE THEM. MAMEDOV OFFERED NO FURTHER COMMENT ON THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, PROMISING ONLY THAT IT WOULD BE DELIVERED PROMPTLY TO YELTSIN AND THAT IT WOULD BE STUDIED CAREFULLY.

STRUCTURING THE GENEVA MINISTERIAL

8. WITH SENSITIVITIES ABOUT NATO POLICY CLEARLY IN MIND, MAMEDOV EMPHASIZED HIS VIEW THAT THE GENEVA PLENARY MEETINGS SHOULD BE "SMALL, INFORMAL, AND TIGHTLY FOCUSED ON A FEW KEY ISSUES." PARTICULARLY SINCE HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ATTEND THE GENEVA MEETING, HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT BEST THAT DETAILED DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES BE RESERVED FOR LATER MEETINGS, PERHAPS IN MOSCOW DURING THE TALBOTT/DEUTCH VISIT.

9. THE AMBASSADOR PRESSED MAMEDOV ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A COMMITMENT FROM KOZYREV -- IDEALLY MADE PUBLIC IN GENEVA NEXT WEEK -- TO SIGN IMMEDIATELY THE TWO OUTSTANDING NATO DOCUMENTS. MAMEDOV RESPONDED THAT THE GOR WOULD HAVE TO STUDY THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER FIRST. A LOT WOULD ALSO DEPEND, HE ARGUED, ON WHAT "AMMUNITION" KOZYREV COULD TAKE HOME WITH HIM AFTER HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY.

10. AMBASSADOR STRESSED TO MAMEDOV IT WAS TIME TO SIGN THE PFP DOCUMENTS. WHEN KOZYREV OBJECTED TO NATO EXPANSION IN DECEMBER 1994, THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP HAD NOT BEEN RAISED. KOZYREV HAD ASKED FOR CLARIFICATIONS. THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER PROVIDED THEM SUCCINCTLY AND CLEARLY AND RUSSIA SHOULD NOT MOVE THE GOAL POSTS NOW.

11. ON THE ISSUE OF RESTRICTIONS ON NATO FORCE AND WEAPONS DEPLOYMENTS IN THE FUTURE (KOZYREV'S POINT THREE IN OUR DISCUSSION MARCH 10), RUSSIA SHOULD BE CAREFUL ABOUT NOT MOVING THE DIALOGUE FORWARD TOO FAR

TOO FAST ON NATO EXPANSION BY INSISTING ON A DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT PREMATURELY. IT WAS NOT IN RUSSIA'S INTEREST TO DO SO. KOZYREV'S OTHER THREE POINTS WERE CLEARLY SIGNALLED IN THE LETTER AS OPEN FOR DISCUSSION. THE LETTER WOULD NOT PROPOSE THE SOLUTION; THAT WAS FOR THE DIALOGUE. MAMEDOV SAID THIS VERSION OF THE LETTER WAS LESS HELPFUL TO HIM THAN THE EARLIER VERSION WHICH HE HAD SEEN AND WALKED BACK ON THE ISSUE OF CONTAINMENT OF RUSSIA.

12. MAMEDOV CONCLUDED THAT NATO IS NOW "THE CRUCIAL ISSUE" THE TWO MINISTERS NEED TO DISCUSS. HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO SOUND ALARMIST, BUT HIS READING OF KOZYREV'S MOOD, WHAT HE HAD HEARD OF THE YELTSIN SESSION WITH THE MFA COLLEGIUM, AND THE GENERAL PRE-ELECTION POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN THE COUNTRY SUGGESTED THAT "WE ARE HEADING TOWARD A SITUATION LIKE THE ONE THAT WE PERCEIVED BEFORE BRUSSELS AND BUDAPEST." MAMEDOV URGED THAT THE TWO MINISTERS USE THE GENEVA MEETING TO HAVE "A REAL MEETING OF THE MINDS" ON THIS -- POINTING OUT THAT "THE CLOSER WE GET TO ELECTIONS IN BOTH COUNTRIES, THE MORE DIFFICULT THIS WILL GET."

13. MAMEDOV ADDED THAT BOTH OF US HAVE TO SIGNAL HOW WE WILL HANDLE THIS ELECTION PERIOD AHEAD AND WREST THE INITIATIVE AWAY FROM OPPONENTS OF BUILDING A JOINT STRATEGY. AMBASSADOR MADE CLEAR THAT RUSSIAN ELECTION TIMING AND IMPORTANCE WERE VERY MUCH IN OUR THINKING AND THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO TAKE STEPS ON NATO WHICH WOULD CAUSE RUSSIAN DOMESTIC ELECTORAL DIFFICULTIES AS WE MOVE AHEAD. MAMEDOV SAID THAT WAS GOOD NEWS AND HE HOPED THE SECRETARY WOULD COVER THE SAME GROUND.

PICKERING

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#9127

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 9127

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TOR: 950318125737 M1572367

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DIST:

PRT: SIT

SIT: BELL BEYRLE BLACKER FRIED KERRICK PIFER SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

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PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
LINE1: OAASZYUW RUCNGEA5005 0811757-SSSS--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH
LINE3: O 221757Z MAR 95 ZFF4
LINE4: FM USDEL SECRETARY
OSRI: RUCNGE
DTG: 221757Z MAR 95
ORIG: USDEL SECRETARY
TO: RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SUBJ: NIGHT NOTE FROM GENEVA, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 1995

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0792-M (1.12)
KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 005005

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTING SECTO NO.)

NODIS

SPECIAL ENCRYPTION; NOT FOR ADS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER
NSC EYES ONLY FOR LAKE
STATE EYES ONLY FOR BRILL

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN)

SUBJECT: NIGHT NOTE FROM GENEVA, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 1995

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. JUPPE. I HAD AN EXCELLENT BREAKFAST MEETING TODAY WITH ALAIN JUPPE. DESPITE THE INTENSITY OF THE FRENCH POLITICAL CAMPAIGN, HE WAS CLEARLY FOCUSED ON OUR DISCUSSION, WHICH WAS THE BEST ONE I HAVE HAD WITH HIM IN THE LAST TWO YEARS. WE HAVE FOUND MUCH COMMON GROUND ON THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES BEFORE US, INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND NATO, CROATIA, BOSNIA, THE EXTENSION OF NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND NORTH KOREA. THE TURKISH INCURSION INTO IRAQ IS ONE ISSUE ON WHICH THE PRESS IS TRYING TO FIND SOME DAYLIGHT BETWEEN US. THE FRENCH, SPEAKING FOR THE EU, HAVE CONDEMNED THE ATTACK AS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE LINE LAID DOWN BY YOU TO THE EFFECT THAT WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED BY THE TURKS THAT THEIR ACTION IS LIMITED IN SCOPE AND DURATION, AND THAT THEY INTEND TO BE COGNIZANT OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. HOPEFULLY THIS DIFFERENCE WILL NOT PERSIST FOR LONG.

-- JUPPE'S REPORT ON HIS EXTENSIVE MEETING YESTERDAY WITH KOZYREV WAS SOBERING. JUPPE HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT KOZYREV'S

AIM IS TO PUT THE BRAKES ON NATO EXPANSION AND TO TRANSFORM NATO INTO AN OSCE-LIKE ORGANIZATION OF WHICH RUSSIA COULD BE A MEMBER. JUPPE, OF COURSE, TOLD KOZYREV THAT THIS IS A NON-STARTER. THE RUSSIAN POSITION REPORTED BY JUPPE IS QUITE DIFFERENT THAN THE PARALLEL TRACK APPROACH ON WHICH THEY HAD EARLIER AGREED. KOZYREV IS REFLECTING RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS AS WELL AS SOME DISTURBING TRENDS IN RUSSIAN POLICY THAT WE ARE HEARING FROM OTHER RUSSIAN SOURCES (MAMEDOV AND RYURIKOV). I AM GOING TO ATTEMPT TO ANCHOR ANDREY TO THE PARALLEL APPROACH THAT YELTSIN DISCUSSED WITH YOU AND VICE PRESIDENT GORE. I WILL TELL HIM THAT THIS IS THE ONLY FEASIBLE WAY TO PROCEED AND THIS PATH IS SUPPORTED BY THE ALLIES UNANIMOUSLY. I WILL ALSO REMIND HIM OF THE NEED FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE AND POSITIVE PUBLIC DIALOGUE LEST THE RELATIONSHIP SUFFER WITH BOTH OUR PUBLICS.

-- JUPPE ALSO REPORTED THAT IN HIS RECENT CONVERSATION WITH YELTSIN ABOUT CHECHNYA, YELTSIN REPORTED THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH WHAT HE HAD DONE BECAUSE HIS POLLS IN RUSSIA ARE RISING.

CHRISTOPHER
BT
#5005

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 5005

TOR: 950322133910 M1578641

DIST:

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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE//POUCH//
SUBJ: CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC ADDRESSES NATO
MEMBERSHIP WITH PERMREPS

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2015-0792-M (1.13)
KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 001259

STATE FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/NCE

DEFENSE FOR ISA (EUR-NATO), PDUSD (A&T) LONGUEMARE,
OUSD (A&T) DES (VOLKMAN), OUSD (A&T) ID&PP (BRUCE) AND
ISP (RU&E)

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: NATO, NACC, PARM, EZ

SUBJECT: CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC ADDRESSES NATO
MEMBERSHIP WITH PERMREPS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. ON MARCH 27, CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC MADE THE CASE FOR HIS COUNTRY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO DURING AN INFORMAL MEETING WITH PERMREPS. DESCRIBING NATO MEMBERSHIP AS A "NATURAL" DECISION FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC, ZIELENIEC STRESSED HIS COUNTRY'S COMMON POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL VALUES WITH NATO ALLIES. WHILE THE CZECH REPUBLIC DID NOT FEEL AN IMMINENT THREAT TO ITS SECURITY, ZIELENIEC FELT THAT RUSSIA WOULD SEEK TO KEEP EUROPE DIVIDED. ZIELENIEC DESCRIBED THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SLOVAKIA AS "COMPLICATED," BUT SAID RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE VERY GOOD. HE REPORTED THAT THE CZECH MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HAD MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD REFORM, BUT IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO CHANGE THE ATTITUDES OF MILITARY OFFICERS. END SUMMARY.

CZECH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

3. CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC MET INFORMALLY WITH NATO PERMREPS ON MARCH 27. (HIS DISCUSSION WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL BALANZINO WILL BE REPORTED SEPTTEL.) SAYING THAT CZECH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WAS A "NATURAL" DECISION FOR HIS COUNTRY, ZIELENIEC STRESSED THAT THE CZECH REPUBLIC SHARED COMMON POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL VALUES WITH NATO ALLIES. THE CZECH REPUBLIC FELT THAT IT HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. THE CZECH REPUBLIC WAS MAKING EXTENSIVE PREPARATIONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP THROUGH REFORMS IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND WAS EDUCATING THE PUBLIC REGARDING THE COMMITMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS WELL AS THE BENEFITS OF NATO MEMBERSHIP.

4. ZIELENIEC OBSERVED THAT THE CZECH REPUBLIC DID NOT FACE AN IMMINENT SECURITY THREAT FROM RUSSIA, BUT RUSSIA VIEWED THE CURRENT "UNCLEAR" STATUS OF CENTRAL EUROPE AS A CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY. TO COUNTER RUSSIAN OPPORTUNISM, THE WEST SHOULD DEFINE ITS INTERESTS OPENLY AND SPECIFICALLY. HE SUGGESTED THAT RUSSIA FACED A LONG PERIOD OF INSTABILITY. SPEAKING FRANKLY, ZIELENIEC SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE RUSSIAN LEADERS WHEN THEY SAID THEY DID NOT WANT TO DIVIDE EUROPE. IN FACT, THIS WAS THEIR OBJECTIVE, ALTHOUGH THEY REALIZED THEY COULD DO LITTLE NOW SINCE THEY WERE "WEAK." CURRENTLY, RUSSIA WAS FOCUSED ON INTERNAL PROBLEMS. THEY WOULD ACT LATER WHEN THEY WERE "STRONGER." SOME ELEMENTS IN RUSSIA WOULD NEVER ACCEPT NATO ENLARGEMENT.

5. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM DANISH PERMREP BIERRING, ZIELENIEC SAID THAT RUSSIA VIEWED EUROPE IN TERMS OF TRADITIONAL SPHERES OF INFLUENCE. HOWEVER, EACH

COUNTRY SHOULD BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF WHETHER IT WANTED TO REMAIN IN THE RUSSIAN SPHERE; FOR EXAMPLE, BELARUS HAD DECIDED TO MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES TO MOSCOW. IF A COUNTRY DECIDED IT DID NOT WANT TO JOIN THE RUSSIAN SPHERE, THE WEST SHOULD PROVIDE IT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USNATO 001259

STATE FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/NCE

DEFENSE FOR ISA (EUR-NATO), PDUSD (A&T) LONGUEMARE, OUSD (A&T) DES (VOLKMAN), OUSD (A&T) ID&PP (BRUCE) AND ISP (RU&E)

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO, NACC, PARM, EZ

SUBJECT: CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC ADDRESSES NATO MEMBERSHIP WITH PERMREPS

ASSISTANCE.

6. WHEN ASKED ABOUT PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING NATO MEMBERSHIP, ZIELENIEC ESTIMATED THAT ABOUT 50-55 PERCENT OF CZECHS FAVORED JOINING NATO. ALL POLITICAL PARTIES EXCEPT THE FORMER COMMUNISTS SUPPORTED NATO MEMBERSHIP.

CZECH MILITARY REFOJMS

7. ZIELENIEC SAID THAT HIS COUNTRY WAS STRIVING TO ESTABLISH A SYSTEM OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND WAS IN A PERIOD OF RADICAL TRANSITION. IN HIS OPINION, THE CZECH SYSTEM WAS COMPARABLE TO ALLIED MODELS. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE LEARNING ENGLISH, STUDYING IN WESTERN MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND MAINTAINING FREQUENT CONTACTS WITH ALLIED COUNTERPARTS.

8. ZIELENIEC SUGGESTED THAT CHANGING THE ATTITUDES OF OLDER OFFICERS WAS A PROBLEM. WHILE THE MFA HAD CHOSEN TO FIRE MANY SENIOR DIPLOMATS (THE AVERAGE AGE IN THE MFA WAS NOW 33), THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE MILITARY. WHILE MOST OFFICERS DID NOT WANT TO RETURN TO COMMUNISM, CERTAINLY THEY REMAINED COMFORTABLE WITH SOVIET-INSPIRED DOCTRINE AND WERE RESISTANT TO CHANGE. IN FACT, THE CZECH REPUBLIC NEEDED WHOLESALÉ CHANGES IN DOCTRINE, MILITARY EDUCATION AND ATTITUDES.

9. NOTING THAT HE HAD ATTENDED A CZECH MILITARY EXERCISE THE PREVIOUS WEEK, ZIELENIEC SAID THAT DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS HE HAD OBSERVED SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS. HE CREDITED CONTACTS WITH WESTERN MILITARIES AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THESE CHANGES. THE CZECH REPUBLIC WAS MOVING TO A PROFESSIONAL OR SEMI-PROFESSIONAL MILITARY OF ABOUT 65,000 PEOPLE.

RELATIONS WITH SLOVAKIA

10. AMBASSADOR HUNTER PRAISED THE CONCRETE PROGRESS THE CZECH REPUBLIC HAD MADE, NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY REFORM AND CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY. HE HOPED THAT PRAGUE WOULD BE ABLE TO SEND MORE MFA PERSONNEL TO ENHANCE ITS CONTACTS WITH NATO. HE ASKED ZIELENIEC TO REVIEW RELATIONS WITH SLOVAKIA.

11. ZIELENIEC EMPHASIZED THE VERY CLOSE TIES BETWEEN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA "AT ALL LEVELS." WHILE THERE WAS STILL WORK TO BE DONE, BOTH COUNTRIES WERE COMMITTED TO WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER. DESPITE THE "COMPLICATED" POLITICAL SITUATION IN SLOVAKIA, THE CZECH REPUBLIC MAINTAINED GOOD RELATIONS WITH BRATISLAVA. HE HOPED THAT SLOVAKIA WOULD DEMONSTRATE POLITICAL STABILITY.

HUNTER
BT
#1259

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
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SIT: NSC
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PREC: IMMEDIATE
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 OSRI: RUEHC
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 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S MEETING WITH ANDREI
 KOZYREV, APRIL 26.

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0792-M (1.14)
 KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ STATE 106418

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:04/26/15

TAGS: PREL, RS

SUBJECT: SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S MEETING WITH ANDREI
 KOZYREV, APRIL 26.

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN A TWO-HOUR MEETING IN THE MADISON ROOM ON THE 8TH FLOOR OF THE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ELICITED FROM FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV A COMMITMENT TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN THE "MAY-FOR-MAY" PROPOSAL: RUSSIA WOULD, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MAY 10 PRESIDENTIAL MEETING, COMPLETE THE IPP AND BEYOND-PFP DOCUMENTS; AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD USE ITS POSITION WITHIN THE NAC TO ENSURE THAT THE NAC MINISTERIAL IN LATE MAY, IN ADDITION TO PROCEEDING WITH THE '95 NATO-EXPANSION WORK PLAN, WOULD PUT FRESH EMPHASIS ON PFP AND WOULD FORMALLY INAUGURATE THE NATO-RUSSIA DIALOGUE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE SECRETARY WAS JOINED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT AND KOZYREV BY NIKOLAI SPASSKY, DIRECTOR OF THE MINISTRY'S DEPARTMENT OF USA AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS, WHO

SERVED AS NOTETAKERS.

 SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S OPENING PRESENTATION

4. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER BEGAN THE MEETING BY THANKING KOZYREV FOR COMING DOWN FROM NEW YORK. THE SECRETARY

SAID THAT HE WANTED TO PUT FORWARD A NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD SET ASIDE THE ENTIRE AFTERNOON TO TALK WITH KOZYREV; WE WOULD TAKE AS LONG AS NECESSARY FOR THE DISCUSSION. THEN THEY WOULD MEET BRIEFLY WITH THE PRESS. THIS WAS NOT, HOWEVER, A PRESS CONFERENCE AND THE SECRETARY HOPED THAT THEY WOULD NOT MAKE TOO MUCH NEWS.

5. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT IF WE REACH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT KOZYREV AND DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT HAD DISCUSSED IN NEW YORK ON APRIL 25, HE AND KOZYREV WOULD MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT THURSDAY MORNING, APRIL 27, AT 9:00 A.M. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE LIKED KOZYREV'S PHRASE THAT THE UPCOMING MOSCOW SUMMIT IS DOOMED TO SUCCESS IF WE DO OUR WORK. "WE WILL DO OUR WORK."

6. THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE HAD "TAKEN A FEW HITS," BUT SAID WE CAN STILL MAKE IMPORTANT PROGRESS IN THIS RELATIONSHIP. THE KEY ISSUE THAT WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR MEASURING THE SUCCESS OF THE SUMMIT IS EUROPEAN SECURITY. THAT IS THE BASIC ISSUE BY WHICH THE SUMMIT WILL BE JUDGED IN OUR COUNTRY, AS WELL AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE SINCE OUR VERY FIRST MEETING.

7. TODAY'S MEETING, HE SAID, WOULD BE CRITICAL IN PUTTING THE WHOLE ISSUE IN CONTEXT AND THAT CONTEXT SHOULD INCLUDE THE SEVERAL ELEMENTS. FIRST, THE PRESIDENT'S MAIN IDEA IS INTEGRATION; THAT IS AN IDEA THAT OUGHT TO BE REASSURING TO BOTH RUSSIA AND THE U.S. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN AT THE MAY NAC MINISTERIAL. RUSSIA IS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT NATO EXPANSION ACCELERATING OR MOVING ON TO A FASTER TRACK. THE ANTIDOTE TO THAT CONCERN IS A NAC MINISTERIAL THAT PROVIDES ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RUSSIA HAS BEEN ASKING.

8. IF RUSSIA INDICATES AT THE MAY 10 SUMMIT THAT THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE DOCUMENTS WILL SOON BE FORMALLY

APPROVED, AS AGREED, AND IF THAT IS IN THE COMMUNIQUE, THEN THE NAC MINISTERIAL WILL DO THE FOLLOWING: IT WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT NATO EXPANSION IS A CAREFUL, DELIBERATE PROCESS; THAT IT WILL PROCEED "NO FASTER AND NO SLOWER" THAN NATO HAS ALREADY STATED. THERE WILL BE A REFERENCE AT THE NAC TO PROGRESS IN THE INTERNAL STUDY OF EXPANSION AND A STATEMENT THAT THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY WILL BE AVAILABLE TO ALL INTERESTED MEMBERS OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER. THOSE BRIEFINGS BY THE NATO TEAMS IN CAPITALS WILL PRODUCE QUESTIONS THAT WILL THEN BE REVIEWED IN DECEMBER; RUSSIA CAN, IF IT WISHES, BE FIRST TO RECEIVE THESE BRIEFINGS WHEN THE BRIEFINGS ARE READY FOR PRESENTATION.

9. RUSSIA SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WILL BE NO SURPRISES IN THIS PROCESS; THE NAC MINISTERIAL IN MAY WILL CONTAIN A REITERATION OF THE TIMETABLE THAT WE HAVE

TALKED ABOUT BEFORE AND THAT MEANS THAT THE PROCESS WILL CONTINUE NO FASTER AND NO SLOWER. IT WILL BE STEADY, CAREFUL AND DELIBERATE.

10. TO COUNTERBALANCE THE ELEMENT IN THE NAC MINISTERIAL HAVING TO DO WITH NATO EXPANSION, THERE WILL BE OTHER ELEMENTS AS WELL. ONE OF THOSE IS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE THE LEAD IN PUTTING THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE IN THE SPOTLIGHT OF THE MAY NAC MINISTERIAL. ACTUALLY, THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED, THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF ACTIVITY ON PFP ALREADY, BUT WE CAN TAKE THE LEAD AT THE MAY MINISTERIAL. WE CAN RAISE THE VISIBILITY OF PFP AS A PERMANENT ASPECT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY.

11. IF RUSSIA HAS ALREADY SIGNED THE IPP AND BEYOND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE DOCUMENT, THEN WE CAN USE THE MAY MINISTERIAL TO LAUNCH THE NATO-RUSSIA DIALOGUE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE ALSO HOPED TO STRESS INTEGRATION AND RELIANCE ON THE OSCE AT THE MAY NAC MINISTERIAL.

12. IN THE SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER TIME FRAME, NATO WILL HAVE ITS HANDS FULL DEALING WITH ALL THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE MEMBERS WHO WANT A BRIEFING, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED. THE PERIOD WILL BE DEVOTED TO PREPARING REPORTS AND ASSEMBLING THE QUESTIONS FROM PF MEMBERS THAT THE REPORTS GENERATE. AT THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL, NATO WILL CONCENTRATE ON PUTTING IN PLACE THE MECHANISM FOR ANSWERING THOSE QUESTIONS. THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL IS MOST LIKELY TO PRODUCE ANOTHER ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS THAT WILL STRETCH INTO 1996.

13. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HOPED THAT BY DECEMBER WE

COULD HAVE A FRAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLES AND PARAMETERS TO GOVERN THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP, IT IS TOO MUCH TO HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE AN ACTUAL AGREEMENT BY DECEMBER BUT CERTAINLY A FRAMEWORK WILL HELP SET THE STAGE FOR A FORMAL UNDERSTANDING.

14. CHRISTOPHER CONCLUDED THAT, BASED ON THIS UNDERSTANDING, HE HOPED KOZYREV WOULD FEEL COMFORTABLE IN RECOMMENDING TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN THAT WE ADOPT THIS APPROACH AND MOVE FORWARD QUICKLY WITH THE TWO OUTSTANDING NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENTS. FRANKLY, THE SECRETARY SAID, HE HAD BEEN FRUSTRATED BY THE DELAY BECAUSE IT HAS MADE IT HARD TO PROCEED WITH THE NATO-RUSSIA DIALOGUE; HE THUS HOPED KOZYREV COULD RECOMMEND THIS APPROACH TO HIS PRESIDENT.

KOZYREV ON NATO

15. KOZYREV REPLIED THAT HE HAD SOME CONCERN ABOUT PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON NATO THAT HAVE CREATED A GREATER PROBLEM THAN WE NEED TO HAVE. WE NEED SOMEHOW TO STEP DOWN THE RHETORIC ABOUT EXPANSION, KOZYREV SUGGESTED.

"STONES ARE FALLING ON OUR HEADS BEFORE ANYTHING REALLY HAPPENS; NOBODY HAS ACTUALLY ENTERED NATO YET. BUT THERE IS SO MUCH TALK AROUND ABOUT THE EXPANSION OF NATO ANABOUT THE ACCELERATION OF THAT EXPANSION THAT IT IS LIKE AN ECHO IN A VALLEY IN THE MOUNTAINS THAT CAUSES AN AVALANCHE." KOZYREV SAID WE NEED TO BEWARE OF "TERMINOLOGY AND CLICHES" THAT PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO WOULD LIKE TO USE THE NATO EXPANSION ISSUE TO DO DAMAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN, TO KOZYREV HIMSELF, AND TO OTHER REFORMERS. HE SAID HE WAS THINKING OF PEOPLE LIKE LUKIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE RUSSIAN DUMA'S FOREIGN AFFAIR COMMITTEE. LUKIN "HAS MADE A LOT OUT OF TALK ABOUT 'NO VETOES'"; LUKIN USES THE "NO VETO" TALK TO SAY THAT RUSSIA IS NOT REALLY AT THE TABLE.

16. ACCORDING TO KOZYREV, THE BEST ANSWER TO PEOPLE LIKE LUKIN IS DIALOGUE, AND THAT'S ONE REASON KOZYREV LIKES THE MAIN EMPHASIS AT THE MAY NAC MINISTERIAL TO BE ON DIALOGUE. FOR EXAMPLE, RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM CHURKIN RECENTLY GAVE AN INTERVIEW THAT IS THE BEGINNING A PUBLIC CAMPAIGN VERY MUCH ALONG THE LINES OF WHAT AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO SPAIN RICHARD GARDNER HAD PROPOSED PRIVATELY TO KOZYREV ABOUT HOW TO OVERCOME THE PERCEPTION THAT NATO EXPANSION MEANS THE ISOLATION OF RUSSIA.

AMB. GARDNER HAD REPORTED SEPARATELY TO THE

DEPARTMENT HIS CONVERSATION WITH KOZYREV, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN COPENHAGEN THE PREVIOUS WEEKEND.

17. "WE MUST AVOID RHETORIC THAT SEEMS TO PUSH RUSSIA ASIDE, KOZYREV EMPHASIZED. THAT MEANS WE MUST ALSO AVOID THE CHARACTERIZATION OF EXPANSION AS BEING EITHER 'SPEEDY' OR 'SLOW.'" FOR RUSSIA'S PART, KOZYREV SAID MOSCOW WOULD AVOID SAYING "WE HAVE SLOWED IT DOWN."

18. THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OF HOW TO PRESENT THIS ISSUE TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, KOZYREV SAID. THESE STATES WILL ALL ASK THE U.S. IF IT HAD BOWED TO RUSSIAN PRESSURE AND THEY WILL ASK RUSSIA IF WE EXERCISED A VETO. "BOTH THOSE QUESTIONS ARE VERY UNPLEASANT."

19. AS TO SUBSTANCE, KOZYREV SAID THAT ALL THAT CHRISTOPHER HAD PROPOSED SOUNDED "PRAGMATIC ENOUGH..." THERE IS REALLY NO OTHER WAY TO HANDLE THE ISSUE." HE WAS PREPARED TO RECOMMEND THIS COURSE OF ACTION; IN FACT, HE HAD ALREADY RECOMMENDED SOMETHING VERY MUCH ALONG THESE LINES: NAMELY, HIGHLIGHTING OR PUTTING FORWARD PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, LAUNCHING THE NATO RUSSIAN DIALOGUE, AND ALSO SOMETHING IN THE MEETING IN MOSCOW THAT MAKES CLEAR THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AS A PROGRAM IN ITSELF.

20. BUT, KOZYREV CAUTIONED, HIS RECOMMENDATION IS NOT NECESSARILY A FINAL JUDGMENT, THOUGH HE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL SO FAR AS THE RECENT YELTSIN-TO-CLINTON LETTER WAS CONCERNED,

21. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER NOTED THAT HE PARTICULARLY LIKED ONE SENTENCE IN THE LETTER ABOUT GETTING ON WITH THE NATO DOCUMENT, KOZYREV SAID THAT PASSAGE IN THE LETTER HAD ALREADY COST HIM DEARLY -- "I'VE SHED A LOT OF BLOOD." IN ANY EVENT, KOZYREV SAID IT WAS NOT ONE HUNDRED PERCENT CERTAIN THAT HE COULD DELIVER, BUT THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT HE COULD. BACK IN MOSCOW THERE WAS "AN ATTEMPT TO TORPEDO" THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, NOT TO MENTION THE NATO-RUSSIA DIALOGUE. "THAT ATTEMPT MUST BE STOPPED AND IT WILL COST A LOT OF ADDITIONAL BLOOD."

22. ALSO, HE ADDED, THERE MUST BE "NO LINKAGE BETWEEN THE SIGNING OF THE DOCUMENTS AND THE CRITERIA RESULTING FROM THE STUDY IN MAY." KOZYREV SAID HE WORRIED THAT POLISH PRESIDENT WALESA WOULD USE THE MAY MINISTERIAL AND THE STUDY AS A PRETEXT TO ISSUE STATEMENTS ON HOW POLAND WOULD BE A NEW MEMBER BY A PARTICULAR DATE. "IF

THAT HAPPENS WE WILL ALL FIND OURSELVES IN A VERY AWKWARD POSITION; THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE WILL FEEL CHEATED. THEY WILL FEEL THAT THINGS ARE MOVING MUCH FASTER THAN THEY HAD BEEN LED TO EXPECT. IF WE CAN MANAGE THAT PROBLEM AND GET MOMENTUM IN A POSITIVE SENSE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO WITHOUT UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS OR RHETORIC," THE SUMMIT WILL BE SUCCESSFUL AND THE RELATIONSHIP WILL BE VERY MUCH ON TRACK.

CHRISTOPHER: QUESTIONS OF RHETORIC

23. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER THEN REPLIED: "I WILL UNDERTAKE FOR MY PART TO LOWER THE RHETORIC AS FAR AS WE CAN; BUT THE RHETORIC FROM YOUR SIDE HAS ALSO CAUSED PAIN." HE EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO WHAT KOZYREV HAD SAID IN BRUSSELS IN DECEMBER, WHAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAD SAID IN BUDAPEST, WHAT KOZYREV HAD BEEN SAYING IN MORE RECENTLY IN PARIS AND COPENHAGEN. IN PARTICULAR, THE SECRETARY SAID, TALK OF "PUTTING EXPANSION ON ICE" IS SELF-DEFEATING BECAUSE IT INFLAMES PEOPLE WHO FAVOR NATO ACCELERATION. THUS, THE SECRETARY URGED KOZYREV -- IN OUR COMMON INTEREST -- TO WATCH OUT FOR THIS KIND OF RHETORIC.

24. THAT SAID, THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THE NATO STUDY MUST NOT ESTABLISH CRITERIA THAT CREATE PROBLEMS. WE MUST MAKE SURE THAT THE STUDY IS "NOT FAIRLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE INTERPRETATION" THAT THE RUSSIANS FEAR -- I.E., ACCELERATION OF EXPANSION AND EXCLUSION OR ISOLATION OF RUSSIA. OF COURSE, NATO CAN'T CONTROL WHAT CERTAIN POLITICIANS AND MEMBERS OF THE PRESS SAY, BUT @Y BEING PRO-ACTIVE IN PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, RUSSIA CAN HELP GIVE VALIDITY TO THE PARTNERSHIP AND AVOID PROBLEMS OF THE KIND RUSSIA IS CONCERNED ABOUT.

25. "THE TIMING COULD BE VERY HELPFUL HERE": BEFORE

NATO BEGINS ITS BRIEFINGS TO PFP MEMBERS IN THE FALL, WE WILL HAVE THREE OR FOUR MONTHS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE REALLY IS TAKING ON NEW LIFE AND THAT THE NATO-RUSSIA DIALOGUE IS BEGINNING.

26. STILL, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED, WE'RE CONCERNED ABOUT "COLLATERAL DAMAGE"; LET'S MAKE SURE THAT WE GET AS MUCH ACCOMPLISHED AS POSSIBLE BEFORE THE 1996 ELECTIONS -- IN BOTH YOUR COUNTRY AND MINE -- AS POSSIBLE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE REALIZED THAT KOZYREV COULD ONLY RECOMMEND -- HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THE

OUTCOME. BUT KOZYREV'S BRIEF APRIL 27 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT WOULD GIVE KOZYREV A CHANCE TO ENDORSE THIS PLAN AND THE SUBSEQUENT PHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN WOULD GIVE PRESIDENT CLINTON A CHANCE TO SAY THAT HE LIKED PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S LETTER AND FAVORED THE APPROACH THE TWO MINISTERS HAD AGREED UPON.

27. WHEN THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE COULD SEE KOZYREV'S FINGERPRINTS AND PERHAPS HIS HAND PRINTS WERE ALL OVER THE LETTER, KOZYREV INTERJECTED THAT THERE WAS ALSO "BLOOD -- THE PRINTS ARE BLOODY."

NO RUSSIAN ENDORSEMENT OF NATO EXPANSION

28. KOZYREV UNDERScoreD THAT RUSSIA WOULD NEVER BE IN THE POSITION OF ENDORSING AN ACCELERATED NATO EXPANSION TRACK. "WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE ON RECORD OPPOSING HASTY NATO EXPANSION," HE SAID; ANYTHING THAT LOOKS LIKE AN "AVALANCHE" WE CANNOT FAVOR.

29. THIS STILL LEAVES OPEN THE QUESTION, KOZYREV CONTINUED, OF HOW TO HANDLE THIS AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. KEEP IN MIND, HE URGED, WHAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS DEALING WITH DOMESTICALLY: "WHEN I SPEAK OF FREEZING NATO EXPANSION IT'S ONE THING, BUT IT'S QUITE ANOTHER WHEN SOME PEOPLE TALK ABOUT MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES." SEEMING TO CONFIRM THAT HE HAD IN MIND THE RUSSIAN MILITARY, HE WENT ON TO SAY IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE GRACHEV TO CONCENTRATE ON THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, RATHER THAN HIGH POLICY.

30. "WE ALSO NEED TO FIND A WAY TO MAKE MORE CENTRAL WHAT WE CALL A NEW MODEL OF SECURITY AS OPPOSED TO NATO BEING CENTRAL TO EUROPEAN SECURITY."

31. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND THE NATO-RUSSIA DIALOGUE COULD BE PART OF THE NEW SECURITY MODEL AS RUSSIA SEES IT. KOZYREV REPLIED THAT THEY COULD, PROVIDED THEY WERE PART OF THE MODEL AND THE MODEL WAS NOT SEEN AS SUBORDINATE TO NATO AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. HE THEN CONTINUED THAT RUSSIA WOULD EMPHASIZE THE NEW MODEL OF SECURITY "NOT IN AN AGGRESSIVE WAY, BUT BECAUSE ITS RUSSIA'S

POSITION." IN ANY EVENT, NOTHING SHOULD IMPLY AGREEMENT BY MOSCOW TO A SPEEDY NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS.

CONVERSATIONS WITH THE POLES

32. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT KOZYREV MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RUSSIA'S OBJECTION TO WHAT KOZYREV TERMED "AN AVALANCHE" OR "TOO SPEEDY ENLARGEMENT" ON THE ONE HAND AND LIVING WITH A GRADUAL PROCESS THAT RUSSIA MIGHT NEITHER WELCOME NOR APPLAUD BUT COULD NEVERTHELESS ACCEPT.

33. THE SECRETARY THEN ASKED TALBOTT TO REPORT ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER AN HOUR OR SO BEFORE. TALBOTT EXPLAINED HOW THE U.S, WAS URGING THE POLES TO BE HELPFUL IN THREE RESPECTS:

-- BY EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE AND VITALITY OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE IN ITS OWN RIGHT RATHER THAN TREATING IT AS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT THAT WILL DISAPPEAR AS SOON AS NATO TAKES IN NEW MEMBERS;

-- BY ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE, INTEGRATIONIST RATIONALE FOR NATO EXPANSION AS A WAY OF INDUCING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE RATHER THAN PLAYING UP THE ANTI-RUSSIAN, NEO-CONTAINMENT RATIONALE; AND

-- BY NOT PUBLICLY SPECULATING ON DATES WHEN NEW MEMBERS MIGHT COME INTO NATO WHEN SUCH SPECULATION GOES BEYOND ANYTHING TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES OR THE ALLIANCE HAS COMMITTED ITSELF.

34. KOZYREV SAID IT WAS FINE TO MAKE THOSE POINTS TO POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER BARTOSZEWSKI, BUT HE IS NOT THE PROBLEM; THE PROBLEM, HE SAID, WAS WALESIA.

35. KOZYREV THEN CONTINUED THAT THE QUESTION WAS STILL HOW TO FRAME THIS WHOLE PRESENTATION IN MOSKOW. HOW DO WE ANSWER THE QUESTION ABOUT SPEEDING UP OR SLOWING DOWN OF THE PROCESS? "PEOPLE WILL WANT TO ATTRIBUTE VICTORY OR DEFEAT TO ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER." KOZYREV SAID WE NEED TWO OR THREE CATCH PHRASES THAT MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS IS NOT A WIN/LOSE SITUATION. AN EXAMPLE MIGHT BE SIMPLY TO USE REPEATEDLY THE PHRASE "NO HASTY PROCESS" OR THE PHRASE "WHAT'S IMPORTANT IS THAT THE DIALOGUE GOES FORWARD."

36. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT WHILE HE WILL LEAVE IT TO OTHERS TO COME UP WITH THE EXACT PHRASES, WE MIGHT TRY SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF: "A BALANCED AND INTEGRATED APPROACH THAT INCLUDES THE REINVIGORATED PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, AN ACTIVE NATO-RUSSIA DIALOGUE, A DELIBERATE AND GRADUAL PROCESS OF EXPANSION, A STEADILY EVOLVING OSCE AND RUSSIA'S IMPORTANCE TO THE PROCESS AS A WHOLE, IN WHICH, IF POSSIBLE, THERE MUST BE NO WINNERS

AND NO LOSERS."

37. KOZYREV SAID "YES," BUT WE STILL NEED SIMPLE LANGUAGE, CLICHES WITH THREE, FOUR, FIVE WORDS.

38. WRAPPING-UP THEIR REVIEW OF NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID HE WOULD TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT KOZYREV WAS PREPARED TO PUT FORWARD THE APPROACH THAT THEY HAD BEEN DISCUSSING. KOZYREV AGREED, BUT SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE PRESIDENT PUTS ALL THIS TO YELTSIN IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: "CHRISTOPHER AND KOZYREV HAVE PRESENTED ME WITH A FRAMEWORK THAT PRESERVES THE QU.S.-RUSSIANQ PARTNERSHIP AND THAT PUTS AN EMPHASIS ON THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP."

39. "I NEED," KOZYREV CONTINUED, "AN ALLY."

40. "FOR THIS PACKAGE, YOU HAVE AN ALLY AT 1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE," THE SECRETARY REPLIED.

41. KOZYREV SAID: "WELL I NEED AN ALLY SOON BECAUSE THE INVASION HAS ALREADY STARTED; IT'S ALREADY 1944 IN THE WAR THAT I'M FIGHTING BACK HOME."

RUSSIAN DEALINGS WITH IRAN

42. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER NEXT LAID OUT U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIAN REACTOR SALES AND THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN. KOZYREV SAID HE TOO HAS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS, ESPECIALLY THE ADDITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BY MIKHAILOV. HE SAID HE COULD USE AN ALLY ON THIS SUBJECT AS WELL, BUT IT WAS TOO SENSITIVE TO BRING UP IN HIS APRIL 27 CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON. BESIDES, HE ADDED, WE HAVE ENOUGH TROUBLE WITH NATO,

43. KOZYREV CONTINUED THAT HE COULD TELL THE SECRETARY THAT RUSSIA WOULD ABROGATE EVERYTHING EXCEPT THE REACTOR

DEAL ITSELF AND THAT WOULD PROCEED WITH VERY STRICT CONTROLS. KOZYREV SAID WHAT MIKHAILOV IS DOING MADE HIM AND "SOME OTHER PEOPLE" VERY UNHAPPY. KOZYREV HAD , DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN RECENTLY, WHO "HADN'T KNOWN THESE THINGS." NOW KOZYREV WAS FAIRLY SURE THAT YELTSIN WOULD PUT A STOP TO "THE DANGEROUS PART" OF THIS ACTIVITY. THE QUESTION IS HOW TO DO IT IN A WAY THAT AVOIDS THE APPEARANCE OF "ANOTHER AMERICAN VICTORY."

44. KOZYREV CONTINUED THAT "IF THE U.S. BRINGS TO RUSSIA INFORMATION ABOUT SOMETHING THAT IS TRULY DANGEROUS, IT'S IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF OUR PARTNERSHIP TO ACT, BUT WE ALL NEED TO STEP DOWN THE RHETORIC AND MOVE VERY PRACTICALLY ALONG THE SAME TRACK. IF OUR PRESIDENTS DISCUSS THIS EYEBALL TO EYEBALL IN MOSCOW," KOZYREV SAID, "PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL PROBABLY BE QUITE

BLUNT IN SAYING THAT THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN SHUT DOWN."

45. ON THE ISSUE OF THE EXPERTS GROUP WORKING ON THE REACTOR SALES ISSUE, KOZYREV AGREED THE EXPERTS QEINHORN AND KISLYAK, WHO ARE OPERATING UNDER THE TALBOTT-MAMEDOV STRATEGIC STABILITY GROUPQ WOULD REPORT BACK TO THEIR MINISTERS.

46. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER CONCLUDED THAT ON IRAN REACTOR SALES LIKE OTHER ISSUES, "WE MUST BE ABLE TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH, WHEN WE AGREE ON SOMETHING, IT'S NOT SEEN AS A CONCESSION BY ONE SIDE OR A VICTORY FOR THE OTHER."

ABM/TMD

47. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER REVIEWED THE U.S. POSITION ON ABM. KOZYREV SAID THE FOCUS HAS IN THE DUMA. WE NEED AN AGREEMENT NOT TO DISAGREE BUT AN AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE WORK AND FINDING AN ANSWERS KOZYREV SAID; THIS IS CRUCIAL TO THE RATIFICATION OF START II.

48. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID THERE WAS A "MIRROR IMAGE" ON OUR OWN SIDE, WITH THE NEW REPUBLICAN MAJORITY SURPRISINGLY INTENSE ABOUT THE ABM ISSUE. WHEN KOZYREV ASKED FOR ADVICE ON HOW TO BEHAVE WITH THE REPUBLICANS HE WOULD BE MEETING, CHRISTOPHER SAID HE SHOULD SIMPLY BE VERY CANDID THAT THE WHOLE ARMS CONTROL REGIME IS DEPENDENT ON THE ABM TREATY.

BW VISITS

49. IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S PRESENTATION ON BW VISITS, KOZYREV SAID THE EXPERTS WERE STILL WRESTLING WITH DEFINITIONS AND THE QUESTION OF PARITY AND MUTUALITY. IT DESERVED SOME ATTENTION AT THE SUMMIT, GIVEN THE WORK THAT'S BEEN DONE AMONG KISLYAK, LYNN DAVIS AND ACDA DIRECTOR HOLUM.

POST-COCOM EXPORT CONTROL REGIME

50. ON COCOM, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER NOTED THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD WRITTEN A NEW LETTER TO CHERNOMYRDIN. KOZYREV REPLIED THAT COCOM WAS ONE OF THE BEST ISSUES FOR A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT; IT MIGHT BE A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH.

SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

51. WHEN SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER RAISED SPACE LAUNCH

VEHICLES QSLVSQ, KOZYREV DID NOT SEEM EITHER VERY
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TO SPASSKY, WHO SAID THAT THE ISSUE WAS STRICTLY
COMMERCIAL AND THAT THE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES, WHEN USED
FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES, WERE NOT COVERED BY START.
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID "OUR POSITIONS ARE NOT
CONGRUENT." THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT THE EXPERTS
SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK THE PROBLEM.

CFE FLANKS

52. IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S PRESENTATION
ON CFE, KOZYREV SAID THAT THERE IS "DISSATISFACTION AND
GROWING ANXIETY" IN MOSCOW. TO THE RUSSIANS, IT SEEMED
THAT "OUR PARTNERS" WERE TRYING TO AVOID THE ISSUE.
PRESIDENT YELTSIN WOULD CERTAINLY BRING IT UP AT THE

SUMMIT, KOZYREV SAID; THE CFE FLANKS ISSUE WAS LINKED TO
NATO EXPANSION. "CFE III" -- HE SURELY MEANT CFE II
--SEEMS TO RUSSIA TO BE "A POSITIVE WAY TO GO."

53. TALBOTT INTERVENED AND SAID THE IMPORTANT THING IS
THAT RUSSIA TREAT CFE I AS A SOLEMN INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATION AND NOT ABROGATE THE TREATY UNILATERALLY;
WHATEVER SOLUTION WE FIND MUST BE GENUINELY NEGOTIATED
AND MULTILATERAL.

54. KOZYREV REPLIED THAT SUCH WAS HIS PREFERENCE AND
MAMEDOV'S AND OTHERS' BACK HOME, BUT THE U.S. WAS
EXACERBATING THE PROBLEM BY REFUSING TO ENGAGE ON THE
ISSUE WITH THE URGENCY IT REQUIRED: THERE HAD BEEN NO
REPLY TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON
OF LATE LAST YEAR. THAT DELAY CREATED A "VACUUM WHICH
HAS BEEN FILLED BY FEAR, WHICH IN TURN FANS THE
POSSIBILITY OF UNPLEASANT ALTERNATIVES." RUSSIA WOULD
PREFER ALTERNATIVES THAT ADDRESS THE ISSUE IN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY SUCH AS EXCLUSION ZONES. "BUT
THE LONGER THERE IS AMBIGUITY, THE MORE DANGER THERE IS
OF EXTREME ALTERNATIVES."

CHECHNYA/FRED CUNY

55. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID KOZYREV'S MENTION OF THE
FLANK LIMITS "TAKES US INTO THE CAUCASUS." HE THEN
URGED THAT ON CHECHNYA THERE BE AN OPEN-ENDED CEASE-FIRE
RATHER THAN A 10-DAY OR 2-WEEK CEASEFIRE, WHICH WOULD
"BE CRUELLY ARTIFICIAL LOOKING." SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER
ALSO URGED AN OSCE MISSION FOR THE NORTH CAUCASUS. HE
THEN PUT FORWARD AMERICAN CONCERN ABOUT FRED CUNY AND
STEVE LEVINE.

56. ON CUNY, KOZYREV SAID HE DIDN'T WANT TO RAISE ANY
EXPECTATIONS -- "THIS ISSUE IS BEYOND MY CONTROL" --
BUT THERE WAS "SOME SLIGHTS REASON FOR HOPE; KOZYREV

SAID HE HAD SEEN "AMBIGUOUS INDICATIONS" FROM HIS SECRET SERVICE THAT CUNY WAS STILL ALIVE. "THIS ISSUE IS VERY MUCH IN THE FOCUS OF ALL THE AGENCIES CONCERNED, ESPECIALLY THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND INTERIOR."

BOSNIA

57. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER THEN TURNED TO BOSNIA AND SAID IT WAS GOOD THAT THE CONTACT GROUP WAS GETTING TOGETHER IN PARIS TO DISCUSS, AMONG OTHER ISSUES, RECOGNITION. KOZYREV SEEMED UNAWARE OF THE MEETING, OR AT LEAST OF THE LEVEL AT WHICH IT WOULD TAKE PLACE. HE THEN MADE AN ARGUMENT FOR TRYING TO ENGAGE MILOSEVIC IN A "GENUINE GIVE-AND-TAKE" ON THE ISSUE OF RECOGNITION. HE SAID WE SHOULD GIVE MORE EMPHASIS TO "SIGNIFICANT SANCTIONS RELIEF AS OPPOSED TO SMALLER SYMBOLIC SANCTIONS RELIEF"; THERE IS A CHANCE OF BRINGING MILOSEVIC INTO THE PROCESS AS A "REAL PARTNER" IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE KARADZIC -- ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MILOSEVIC HAS OVERESTIMATED HIS INFLUENCE BEFORE. HE SAID RUSSIA ALSO HAD INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH MLADIC AND SOME CHANCE OF INFLUENCING HIM-

58. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID THE CONTACT GROUP NEEDED TO DEFINE WHAT WAS MEANT BY RECOGNITION AND THAT THE POROUSNESS OF THE SERBIAN BORDER MADE SANCTIONS RELIEF OF ANY KIND DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY. KOZYREV REPLIED THAT CONTROL OF THE BORDERS WAS A TRICKY THING; THE BORDERS BETWEEN SERBIA AND BOSNIA ARE JUST AS POROUS AS THOSE BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA, SO IT'S MUCH HARDER TO CARRY OUT REAL CONTROL. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER NOTED THAT WHEN A BORDER IS MARKED BY A RIVER, IT IS MUCH EASIER TO CONTROL IT: "THE STORIES THAT ARE COMING OUT ABOUT THE POROUSNESS OF THE BORDER ARE RATHER DRAMATIC,"

59. THE SECRETARY URGED THAT WE GET THE PARTIES NOT TO LAUNCH ANY OFFENSES. KOZYREV SAID "YES," BUT SUCH A COMMITMENT HAD TO INCLUDE THE MOSLEM SIDE.

OTHER ISSUES

60. KOZYREV ARGUED THAT AT THE HALIFAX G-7/P-8 SUMMIT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THE DINNER DISCUSSION TO BE HIGHLY SUBSTANTIVE.

61. RETURNING TO THE MAY SUMMIT AND HOW TO UNDERScore THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP, KOZYREV SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENTS HIGHLIGHT THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS COSPONSORSHIP AS A SUCCESS STORY. HE THEN ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY GOOD NEWS ON THE SYRIA FRONT. CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT THE SYRIA TRACK IS "NOT DEAD."

62. KOZYREV CONCLUDED THE MEETING WITH A REQUEST THAT

U.S. OFFICIALS WHO VISIT THE BALTIC STATES AVOID ,
LANGUAGE THAT SUGGESTS "COMPLETE NORMALCY" -- I.E., THAT
DOES NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN POPULATIONS'
GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE BALTIC GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID SUCH
LANGUAGE "HURTS" THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING POPULATION THERE
AND "HURTS IN RUSSIA ITSELF...THESE ISSUES HAVE TO BE
HANDLED IN A SENSITIVE WAY."

CHRISTOPHER

BT

#6418

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 6418

TOR: 950501221117 M1645849

DIST:

PRT: SIT

SIT: BELL BEYRLE BLACKER FRIED HESLIN KERRICK OLOUGHLIN PIFER SCHMIDT
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Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: RAACZYUW RUEHSLA1179 1451540-CCCC--RUEADWW.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: R 251540Z MAY 95
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
OSRI: RUEHSL
DTG: 251540Z MAY 95
ORIG: AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO: RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0556
 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1333
 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0672
 RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
 RUEHRL/USOFFICE BERLIN 0499
 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 0460
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0484
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:EUR-POL//
 RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0634
 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0372
 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0484
 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0480
 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0205
 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0628
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2523
INFO: ////
SUBJ: 5/24 MEETING OF DODDEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 KRUZEL AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FRIED WITH SLOVAK
 PRESIDENT KOVAC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2015-0792-m (1.15)
 KRH 3/12/2020

SUMMARY

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 001179

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, PM
 NSC FOR FRIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/24/2000
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, NATO, MARR, LO
 SUBJECT: 5/24 MEETING OF DODDEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 KRUZEL AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FRIED WITH SLOVAK
 PRESIDENT KOVAC

SUMMARY

1. DOD DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO
 AFFAIRS JOSEPH KRUZEL, IN BRATISLAVA FOR A MEETING OF THE
 U.S.-SLOVAK BILATERAL WORKING GROUP, MET SLOVAK PRESIDENT

MICHAL KOVAC ON MAY 24. KRUZEL DESCRIBED THE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND SLOVAK PARTICIPANTS AT THE BWG MEETING AND PRAISED THE SLOVAK MILITARY AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. HE SAID THE U.S. IS PLEASED WITH MANY DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ESPECIALLY THE SLOVAK-HUNGARIAN TREATY, BUT IS CONCERNED AT SOME POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SLOVAKIA; HE ALSO DESCRIBED THE CRITERIA NATO MEMBERS WOULD RELY ON IN JUDGING POTENTIAL NEW MEMBERS. KOVAC SAID THERE IS WIDE AGREEMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY ACROSS SLOVAK PARTY AND INSTITUTIONAL LINES, AND AFFIRMED THAT SLOVAKIA IS CLEARLY COMMITTED TO JOINING NATO. KRUZEL THEN DESCRIBED AT LENGTH WHAT HE CONSIDERS DANGEROUS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC TENDENCIES OF SLOVAK PRIME MINISTER VLADIMIR MECIAR. KOVAC WELCOMED DAS KRUZEL'S STRONG STATEMENT CONCERNING THE NEED FOR SLOVAKIA TO OBSERVE FULLY THE VALUES AND PROCESSES OF DEMOCRACY. END SUMMARY.

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2. ON MAY 24, DOD DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS JOSEPH KRUZEL AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR \OR CENTRAL EUROPE DANIEL FRIED MET FOR ONE HOUR WITH SLOVAK PRESIDENT MICHAL KOVAC. THE MEETING OCCURRED DURING THE VISIT OF DAS KRUZEL TO SLOVAKIA TO PARTICIPATE IN THE THIRD MEETING OF THE U.S.-SLOVAK BILATERAL WORKING GROUP ON MILITARY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION. KRUZEL AND FRIED WERE ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR, STATE EUR/NCE DIRECTOR SNELL, EUCOM/J5 DIRECTOR ALLEN, AND ECONOFF (NOTETAKER). ALSO PRESENT FROM THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT KOVAC WERE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR PAVOL DEMES AND SPOKESMAN VLADIMIR STEVKO.

3. KOVAC OPENED BY RECALLING THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD SAID IN JANUARY 1994 THAT CENTRAL EUROPEAN SECURITY IS PART OF U.S. SECURITY. HE OBSERVED THAT YEARS OF TOTALITARIAN RULE AND PROPAGANDA HAD NOT SUCCEEDED IN CREATING ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING AMONG THE SLOVAK PEOPLE, MOST OF WHOM HAVE RELATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES.

4. DAS KRUZEL REVIEWED THE EFFORTS OF THE BILATERAL WORKING GROUP, PRAISING THE SLOVAK MILITARY AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FOR IMAGINATION AND ENERGY AND COMMENTING ON THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF GOOD WORKING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. HE THEN TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF NATO EXPANSION FOR COUNTRIES SUCH AS SLOVAKIA, DESCRIBING SUCH EXPANSION AS NOT IMMINENT BUT NONETHELESS INEVITABLE. DAS KRUZEL TOLD KOVAC THAT PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS WOULD HAVE TO SATISFY NATO ON TWO COUNTS: THEIR ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AND THEIR COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND PROCESSES. DAS KRUZEL SAID THAT WHILE THE U.S. IS ENCOURAGED BY MANY DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE -- NOTABLY THE RECENTLY SIGNED TREATY BETWEEN SLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY -- IT IS NEVERTHELESS TROUBLED BY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SLOVAKIA.

5. KOVAC BEGAN BY ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE, POINTING OUT THE BROAD AGREEMENT ACROSS PARTY AND INSTITUTIONAL LINES IN SLOVAKIA ON FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS. DESPITE

THE PRESENCE IN THE GOVERNING COALITION OF THE FAR-LEFT WORKERS' PARTY, THE GOVERNMENT IS CLEARLY COMMITTED TO JOINING NATO, SAID KOVAC.

6. KOVAC SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY POSED BY THE ACTIONS OF SLOVAK PRIME MINISTER VLADIMIR MECIAR, AND THE RESULTING DEEP ANXIETY AMONG MANY SLOVAKS. MECIAR'S EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE POLITICAL POWER
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 001179

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, PM
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E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/24/2000
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MIGHT NOT BE HARMFUL IF SLOVAKIA ENJOYED A GOOD SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES, SAID KOVAC, BUT IT LACKS SUCH A SYSTEM. SLOVAK CITIZENS DISAGREE WITH MECIAR'S ACTIONS BUT ARE INCREASINGLY INTIMIDATED BY THEM, AS THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY MOVED TO REWARD SUPPORTERS AND PUNISH OPPONENTS. PARTICIPATION IN, OR SUPPORT FOR, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOW ACQUIRED A DISTINCT CONNECTION IN THE EYES OF CITIZENS TO EXPECTATION OF PERSONAL GAIN. KOVAC INITIALLY HOPED MECIAR WOULD AGREE TO WORK TOGETHER WITH HIM DESPITE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND MECIAR'S THIRST FOR REVENGE, BUT MECIAR'S COALITION IS WEAK AND THE PRIME MINISTER IS THUS COMPELLED TO EXAGGERATE HIS DIFFERENCES WITH KOVAC TO KEEP THE COALITION TOGETHER (I.E, BY EMPHASIZING A COMMON ENEMY). MECIAR'S MESSAGE TO ORDINARY SLOVAKS, SAID KOVAC, IS ESSENTIALLY THAT BECAUSE NATO AND THE EU WISH TO SEE STABILITY IN SLOVAKIA, THEY WILL CAST A BLIND EYE TO SLOVAKIA'S INTERNAL POLITICS.

7. KOVAC DREW ATTENTION TO MECIAR'S SKILL IN CITING ANY FOREIGN CONTACT AS EVIDENCE OF HIS (MECIAR'S) INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE. FOR THIS REASON, SAID KOVAC, IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR ORDINARY SLOVAKS WHO DISLIKE THE GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MEASURES TO RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM ABROAD. MECIAR HAS NO LEGAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR REMOVING THE PRESIDENT, BUT MAY BE ABLE TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY 90 VOTES IN PARLIAMENT TO BEGIN SUCH A PROCESS ANYWAY. KOVAC SAID HE HAS MADE CLEAR TO THE SLOVAK PUBLIC THAT HE WILL NOT RESIGN AND THAT THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER SHOULD COOPERATE ON MORE IMPORTANT ISSUES FOR THE GOOD OF SLOVAKIA.

8. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM DAS KRUZEL, KOVAC AGREED THAT TO DATE THE MILITARY HAS NOT BEEN USED AS A POLITICAL PAWN IN DOMESTIC POLITICS. HOWEVER, KOVAC IS NOT ENTIRELY CONFIDENT THAT THIS SITUATION WOULD CONTINUE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS IN A NUMBER OF CASES USED HIS PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY TO CHANGE

LAWS GOVERNING THE RIGHT OF THE PRESIDENT TO NAME OR REMOVE PUBLIC OFFICIALS (TRANSFERRING THIS POWER TO THE PRIME MINISTER), AND SUCH AN EFFORT IS NOW BEING MADE WITH REGARD TO THE MILITARY CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF.

9. DAS KRUZEL AND FRIED EMPHASIZED TO KOVAC THAT THE MILITARY SHOULD BE KEPT OUT OF POLITICS, AND THAT ANYONE (I.E., MECIAR) WHO SAYS NATO AND THE EU WILL ACCEPT A COUNTRY (I.E., SLOVAKIA) REGARDLESS OF ITS ADHERENCE TO DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE IS "DEAD WRONG."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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10. COMMENT. THE PRESIDENT WAS FRANK AND DIRECT IN DESCRIBING WHAT ARE TO HIM (AND EMBASSY) DANGEROUS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC TENDENCIES IN THE PRIME MINISTER. KOVAC WAS CLEARLY PLEASED AT DAS KRUZEL'S STRONG EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES AND VALUES AND IMPLICIT SUPPORT FOR KOVAC'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS MECIAR. ADVISOR DEMES WAS EQUALLY PLEASED AT THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFER TO THE MEETING IN A PRESS RELEASE, WHICH IS CERTAIN TO ATTRACT ATTENTION IN THE HIGHLY CHARGED CONTEXT OF SLOVAK POLITICS. (A RECENT EMBASSY PRESS RELEASE CORRECTING A DISTORTED GOVERNMENT DESCRIPTION OF THE WATERGATE AFFAIR HAD JUST AN EFFECT, AS THE OPPOSITION SEIZED ON IT WITH SATISFACTION AND THE GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER REJECTED IT FROSTILY.)

11. DAS KRUZEL AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FRIED DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THIS REPORT PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE.

RUSSELL

BT

#1179

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 1179
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TOR: 950525110916 M1685782
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DIST: SIT: NSC

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PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 LINE3: O 281544Z MAY 95
 LINE4: FM USMISSION USNATO
 OSRI: RUEHNO
 DTG: 281544Z MAY 95
 ORIG: USMISSION USNATO
 TO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3470
 INFO: RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
 RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
 RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
 RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
 RUCBTEC/USLO SAACLANT NORFOLK VA
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE
 ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
 SUBJ: NAC MINISTERIAL AT NOORDWIJK

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0792-M (1.16)
 KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 002222

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM AMBASSADOR HUNTER
 STATE FOR EUR/RPM, TALBOTT, TARNOFF, DONILON,
 HOLBROOKE, AND COLLINS
 OVIP FOR FUERTH
 DEFENSE FOR PERRY, SLOCOMBE, NYE, AND KRUZEL
 NSC FOR LAKE AND VERSHBOW
 JCS FOR SHALIKASHVILI

E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/28/25
 TAGS: NATO, PARM, MARR, NAC
 SUBJECT: NAC MINISTERIAL AT NOORDWIJK

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. THE NOORDWIJK MINISTERIAL WILL BE DOMINATED IN THE MEDIA BY BOSNIA, BUT WHAT HAPPENS THERE REGARDING NATO'S ROLE IN THE EAST WILL HAVE MORE LASTING IMPORTANCE. THIS IS A "NON-DECISION" MEETING, BUT IT IS STILL A WATERSHED. NATO HAS THREE INTERRELATED TASKS AT NOORDWIJK, ALL DEVOTED TO ITS NEW ROLE: PROMOTING PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, MOVING FORWARD WITH THE EXPANSION STUDY, AND LAUNCHING FORMAL NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS. PRESSING PFP AT NOORDWIJK, INCLUDING A NEW "ACTION PLAN", IS IMPORTANT IN ORDER TO SHOW THE SENATE THAT COUNTRIES ARE GETTING READY FOR MEMBERSHIP, TO REASSURE NON-ENTRANTS THAT THEY WILL HAVE A PERMANENT, U.S.-BACKED ENGAGEMENT IN NATO, TO GIVE YELTSIN A FIG-LEAF ON NATO

ENLARGEMENT, AND TO HELP "FILL THE GAP" BEFORE "WHO AND WHEN" ENLARGEMENT DECISIONS.

3. KEEPING THE EXPANSION PROCESS AND THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP IN BALANCE WITH ONE ANOTHER IS THE NEXT MOST IMPORTANT TASK. TWO ELEMENTS STAND OUT: 1) PROCEEDING WITH THE EXPANSION STUDY AND ITS PRESENTATION TO PARTNERS AT A STEADY PACE -- WITHOUT INCREASE OR DECREASE -- IN ORDER TO REASSURE ALLIES THAT WE ARE TACKLING THE SERIOUS ISSUES, TO SHOW PARTNERS THAT WE ARE MOVING FORWARD, AND TO GIVE YELTSIN A CHANCE TO ADJUST RUSSIAN POLITICS TO A "NO SURPRISES" NATO EXPANSION PROCESS; AND 2) SHIFTING THE FOCUS IN THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP INCREASINGLY FROM BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIA CHANNELS INTO NATO-BRUSSELS.

4. ON BOSNIA, TWO NATO ELEMENTS STAND OUT: 1) THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING YOUR CONTACT GROUP AND RELATED MEETINGS TO DEMONSTRATE EMPHASIS ON A DIPLOMATIC TRACK, WHICH IS NEEDED TO GIVE LEGITIMACY TO, AND PRESERVE SUPPORT FOR, NATO MILITARY COMMITMENTS; AND 2) TO PRESS AHEAD WITH UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL PLANNING, IN ORDER TO HELP UNPROFOR STAY BY SHOWING THAT THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO SHARE RISKS. IT WOULD HELP TO ENGAGE NATO TROOP-CONTRIBUTING NATIONS AT SOME LEVEL. END SUMMARY.

5. THIS MINISTERIAL BRINGS TOGETHER THE TWO KEY STRANDS OF NATO'S FUTURE: ITS ROLE IN PROVIDING STABILITY IN THE HEARTLAND OF EUROPE, AND ITS CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH PRODUCTS OF THE "UNFREEZING OF HISTORY", FOCUSED ON BOSNIA. BOTH STRANDS HAVE COMMON ELEMENTS THAT COME TO A HEAD AT NOORDWIJK: TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE U.S. PREPARED TO BE INVOLVED? TO WHAT EXTENT ARE WE PREPARED TO LEAD? FOR THE ALLIES, THESE QUESTIONS TAKE ON ADDED WEIGHT IN THE WAKE OF THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS AND MEDIA FOCUS ON AN INWARD-TURNING AMERICA.

MOVING NATO EASTWARD

6. BOSNIA WILL GRAB MOST OF THE HEADLINES, BUT NATO'S ROLE -- AND AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS -- IN SPREADING SECURITY EASTWARD IS THE MORE ENDURING AND CONSEQUENTIAL STRATEGIC ISSUE, AND WHERE WHAT THE U.S. WILL DO CLEARLY HAS PREEMINENCE. THE JANUARY 1994 SUMMIT AGENDA REMAINS NATO'S AGENDA, AND FULFILLING IT IS THE MEASURE OF ALLIED AND U.S. SUCCESS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY. ASSUMING THAT RUSSIA DOES "ACCEPT THE DOCUMENTS" AND THUS CROSSES THE THRESHOLD OF AN ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH NATO, THE ALLIANCE WILL FINALLY TAKE A DECISIVE STEP ONTO THE ICE FLOES OF HISTORY. THE OLD COMFORT OF MANAGING NATO JUST AT 16 WILL BE GONE; HENCEFORTH, WHAT IT DOES WILL BE PRODUCED NOT JUST BY THE TRADITIONAL ALLIES OR EVEN JUST BY ADDING IN THE SUPPLICANT PARTNERS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT ALSO BY WHAT MOSCOW PRESSES TO DO WITH THE ALLIANCE.

7. WE ARE, OF COURSE, EMBARKED ON TWO SETS OF "TRIPLES"

THIS YEAR: FIRST, THE BASIC SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPE-BEYOND-GERMANY OF NATO, THE EU, AND THE OSCE; AND SECOND, PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, NATO ENLARGEMENT, AND NATO-RUSSIA. THE LATTER "TRIPLE" EFFORTS ARE TIGHTLY INTERRELATED, AND MANAGING THEM TOGETHER -- AND SUCCESSFULLY -- IS TODAY'S ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 USNATO 002222

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM AMBASSADOR HUNTER
STATE FOR EUR/RPM, TALBOTT, TARNOFF, DONILON,
HOLBROOKE, AND COLLINS
OVIP FOR FUERTH
DEFENSE FOR PERRY, SLOCOMBE, NYE, ANDUZEL
NSC FOR LAKE AND VERSHBOW
JCS FOR SHALIKASHVILI

E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/28/25
TAGS: NATO, PARM, MARR, NAC
SUBJECT: NAC MINISTERIAL AT NOORDWIJK

KEY TEST OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP. NATO HAS ALREADY DECIDED TO TAKE MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY IN THE EAST, AS ITS PRINCIPAL NEW PURPOSE, AND IT NOW MUST ANSWER FIVE BASIC QUESTIONS: HOW TO GET PARLIAMENTS TO APPROVE NEW MEMBERS OF NATO? HOW TO MAKE ASPIRANTS FOR MEMBERSHIP "PRODUCERS AS WELL AS CONSUMERS OF SECURITY?" HOW TO ENSURE THAT COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT JOIN NATO IN THE FIRST WAVE CAN STILL LOOK TO NATO FOR THEIR SECURITY? HOW TO AVOID A NEW DIVISION OF EUROPE IN THE PROCESS? AND HOW TO DRAW RUSSIA SUCCESSFULLY INTO THE WEST?

8. THE U.S. IS KEY TO ANSWERING ALL THESE QUESTIONS, AND THE ALLIES EXPECT IT OF US -- INDEED, THAT IS WHY NATO IS AT THE CORE OF EUROPE'S SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS. THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ON THE U.S. CONSIST OF THREE KEY ELEMENTS: WILL WE GIVE GUARANTEES (INCLUDING, IMPLICITLY, NUCLEAR GUARANTEES) TO NEW NATO MEMBERS? WILL WE DEMONSTRATE STAYING POWER IN ENGAGING IN THE WEST THOSE CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES WHICH DO NOT JOIN NATO? AND CAN WE SUCCESSFULLY MANAGE THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE WEST'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA -- THE ONLY COUNTRY CAPABLE DURING THE NEXT GENERATION OF PRODUCING A NEW DISASTER IN EUROPE?

PROMOTING PFP

9. THE "MAGIC" INGREDIENT IN THE U.S. AND NATO APPROACH IS PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: HENCE, THE KEY IMPORTANCE ASCRIBED TO IT IN U.S. PLANNING FOR THIS MINISTERIAL. IT IS THE MOST PROMINENT DEVICE IN GETTING COUNTRIES READY TO BE ALLIES -- IN PARTICULAR, TO CONVINCE THE U.S. SENATE TO PROVIDE GUARANTEES. UNTIL THE EUROPEAN UNION DOES EXPAND, PFP IS THE ONLY TANGIBLE EVIDENCE THAT COUNTRIES THAT DON'T JOIN NATO WILL HAVE A WESTERN SECURITY SHELTER. MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, IT ENABLES US TO MAKE THE CASE -- IN RUSSIA AND ELSEWHERE -- THAT NATO EXPANSION IS NOT REDIVIDING EUROPE. VIGOROUS PROSECUTION

OF PFP CAN MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO "FILLING THE GAP" BETWEEN COMPLETION OF THE "HOW AND WHY" EXPANSION STUDY AND THE TAKING OF "WHO AND WHEN" DECISIONS. AND IT HAS AN ADDED, UNSPOKEN VALUE: WITH U.S. LEADERSHIP, U.S. MONEY, AND U.S. INVOLVEMENT, IT SHOWS THE ALLIES AND THE PARTNERS THAT WE WILL NOT LEAVE EUROPE.

BALANCING EXPANSION AND NATO-RUSSIA

10. THUS THE MOST IMPORTANT GOAL AT NOORDWIJK FOR THE LONG-TERM AGENDA IS TO SHOW U.S. SUPPORT FOR PFP, TO STEP UP THE PACE -- THROUGH AN AMERICAN-LED "ACTION PLAN" -- AND TO PRESS ALLIES TO INCREASE THEIR OWN CONTRIBUTIONS. NEXT IN IMPORTANCE FOR THIS MINISTERIAL AND THE REST OF THE YEAR IS FOR THE U.S. TO DEMONSTRATE A BALANCED APPROACH IN PURSUING THE OTHER TWO KEY ELEMENTS: THE NATO EXPANSION STUDY (AND FOLLOW-UP) AND THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP.

11. THE CHALLENGE CAN BE STATED SIMPLY:

O WE NEED TO KEEP THE EXPANSION STUDY AND FOLLOW-UP STEPS MOVING ALONG A STEADY TRACK -- ON A REASONABLE, AGREED SCHEDULE -- TO SHOW THE ALLIES THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT ANSWERING THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS AND SEE EXPANSION PRIMARILY AS A FUNCTION OF SECURITY -- AND OF U.S. WILLINGNESS TO GIVE GUARANTEES -- NOT OF U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS.

O WE NEED TO SHOW THE CENTRAL EUROPEANS THAT WE ARE MOVING DELIBERATELY FORWARD WITH EXPANSION, TAKING TIME ONLY A) TO MAKE SURE THAT NEW ENTRANTS AND NATO ARE BOTH READY TO TAKE THE DECISIVE STEP AND B) TO MAKE PFP PERMANENT FOR NON-ENTRANTS.

O WE NEED TO MAXIMIZE SUPPORT FOR THOSE LEADERS IN RUSSIA WHO UNDERSTAND THE INEVITABILITY OF NATO EXPANSION
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 USNATO 002222

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM AMBASSADOR HUNTER
STATE FOR EUR/RPM, TALBOTT, TARNOFF, DONILON,
HOLBROOKE, AND COLLINS
OVIP FOR FUERTH
DEFENSE FOR PERRY, SLOCOMBE, NYE, AND KRUZEL
NSC FOR LAKE AND VERSHBOW
JCS FOR SHALIKASHVILI

E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/28/25
TAGS: NATO, PARM, MARR, NAC
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BUT WHO NEED HELP IN REDUCING PERCEPTIONS THAT THIS SOMEHOW ISOLATES RUSSIA, POSES A THREAT TO IT, OR DENIES IT ITS RIGHTFUL PLACE IN EUROPEAN LIFE.

EXPANSION STUDY: NEXT STEPS

12. BASED ON WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING AT NATO, TWO EFFORTS WILL BE MOST IMPORTANT AT THE NOORDWIJK MINISTERIAL TO KEEP THESE ISSUES IN PROPER BALANCE. FIRST, WE NEED TO WORK TO GET THE EXPANSION STUDY COMPLETED AND ITS RESULTS PRESENTED TO PARTNERS ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE LAID OUT AT LAST DECEMBER'S MINISTERIAL. IN FACT, THE STUDY HAS DONE ITS WORK -- 1) TO SHOW THE ALLIES WHAT NATO WILL LOOK LIKE WHEN IT IS LARGER; 2) TO SHOW PARTNERS WHAT THEY MUST DO AS ALLIES; AND 3) TO GET ALLIES WHICH HAVE BEEN AMBIVALENT ABOUT EXPANSION BOTH COMFORTABLE WITH THE IDEA AND MORE CONFIDENT THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT WALK AWAY FROM THE ADDED RESPONSIBILITIES THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT CONFERS.

13. IN FACT, UNLIKE THE PERIOD AFTER THE JANUARY 1994 SUMMIT, IN RECENT WEEKS NONE OF THE ALLIES HAS BEEN VISIBLY TRYING TO SLOW DOWN THE PROCESS, IN THE HOPE THAT SOMEHOW EXPANSION WOULD JUST GO AWAY. INSTEAD, THE ALLIES HAVE BEEN MORE ACTIVELY COOPERATIVE IN TRYING TO DESIGN A PROCESS OF COMPLETING THE STUDY AND BRIEFING IT TO PARTNERS. KEY ALLIES AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL FORESEE A DELIBERATE SCHEDULE, WHICH DOES NOT FORCE THE PACE, AS HELPING TO AVOID EITHER 1) SENDING A SIGNAL TO THE RUSSIANS THAT WE ARE PRESSING AHEAD WITH EXPANSION, HEEDLESS OF YELTSIN'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS, OR 2) CREATING SO MUCH DEAD SPACE THAT "FILLING THE GAP" BEFORE "WHO AND WHY" DECISIONS WOULD POSE AN EVEN GREATER POLITICAL PROBLEM OF ASSURING THE CENTRAL EUROPEANS ABOUT NATO'S INTENTIONS. WHAT THESE KEY ALLIES ARE ASKING OF THE U.S. NOW IS TO AVOID COMPLICATING THE MANAGEMENT PROBLEM BY GIVING AN IMPRESSION OF WANTING TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS (WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT IS ONLY A FEW WEEKS, EITHER WAY).

NATO-RUSSIA AT BRUSSELS

14. SECOND, THE ALLIES LOOK TO THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE THE LEAD IN MANAGING NATO'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. UNLIKE THE COLD WAR PERIOD, HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT SEE THIS ROLE AS EXCLUSIVE. THERE IS NO LONGER A CENTRAL NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP WHERE THE U.S. HAD TO HAVE A NEAR-MONOPOLY OF CONTROL IF NOT OF DECISION. AND MANY OF THE ALLIES HAVE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA THAT ARE NOT DETERMINED BY AN ENCOMPASSING EAST-WEST FRAMEWORK. THUS THE ALLIES EXPECT TO BE MORE "IN THE GAME" THAN IN THE PAST, ALTHOUGH THEY RECOGNIZE THAT ONLY THE U.S. CAN MATCH RUSSIAN POWER. WE HAVE BEEN RESPONSIVE. WE HAVE, IN FACT, UNDERTAKEN THIS YEAR AN INTENSIVE AND PERHAPS UNPRECEDENTED PROCESS OF KEEPING ALLIES ENGAGED IN OUR DEALINGS WITH MOSCOW -- AND THE ALLIES HAVE READILY ACCEPTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD ACT AS NATO'S "AGENT." STROBE TALBOTT CAME TO THE NAC BEFORE YOUR FIRST MEETING WITH KOZYREV, VICE PRESIDENT GORE DISCUSSED WITH THE NAC HIS WORK WITH CHERNOMYRDIN, YOU

MET WITH CLAES IN GENEVA, THE PRESIDENT'S KEY LETTER TO YELTSIN INCLUDED THOROUGH CONSULTATIONS IN BRUSSELS, AND THE ALLIES HAVE APPRECIATED THE REGULAR AND COMPREHENSIVE READ-OUTS FROM JIM COLLINS AND JOHN KORNBLUM.

15. BUT THERE REMAINS A WIDESPREAD DESIRE AT NATO FOR MORE OF THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP TO BE CENTERED IN WHAT HAPPENS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, ITSELF. THESE CONCERNS CAN BE DEALT WITH IN LARGE PART THROUGH THE NATURAL SHIFTING TO BRUSSELS OF MUCH OF THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP ONCE THEY ACCEPT THE TWO DOCUMENTS. YOU COULD USEFULLY MAKE THIS POINT, IN CHALLENGING THE ALLIES AT NATO TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN DEFINING HOW THAT RELATIONSHIP WILL DEVELOP. BUT SOME TENSION WILL REMAIN: ON THE ONE HAND, THE ALLIES WILL STILL WANT A U.S. LEAD
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USNATO 002222

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM AMBASSADOR HUNTER
 STATE FOR EUR/RPM, TALBOTT, TARNOFF, DONILON,
 HOLBROOKE, AND COLLINS
 OVIP FOR FUERTH
 DEFENSE FOR PERRY, SLOCOMBE, NYE, AND KRUZEL
 NSC FOR LAKE AND VERSHBOW
 JCS FOR SHALIKASHVILI

E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/28/25
 TAGS: NATO, PARM, MARR, NAC
 SUBJECT: NAC MINISTERIAL AT NOORDWIJK

IN DEVELOPING THE PRACTICAL STEPS OF THE NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP, AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF CONFIDENCE THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO MATCH RUSSIAN POWER IN EUROPE. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY WILL WANT TO BE INCLUDED INCREASINGLY IN THE GAME, AND HAVE MORE OF IT CENTERED AT NATO.

 BOSNIA: TWO ASPECTS

16. REGARDING BOSNIA, MUCH OF WHAT YOU WILL BE DOING AT NOORDWIJK GOES BEYOND NATO. BUT TWO ALLIED EXPECTATIONS FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP STAND OUT:

O THE ALLIES WANT US TO PLAY THE MOST ACTIVE ROLE IN DEVELOPING A COHERENT, OVERALL STRATEGY, ESPECIALLY IN CRAFTING A DIPLOMATIC TRACK TO GIVE LEGITIMACY TO NATO'S COMMITMENTS ON MILITARY ACTION -- AND, INDEED, TO PREVENT EROSION OF POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTING THOSE COMMITMENTS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT ALLIES EXPECT THE U.S. TO "SOLVE" THE BOSNIA ISSUE, OR EVEN TO PLAY A MILITARY ROLE ON THE GROUND. THERE IS WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION THAT KEY RESPONSIBILITIES REST WITH EUROPEAN STATES; THAT NO ONE IS WILLING TO EXPEND LIVES TO CHANGE THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA; THAT CONTAINMENT OF THE CONFLICT NEEDS TO BE THE PREEMINENT STRATEGIC GOAL -- EVEN IF THAT COURSE PROVIDES NO CLEAR EXIT STRATEGY; AND THAT DAMAGE TO NATO AND TO PURSUIT OF

ITS MORE IMPORTANT PURPOSES SHOULD BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM. THUS THE FACT THAT YOU ARE HOLDING A CONTACT GROUP MEETING, ALONG WITH THE OTHER U.S. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS THE LAST FEW DAYS, HELPS AT NATO EVEN IF THEY DO NOT PRODUCE ANY RADICAL NEW APPROACH.

O AT THE SAME TIME, ALLIES INVOLVED IN UNPROFOR WANT TO BE CONFIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL HELP GET THEM OUT, AS SAFELY AS POSSIBLE, IF THAT BECOMES NECESSARY. LAST DECEMBER'S DECISION THAT THE U.S. WOULD PROVIDE UP TO HALF OF A NATO WITHDRAWAL FORCE WAS THUS INSTRUMENTAL IN GETTING UNPROFOR TO STAY. IN EFFECT, IT LARGELY CLOSED A CRITICAL GAP IN SHARED RISKS WHICH HAD BEEN THE KEY BASIS FOR CRITICISM OF OUR ACTIVISM REGARDING THE USE OF NATO AIRPOWER. IN BRIEF, THE U.S. DOES NOT HAVE FORCES IN UNPROFOR, BUT IF A MAJOR OPERATION IS NEEDED TO SECURE UNPROFOR, WE WILL BE THERE. THUS AT NOORDWIJK, DEMONSTRATING ONCE AGAIN THAT WE ARE FULLY COMMITTED TO WITHDRAWAL PLANNING -- THAT WE ARE PRESSING FOR ITS RAPID COMPLETION -- IS A NECESSARY BACKDROP TO ALL OTHER EFFORTS. IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO HAVE SOME LEVEL OF U.S. ENGAGEMENT AT NOORDWIJK WITH THE NATO TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS.

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SSN: 2222

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DIST:

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SIT: BELL BEYRLE BLACKER DREW FRIED HARMON KERRICK LAKEA NSC PIFER
SCHMIDT SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: P 280651Z JUN 95
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 OSRI: RUEHMO
 DTG: 280651Z JUN 95
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4652
 INFO: RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 3325
 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 3349
 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3238
 RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
 RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
 SUBJ: KARAGANOV ELABORATES ON HIS RUSSIA-NATO
 -- "THESES:" BUT NO GIVE ON EXPANSION

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0792-M (1.17)
 KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 020261

E.O. 12356: DECL:6/27/00
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, PGOV, US, RS
 SUBJECT: KARAGANOV ELABORATES ON HIS RUSSIA-NATO
 -- "THESES:" BUT NO GIVE ON EXPANSION

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. EUROPEAN INSTITUTE DEPUTY DIRECTOR KARAGANOV ELABORATED ON HIS RECENT RUSSIA-NATO "THESES" WITH AMBASSADOR PICKERING AND THE NSC'S VERSHBOW JUNE 26, ARGUING THAT MFA MISMANAGEMENT OF THE ISSUE HAS MERELY SOLIDIFIED A CONSENSUS HERE AGAINST EXPANSION. EVEN SUBSTANTIVE PARTICIPATION IN RUSSIAN-NATO COOPERATION IS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT UNLESS MOSCOW GAIN ASSURANCES THAT NO DECISIONS ON EXPANSION WILL BE TAKEN FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. AT ONE TIME CLAIMING HE COULD HAVE GOTTEN SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY LOBOV AND EVEN PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S SIGNATURES ON HIS "THESES," KARAGANOV SUGGESTED THE USG SHOULD IN THE FUTURE LOOK MORE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL APPARAT AND MOD THAN THE MFA FOR AUTHORITATIVE RUSSIAN THINKING ON THIS ISSUE. KARAGANOV DID EXPLORE SOME IDEAS ON MANAGING THE PROBLEM IN THE COMING MONTHS, INCLUDING REPLACING ARTICLE V GUARANTEES WITH "ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP," BUT HE INSISTED THIS COULD APPLY ONLY TO FORMER

COMECON COUNTRIES, NOT/NOT THE BALTICS. END
SUMMARY.

INTRODUCTION

3. AMBASSADOR PICKERING, NSC SENIOR EUROPEAN
DIRECTOR VERSHBOW AND POL/EXT CHIEF MET JUNE 26
WITH DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTE
SERGEY KARAGANOV TO DISCUSS HIS RECENTLY
PUBLISHED STUDY OF RUSSIAN-NATO RELATIONS.
DURING THE HOUR-LONG SESSION, KARAGANOV
ELABORATED ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICS BEHIND HIS
PAPER, WHICH BEARS THE SIGNATURE OF NUMEROUS HIGH
LEVEL GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENTARY OFFICIALS,
ARGUING AT ONE POINT THAT MORE SIGNATURES COULD
HAVE BEEN GARNERED IF NECESSARY. HE SUGGESTED
THIS MIGHT HAVE INCLUDED SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARY LOBOV AND EVEN THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF.

KOZYREV BLAMED FOR CURRENT IMPASSE

4. KARAGANOV BEGAN BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE
PREDICAMENT BOTH RUSSIA AND NATO FIND THEMSELVES
IN STEMS FROM THE FAILURES OF ANDREY KOZYREV'S
INEPT DIPLOMACY OVER THE PAST YEAR. AN OUTSPOKEN
CRITIC OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, KARAGANOV ARGUED
THAT KOZYREV HAD FROM THE START MARGINALIZED THE
ABILITY OF OTHER PLAYERS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT
TO INFLUENCE THE PROCESS, ALIENATED THE DUMA AND
CREATED A SITUATION WHERE NO ONE OUTSIDE THE MFA
WOULD NOW ARGUE EITHER FOR AN ACTIVE RUSSIAN-NATO
RELATIONSHIP OR FOR EVENTUAL NATO EXPANSION. HIS
HIGH RANKING MILITARY CONTACTS ARE NOW AFRAID
THAT ANY ASSOCIATION WITH NATO, INCLUDING SERIOUS
COOPERATION WITHIN PFP, WOULD EXPOSE THEM TO A
SHARP BACKLASH WHEN NATO EXPANSION IS ANNOUNCED.

POWERFUL PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO EXPANSION

5. KARAGANOV DEFENDED HIS THESES AS THE MOST
LIBERAL PAPER ONE COULD EXPECT IN THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES. HE CLAIMED ANY AGENCY OF THE
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT -- WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE
MFA -- WOULD HAVE PRODUCED AN EVEN TOUGHER
DOCUMENT ON THE QUESTION OF RUSSIAN-NATO
RELATIONS OR EXPANSION. THE CRUX OF THE MATTER,
HE ARGUED, IS THAT THERE CONTINUES TO BE A
WIDESPREAD PERCEPTION HERE THAT THE WEST IS
TRYING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CURRENT RUSSIAN
WEAKNESS TO EXPAND A MILITARY ALLIANCE WHICH HAS
NOT OUTGROWN ITS COLD WAR REPUTATION.

6. "WE ARE AT OUR LOWEST POINT NOW," KARAGANOV
ARGUED, BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY. IN

TWO OR THREE YEARS HE EXPECTED THINGS TO BE BETTER, BUT TO DEAL ON NATO EXPANSION NOW WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR ANY RUSSIAN POLITICIAN; ANYTHING SEEN TO BE ACQUIESCING IN THE ALLIANCE'S EXP[NSION WILL BE VIEWED AS CONTRIBUTING TO NATIONAL HUMILIATION. THUS, WHILE HE AND LIKEMINDED POLICY THINKERS ARE WILLING TO
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 020261

E.O. 12356: DECL:6/27/00
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-- "THESES:" BUT NO GIVE ON EXPANSION

ENTERTAIN NATO EXPANSION ON AN INTELLECTUAL BASIS, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR MAKES THIS IMPOSSIBLE. THE KEY PERIOD WILL BE THE NEXT TWELVE TO FOURTEEN MONTHS; "WE MUST FIND A WAY OUT OF THIS QUAGMIRE," KARAGANOV CONCLUDED.

EVEN RUSSIAN-NATO COOPERATION ON HOLD

7. VERSHBOW AND THE AMBASSADOR REPEATEDLY PROBED KARAGANOV FOR FLEXIBILITY ON RUSSIAN-NATO RELATIONS, DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH A TRACK RECORD OF PRACTICAL COOPERATION WHICH MIGHT REDUCE THESE FEELINGS OF DISTRUST, YIELDING CONCRETE EXAMPLES OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION ON A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES. KARAGANOV RESPONDED THAT THIS COULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE A YEAR AGO, BUT NOW WAS INSEPARABLE IN DOMESTIC TERMS FROM THE EXPANSION QUESTION (A KEY POINT IN HIS "THESES.")

8. RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO DEFINE A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO HAVE BEEN BADLY SET BACK -- "BACK TO 1988" -- BY KOZYREV'S MISMANAGEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, KARAGANOV CONTINUED. KOZYREV GOT SNOOKERED BY WESTERN CLAIMS THAT EXPANSION WOULD NOT GO FORWARD WITHOUT A FRAMEWORK. "COMPENSATION WAS A STUPID, INCOMPREHENSIBLE IDEA." KOZYREV THEN LURCHED FROM A NATO-RUSSIA TREATY TO "TWO-TRACK" TO "MAY FOR MAY," ALL AGAINST HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT. FOR THIS CHARADE THE WESTERN SIDE HELD SOME BLAME AS WELL, KARAGANOV CONTENDED; IN ANY EVENT, NOW COOPERATION WOULD MERELY BE VIEWED HERE AS ACQUIESCENCE IN EXPANSION. ILLUSTRATING HIS PERSONAL STAKE IN ALL THIS, KARAGANOV ARGUED THAT THOSE LIKE HIMSELF WOULD BE "DONE IN" FOR THEIR PRO-WESTERN STAND IF THEY ARGUED NOW FOR COOPERATION IN THE ABSENCE OF A SOLUTION TO THE EXPANSION ISSUE.

TRYING TO PREVENT A SHOWDOWN

9. PERHAPS, HE OPINED, A NEW FOREIGN MINISTER

LESS TAINTED THAN KOZYREV WOULD IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR DEFINING A VIABLE RUSSIAN-NATO RELATIONSHIP, BUT IN THE END ALL THIS WOULD BE ON THE MARGINS. KARAGANOV ALSO DISMISSED OSCE "DEAD ON ARRIVAL," INSISTING THAT A GENUINELY NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY MODEL WAS NECESSARY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY. BUT IN THE SHORT RUN, SOME WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT DILEMMA WAS NECESSARY.

10. KARAGANOV ARGUED THAT MANY IN THE WEST -- MOST RECENTLY SENATOR NUNN -- WERE NOT SOLD ON EXPANSION. BUT HE ADMITTED THAT THE THREAT OF A HEAD ON RUSSIAN COMPETITION TO DEFEAT NATO EXPANSION THROUGH A PROPAGANDA DRIVE INCLUDED IN HIS THESES WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE, PRODUCING MERELY A PYRRHIC VICTORY. RUSSIA WANTED NATO TO CHECK GERMANY AND KEEP THE U.S. IN EUROPE.

KARAGANOV BRAINSTORMS ON ALTERNATIVES

11. THE PROBLEM WAS HOW TO ADDRESS REAL SECURITY CONCERNS WITHOUT EXPANSION. KARAGANOV WAS INTRIGUED BY THE CONCEPT OF ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP RATHER THAN FULL MEMBERSHIP INCLUDING ARTICLE V GUARANTEES, BUT ONLY FOR THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL EUROPE -- THE FORMER COMECON MEMBERS. HE BALKED AT ANY SUGGESTION THAT THIS COULD INCLUDE THE BALTIC STATES, EVEN IF RUSSIA WERE ALSO OFFERED ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP.

12. AT VARIOUS POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION HE ENCOURAGED THE IDEA OF EXTENDING BILATERAL SECURITY GUARANTEES TO THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEANS, OFFERING TO MATCH THEM WITH RUSSIAN GUARANTEES IF THAT WOULD HELP. HE ALSO HAD NO PROBLEM WITH EXPANDING THE WEU TO THESE EASTERN COUNTRIES. KARAGANOV READILY AGREED WITH VERSHBOV THAT WEU'S TECHNICAL OPERATION WITHIN NATO MADE THIS LITTLE DIFFERENT FROM OUTRIGHT EXPANSION IN REAL TERMS. BUT IN PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE, BECAUSE FEW HERE IN RUSSIA KNEW OR CARED ABOUT THE DISTINCTION. IT WAS THE NATO LABEL, HE AGREED, THAT WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 020261

E.O. 12356: DECL:6/27/00
TAGS: PREL, NATO, PGOV, US, RS
SUBJECT: KARAGANOV ELABORATES ON HIS RUSSIA-NATO
-- "THESES:" BUT NO GIVE ON EXPANSION

13. CONTINUED WESTERN PURSUIT OF EXPANSION, HE WARNED, COULD FORCE RUSSIA TO LOOK SOUTH AND EAST FOR HER SECURITY PARTNERS. THERE WAS AN ELEMENT OF THIS IN THE IRAN REACTOR DEAL, WHICH HAD BEGUN BEING ABOUT MONEY BUT NOW WAS ABOUT MORE THAN

JUST CASH. RUSSIA DID NOT WANT TO ENTER THE 21ST CENTURY ISOLATED. SO THIS WAS ANOTHER DANGER STEMMING FROM THE EXPANSION PROBLEM.

14. IF THE WEST COULD WAIT UNTIL AFTER NEXT YEARS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA, THE CONTEXT MIGHT BE IMPROVED, KARAGANOV SUGGESTED. A PRESIDENT LIKE YAVLINSKIY OR CHERNOMYRDIN COULD NEGOTIATE WITH GREATER STRENGTH ON THIS ISSUE. BUT VERSHBOW SUGGESTED AN ALTERNATE SCENARIO IN WHICH SUCH A NEW RUSSIAN LEADER WOULD ASK THE WEST TO PUT ASIDE EXPANSION PLANS IN ORDER TO ALLOW HIM TO CONSOLIDATE AT HOME AND BUILD BRIDGES ABROAD. SOME SUPPORTERS OF EARLY NATO EXPANSION USED JUST THIS ARGUMENT, VERSHBOW CONTINUED.

"BROADEN CONTACTS OUTSIDE MFA"

15. GETTING IN A LAST SWIPE AT HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY NEMESIS, KARAGANOV OFFERED AS HIS PERSONAL ADVICE THE SUGGESTION THAT THE WEST DEAL MORE ON SECURITY ISSUES WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL STAFF AND THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, RATHER THAN RELYING SO HEAVILY ON THE MFA. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TALK WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORS RYURIKOV AND BATURIN, FOR INSTANCE. HE CLOSED THE DISCUSSION BY PLEADING FOR WESTERN ASSISTANCE IN PREVENTING THE NATO PROBLEM FROM DRIVING BOTH SIDES BACK INTO THE COLD WAR. "ONCE WAS ENOUGH," HE EMPHATICALLY CONCLUDED.

COMMENT

16. KARAGANOV PROJECTS A CONVINCING IMAGE OF SINCERE REASONABILITY. BUT JUST AS HIS PAPER LEAVES NO AMBIGUITY ABOUT EXPANSION ITSELF, THERE WAS NO HINT OF COMPROMISE ON THAT CENTRAL ISSUE WITH US. WE BELIEVE THE KARAGANOV PAPER, WITH WHICH SUCH POLITICAL HEAVIES AS RYURIKOV, KOKOSHIN, VOLSKIY AND LUKIN HAVE ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES, WILL BE THE RUSSIAN WORKING SCRIPT ON BOTH EXPANSION AND THE TERMS OF RUSSIAN-NATO COOPERATION IN THE DIFFICULT MONTHS AHEAD. THAT SAID, THE GOOD NEWS IS THAT KARAGANOV -- WHO REPRESENTS AN INFLUENTIAL NETWORK OF POLICY THINKERS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT -- SEEMS OPEN TO ENGAGEMENT, EVEN IF HIS PAPER GIVES LITTLE HINT OF THAT.

PICKERING

BT

#0261

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03

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SSN: 0261

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WITKOWSKY



Cable

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 EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
 SUBJ: DEMARCHE: POLISH FONMIN BARTOSZEWSKI ON NATO

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2015-0792-M (1.18)
 KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 171711

FOR AMBASSADOR REY FROM A/S HOLBROOKE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, PL
 SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: POLISH FONMIN BARTOSZEWSKI ON NATO

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. I WAS EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTED TO SEE THE 7/18 ARTICLE IN THE FINANCIAL TIMES REPORTING POLAND FOREIGN MINISTER BARTOSZEWSKI'S DOUBTS ABOUT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO EARLY NATO ENLARGEMENT. FURTHER THE ARTICLE QUOTES BARTOSZEWSKI'S STATEMENT THAT "ALL PROGRESS ON RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA HAD BEEN MADE UNDER REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTS - FROM NIXON, REAGAN AND BUSH - NOT THE DEMOCRATS." WHILE I AM AWARE AND APPRECIATE THE GOP'S ANTICIPATED CLARIFICATION THAT BARTOSZEWSKI'S REMARKS WERE TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT, WE HAVE TO MAKE HIM AWARE OF THE FACTS AND THAT POLITICIZING THIS ISSUE IN ANY WAY IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. PLEASE GO SEE HIM AS SOON AS YOU CAN TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT, USING THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

O WE WERE EXTREMELY CONCERNED TO SEE THE FINANCIAL TIMES ARTICLE PUBLICLY REPORTING YOUR DOUBTS ABOUT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO EARLY NATO ENLARGEMENT AND YOUR WILLINGNESS TO GIVE VOICE TO THE BELIEF HELD BY SOME POLES THAT ALL PROGRESS ON RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA HAS BEEN MADE UNDER REPUBLICAN, NOT DEMOCRATIC, ADMINISTRATIONS.

O WE ARE CONCERNED THAT YOU MAY BE UNAWARE OF THE HISTORY OF THE NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS. FURTHERMORE ANY DISTINCTION BETWEEN REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC HANDLING OF RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA THREATENS TO POLITICIZE THE POLICY OF SEEKING A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN EUROPE WHICH WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO ALL CONCERNED.

O ONE OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S TOP FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IS TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MARKET SYSTEM IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. IT WAS PRESIDENT CLINTON WHO SAW CORRECTLY THAT THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO WAS KEY TO ACHIEVING THIS GOAL. PRESIDENT CLINTON OPENED THE DOOR TO THIS PROCESS AND HAS CARRIED IT FORWARD WITH HIS PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT AND STRONG COMMITMENT.

O THE NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS IS AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE U.S./POLISH DIALOGUE AND WE HAVE MADE TREMENDOUS PROGRESS, BUT WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THIS PROCESS BEGAN JUST 18 MONTHS AGO AT NATO'S JANUARY 1994 SUMMIT. WITH THE U.S. IN A LEADING ROLE, NATO BOTH DECIDED TO EXPAND AND TO LAUNCH THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM WHICH WOULD PREPARE COUNTRIES FOR SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATO AND FOR SOME, EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP.

O IN JULY 1994, PRESIDENT CLINTON VISITED WARSAW TO PERSONALLY CONFIRM NATO'S DECISION TO ENLARGE. HE DECLARED THAT THE U.S. EXPECTED POLAND'S FUTURE MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WAS NO LONGER A QUESTION OF IF, BUT WHEN. PRESIDENT CLINTON ALSO ANNOUNCED THE WARSAW INITIATIVE, AND PLEDGED TO SEEK DOLLARS 100 MILLION IN FY96 FUNDS TO SUPPORT PFP ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HE RESERVED DOLLARS 25 MILLION OF THIS AMOUNT FOR POLAND, SIGNALLING THE IMPORTANCE HIS ADMINISTRATION ASSIGNS TO POLAND'S ROLE IN THE PROCESS. ONLY ONE MONTH LATER, VICE PRESIDENT GORE REEMPHASIZED THESE POINTS IN HIS OWN VISIT TO WARSAW.

O UNDER THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S LEADERSHIP WE HAVE MADE TREMENDOUS PROGRESS IN A VERY SHORT TIME. PROGRESS WITH POLAND HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY IMPRESSIVE.

O WITHOUT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN THIS PROCESS, MUCH OF THIS WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. DESPITE THIS, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID POLITICIZING THE NATO EXPANSION ISSUE. AS YOU WELL KNOW, THE DECISION TO ADMIT NEW NATO MEMBERS WILL REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OF THE U.S. CONGRESS AND FIFTEEN PARLIAMENTS. WHEN IT OCCURS, THE DEBATE ABOUT NATO EXPANSION IN THE U.S. CONGRESS WILL BE THOROUGH AND COMPLEX. BUT WE HOPE TO ENTER THAT DEBATE WITH THE STRONG BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR EXPANSION THAT WE HAVE WORKED HARD TO DEVELOP. WITHOUT THIS BIPARTISAN

SUPPORT, OUR EFFORTS WILL BE UNSUCCESSFUL.

O AS FOR THIS ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF THE NATO/RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP, WE KNOW YOU AGREE THAT RUSSIA MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE PROCESS TO DEVELOP A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE. INDEED, OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE WORKED WELL TOGETHER TO DEVELOP COMMON AND COMPATIBLE APPROACHES TO THIS ISSUE. PRESIDENT CLINTON CONFIRMED THIS APPROACH IN HIS MAY 18 LETTER TO PRESIDENT WALESIA. DURING THE MOSCOW SUMMIT IN MAY, PRESIDENT CLINTON LEFT NO DOUBT WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN THAT THE U.S. WAS DETERMINED TO PROCEED WITH THE NATO EXPANSION PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE URGED PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO BRING RUSSIA INTO THE PROCESS, AS IT WILL HELP THE CAUSE OF DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA.

O ALTHOUGH THE U.S. AND POLAND HAVE MADE MUCH PROGRESS TOGETHER, THERE ARE MANY CHALLENGES IN THE ROAD AHEAD. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IS CONFIDENT OF THE OUTCOME, BUT EXPRESSING THE ISSUE IN WAYS THAT CAN EASILY BE MISINTERPRETED WILL NOT MAKE OUR TASK ANY EASIER.

END TALKING POINTS. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#1711

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1711

TOR: 950718205913 M1769970

DIST: SIT: NSC
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Cable

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 RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
 SUBJ: BARTOSZEWSKI AND THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION:
 WHAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER MEANT TO SAY

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**
 2015-0792-M (1.19)
 KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 009923

DEPT FOR D/NULAND AND EUR/NCE

NSC FOR FRIED

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PL

SUBJECT: BARTOSZEWSKI AND THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION:
 WHAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER MEANT TO SAY

REFTEL: STATE 171711

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. OADR DECLASSIFICATION
 INSTRUCTION BASED ON REFTEL DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTION.

 SUMMARY

2. BARTOSZEWSKI TOLD AMBASSADOR REY JULY 19 THAT THE
 PRESS MISREPORTED HIS COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT CLINTON'S
 NATO ENLARGEMENT POLICY, FOR WHICH HE EXPRESSED STRONG
 APPRECIATION. IN RESPONSE TO OUR REQUESTS, THE
 PRESIDENT'S AND PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICES ISSUED
 STATEMENTS JULY 19 REAFFIRMING POLAND'S SUPPORT FOR
 CLINTON ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON NATO, AND PRIME MINISTER
 OLEKSY TOLD THE AMBASSADOR HE FOUND BARTOSZEWSKI'S
 STATEMENTS EXASPERATING. THE EPISODE IS THE LATEST
 EXAMPLE OF A FOREIGN MINISTER WHO OFTEN FORGETS TO WATCH
 HIS WORDS. END SUMMARY.

 "TRANSLATION DIFFICULTIES"

3. AMBASSADOR REY CALLED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO DELIVER REFTEL TALKING POINTS ON THE MINISTER'S REPORTED COMMENTS IN THE JULY 18 "FINANCIAL TIMES" THAT HE DOUBTS PRESIDENT CLINTON'S COMMITMENT TO NATO EXPANSION. HE SAID THAT HE HAD CONDUCTED THE INTERVIEW WITH THE "TIMES" CORRESPONDENT IN GERMAN, AND THAT THE REPORTER "DID NOT UNDERSTAND GERMAN AS WELL AS HE SEEMED TO." BARTOSZEWSKI SAID THAT IN THE INTERVIEW HE HAD COMMENTED THAT NEXT YEAR'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA AND IN THE U.S. COULD AFFECT THE NATO EXPANSION DEBATE. HE SAID HE NOTED THAT AT LEAST IN THE U.S. SENATOR DOLE HAD ASSURED HIM THAT REPUBLICANS WOULD ALSO SUPPORT NATO EXPANSION, AS HAD PRESIDENT CLINTON. HE SAID THAT HE AT NO POINT COMMENTED ON THE POLICY OF THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION, BUT THAT HE HAD ONLY REFERRED TO SOME ELEMENTS OF POLISH PUBLIC OPINION THAT ARE IMPATIENT WITH THE NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS. "I DID NOT SAY THE THINGS THAT REPORT SAID A DID!" HE EXCLAIMED.

4. "I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN A FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES," HE TOLD US, "AND ALWAYS WILL BE REGARDLESS OF WHICH ADMINISTRATION IS IN POWER." HE SAID "I HIGHLY APPRECIATE ALL THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS DONE IN THE CAUSE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT." HE ADDED THAT HE HAD NEVER EXPECTED HIS REMARKS TO RECEIVE SUCH A REACTION, AND NOTED THAT EVEN THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR HAD REQUESTED A MEETING WITH HIM TO DISCUSS THE IMPLICATION OF THE "TIMES" REPORT.

5. "POLICY IS NOT DEFINED IN ONE REMARK," HE SAID, "BUT IN ITS ENTIRETY." TO REITERATE POLAND'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S POLICY ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, BARTOSZEWSKI SAID THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ISSUE A PRESS RELEASE, AND THE GOVERNMENT RELEASED IT LESS THAN AN HOUR LATER (TEXT IN PARA 9). ADDITIONALLY, HE SAID HE WOULD GRANT THE "TIMES" WARSAW CORRESPONDENT AN INTERVIEW IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN ORDER TO CORRECT ANY MISPERCEPTION THAT HE DOES NOT FULLY SUPPORT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S POLICY.

SUPPORT FROM THE PRESIDENCY AND PRIME MINISTER

6. AT OOB JULY 19, WE CONTACTED PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER ANDZREJ ANANICZ, PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SPOKESMAN LESZEK SPALINSKI, PRIME MINISTER OLEKSY FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER ADAM BROMKE AND OLEKSY SPOKESMAN ALEKSANDRA JAKUBOWICZ TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN OVER BARTOSZEWSKI'S REPORTED STATEMENTS. WE URGED THAT THE OFFICES OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER ISSUE A JOINT OR SEPARATE STATEMENTS THAT:

--THE POLISH GOVERNMENT APPRECIATES THE FULLY
BIPARTISAN NATURE OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR NATO
ENLARGEMENT; AND

--THE POLISH GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THE CRITICAL ROLE
PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS PLAYED IN PIONEERING NATO
ENLARGEMENT AND I
N BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE.

7. SPALINSKI WITHIN AN HOUR RELEASED A STATEMENT THAT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 WARSAW 009923

DEPT FOR D/NULAND AND EUR/NCE

NSC FOR FRIED

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PL

SUBJECT: BARTOSZEWSKI AND THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION:
WHAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER MEANT TO SAY

"WE ARE CONVINCED BOTH THE REPUBLICANS AND THE DEMOCRATS
SEE THE NEED TO EXPAND NATO...IT WAS PRECISELY THE
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION THAT HAD INITIATED THE DEBATE ON
NATO ENLARGEMENT AND HAD TAKEN PRACTICAL STEPS IN THAT
DIRECTION." JAKUBOWSKA AGREED WITH OUR CONCERN AND TOLD
US SHE WAS CERTAIN THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD APPROVE A
STATEMENT FOR RELEASE THAT AFTERNOON.

8. PRIME MINISTER OLEKSY LATER TOLD AMBASSADOR REY THAT
BARTOSZEWSKI'S WORDS HAD EXASPERATED HIM. HE SAID THAT
HE WOULD SUMMON THE ENTIRE SENIOR MANAGEMENT OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY ON JULY 20 TO DEMAND THAT NO ONE EXPRESS
SUCH VIEWS AGAIN.

TEXT OF POLISH GOVERNMENT RELEASE

9. TRUE TO JAKUBOWSKA'S AND BARTOSZEWSKI'S WORD, THE
POLISH GOVERNMENT RELEASED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT
IMMEDIATELY AFTER BARTOSZEWSKI'S MEETING WITH THE
AMBASSADOR ON JULY 19.
BEGIN TEXT:

IN CONNECTION WITH THE REPORT FROM BRUSSELS PUBLISHED IN
YESTERDAY'S (7/18/95) "FINANCIAL TIMES", THE POLISH
GOVERNMENT DECLARES THAT IT HIGHLY VALUES THE COOPERATION
BETWEEN POLAND AND THE USA AS WELL AS THE UNWAVERING
SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES THAT WE HAVE IN OUR EUROPEAN
AND ATLANTIC ASPIRATIONS.

ALSO HIGHLY VALUED IS THE PERSONAL ACTIVISM OF PRESIDENT
BILL CLINTON IN THIS ISSUE. IN POLAND WE WELL REMEMBER
HIS WORDS IN THE SEJM CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF NATO
EXPANSION: THERE IS NO LONGER A QUESTION OF "WHETHER,"
BUT "WHEN AND HOW."

THE GOVERNMENT EXPRESSES THE CONVICTION THE POLISH-USA
RELATIONS WILL ALSO DEVELOP IN THE FUTURE IN A SPIRIT OF
FRIENDSHIP AND GOOD COOPERATION.

END TEXT.

COMMENT: HE TALKS TOO MUCH

10. AS MFA AMERICAS DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR MACIEJ KOZLOWSKI TOLD US AS WE WERE LEAVING BARTOSZEWSKI'S OFFICE, "SOMETIMES OUR MINISTER TALKS TOO MUCH!" ALTHOUGH AN ACCOMPLISHED HISTORIAN, HUMANIST AND INTELLECTUAL, BARTOSZEWSKI LACKS THE DIPLOMATIC POLISH OF HIS PREDECESSORS. HE FAILS TO REALIZE THAT AS MINISTER, HIS PRONOUNCEMENTS AUTOMATICALLY HAVE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE, AND THAT ANY VIEW HE MENTIONS, EVEN THOSE WITH WHICH HE MAY DISAGREE, AUTOMATICALLY TAKES ON AN AIR OF OFFICIAL BLESSING. HIS OBVIOUS CONTRITION IN THE MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR REY, AND THE RABIDITY WITH WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT CONTRADICTED HIM, LEADS US TO BELIEVE THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND BARTOSZEWSKI ARE EAGER TO PUT THE EPISODE BEHIND THEM QUICKLY. REY

BT

#9923

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 9923

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SIT: NSC

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SIT: BELL BLACKER DREW FRIED PASCUAL PIFER SCHMIDT VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
020. cable	re: NATO Enlargement: September 28 Collective Briefing to Partners (14 pages)	09/29/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[01/23/1995-09/29/1995]

2015-0792-M

rs1264

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Secretary's Lunch with Central European Foreign Minister (10 pages)	03/24/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
002. cable	re: Foreign Minister Rosati's U.S. Visit (8 pages)	04/16/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
003. cable	re: Your Meetings with President Yeltsin (4 pages)	04/17/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
004. cable	re: Polish Foreign Minister Rosati and Acting Secretary Talbott Discuss NATO Enlargement... (5 pages)	05/11/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
005. cable	re: Memorandum of Conversation with Former President of Poland, Lech Walesa (6 pages)	06/13/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
006. cable	re: Consultations with the French MFA on European Security, August 22 (9 pages)	08/27/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
007. cable	re: Acting Secretary Briefs Baltics on Action Plan (4 pages)	09/07/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
008. cable	re: Secretary Christopher's Working Luncheon with Foreign Minister de Charette (6 pages)	09/10/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
009. cable	re: Scenecsetter for Deputy Secretary Talbott's September 11-13 Visit to Paris (6 pages)	09/10/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
010. cable	re: Informal Defense Ministers Meeting in Bergen, Norway... (6 pages)	09/27/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
011. cable	re: Informal Defense Ministers Meeting in Bergen, Norway... (5 pages) <i>Partial release - KBH 4/12/2022</i>	09/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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[03/24/1996-12/04/1996]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. cable	re: Deputy Secretary's 9/16 and 9/19 Meetings with Ukrainian NSDC Secretary Horbulyn (5 pages)	10/02/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
013. cable	re: Ambassador's Farewell Call on Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Ryurikov (4 pages)	10/29/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
014. cable	re: SYG Solana on AFSOUTH... (3 pages)	11/05/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
015. cable	re: Ukrainian Ambassador Offers Draft Agreement on "Special Partnership" between NATO and Ukraine (7 pages)	11/06/1996	P1/b(1) <i>Partial release - KBH 4/12/2022</i>
016. cable	re: The Secretary's Breakfast Meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana (7 pages)	12/04/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA9734 0840248-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH

LINE3: O 240240Z MAR 96

LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC

OSRI: RUEHC

DTG: 240240Z MAR 96

ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

INFO: ////

SUBJ: SECRETARY'S LUNCH WITH CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOREIGN
MINISTER, MARCH 20, 1996, PRAGUE

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 059734

SECTO 05031

E.O. 12958: 3/21/16

TAGS: OVIP, PREL, US, EZ, XG, XH, ZL, ZB, AL,
BU, HU, LG, LH,

MK, PL, LO, RO, SI, NATO

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S LUNCH WITH CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOREIGN
MINISTER, MARCH 20, 1996, PRAGUE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL GUEST, S/S DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, REASON 1.5 (B & D)

2. (U) MARCH 20, 1996, AMBASSALOR'S RESIDENCE, PRAGUA,
CZECH
REPUBLIC

3. (U) PARTICIPANTS

U.S.: THE SECRETARY; AMBASSADOR WALKER; UNDERSECRETARY
DVIS;
ASSISTANT SECRETARY DONILON; ASSISTANT SECRETARY QDESIGNATE
KORNBLUM; DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLQNNING SEINCERG; NSC SENIOR
DIRECTOR FRIED; LT. GENERAL CHRISTMAN; SPOKESMAN BURNS;
EXECUTI
ASSISTANT BRADTKE; DCM EDELMAN (NOTETAKER)

CZECH BEPUBLIC: FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC; DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER VONDVA; AMBASSADOR TO NATO SEDIVY; AMBASSADOR TO THE
UNITED STATES ZANTOVSKY; GENERAL DIRECTOR MRAVEC

ALBANIA: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER STAROVA; DIRECTOR FOR IO AFFAI
PEKA

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0792-M (1.21)
KBH 3/12/2020

BULGARIA: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BGKNVA; DIRECTOR FOR IO AFFAIRS DMITROV

ESTONIA: FOREIGN MINISTER KALLAS; POLITICAL DIRECTOR KIONKA

FYROM: FOREIGN MINISTER FRCKOVSKI; DEPUTY MINISTER IVANOVSKI

HUNGARY: FOREIGN MINISTER KOVACS; CHIEF OF STAFF BRODY

LATVIA: FOREIGN MINISTER BIRKAVS; AMBASSADOR TO PRAGUE KRASTIN

LITHUANIA: FOREIGN MINISTER P. GYLYS; AMBASSADOR TO PRAGUE JURGIS BREDIKIS

POLAND: FOREIGN MINISTER ROSATI; DIRECTOR EUROPEAN INSTITUTION STEBELSKI

ROMANIA: FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU; DIRECTOR FOR NATO AFFAIRS ROSIANU

SLOVAKIA: FOREIGN MINISTER SCHENK; POLITICAL DIRECTOR KUCHAR

SLOVENIA: FOREIGN MINISTER THALER; AMBASSADOR TO PRAGUE DRAGAN

4. (✓) SUMMARY. AT HIS FIFTH MEETING WITH CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER REVIEWED EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AND ASSURED HIS COLLEAGUES THE U.S. WOULD REMAIN ENGAGED IN EUROPE AND SUPPORT A DELIBERATE, GRADUAL, AND TRANSPARENT PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT. THE SECRETARY REVIEWED THE UPCOMING CALENDAR OF NATO EVENTS AND STRESSED THAT DECISIONS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT WERE NOT LIKELY AT THE JUNE NATO MINISTERIAL BUT THAT THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MUST "SOMEHOW COME TO GRIPS WITH THE QUESTION OF WHO AND WHEN," WITHOUT NECESSARILY TAKING "ULTIMATE" DECISIONS. HE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A NATO SUMMIT EARLY IN 1997. ALL MINISTERS REACTED FAVORABLY TO THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH EARLIER IN THE DAY AND TO HIS ASSURANCES OF A CONTINUED U.S. LEADERSHIP ROLE IN EUROPE.

5. (✓) ALL FOREIGN MINISTERS WELCOMED THE SECRETARY'S REAFFIRMATION OF WASHINGTON'S COMMITMENT TO NATO ENLARGEMENT AND AGREE THAT PRIMAKOV'S "SIREN SONG" OF CONDITIONED OR PARTIAL MEMBERSHIP SHOULD BE RESISTED. THE LITHUANIAN SUGGESTED EARLY DESIGNATION OF WHICH STATES WERE CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERSHIP, WITHOUT SPECIFYING WHEN -- ALONG THE EU MODEL WITH ASSOCIATED STATES. BALTIC MINISTERS RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT MANAGING THE PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES FOR THOSE COUNTRIES THAT DID NOT ENTER IN THE FIRST TRANCHE.

6. (✓) THE SLOVAK MINISTER ASSURED HIS COLLEAGUES THAT THE SLOVAK-HUNGARIAN TREATY WOULD BE RATIFIED THE WEEK OF MARCH 25. THE POLISH, LITHUANIAN, ESTONIAN, AND HUNGARIAN MINISTERS URGED CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR AND ENGAGEMENT WITH AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE. THE SLOVENIAN AND BULGARIAN MINISTERS URGED COOPERATION ON TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES SUCH AS TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME. THE SLOVENIAN FM AND BULGARIAN DEPUTY FM TALKED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING STATES BORDERING THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND TAKING A REGIONAL APPROACH TO SECURITY ISSUES IN THE BALKANS. THE ALBANIAN DEPUTY FM STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE

KOSOVO PROBLEM. THE ESTONIAN AND ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS MADE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR INCREASED MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN PARTNER COUNTRIES AND NATO. CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC, CO-HOST, SAID THE MINISTERS GATHERED AGREED THAT A COOPERATIVE EUROPE WOULD REQUIRE A U.S. LEADERSHIP. ALL AGREED THERE WAS A NEED FOR A DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF ANY OTHER NATION. END SUMMARY.

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S OPENING REMARKS

7. (S) NOTING THIS WAS HIS FIFTH MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF CENTRAL EUROPE, THE SECRETARY, REFERRING TO HIS SPEECH EARLIER THAT DAY ON EUROPEAN SECURITY, SAID THE RUSSIAN ELECTIONS HAD BROUGHT TO THE SURFACE SOME DIFFICULT AND DISTURBING DEVELOPMENTS. AS THERE MIGHT WELL BE A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY AHEAD IN RUSSIA, THE SECRETARY WANTED TO SET OUT THE U.S. VIEW CLEARLY AND DIRECTLY SO THAT WHATEVER UNCERTAINTY EXISTED IN RUSSIA DID NOT DERIVE FROM AMBIGUITY IN THE WEST.

8. (S) THE U.S. INTENDED TO MAINTAIN ITS BROAD STRATEGY AIMED AT THE INTEGRATION OF ALL OF EUROPE, NATO EXPANSION WAS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THIS STRATEGY. THE PROCESS WOULD BE TRANSPARENT, DELIBERATE AND NOT PROVOCATIVE. THE SECRETARY REVIEWED THE UPCOMING CALENDAR OF NATO EVENTS. THERE WOULD BE A NATO MEETING IN BERLIN IN JUNE, AT WHICH THE MINISTERS WOULD RECEIVE A REPORT ON THE INITIAL ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS ON THE ENHANCED DIALOGUE. THE SECRETARY DID NOT ANTICIPATE ANY DECISIONS ON ENLARGEMENT IN BERLIN, SINCE ITS FOCUS WOULD BE ON ADAPTATION OF THE ALLIANCE TO ITS NEW ROLE IN EUROPE. ONE FOCUS WOULD BE INTERNAL ADAPTATION, HIGHLIGHTED BY FRANCE'S INTEREST IN WORKING MORE CLOSELY WITH THE NATO INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. THERE WOULD ALSO BE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE BOSNIA OPERATION, THE LARGEST MILITARY OPERATION IN NATO'S HISTORY AS WELL AS A SIGNIFICANT EXAMPLE OF NATO'S NEW ROLES AND MISSIONS.

9. (S) ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT EXPECT ANY DECISIONS IN JUNE, THE SECRETARY WANTED THE MINISTERS TO KNOW THAT THE U.S. INTENDED TO HOLD THE NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF TO A HIGH STANDARD OF DISCUSSION. THERE WAS A CLEAR CONSENSUS AMONG NATO MEMBERS THAT SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA WAS DOING AN EXCELLENT JOB IN HIS NEW POST. SOLANA WAS TRAVELLING TO NATO CAPITALS AND WOULD ALSO BE VISITING THE CAPITALS OF PARTNER COUNTRIES.

10. (S) THE DECEMBER NATO MINISTERIAL WOULD ASSESS THE RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATIONS -- WHAT PARTNER COUNTRIES WERE PREPARED TO DO AND WHAT NATO NEEDED TO DO. THE DECEMBER NATO MINISTERIAL WOULD HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE QUESTION OF WHO AND WHEN. A NATO SUMMIT IN EARLY 1997 WAS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS STILL UNDECIDED. BY THAT TIME BOTH THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN ELECTIONS WOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND THE OVERALL SITUATION WOULD BE MORE SETTLED.

11. (S) THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT BEFORE HE WENT TO MOSCOW HE WANTED TO REASSURE THE OTHER MINISTERS THAT THE U.S. REMAINED STEADY WITH REGARD TO NATO ENLARGEMENT. WHILE THE U.S. WANTED TO AVOID DRAWING NEW LINES IN EUROPE, THERE WOULD BE NO

PULLBACK FROM THE OVERALL APPROACH -- AND NO DEALS. THERE WAS ALWAYS THE "SIREN SONG" OF A SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD PROTECT SOME COUNTRIES BUT LEAVE OTHERS OUT. THIS WAS A TEMPTATION THAT SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

12. ~~(S)~~ CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC, AS CO-HOST, OPENED T DISCUSSION BY CONGRATULATING THE SECRETARY ON HIS SPEECH AND IT EXPLICIT COMMITMENT TO A CONTINUED AMERICAN LEADERSHIP ROLE IN SHAPING EUROPEAN SECURITY. THE U.S. HAD BEEN A SOURCE OF STABILITY IN EUROPE DURING THE ENTIRE POST-WAR ERA. THE SECRETARY'S CLEAR LANGUAGE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT SINCE THE RUSSIANS WERE ADOPTING A MORE SOPHISTICATED APPROACH TO NATO ENLARGEMENT. THEY WERE NO LONGER JUST SAYING "NYET, NYET, NYET" IT WAS IMPORTANT, IN THE FACE OF THIS, FOR ALL CONCERNED TO BE CLEAR ABOUT THEIR COMMITMENTS AND TO DEMONSTRATE A STRONG WILL FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT TO PROCEED. ANXIETY IN THE REGION HAD BEEN CAUSED BY THE PERSISTENT ILLUSION IN RUSSIA THAT CENTRAL EUROPE COULD BE A POSSIBLE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE. THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH WOULD HELP TO DISABUSE THE RUSSIANS OF THESE DANGEROUS ILLUSION DURING THEIR ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

MACEDONIA

13. ~~(S)~~ FYROM MINISTER FRCHOVSKI NOTED THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN MACEDONIA SUPPORTED THE PROCESS OF NATO AND EU ENLARGEMENT, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SOUTH BALKANS RECEIVE PROPER ATTENTION IN THAT REGARD ALBANIA AND MACEDONIA SHOULD BE LINKED EFFECTIVELY TO THESE STRUCTURES. THE AMERICAN PRESENCE, HE NOTED, MADE A BIG DIFFERENCE FOR MACEDONIA IN HELPING TO MAINTAIN REGIONAL STABILITY.

POLAND

14. ~~(S)~~ POLISH MINISTER ROSATI NOTED HE WAS PLEASED BY THE CONTENTS OF THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH AND PARTICULARLY THE REFERENCES TO HISTORICAL EVENTS THAT HAD LEAD TO EARLIER CATASTROPHES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE SECRETARY'S REASSURANCE THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT WAS ON TRACK WAS NEEDED IN THE REGION. IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT SOME COUNTRIES AND FORCES WERE OPPOSED TO THE PROCESS. THE PREVAILING OPINION IN POLAND WAS THAT ONLY FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO COULD PROVIDE A FULL GUARANTEE OF SECURITY. THERE WAS NO REASON FOR THE PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT TO LEAD TO NEW DIVISIONS IN EUROPE. HE HOPED A NATO SUMMIT WOULD CREATE NOT ONLY DECLARATIONS BUT PROSPECTS FOR THE CREATION OF REAL FACTS. POLAND DID NOT SEE NATO ENLARGEMENT AS DIRECTED AGAINST ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

SLOVENIA

15. ~~(S)~~ SLOVENIAN MINISTER THALER SAID SLOVENIA WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO ENTERING CONSULTATIONS LEADING TO FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. HE BELIEVED COUNTRIES NEEDED TO BE PREPARED TO TAKE ON

COMMITMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS BUT ALSO TO RECEIVE THE BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP. SLOVENIAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WOULD NOT BE A THREAT TO ANY STATE. HISTORY DEMONSTRATED THAT MEMBERSHIP HAD PROVED VALUABLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN, GREECE AND OTHERS WHO HAD JOINED. THE SUCCESS OF NATO'S MILITARY OPERATION IN BOSNIA DEMONSTRATED THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF A U.S. PRESENCE TO PROMOTE STABILITY IN EUROPE.

LITHUANIA

16. (C) LITHUANIAN MINISTER GYLYS FELT REASSURED BY THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH. THERE WAS BOTH AN EXTERNAL/MILITARY DIMENSION AND AN INTERNAL/NON-MILITARY DIMENSION TO THE PROBLEM OF ENLARGEMENT. IT HAD BEEN A GOOD IDEA TO SEPARATE THE ISSUES OF "WHY AND HOW" FROM THOSE OF "WHO AND WHEN" OVER THE PAST YEAR AND HALF. NOW IT WOULD BE GOOD TO SEPARATE THE QUESTION OF "WH" FROM THE QUESTION OF "WHEN." IN OTHER WORDS IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO SEPARATE POTENTIAL MEMBERS, WHO WOULD BE NAMED, FROM NOT SPECIFYING THE TIME WHEN THOSE COUNTRIES MIGHT ACTUALLY JOIN NATO. THEN, LIKE THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS, THERE WOULD BE ONE STARTING POINT FOR ALL BUT THE ACTUAL TIMING OF MEMBERSHIP WOULD DEPEND ON READINESS.

ESTONIA

17. (C) ESTONIAN MINISTER KALLAS NOTED SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAD MADE CLEAR THE PROCEEDINGS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT WOULD BEGIN WITH THE STRONGEST AND MOST ABLE CANDIDATES. THIS MEANT THERE WOULD BE AT LEAST A COUPLE OF TRanches OF NEW MEMBERS. MINISTER KALLAS BELIEVED IT NECESSARY TO CREATE A POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT WHICH REASSURED THOSE COUNTRIES THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE FIRST TRanche THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE LEFT OUT.

18. (C) SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER POINTED OUT THAT HIS SPEECH HAD SPECIFIED THAT THOSE COUNTRIES WHO CAME IN FIRST HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO HELP THOSE THAT FOLLOW. ANY ATTEMPT AT "PULLING UP THE LADDER" BEHIND THEM WOULD BE VERY BADLY RECEIVED. HE STRESSED THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE SHOULD BE A ROUGH PARALLEL BETWEEN EU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP, BUT IT WOULD NOT OPERATE LIKE CLOCKWORK.

LATVIA

19. (C) LATVIAN MINISTER BIRKAVS SAID THAT ENROUTE TO PRAGUE HE HAD BEEN READING A BOOK BY THE CZECH NOVELIST MILAN KUNDERA, WHO HAD WRITTEN THAT THE DEFINITION OF A SMALL COUNTRY WAS ONE WHICH KNEW THAT IT COULD DISAPPEAR AT ANY MOMENT. THIS EXPLAINED WHY SOME OF THE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED AT THE TABLE WERE SO SENSITIVE ON THE ISSUE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT. BIRKAVS WAS GLAD TO HEAR THE SECRETARY SAY THERE WAS NO PLACE FOR GREY ZONES OR ZONES OF INFLUENCE IN EUROPE. LATVIA WAS FOLLOWING A GOAL-ORIENTED APPROACH TOWARD NATO ENLARGEMENT AND WAS LOOKING FOR CONCRETE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EUROPE DID NOT WORSEN AFTER THE FIRST TRanche OF NATO MEMBERS WAS ADMITTED. ONE STEP WOULD BE TO STRENGTHEN THE BALTIC BATTALION' ALD TO BE MORE ACTIVE IN IFOR.

SLOVAKIA

20. ~~(S)~~ SLOVAK MINISTER SCHENK ASSURED HIS COLLEAGUES THAT SLOVAKIA SHARED THE DEMOCRATIC VALUES ON WHICH NATO IS BASED AND WANTED TO BE A FULL-FLEDGED MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE. HE HAD STRESSED TO FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV THAT SLOVAKIA WOULD REJECT NEUTRALITY OR THE STATUS OF A "BRIDGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST." THE SAME TOKEN, SLOVAKIA FAVORED A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO. SLOVAKIA WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE ENHANCED INDIVIDUAL DIALOGUE WITH NATO AND WOULD BE THE FIRST COUNTRY TO HAVE ITS INDIVIDUAL DISCUSSION PAPER APPROVED.

ALBANIA

21. ~~(S)~~ ALBANIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER STAROVA SAID "HIS COUNTRY WAS GLAD TO SEE THE PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT CONTINUE. ALBANIA DID NOT VIEW NATO AS DEFENDING IT FROM ATTACK BUT COULD NOT IGNORE THE FACT THAT AFTER THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN THE PARTIES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA HAD FINALLY MET AT THE NEGOTIATION TABLE."

BULGARIA

22. ~~(S)~~ BULGARIAN DEPUTY FM BOKOVA STRESSED THAT BULGARIA WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED WITH NATO AND IN THE PROCESS OF EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY INTEGRATION. THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT HAD WORKED OUT A DOCUMENT FOR ITS INTENSIFIED DIALOGUE WITH NATO.

ROMANIA

23. ~~(S)~~ ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU JOINED THE OTHER MINISTERS IN CONGRATULATING THE SECRETARY ON HIS SPEECH. ROMANIA'S CLEAR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE WAS TO BECOME A MEMBER OF NATO. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HEAR THE SECRETARY'S REAFFIRMATION OF A GRADUAL, DELIBERATE, TRANSPARENT PROCESS.

HUNGARY

24. ~~(S)~~ HUNGARIAN MINISTER KOVACS SAID THAT AS THE LAST SPEAKER HE WANTED TO STRESS THAT THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH HAD MADE CLEAR THE U.S. WAS WILLING TO TREAT THE CENTRAL EUROPEANS NOT ONLY AS PARTNERS BUT AS ALLIES. THE PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT AND EURO-ATLANTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION INCLUDES NOT ONLY PARTNERS THAT WANT TO BE MEMBERS OF NATO, BUT ALSO RUSSIA, WHICH HAS A NATURAL INTEREST IN MAKING SURE THE PROCESS IS NEITHER AIMED AGAINST RUSSIA NOR ISOLATES IT FROM THE REST OF EUROPE. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND WITH OTHER NEIGHBORS

25. ~~(C)~~ MINISTER GYLYS NOTED LITHUANIA HAD EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH POLAND AND WANTED BETTER RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS TO THE EAST. LITHUANIA, HE SAID, HAD BEEN CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA. THE RECENT STATE DUMA RESOLUTION ABOUT THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION HAD CAUSED INCREASED CONCERNS ABOUT THE CREATION OF ZONES OF INFLUENCE, GREY ZONES, "BLACK HOLES OF SECURITY IN EUROPE. NONETHELESS, IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE TO "INVEST" IN A RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY, DESPITE THE NEGATIVE TENDENCIES.

26. ~~(C)~~ MINISTER SCHENK NOTED THAT WITH REGARD TO THE SECRETARY'S MENTION OF THE SLOVAK-HUNGARIAN TREATY IN HIS SPEECH HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT THE SLOVAK PARLIAMENT WOULD RATIFY THE TREATY DURING THE WEEK OF MARCH 25.

27. ~~(C)~~ MINISTER MELESCANU SAID THAT WHILE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES INTO ACCOUNT IN THE PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT WENT FORWARD, IT ALSO WAS IMPORTANT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SENSITIVITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. CROSS-BORDER SECURITY ASSURANCES AND LIMITED GUARANTEES AMOUNTED TO A SOPHISTICATED WAY OF SAYING NO TO NATO ENLARGEMENT. REGIONAL STABILITY WAS A PILLAR OF NATO ENLARGEMENT. IT WAS NECESSARY TO TURN THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION INTO ONE OF GOOD NEIGHBORHOOD. MELESCANU SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT THE HUNGARIAN/SLOVAK AGREEMENT WAS TO BE RATIFIED SOON. MINISTER MELESCANU TOOK SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S POINT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED HUNGARIAN-ROMANIAN NEGOTIATIONS AND WANTED TO ASSURE THE SECRETARY THAT ROMANIA WOULD DO ITS BEST.

28. ~~(C)~~ SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIAN DUMA'S ACTIONS WERE OF CONCERN, ONE SHOULD NOT RULE OUT THAT THINGS IN RUSSIA COULD WORK OUT IN A POSITIVE WAY. THE NATO-RUSSIA NEGOTIATIONS WERE CURRENTLY DORMANT BUT COULD PICK UP. COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA IN IFOR HAD BEEN THE BEST AND MOST POSITIVE ELEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA.

29. ~~(C)~~ MINISTER KOVACS NOTED THAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW PRIMAKOV MADE TWO OBJECTIONS TO NATO ENLARGEMENT. FIRST WAS ITS "UNLIMITED NATURE." PRIMAKOV SUPPOSED THAT EVENTUALLY ALL THE COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD EXCEPT RUSSIA COULD BECOME MEMBERS OF NATO. THE SECOND WAS THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE (TROOPS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS) SHOULD NOT APPROACH RUSSIA'S BORDERS. KOVACS HAD TOLD PRIMAKOV THAT HUNGARY WANTED FULL-FLEDGED MEMBERSHIP IN NATO AND THAT THIS WAS TO BE NEGOTIATED IN BRUSSELS, NOT MOSCOW HE ADDED THAT HUNGARY WOULD NOT MAKE NATO CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR FORCES ON ITS SOIL A CONDITION OF MEMBERSHIP, BUT WOULD NOT RULE THEM OUT. PRIMAKOV HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT SEE ENLARGEMENT AS A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF RUSSIA. THIS WAS A "NEW TUNE" FROM RUSSIA AND KOVACS BELIEVED THAT A COMPROMISE WAS POSSIBLE.

THE IMPORTANCE OF UKRAINE

30. ~~(C)~~ POLISH MINISTER ROSATI WELCOMED SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S SPEECH REMARKS ON UKRAINE. HE HAD THE FEELING THAT UKRAINE HAD REMAINED FOR TOO LONG ON THE PERIPHERY OF DISCUSSIONS OF EUROPE SECURITY. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO BOTH UKRAINE AND BELARUS SO THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT, WHEN IT CAME, DID NOT END AT POLAND'S BORDERS. SLOVENIAN MINISTER THALER AGREED WITH MINISTER ROSATI ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF UKRAINE. MINISTER GYLY AGREED BUT URGED THAT BELARUS, WHICH HAD ITS OWN VERY PARTICULAR PROBLEMS, NOT BE FORGOTTEN OR NEGLECTED. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD NO SPECIFIC RECIPE. MINISTER KALLAS ADDED TO THOSE WHO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF UKRAINE, NOTING THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO REESTABLISH THE SOVIET UNION OR THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE WITHOUT UKRAINE. MINISTER KOVACS AGREED WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY AND URGED CONSULTATIONS WITH KIEV TO HELP UKRAINE UNDERSTAND WHAT NATO ENLARGEMENT WAS ALL ABOUT.

GLOBAL ISSUES

31. ~~(C)~~ MINISTER THALER NOTED THAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HAD SO FAR NOT BEEN A PROBLEM ON SLOVENIAN SOIL BUT NONETHELESS REMAINED A THREAT. SLOVENIA WANTED TO WORK WITH OTHERS TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER APPRECIATED THIS POINT: GLOBAL ISSUES WERE OF GROWING IMPORTANCE AND THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO WORK ON COUNTER-TERRORISM, ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG TRAFFICKING WITH THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

32. ~~(C)~~ DEPUTY FM BOKOVA AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES, INCLUDING TERRORISM AND DRUGS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL AS WELL TO DISCUSS TRADE, INVESTMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, PARTICULARLY PROJECTS WHICH WOULD PROMOTE THE INTEGRATION OF SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE INTO EUROPE ITSELF.

BOSNIA AND BALKAN SECURITY

33. ~~(C)~~ THE SECRETARY SAID BOSNIA REMAINED A DAUNTING CHALLENGE BUT WAS ALSO A WONDERFUL LABORATORY FOR PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. HE NOTED THAT SEVERAL OF THE COUNTRIES AT THE TABLE WERE REPRESENTED IN IFOR. THE SECRETARY HAD MET OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS WITH THE NATO COMMANDERS, INCLUDING GENERAL JOULWAN AND ADMIRAL SMITH. BOTH HAD SPOKE ENTHUSIASTICALLY ABOUT THE INTEROPERABILITY OF THE FORCES AND THEIR PERFORMANCE.

34. ~~(C)~~ MINISTER THALER INDICATED THE PEACE PROCESS IN BOSNIA SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED BY REINFORCING THE SECURITY OF THE AREAS BORDERING THE CRISIS AREA. A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS MOMENT WAS APPROACHING; IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO SEE WHETHER SIGNED INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WERE RESPECTED BY THE PARTIES. VIOLATIONS COULD LEAD TO THE DESTABILIZATION OF THE SECURITY

SITUATION IN EUROPE.

35. ~~(C)~~ ALBANIAN DEPUTY MINISTER STAROVA SAID HE WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA DUE TO THE DAYTON ACCORDS. NONETHELESS KOSOVO REMAINED DANGEROUS. ALBANIA WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE U.S. ROLE AND AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S RECENT STATEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. STAROVA SAID THE REAL ISSUE WAS THAT, ALTHOUGH KOSOVO WAS LEGALLY AND TECHNICALLY PART OF SERBI TWO MILLION ALBANIANS -- WHO HAD NOTHING IN COMMON WITH THE SERBS -- LIVED THERE. HE URGED A DIALOGUE, BROKERED BY AN IMPARTIAL THIRD PARTY, LEADING TO EITHER ONE COUNTRY OR A GROUP OF COUNTRIES. PERHAPS THE U.S. COULD PLAY SUCH A ROLE.

KOSOVO

THREATENED THE ENTIRE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE BALKANS AND EUROPE AS A WHOLE. THE TIME FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY HPN COULD QUICKLY LEAD TO CONFLICT.

36. ~~(C)~~ SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AGREED THAT KOSOVO WAS A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM AND SAID HE HAD TALKED ABOUT IT SEVERAL TIMES WITH PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC. THE LATTER HAD AGREED TO THE OPENING OF A U.S. INFORMATION OFFICE IN KOSOVO AND TO END THE PRACTICE OF REQUIRING EXIT VISAS. THESE WERE SMALL STEPS. NONETHELESS, TH U.S. HAD PRESSED MILOSEVIC SO HARD THAT IT MIGHT NO LONGER QUALIFY AS THE "IMPARTIAL" PARTY WHICH ALBANIA SOUGHT AS MEDIATOR. MILESOVIC HAD BEEN TOLD IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT T LAST SANCTIONS WOULD NOT BE LIFTED UNTIL THE KOSOVO PROBLEM WAS ADDRESSED. IN SHORT, KOSOVO REMAINED A PROBLEM THAT HAD NOT BE FORGOTTEN, BUT HAD NOT BEEN SOLVED.

37. ~~(C)~~ DEPUTY FM BOKOVA NOTED THAT BULGARIA TENDED TO LOOK AT SECURITY ISSUES THROUGH THE PRISM OF ITS REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE - ONLY NATURAL FOR A COUNTRY THAT HAD BEEN SO CLOSE TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAV CATASTROPHE AND HAD SUFFERED SO MUCH FROM IT. BULGARI HOPED THAT A MEETING OF BALKAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, ADEQUATELY PREPARED BY EXPERTS, COULD MEET TO REAFFIRM BASIC PRINCIPLES.

MILITARY COOPERATION

38. ~~(C)~~ MINISTER KALLAS ASKED THAT NATO SPELL OUT MORE CLEARLY WHAT STEPS ASPIRANT COUNTRIES NEED TO TAKE. THE PARTNERS NEEDED A CLEARER PICTURE TO ASSURE THAT THERE WERE SUFFICIENT BUDGETAR RESOURCES FOR THE MILITARY AND TO CREATE "STRUCTURES" THAT COULD WORK WITH NATO.

39. ~~(C)~~ MINISTER MELESCANU H544DRQ WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE OFFICERS FROM PARTNER COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN BOTH THE SPECIALIZED COMMITTEES OF NATO AND IN ITS REGIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURES. IN ADDITION HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO EXTEND COOPERATION WITH PARTNER COUNTRIES AT THE LEVEL OF AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD LOOK AT THESE SUGGESTIONS BUT NO PARTICIPATION WAS AS IMPORTANT AS IFOR\$PARTICIPATION. IT WAS TANGIBLE AND REAL.

CONCLUSION

40. ~~(C)~~ MINISTER ZIELENIEC THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR MEETING WITH THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS. HE BELIEVED THERE WERE IMPORTANT CHANGES IN RUSSIAN INTERNAL POLITICS THAT MADE THIS DIALOGUE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT. HE BELIEVED THE COMMON DENOMINATOR OF THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN THAT ALL THE MINISTERS WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO A UNITED EUROPE OF COOPERATING NATIONS WITH A STRONG LEADERSHIP ROLE BY THE UNITED STATES. THERE SHOULD BE A PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA BUT NO QUESTIONING OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF ANY OTHER NATION. FINALLY, 1996 AND 1997 WOULD BE YEARS SO BIG CHANGES IN THE DIRECTION OF STABILITY AND COOPERATION. SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER MINISTERS, HE WISHED (SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER THE BEST OF LUCK IN MOSCOW.

CHRISTOPHER

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 9734

TOR: 960324152307 M2146315

DIST:

SIT: BELL BLACKER FEELEY FRIED PASCUAL PIFER SCHMIDT VERSHAW WITKOWSKY

SIT: NSC

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PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH

LINE3: O 161617Z APR 96

LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

OSRI: RUEHWR

DTG: 161617Z APR 96

ORIG: AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6960
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0592
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/ISA//

INFO: RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1461
RUEHNSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 1134
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0546
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0764
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 1397
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 2304

SUBJ: FOREIGN MINISTER ROSATI'S U.S. VISIT: HEAVY ON
SECURITY QUESTIONS

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 WARSAW 004254

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, S/NIS AND EUR/RPM

OSD/ISA FOR BRADEN

USUN FOR STUART JONES

PASS NSC FOR FRIED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/16/06

TAGS: PREL, PL

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ROSATI'S U.S. VISIT: HEAVY ON
SECURITY QUESTIONS

REF: EVANS-MULL TELCON 4/12/96

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. POLITICAL COUNSELOR
STEPHEN MULL CLASSIFIED THIS REPORT PER E.O. 12958,
SECTIONS 1.5 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY

2. ROSATI'S TALKS IN THE U.S. APRIL 22-25 WILL OFFER
IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES TO:

-- HIGHLIGHT POLAND'S STEPS AHEAD IN THE NATO

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0792-M (1.22)
KBH 3/12/2020

ENLARGEMENT PROCESS, AND FLAG IMPORTANT PITFALLS LIKE ARMS SALES AND THE PFP SOFA;

- DRAW LESSONS FROM POLAND'S PARTICIPATION IN IFOR;
- BTRESS EFFORTS TO BUILD REGIONAL SECURITY AND IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA; AND
- IMPROVE UPON ALREADY EXCELLENT COOPERATION IN THE UNSC.

ROSATI PLANS TO GIVE A READOUT OF KWASNIEWSKI'S RECENT VISITS TO MINSK AND MOSCOW, PRESS AGAIN FOR POLISH MTCR MEMBERSHIP, ASK FOR A REPORT ON PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT TO RUSSIA, AND REQUEST U.S. VIEWS ON PLANS FOR OPERATIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA BEYOND DECEMBER. HE WILL PROBABLY URGE AN EARLY VISIT FOR KWASNIEWSKI TO WASHINGTON. INTERLOCUTORS WILL FIND ROSATI SERIOUS, WORKMANLIKE AND PRAGMATIC. HE SPEAKS EXCELLENT ENGLISH. END SUMMARY.

A NEWCOMER TO THE ACCOUNT

3. ROSATI, A NEWCOMER TO TRANSATLANTIC ISSUES, HAS WORKED QUICKLY TO ESTABLISH HIS FOOTING ON POLAND'S MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA ITEMS, AND MOST OBSERVERS GIVE HIM HIGH MARKS. HE CLEARLY ENJOYS PRESIDENT KWASNIEWSKI'S PERSONAL TRUST, DESPITE EARLY HORN-LOCKING WITH THE GOVERNING SOCIAL DEMOCRACY OF POLAND (SDRP) OVER ITS CHOICE OF SPY-PLAGUED, FORMER PM OLEKSY AS ITS LEADER IN JANUARY. HE HAS WORKED DILIGENTLY TO EXPAND HIS MINISTRY'S EVER-EMBATTLED POSITION IN THE BUREAUCRACY -- FOR EXAMPLE, BY EFFECTIVELY PUTTING POLAND'S OVERSEAS TRADE OFFICES UNDER HIS CONTROL AND INTERCEDING MORE AGGRESSIVELY ON ARMS SALES -- AND HAS DEMONSTRATED INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE GOVERNMENT'S CONFIDENCE. ACCORDING TO HIS STAFF IN THE MINISTRY, HE VIEWS HIS WASHINGTON VISIT AS A CRITICAL STEP TOWARDS WINNING CREDIBILITY FOR KWASNIEWSKI'S PRO-WEST FOREIGN POLICY TILT AND LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR A KWASNIEWSKI VISIT TO WASHINGTON LATER THIS YEAR.

4. ROSATI'S VISIT WILL LIKELY COINCIDE WITH THE LATEST CHAPTER IN THE OLEKSY AFFAIR, IN WHICH THE OUTGOING WALESZA ADMINISTRATION IN DECEMBER ACCUSED THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF ESPIONAGE ON BEHALF OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET INTELLIGENCE. POLISH MILITARY PROSECUTORS HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATING THE CHARGES AND WE EXPECT THEM TO ANNOUNCE ON/ABOUT APRIL 22 WHETHER THEY WILL FORMALLY PROSECUTE ANYONE ON THE CASE. PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE CASE WILL BE DROPPED BECAUSE OF A LACK OF EVIDENCE -- A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WILL LIKELY PROMPT OPPOSITION CHARGES OF A COVER-UP.

5. HIS VISIT WILL ALSO COINCIDE WITH MOVEMENT FROM SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION LEADERS TO JOIN A MULTI-PARTISAN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT VETERAN JANUSZ ONYSZKIEWICZ. THE

COUNCIL WOULD HAVE OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLISH NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. OPPOSITION LEADERS LIKE FREEDOM UNION (UW) PARLIAMENTARY CHIEF BRONISLAW GEREMEK (PROTECT) HAVE TOLD US THEY WILL SUPPORT THE COUNCIL REGARDLESS OF THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE OLEKSY AFFAIR, THOUGH NONE OF THEM HAVE YET MADE ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO THAT
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STATE FOR EUR/NCE, S/NIS AND EUR/RPM

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/16/06

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EFFECT -- GEREMEK TOLD US APRIL 16 HE EXPECTS AN ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE APRIL 19.

6. THE VISIT ALSO COMES ON THE HEELS OF THE APPOINTMENT OF RYSZARD MIAZEK, A PEASANT PARTY APPARATCHIK, AS THE NEW HEAD OF POLISH PUBLIC TELEVISION (SEPTEL). WHILE THE TV MANAGEMENT BOARD WILL SIGNIFICANTLY CONSTRAIN HIS ABILITY TO UNDERMINE THE INDEPENDENCE OF TV NEWS, HIS EARLY PRONOUNCEMENTS THAT TV JOURNALISTS SHOULD FOCUS ON SERVING THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERESTS HAVE AROUSED SIGNIFICANT CONCERN ABOUT THE DIRECTION OF POLISH PUBLIC BROADCASTING.

ROSATI'S AGENDA

7. ACCORDING TO FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES, ROSATI PLANS TO RAISE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

-- NATO ENLARGEMENT: ROSATI VIEWED THE SECRETARY'S RECENT REMARKS IN PRAGUE AS A WATERSHED DEVELOPMENT. HE WILL SEEK WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO THE POLISH NATO DISCUSSION PAPER, WHICH IT SUBMITTED APRIL 4, AND SEEK FURTHER CLARIFICATION HOW THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS WILL MOVE FORWARD AT THE DECEMBER NAC. A/S HOLBROOKE TOLD ROSATI IN FEBRUARY THAT THE DECEMBER NAC WILL BE A CRITICAL EVENT IN IDENTIFYING THE "WHO AND WHEN" OF

NATO ENLARGEMENT -- ROSATI WILL DOUBTLESS WANT MORE DETAILS. THE POLES HOPE FOR SPECIFIC NAMES OF NEW NATO MEMBERS AT THE NAC, BUT REALISTICALLY EXPECT THE NAC WILL ANNOUNCE A DATE FOR SPRING 1997 SUMMIT WHICH WILL NAME NAMES.

-- U.S. VIEWS ON RUSSIA: ROSATI PLANS TO ASK FOR THE SECRETARY'S IMPRESSIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA, AND ANY RELEVANT DETAILS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S DISCUSSIONS THERE. HE WILL ALSO WANT TO DISCUSS THE EVOLVING NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP, AND WAYS IN WHICH POLAND CAN HELP IT. WASHINGTON MAY BE INTERESTED IN ASKING ROSATI FOR AN OUTLINE OF KWASNIEWSKI'S STRATEGY FOR RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA BEYOND THE JUNE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS -- HE WILL CERTAINLY ASK US FOR OURS. ROSATI WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY UNDERSTANDING AND PUBLIC SUPPORT THE U.S. CAN OFFER FOR POLAND'S DESIRE FOR ENHANCED MILITARY COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA -- KWASNIEWSKI'S OUTREACH TO THE EAST HAS DRAWN SOME FLAK FROM POLISH RIGHT-WINGERS.

-- REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS: THE MINISTER WILL BRIEF ON PRESIDENT KWASNIEWSKI'S RECENT VISITS TO MINSK AND MOSCOW, AS WELL AS HIS RECENT SERIES OF TALKS WITH POLAND'S OTHER NEIGHBORS. THE POLISH GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO SEE UKRAINIAN SOVEREIGNTY AS ONE OF POLAND'S MOST CRITICAL STRATEGIC INTERESTS, AND ROSATI WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH WASHINGTON. HE WILL ALSO BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS BURGEONING COORDINATION AMONG THE CZECH REPUBLIC, POLAND AND HUNGARY IN THEIR INTEREST IN JOINING NATO AND IN PURCHASES OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (SEE PARA 5, TICK 4).

-- MTCR: POLAND STILL SMARTS OVER THE DENIAL OF MTCR MEMBERSHIP (PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF HUNGARIAN MEMBERSHIP), AND ROSATI PLANS TO PRESS ITS CASE AGAIN.

-- IFOR/BOSNIA: AS AN IFOR PARTICIPANT, THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IS EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN PLANS FOR NATO, UN OR OTHER OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE IFOR MANDATE. ROSATI WILL SEEK U.S. VIEWS, PARTICULARLY ON WHAT, IF ANY, ROLE THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO SEE POLAND PLAY IN POST-IFOR BOSNIA. ROSATI MAY ALSO NOTE THAT POLISH COSTS IN IFOR ARE SKYROCKETING.

-- MILITARY COOPERATION: IN HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY PERRY, ROSATI WILL SEEK TO ENGAGE IN A DISCUSSION ON HOW POLAND AND THE U.S. CAN INTENSIFY BILATERAL MILITARY COOPERATION. WE RECOMMEND DRAWING HIM OUT ON THIS BY PURSUING A SEPTEL IDEA ON INVOLVING UKRAINIAN

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USUN FOR STUART JONES

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/16/06

TAGS: PREL, PL

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ROSATI'S U.S. VISIT: HEAVY ON
SECURITY QUESTIONS

SOLDIERS IN U.S.-POLISH MIL-MIL PROGRAMS UNDER THE
AUSPICES OF THE MLT.

-- UNSC CONSULTATIONS: ROSATI WILL BE EAGER TO
EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT ON PENDING
UNSC ISSUES, AND ON ENHANCING OUR ALREADY CLOSE
COOPERATION ON THEM.

ALTHOUGH OUR FOREIGN MINISTRY CONTACTS DIDN'T MENTION IT AS
PART OF THE AGENDA, WE EXPECT ROSATI WILL EMPHASIZE
KWASNIEWSKI'S INTENSE INTEREST IN AN EARLY WORKING VISIT TO
THE UNITED STATES.

OUR AGENDA

8. WE RECOMMEND RAISING THE FOLLOWING CHECKLIST OF ISSUES
WITH ROSATI IN THE APPROPRIATE FORA:

-- POLAND'S INTENSIFIED DISCUSSION AT NATO: POLISH
OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY OPEN TO CONSTRUCTIVE
CRITICISM OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO
ENLARGEMENT PROCESS -- FOR EXAMPLE, THEY INCORPORATED
MANY OF OUR SUGGESTIONS IN THEIR NATO DISCUSSION
PAPER, WHICH THEY SHARED WITH US IN DRAFT BEFORE
SUBMITTING IT IN BRUSSELS. WE RECOMMEND GIVING ROSATI
A CRITIQUE OF THE POLISH PAPER AS WELL AS SHARING U.S.
VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS IN THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS.

-- PFP SOFA: THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S RATIFICATION IS
MIREN IN INTER-AGENCY SQUABBLING AMONG CUSTOMS AND THE
JUSTICE MINISTRY. THE FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES
HAVE BEEN SUPPORTIVE, BUT HAVE LACKED THE STRENGTH TO
PUSH IT THROUGH. WE RECOMMEND UNDERSCORING THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE PFP SOFA TO BOTH PFP AND THE NATO
ENLARGEMENT PROCESS, AND URGING ACCELERATED EFFORTS
FOR RATIFICATION.

-- ARMS SALES: WE NOTE THAT THE SEJM IS MOVING SLOWLY
TO CONSIDER A NEW ARMS EXPORT CONTROL REGIME WHICH THE

GOVERNMENT SUBMITTED IN 1995. THE NEW REGIME WOULD PROVIDE A MECHANISM TO PROHIBIT SALES TO PARIAS STATES. MEANWHILE, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT POLISH ARMS MANUFACTURERS CONTINUE TO MARKET THEIR WARES AGGRESSIVELY. WE RECOMMEND WASHINGTON FLAG THE ISSUE AS A POTENTIAL PITFALL IN POLISH-U.S. COOPERATION.

-- ADVANCED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT: THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET FORMALLY RESPONDED TO OUR GENEROUS F-16 LEASE PACKAGE IN JANUARY, HOPING TO HOLD OUT FOR AN EQUALLY ATTRACTIVE F-18 LEASE OPTION. IF TIME IS RUNNING OUT ON THE F-16 AVAILABILITY, WE RECOMMEND RAISING IT WITH ROSATI PROMINENTLY. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO HEAR POLAND'S PLANS FOR COORDINATING ITS PURCHASE/LEASE OF U.S. AIRCRAFT WITH THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND POSSIBLY HUNGARY, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE POLISH/CZECH FOREIGN/DEFENSE MINISTERS SUMMIT IN VYSKOV APRIL 13.

-- HELLFIRE MISSILES: AFTER EXPRESSING INTEREST IN UPGRADING ITS HUZAR HELICOPTERS WITH HELLFIRE MISSILES LAST WINTER, THE POLISH DEFENSE MINISTRY HAS INSTEAD OPTED TO PURCHASE AN UNTRIED ISRAELI MISSILE THAT WILL FEATURE CO-PRODUCTION OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLISH INDUSTRY. THE ROCKWELL CORPORATION HAS LAUNCHED AN AGGRESSIVE CAMPAIGN TO OVERTURN THE DECISION THROUGH HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS THROUGHOUT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND STORIES IN THE PRESS IN WHICH IT EMPHASIZES ITS COIDERABLE INTEREST IN POLISH CO-PRODUCTION OPPORTUNITIES. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS SUPPORTED ROCKWELL IN THE INTER-AGENCY PROCESS, AND HAS SUCCEEDED IN PUTTING RECONSIDERATION OF THE DEAL BACK ON THE AGENDA OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DEFENSE COMMITTEE (KSORM). DEFENSE MINISTER DOBRZANSKI HAS ALSO ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR OF FULL RECONSIDERATION, AS HAVE OTHER DEFENSE OFFICIALS AT OUR MOST RECENT IWG (SEPTTEL). WE RECOMMEND THANKING ROSATI FOR HIS MINISTRY'S SUPPORT AND EXPRESSING OUR HOPE FOR THE CHANCES OF A ROCKWELL SALE.

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-- IFOR LESSONS LEARNED: IN ROSATI'S DOD MEETING, A
CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF POLISH PARTICIPATION IN IFOR
WOULD BE OF ENORMOUS VALUE TO THE POLES IN DEVISING
THEIR NATO INTER-OPERABILITY ACTION PLAN.

-- BOSNIA POLICE: A/S HOLBROOKE TOLD ROSATI IN
FEBRUARY THAT HE WOULD SEEK TO REMOVE THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICE
PARTICIPATION IN IPTF IN BOSNIA. ROSATI SAID POLAND
WOULD PROBABLY CONTRIBUTE MORE IF HE SUCCEEDED IN
ELIMINATING THE LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT. WE RECOMMEND
UPDATING ROSATI ON WHERE THE ISSUE STANDS.

-- OECD: ROSATI BELIEVES THAT POLAND'S ACCESSION IS ON
TRACK FOR JUNE. WE WOULD ENCOURAGE HIS INTERLOCUTORS
TO CONGRATULATE HIM ON THE PROGRESS POLAND HAS MADE,
AND TO CONFIRM HIS UNDERSTANDING. IN ADDITION, HIS
INTERLOCUTORS SHOULD NOTE THE NEED TO FINISH WORK ON
THE COMMITMENTS POLAND HAS MADE TO THE OECD
SECRETARIAT.

-- PUBLIC TV: WE RECOMMEND EXPRESSING OUR INTEREST IN
CONTINUED FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN LIGHT OF POLISH TV
HEAD RYSZARD MIAZEK'S STATEMENTS INDICATING POSSIBLE
RESTRICTIONS ON BROADCAST JOURNALISTS.

ROSATI BIO

9. QR OLD ROSATI WAS BORN IN RADOM TO AN ITALIAN
FATHER AND POLISH MOTHER. HE RECEIVED A PH.D. IN ECONOMICS
FROM WARSAW'S CENTRAL SCHOOL OF PLANNING AND STATISTICS
(SGPIS), WHERE HE WAS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE SCHOOL'S
COMMUNIST PARTY (PZPR) ORGANIZATION FROM 1981-85 (ROSATI
WAS A MEMBER OF THE PZPR FROM 1966 UNTIL IT DISBANDED IN
1990). ROSATI FOUNDED AND DIRECTED THE SCHOOL'S WORLD
ECONOMIC INSTITUTE FROM 1985-87, AND SPENT 1987-88 STUDYING
EXPORT PROMOTION POLICY AT PRINCETON ON A FULBRIGHT
SCHOLARSHIP. FROM 1988-89 ROSATI WAS AN ECONOMIC ADVISOR
TO THE LAST COMMUNIST PRIME MINISTER, AND IN 1989 RAN
UNSUCCESSFULLY AS A COMMUNIST CANDIDATE FOR THE=SENATE.
AFTER BECOMING A FULL PROFESSOR IN 1990, ROSATI WORKED AT
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. HE HEADED THE
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN SECTION OF THE UN ECONOMIC
COMMISSION FOR EUROPE IN GENEVA FROM 1991 UNTIL HIS
APPOINTMENT AS FOREIGN MINISTER IN DECEMBER 1995. IN 1994
HE WAS THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT ALLIANCE (SLD) CANDIDATE FOR
FINANCE MINISTER, BUT PRESIDENT WALESA REJECTED THE
NOMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF ROSATI'S ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT
IN A SCANDAL-PLAGUED-FOREIGN DEBT FUND. SINCE ROSATI
BECAME FOREIGN MINISTER, HE HAS BEEN EXTREMELY ACCESSIBLE

AND RECEPTIVE TO US. IN OUR MEETINGS, WE HAVE FOUND HIM TO BE A SERIOUS AND PRAGMATIC INTERLOCUTOR, THOUGH SOMEWHAT RESERVED AND UNCERTAIN ON TRANSATLANTIC ISSUES. ROSATI SPEAKS ENGLISH, AND IS MARRIED WITH TWO CHILDREN.

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PREC: IMMEDIATE
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 LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 LINE3: O 170713Z APR 96 ZDK CCY
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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 ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO: RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4724
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: YOUR MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

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2015-0792 - M (1.23)
 KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:
~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 010539

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT THROUGHOUT)

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE AMBASSADOR

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USDEL SECRETARY

E.O. 12958: 4/14/11

TAGS: PREL, OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM J.), RS

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

1. CLASSIFIED BY THOMAS R. PICKERING, U.S. AMBASSADOR
 TO RUSSIA. REASON: 1.5(B) (D) .

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: YOUR VISIT TO MOSCOW WILL YIELD
 SIGNIFICANT DIVIDENDS ON THE NUCLEAR SAFETY AND
 SECURITY ISSUES, AS WELL AS GUIDING U.S.-RUSSIAN
 RELATIONS STEADILY AHEAD INTO THE TRICKY AND DIFFICULT
 ELECTION SEASON. BOTH THE SUBSTANCE AND SYMBOLISM OF
 YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL BE
 VITALLY IMPORTANT IN KEEPING THE RELATIONSHIP
 PRODUCTIVE AND VITAL IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. YOUR
 MEETING WITH POLITICAL LEADERS WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH
 ANOTHER DIMENSION TO EXPRESS OUR SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA'S
 DEMOCRATIC REFORMS.

3. ~~(S)~~ YOU WILL BE MEETING WITH A PRESIDENT YELTSIN
 WHO IS INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT OF HIS RE-ELECTION. HE
 MAY BE OVERCONFIDENT: THE RACE BETWEEN HIM AND
 ZYUGANOV IS CLOSE AND COULD GO EITHER WAY. (A KEY
 QUESTION MARK REMAINS THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH, WHICH
 WILL BE TESTED BY A TOUGH FOREIGN TRAVEL SCHEDULE AND
 THE RIGORS OF THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL. THE OTHER WILD CARD

IN THE CAMPAIGN IS CHECHNYA WHERE YELTSIN'S PEACE PLAN IS LAGGING.) YELTSIN WILL SEE HIS MEETINGS WITH YOU (AND OTHER LEADERS) PRIMARILY THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE CAMPAIGN. HE WILL PRESS VERY HARD FOR ADMISSION TO THE G-7, AND WILL SEEK TO USE HIS POSITION AS HOST TO MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE ON ALL ISSUES ACROSS THE BOARD. HE WILL BE ADVERSE TO MAKING ANY SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS FOR THEAKE OF SUMMIT AGREEMENT, FEARING ELECTORAL BACKLASH FROM ANY APPEARANCE OF WEAKNESS TOWARD THE WEST. THIS LIMITS OUR LEVERAGE ON SOME ISSUES SUCH AS G-7/G-8 AND ABM/TMD. ANY INDICATION BY THE WEST, AND ESPECIALLY THE U.S., THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO "LIVE WITH" ZYUGANOV AND THE COMMUNISTS SEVERELY UNDERCUTS YELTSIN'S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY OF PAINTING HIS CHIEF OPPONENT AS A NEO-STALINIST READY TO DRAG RUSSIA BACK TO A BLOODY AND DIVISIVE PAST. HE HAS BEEN VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT U.S. CONTACTS WITH ZYUGANOV -- AND REMAINS NERVOUS ABOUT THE ENCOUNTER WITH POLITICAL FIGURES ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON. IF HE RAISES IT, YOU CAN REASSURE HIM THAT WE HAVE STRUCTURED THE SESSION TO MINIMIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR HIS OPPONENTS TO CAPITALIZE ON THE MEETING.

4. (S) YOU MAY WISH TO NOTE THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS AND RESPECTS FREE AND FAIR DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. THIS WOULD BE A PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT IN VIEW OF EARLIER REPORTS THAT YELTSIN'S INNER CIRCLE WERE CONSIDERING WAYS TO POSTPONE THE ELECTION.

END SUMMARY

THE STATE OF THE RACE

5. (S) THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS INCREASINGLY LOOKING LIKE A TWO-MAN RACE BETWEEN ZYUMANOV AND YELTSIN. THE OTHER COMPETITORS ARE EITHER FAR BEHIND, OR FADING. ATTEMPTS TO CONSOLIDATE A "THIRD FORCE" HAVE COLLAPSED IN SQUABBLING. THE OTHER CANDIDATES, HOWEVER, ARE LIKELY TO GARNER ENOUGH FIRST ROUND VOTES TO KEEP EITHER FRONT-RUNNER FROM CAPTURING AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY. A SECOND ROUND IN EARLY JULY THEREFORE LOOKS LIKELY.

6. (S) YELTSINQINGLY CONFIDENT OF VICTORY, BOTH IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE. HE HAS BEGUN CAMPAIGNING WITH GREAT VIGOR AND ENTHUSIASM, AND APPEARS TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH. (THE RIGORS OF THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL, COMBINED WITH FOREIGN TRAVEL, COULD TAKE THEIR TOLL -- AND A SUDDEN RECURRENCE OF HIS HEART PROBLEMS CANNOT BE RULED OUT WITH THE OBVIOUS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON HIS CAMPAIGN AND CHANCES FOR SUCCESS.) THE CENTERPIECE OF YELTSIN'S GRAND STRATEGY FOR REELECTION IS TO OVERCOME HIS HIGH NEGATIVES WITH THE VOTERS BY PAINTING THE COMMUNISTS AS EAGER TO REINSTATE THE WORST EXCESSES OF RUSSIA'S BLOODY AND DIVISIVE PAST. ALTHOUGH RUSSIAN POLLS STILL HAVE SERIOUS FLAWS AND MUST BE TAKEN WITH A GRAIN OF SALT, THEY DO SUGGEST THAT ZYUGANOV'S SUPPORT MAY HAVE

PEAKED. THIS RAISES THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HE CAN REACH OUT BEYOND THE 30 PERCENT-PLUS OF THE POPULATION THAT CONSTITUTES HIS CORE CONSTITUENCY. IN ADDITION TO RAISING THE SPECTER OF THE PAST, YELTSIN IS TRYING TO ALLEVIATE THE HARDSHIPS OF THE PRESENT THROUGH PAYMENTS OF ARREARS ON PENSIONS AND FEDERAL WAGES, AND PROMISES TO RIGHT THE SOCIAL INJUSTICES OCCASIONED BY REFORM. ONE MAJOR WEAKNESS IS CHECHNYA, WHERE YELTSIN'S DE FACTO POLICY IS OFFERING TO NEGOTIATE WHILE CONTINUING TO PRESS DUDAYEV HARD MILITARILY. THERE IS, HOWEVER, AN OBVIOUS INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT'S DECLARATIONS THAT MILITARY OFFENSIVES HAVE STOPPED, AND NEWS FOOTAGE OF ONGOING CARNAGE. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE DUDAYEV MAY ATTEMPT TO LAUNCH TERRORIST ATTACKS AT RUSSIAN TARGETS BEFORE ELECTION DAY, PUTTING YELTSIN ON THE DEFENSIVE. (IT'S NOT CLEAR THAT DUDAYEV WOULD PREFER D.EVER.)

THE FOREIGN CONNECTION

7. ~~(C)~~ FOREIGN POLICY DOES NOT PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CAMPAIGN. INDEED, OUTSIDE THE POLITICAL ELITE IN MOSCOW THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT MANY PEOPLE CARE ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY -- PARTICULARLY ONCE IT MOVES BEYOND THE FORMER USSR. YELTSIN HAS SKILLFULLY PLAYED THE ISSUE OF INTEGRATION OF THE CIS. HIS STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO NATO ENLARGEMENT "FIREPROOFS" HIM ON THAT ISSUE AS WELL -- PROVIDED THERE ARE NO SURPRISES BEFORE THE ELECTION PROCESS IS COMPLETED.

8. ~~(C)~~ ON THE UP SIDE, YELTSIN IS DETERMINED TO MAXIMIZE THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ADVANTAGE HIS PRESTIGE ON THE WORLD STAGE CONFERS. AS HOST TO THE P-8 NUCLEAR SUMMIT, AND YOUR HOST FOR THE BILATERAL MEETING, HE WILL BE LOOKING FOR CLEAR INDICATION OF FOREIGN SUPPORT, BOTH POLITICAL AND MATERIAL. (MANY RUSSIANS BELIEVE THAT WE AND THE WEST HAVE NEVER DELIVERED ON OUR POST-SOVIET PROMISES OF ASSISTANCE.) PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL ALSO BE ADVERSE TO MAKING ANY SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS THAT COULD BE EXPLOITED BY HIS OPPONENTS AS WEAKNESS IN THE FACE OF WESTERN DEMANDS. WHILE WE ARE LIKELY TO PREVAIL ON SOME OF THE ISSUES IN THE MULTILATERAL CONTEXT (SUCH AS SHUTTING DOWN CHERNOBYL), OUR LEVERAGE IN ACHIEVING BREAKTHROUGHS THIS WEEK ON SUCH BILATERALLY IMPORTANT ISSUES AS THE ABM/TMD IS LIMITED.

U.S. CONTACTS WITH THE OPPOSITION

9. ~~(S)~~ YELTSIN HAS REMAINED QUITE SENSITIVE TO FOREIGN CONTACTS WITH THE OPPOSITION, ESPECIALLY ZYUGANOV AND THE COMMUNISTS. HE REACTED TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S MEETING WITH POLITICAL LEADERS HERE IN MARCH, AND IS OBVIOUSLY NERVOUS ABOUT YOUR MEETINGS OVER THE WEEKEND -- PARTICULARLY WITH ZYUGANOV. WE HAVE STRUCTURED THE SESSION, HOWEVER, TO MINIMIZE ANY CHANCE THAT ZYUGANOV CAN SET HIMSELF APART FROM THE

OTHER 11 GUESTS AND CLAIM A SEPARATE MEETING OR SEPARATE ATTENTION. STROBE TALBOTT HAS GONE OVER THE GROUND CAREFULLY WITH YELTSIN AND PRIMAKOV, AND I HAVE ALSO DISCUSSED IT EXTENSIVELY AT THE MFA AND WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORS. THEY UNDERSTAND WE ARE INTENT ON HOLDING THIS MEETING -- IN PART TO SHOW OUR CLEAR SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN RUSSIA. PRIMAKOV AND THE OTHERS SEEM TO UNDERSTAND AND HAVE NO OBJECTION TO OUR EFFORTS TOQTHE MEETING TO AVOID HIGHLIGHTING ZYUGANOV'S PARTICIPATION. IF ASKED YOU CAN REASSURE PRESIDENT YELTSIN DIRECTLY ON OUR MOTIVATIONS AND MODALITIES, AND ALSO PREVIEW WITH HIM YOUR APPROACH TO THE MEETING.

10. ~~(S)~~ AT THIS POINT, WE BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN IS COMMITTED TO HOLDING THE ELECTIONS ON TIME -- NOT LEAST BECAUSE HE IS CONFIDENT OF HIS ABILITY TO WIN. HOWEVER, IF YOU DETECT ANY SENSE OF WAVERING ON HIS PART, AND WE DO NOT SEE THAT NOW, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO MAKE OUR POSITION COMPLETELY CLEAR.

PICKERING

BT

#0539

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0539

TOR: 960418022731 M2185588

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SIT: NODIS NODIST

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 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O P 110101Z MAY 96
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
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 DTG: 110101Z MAY 96
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 TO: RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 0000
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 SUBJ: POLISH FONMIN ROSATI AND ACTING SECRETARY
 TALBOTT DISCUSS NATO ENLARGEMENT AND REGIONAL RELATIONS

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0792-M (1.24)
 KSH 3/14/2020

SUMMARY

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 097984

E.O. 12958: 04/25/06
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, RU, PL
 SUBJECT: POLISH FONMIN ROSATI AND ACTING SECRETARY
 TALBOTT DISCUSS NATO ENLARGEMENT AND REGIONAL RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. (S) ON APRIL 24, ACTING SECRETARY TALBOTT HOSTED A WORKING LUNCH FOR POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER ROSATI. TALBOTT BRIEFED ROSATI ON PRESIDENT CLINTON'S RECENT BILATERAL MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THE TWO AGREED THAT RUSSIA WAS BEGINNING TO ACCEPT THE FACT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT WHILE STILL DOING EVERYTHING IT COULD TO SLOW DOWN, CONSTRAIN OR DISCOURAGE THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS. ROSATI SAID POLAND IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, AND HAS MADE THIS POSITION CLEAR TO RUSSIA. HE REVIEWED POLAND'S RELATIONSHIPS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING BELARUS AND THE BALTIC STATES. ROSATI URGED TALBOTT TO SUPPORT PRESIDENT KWASNIEWSKI'S DESIRE FOR A VISIT TO THE U.S. IN THE NEAR FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

CLINTON/YELTSIN BILATERAL

2. (S) THE ACTING SECRETARY BEGAN THE SESSION WITH A BRIEF OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S RECENT BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN MOSCOW. THE MEETING COVERED THREE MAIN AREAS: STRATEGIC ARMS AND THE ABM TREATY, RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE "P-8", AND CFE. ON THE P-8, TALBOTT SAID YELTSIN IS EAGER FOR FULL GRADUATION TO THE G-7 BEFORE THE

JUNE ELECTIONS, BUT THAT THE USG BELIEVES THERE IS STILL A VALID ROLE FOR THE G-7 IN ITS PRESENT FORM. ON CFE, YELTSIN ACCEPTED THE LATEST CFE FLANKS MAP PROPOSAL THE USG HAD RECENTLY WORKED OUT WITH TURKEY, BUT THERE IS STILL WORK TO DO ON NUMBERS.

NATO ENLARGEMENT - PRIVATE/PUBLIC STATEMENTS

3. (S) TALBOTT SAID THE SUBJECT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT BARELY CAME UP IN THE MEETING, BUT WAS FIRST RAISED BY PRESIDENT CLINTON, WHO NOTED THAT OUR POLICY HAD NOT CHANGED. WE ARE AWARE OF RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES CONCERNING THE TIMING OF THE JUNE NAC MINISTERIAL IN BERLIN. THE MINISTERIAL WOULD PRODUCE NO SURPRISES. THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT DESPITE THE DIFFERENCES THE U.S. AND RUSSIA MAY HAVE ON NATO, WE SHOULD BE SATISFIED THAT WE HAD ACCOMPLISHED MUCH TOGETHER IN BOSNIA.

4. (S) IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE, HOWEVER, YELTSIN MADE STATEMENTS IMPLYING MUCH MORE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED CONCERNING THE PACE AND MODALITIES OF ENLARGEMENT. PRESIDENT CLINTON REITERATED THAT OUR POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED. ROSATI NOTED THAT THE POLISH PRESS HAD LOOKED INTO THESE STATEMENTS VERY CAREFULLY AND SPECULATED ABOUT WHAT MIGHT HAVE OCCURRED AT THE MEETING, BUT THAT HE WAS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE INCIDENT AND HAD NO QUESTIONS ON THE MATTER.

RUSSIA'S TWO-TRACK APPROACH ON ENLARGEMENT

5. (S) TALBOTT NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR KOZMINSKI HAD PROVIDED HIM A DETAILED BRIEF ON POLISH PRESIDENT KWASNIEWSKI'S RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. TALBOTT BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS, AND MORE PARTICULARLY PRIMAKOV, ARE PROCEEDING ON TWO TRACKS WITH REGARD TO NATO ENLARGEMENT. ON THE FIRST TRACK, THEY WILL DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO STOP, SLOW DOWN, DISCOURAGE OR CONTAIN THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS. ON THE SECOND TRACK, PRIMAKOV AND OTHERS ARE BEGINNING TO ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF NATO'S ENLARGEMENT, BUT ARE LOOKING FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY

GUARANTEES FOR RUSSIA AS NATO EXPANDS.

6. (S) THE RUSSIANS ARE NOW ATTEMPTING TO LAY DOWN CONDITIONS CONCERNING THE SECOND TRACK, I.E., NO MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE, NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE NATURE OF THE ASSOCIATION. NONE OF THEIR CURRENT POSITIONS IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S., BECAUSE THEY IMPLY SECOND CLASS MEMBERSHIP FOR NEW ENTRANTS INTO NATO. THEY ALSO MAY BE TRYING TO ESTABLISH A LINK BETWEEN CFE MODERNIZATION AND NATO ENLARGEMENT.

7. (S) NSC'S DEN FRIED NOTED THAT AS WE PROCEED TOWARD DECISION POINTS IN THE NEXT PHASE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT, RUSSIA'S OPPOSITION ON BOTH TRACKS WILL INTENSIFY. THE USG WILL RESPOND TO THIS WITH STEADINESS AND CONSISTENCY AND SO SHOULD CENTRAL EUROPEAN ASPIRANTS TO NATO MEMBERSHIP.

8. (C) TALBOTT NOTED WHEN THE SECRETARY MET PRIMAKOV IN MOSCOW IN MARCH, PRIMAKOV SPENT A HALF HOUR ATTACKING THE SECRETARY'S PRAGUE SPEECH, CLAIMING IT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY. HE FOCUSED IN PARTICULAR ON PASSAGES CONCERNING THE BALTIC STATES AND THE UKRAINE, AND CHARGED THAT WE WERE IMPLYING THAT WE HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO INCLUDE THEM IN NATO'S SECOND TRANCHE OF NEW MEMBERS. THIS APPEARS TO BE A DELIBERATE MISREADING OF OUR STATEMENT, AND WAS LIKELY INTENDED AS A "SHOT ACROSS OUR BOW" CONCERNING NATO'S TREATMENT OF THESE STATES.

POLAND WANTS FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP

9. (C) ROSATI AGREED WITH TALBOTT'S TWO-TRACK ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN POLICY ON NATO, AND ALSO AGREED THAT RUSSIA WAS THINKING ABOUT A PRICE FOR AGREEMENT ON THE CFE SOUTHERN FLANK. THE RUSSIANS IMPLIED THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT POLAND'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, BUT ONLY IF NATO'S MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE WAS NOT PART OF THE DEAL. POLAND TELLS RUSSIA THAT IT IS NOT INTERESTED IN "POLITICAL" MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, OR SOME OTHER FORM OF SECURITY GUARANTEE SHORT OF FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP. HE RESTATED THAT POLAND WANTS FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP AND THE RESPONSIBILITIES THAT COME WITH IT. POLAND, TOO, IS APPLYING THE RULE OF "NO SURPRISES" IN ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIA AND OTHER NEIGHBORS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT. POLAND SEES THAT NATO'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE ARE THE LOGICAL IMPLICATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT. HE NOTED THAT VISITING NATO SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA WAS ENCOURAGING IN HIS TIMELINE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT -- A DECISION UNLIKELY IN DECEMBER BUT CERTAINLY BY JUNE 1997.

10. (C) TALBOTT RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO PREDICT WHAT WOULD OCCUR AT THE DECEMBER NAC, BUT THAT THE DECISION WILL BE IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSENSUS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THE DECISION MUST BE BASED ON MEANINGFUL PROGRESS ON THIS SECOND PHASE IN WHICH WE ARE NOW INVOLVED. WE ARE NOW WORKING CLOSELY WITH CONGRESS TO BUILD A CRITICAL MASS OF SUPPORT FOR THE EVENTUAL DEBATE THERE.

POLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE BALTICS

11. (C) ON THE BALTICS, ROSATI SAID POLAND HAS TOLD RUSSIA THAT THE BALTIC STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURES AND MEMBERSHIPS IN ALLIANCES, PRIMAKOV, HOWEVER, SEEMED TO BE GENUINELY PREOCCUPIED WITH RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ESTONIA. HE SAID RUSSIA WAS CONCERNED ABOUT A SURGE OF NATIONALIST FEELING THERE. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH LITHUANIA IS GOOD.

BELARUS

12. (C) ROSATI DESCRIBED BELARUS AS AN "UNHAPPY, UNFORTUNATE CASE OF A COUNTRY IN TRANSITION BEING LEFT TO ITSELF." IN HIS RECENT MEETING, PRESIDENT KWASNIEWSKI

TOLD PRESIDENT LUKASHENKO THAT BELARUS' INTEGRATION WITH RUSSIA WAS A SOVEREIGN DECISION IN WHICH POLAND WOULD NOT INTERFERE. YET THE PRESENCE OF A DEMOCRATIC, INDEPENDENT BELARUS IS IN POLAND'S INTEREST, SO IF SUCH A DECISION WERE NOT ARRIVED AT IN A DEMOCRATIC MANNER, POLAND WOULD FEEL FREE TO PROTEST THE DECISION. BOTH RUSSIA AND BELARUS HAVE ASSURED POLAND THIS IS NOT THE CASE. POLAND WILL INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS TO SHOW BELARUS ALTERNATIVES TO CLOSER LINKS WITH MOSCOW BY BRINGING PARLIAMENTARIANS AND PUBLIC LEADERS TO POLAND FOR EXPOSURE TO WESTERN IDEAS AND APPROACHES.

IFOR IN BOSNIA

13. (C) ROSATI ASKED TALBOTT IF IFOR WOULD HAVE A ROLE IN BOSNIA PAST DECEMBER. TALBOTT RESPONDED THAT WHEN THE U.S. PUT THE PEACE PLAN TOGETHER IN DAYTON, WE INTENTIONALLY SEPARATED THE PLAN'S MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ASPECTS. DOD BELIEVES THAT THE MILITARY TASK IN BOSNIA CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN ONE YEAR. IF WE SHOW THAT WE ARE UNSTEADY ABOUT FINISHING THE JOB IN THAT TIME, THE PARTIES INVOLVED WILL BE LESS MOTIVATED TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO

PRESERVE PEACE -- HOLD ELECTIONS, ESTABLISH POLICE FORCES, ETC. WE CANNOT GIVE THEM A PRETEXT FOR SLOWING DOWN.

14. (C) ROSATI RESPONDED THAT EVEN IF THE U.S. DEMONSTRATES ITS RESOLVE, PERHAPS THE PEACE PROCESS WILL NOT WORK OUT. IF THE US. LEAVES BOSNIA TOO SOON, NO ONE ELSE CAN RESOLVE THE SITUATION; THE POLES, TOO, PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO PULL OUT.

KWASNIEWSKI VISIT

15. (C) ROSATI ASKED IF THE ACTING SECRETARY COULD ANTICIPATE A DATE FOR PRESIDENT KWASNIEWSKI'S DESIRED VISIT TO THE U.S. HE SAID IT HAS BECOME AN ISSUE OF "HIGH EXPECTATIONS" IN POLAND, AND THAT NOW THERE IS SOME MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT WHY THIS VISIT HAS NOT YET OCCURRED. THERE HAS BEEN SOME PRESS SPECULATION THAT KWASNIEWSKI ACTUALLY TURNED DOWN AN INVITATION TO VISIT THE U.S. ROSATI SAID POLAND KNOWS THERE ARE SENSITIVITIES CONCERNING THE VISIT, BUT NOTED THAT UKRAINE PRESIDENT KUCHMA HAD MADE A VISIT, AND THAT KWASNIEWSKI SHOULD BE ACCORDED "BETTER SCORES" FOR HIS PERFORMANCE IN FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC REFORM.

16. (C) NSC DAN FRIED RESPONDED THAT BOTH THE DEPARTMENT AND NSC SUPPORT THE IDEA, BUT IT IS A SCHEDULING PROBLEM WE ARE NOT YET CERTAIN CAN BE RESOLVED BEFORE ROSATI'S DEPARTURE. (FYI: IN FACT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR LAKE TELEPHONED ROSATI THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 26 TO CONVEY THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING PRESIDENT KWASNIEWSKI AT SOME POINT IN THE COMING MONTHS. IN RESPONSE TO ROSATI'S QUERY, LAKE SAID THE POLES COULD MAKE THIS PUBLIC. END FYI.)

17. (U) THE POLISH SIDE INCLUDED THE MINISTER, AMBASSADOR

KOZMINSKI; MACIEJ KOZLOWSKI, DIRECTOR MFA AMERICAS
DIVISION; STANISLAW STEBELSKI, DIRECTOR MFA EUROPEAN
INSTITUTIONS DIV.; PAWEL DOBROWOLSKI, MFA PRESS SPOKESMAN;
AND ANDRZEJ JAROSZYNSKI, DCM. THE U.S. SIDE INCLUDED THE
ACTING SECRETARY; S/NIS ACTING DIRECTOR SPECKHARD; EUR/DAS
ADAIR; DOD GEN. OSTERHALER, ACTING A/S FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS; NSC DAN FRIED; AMBASSADOR NICHOLAS REY;
D STAFF PHIL GOLDBERG; AND EUR/NCE TREVOR EVANS.
CHRISTOPHER
BT
#7984

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 7984

TOR: 960510211350 M2221099

DIST:

SIT: BELL BLACKER FEELEY FRIED PASCUAL PIFER SCHMIDT VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY
SIT: NSC

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PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA2146 1650049-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 130040Z JUN 96 ZFF4
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 TO: AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 0000
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH FORMER PRESIDENT
 - OF POLAND, LECH WALESA (U)

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0792-M (1.25)
 KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 122146

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EYES ONLY AMB/DCM

E.O. 12958: DECL 6/4/06

TAGS: PL

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH FORMER PRESIDENT
 - OF POLAND, LECH WALESA (U)

BEGIN TEXT.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FORMER POLISH PRESIDENT
 - LECH WALESA

PARTICIPANTS: THE PRESIDENT
 - SAMUEL BERGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE
 - PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
 - DANIEL FRIED, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL
 - AND EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, NSC STAFF,
 - NOTETAKER
 - DAVID JOHNSON, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR PUBLIC
 - AFFAIRS, NSC STAFF
 - VICTOR LITWINSKI, INTERPRETER
 -
 - LECH WALESA, FORMER PRESIDENT OF POLAND
 - JERZY KOZMINSKI, POLISH AMBASSADOR TO THE
 -
 - UNITED STATES
 - MAREK KARPINSKI, WALESA SPOKESMAN
 - ANDRZEJ JAROSZYNSKI, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
 - MISSION, NOTETAKER
 - MAGDALENA IWINSKA, INTERPRETER

DATE, TIME JUNE 3, 1996, 11:00 A.M. - 11:27 A.M.
AND PLACE: MAP ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT: HELLO, MR. WALESA. IT'S GOOD TO SEE YOU
AND GOOD TO SEE YOU LOOKING SO WELL. (U)

LECH WALESA: I FEEL PRETTY GOOD. AFTER ALL THIS TRAVEL,
I'M IN REAL AMERICAN CONDITION. YOU KNOW, I'VE BEEN
TRAVELING AROUND THE UNITED STATES FOR A COUPLE OF WEEKS,
TALKING TO A LOT OF PEOPLE -- STUDENTS, FACULTY, POLISH
AMERICANS -- AND I MUST SAY THAT AMERICANS ARE NOW VERY
ENGAGED IN POLITICS, VERY INTERESTED IN IT AND NOT JUST
INTERESTED IN MONEY AS I'VE SEEN BEFORE. (U)

WE'VE SPOKEN ABOUT NATO ENLARGEMENT AND PEOPLE ARE
THINKING ABOUT THIS IN TWO WAYS: A PEACEFUL LINE AND A
LINE OF CONFRONTATION. MANY WOULD NOT WANT TO DO IT IF IT
MEANT CONFRONTATION. THEY WOULDN'T WANT TO DIE TO EASTERN
EUROPE. AND I UNDERSTAND THIS. BUT I TELL THEM THAT WE
DON'T HAVE TO HAVE CONFRONTATION IN MIND AS WE ENLARGE
NATO. JUST THE OPPOSITE: IF WE ENLARGE NATO WE WON'T
HAVE CONFRONTATION; WE'LL ONLY HAVE CONFRONTATION IF WE
DON'T ENLARGE BECAUSE IF WE DON'T ENLARGE THAN AMERICANS
WOULD HAVE TO DIE, BUT NOT FOR EASTERN EUROPE, NOT FOR
POLAND, BUT FOR THEIR OWN AND THEIR OWN INTERESTS. (U)

I TOLD ALL THIS TO STUDENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
THEY WERE THERE WITH TWO PROFESSORS WHO OPPOSED NATO
ENLARGEMENT AND I SPOKE FOR A LONG TIME. THEY SUPPORTED
MY IDEA IN THE END -- 17 OUT OF 20 DID SO. THE PROFESSORS
WERE SURPRISED. SO IT'S CLEAR THAT SOME AMERICANS ARE
OPPOSED TO ENLARGEMENT AND THAT IS NOT EASY FOR YOU, BUT
MANY SUPRT IT AS WELL. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: YOU KNOW WHERE I STAND ON THIS: WE SHOULD
ENLARGE NATO; WE WILL HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE FOR THIS AND MOST EUROPEANS WILL SUPPORT US, TOO.
SINCE WE FIRST DISCUSSED THIS, YOU AND I, I'VE PERSUADED
MOST OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES THAT WE SHOULD MOVEHEAD AND
I'VE STRESSED THAT THERE WILL BE NO VETO BY RUSSIA NOR BY
ANYONE ELSE. NATO MINISTERS ARE MEETING NOW AND WILL MEET
AGAIN IN DECEMBER. THEY WILL STAY ON THE EXACT TIMETABLE

THAT WE GOT NATO'S FOREIGN MINISTERS TO AGREE TO LAST
YEAR. ENLARGEMENT WILL COME AND WE SHOULD ONLY MAKE CLEAR
THAT THROUGH ENLARGEMENT WE ARE NOT DOING ANYTHING AGAINST
ANY COUNTRY. (U)

WITH RESPECT TO POLAND, I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE
COUNTRY IS STILL MOVING FORWARD IN A PRO-WESTERN WAY.
POLAND WILL SOON JOIN THE OECD; REFORMS ARE CONTINUING AND
I HOPE THESE WILL CONTINUE. (U)

LECH WALESA: OBVIOUSLY, WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO CONTINUE
THESE REFORMS. BUT ALL DEPENDS REALLY ON WHAT YOU IN
AMERICA DECIDE. THE EUROPEANS -- FRANCE, ENGLAND, THE
OTHERS -- WILL NOT DECIDE THIS QUESTION. YOU WILL. WE

EUROPEANS COMPLAIN ABOUT YOU BUT LOOK TO YOU TO DECIDE THINGS; WE HAVE AN AMERICAN COMPLEX. THE POLES WILL SUPPORT YOU FULLY. YOU CAN COUNT ON IT. THE GERMANS ARE BOTH SUPPORTIVE (ON NATO ENLARGEMENT) AND NOT SUPPORTIVE; THEY ARE CONSTANTLY CHANGING BECAUSE THEY HAVE A RUSSIA COMPLEX. WE POLES DON'T HAVE A RUSSIA COMPLEX BECAUSE WE'VE ALREADY SETTLED OUR SCORES WITH THEM. (e)

BUT AMERICA DECIDES THESE ISSUES. AND WITHOUT A CLEAR SIGNAL FROM YOU EUROPE WILL LOSE ITS WAY. THAT WOULD BE TERRIBLE BECAUSE NOW, FOR THE FIRST TIME, EUROPE HAS A CHANCE, A UNIQUE CHANCE, FOR UNITY. NOT UNITY OF THE SORT STALIN AND HITLER TRIED TO CREATE BUT REAL, DEMOCRATIC UNITY. SO MY PLEA IS TO CREATE A UNITED STATES OF EUROPE. I COULD EVEN BE PRESIDENT. BUT THE POINT IS THAT WE HAVE A HISTORIC MOMENT TO MAKE THE RIGHT DECISIONS. AS I'VE TOLD YOU BEFORE, THE QUESTION IS WHETHER WE WILL ACHIEVE THIS. (e)

WE WON'T ACHIEVE IT IF WE MAKE TOO MANY CONCESSIONS TO RUSSIA. AND YOU HAVE CONTROL OVER THIS. NOT THE FRENCH, GERMANS, BRITISH NOR ANYONE ELSE. BUT YOU. SO A MANLY DECISION AWAITS. WE WILL SUPPORT YOU IF YOU MAKE A CLEAR ONE. PERHAPS NOT NOW, BUT IN YOUR SECOND TERM. THAT'S WHAT WE WANT. (e)

THE PRESIDENT: WE UNDERSTAND VERY WELL WHAT IS GOING ON. WE HAVE TO ENLARGE NATO IN A WAY THAT DOES NOT PROVOKE A BAD REACTION FROM RUSSIA BUT DOES NOT GIVE THEM A VETO EITHER. WE MUST UNIFY EUROPE POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY.

LECH WALESZA: BUT OPPORTUNITIES HAVE BEEN WASTED BEFORE. THAT'S BECAUSE DEMOCRACY HAS TROUBLE MAKING THE TOUGH DECISIONS; DEMOCRACY MAKES EASY DECISIONS BUT NOT

DIFFICULT ONES. THE WEST LOST TWO OPPORTUNITIES. ONE AS IN AUGUST 1991 AFTER THE PUTSCH IN MOSCOW. NATO COULD HAVE ENLARGED THEN TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY AND REFORM; IN ORDER TO SUPPORT YELTSIN, IN FACT, WHO STOOD FOR DEMOCRACY. YELTSIN WOULD HAVE SUPPORTED THIS HAD IT BEEN DONE IN THE RIGHT WAY. THE SECOND OPPORTUNITY WAS IN THE SUMMER OF 1993 WHEN YELTSIN VISITED POLAND. WE GOT HIM TO AGREE -- TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT -- IN WHICH HE SAID HE DID NOT OBJECT TO POLAND JOINING NATO. HE WAS THERE WITH ALL OF HIS GENERALS AND MINISTERS AND HE AGREED TO THIS. BUT THE WEST DID NOT REACT AND TWO WEEKS LATER HE WITHDREW HIS OFFER. YOU COULD HAVE ENLARGED NATO THEN OR AT LEAST SAID YOU WERE GOING TO. (e)

THE THIRD OPPORTUNITY IS COMING SOON, AFTER THE RUSSIAN ELECTIONS. IF YELTSIN LOSES -- AND HE HAS VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF WINNING IN MY OPINION -- THERE WILL BE CHAOS. SO YOU SHOULD ENLARGE NATO TO HELP THE FORCES OF DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA. IF YELTSIN WINS IT MIGHT BE HARDER TO ENLARGE NATO BECAUSE HE WILL DEPEND ON SOME UNDERSTANDING YOU HAVE REACHED WITH HIM. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THESE UNDERSTANDINGS MIGHT BE BUT YOU DO. YOU SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WILL BE A DECISIVE MOMENT BECAUSE IF YOU WAIT TOO LONG AND

RUSSIA GROWS STRONGER, THERE WILL ONLY BE NEW CONDITIONS COMING EITHER FROM RUSSIA DIRECTLY OR THROUGH BELARUS OR EVEN UKRAINE. SO THE ELECTION IS DECISIVE. YELTSIN HAS SLIM CHANCES, THOUGH OF COURSE THE ELECTION REALLY WILL BE WON BY THE SIDE WITH THE BETTER STRUCTURES TO COUNT THE VOTES, NOT JUST GET VOTES BUT COUNT THE VOTES. ~~(S)~~

THE PRESIDENT: I THINK YELTSIN'S CHANCES ARE BETTER THAN THAT, BUT WE SHALL SEE. IN ANY EVENT, WE WILL PURSUE OUR TIMETABLE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION. ~~(S)~~

LECH WALESIA RUSSIA IS UNSTABLE AND UNPREDICTABLE AND UNLIKELY TO HAVE REALLY NORMAL ELECTIONS. I TOLD SENATOR DOLE WHAT I TOLD YOU ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF COUNTING VOTES. HE AGREED AND SAID THAT IN AN AMERICAN PRIMARY ELECTION THIS YEAR HE GOT MORE VOTES THAN THERE WERE INHABITANTS OF THAT ELECTORAL DISTRICT. ~~(S)~~

MAREK KARPINSKI: IT WAS A REPUBLICAN PRIMARY IN SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO. (U)

LECH WALESIA: ONE MORE THING: YELTSIN REALLY CAN BE DANGEROUS. HE HAS ALREADY SHOT AT HIS PEOPLE AND AT

PARLIAMENT. HE HAS CROSSED THIS THRESHOLD. HE HAS THE WILL AND THE STRUCTURES TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTION. EVERY OTHER POLITICIAN IN RUSSIA MIGHT HAVE DOUBTS AND HESITATIONS BEFORE REACHING THE SHOOTING STAGE AND MIGHT NOT BE SURE WHETHER THE STRUCTURES WOULD ACTUALLY OBEY AN ORDER TO SHOOT. BUT YELTSIN WOULD HAVE NO SUCH DOUBTS. THIS PART OF THE WORLD IS NOT LIKE THE UNITED STATES WHERE AN ORDER IS AN ORDER. IN RUSSIA, ORDERS ARE OFTEN JUST NOT REALIZED. BUT YELTSIN HAS THE CAPABILITY TO DO SUCH THINGS. THIS MAKES HIM DANGEROUS IN A SITUATION OF CONFRONTATION. IN A PEACEFUL SITUATION, OF COURSE, YELTSIN IS PREFERABLE BECAUSE HE IS A KNOWN QUANTITY. BUT THE SITUATION IS NOT NECESSARILY PEACEFUL IN RUSSIA. ~~(S)~~

I SHOULD ADD THAT YOU HAVE WITH YOU ON YOUR STAFF SOME VERY EXPERIENCED PEOPLE, PEOPLE WHO KNOW RUSSIA AND POLAND AND THE WHOLE SITUATION. THEY KNOW ALL THIS BETTER THAN I. ONE OF YOUR BEST PEOPLE IS WITH US NOW AND HE HAS BEEN A LONG-TIME FRIEND OF POLAND (WALESIA GESTURES TO ONE OF THE U.S. PARTICIPANTS). HE WAS WITH US THROUGH A LOT AND ALWAYS GAVE GOOD ADVICE. HE KNEW JUST WHAT WAS GOING ON AND WHAT TO DO; HE HAS VERY HELPFUL. I JUST THOUGHT I WOULD THANK HIM FOR ALL HE HAS DONE FOR US FOR SO LONG. (U)

DANIEL FRIED: THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT. (U)

SAMUEL BERGER: MR. WALESIA, YOU SAID EARLIER THAT THE GERMANS HAVE SOMETIMES ONE ATTITUDE TOWARD NATO ENLARGEMENT AND SOMETIMES ANOTHER. THIS PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, HAS HAD JUST ONE ATTITUDE: THAT NATO WILL ENLARGE. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LEADERSHIP IN 1994 WAS CRUCIAL TO ENLARGEMENT GETTING MOVING AT ALL AND HIS

LEADERSHIP WILL CONTINUE. (S)

LECH WALESZA: YES, I KNOW. BUT ALL THIS HAS BEEN DONE IN AN EVOLUTIONARY WAY. YES, YOU HAVE LAUNCHED THIS AND DONE A LOT. THE DIRECTION IS CLEAR AND THAT IS GOOD. BUT THE POINT IS THAT THIS IS A REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION, NOT EVOLUTIONARY, AND DECISIVE MOVES ARE IMPORTANT. IN 1939 WE WERE IN A DECISIVE SITUATION. WE RESISTED HITLER, KNOWING THAT WAR WOULD COME ANYWAY AND IF WE WAITED OR GAVE IN IT WOULD JUST BE WORSE. BUT NOW THINGS ARE GETTING WORSE. THE LOSS OF BELARUS TO RUSSIA IS REALLY A MATTER OF CONCERN. SO WE ARE INSISTING ON THE RIGHT DECISIONS. DON'T WASTE THIS OPPORTUNITY. OF COURSE THE DELAYS ARE NOT AMERICA'S FAULT. THE EUROPEANS HAVE BEEN VERY SLOW THROUGHOUT. AND YOU THINK, WHY SHOULD WE WORRY

ABOUT EUROPE IF THE WEST EUROPEANS DON'T? BUT YOU MUST MAKE THE HARD CHOICES, EVEN FOR THE EUROPEANS, BECAUSE THE EUROPEANS THEMSELVES WON'T OR CAN'T. IT IS JUST LIKE YUGOSLAVIA. THE EUROPEANS COULD DECIDE NOTHING. YOU HAD TO MAKE THE DECISIVE MOVES. AND YOU DID AND THESE WERE RIGHT. (S)

THIS IS THE WAY FORWARD. YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT DEMOCRACY REQUIRES. THE EUROPEANS JUST SEE MONEY. HERE IS WHERE DECISIONS MUST BE MADE. MAKE THEM AND THE EUROPEANS WILL SHOUT FOR A WHILE BUT ACCEPT THEM. SO WE EXPECT DECISIONS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT IN YOUR NEXT TERM. WE ARE CONFIDENT AND YOU CAN BE CONFIDENT IN THE POLES. BUT WE MUST BE CLEAR ABOUT WHERE WE ARE. (S)

POLAND IS LIKE A BALLET DANCER, A BEAUTIFUL DANCER IN A THEATER OR A CAFE. POLAND HAS NICE LEGS AND YELTSIN IS TEMPTED. BUT WE ARE FAR SAFER WITH SOMEONE ELSE. YELTSIN IS TOO CRUDE FOR US. (S)

LET ME TURN TO INTERNAL MATTERS, THINGS IN POLAND. MY OPPONENTS WERE ALL EDUCATED IN THE UNITED STATES. THEY HAD GOOD TRAINING HERE AND THEY WON THE ELECTION. WE HOPE WE WILL GET EDUCATED AND TRAINED, TOO, AND THAT WE WILL WIN. THEY WON A BATTLE IN THE LAST ELECTIONS. BUT I WON, TOO; IN FACT, I WON THE WAR BECAUSE DEMOCRACY WON IN THE ELECTIONS. SOME ASK ME WHY I DID NOT "DEFEND" MY JOB EVEN AFTER I LOST THE ELECTIONS. BUT I TELL THEM THAT I COULDN'T BE FIDEL CASTRO. I HAD TO RESPECT DEMOCRACY. (S)

THE PEOPLE WHO WON THE ELECTIONS HAVE A MANDATE ONLY TO CONTINUE POLAND'S WESTERN COURSE; TO CONTINUE DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMICS. SO FAR, THEY HAVE. THEY HAVE BEEN CONSISTENT. THIS IS GOOD AND THEY ARE CAPABLE; THEY ARE GOOD BUSINESSMEN; COMMUNISM WILL NOT RETURN TO POLAND. OF COURSE IF THEY TRIED TO TURN BACK THERE WOULD BE A REVOLUTION. WE WOULD LEAD THAT. BUT THIS WON'T HAPPEN. WE WILL STRUGGLE WITH THEM, BUT DEMOCRATICALLY. AND WE WILL NOT DO SO IN A WAY THAT INTERFERES WITH POLAND'S ECONOMY. IT IS DOING WELL AND WE WANT POLAND TO BE STABLE. (S)

SO, POLAND WILL BE FINE. BUT HOW LONG WILL POLAND KEEP DANCING ON A THIN LINE, LIKE A BALLERINA, WITHOUT KNOWING WITH WHOM TO DANCE? SHE WANTS NATO AND THE EU AS HER PARTNERS. YELTSIN CAN BE VERY JEALOUS. A JEALOUS NATASHA. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: POLAND WILL HAVE A LONG DANCE WITH THE RIGHT PARTNERS, A GOOD DANCE. (U)

LECH WALESZA: BUT MAKE SURE THE MUSIC IS THE RIGHT KIND. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: EVERY TIME I SEE BORIS YELTSIN FROM NOW ON I'LL BE SURE TO THINK OF NATASHA. (U)

LECH WALESZA: JEALOUS NATASHA. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: SURE, JEALOUS NATASHA. IT HAS BEEN GREAT SEEING YOU AGAIN AND SEEING YOU IN SUCH GOOD SPIRITS. (U)

END OF CONVERSATION. END TEXT.
CHRISTOPHER
BT
#2146

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2146

TOR: 960612223959 M2268673

DIST:

SIT: CULLIN FETIG FRIED JOHNSON SCHMIDT SCHUKER
SIT: NODIS

Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: RAACZYUW RUEHFRA9272 2401707-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: R 271707Z AUG 96
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 271707Z AUG 96
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8285
 INFO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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 SUBJ: CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH MFA ON EUROPEAN
 - SECURITY, AUGUST 22

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TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 19272

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/27/06
 TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, FR
 SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH MFA ON EUROPEAN
 - SECURITY, AUGUST 22

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE DONALD K. BANDLER. REASON:
 1.5 (B,D).

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: US INTERAGENCY TEAM HEADED BY A/S KORNBLUM HELD FOUR HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH COUNTERPARTS IN PARIS AUGUST 22 ON DETAILS OF NATO ADAPTATION ISSUES. THE FRENCH SIDE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING FORWARD TOWARD DECISIONS ON ADAPTATION, EVIDENCED NO HESITATION ABOUT SCHEDULING NATO SUMMIT, AND DID NOT SEEK TO LINK ENLARGEMENT WITH EITHER INTERNAL ADAPTATION OR NATO-RUSSIA ISSUES. AT THE SAME TIME, FRENCH INTERLOCUTORS UNDERLINED THE PERSONAL INTEREST OF PRESIDENT CHIRAC IN THE DETAILS OF NATO ISSUES. THEY PURSUED CHIRAC'S IDEA FOR A EUROPEAN SACEUR; ARGUED THAT THE NAC AND NOT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WAS THE RIGHT PLACE FOR SUCH POLITICAL DECISIONS, AND WARNED THAT FINAL POLITICAL DECISIONS ON COMMAND STRUCTURE ISSUES MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE IN TIME FOR THE LATE SEPTEMBER BERGEN MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS. THE US SIDE UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR THE BERGEN MEETING TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE. THE FRENCH RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR GENERIC DECISIONS BY EARLY TO

MID-OCTOBER.

3. (C) A/S KORNBLUM STRESSED - AND POLDIR BLOT ON THE FRENCH SIDE AGREED - THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT NEEDS TO BE SEEN AND IMPLEMENTED AS PART OF AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCEPT. BOTH AGREED IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT, AS PART OF SUCH AN INTEGRATED CONCEPT, THE ALLIANCE HAVE A STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH "THIRD CATEGORY" COUNTRIES - THOSE NOT IMMEDIATELY JOINING NATO, BY CHOICE OR CIRCUMSTANCE, BUT NONETHELESS IN NEED OF AN ENHANCED SENSE OF SECURITY AND A PROSPECT OF CLOSER ASSOCIATION WITH NATO. THE OSCE LISBON SUMMIT AND AN ENHANCED PFP WOULD HAVE TO GE USEFUL ELEMENTS IN ANY SUCH STRATEGY. OF NOTE WAS THE FACT THAT BLOT AND OTHERS ON THE FRENCH SIDE DID NOT USE THIS DISCUSSION OF ENLARGEMENT TO DWELL ON RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES OR TO ASSERT A PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION TO ASSUAGE THEM. END SUMMARY.

NATO ADAPTATION: A EUROPEAN SACEUR?

4. (C) THE FRENCH HAD MADE CLEAR BEFORE THE MEETING THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BERLIN NATO MINISTERIAL DECISIONS, SPECIFICALLY NATO INTERNAL REFORM AND ESDI, TOPPED THEIR CONCERNS. THIS WAS IN FACT THE ONLY TOPIC OF THE ONE HOUR FORTY-FIVE MINUTE LUNCHEON DISCUSSION THAT KICKED OFF THE CONSULTATIONS. MFA STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR REGIS DE BELENET UNDERLINED THAT THE FRENCH HAVE THREE MAIN GOALS IN IMPLEMENTING THE BERLIN MANDATE: (A) TO PRESERVE THE EFFICIENCY OF NATO, ESP. ITS MILITARY DIMENSION; (B) TO MAINTAIN A STRONG TRANSATLANTIC LINK; AND (C) TO DEVELOP AN APPROPRIATE WAY TO GIVE VISIBILITY AND EFFICIENCY TO ESDI. WITH RESPECT TO REFORM OF THE NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE, HE SAID THE FRENCH WERE STILL IN A PHASE OF ASSESSMENT, AND WERE CONSIDERING THREE BROAD OPTIONS:

OPTION 1: AN OVERALL U.S. STRATEGIC COMMANDER, WITH A EUROPEAN SACEUR AND A U.S. SACLANT REPORTING TO HIM;

OPTION 2: ALTERNATION BETWEEN U.S. SACEUR/EUROPEAN NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL AND EUROPEAN SACEUR/U.S. NATO SYG;

OPTION 3: A EUROPEAN DEPUTY SACEUR, WITH RESPONSIBILITY BOTH AS A TRUE DEPUTY TO SACEUR AND ALSO AS DEPUTY FOR EUROPEAN/WEU MATTERS, BOTH IN PEACETIME AND DURING THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS; D/SACEUR WOULD BE NOMINATED BY THE WEU.

5. (C) BLOT NOTED FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S WISH THAT

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OPTION ONE BE EXPLORED CAREFULLY. BLOT ARGUED THAT OPTION 1 WOULD MAINTAIN THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK: THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NEED A STRONG LINK IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, WHICH NECESSITATES AN OVERALL U.S. STRATEGIC COMMANDER. AT THE SAME TIME, THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY SHOULD BE STRONG WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. FRENCH ACCEPTANCE OF A EUROPEAN IDENTITY ANCHORING ESDI WITHIN/WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IS A MAJOR CHANGE IN GOF VIEWS. IN TURN, IT IS POLITICALLY VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY BE STRONG AND VISIBLE. BLOT RECALLED THAT SOME AMERICANS HAD REACTED TO THE PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN D/SACEUR BY ARGUING THAT HAVING A DEPUTY WITH A EUROPEAN MANDATE WAS NOT POSSIBLE. IF IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO HAVE A D/SACEUR WITH REAL AUTHORITY, THE FRENCH REASONED, THEY MIGHT AS WELL LAUNCH THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN SACEUR.

6. (✓) FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (J-5) GEN FAUPIN SAID THAT THE FRENCH FAVOR A EUROPEAN SACEUR BECAUSE THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS STRETCH ACROSS ALL THE LIKELY EUROPEAN REGIONAL COMMANDS. FAUPIN UNDERLINED THAT CHIRAC SHARED THIS PERSPECTIVE. (BLOT LATER RETURNED TO THE POINT THAT FRENCH INTERESTS LIE TO THE NORTH, SOUTH, AND WEST.) FAUPIN ALSO ARGUED THAT, SINCE THE BERLIN MINISTERIAL, THE U.S. HAS FALLEN BACK TO A VERY CONSERVATIVE POSITION ON NATO REFORM.

7. (✓) FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO NATO ERRERA ARGUED THAT WE HAVE A RARE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY TO RESTRUCTURE NATO IN A COMPREHENSIVE FASHION. ESDI IS NECESSARY TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ALLIANCE, NOT AS A BONE TO TOSS TO FRANCE OR THE EUROPEANS. ERRERA UNDERLINED THE FRENCH DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT, STATING THAT CHIRAC'S DECISION ON NATO IS VERY FAR-REACHING. IT HAS NOT YET RESULTED IN PUBLIC POLEMICS, BUT REACTIONS, ESPECIALLY IN CHIRAC'S OWN PARTY, THE RPR, HAVE NOT BEEN ENTHUSIASTIC. WE HAVE TO BUILD FOR THE FUTURE, ERRERA ARGUED, CREATING AN "IRREVERSIBLE FOUNDATION" FOR A EUROPEAN DEFENSE IDENTITY. IT IS NOT JUST A MATTER OF VISIBILITY; THE SOLUTION MUST ALLOW FOR A CONCRETELY FEASIBLE EUROPEAN IDENTITY.

8. (✓) THE U.S. DELEGATION FIRMLY REBUTTED THE FRENCH ARGUMENTS FOR OPTION 1. A/S KORNBLUM ARGUED THAT THE PROPOSED OVERALL STRATEGIC COMMANDER COULD EASILY BECOME A SYMBOLIC FIGURE, OR ELSE FIND HIMSELF IN CONFLICT WITH THE EUROPEAN SACEUR. OPTION 1 REFLECTS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL AGENDA, AND WOULD NOT PRESERVE THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ALLIANCE. THE BASIC MILITARY REQUIREMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE NOT CHANGED: IT NEEDS A HANDS-ON U.S. COMMANDER ON THE GROUND IN EUROPE. A MILITARY ALLIANCE CAN NOT SACRIFICE OPERATIONAL NEEDS TO MAKE A POLITICAL STATEMENT. ASD KRAMER AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR EUROPE VERSHBOW STRESSED THAT THE INDISPENSABLE U.S. ROLE EXTENDS FAR

BEYOND THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION; THE U.S. ALSO PROVIDES THE BULK OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES, COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND LOGISTICS. THIS NECESSITATES A U.S. SACEUR WITH REAL AUTHORITY. AMBASSADOR TO NATO HUNTER STRESSED THAT, TO THE U.S. PUBLIC, AN AMERICAN SACEUR IS THE VISIBLE DEMONSTRATION OF THE U.S. PURPOSE IN NATO; A NON-U.S. SACEUR WOULD WEAKEN THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK BY WEAKENING U.S. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NATO.

9. (e) ASD KRAMER STRESSED THAT FRENCH OPTIONS 1 AND 2 ARE SIMPLY NOT REALISTIC. OPTION 3 IS UNDER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, HOWEVER, AND HAS BEEN THE FOCUS OF CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS BY THE FRENCH AND U.S. CHODS. THE U.S. DOES NOT YET HAVE A SOLUTION, BUT IS COMMITTED TO MINISTERIAL APPROVAL OF A BASIC COMMAND STRUCTURE AT THE DECEMBER NAC MINISTERIAL. THAT BASIC STRUCTURE WOULD INCLUDE TWO MNC'S, LED BY AMERICANS. KRAMER REBUTTED ERRERA'S CHARGE THAT THE U.S. HAD RETURNED TO A CONSERVATIVE POSITION. HE OPINED THAT NOT MANY ACTUAL OPERATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE ESDI OPERATIONS: EUROPEAN SECURITY PROBLEMS ARE OFTEN AMERICAN SECURITY PROBLEMS, AND WE WORK BETTER WHEN WE WORK TOGETHER. HE STRESSED HOW WELL THE U.S. AND EUROPEANS HAVE WORKED

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TOGETHER IN IFOR IN BOSNIA, AND HOW THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE HAS PROVED ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND FLEXIBILITY. (NOTE: THIS CLEARLY STRUCK A NERVE WITH BLOT, WHO SAID THAT BOSNIA IS NOT A GOOD EXAMPLE FOR THE EUROPEANS, SINCE THE EARLY YEARS HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR EUROPE TO ACT WITHOUT THE U.S.: "WE WANT TO CHANGE THAT," HE ADDED. A/S KORNBLUM SAID HE DOUBTED THAT FRENCH OPTION 1 WOULD HAVE MADE IT EASIER TO ORGANIZE IFOR.)

 TIMETABLE FOR DECISIONS

10. (e) AFTER THE VIGOROUS EXCHANGE ON OPTION 1, FAUPIN ADMITTED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE ANOTHER OPTION, AND THAT EUROPEAN-LED OPERATIONS WERE NOT YET CLEARLY DEFINED. THE FRENCH SHIFTED TO PROBING FOR U.S. VIEWS ON THE TIMETABLE FOR REACHING DECISIONS ON THE NEW NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE AND OTHER KEY NATO TASKS, PICKING UP TO SOME EXTENT ON THE EARLIER INSISTENCE OF A/S KORNBLUM, ASD KRAMER, AND AMBASSADOR HUNTER THAT COMMAND STRUCTURE ADAPTATION WAS PART OF A PACKAGE, INCLUDING PFP, ENLARGEMENT, PEACEKEEPING, CFE, AND NATO RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. ERRERA IN PARTICULAR STRESSED THE NEED TO REACH CLARITY ON THE IRREVERSIBLE ELEMENTS

OF ESDI IN ORDER TO BE CLEAR ON ENLARGEMENT, ALL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.

11. (C) ASD KRAMER STRESSED THE U.S. INTEREST IN SEEING FRANCE FULLY INTEGRATED IN THE NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE, AND IN HAVING FRANCE FOCUS ON THE INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, NOT JUST ESDI. HE POINTED OUT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WE NEED A MORE DETAILED RESPONSE AS TO WHAT ASSETS THE FRENCH ARE WILLING TO COMMIT TO THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. WE WOULD LIKE FRANCE TO PARTICIPATE MORE ACTIVELY NOW IN NATO'S MILITARY COMMITTEE. A/S KORNBLUM STRESSED THAT THE PROPOSED NATO SUMMIT IN THE SPRING COULD BE A REAL MILESTONE, AND THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SET A TIMETABLE ON INTERNAL ADAPTATION SO THAT ALL THE COMMITMENTS TAKEN AT THE JANUARY 1994 NATO SUMMIT COULD COME TO FRUITION, INCLUDING SUCH ITEMS AS AGREEMENT ON NATO/RUSSIA RELATIONS.

12. (C) ERRERA NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOF HAS SOME CONCERNS THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IS GOING TOO FAST ON THE ISSUE OF INTERNAL ADAPTATION. "MANY PEOPLE," HE CLAIMED, WANT TO GO AS FAST AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO DO AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE, AND WANT A DETAILED OPTION, INCLUDING MNC'S AND REGIONAL COMMANDS, FROM THE CHODS IN TIME FOR THE BERGEN DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETING SEPTEMBER 24-25. AMBASSADOR HUNTER STRESSED THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD AGREED TO HAVE A GENERIC OPTION BY THAT TIME. ASD KRAMER SAID THAT A GENERIC OPTION IS NOW ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE'S TABLE, SPECIFYING TWO NMC'S AND THE NUMBER OF LEVELS OF COMMAND REQUIRED. MORE DETAIL WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE BY SEPTEMBER, BUT, TO GET A DETAILED OPTION BY DECEMBER, IT IS NECESSARY TO PICK A GENERIC OPTION IN SEPTEMBER. (NOTE: THE FRENCH PROBED FOR U.S. VIEWS ON THE NUMBER OF REQUIRED COMMANDS FOR EUROPE, BUT DID NOT DETAIL THEIR OWN VIEWS.)

13. (C) ERRERA ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD KEEP THE GENERIC OPTION OPEN AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF SEPTEMBER. WHILE CONCEDING THAT THE GENERIC OPTION COULD BE PUT BEFORE DEFENSE MINISTERS AT BERGEN, ERRERA AND BLOT STRESSED THAT AN INFORMAL MEETING LIKE BERGEN WAS ALL RIGHT FOR DISCUSSION, BUT IT WAS UP TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL TO TAKE DECISIONS. A/S KORNBLUM SAID IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY TO LET THE BERGEN MEETING GO BY WITHOUT PROVIDING GUIDANCE, E.G. RECOMMENDING AMONG OPTIONS ON HOW DETAILED WORK SHOULD GO FORWARD. BLOT STRESSED IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO HAVE A FRENCH DECISION IN TIME, AND DECLARED RHETORICALLY THAT OF COURSE, IF THE OTHER ALLIES WANTED A DECISION WITHOUT FRENCH INVOLVEMENT, IT WOULD BE A DIFFERENT MATTER. A/S KORNBLUM SAID WE WANT

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FRENCH INVOLVEMENT, BUT ALSO WANT BERGEN TO PROVIDE SOME DIRECTION TO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. BLOT RESPONDED VERY POSITIVELY WHEN KORNBLUM MENTIONED THE DITCHLEY PARK POL/MIL KEY ALLIES MEETING OCTOBER 12, NOTING THAT, IN THE PAST, SUCH MEETINGS HAD PROVIDED USEFUL GUIDANCE, BEFORE MOVING ISSUES INTO THE LARGER ALLIANCE CONTEXT. AMBASSADOR HUNTER STRESSED, IN CLOSING, THE NEED TO REACH CONCLUSIONS AND AVOID HAVING ESDI GET LOST IN CONSIDERATION OF WHAT HAPPENS POST-IFOR. (NOTE: IN CORRIDOR CONVERSATION, FRENCH OFFICIALS SUGGESTED THAT THEIR TIMING CONCERNS RELATED TO THE NEED TO CONVINCING CHIRAC THAT OPTION ONE IS NOT FEASIBLE. END NOTE.)

ENLARGEMENT

14. (S) A/S KORNBLUM LED OFF BY STRESSING THAT ENLARGEMENT IS PART OF OUR INTEGRATED SECURITY CONCEPT. OUR APPROACH, ENCAPSULATED IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CHIRAC, IS TO KEEP THE ALLIANCE'S PROMISE TO THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, PROMOTE THE INTEGRATION OF RUSSIA INTO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM, AND GIVE THE COUNTRIES THAT DON'T IMMEDIATELY ENTER THE ALLIANCE A SENSE OF ENHANCED SECURITY AND THE FEELING THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING LEFT OUT. BLOT SAID THE FRENCH SHARE THE SAME VIEW OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. HE ALSO RECALLED THE CONCERNS HE HAD EXPRESSED TO DEPSEC TALBOTT ABOUT THE "THIRD CATEGORY," COUNTRIES LIKE UKRAINE, THE BALTICS, ARMENIA AND GEORGIA. IN BLOT'S VIEW, WE NEED TO DISCUSS SOLUTIONS FOR THESE COUNTRIES BEFORE BEGINNING ENLARGEMENT DISCUSSIONS. OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE HARD TO EXPLAIN WHY POLAND WAS ENTERING THE ALLIANCE, BUT NOT LATVIA. ALSO, IN THE EVENT OF DEEPER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THE PROSPECTS OF UKRAINE.

15. (S) A/S KORNBLUM AGREED THAT THE "THIRD CATEGORY" WILL BE KEY. THE USG IS FINALIZING ITS VIEWS ON THE BALTICS FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION BY EARLY SEPTEMBER. THESE ARE LIKELY TO INCLUDE A CONCEPT ALONG THE LINES OF A "COMMON SECURITY SPACE," DEFINED BY COMMON COMMITMENTS AND USE OF PFP, OSCE, AND THE EU ASSOCIATE STATUS OF THE BALTICS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONVEY THE SENSE OF AN INTEGRATED STRUCTURE. NSC VERSHBOW UNDERLINED U.S. INTEREST IN WORKING CLOSELY WITH FRANCE ON A REGIME FOR NON-ENTRANTS TO NATO. WE NEED TO MAKE A CONVINCING CASE THAT THE FIRST WAVE OF ENLARGEMENT IS NOT THE LAST. THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE BALTICS, WHICH ARE BONA FIDE CANDIDATES, DESPITE THE MILITARY DIFFICULTIES. THE U.S. SIDE STRESSED THAT WE SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE PFP COUNTRIES FROM THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS; IT HAS TO REMAIN DYNAMIC. EVEN WITH RUSSIA, WE "NEVER SAY NEVER." (BLOT NOTED THAT THE EU HAD SAID

NEVER TO RUSSIA.) THE U.S. SIDE ALSO STRESSED THE VALUE AND FLEXIBILITY OF PFP IN INVOLVING THE BALTICS WITH NATO AND GIVING THEM A SENSE OF PROGRESS.

16. (C) THE OSCE LISBON SUMMIT COULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP, BLOT SUGGESTED, BY PROVIDING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE THIRD CATEGORY COUNTRIES, A SET OF PRINCIPLES. A/S KORNBLUM AGREED THAT THE OSCE COULD SERVE AS A DEFINING STRUCTURE FOR THSE COUNTRIES. BLOT RESPONDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY TO KORNBLUM'S SUGGESTION THAT NORMS OF BEHAVIOR WOULD BE A VERY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION, AND THEY AGREED ON THE VIRTURE OF STATING NORMS IN POSITIVE TERMS, I.E. WHAT PEOPLE AND STATES SHOULD DO, RATHER THAN WHAT THEY SHOULD NOT DO. KORNBLUM TOOK THE OCCASION TO UNDERLINE THAT THE PRODUCT FOR THE LISBON SUMMIT MUST BE OF HEAD OF STATE QUALITY.

17. (C) BLOT OFFERED THAT NATO SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER ROMANIA SHOULD BE INCLUDED AMONG THE FIRST NEW MEMBER COUNTRIES. NATO COULD CONTRIBUTE MORE EFFECTIVELY TO STABILITY BETWEEN ROMANIA AND HUNGARY IF BOTH COUNTRIES WERE MEMBERS. ALSO, ROMANIAN MEMBERSHIP WOULD HELP PRESERVE NORTH/SOUTH BALANCE. FRANCE IS NOT ENDORSING

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 PARIS 19272

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/27/06
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, FR
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH MFA ON EUROPEAN
- SECURITY, AUGUST 22

INCLUSION OF ROMANIA IN THE FIRST WAVE, BUT IT DOES BELIEVE THIS MUST BE CONSIDERED. THE U.S. SIDE NOTED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN ROMANIA, AT WHICH POINT BLOT RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN POLAND.

18. (C) A/S KORNBLUM STRESSED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SAY AT THE DECEMBER NAC THAT IT HAS REVIEWED POSITIVE RESULTS OF THE JUST-CONCLUDED AND SUCCESSFUL ENHANCED DIALOGUE WITH INTERESTED PARTNERS; THE NAC SHOULD GO ON TO ANNOUNCE A NATO SUMMIT FOR EARLY '97, AT WHICH TIME INVITATIONS TO BEGIN FORMAL ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE EXTENDED TO A FIRST TRANCHE OF SPECIFIC COUNTRIES. AMBASSADOR HUNTER UNDERLINED THE NEED TO DECIDE WHAT WE WILL REQUIRE MILITARILY OF NEW ALLIES. IN RESPONSE TO BLOT'S SUGGESTION OF AN "ADAPTATION PERIOD" FOR NEW NATO MEMBERS, AS FOR NEW EU MEMBERS, A/S KORNBLUM OPINED THAT NATO COULD DECIDE THAT NEW MEMBERS NEEDED AN ADAPTATION PERIOD, WITHOUT FORGETTING, HOWEVER, THAT A MILITARY ALLIANCE MUST BE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. IN RESPONSE TO BLOT'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER WE CAN REALLY KNOW THE MILITARY LEVEL OF THE NEW MEMBER COUNTRIES, ASD KRAMER ASSURED THE FRENCH THAT WE CAN CONNECT EFFECTIVELY WITH THE SECURITY STRUCTURES IN THOSE COUNTRIES.

OSCE SUMMIT - COOPERATIVE SECURITY PLATFORM

19. (C) STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR DE BELENET UNDERLINED FRENCH INTEREST IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON A HIGH-QUALITY COOPERATIVE SECURITY PLATFORM BEFORE THE NAC MINISTERIAL AND ANY NEW STEPS ON ENLARGEMENT. SUCH A DECLARATION REQUIRES WORK IN SMALLER CIRCLES, AND DE BELENET ASKED FOR U.S. VIEWS ON INCLUDING RUSSIA IN SUCH AN EFFORT. A/S KORNBLUM AGREED ON CONSULTING RUSSIA, BUT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING THE IMPRESSION KEY ALLIES WERE MAKING DECISIONS WITH RUSSIA OVER THE HEAD OF THE CEE'S. IT WOULD BE BEST TO CONSULT FIRST AMONG KEY ALLIES, AND THEN APPROACH THE RUSSIANS.

CTBT

20. (C) FRENCH MFA DISARMAMENT DIRECTOR DUCLOS REPORTED ON JUST-CONCLUDED P-3 AGREEMENT IN GENEVA TO POINT TOWARD A SPECIAL MEETING AT THE UNGA SEPT. 27 TO CONSIDER AN AUSTRALIAN RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF THE DRAFT CTBT. DUCLOS UNDERLINED THE NEED TO LINK SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTION WITH A COMMITMENT TO SIGN THE TREATY. THOUGH NOTING U.S. PROBLEMS WITH SUCH AN APPROACH, HE MENTIONED THE IDEA OF OPENING A BOOK, PERHAPS IN TOKYO, WHERE AMBASSADORS COULD SIGN AS TESTIMONY TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS' COMMITMENT TO SIGN THE TREATY. DE BELENET STRESSED IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO GET SPONSORSHIP FOR THE AUSTRALIAN RESOLUTION, SINCE THAT WOULD STILL LEAVE ROOM FOR AMENDMENTS. WHAT IS NEEDED ARE COMMITMENTS TO SIGN THE TREATY AS IS. IF A BOOK IS NOT ACCEPTABLE, SOME DEVICE MUST BE FOUND TO ENSURE THE COMMITMENT OF A BROAD GROUP OF STATES NOT TO CHANGE THE TREATY. A/S KORNBLUM EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE AUSTRALIAN RESOLUTION TO BRING THE TREATY TO THE UN FOR SIGNATURE. HE ALSO UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTRIBUTES TO CONCLUSION OF A CTBT.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05
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SSN: 9272
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TOR: 960827131417 M2373659
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DIST:

SIT: ANDREASEN BELL DAALDER DOWLING EGGERT EPSTEIN FEELEY FRIED HAMEL

PASCUAL PIFER SCHMIDT VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA6058 2510256-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 070253Z SEP 96
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 070253Z SEP 96
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO: RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0000
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0000
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0000
RUEHRS/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0000
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV IMMEDIATE 0000
SUBJ: ACTING SECRETARY BRIEFS BALTICS ON ACTION PLAN

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 186058

MOSCOW POUCH ST PETERSBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/06
TAGS: PREL, NATO, MARR, EN, LG, LH, RS
SUBJECT: ACTING SECRETARY BRIEFS BALTICS ON ACTION PLAN

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CAROL VAN VOORST, DIRECTOR EUR/NB.
REASONS: 1.5 (B) AND (D).
2. SUMMARY. IN A MEETING AUGUST 29 WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE BALTIC EMBASSIES, ACTING SECRETARY TALBOTT PROVIDED AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERAGENCY-CLEARED BALTIC ACTION PLAN OUTLINING A THREE-TRACK APPROACH TO U.S. RELATIONS WITH LATVIA, LITHUANIA, AND ESTONIA. NOTING THAT THE PLAN WOULD BE BRIEFED IN MORE DETAIL BY A USG TEAM PREPARED TO VISIT THE REGION IN SEPTEMBER, THE ACTING SECRETARY DESCRIBED IT AS A STRATEGY DESIGNED TO PROMOTE THE INTEGRATION OF THE BALTICS INTO THE WEST BY FOSTERING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL LINKS, REGIONAL COOPERATION, PEACEFUL RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS, AND A DEEPENING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. AMBASSADOR OJARS KALNINS (LATVIA), CHARGE LAURI LEPIK (ESTONIA), AND CHARGE STASYS SAKALAUSKAS (LITHUANIA) ATTENDED FOR THE BALTIC MISSIONS; AMBASSADOR AT LARGE COLLINS, EUR DAS WAYNE, D STAFFER GOLDBERG, AND EUR/NB DIRECTOR VAN VOORST (NOTETAKER) JOINED THE ACTING SECRETARY. END SUMMARY.

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3. THE ACTING SECRETARY OPENED BY EXPLAINING THAT HE WANTED TO PROVIDE THE BALTIC GOVERNMENTS WITH AN INITIAL SKETCH OF THE LATEST U.S. THINKING ON THE BALTIC DIMENSION OF OUR OVERALL EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY. FOR SOME TIME THE USG HAD BEEN CONSIDERING HOW BEST TO PROMOTE THE INTEGRATION OF THE BALTICS INTO THE WESTERN COMMUNITY; WE WERE NOW READY TO CONSULT WITH THE BALTICS AND OTHERS ON A THREE-TRACK APPROACH TO MOVE US TOWARDS THIS OBJECTIVE. U.S. AMBASSADORS IN THE BALTICS WOULD FOLLOW UP THE ACTING SECRETARY'S CONSULTATION WITH BRIEFINGS IN VILNIUS, RIGA, AND TALLINN. AN INTERAGENCY TEAM PLANNED TO VISIT THE REGION IN SEPTEMBER FOR MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BALTIC GOVERNMENTS.

4. THE ACTING SECRETARY THEN OUTLINED THE HIGHLIGHTS OF ACTION PLAN'S THREE TRACKS. THE OBJECTIVE OF TRACK 1, WHICH COVERED MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL ACTIVITIES, WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE BALTICS MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS AND ULTIMATELY ACHIEVE SUCCESS IN THEIR ASPIRATIONS TO JOIN WESTERN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS. HE ASSURED THE REPRESENTATIVES THE U.S. WOULD FIND EVERY OCCASION TO REAFFIRM AND MAKE GOOD OUR POSITION THAT NATO SHOULD BE OPEN TO ALL INTERESTED STATES IN A SELF-SELECTING PROCESS THAT WAS INCLUSIVE RATHER THAN EXCLUSIVE. TALBOTT SAID THE USG WOULD GIVE NO CREDENCE TO ANY ATTEMPT TO RULE OUT A COUNTRY OR A GROUP OF COUNTRIES AS FUTURE MEMBERS. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO ASSIST THE BALTICS AND OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES WITH THEIR PREPARATIONS TO MEET THE ALLIANCE'S ACCESSION REQUIREMENTS.

5. TALBOTT SAID THE U.S. APPRECIATED THE BALTIC ASPIRATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU AND WOULD USE OUR GOOD RELATIONS WITH KEY UNION MEMBERS TO PRESS VIGOROUSLY FOR EXPEDITIOUS MEMBERSHIP FOR QUALIFIED BALTIC APPLICANTS. THE ACTING SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE HAD ALREADY RAISED THIS POINT IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEADING EU STATES.

6. POINTING TO THE OSCE'S ROLE AS A FORUM FOR REGIONAL DISCUSSION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION, TALBOTT SAID THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE RESIDENT MISSIONS IN RIGA AND TALLINN AND, IN THE OSCE ITSELF, WOULD ENERGIZE DISCUSSIONS WITH REGIONAL PLAYERS -- INCLUDING THE RUSSIANS -- ON PRACTICAL STEPS TO IMPLEMENT AND ADVANCE OSCE GOALS IN THE BALTICS.

7. THE ACTING SECRETARY NOTED THAT AN IMPORTANT SUBSET OF TRACK 1 WAS PROMOTION OF MORE INTENSE REGIONAL COOPERATION

AS A FUNDAMENTAL WAY TO INCREASE SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE IN THE BALTIC LITTORAL AREA. THE U.S. WOULD THEREFORE STRONGLY SUPPORT REGIONAL COOPERATION INITIATIVES SUCH AS THOSE UNDER DEVELOPMENT IN THE BALTIC SEA STATES COUNCIL. FOR OUR PART THE U.S. WOULD, DESPITE BUDGETARY DIFFICULTIES, CONTINUE OUR EFFORT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE BALTIC PEACEKEEPING BATTALION (BALTBAT). WE WOULD ALSO WORK WITH OTHER DONORS AND THE BALTIC STATES THEMSELVES TO RATIONALIZE MILITARY ASSISTANCE EFFORTS, IMPROVE THE

NATIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF THE BALTICS, PROMOTE NATO INTEROPERABILITY OF THEIR COMMANDS, AND INCREASE INTRA-BALTIC MILITARY COOPERATION. THE U.S. INTENDED TO PUSH AHEAD ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGIONAL AIRSPACE INITIATIVE (RAT).

8. UNDER TRACK 2, TALBOTT SAID THE U.S. WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO STABILIZE THE REGION BY FOSTERING NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE BALTICS. THE USG WOULD USE ITS GOOD OFFICES TO WORK TOWARDS A PRACTICAL RESOLUTION TO BORDER DISPUTES. THE ACTING SECRETARY STATED THAT SHOULD RUSSIA -- RHETORICALLY OR OTHERWISE -- TRY TO BULLY OR INTIMIDATE THE BALTICS, THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO SPEAK UP AND WOULD FIND AN APPROPRIATE WAY TO DISCOURAGE MOSCOW FROM ACTIVITIES IMPINGING ON BALTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

9. UNDER TRACK 3, THE USG PROPOSED AN INTENSIFIED PROGRAM OF BILATERAL ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING BALTIC SOVEREIGNTY, EXPANDING OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, INCREASING TRADE AND INVESTMENT, AND COUNTERING CRIME AND CORRUPTION. TALBOTT SUGGESTED THAT A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE A "CHARTER OF U.S.-BALTIC PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION" SPELLING OUT THE FUNDAMENTALS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP (SOVEREIGNTY SUPPORT, HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE OF LAW, FREE MARKETS, SECURITY COOPERATION); THIS COULD BE SIGNED AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH-VISIBILITY OPPORTUNITY. OFFICIAL BILATERAL CONTACTS WERE INCREASING AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO, TALBOTT OBSERVED, POINTING TO A STEADY STREAM OF VISITORS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS AND AN INCREASE IN THE FREQUENCY OF THREE-ON-ONE AS WELL AS ONE-ON-ONE OFFICIAL MEETINGS. TALBOTT PROMISED REGULAR, REAL-TIME BRIEFINGS FOR THE BALTIC GOVERNMENTS ON U.S.-RUSSIA CONTACTS AS WELL AS REGULAR U.S.-BALTIC CONSULTATIONS AS THE NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS MOVED AHEAD OVER THE COMING MONTHS.

10. THE U.S. WOULD ALSO STRESS THE INTENSIFICATION OF OUR BILATERAL SECURITY LINKS WITH THE BALTICS, TALBOTT SAID. HE OBSERVED THAT WE WERE EXPANDING THE IMET PROGRAM FOR

THE BALTIC STATES AND WERE ALSO DEVELOPING A MODEST ARMS RELATIONSHIP TO HELP THE BALTIC DEFENSE FORCES MEET THEIR LEGITIMATE NEEDS. THE U.S. WOULD SCHEDULE ADDITIONAL JOINT EXERCISES WITH BALTIC UNITS, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP MIL-TO-MIL CONTACTS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE BALTIC DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS.

11. TO HELP THE BALTICS MOVE AHEAD WITH ECONOMIC REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD SEEK TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE BALTICS BY MOBILIZING THE RESOURCES OF AGENCIES SUCH AS THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, OPIC, TDA, AND EXIM. TALBOTT SAID THE USG WOULD ALSO PUSH FORWARD AGGRESSIVELY TO COMPLETE THE REQUIRED INVESTMENT AND TAXATION TREATIES.

12. CONCLUDING THE ROUNDUP OF BILATERAL ACTIVITIES UNDER TRACK 3, THE ACTING SECRETARY CHARACTERIZED ORGANIZED

CRIME IN THE BALTICS AS A SCOURGE AND SAID THE U.S. WOULD ESTABLISH AN FBI PRESENCE IN THE REGION TO HELP THE BALTIC GOVERNMENTS DEAL WITH THIS GROWING CONCERN.

13. TO AMBASSADOR KALNINS'S QUERY ASKING WHETHER THE U.S. INTENDED TO PUBLICIZE THE ACTION PLAN AT ANY POINT, TALBOTT SUGGESTED THAT ALL PARTIES REGARD IT AS A SET OF THEMES RATHER THAN A SINGLE POLICY INITIATIVE. THE PLAN DID NOT CONSTITUTE A RADICAL NEW PROPOSAL; IT CONSOLIDATED AND INTENSIFIED PROGRAMS ALREADY UNDERWAY. HOWEVER, THE ACTING SECRETARY THOUGHT THAT THE THEMES SUGGESTED IN THE PLAN SHOULD BE WORKED INTO OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS -- THE CHARTER SIGNING WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR THIS -- TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE BALTICS ARE NOT A PERIPHERAL REGION IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE BUT AN AREA ON WHICH U.S. ATTENTION IS SHARPLY FOCUSED.

14. SAYING HE WELCOMED U.S. ASSISTANCE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BALTICS AND RUSSIA, KALNINS SAID A

SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER WAS IN JEOPARDY DUE TO RUSSIAN IRE OVER AN AUGUST 22 RESOLUTION OF THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT REGARDING THE SOVIET OCCUPATION. KALNINS REQUESTED U.S. INTERVENTION TO PERSUADE THE RUSSIANS NOT TO CANCEL THE MEETING. TALBOTT AGREED THE MATTER SHOULD GO ON THE U.S. AGENDA WITH MOSCOW; AMB. COLLINS NOTED HE WAS ALREADY ENGAGED IN THIS EFFORT. CHARGE LEPIK ASKED THE U.S. TO FACILITATE A MEETING BETWEEN PRIMAKOV AND ESTONIAN FORMIN KALLAS, AGAIN IN UNCERTAIN STATUS FOLLOWING SEVERAL RUSSIAN CANCELLATIONS THIS SPRING.
TALBOTT

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 6058

TOR: 960906230400 M2389395

DIST:

SIT: EGGERT FORT HESLIN PASCUAL PIFER RUMER

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~SECRET~~

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LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH

LINE3: O 102133Z SEP 96 ZFF6

LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC

OSRI: RUEHC

DTG: 102133Z SEP 96

ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

INFO: ////

SUBJ: SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S WORKING LUNCHEON WITH FOREIGN
 MINISTER DE CHARETTE, SEPTEMBER 5, 1996, PARIS

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ STATE 187939

NODIS

GENEVA FOR CD DEL, ANATO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/10/96

TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PREL, PARM, ETRD, XF, FR
 SUBJECT: SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S WORKING LUNCHEON WITH FOREIGN
 MINISTER DE CHARETTE, SEPTEMBER 5, 1996, PARIS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ALEX WOLFF, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
 SECRETARY. REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. SEPTEMBER 5, 1996; MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

3. PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

THE SECRETARY
 AMBASSADOR PAMELA HARRIMAN
 JOHN KORNBLUM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 JAMES STEINBERG, DIRECTOR, POLICY PLANNING STAFF
 ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, SENIOR DIRECTOR
 FOR EUROPE
 NICHOLAS BURNS, SPOKESMAN FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 MAURA HARTY, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

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 PER E.O. 13526

2015-0792-17 (1.28)
 KBH 3/12/2020

LT. GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DONALD BANDLER, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION,
BARBARA LEAF U.S. EMBASSY (EMBASSY NOTETAJER)
MARCEL BOUQUET (INTERPRETER)

FRANCE

HERVE DE CHARETTE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FRANCOIS BUJON DE L'ESTANG, AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.
BERTRAND DUFOURCQ, SECRETARY GENERAL, MFA
DENIS BAUCHARD, CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE MINISTER
JACQUES BLOT, DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR
POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS, MFA
CLAUDE MARTIN, DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR
EUROPEAN AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, MFA
ALAIN ROUQUIE, DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS, MFA
JACQUES-ANTOINE RUMMELHARDT, SPOKESMAN, MFA
GILLES ANDREANI, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TO THE MINISTER

4. (S) SUMAARY: FOREIGN MINISTER DE CHARETTE TOLD THE
SECRETARY FRANCE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT
PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN SACEUR
UNDER A U.S. "SUPERSACEUR," BUT ASKED THAT THIS BE OPEN
TO REVIEW IN THE FUTURE. DE CHARETTE AGREED THAT THE
1997 NATO SUMMIT SHOULD REGISTER IMPORTANT PROGRESS ON
INTERNAL ADAPTATION, ENLARGEMENT AND RELATED EUROPEAN
SECURITY ISSUES. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AGREEING
AT THE LISBON OSCE SUMMIT ON A REFERENCE FRAMEWORK FOR
EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT
RUSSIA SHOULD BE PART OF THE NEW ARCHITECTURE BUT AGREED
THAT MOSCOW SHOULD NOT HOLD UP PROGRESS ON THESE
ISSUES. DE CHARETTE EXPRESSED REGRET AT THE
POSTPONEMENT OF BOSNIA'S MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS; HE AND THE
SECRETARY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO SET A DATE FOR A
MINISTERIAL ON A CIVIL STABILIZATION PLAN PRIOR TO THE
LONDON II CONFERENCE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY KORNBLUM
URGED CAREFUL COORDINATION OF THE MINISTERIAL WITH
DONORS' MEETINGS AND THE POST-ELECTION FORMATION OF THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IT WAS
EARLY TO DISCUSS POST-IFOR. END SUMMARY.

5. (S) FM DE CHARETTE PROPOSED FOR THE LUNCHEON AND
FOLLOW-ON BILATERAL AN AGENDA OF NATO/EUROPEAN SECURITY;
BOSNIA; THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS; AND BILATERAL
TRADE RELATIONS. HE NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD
DISCUSSED IRAQ DURING HIS ONE ON ONE SESSION AND WOULD
CONTINUE THAT DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT CHIRAC LATER

THAT AFTERNOON. HE TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT CLOSE
FRENCH-U.S. COORDINATION ON THESE ISSUES WAS A TOP
FRENCH PRIORITY, AND THAT HE WISHED TO CONTINUE THE
MINISTERIAL-LEVEL CONSULTATION PROCESS WITH A NOVEMBER
VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

NATO ADAPTATION

6. (S) THE SECRETARY SAID THE NEXT 6-12 MONTHS WERE A CRITICAL PERIOD FOR NATO, AND WELCOMED PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S AGREEMENT TO AN EARLY 1997 NATO SUMMIT. THE SUMMIT COULD BE A CULMINATION OF ADAPTATION OF NATO TO CURRENT OPPORTUNITIES; DECISIONS ON ENLARGEMENT; GREATER ACTIVATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE; AND THE INTENSIFICATION OF NATO-RUSSIA DIALOGUE. THE ISSUE OF RUSSIA, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT HOLD BACK PROGRESS ON THE OTHER TRACKS, WHICH SHOULD BE DONE IN PARALLEL. IN ORDER TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THESE FOUR TRACKS, THE SECRETARY SAID, THE DECEMBER MEETING SHOULD SERVE AS THE LAUNCHING PAD FOR PREPARATION FOR THE 1997 SUMMIT. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE A EUROPEAN DEPUTY SACEUR UNDER A U.S. SACEUR, WHICH SHOULD BRING US CLOSER TO CONCLUSION ON OVERALL ADAPTATION ISSUES AT THE SUMMIT.

7. (S) DE CHARETTE, QUOTING PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON, SAID FRANCE UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. WAS NOT READY TO ACCEPT A U.S. STRATEGIC COMMANDER AND A EUROPEAN SACEUR BENEATH. FRANCE WOULD ACCOMMODATE U.S. PRESENT CONCERNS, BUT ASKED THAT WE NOT FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DISCUSSION AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE. FRANCE HAD ALSO PROPOSED THAT THERE BE TWO EUROPEAN COMMANDS, NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN, LED BY EUROPEAN GENERALS. DE CHARETTE EMPHASIZED THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THESE ISSUES AND THE IMPORTANCE THAT FRANCE PLACED ON THEM, AND ASKED THAT DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE U.S. IN BOTH DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY CHANNELS.

8. (S) THE SECRETARY SAID THE CONCEPT OF A EUROPEAN DEPUTY SACEUR WAS AN IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGH. HE WELCOMED CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS IN BOTH CHANNELS.

9. (S) DE CHARETTE SAID HE WAS PLEASED THEY AGREED ON THE BROAD OUTLINE OF THE NATO SUMMIT, WHICH WOULD BE HISTORIC IF SIGNIFICANT STEPS ON ADAPTATION, ENLARGEMENT AND OVERALL EUROPEAN SECURITY COULD BE AGREED UPON

THERE. GIVEN THAT THIS SUMMIT WAS AS IMPORTANT AS THE FOUNDING OF NATO, HE WANTED VERY CLOSE FRENCH COORDINATION WITH THE U.S. LEADING UP TO IT. THE SECRETARY SAID THE ONLY U.S. CAVEAT TO COMMITTING TO THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE AT THE 1997 SUMMIT WAS THE OUTCOME OF THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN NOVEMBER.

10. (S) DE CHARETTE NOTED THAT THE LISBON OSCE MEETING WOULD OCCUR PRIOR TO THE NATO SUMMIT. EUROPEAN SECURITY WAS NOT SIMPLY A MATTER FOR NATO; WE HAD ALSO TO COMMIT TO STRENGTHENING THE PRINCIPLES OF THE OSCE. GIVEN THE PRESSURE OF TIMING BETWEEN LISBON AND THE SUMMIT, OUR TWO STAFFS SHOULD WORK VERY CLOSELY, IN PARTICULAR ON LISBON.

THE SECRETARY NOTED WE HAD TO TAKE OSCE VERY SERIOUSLY, ESPECIALLY AS IT TOOK ON NEW TASKS SUCH AS THE ELECTIONS

IN BOSNIA.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

11. (C) ON ENLARGEMENT, THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THE TIME WAS UPON US TO MAKE DECISIONS. THE DECEMBER SUMMIT WAS A POINT AT WHICH TO TAKE STOCK AND TO IDENTIFY THE STRONGEST CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERSHIP. WE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO HAVE A STRONG, WELL THOUGHT-OUT PLAN FOR DEALING WITH THOSE WHO WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE FIRST GROUP OF NEW MEMBERS, SO THAT THEY WOULD NOT BECOME ISOLATED DISCOURAGED OR DISINTERESTED.

12. (C) DE CHARETTE SAID ALL OF THE SECURITY ISSUES IN EUROPE WERE INTER-RELATED. NATO ENLARGEMENT COULD NOT PROSPER IF WE HAD NOT MADE PROGRESS ON ADAPTATION, OR IF ONE OF THE PARTIES IN EUROPE FELT ITS SECURITY THREATENED, HE SAID, CITING RUSSIA. THE BALTICS WERE A DIFFICULT CASE, BUT WE COULD NOT IGNORE THEM. DE CHARETTE ALSO EMPHASIZED SEVERAL TIMES THAT FRANCE HAD A PARTICULAR INTEREST IN ROMANIA AS A CANDIDATE FOR ENLARGEMENT. HE ASKED THE SECRETARY FOR HIS AGREEMENT THAT U.S. AND FRENCH SIDES SHOULD WORK FROM NOW ON A REFERENCE FRAMEWORK ON: ADAPTATION; CLEAR DEFINITION OF THE FIRST WAVE OF ENLARGEMENT CANDIDATES; TERMS OF WHAT WOULD BE OFFERED TO THOSE WHO DID NOT QUALIFY; DEFINITION OF NATO'S SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA.

13. (C) THE SECRETARY SAID THE FRENCH PROPOSAL WAS A GOOD ONE, BUT CAUTIONED THAT IF RUSSIA PREVENTED PROGRESS ON THE NATO-RUSSIA SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, WE OUGHT NOT HOLD BACK PROGRESS ON THE OTHER THREE TRACKS. THE SECRETARY ALSO NOTED DECISIONS ON ENLARGEMENT CANDIDATES WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS.

14. (C) DE CHARETTE AGREED RUSSIA SHOULD NOT DELAY PROGRESS, BUT SAID WE HAD TO SHOW GOODWILL AND JUGGLE COMPETING CONCERNS. HE PROPOSED BILATERAL AND QUAD DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING RUSSIA, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON LISBON. IN CONNECTION WITH LISBON, HE SAID, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HAMMER OUT AN AGREEMENT ON CFE MODERNIZATION. HE NOTED REPORTS THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION TO NATO HAD RESERVATIONS ON THIS ISSUE, AND ASKED FOR THE SECRETARY'S SUPPORT ON EARLY RESOLUTION. WHILE EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES SUCH AS THIS WERE HIGHLY TECHNICAL, HE SAID, THEY WERE ALSO HIGHLY CHARGED POLITICALLY.

15. (C) CFE MODERNIZATION WAS AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT, THE SECRETARY SAID, AND IT WOULD BE ONE OF SEVERAL ELEMENTS FOR ADDRESSING RUSSIA'S SECURITY DESIRES, WHICH COULD NOT IN ANY CASE BE ADDRESSED BY ONLY ONE DOCUMENT. WE SHOULD LOOK TO OFFER A COMPLEX OF RESPONSES TO RUSSIA'S NEEDS. HE AGREED WITH DE CHARETTE'S CONCLUSION THAT U.S. AND FRENCH VIEWS ON

THESE SECURITY ISSUES WERE CONVERGING IN A WAY HITHERTO UNIMAGINABLE.

BOSNIA

16. (C) DE CHARETTE SAID THE FRENCH HAD FELT AT TIMES THAT THE U.S. COULD HAVE INVOLVED THEM MORE AND EARLIER ON BOSNIA, BUT THE IMPORTANT POINT NOW WAS THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED. HE REGRETTED THE POSTPONEMENT OF MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, SOME OF WHICH HE THOUGHT MIGHT BETTER HAVE BEEN POSTPONED SELECTIVELY. IN ANY CASE IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THE MAJORITY OF MUNICIPALITIES HELD ELECTIONS BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

17. (C) THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS DEEPLY ATTACHED, DE CHARETTE CONTINUED, TO ITS TWO-YEAR IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR CIVILIAN STABILITY, AND HE PRESSED HARD FOR THE SECRETARY'S AGREEMENT TO FRANCE HOLDING A MINISTERIAL SOON TO BLESS IT. NOTING THAT MID-OCTOBER SEEMED TOO EARLY FOR THE U.S., DE CHARETTE SAID FRANCE NONETHELESS DID NOT AGREE WITH HIGH REPRESENTATIVE CARL BILDT'S ASSUMPTION THAT THE NEW BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT HAD TO BE ESTABLISHED PRIOR TO SUCH A MINISTERIAL. HE ASKED THE

SECRETARY TO AGREE TO FRANCE AND THE U.S. WORKING TO ESTABLISH THE CONTENT OF THE STABILITY PLAN.

18. (C) THE SECRETARY SAID THE POSTPONEMENT OF MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS HAD SPARKED A LIVELY INTERNAL DEBATE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND AMBASSADOR FROWICK'S ANALYSIS HAD PERSUADED HIM OF THE NEED FOR POSTPONEMENT. THE POSITIVE ELEMENT WAS THAT ALL PARTIES HAD AGREED TO CANTONAL, ENTITY AND STATEWIDE ELECTIONS ON SEPTEMBER 14; ALTHOUGH THERE WERE RISKS OF FURTHER VIOLENCE, IFOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE WOULD HELP CONTROL IT. THE SECRETARY NOTED OUR OWN UNEASE WITH BILDT'S NON-SYSTEMATIC APPROACH GIVEN THE NEXT DIFFICULT ISSUE WE WOULD FACE, THE FORMATION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ITS INSTITUTIONS. WE WOULD LOOK TO FRANCE AND OTHERS FOR HELP IN ENSURING THE EFFECTIVE AND PROMPT ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT, WHICH SOME OF THE PARTIES WOULD SEEK TO DELAY. THE BOSNIANS WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO SURRENDER THEIR CONCEPT OF BOSNIA TO A THREE-PERSON PRESIDENCY, WHICH WAS CLEARLY STIPULATED BY THE DAYTON ACCORDS. FRENCH AND U.S. STAFFS COULD WORK OUT A GOOD MINISTERIAL DATE, AS LONG AS IT TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE BRITISH DESIRE TO HOLD A LONDON II CONFERENCE.

19. (C) ASSISTANT SECRETARY KORNBLUM SAID WE HAD AGREED SINCE JUNE THAT THE CONCEPT OF A STABILITY PLAN WAS GOOD, BUT THAT IT HAD TO BE CAREFULLY COORDINATED TO FIT WITH DONORS' MEETINGS AND THE FORMATION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THE TWO SIDES WOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUE AGAIN IN UPCOMING CONTACT GROUP MEETINGS.

20. (2) THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT BOSNIA WOULD CONTINUE TO REQUIRE CONSTANT ATTENTION, WHICH WOULD NOT END WITH ELECTIONS NOR WITH IFOR'S TERMINATION. IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY WHAT WOULD COME AFTER IFOR, SINCE THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR, BUT WE WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT THE ISSUE WITHIN THE NATO CONTEXT. DE CHARETTE SAID FRANCE HAD A NUMBER OF IDEAS FOR POST-IFOR WHICH IT WAS READY TO DISCUSS WITH THE U.S. AT ANY TIME.

CHRISTOPHER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 7939

TOR: 960910182414 M2393876

DIST:

SIT: ANDREASEN BELL DAALDER DOWLING FEELEY PETERS SCHMIDT SEATON SESTAK
VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY
SIT: NODIS

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 101337Z SEP 96
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 101337Z SEP 96
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8605
 INFO: RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
 SUBJ: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S
 - SEPTEMBER 11-13 VISIT TO PARIS

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0792-14(1.29)
 KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 20153

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/9/07
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, FR
 SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S
 - SEPTEMBER 11-13 VISIT TO PARIS

REF: PARIS 20134

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM DONALD K. BANDLER. REASON:
 1.5 (B).

SUMMARY

2. ~~(S)~~ AFTER TWO YEARS OF TEPID FRENCH SUPPORT FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT -- DUE IN LARGE PART TO FRENCH CONCERNS OVER REACTIONS IN RUSSIA -- THE GOF HAS WARMED TO THE "PARALLEL TRACK" APPROACH OUTLINED IN SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S STUTTGART SPEECH. THE FRENCH PARTICULARLY LIKE THE PERMANENT NATO-RUSSIA CONSULTATION MECHANISMS CALLED FOR BY THE U.S. STILL, PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S PERSONAL ATTACHMENT TO RUSSIA AND HIS GAULLIST DESIRE TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE WEST AND MOSCOW OPEN THE WAY FOR CONTINUED GOF IMPROVISATION ON NATO-RUSSIA ISSUES. FRANCO-RUSSIAN CONTACTS ARE GROWING -- DE CHARETTE AND PRIMAKOV WILL MEET TWICE IN THE COMING MONTH -- AND THE FRENCH MAY BE TEMPTED TO USE THE RELATIONSHIP TO TEMPER GERMAN POWER IN EUROPE AND WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE U.S. "UNILATERALISM" WORLDWIDE.

3. ~~(S)~~ THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US IN BOSNIA, DESPITE DIFFERENCES ON NATO POLITICAL CONTROL,

TRAIN-AND-EQUIP AND THE ROLE OF CARL BILDT. CTBT IS ANOTHER KEY AREA OF BILATERAL COORDINATION. ON IRAQ, OUR DIFFERENCES DERIVE FROM DIVERGENT STRATEGIC INTERPRETATIONS AS WELL AS FRANCE'S EAGERNESS TO NORMALIZE POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL TIES. THE FRENCH HAVE RESUMED OPERATIONS WITH US IN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN NO-FLY ZONES, BUT ARE NOT FLYING ABOVE THE 32ND PARALLEL. YOUR VISIT PROVIDES A KEY OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT ON HOW BEST TO DEAL WITH SADDAM. END SUMMARY

FRANCE, NATO, AND RUSSIA
NATO ENLARGEMENT

4. DESPITE GENERALLY GOOD GOF COOPERATION ON THE SEPTEMBER 1995 NATO ENLARGEMENT STUDY, THE FRENCH HAVE NEVER BEEN ARDENT PROPONENTS OF THE ALLIANCE'S EXTENSION EASTWARD. IN PART, FRENCH RELUCTANCE DERIVED FROM CONCERNS THAT THE U.S. WAS PUSHING TOO FAST, GIVING ENLARGEMENT PRIDE OF PLACE OVER NATO'S INTERNAL ADAPTATION, FRANCE'S TOP PRIORITY. THE FRENCH ALSO HATED TO SEE NATO ENLARGEMENT GET TOO FAR IN FRONT OF EU EXPANSION. FRENCH CONCERNS WERE SUBSTANTIVE AS WELL AS PROCEDURAL, FOCUSING ON ENLARGEMENT'S CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIA AND THE FATE OF THOSE COUNTRIES NOT BROUGHT INTO NATO IN THE FIRST TRANCHE.

5. ~~(S)~~ THESE MISGIVINGS, AND CHIRAC'S INTENSE INTEREST IN RUSSIA, SPARKED SOME UNHELPFUL PROPOSALS OVER THE PAST YEAR, INCLUDING:

--CHIRAC'S INSISTENCE -- LATER WITHDRAWN -- THAT A NATO-RUSSIA TREATY BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE ALLIANCE PROCEEDED ON ENLARGEMENT.

--CHIRAC'S VAGUE OUTLINE OF A THREE-PILLARED SECURITY STRUCTURE FOR EUROPE (NATO, EU/WEU, RUSSIA/OSCE), WHICH GOF OFFICIALS ARE STILL AT A LOSS TO FLESH OUT.

COMING AROUND?

6. ~~(S)~~ MORE RECENTLY, THE FRENCH HAVE SOFTENED THEIR "RUSSIA FIRST" APPEAL AND ENDORSED THE PARALLEL APPROACH AS SPELLED OUT IN THE SECRETARY'S LETTER ND STUTTGART SPEECH. GOF OFFICIALS NOW TELL U THAT THE U.S. CALL FOR A NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER IN TIME FOR THE 1997 SUMMIT GOES FAR TO ALLVIAE FRENCH CONCERNS. THE FRENCH ARE PARTICULARLY PLEASED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 PARIS 20153

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INTENSIFIED NATO-RUSSIA CONSULTATION MECHANISMS.

7. (S) THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR CONCRETE MEASURES TO ADDRESS THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF COUNTRIES THAT WILL NOT ENTER NATO IN THE FIRST PHASE OF ENLARGEMENT. MOREOVER, THE GOF HAS URGED ALLIES TO CONSIDER GOING BEYOND THE "USUAL LIST OF THREE" AND WEIGH THE CANDIDACIES OF ROMANIA, SLOVENIA AND SLOVAKIA FOR EARLY ADMISSION. THE ROMANIANS IN PARTICULAR ARE LOBBYING PARIS TO GOOD EFFECT. SOME LOCAL JOURNALISTS HAVE COMMENTED THAT THE GOF SEES ROMANIAN ENTRY AS A WAY TO ENHANCE FRENCH INFLUENCE AS NATO ENLARGES -- BALANCING THE ATTACHMENT OF POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC TO THE U.S. AND GERMANY. MFA PLANNING CHIEF ANDREANI ARGUES THE IMPORTANCE OF ADDING A COUNTRY LIKE ROMANIA TO SHOW THAT EVEN THE EAST'S "SOILED, RAGGED" NATIONS HAVE A CHANCE.

ENLARGEMENT A HOSTAGE TO INTERNAL REFORM?

8. (S) WHILE THE FRENCH INSIST THAT THEY WILL NOT TRY TO HOLD ENLARGEMENT HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS ON REFORM OF NATO'S INTERNAL STRUCTURES, THE GOF HAS MANEUVERED TO RESOLVE THE MAIN ADAPTATION ISSUES BEFORE ENLARGEMENT AND POST-IFOR QUESTIONS DOMINATE THE ALLIANCE AGENDA EARLY NEXT YEAR. THIS GOF NEAR-LINKAGE STILL COULD POSE PROBLEMS, BUT THE PROGRESS MADE ON CJTF, COMMAND STRUCTURE REFORM (INCLUDING DISCUSSIONS ON A REINFORCED DEPUTY SACEUR WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVENTUAL WEU-LED OPERATIONS) AND OVERALL EUROPEAN VISIBILITY -- NOT TO MENTION FRANCE'S ENHANCED PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE -- MAKE IT HARD FOR FRANCE TO ARGUE THAT ITS VIEWS HAVE NOT RECEIVED A FAIR HEARING. IN RECENT BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH A/S KORNBLUM, THE FRENCH ACKNOWLEDGED REAL PROGRESS ON STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND REITERATED THEIR COMMITMENT TO SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENT ON INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL NATO EVOLUTION. AT LUNCH WITH THE SECRETARY SEPTEMBER 5, FM DE CHARETTE EMBRACED THE CONCEPT OF PARALLEL PROGRESS ON NATO'S THREE-WAY ADAPTATION COURSE.

THE GREAT UNKNOWN: CHIRAC

9. (S) WHILE MANY GOF OFFICIALS NOW ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT WILL OCCUR AND THAT THE U.S. STRATEGY IS SOUND, NO ONE CAN PREDICT HOW PRESIDENT CHIRAC WILL RESPOND AS A 1997 ALLIANCE SUMMIT DRAWS NEAR. THE RUSSOPHILE CHIRAC, IMPULSIVE BY NATURE AND DETERMINED TO PROVE THAT FRANCE STILL HAS A ROLE TO PLAY AS MEDIATOR BETWEEN MOSCOW AND THE WEST, IS LIABLE AT ANY TIME TO PLAY THE RUSSIA CARD WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES OR HIS OWN ADVISORS. IT IS LIKELY THAT CHIRAC VIEWS FRANCO-RUSSIA COOPERATION AS A WAY TO TEMPER GERMANY'S GROWING DOMINATION OF EUROPE AND WASHINGTON'S "UNILATERALIST" (CHIRAC'S TERM) FOREIGN POLICY TENDENCIES. ADD TO THIS HIS DETERMINATION TO PROVE

THAT FRANCE IS GETTING SOMETHING IN RETURN FOR ITS NATO RAPPROCHEMENT, AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR MISCHIEF ARE EVIDENT -- DESPITE CHIRAC'S PRO-AMERICAN TENDENCIES.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN TIES GROW

10. (C) IN THE MEANTIME, DAY-TO-DAY FRANCO-RUSSIAN CONTACTS GROW. IN THE WAKE OF THE OCTOBER 1995 YELTSIN VISIT TO PARIS, THE GOF AND GOR BEGAN PERIODIC POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATIONS. MAMEDOV WILL SEE FRENCH MOD STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR MALLET SEPTEMBER 12 IN PARIS TO DISCUSS THE ENTIRE RANGE OF STRATEGIC ISSUES, INCLUDING START II, CFE, CTBT, ABM, OSCE SECURITY MODEL AND BOSNIA. FM'S DE CHARETTE AND PRIMAKOV WILL MEET TWICE IN THE NEXT MONTH (LATE SEPTEMBER AT UNGA AND OCTOBER 8 IN MOSCOW). A RUSSIAN EMBASSY SOURCE -- WHO WELCOMES WHAT HE CALLS

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INCREASINGLY PRAGMATIC GOR ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO ENLARGEMENT -- TELLS US THAT MOSCOW IS PLEASED WITH THE BURGEONING FRANCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP, AND BELIEVES THAT FRANCE, WITH ITS UNIQUE ROLE IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, CAN BE SOMETHING OF A FRIEND IN COURT ON NATO ENLARGEMENT.

11. (C) IT IS PRECISELY THE FRENCH TEMPTATION TO PLAY FRIEND IN COURT TO RUSSIA THAT IS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF DIFFICULTY. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO CONVINCING THE FRENCH THAT IF NATO ALLIES APPEAR DIVIDED ON ENLARGEMENT, RUSSIA WILL EXPLOIT THOSE DIFFERENCES TO INCREASE ITS DEMANDS. THIS MESSAGE BEARS REPEATING. HOWEVER, RUSSIA IS A DEEPLY PERSONAL SUBJECT FOR CHIRAC. HE MAY WELL CALCULATE THAT, WITH RUSSIA AS WELL AS WITH IRAQ, A MEASURE OF INDEPENDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES WILL WIN FRANCE A SPECIAL PLACE -- WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE GOF'S VITAL STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH WASHINGTON.

BOSNIA

12. (C) THE FRENCH SOMEWHAT GRUDGINGLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT BOSNIA IS PROOF OF NATO'S EXTRAORDINARY MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND FLEXIBILITY. FOR THE FRENCH, BOSNIA ALSO SIGNALS EUROPE'S FAILURE TO RESOLVE A SECURITY CRISIS IN ITS OWN NEIGHBORHOOD -- A FAILURE THEY HOPE THE "EUROPEANIZATION" OF NATO WILL RESOLVE. THIS VIEW, OF COURSE, IGNORES THAT EUROPE'S SHORTCOMINGS IN BOSNIA HAD MORE TO DO WITH FLAGGING POLITICAL WILL THAN INSUFFICIENT MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

13. (C) IF WE AND THE FRENCH DRAW DIFFERENT HISTORICAL LESSONS FROM BOSNIA, WE NEVERTHELESS ARE WORKING CLOSELY TO SUPPORT ELECTIONS, PROMOTE DAYTON-RELATED ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS AND FOSTER OVERALL STABILIZATION. THE FRENCH WANT TO HOST A FALL MINISTERIAL ON STABILIZATION. WE HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE BUT ARGUE THAT TIMING MUST COMPLEMENT OTHER CONFERENCES SUCH AS LONDON II. WE CAN EXPECT SOME HARD SLOGGING WITH THE GOF OVER CARL BILD'T'S ROLE IN THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD.

14. (C) THE FRENCH HAVE OPPOSED OUR TRAIN AND EQUIP PROGRAM FOR THE FEDERATION FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, DESPITE OUR ARGUMENTS THAT THE PROGRAM IS FULLY IN LINE WITH TRADITIONAL FRENCH CONCEPTS OF BALANCE OF POWER. THE GOF HAS FOR THE MOMENT AGREED TO DISAGREE WITH US. ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH HAVE ALLUDED PUBLICLY TO POST-IFOR MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS, THEY HAVE RESPECTED OUR INSISTENCE ON AVOIDING DISCUSSION OF POST-IFOR FOR THE TIME BEING. THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT NATO POLITICAL OVERSIGHT IS INSUFFICIENT IN BOSNIA, AND VOW TO APPLY THE LESSONS LEARNED TO NATO ADAPTATION.

CTBT

15. (C) THE FRENCH JOINED US AS ORIGINAL CO-SPONSORS OF THE AUSTRALIAN UNGA RESOLUTION. THEY CONDUCTED A VIGOROUS CAMPAIGN TO WIN MORE CO-SPONSORS FOR THE RESOLUTION, ESPECIALLY AMONG FRANCOPHONE COUNTRIES, AND HAVE COORDINATED CLOSELY WITH US ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS. THE FRENCH REMAIN ADAMANT AGAINST ANY CHANGES IN THE RAMAKER TEXT.

IRAQ

16. (C) FRANCE HAS AGREED TO CONTINUE FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, WITHOUT EXTENDING SOUTHERN OPERATIONS TO THE 33RD PARALLEL. THE FRENCH HAVE POSED NO CONDITIONS FOR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION. HOWEVER, IF THE U.S. RESUMES STRIKES AGAINST TARGET IN

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IRAQ, THE FRENCH MIGHT WELL REVIEW THEIR POLICY.

17. (C) DE CHARETTE HAS REITERATED GOF DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE U.S. ON THE IRAQ STRIKE, EVEN WHILE UNDERSCORING THE "WARM CONVERSATIONS" HE HAD WITH THE SECRETARY SEPTEMBER 5 IN PARIS. THE FRENCH BELIEVE

SADDAM'S BARK IS BIGGER THAN HIS BITE IN THE KURDISH AREA. THEY ARGUE THAT SADDAM POSES NO REAL THREAT TO HIS NEIGHBORS, AND THAT THE REAL DANGERS IN THE REGION ARE IRAN AND/OR DISINTEGRATION INSIDE IRAQ. A POLICY OF POSITIVE INDUCEMENTS WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE, THE FRENCH IMPLY. OUR DIFFERENCES WITH FRANCE ON IRAQ THUS REMAIN PROFOUND, GROWING OUT OF DIVERGENT STRATEGIC INTERPRETATIONS AS WELL AS FRANCE'S EAGERNESS TO NORMALIZE POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL TIES.

18. (S) WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY OVER THE LAST WEEK IN AVOIDING A MAJOR PUBLIC SPLIT WITH FRANCE. MOD STRATEGIC DIRECTOR MALLET TOLD DCM SEPTEMBER 9 THAT "SOMEWHAT MIRACULOUSLY" FRENCH DEFENSE PLANNERS HAVE NOW GOT A MARGIN OF FLEXIBILITY IN DESIGNING OPTIONS TO RESPOND TO SADDAM'S CURRENT ACTIONS. WE ARE NOW DOING BETTER AT CONSULTATIONS AT THE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYST LEVELS. GIVEN THE DIVERGENCE ON BASIC OUTLOOKS, HOWEVER, CLOSE POLITICAL-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO AVOID UNHINGING THE COALITION. YOUR VISIT, ESPECIALLY THE SMALL MEETING WITH JEAN-DAVID LEVITTE AT THE ELYSEE, OFFERS A TIMELY OPPORTUNITY IN THIS REGARD.

HARRIMAN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
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DIST:
SIT: PETERS VERSHBOW
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 LINE3: O 271748Z SEP 96
 LINE4: FM USMISSION USNATO
 OSRI: RUEHNO
 DTG: 271748Z SEP 96
 ORIG: USMISSION USNATO
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//USDP-ISA/USDP-ISP// IMMEDIATE 5000
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 RUCBTEC/USLO SACLANT NORFOLK VA
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 RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5//
 ZEN/USDELTC BRUSSELS BE
 SUBJ: INFORMAL DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN BERGEN,
 NORWAY, SECDEF BILATERAL WITH FRENCH MOD MILLON

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2015-0792-M (1.30)
 K8H 3/12/2020

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 003452

NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND FUERTH
 STATE FOR EUR/RPM (HOLLEY & HAWTHORNE)

SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/ASD KRAMER, ISA/ENP OSTERHALER,
 ISA/NATO TOWNSEND, ISP/ASD MILLER, DASD DESIGNEE KELLEHER,
 JOINT STAFF FOR LTG RYAN AND VADM REDD

E.O. 12958: DECL : 06/14/06

TAGS: NATO, MCAP, DPC, PREL, FR

SUBJECT: INFORMAL DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN BERGEN,
 NORWAY, SECDEF BILATERAL WITH FRENCH MOD MILLON

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. HUNTER. REASON:
 1.5 (B AND D).

2. ~~(S)~~ ON 24 SEPTEMBER 1996, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY
 MET WITH FRENCH MINISTER OF DEFENSE MILLON ON THE MARGINS
 OF THE INFORMAL MEETING OF NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS AT
 BERGEN, NORWAY. OTHER PRESENT AT THE TABLE FOR FRANCE
 WERE: NATO AMBASSADOR ERRERA, CHOD DOUIN, COUNSELOR
 GUELLUY, AND ADVISOR MALLET. OTHERS AT THE TABLE FOR THE
 U.S. WERE: NATO AMBASSADOR HUNTER, USD(P) SLOCOMBE,
 ASD(ISA) KRAMER, ACTING DASD FOR NATO AFFAIRS OSTERHALER,
 AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT HALL.

3. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: SECDEF PERRY AND MOD MILLON DISCUSSED FOUR
 TOPICS: IRAQ; IFOR; ADAPTATION OF NATO; AND ENLARGEMENT.

ON IRAQ, MOD MILLON AGREED THAT THE SITUATION SEEMED TO HAVE STABILIZED, BUT CAUTION WAS STILL WARRANTED IN THE KURDISH AREAS ON IFOR, THE FRENCH RAISED CONCERNS THAT THE WAY OF TASKING THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER OPTIONS AND PRESENT RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NAC NOT PREJUDGE OUTCOMES; ANY NATIONAL MISSIONS TASKED TO THE NMAS MUST BE ONES THAT COULD SUPPORT NATIONS. ON ADAPTATION, THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON A ROLE FOR A EUROPEAN DEPUTY SACEUR IN SUPPORT OF ESDI AND TWO REGIONAL COMMANDS IN EUROPE, BUT STRONG DISAGREEMENT ON THE NATIONALITY OF THE SOUTHERN REGIONAL COMMANDER. ON ENLARGEMENT, THE FRENCH LAID A MARKER THAT THEY WOULD WANT ALLIANCE ADAPTATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP IN PLACE BEFORE BEGINNING DISCUSSIONS ON ENLARGEMENT, A POSITION WHICH SECRETARY PERRY REFUTED. END SUMMARY.

IRAQ

4. (S) SECRETARY PERRY STATED THAT THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP HAD LARGELY COMPLIED WITH THE U.S./UK DEMARCHE, AND HAD NEITHER FIRED ON NOR TRACKED ALLIED AIRCRAFT. IN FACT, MOBILE SAMS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND RADARS HAD NOT BEEN TURNED ON IN MOST CASES. MOD MILLON AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY'S ASSESSMENT, AND SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT THE UN PROGRAM OF OIL FOR FOOD COULD BE PUT IN PLACE TO SEPARATE SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ. BOTH AGREED THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRAQ AND THE CONDITION OF THE KURDS REMAINS VOLATILE. MILLON ASKED THAT IF FURTHER ACTION WERE CONTEMPLATED, THE U.S. CONSULT FRANCE ON A TIMELY BASIS.

BOSNIA/IFOR

5. (S) SECRETARY PERRY CHARACTERIZED THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AS "POSITIVE," NOTING THAT MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS WERE SCHEDULED FOR 21-24 NOVEMBER. THIS DATE, AND LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, WOULD REQUIRE A SIGNIFICANT LEVEL OF IFOR FORCES TO REMAIN IN PLACE. ALSO, DRAW DOWN WOULD CONTINUE WELL UNTIL PAST THE 20TH OF DECEMBER. SECRETARY PERRY URGED THAT DEFENSE MINISTERS INITIATE WORK ON IFOR FOLLOW-ON BY PROVIDING GUIDANCE THROUGH THE NAC TO THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. THE WORK OF NMAS WOULD BE SUPERVISED BY THE NAC IN PERMANENT SESSION SO THAT THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE COULD HAVE MILITARY OPTIONS TO PRESENT SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. BASED ON THESE OPTIONS, NATIONS COULD DECIDE WHAT THEIR PARTICIPATION WOULD BE. THE FRENCH SIDE (AMB ERRERRA AND COUNSELOR GUELLUY) INTERVENED THAT IF THE NAC MANDATED MILITARY COMMITTEE WORK, THE DECISION TO LAUNCH A MILITARY OPERATION WAS DE FACTO ALREADY TAKEN, OR WOULD SEEM TO BE SO. ALSO, NO MISSION SHOULD BE TASKED TO THE NMAS FOR ANALYSIS THAT ALLIES WERE NOT PREPARED TO SUPPORT. SECRETARY PERRY SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT AGREE AHEAD OF TIME ON WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT ONE OF THE OPTIONS THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WOULD BE A MINIMUM ONE: CONDUCTING THE IFOR-FOLLOW-ON MISSION

WITHOUT KEEPING GROUND FORCES IN BOSNIA. SECRETARY PERRY RETURNED TO THE ISSUE OF PROCESS BY NOTING THAT MISSIONS, PROPERLY FRAMED, WOULD BE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE FROM THE OUTSET, AND ONLY THE VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSIONS WOULD BE WORK FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. WHATEVER VARIETY OF OPTIONS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED, HOWEVER, ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USNATO 003452

NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND FUERTH
STATE FOR EUR/RPM (HOLLEY & HAWTHORNE)

SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/ASD KRAMER, ISA/ENP OSTERHALER,
ISA/NATO TOWNSEND, ISP/ASD MILLER, DASD DESIGNEE KELLEHER,
JOINT STAFF FOR LTG RYAN AND VADM REDD

E.O. 12958: DECL : 06/14/06
TAGS: NATO, MCAP, DPC, PREL, FR
SUBJECT: INFORMAL DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN BERGEN,
NORWAY, SECDEF BILATERAL WITH FRENCH MOD MILLON

THE PROCESS WOULD NOT PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME. PRECISE GUIDANCE TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WAS THE KEY. WHATEVER GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED, IT CAN ONLY PRODUCE ALTERNATIVES WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT. SECRETARY PERRY CLOSED THE TOPIC BY URGING MINISTER OF DEFENSE MILLON TO JOIN HIM IN MOVING THE TOPIC FORWARD.

NATO ADAPTATION

6. ~~(S)~~ THE RENOVATION OF THE ALLIANCE (CALLED ADAPTATION BY THE REST OF THE ALLIES) WAS AT THE HEART OF FRANCE'S CONCERNS, MOD MILLON BEGAN. FRANCE SAW THREE AREAS WHICH NEEDED MINISTERIAL DECISION:

- THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A EUROPEAN DEPUTY SACEUR
- THE NUMBER AND CONFIGURATION OF REGIONAL COMMANDS IN EUROPE, AND
- WHO WILL COMMAND THE REGIONAL COMMANDS.

MOD MILLON SAID THAT THE FRENCH BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR A EUROPEAN DEPUTY SACEUR WHOSE CHARTER INCLUDED ASSUMING COMMAND OF OPERATIONS OF A EUROPEAN NATURE, AND WHO WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR INTEGRATING NATO AND WEU MILITARY CONCERNS. FOR FRANCE, THERE SHOULD BE TWO REGIONAL COMMANDS IN EUROPE, DIVIDED INTO A NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN AREA. FINALLY, BECAUSE OF THE REQUIREMENT TO INCREASE EUROPEAN VISIBILITY AND TO ALIGN CONTRIBUTIONS WITH LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, BOTH REGIONAL COMMANDS SHOULD HAVE EUROPEAN COMMANDERS.

7. ~~(S)~~ SECRETARY PERRY RESPONDED TO THE FRENCH POINTS IN ORDER:

- HE BELIEVED THAT ACCOMMODATION COULD BE REACHED ON THE DEPUTY SACEUR QUESTION, THOUGH THE DETAILS ARE IMPORTANT;

- THE U.S., WHILE STILL OPEN TO FURTHER SUGGESTIONS,

WAS WILLING TO AGREE TO TWO REGIONAL COMMANDS IN ALLIED
COMMAND EUROPE; BUT

- THE U.S. INTENDED TO RETAIN THE POSITION OF
CINCSOUTH. SECRETARY PERRY SAID THAT TO BE ABSOLUTELY
CLEAR, THIS ISSUE WAS ONE WHERE WE HAD NO FLEXIBILITY.
CJCS, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
SECRETARY OF STATE, AND THE PRESIDENT WERE IN AGREEMENT ON
THIS POINT.

8. (S) MINISTER OF DEFENSE MILLON ASKED IF SECRETARY PERRY
COULD ENLARGE ON THE REASONS FOR THE FIXED U.S. POSITION.
SECRETARY PERRY RESPONDED THAT A U.S. CINCSOUTH MADE
MILITARY SENSE, SINCE THE PREPONDERANCE OF MILITARY POWER IN
THE SOUTHERN REGION CAME FROM THE U.S. SIXTH FLEET AND
FORWARD BASED U.S. AIRCRAFT. U.S. MILITARY POWER WAS ALSO
PROJECTED TO THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SECOND ARGUMENT WAS THAT
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S COMMITMENT TO NATO WOULD BE
UNDERMINED, IN THE SECRETARY'S OPINION, IF THE U.S. WERE
LEFT WITH NO GROUND COMMANDERS IN EUROPE. THE OUTCOME OF
THE ANNUAL CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ON PROVISION OF U.S. FORCES
TO NATO WOULD BECOME LESS CERTAIN, AND, SECRETARY PERRY
SAID, THAT SHOULD BE WORRISOME TO EUROPEANS.

9. (S) MOD MILLON SAID THAT THE POSITION OF THE FRENCH
GOVERNMENT WAS EQUALLY INFLEXIBLE, AND HE WONDERED ALOUD IF
SOME DEVICE LIKE PLACING THE SIXTH FLEET DIRECTLY UNDER
SACEUR WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. IN THIS WAY, THE ABILITY TO
EMPLOY THE SIXTH FLEET OUT OF AREA AS A EUCOM ASSET WOULD BE
UNIMPEDED. EQUALLY, IN OPERATIONS, THE NATO PRINCIPLE WAS
THAT THE COMMANDER CAME FROM THE NATION SUPPLYING THE
PREPONDERANCE OF FORCES, SO IF THE U.S. SUPPLIED THE
PREPONDERANCE OF FORCES TO AN OPERATION IN THE AFSOUTH AREA,
THE COMMANDER WOULD PERFORCE BE AMERICAN. MOD MILLON WENT
ON TO SAY THAT IT SEEMED THAT THE U.S. PUBLIC AND CONGRESS
SHOULD BE CONTENT WITH HAVING THE TWO "STRATEGIC" COMMANDERS
- SACLANT AND SACEUR - AND IT SHOULD NOT BE UNREASONABLE TO
ALLOW OTHERS THE REGIONAL COMMANDS. SHOULD FRANCE NOT BE
ABLE TO REACH SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT WHICH IT FOUND
ACCEPTABLE, IT COULD BE FORCED TO REVERT TO ITS POSITION PRE-
DECEMBER 5, 1995 (THE DATE FRANCE ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USNATO 003452

NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND FUERTH
STATE FOR EUR/RPM (HOLLEY & HAWTHORNE)

SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/ASD KRAMER, ISA/ENP OSTERHALER,
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JOINT STAFF FOR LTG RYAN AND VADM REDD

E.O. 12958: DECL : 06/14/06
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SEEK TO CREATE ESDI WITHIN NATO).

10. (S) SECRETARY PERRY SAID SACEUR HAD A HAD FULL-TIME

JOB, AND THAT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL ON THE SIXTH FLEET MADE NO SENSE. ON THE POINT ABOUT COMMAND OF OPERATIONS, THE UNITED STATES DID NOT CONTEMPLATE, NOR WOULD IT ACCEPT, "VIRTUAL COMMANDS", THE SECRETARY SAID. AGREEMENT ON THE POSITION OF DEPUTY SACEUR WITH ALL THAT IT ENTAILS AND AGREEMENT ON THE TWO REGIONAL COMMANDS WERE ALREADY A CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS. HOWEVER, HE VIEWED THIS AS A THREE PART PACKAGE SOLUTION -- NONE SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL ALL COULD BE. IN CLOSING, MOD MILLON SAID HE WOULD BE IN CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT CHIRAC OVERNIGHT, AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH SECRETARY PERRY DURING THE PLENARY SESSION THE FOLLOWING DAY.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

11. (X) SECRETARY PERRY SAID THAT IN THE U.S. VIEW, THE NAC IN DECEMBER WOULD ENDORSE FURTHER MOVEMENT ON ENLARGEMENT, AND THAT DECISIONS ON "WHO", WHICH THE U.S. HAS YET NOT MADE, WOULD BE MADE FOR THE SUMMIT. IT LOOKED LIKE POLAND, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, AND HUNGARY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, AND POSSIBLY ALSO SLOVENIA AND ROMANIA. NATO WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHICH NATIONS WERE QUALIFIED TO BECOME NEW MEMBERS, AND WHICH WERE CLOSE. THE PROCESS HAD TO BE OPEN ENDED SO THAT THOSE WHO WERE CLOSE COULD HOPE TO BE MEMBERS AT A LATER DATE. AN ENHANCED PFP HAD TO STRENGTHEN TIES NOT ONLY TO THOSE WHO WERE CLOSE TO MEMBERSHIP, BUT TO THOSE LIKE FINLAND, SWEDEN, AND UKRAINE, WHICH DID NOT HAVE ANY INTENTION OF JOINING NATO.

12. (X) MOD MILLON SAID THAT ONE WORD ENCAPSULATED FRENCH VIEWS: "PROCESS." FIRST, MILLON SAID, CRITERIA HAD TO BE DECIDED UPON: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY. THESE HAD TO BE CLEAR AND ENUNCIATED TO ALL CANDIDATES. THOSE IN THE "AREA" WHICH WERE NOT CONSIDERED FOR MEMBERSHIP (BALTS, UKRAINE) WOULD HAVE TO KNOW IF THEY COULD JOIN THE PROCESS OF MEMBERSHIP. FRANCE THOUGHT THAT ROMANIA COULD BE WITHIN THE "ARENA FOR MEMBERSHIP." SECOND, AN AGREEMENT HAD TO BE REACHED WITH RUSSIA. BEFORE THAT, OF COURSE, THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT, AND WHO WOULD SIGN IT, HAD TO BE AGREED. AT ANY RATE, BOTH ISSUES OF "NATO RENOVATION" AND A NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER HAD TO BE IN PLACE BEFORE FRANCE COULD ENVISION THE ALLIANCE TURNING TO ENLARGEMENT.

13. (X) SECRETARY PERRY AGREED THAT THERE HAD TO BE A DISCUSSION OF THE CRITERIA, BUT CAUTIONED THAT NATO COULD NOT BE SEEN TO BE OFFERING RUSSIA AN INDIRECT VETO BY PUTTING AGREEMENT ON NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS AS A CONDITION FOR MOVING FORWARD ON ENLARGEMENT. THE ALLIANCE HAD AGREED TO OPEN ITSELF TO NEW MEMBERS, AND IT HAD TO BE STEADFAST, THE SECRETARY SAID.

HUNTER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
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SSN: 3452
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TOR: 960927135728 M2421313

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<^TOR>960927135744 M2421314

DIST:

SIT: BELL BUJOLD DAALDER DOWLING EGGERT FEELEY FORT FRIED PASCUAL PIFER
SCHMIDT SESTAK SZASZ VERSHBOW WISE WITKOWSKY

SIT: NSC

PRT: FUERTH

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHNOA3439 2711346-CCCC--RHEHNSC.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 271346Z SEP 96
 LINE4: FM USMISSION USNATO
 OSRI: RUEHNO
 DTG: 271346Z SEP 96
 ORIG: USMISSION USNATO
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//USDP-ISA/USDP-ISP// IMMEDIATE 4973
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 INFO: RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECPLAD/ECJS//
 RUCBTEC/USLO SACLANT NORFOLK VA
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//SPASAC//
 RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5//
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 SUBJ: INFORMAL DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN BERGEN,
 NORWAY, SECDEF BILAT WITH SYG SOLANA, 24 SEP 96

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
 PER E. O. 13526

2015-0792-M [1.31]

KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 003439

NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND FUERTH
 STATE FOR EUR/RPM (HOLLEY & HAWTHORNE)

SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/ASD KRAMER, ISA/ENP OSTERHALER,
 ISA/NATO TOWNSEND, ISP/ASD MILLER, DASD DESIGNEE KELLEHER,
 JOINT STAFF FOR LTG RYAN AND VADM REDD

E.O. 12958: DECL : 06/14/06

TAGS: NATO, MCAP, DPC, PREL

SUBJECT: INFORMAL DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN BERGEN,
 NORWAY, SECDEF BILAT WITH SYG SOLANA, 24 SEP 96

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. HUNTER. REASON:
 1.5 (B AND D).
2. (C) ON 24 SEPTEMBER 1996, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY
 MET WITH SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA ON THE MARGINS OF THE
 BERGEN INFORMAL MEETING OF NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS. ALSO
 PRESENT WERE AMB HUNTER, SA HALL, USD(P) SLOCOMBE, ASD
 KRAMER, AMB BALANZINO, AMB VON MOLTKE, A/SYG CRAGG, AND MR.
 SCHULTE.
3. (C) SUMMARY. SYG OUTLINED THE FOUR MAIN ISSUES FOR
 DISCUSSION AT THE BERGEN MEETING: IFOR; ADAPTATION; NATO-
 RUSSIA; AND PFP/PFP-PLUS. ON IFOR, THERE WAS AGREEMENT FOR
 THE NAC IN PERMANENT SESSION TO TASK THE MC TO DEVELOP
 OPTIONS; ON ADAPTATION, SECDEF NOTED US AGREEMENT ON

REVISING THE TOR FOR D/SACEUR AND ON TWO REGIONAL COMMANDS IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, SECDEF NOTED HIS FRANK CONVERSATION WITH MILLON ON THE FIRM US POSITION ON THE SOUTHERN REGIONAL COMMANDER; ON NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS, SECDEF AND SYG AGREED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE TAKING A HARD LINE BUT THAT NATO SHOULD MAINTAIN A UNITED POSITION AND STAND FIRM; ON PFP/PFP-PLUS SECDEF PROPOSED OPENING FOR PARTNERS ALL NATO FUNCTIONS SHORT OF ARTICLE 5 COMMITMENTS. END SUMMARY

IFOR

4. (C) SYG SAID THAT THERE WERE THREE OPTIONS FOR THE FOLLOW-ON FORCE TO IFOR: 1) FINISH THE MISSION AND NOT HAVE A FOLLOW-ON FORCE; 2) PROLONGATION OF IFOR WITH A NAME CHANGE; 3) PREVENTION OF WAR. SYG'S PREFERENCE WAS FOR OPTION 2. SECDEF AGREED AND SUGGESTED THE TITLE, "STABILIZATION FORCE". HE CAUTIONED, NEVERTHELESS, THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE DESCRIBED AS DIFFERENT FROM IFOR, AND CANNOT BE JUST A NAME CHANGE: NATO NEEDS TO SPELL OUT CLEARLY WHAT IT REQUIRES FOR SUCH A STABILIZATION MISSION. SECDEF MADE CLEAR THAT NATO SHOULD BEGIN PLANNING SOONER RATHER THAN LATER AND NEEDS TO CONCENTRATE ON WHAT IS MILITARILY NECESSARY. DECISIONS ON THE FOLLOW-ON FORCE WILL BE DIFFICULT POLITICALLY FOR THE UNITED STATES WHENEVER THEY ARE TAKEN, AND BETTER TO BEGIN TO WORK ON THE PLANNING NOW. SECDEF THEN ASKED ABOUT PROCEDURES AND TIMETABLE FOR THE WAY FORWARD.

5. (C) SYG SAID THAT SACEUR NEEDED A DECISION ON THE FOLLOW-ON IFOR REQUIREMENT NO LATER THAN 17 NOVEMBER. SYG PROPOSED THAT THE 2 OCTOBER NAC TASK THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLAN OPTIONS AND REPORT TO THE NAC ON 10 NOVEMBER. SYG NOTED THAT THERE WAS A STRONG CONSENSUS AMONG THE PERMREPS TO TASK THE MC ON THIS ISSUE.

6. (C) SECDEF SUGGESTED THAT NATO SET A TIME LIMIT FOR THE IFOR FOLLOW-ON MISSION. SYG THOUGHT TWO YEARS WAS TOO LONG AND SUGGESTED ONE YEAR. SECDEF PROPOSED A LIMIT OF 1 OCTOBER 1997 OR 1 NOVEMBER TO ENSURE REDEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS BEFORE WINTER SETS IN AND BEFORE CHRISTMAS.

7. (C) REGARDING THE LEVEL OF FORCES, SYG SAID SACEUR THOUGHT ONE-HALF THE LEVEL OF IFOR WOULD BE ENOUGH. SYG SAID ALL ALLIES WERE ON-BOARD FOR THE FOLLOW-ON FORCE AND PERHAPS THAT NATO WOULD HAVE MORE FORCES OFFERED THAN WOULD BE REQUIRED. SECDEF NOTED THAT DUTCH DEFMIN VOORHOEVE HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE FOLLOW-ON FORCE ASSISTING IN FINDING WAR CRIMINALS FOR PROSECUTION. SECDEF NOTED THIS REQUIREMENT WOULD CHANGE THE MISSION TO "OCCUPATION" AND THAT THE NMAS WOULD UNDERSTANDABLY SAY THAT THIS WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE FORCE REQUIREMENT. IF THIS MISSION WERE CONSIDERED, IT SHOULD BE A FOURTH OPTION. SYG NOTED THAT GERMAN DEFMIN RUEHE HAD RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF ROUNDING-UP WAR CRIMINALS AND MAY PRESS FOR SUCH A MISSION.

ADAPTATION

8. (C) SYG SAID THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WILL BEGIN THIS AGENDA ITEM IN THE PLENARY WITH A REPORT ON THE LISBON AND MADRID MC/CS MEETINGS. SYG OBSERVED THAT THE ADAPTATION PROCESS WAS GOING MUCH BETTER THAN EXPECTED. THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE AT THE MOMENT IS THE ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USNATO 003439

NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND FUERTH
STATE FOR EUR/RPM (HOLLEY & HAWTHORNE)

SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/ASD KRAMER, ISA/ENP OSTERHALER,
ISA/NATO TOWNSEND, ISP/ASD MILLER, DASD DESIGNEE KELLEHER,
JOINT STAFF FOR LTG RYAN AND VADM REDD

E.O. 12958: DECL : 06/14/06
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QUESTION OF THE COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN REGIONAL COMMAND, AN ISSUE WHERE CLARIFICATION BY SECDEF IS NEEDED. SYG REPORTED THAT HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCED FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC NOT TO CONCENTRATE ON THIS ISSUE, THAT MUCH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON OTHER ASPECTS OF ADAPTATION, ESPECIALLY THE DEPUTY SACEUR ISSUE.

9. (C) SECDEF SAID HE HAD BEEN UNAMBIGUOUS ON THE SOUTHERN REGIONAL COMMANDER ISSUE IN TALKING WITH FRENCH DEFMIN MILLON EARLIER THAT DAY (REPORTED SEPTEL). MILLON HAD TOLD SECDEF HE WOULD CALL CHIRAC THAT EVENING AND MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE NEXT DAY'S MEETING. SECDEF NOTED TO SYG THAT THERE MAY BE A CONFRONTATION COMING ON THIS ISSUE. NEVERTHELESS, THE FRENCH THREAT NOT TO INTEGRATE WOULD NOT DISSUADE THE UNITED STATES. THE U.S. DID NOT THINK THE FRENCH WOULD CARRY THROUGH WITH THEIR THREAT, BUT IN ANY CASE THE US POSITION IS NOT NEGOTIABLE. ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOUTHERN REGIONAL COMMANDER, THE US DID HAVE FLEXIBILITY ON THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND DEPUTY POSITIONS.

NATO-RUSSIA

10. (C) SYG NOTED THAT IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH RUSSIAN FONMIN PRIMAKOV, PRIMAKOV WAS TAKING A TOUGH LINE, REMINISCENT OF THE "OLD DAYS". PRIMAKOV SAID THERE WERE THREE ISSUES THAT COULD NOT/NOT BE DECOUPLED: 1) ADAPTATION OF NATO; 2) THE BILATERAL NATO-RUSSIAN CONSULTATION MECHANISM; AND, 3) NATO ENLARGEMENT, AND THEY MUST PROCEED IN THIS ORDER. PRIMAKOV HAD SAID HE OPPOSED A NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER, SINCE IT DID NOT PROVIDE SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR RUSSIA. HOWEVER, HE WAS PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT ASPECTS OF PRACTICAL COOPERATION. SYG NOTED THAT RUSSIAN DEPUTY FONMIN AFANASIYEVSKY'S STATEMENT AGAINST ALL NATO INFRASTRUCTURE IN NEW MEMBER STATES MEANT ALL MILITARY ASSETS WOULD BE PRECLUDED, MAKING ENLARGEMENT ONLY POLITICAL. ON A POSITIVE NOTE, PRIMAKOV TOLD SYG THAT RUSSIA WOULD BE PREPARED TO

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CONTINUE WITH THE IFOR MISSION. HOWEVER, IT SUPPORTED LIFTING SANCTIONS 10 DAYS AFTER ELECTIONS, RATHER THAN 10 DAYS AFTER CERTIFICATION. SYG ENDED BY ASKING FOR SECDEF VIEWS ON HOW TO HANDLE RUSSIAN DEFMIN RODIONOV AT THE BERGEN MEETING IF HE TOOK UNREASONABLE POSITIONS.

11. (E) SECDEF CONFIRMED THAT SYG READOUT CORRESPONDED TO US INFORMATION. HE OBSERVED THAT THIS IS A RUSSIAN DECLARED POSITION AND WE WON'T KNOW WHETHER THIS IS THEIR FINAL POSITION UNTIL THE ENDGAME. SECDEF SUGGESTED NOT PRESSING RODIONOV AT BERGEN, INCLUDING ON A NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER, RATHER TO USE THE MEETING AS A BONDING SESSION; TREAT HIM WITH RESPECT, DON'T CONFRONT HIM, BUT DON'T BACK OFF FUNDAMENTAL NATO POSITIONS ON OPENING NATO TO NEW MEMBERS. NATO SHOULD FOCUS ON POSITIVE STEPS WITH THE RUSSIANS SUCH AS A SPECIAL NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP, BRINGING THEM ALONG ON THE FOLLOW-ON FORCE FOR BOSNIA, AND INVOLVING THEM IN ENHANCED PFP. SECDEF RELATED HIS DISCUSSION WITH MILLON (REPORTED SEPTTEL) ON NOT GIVING RUSSIA A DE FACTO VETO ON ENLARGEMENT BY LINKING ADAPTATION TO ENLARGEMENT.

PFP AND PFP/PLUS

12. (E) SECDEF SAID NATO SHOULD BEGIN WITH THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE POSITION FOR PFP ENHANCEMENT, THAT PARTNERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE ALLIANCE SHORT OF ARTICLE 5. IN ITS DELIBERATIONS, NATO SHOULD THEN DELETE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PARTICIPATION BY EXCEPTION IF THIS WERE NECESSARY. PARTNERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN COMMITTEES TO WHICH THEY CAN CONTRIBUTE BUT THAT SUCH DECISIONS SHOULD BE ON A CASE-BE-CASE BASIS. IN PARTICULAR, PARTNERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN PLANNING FOR CJTFs. PFP ENHANCEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE STATES LIKE SWEDEN AND FINLAND AND NOT BE RESERVED ONLY FOR DECLARED MEMBERSHIP CANDIDATES. WHEN ASKED ABOUT RUSSIA, SECDEF SUGGESTED THAT RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION SHOULD GO BEYOND THIS, TO INCLUDE ISSUES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, PREVENTION OF PROLIFERATION.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(2), EO 13526 3.3(b)(5), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USNATO 003439

NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND FUERTH
STATE FOR EUR/RPM (HOLLEY & HAWTHORNE)

SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/ASD KRAMER, ISA/ENP OSTERHALER,
ISA/NATO TOWNSEND, ISP/ASD MILLER, DASD DESIGNEE KELLEHER,
JOINT STAFF FOR LTG RYAN AND VADM REDD

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TAGS: NATO, MCAF, DPC, PREL
SUBJECT: INFORMAL DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN BERGEN,
NORWAY, SECDEF BILAT WITH SYG SOLANA, 24 SEP 96

3.3(b)(2), 3.3(b)(5), 3.3(b)(6) SECDEF SUGGESTED
A CFE-LIKE NEGOTIATION WITH THE RUSSIANS TO ADDRESS THIS
PROBLEM. IN SUMMARY, HOWEVER, SECDEF DID NOT THINK THAT PFP

ENHANCEMENT WOULD MAKE MUCH OF A DIFFERENCE IN THE RUSSIAN DEBATE ON NATO AND ENLARGEMENT. IT WAS AGREED THAT SYG WOULD VISIT WASHINGTON IN NOVEMBER TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH SECDEF ON THESE ISSUES.

HUNTER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
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SSN: 3439
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PRT: FUERTH

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
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LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3: O 011530Z OCT 96
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
OSRI: RUEHCP
DTG: 011530Z OCT 96
ORIG: AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9741
INFO: RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 2596
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0475
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0054
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0599
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 1482
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0625
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0741
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0510
RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0614
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0802
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 7077
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0049
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0545
SUBJ: COPENHAGEN SEMINAR: SECRETARY PERRY, UK AND
TEXT:

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 COPENHAGEN 005129

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, DA

SUBJECT: COPENHAGEN SEMINAR: SECRETARY PERRY, UK AND
GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTERS SAY "NOT YET" TO BALTIC NATO
MEMBERSHIP; RUSSIANS DON'T SHOW

REF COPENHAGEN 4846

SUMMARY

1. AT A 10-NATION OFF-THE-RECORD SEMINAR ON BALTIC
SECURITY SEPTEMBER 24:

--SECRETARY PERRY SAID THE BALTIC STATES ARE NOT YET
QUALIFIED FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP (ARTICLE V SECURITY
GUARANTEES) BUT ARE MAKING ENCOURAGING PROGRESS TOWARD

POSSIBLE FUTURE QUALIFICATION.

--PERRY (AND OTHER SPEAKERS) OPPOSED DRAWING FORMAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DECLARED NATO ASPIRANTS AND OTHER PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP) COUNTRIES (E.G. SWEDEN, FINLAND, RUSSIA, UKRAINE).

--OFFICIAL RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS BACKED OUT AT THE LAST MINUTE, AND THE SOLE REP FROM MOSCOW, AN AIDE TO ALEXEI ARBATOV, OUTRAGED THE AUDIENCE BY DESCRIBING THE DEMISE OF EAST GERMANY AND COMMUNIST RULE IN POLAND AND THE BALTIC STATES AS RUSSIAN "CONCESSIONS", AND DEMANDING NATO CONCESSIONS IN RETURN.

--SEVERAL SPEAKERS OBSERVED THAT COOPERATION IN MILITARY AND SECURITY MATTERS BETWEEN THE BALTICS AND THE WEST IS PRECEDING COMPARABLE SPECIFIC STEPS IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION. THE DEFENSE-ORIENTED GROUP CONSIDERED THIS PREDICTABLE AND POSITIVE.

--ONLY DANISH DEFENSE MINISTER HAEKKERUP AND THE BALTS THEMSELVES ADVOCATED THAT THE BALTIC STATES BE AMONG THE FIRST GROUP CONSIDERED FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP.

--ALL SPEAKERS PRAISED BALTBAT; THE UK AND NETHERLANDS OFFERED CONTINUED AID; SWEDEN PROPOSED (BUT GOT NO REACTION TO) A REGIONAL PFP TRAINING CENTER IN STOCKHOLM.

END SUMMARY.

AN "ACADEMIC CONFERENCE WITH A REAL-WORLD CAST

2. DANISH DEFENSE MINISTER HANS HAEKKERUP INVITED COUNTERPARTS FROM THE US, UK, RUSSIA, GERMANY, SWEDEN, NORWAY, FINLAND, ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, FRANCE, POLAND AND THE NETHERLANDS--AND AN EQUAL NUMBER OF ACADEMIC EXPERTS--TO DISCUSS "FUTURE DEFENSE COOPERATION AROUND THE BALTIC SEA" SEPTEMBER 24 IN COPENHAGEN. THE FOUR HOUR DISCUSSION AND WORKING DINNER, BREAKFAST AND LUNCH WERE CLOSED TO THE PRESS AND OFF-THE-RECORD. THE LIST OF ATTENDEES WAS IMPRESSIVE: SECRETARY PERRY WAS JOINED BY NINE OTHER DEFENSE MINISTERS. POLAND, FRANCE AND NORWAY SENT SENIOR OFFICIALS. AMBASSADOR ELSON JOINED PERRY AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE AS THE U.S. "PLUS ONE."

3. THE LIST OF ABSENTEES WAS SHORT BUT STRIKING: RUSSIA. NEW DEFENSE MINISTER RADIONOV HAD ORIGINALLY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN ATTENDING, BUT DECLINED, SAYING HE WOULD SEND A DEPUTY MINISTER, THE ADMIRAL OF THE BALTIC FLEET AND THE COMMANDERS OF THE KALININGRAD AND/OR ST. PETERSBERG MILITARY DISTRICTS. ONE BY ONE THE RUSSIANS DROPPED OUT, WITH THE ADMIRAL INFORMING THE DANES ONLY THREE DAYS IN ADVANCE THAT HE, TOO, COULD NOT ATTEND. THE ONLY RUSSIAN AT THE TABLE, THEREFORE, WAS ONE ALEXANDER PIKAYEV. PIKAYEV'S BUSINESS CARD IDENTIFIES HIM AS AN AIDE TO DUMA MEMBER ALEXEI ARBATOV, BUT WHEN ASKED ABOUT PIKAYEV, THE

LOCAL RUSSIAN DEFENSE ATTACHE CONFIDED TO US DISMISSIVELY IN THE GALLERY, "HE'S BORN IN 1964 AND IS WITH ONE OF THE INSTITUTES. I'VE NEVER HEARD OF HIM BEFORE". (COMMENT. UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 06 COPENHAGEN 005129

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TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, DA

SUBJECT: COPENHAGEN SEMINAR: SECRETARY PERRY, UK AND GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTERS SAY "NOT YET" TO BALTIC NATO MEMBERSHIP; RUSSIANS DON'T SHOW

THE ATTACHE'S FOREBODINGS WERE WELL GROUNDED, AS THE BALTIC PARTICIPANTS WERE ONLY TOO READY TO BELIEVE THAT PIKAYEV'S PROVOCATIVE AND ILL-INFORMED INTERVENTIONS CONFIRMED THEIR WORST FEARS ABOUT CURRENT RUSSIAN THINKING.)

THE SPEAKERS

SECRETARY PERRY--"NOT NO BUT NOT YET"

4. PERRY MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN HIS CONCLUDING ADDRESS TO THE CONFERENCE LUNCH:

--THE GOAL OF THE NATIONS REPRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE MUST BE TO DETERMINE BEST HOW TO STRENGTHEN EUROPEAN AS WELL AS BALTIC SECURITY.

--NATO IS A MILITARY ALLIANCE--WHICH MUST BE STRONG ENOUGH TO DETER AGGRESSION AND, IF NECESSARY, EXECUTE ITS ARTICLE V RESPONSIBILITIES. IT ALSO HAS TO BE SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE TO PERFORM OUT OF AREA TASKS AND-- IN RECOGNITION OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES --ENSURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE BY CREATING A "CIRCLE" IN WHICH RUSSIA IS INCLUDED AND IN WHICH PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PPF) IS ENHANCED.

--NATO SHOULD SERVE AS A BRIDGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC: NOT ONE THAT NEEDS LITTLE UPKEEP, BUT A PONTOON (SUCH AS ONE PUT TOGETHER BY IFOR FORCES ACROSS THE SAVA) STRUCTURE THAT DEMANDS CONSTANT CARE. EUROPEANS, DR. PERRY ADDED, SHOULD "NEVER TAKE FOR GRANTED" U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPE; FOR 50 YEARS, AMERICA'S "ISOLATIONIST STREAK" HAS BEEN SUPPRESSED BUT STILL EXISTS.

--NATO "WITHOUT DOUBT" WILL EXPAND, "AND IT MUST BE OPEN TO ALL QUALIFIED AND INTERESTED NATIONS NOW AND FOREVER". RUSSIA "WITH TIME AND PATIENT UNDERSTANDING" MUST BE LED TO REALIZE THAT NATO WILL HELP CONTRIBUTE TO ITS SECURITY: AND FOR APPLICANTS NOT INITIALLY ACCEPTED, NATO'S REPLY WILL EMPHASIZE THE OPEN DOOR, AND BE "NOT NO BUT NOT YET".

--PPF IS HITTING FULL STRIDE, WITH CONCRETE

ACCOMPLISHMENTS BEGINNING WITH PERRY'S INITIAL SUCCESS IN 1993 CONVINCING SWEDEN AND FINLAND TO SIGN UP AS CHARTER MEMBERS ("YOU ARE ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED PEACEKEEPERS: YOU MAY NOT NEED PFP BUT PFP NEEDS YOU"); THE NORDIC/POLISH BRIGADE HAS BEEN CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF IFOR.

-- NONETHELESS, WE MUST NOT REST ON OUR LAURELS--BUT INSTEAD CREATE A "SUPER PFP"--ONE ABLE TO PERFORM ALL BUT ARTICLE V NATO FUNCTIONS--AND CONSISTING OF ALL COUNTRIES THAT ARE WILLING AND ABLE, NOT JUST THOSE IN THE NATO MEMBERSHIP QUEUE. WITH BALTBAT AS A MODEL, PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN SHORT-TERM AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING AS WELL AS MORE COMPLEX EXERCISES.

-- RUSSIA'S IFOR PARTICIPATION, ONCE THOUGHT TO BE A GAMBLE, HAS WORKED FAR BETTER THAN EVEN THE MOST OPTIMISTIC HAD EXPECTED AND SHOULD BE SEEN AS A DEMONSTRATION OF HER WILL TO PARTICIPATE IN EUROPE'S FUTURE SECURITY STRUCTURE. TO THIS END, WE NEED TO DEEPEN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATIONS, BRING THEM BEYOND PFP, MAKE POSSIBLE A ROLE FOR RUSSIA COMMENSURATE WITH ITS GREAT POWER STATUS AND DEVELOP A NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER.

--TURNING SPECIFICALLY TO THE BALTS' APPLICATIONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP, PERRY SAID THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT, NONE IS YET READY TO TAKE ON ARTICLE V RESPONSIBILITIES. THEY ARE MAKING "GOOD PROGRESS", HOWEVER, AND "ALL PLAYERS SHOULD WORK TO HASTEN THE DAY THEY WILL BE READY".

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SUBJECT: COPENHAGEN SEMINAR: SECRETARY PERRY, UK AND GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTERS SAY "NOT YET" TO BALTIC NATO MEMBERSHIP; RUSSIANS DON'T SHOW

--PRAISE FOR HAEKKERUP'S PERSONAL AND UNIQUE ROLE IN ADVANCING BALTIC SECURITY AND DENMARK'S CONTRIBUTION THERE AND IN IFOR.

PORTILLO--WANTED: "A NATO THAT SPENDS AS MUCH ENERGY ON ITS NEIGHBORS AS IT DOES ON GROWTH AND ADAPTATION"

5. UK DEFENSE MINISTER MICHAEL PORTILLO MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--THE KEY TO LASTING PEACE IS THE TRANSCONTINENTAL ENTRENCHMENT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY. DEEPENED ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND PERSONAL TIES WILL MAKE CONFLICT MORE DIFFICULT.

--NO ONE NATION ALONE CAN DEFEND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. MILITARY COOPERATION AND BURDEN-SHARING ARE NECESSARY.

--IFOR HAS PROVEN THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WORLD CAN WORK TOGETHER IN A COMPLEX OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, AND PROVIDED A FRAMEWORK TO ENABLE RUSSIA AND NATO TO WORK TOGETHER. AND IT COINCIDED WITH THE SUCCESS OF PFP.

--WE HAVE LEARNED IMPORTANT LESSONS FROM BOSNIA: THE NEED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO REACH PRIOR AGREEMENT ON A CLEAR STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES AND PULL TOGETHER POLITICALLY AS WELL AS MILITARILY; A MECHANISM TO TRANSLATE THAT STRATEGY QUICKLY INTO REALISTIC POLITICAL GUIDANCE; AND IF THERE IS MORE THAN ONE MANDATE OR OPERATION, THE NECESSITY THAT THEY BE MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE.

--PFP HAS BEEN OPERATIONALLY, POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT AND HAS "PROBABLY" EARNED ITS PLACE AS A PERMANENT FEATURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. BUT IF SO, IT WILL NEED TO EVOLVE SO AS TO REMAIN RELEVANT EVEN AFTER NATO TAKES ON ITS FIRST NEW MEMBERS. INTEROPERABILITY WILL BE A "HARD SLOG" AND REQUIRE LONG TERM COMMITMENT ON ALL SIDES.

--ENHANCING PFP SHOULD INCLUDE A GREATER DEGREE OF PARTNER INVOLVEMENT IN ITS POLITICAL DIMENSION AND AN IMPROVED FORUM FOR DIALOGUE ON SECURITY CONCERNS.

--BALTBAT IS A CLEAR EXAMPLE OF WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED--AND ONE HOPES THAT IT WILL INSPIRE SIMILAR REGIONALLY BASED INITIATIVES. THE EXPERIENCE GAINED HAS ALREADY ASSISTED THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CENTRAL ASIAN PEACEKEEPING BATTALION; POLAND AND UKRAINE AND POLAND AND LITHUANIA ARE LOOKING TO CREATE JOINT PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES. "SUCH COOPERATION IS A REMINDER THAT PARTNERSHIP IS NOT ABOUT NATO TEACHING LESSONS TO ITS FORMER ADVERSARIES, BUT ABOUT POOLING IDEAS AND ESTABLISHING NEW LINKS".

--ROYAL MARINES, WHO HAVE PLAYED A "CENTRAL ROLE" IN BALTBAT TRAINING OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS, WILL CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS NEXT YEAR JOINTLY WITH THE DUTCH MARINES. IN BILATERAL MILITARY COOPERATION, THE UK CONTINUES TO ASSIST IN THE ADAPTATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF CENTRAL EUROPE.

--NATO WILL REMAIN A CRITICAL ELEMENT IN EUROPE'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE--BUT WITH CHANGES: "A NATO THAT IS OUTWARD-LOOKING. A LARGER NATO, CERTAINLY. A NATO WHICH KEEPS ITS DOOR OPEN TO FUTURE APPLICANTS. BUT A NATO THAT SPENDS AS MUCH ENERGY ON ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS NEIGHBORS IN EUROPE AS IT DOES ON ITS OWN ISSUES OF GROWTH AND ADAPTATION. A NATO THAT DEVELOPS FURTHER ITS PARTNERSHIP WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND A NATO WHICH FULLY RECOGNIZES THAT THE INTERESTS AND CONCERNS OF RUSSIA MUST
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TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, DA
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BE WOVEN INTO A PARTNERSHIP WITH THE ALLIANCE".

RUHE: "LET'S GET IT RIGHT THIS TIME"

6. GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER VOLKER RUHE EMPHASIZED THAT THE NEXT 12 MONTHS WILL BE A PERIOD WHEN MAJOR DECISIONS ARE TAKEN THAT WILL SHAPE THE NEW SECURITY ORDER IN AND FOR EUROPE. FOUR KEY QUESTIONS: WHAT KIND OF EUROPE DO WE WANT? WHAT KIND OF ALLIANCE DO WE WANT? WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP DO WE WANT BETWEEN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW NATO? AND FINALLY, WHAT KIND OF POLITICAL, STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP DO WE WANT BETWEEN EUROPE AND NATO ON THE ONE HAND AND RUSSIA ON THE OTHER?

--THE BALTIC SEA REGION IS A TESTING GROUND FOR THESE FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGES. IT CONTAINS SOME COUNTRIES THAT BELONG TO THE EU--WHICH IS IN THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING FUTURE SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS; SOME BELONG TO NATO, AND "THEIR PLACE, ROLE AND FUTURE COURSE IS CLEAR". SOME ARE NATO AND EU ASPIRANTS; "THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THIS CAN ONLY BE REALIZED AS PART OF A LONGER PROCESS". AND RUSSIA DOES NOT WANT TO BE ISOLATED AND EXCLUDED, BUT RESPECTED AND INCLUDED AS A SPECIAL PARTNER.

--THE 1997 NATO SUMMIT WILL FINALIZE DECISIONS ON INTERNAL ADAPTATION; WILL ANSWER THE "WHO AND HOW" OF NEW MEMBERSHIP, COMPLEMENTED BY AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH THE OTHERS; WILL AGREE ON A NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER AND ON A FORMALIZED ENHANCED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND THE UKRAINE.

--THE DESIRE TO JOIN NATO HAS ALREADY PROVIDED LEVERAGE TO ENCOURAGE COUNTRIES TO WORK WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS ON ENDEAVORS THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE EMBARKED UPON OTHERWISE. (IRONICALLY, HE ADDED, THESE EFFORTS COULD DIMINISH WITH ACTUAL MEMBERSHIP).

--THE RUSSIANS MUST UNDERSTAND: NATO IS NOT MOVING EAST; NATIONS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION ARE ASSOCIATING THEMSELVES WITH EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE WEST.

--THE NEW NATO WILL BE OPEN FOR COOPERATION WITH NON-MEMBERS AND WILL FACILITATE THE PREPARATION OF POTENTIAL NEW MEMBERS FOR BOTH MEMBERSHIP AND INTEGRATION.

--NATO REFORM ALSO MEANS THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST PUT ITS HOUSE IN ORDER BEFORE NEW TENANTS MOVE IN. "NATO ENLARGEMENT IS ON TRACK AND WILL HAPPEN...AND RIGHT NOW NATO IS ENGAGED IN AN INTENSIVE DIALOGUE WITH INTERESTED COUNTRIES TO DETERMINE WHAT THEY MUST DO AND WHAT NATO

MUST DO TO PREPARE FOR THEIR ACCESSION".

--AND IN THIS CONNECTION, NEW MEMBERS MUST BE GOOD NEIGHBORS, ACTIVELY PROMOTE COOPERATION AND COMMIT NOT TO VETO THE ACCESSION OF OTHER NEW MEMBERS. "EURO-PURISTS" ARE MISTAKEN. NEW MEMBERS --WHO REALIZE THE US IS ESSENTIAL--WILL BE GOOD ATLANTICISTS.

--THE MILITARY HAS SO FAR BEEN IN THE VANGUARD OF THE PROCESS. FOR EXAMPLE, GERMANY WILL HAVE HAD 85 COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES WITH POLAND THIS YEAR--CULMINATING IN AN EXERCISE OF TREMENDOUS SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE, THE JOINT CROSSING OF THE ODER. THE TRILATERAL MILITARY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION BETWEEN GERMANY, DENMARK AND POLAND HAS AN EVEN GREATER IMPACT FOR REGIONAL STABILITY, AND AT THEIR LAST MEETING, THE THREE DEFENSE MINISTERS INVITED THEIR BALTIC STATES COLLEAGUES TO BE THEIR GUESTS AT THEIR NEXT MEETING.

--WE NOW HAVE A THIRD CHANCE THIS CENTURY TO CONSTRUCT A UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 06 COPENHAGEN 005129

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TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, DA
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"EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE"--AND THIS TIME, WE MUST "DO IT RIGHT".

DISCUSSION

7. THE DISCUSSION FOLLOWING RUHE'S AND PORTILLO'S ADDRESSES WAS WIDE-RANGING:

--AS HE HAS DONE FREQUENTLY IN THE PAST, HANS HAEKKERUP ARGUED FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR THE BALTS. IF THEY DO NOT MAKE THE FIRST TRANCHE, HOWEVER, HE URGED THAT THERE BE MAXIMUM COOPERATION BETWEEN PFP AND NATO AND THAT AS MANY ACTIVITIES AS POSSIBLE BE "PAINTED NATO BLUE" (REFTEL, NOTAL) .

--ESTONIAN DEFENSE MINISTER ANDRUS OOVEL BEMOANED THE SEPARATION OF THE AREA'S NATO MEMBERS FROM THOSE THAT ARE NOT, AND CALLED BOTH FOR THE NAMING OF "PROSPECTIVE NATO MEMBERS" AND FOR WIDER AND DEEPER COOPERATION WITH NATO--BUILDING UPON THE SEARCH AND RESCUE AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXERCISES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE SO FAR. HE ALSO URGED THAT THERE BE NATO/PFP "PEACE SUPPORT" TRAINING AND SUGGESTED THAT NOT TAKING IN THE BALTS MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED AS DEFERRING TO RUSSIA.

--SWEDEN'S DEFENSE MINISTER THAGE G. PETERSSON STRESSED

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EU, AND STATED THAT MEMBERSHIP FOR THE BALTS SHOULD RECEIVE HIGHEST PRIORITY. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT A REGIONAL PFP TRAINING CENTER BE ESTABLISHED IN SWEDEN. (COMMENT. NO SUBSEQUENT SPEAKER PICKED UP ON THIS SUGGESTION. END COMMENT)

--NORWAY'S FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER ANDERS SJAASTAD ARGUED THAT "NO MATTER HOW YOU LOOK AT IT", THE COUNTRIES MOST IN NEED OF SECURITY (THE BALTS: THE BALKANS?) MAY BE DEPRIVED OF NATO MEMBERSHIP. SJAASTAD, WHOM RUHE ACCUSED OF HAVING A "COLD WAR MENTALITY", ALSO SAID THAT THE OLD NATO WAS ATTRACTIVE BECAUSE IT PROVIDED COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND SAID THAT THE NEW NATO SHOULD NOT BE TURNED INTO ANOTHER OSCE.

----THE RAND CORPORATION'S RONALD ASMUS EMPHASIZED RUHE'S ASSERTION THAT THE MILITARY--NOT THE POLITICIANS-- HAS SO FAR BEEN IN THE VANGUARD. HE STRESSED THAT NORTHEAST EUROPE IS THE "LITMUS TEST" OF NATO'S INTENTIONS AND THAT "GUESSING GAMES" ARE IN NO ONE'S INTEREST: "THIS IS THE YEAR--JUST DO IT." IN THIS CONNECTION, HE ALSO QUOTED SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AS STATING THAT ONE MUST START WITH THE STRONGEST CANDIDATES BECAUSE IF WE DON'T, WE WON'T START AT ALL.

--ROSE GOTTEMOELLER OF THE LONDON-BASED INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES POSITED THAT RUSSIA IS BACKING ITSELF OUT OF THE CORNER INTO WHICH IT HAS PAINTED ITSELF. DESPITE YELTSIN'S ILLNESS, ITS ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS MANDATE STABILITY. NONETHELESS, MAXIMUM NATO-RUSSIA TENSION MAY OCCUR WITH THE "SHOCK" OF THE FIRST NATO ENLARGEMENT. SUBSEQUENT ONES WILL BECOME "ROUTINIZED". IT IS THUS NECESSARY THAT A "PACKAGE DEAL" BE ARRANGED WITH RUSSIA NEXT YEAR.

--IN CONTRAST, PIKAYEV OF THE ARBATOV INSTITUTE, ARGUED THAT NATO EXPANSION, PARTICULARLY IN 1997--THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF ITS INCEPTION--WOULD BE PROVOCATIVE, THAT RUSSIAN OPPOSITION IS NOT A POLITICAL TACTIC BUT BASED ON POLITICAL CONSENSUS, AND THAT IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD, RUSSIA IS THE NATION THAT HAS MADE ALL THE CONCESSIONS. (AMONG THE "CONCESSIONS", HE NAMED GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE "LIBERATION" OF POLAND AND THE BALTIC STATES. AFTER RUHE AGGRESSIVELY CHALLENGED PIKAYEV, THE RUSSIAN SAID HIS LIMITED ENGLISH HAD RESULTED IN MISUSE OF BOTH "CONCESSION" AND "LIBERATION".) NATO HAS NOT CHANGED
UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 06 COPENHAGEN 005129

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SUBSTANTIALLY OTHER THAN TO RESPOND TO RUSSIAN REDUCTIONS ("EVERYTHING ELSE IS DECLARATIVE"), AND "HOPEFUL DEVELOPMENTS" SUCH AS TALK OF THE RUSSIA-NATO CHARTER ARE

"TOO LATE". THE BALTICS "WOULD DO WELL NOT TO REMIND US OF THE 1919-1940 PERIOD WHEN THE "INTERWAR SYSTEM" CAUSED THEM TO BE OCCUPIED". HE SPOKE IN FAVOR OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES "EAST OF THE ODER-NEISSE LINE" AND OTHER MECHANISMS TO KEEP RUSSIA IN THE SYSTEM . THE SECURITY CHALLENGE, HE POSITED, IS IN THE BALKANS--NOT AN AREA TO WHICH NATO PLANS TO EXPAND. IN SHORT, HE ASKED, "WHY IS NATO EXPANSION NECESSARY?"

--LATVIA'S DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, COL. JANIS KAZOCINS, CHARGED THAT WHILE RUSSIA (PIKAYEV) SAYS IT PRESENTS NO THREAT IN THE BALTIC, IT MUST ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THE BALTS' ASPIRATIONS ARE NO THREAT TO RUSSIA. HE ALSO NOTED THAT WHILE CFE PERMITS RUSSIAN TANKS NEAR THEIR BORDER, THE BALTS HAVE NO TANK DEFENSE. IF NECESSARY, HE CONCLUDED, NATO COULD PLAY A CRISIS MANAGEMENT ROLE IN THE BALTS WITHOUT OFFERING ARTICLE V GUARANTEES.

--POLAND'S FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER, JANUSZ ONYSZKIEWICZ, AGREED WITH PIKAYEV THAT THE BALTIC AREA MAY INDEED BE FREE OF EVEN POTENTIAL CONFLICT BUT CHARGED THAT MORE TRANSPARENCY IS NEEDED. THE POLES, FOR EXAMPLE, DO NOT KNOW THE LEVEL OF RUSSIAN NAVAL FORCES IN KALININGRAD--AND WISH THERE COULD BE A FORUM TO DISCUSS THIS.

--FRANCE'S GUILLAUME PARMENTIER OBSERVED THAT "BY TAKING PEOPLE IN, YOU LEAVE PEOPLE OUT"--AND URGED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTINUUM RATHER THAN THE CREATION OF CATEGORIES OF PFP OR NATO NON-MEMBERS. .

DR. PERRY AND MINISTER RUHE REBUT

8. SECRETARY PERRY AND MINISTER RUHE'S RESPONSES CONCLUDED THE FORMAL DISCUSSION--LARGELY PICKING UP ON THESE AND OTHER POINTS RAISED. FIRST, DR. PERRY SAID THAT "TRANCHE" WAS THE WRONG WORD, AND THAT THE ACCESSION OF NEW MEMBERS WOULD BE A CONTINUING PROCESS. AS FAR AS THE COSTS OF EXPANSION WERE CONCERNED, NATIONAL DEFENSE COSTS WOULD BE BORNE BY THE NATIONS INVOLVED; INCREASING THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE--WITH INEVITABLE CONCOMITANT COSTS--MAY NOT BE DESIRABLE; AND THERE IS NO NEED TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS FURTHER. IN FACT, US NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON EUROPEAN TERRITORY ARE BEING REDUCED 90%. THIS, THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED, IS NOT/NOT THE SAME AS MAKING A COMMITMENT TO RUSSIA RE WHAT WE WILL AND WILL NOT DO, BUT HE REMINDED HIS LISTENERS THAT START I IS AHEAD OF SCHEDULE, AND START II IS ON TRACK. RUSSIA IS NOT A THREAT TODAY, BUT COULD CONCEIVABLY BE IN THE FUTURE. IT ALL DEPENDS ON RUSSIA.

9. IN A PARTICULARLY SPIRTED REJOINER TO PIKAYEV, RUHE CHARGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RUSSIAN "CONCESSION" ON FREEDOM FOR EAST GERMANY, POLAND AND THE BALTS, AND THAT IT BEGS THE QUESTION TO POINT OUT (INDISPUTBLY) THAT "NATO DID NOT CHANGE AS MUCH AS THE WARSAW PACT". AND THE US COMMITMENT TO EUROPE IS THE SAME, RUHE CONCLUDED, EVEN THOUGH EUROPE IS NOT/NOT THE SAME--AND THE U.S.

FORTUNATELY REMAINS PART OF THE "SECURITY CULTURE" OF
EUROPE. KOLKER

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SCHMIDT VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
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 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0000
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 SUBJ: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S 9/16 AND 9/19 MEETINGS WITH
 UKRAINIAN NSDC SECRETARY HORBULYN

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0712-M (1.32)
 K8H 3/12/2020

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ STATE 205479

EXDIS, USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/24/06

TAGS: PREL, PARM, UP, US

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S 9/16 AND 9/19 MEETINGS WITH
 UKRAINIAN NSDC SECRETARY HORBULYN

1. CLASSIFIED BY EUR/WST DIRECTOR JACK SEGAL. REASONS
 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT MET SEPTEMBER
 16 AND 19 WITH UKRAINIAN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
 CHAIRMAN VOLODYMYR HORBULYN TO DISCUSS EUROPEAN SECURITY
 AND NATO, NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO. THE DISCUSSION
 INCLUDED THE ISSUE OF HOW TO RECORD IN A DOCUMENT
 UKRAINE'S ENHANCED RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, THE
 NATO/RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP, NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENTS IN
 NATO MEMBER STATES, UKRAINE'S STANCE ON PROPOSING A
 NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE,
 AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO, THE EU AND WEU. END
 SUMMARY.

3. ~~(S)~~ THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, ACCOMPANIED BY
 AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE COLLINS, DISCUSSED A WIDE RANGE OF
 EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES WITH VOLODYMYR HORBULYN,

SECRETARY OF UKRAINE'S NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE

COUNCIL (NSDC) IN TWO SEPARATE MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON SEPTEMBER 16 AND 19. HORBULYN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL SMESHKO, AMB. SHCHERBAK, DCM KUCHINSKY, DATT COLONEL HAVRYLOV, AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT VOITKO. ALSO ATTENDING WERE D EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT EDELMAN, ETJR/WST DIRECTOR SEGAL, S/P'S WEISS AND UKRAINE DESK OFFICER CONNUCK.

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

4. (e) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OUTLINED THE USG'S VIEWS OF A FUTURE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE THAT WOULD HAVE NATO SERVING AS THE BASIS FOR THE CONTINENT'S COLLECTIVE SECURITY. CITING THE FACT THAT EUROPEAN STATES DESIRING NATO MEMBERSHIP ARE IN VARYING STATES OF READINESS FOR JOINING, HORBULYN SUGGESTED THAT A PROCESS OF DEVELOPING TIES FIRST WITH THE EU, THEN THE WEU, THEN GOING ON EVENTUALLY TO NATO MEMBERSHIP MIGHT PROVIDE A MODEL FOR BRINGING NEW STATES INTO NATO.

5. (e) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTED THAT PLANS FOR GIVING A GREATER SECURITY ROLE TO THE WEU WERE FAR FROM REALIZATION. MAKING NATO THE ONLY REAL OPTION AT PRESENT. HE SAID THE U.S. SEES THE EU'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO AS ONE OF COORDINATION. DECLINING TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A MECHANISTIC LINKAGE BETWEEN EU (AND/OR WEU) AND NATO MEMBERSHIP, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. INTENDS TO ENSURE THAT NATO EXPANDS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY THAT ENHANCES UKRAINE'S SECURITY. BUT ONLY NATO CAN PLAY THE NECESSARY LEADERSHIP ROLE IN DEVELOPING THE SECURITY SYSTEM FOR THE NEW EUROPE, HE ARGUED.

RUSSIAN VIEWS ON NATO

6. (e) HORBULYN MENTIONED THE CZECH REPUBLIC, POLAND AND HUNGARY AS THE COUNTRIES MOST PREPARED FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP. A SECOND TRANCHE CITED CONSISTED OF BULGARIA, ROMANIA, SLOVAKIA AND THE BALTIC STATES (WHICH HE SAID LOOK INCREASINGLY WESTWARD FOR THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY). OBSTACLES TO NATO EXPANSION INCLUDE THE STATE OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENT IN EACH POTENTIAL NEW MEMBER-STATE, THE EXISTENCE OF UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AMONG THEM, AND THE POTENTIAL REACTION OF NEIGHBORS, PARTICULARLY RUSSIA. HE NOTED THAT RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON EXPANSION HAD EVOLVED FROM OUTRIGHT REJECTION, TO STATEMENTS BY FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV SUGGESTING

THAT EXPANSION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OSCE MIGHT WARRANT DISCUSSION, TO THE RECENT PROPOSAL FOR A NATO/RUSSIA CHARTER. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT YELTSIN'S HEALTH PROBLEMS MAY HAVE TEMPORARILY HALTED RUSSIA'S ABILITY TO ACT ON THIS ISSUE.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO

7. (e) ASKED WHAT ASPECTS OF NATO EXPANSION WORRY

UKRAINE, HORBULYN CITED THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON ITS BORDERS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF NATO EXPANSION. HAVING TAKEN THE VERY DIFFICULT POLITICAL AND MORAL STEP OF BECOMING A NON-NUCLEAR STATE, HORBULYN SAID NATO EXPANSION WITHOUT ASSURANCES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE A POLITICAL DISASTER FOR THE KUCHMA GOVERNMENT. (HE MENTIONED THAT PRESIDENT KUCHMA HAD JUST SIGNED A DECREE DIRECTING THE ELIMINATION OF ALL SS-19 SILOS BY THE END OF 1998, AND MENTIONED THAT TEN SS-19 SILOS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ELIMINATED, WITH 33 MORE TO BE DESTROYED IN THE NEAREST FUTURE.)

8. (S) HORBULYN SUGGESTED THAT NATO'S EXPANSION REALLY HAD TWO ENTIRELY DIFFERENT ASPECTS IF ONE DIFFERENTIATES BETWEEN EXPANSION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR WITHOUT. SO LONG AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENTS TO NEW NATO MEMBER-STATES REMAINS AN OPTION, HORBULYN SAID RUSSIA WILL CONSIDER DEPLOYING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO KALININGRAD AND BELARUS. THEREFORE, HE SAID THE IDEA OF PURSUING A RUSSIA/NATO CHARTER IS A GOOD ONE -- IT WOULD ADD SOME BRICKS TO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM.

9. (S) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED UKRAINE'S POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS ON ITS BORDERS. HE SAID ON THIS POINT UKRAINE AND RUSSIA AGREE, THOUGH THEIR MOTIVES DIFFER. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. IS TRYING TO MAKE SURE THAT NATO ADOPTS A REALISTIC, RESPONSIBLE POSITION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT DOES NOT PROVOKE FEELINGS OF INSTABILITY. SPECIFICALLY WITH REGARD TO UKRAINE, HE SAID WE WOULD MAKE SURE THAT OUR PLANS AND POLICIES ON THE DISPOSITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS NEVER GIVE UKRAINE CAUSE TO REGRET ITS 1994 DECISION TO RID ITSELF OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT HE ADDED THAT WE NEED TO BALANCE THAT OBJECTIVE WITH THE NEED TO AVOID CREATING TWO TIERS OF NATO MEMBERSHIP. NATO MUST REMAIN A UNIFIED ALLIANCE OF EQUALS. TO HELP IMPROVE UKRAINE'S UNDERSTANDING OF HOW WE CAN BALANCE THESE

GOALS, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OFFERED A BRIEFING ON NATO'S NUCLEAR PLANNING (DELIVERED SEPTEMBER 19 BY ASSISTANT DEFENSE SECRETARY FRANK MILLER)

10. (S) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT UKRAINE'S PROPOSAL FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WAS NOT A GOOD IDEA. (LATER, THE UKRAINIAN EMBASSY DELIVERED A LETTER TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY DATED SEPTEMBER 18, SIGNED BY AMBASSADOR SHCHERBAK WHICH STATED, "...I HAVE BEEN OFFICIALLY INSTRUCTED BY FOREIGN MINISTER HENNADY UDOVENKO, WITH WHOM I SPOKE THIS AFTERNOON, THAT UKRAINE HAS NO INTENTION TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AT THE UNITED NATIONS."

NATO/UKRAINE, NATO/RUSSIA CHARTERS

11. (S) CITING UKRAINE'S ACTIVE ROLE IN PFP, EXERCISE PEACE SHIELD," AND ITS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO ESTABLISH A NATO INFORMATION CENTER IN KIEV, HORBULYN SAID THAT WHENEVER UKRAINE ACHIEVES PROGRESS WITH NATO, RUSSIA REACTS STRONGLY. HE SAID THAT IF RUSSIA DECIDES THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE REDEPLOYED ON ITS WESTERN BORDER, IT WILL LOOK FOR A FORCEFUL WAY TO RESPOND, MOST LIKELY BY INCREASING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON UKRAINE. IN THAT EVENTUALITY, UKRAINE WOULD NEED SOME FORM OF GUARANTEES THAT ITS INTERESTS WOULD BE PROTECTED. HE SUGGESTED THAT A NATO/UKRAINE CHARTER, SIGNED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AGREEMENT ON A NATO/RUSSIA CHARTER WOULD BE THE MOST STABILIZING APPROACH.

UKRAINE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO

12. (S) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT HE, THE PRESIDENT, MR. LAKE AND THE SECRETARY, HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED UKRAINE'S LEADING ROLE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. IT FOLLOWS THEN THAT NATO MUST HAVE A STEADILY STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIP WITH UKRAINE AS IT EXPANDS. THE RELATIONSHIP MUST INCLUDE THAT POSSIBILITY THAT UKRAINE MIGHT AT SOME FUTURE DATE DECIDE TO JOIN NATO. THAT DECISION IS FOR UKRAINE TO MAKE. IN THE MEANTIME, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY CITED TWO THINGS NATO WILL NOT DO: 1) PUT PRESSURE ON UKRAINE TO APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, AND 2) ACCEPT ANYONE ELSE'S ATTEMPT TO EXCLUDE UKRAINE FROM ELIGIBILITY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.

NATO EXPANSION AND RUSSIA

13. (S) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTED THAT THIS WAS FAR FROM AN ABSTRACT EXPRESSION OF POLICY. HE SAID ONE RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RECENTLY SAID THAT RUSSIA WANTS IT UNDERSTOOD THAT THE BALTIC STATES AND UKRAINE COULD NEVER BE ALLOWED TO JOIN NATO. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. HAS MADE VERY CLEAR THAT SUCH A POSITION IS UNACCEPTABLE ON ITS FACE AND THAT A RUSSIAN POSITION ON NATO THAT INCLUDES THAT PROVISIO WOULD "GO NOWHERE." THE GERMANS, FRENCH AND BRITISH HAVE CONVEYED THE SAME MESSAGE TO RUSSIA.

14. (S) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY BELIEVE IT WOULD FOR NATO AND RUSSIA TO DEVELOP A POSITIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. THIS WAS THE LOGIC BEHIND THE SECRETARY'S STUTTGART SPEECH AND THE IDEA OF A CHARTER WITH RUSSIA. THE CONCEPT IS NOT SIMPLY TO CALM RUSSIAN FEARS, BUT TO ENSURE THAT RUSSIA RESPECTS THE RIGHT OF EVERY COUNTRY TO MAKE ITS OWN DECISIOS VIS-A-VIS NATO -- PARTICULARLY UKRAINE.

15. (S) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT EACH COUNTRY WOULD PROCEED AT ITS OWN PACE IN DEVELOPING ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PROCESS BE TRANSPARENT. HE STRESSED THAT NATO'S DOOR MUST BE OPEN AND NEVER EXCLUDE THE BALTIC STATES, UKRAINE OR ANY OTHER DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY. HE SAID THE U.S. WOULD

FIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN OPEN PROCESS.
CHRISTOPHER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 5479

TOR: 961002151200 M2428425

DIST:

SIT: BUJOLD CARAVELLI HAMEL PASCUAL PONEMAN SAMORE SZASZ

SIT: NSC

PRT: RRUISA

<^DIST>

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SCHMIDT VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY

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 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 4081
 SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENTIAL
 FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR RYURIKOV

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2015-0792-M (1.33)
 KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 030332

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/06
 TAGS: PREL, US, RS
 SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENTIAL
 FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR RYURIKOV

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR PICKERING. REASONS:
 1.5 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY

2. (U) PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR DMITRIY RYURIKOV TOLD AMBASSADOR PICKERING OCTOBER 25 THAT EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AND EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN REMAINED THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES ON THE CURRENT RUSSIA-U.S. AGENDA. HE SUGGESTED RUSSIA MAY SLOW DOWN ITS ENGAGEMENT ON NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND AWAIT THE RESULTS OF ADAPTATION AND ENLARGEMENT EFFORTS, BUT WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE CFE MODERNIZATION. RYURIKOV WAS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE RECENT KUCHMA-YELTSIN TALKS ON THE BLACK SEA FLEET. DESPITE RECENT MOVEMENT ON THE BORDER TALKS WITH ESTONIA, RYURIKOV SAID RUSSIA STILL NEEDED SOME STEPS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT, AND EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE IDEA OF A BILATERAL WORKING GROUP TO TACKLE THESE ISSUES IN A QUIET, NON-POLITICAL MANNER. DISCUSSIONS ALSO TOUCHED ON THE TRANSFER OF HOLOCAUST FILES AND EVOLUTION OF THE CIS. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) AMBASSADOR PICKERING PAID A FAREWELL CALL

OCTOBER 25 ON DMITRIY RYURIKOV, PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR, IN THE LATTER'S KREMLIN OFFICE. WHEN ASKED TO REVIEW THE HIGH PRIORITY ISSUES IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, RYURIKOV RESPONDED THAT TWO ITEMS CURRENTLY DOMINATED THE KREMLIN'S LIST: EUROPEAN SECURITY/NATO ENLARGEMENT, AND AFGHANISTAN. ON BOTH ISSUES, RYURIKOV SUGGESTED, THE MORE THE TWO SIDES TALKED THROUGH THE PROBLEMS, THE BETTER THE OUTCOME WAS LIKELY TO BE.

NATO: RUSSIA MIGHT STAND ASIDE TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS

4. (✓) AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THERE WERE INCREASING SIGNS THAT RUSSIA MIGHT WISH TO WAIT SOMEWHAT BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH A MORE INTENSE DIALOGUE WITH NATO MEMBERS ON FUTURE RELATIONS. RYURIKOV DID NOT TAKE EXCEPTION TO THIS DESCRIPTION, NOTING THAT SOME THOUGHT THAT IF RUSSIA COULD NOT PREVENT OR INFLUENCE NATO ENLARGEMENT, IT MIGHT BE REASONABLE TO STAND ASIDE FOR AWHILE TO SEE WHAT FORM NATO TAKES AFTER ADAPTATION AND ENLARGEMENT. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT IF THIS IS RUSSIA'S EVENTUAL DECISION, IT WOULD BE TAKEN WITHOUT ILL FEELINGS OR ANIMOSITY, AND THAT RUSSIA FULLY INTENDED TO CONTINUE ITS COOPERATION IN PFP AND BILATERALLY. IN ADDITION, HE NOTED THAT BOTH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MFA WERE IN AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON CFE MODERNIZATION, WHICH WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON HOW RUSSIA VIEWED CHANGES IN NATO.

5. (✓) THE AMBASSADOR CAUTIONED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID STRICT ADHERENCE TO A "THEOLOGY OF FORMAT." IN AMBASSADOR'S RECENT MEETING WITH PRIMAKOV, HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS TOO FOCUSED ON A HIERARCHY IN THE VARIOUS TRACKS UNDER DISCUSSION. ALL TRACKS HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE OTHERS. IF THE RUSSIANS WAIT FOR ADAPTATION TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE SERIOUSLY ENGAGING ON RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONS, THE GOR COULD BE IN THE POSITION OF MISSING THE BOAT. THE CFE TALKS, IN PARTICULAR, WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME CATCHING UP IF THEY WERE DELAYED TOO LONG. THE U.S. REMAINED PREPARED TO SERIOUSLY ENGAGE RUSSIA ON ALL THESE TRACKS, THE AMBASSADOR STATED, BUT HE NOTED THAT "WE CANNOT DANCE WITH OURSELVES."

AFGHANISTAN

6. (✓) TURNING TO AFGHANISTAN, RYURIKOV SAID HE WAS NOT CONVINCED THE SITUATION WAS RIPE FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERMEDIATION. INSTEAD, HE SUGGESTED THE TALIBAN STILL HOPED FOR A MILITARY VICTORY, AND STATED THAT THE PARTIES NEEDED TO "BE AT EACH OTHER'S THROATS" FOR A BIT MORE UNTIL THEY WEARIED OF FIGHTING. ONCE THE BLOODSHED RECEDES, RYURIKOV SUGGESTED THE TIME WOULD BE RIPE FOR A JOINT EFFORT. IN THE MEANTIME, HE SUGGESTED THE U.S. AND RUSSIA SHOULD CONTINUE CLOSE AND FRUITFUL

CONTACTS. HE ALSO PROPOSED MAINTAINING MORE FREQUENT DISCUSSION AT THE EXPERT LEVEL TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND DEVELOP JOINT APPROACHES TO A WHOLE RANGE OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS.

7. (e) RYURIKOV NOTED THAT THE GOR HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THE TAJIK OPPOSITION WAS HAVING DIRECT CONTACTS
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 030332

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/06
TAGS: PREL, US, RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENTIAL
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR RYURIKOV

WITH THE TALIBAN, AND MAY EVEN BE RECEIVING MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THEM. HOWEVER, RUSSIA WAS ALREADY PREPARED TO PREVENT ANY IMPACT FROM AFGHANISTAN EVENTS ON THE SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN.

UKRAINE: BLACK SEA FLEET STILL NOT SOLVED, BUT...

8. (e) AMBASSADOR REQUESTED A READOUT ON THE KUCHMA-YELTSIN TALKS THE PREVIOUS DAY. RYURIKOV, WHO UNTIL RECENTLY WAS PESSIMISTIC ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT WITH UKRAINE, SAID THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME HE WAS NOW CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. IF THE UKRAINIANS STICK TO THE COMMITMENTS THEY HAD MADE, RYURIKOV NOTED (WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL), AN AGREEMENT COULD BE WRAPPED UP BY DPM SEROV IN SEVASTOPOL IN TIME FOR PM CHERNOMYRDIN'S NOVEMBER TRIP TO KIEV. NONETHELESS, WHILE AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN REACHED IN PRINCIPLE, SOME IMPORTANT TECHNICAL POINTS REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT IN EACH KEY DOCUMENT. RYURIKOV NOTED THAT BOTH SIDES SEEMED INTENT ON REACHING COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS WHICH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH COULD ACCEPT. IN BOTH CASES, HOWEVER, THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH WAS WORKING IN A COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE MANNER.

ESTONIA: LOOKING FOR MOVEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

9. (e) RYURIKOV WAS LESS OPTIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN RELATIONS WITH ESTONIA, DESPITE THE RECENT PROGRESS ON BORDER TALKS. HE NOTED THAT RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE MOVE TOWARD A BORDER AGREEMENT IF THERE WAS NO PARALLEL PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS REGARDING RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITIES. RYURIKOV SUGGESTED IT WAS TIME FOR ESTONIA TO TAKE STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION AS WELL. HE REACTED POSITIVELY TO THE AMBASSADOR'S SUGGESTION THAT CREATION OF A BILATERAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MIGHT BE USEFUL TO ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS. HE NOTED THAT RUSSIA ALREADY HAD SUCH A COMMISSION WITH KAZAKHSTAN.

HOLOCAUST RECORDS

10. (SBU) AMBASSADOR ALSO THANKED THE GOR AND RYURIKOV SPECIFICALLY FOR THE ROLE HE HAD PLAYED IN EXPEDITING THE HANDOVER OF THE HOLOCAUST ARCHIVAL RECORDS, AND REQUESTED ONE FINAL PUSH TO ENSURE THAT THE BULK OF THE DOCUMENTS ARE HANDED OVER ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PUBLIC CEREMONY, NOTING THAT A SPEEDY TRANSFER WOULD ALLOW US TO MAKE USE OF A USG PLANE ALREADY IN MOSCOW TO TRANSPORT OUT THE RECORDS.

A EURASIAN UNION?

11. (SBU) RYURIKOV NOTED THAT THE "COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES" NAME MAY HAVE OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS. NO ONE SERIOUSLY QUESTIONED THE INDEPENDENCE OF THESE COUNTRIES ANY LONGER. INSTEAD, HE SUGGESTED A MORE FITTING TITLE WOULD BE "THE EURASIAN UNION" -- ALTHOUGH THIS DESCRIPTION GAVE UKRAINE AND BELARUS HEARTBURN.

PICKERING

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 0332

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TOR: 961029070234 M2467321

<^TOR>961029070324 M2467322

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SIT: BELL DAALDER DOWLING EGGERT FEELEY FORT FRIED GRUMMON PASCUAL PIFER
SCHMIDT VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
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 RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
 ZEN/USDEL BRUSSELS BE
 SUBJ: SYG SOLANA ON AFSOUTH, MINISTERIALS, BOSNIA

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0712-17 (1.34)
 KBM 3/12/2020

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USNATO 003863

EXDIS

STATE FOR EUR-KORNBLUM, AND EUR/RPM

STATE ALSO PASS NSC VERSHBOW; OVP FOR FUERTH

SECDEF FOR USDP SLOCOMBE, USDP/ISA/ASD KRAMER, ISA/ENP
 OSTERHALER, ISA/NATO TOWNSEND, ISP/ASD MILLER, DASD
 DESIGNEE KELLEHER

JOINT STAFF FOR LTG RYAN AND VADM REDD

E.O. 12958 DECL:OADR: 11/05/06

TAGS: NATO, MARR

SUBJECT: SYG SOLANA ON AFSOUTH, MINISTERIALS, BOSNIA

REF: STATE 229503 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT HUNTER. REASON:
 1.5 (B) AND (D).
2. (U) AMBASSADOR HUNTER MET WITH SYG SOLANA NOVEMBER 5 TO
 BRIEF HIM ON NSA LAKE'S VISIT TO PARIS (REFTEL). SOLANA
 VISITS BONN NOVEMBER 6. HUNTER COUNSELED HIM TO SEE
 WHETHER THERE IS ROOM FOR MOVEMENT IN GERMANY'S POSITION,
 RECOGNIZING THAT IT HAD PLAYED A ROLE IN THE ORIGINAL
 FRENCH REQUEST FOR ROTATION OF THE AFSOUTH COMMAND. WE
 WOULD WORK TO MAKE A GERMAN CHANGE OF POSITION AS EASY AS
 POSSIBLE, JUST AS WE ARE PREPARED TO DO THE SAME FOR THE
 FRENCH.

3. (S) SOLANA EXPRESSED PESSIMISM THAT CHIRAC IS PREPARED TO MOVE ANYTIME SOON; INDEED, THE COMMAND STRUCTURE ISSUES COULD GO PAST THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS. SOLANA ALSO SAID THERE WAS RISK OF A LETDOWN IN DECEMBER, FOLLOWING THE INTENSE WORK OF RECENT MONTHS AND WITH THE SUMMIT BECKONING, BECAUSE OF THIS ISSUE AND THE DELAY IN MOVEMENT BY THE RUSSIANS. HUNTER RESPONDED THAT WE WILL PRESS TO MAKE THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS AS POSITIVE AS POSSIBLE. THE AREA MOST IN NEED OF WORK WITH OTHER ALLIES IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF PFP-PLUS, HE SAID.

SUPPORT FOR ENLARGEMENT

4. (S) THE SECGEN SAID THAT, BASED ON HIS RECENT VISITS TO SEVERAL CAPITALS, HE IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT HE SEES AS GENERAL LACK OF PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT FOR ENLARGEMENT. FACED WITH CONFLICTING CHOICES, HE SAID, MANY SEEM TO BE CHOOSING THE RUSSIANS AS THEIR FIRST CONCERN. THE RUSSIANS WILL ALSO BE PICKING UP THESE ATTITUDES. SOLANA SAID HE EXPECTS THAT RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO MANIPULATE ALLIES WILL CONTINUE, AND HE NOTED THAT PRIMAKOV CONTINUES TO BELITTLE HIS ROLE.

POST-IFOR TIMING

5. (S) SOLANA STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF LEARNING FROM US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHEN WE THINK WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE BASIC CHOICES AND DECISIONS ABOUT POST-IFOR. AT THE PERMREPS' LUNCH (SEPTTEL), HE HAD SET NOVEMBER 18 AS THE KEY TARGET DATE; BUT IF THE U.S. TRULY WON'T BE READY TO MAKE A CHOICE AMONG OPTIONS BY THEN, THE SOONER HE KNOWS THE BETTER, SO HE CAN CHANGE THE CALENDAR AND AVOID RISK OF PUBLIC SPECULATION ABOUT DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. AMBASSADOR HUNTER REPEATED HIS INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT COMMIT TO NOVEMBER 18, AND SAID HE WOULD SEEK TO GET AN ANSWER ON POSSIBLE TIMING.

THE SUMMIT

6. (S) FINALLY, THE SECGEN SPECULATED ON THE VENUE FOR THE SUMMIT. HE SAID HE PREFERENCES BRUSSELS. IT WOULD BE HARD TO CHOOSE ANY OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITAL (HE RULED OUT PARIS AS UNLIKELY TO GO DOWN WELL IN THE ALLIANCE), AND THE U.S. WOULD SURELY WANT TO HAVE A BIG EXTRAVAGANZA ON NATO'S FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY IN 1999. IT WOULD BE HARD TO HAVE TWO SUMMITS IN WASHINGTON, HE SAID. THE DUTCH QUEEN HAD RAISED WITH HIM THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING THE 1997 SUMMIT THERE, BUT SOLANA SAID THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT WAS NOT INTERESTED, BECAUSE OF ITS CONCENTRATION ON ITS EU PRESIDENCY.

7. (S) NOTE. HUNTER ALSO BRIEFED SEVERAL OF THE PERMREPS

ON THE NSA LAKE VISIT TO PARIS. THE DUTCH PERMREP SAID THAT THE DEFMIN SUPPORTS US, BUT THE FORMIN CANNOT DO SO PUBLICLY BECAUSE OF THE POOR STATE OF RELATIONS WITH FRANCE. THE UK PERMREP SAID HE COMPLETELY AGREED WITH NSA LAKE'S PRESENTATION. THE GERMAN PERMREP SAID BONN IS CONCERNED THAT THE U.S. NOT REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE AT ITS EXPENSE. OF COURSE, HE SAID, IF THE U.S. AND FRANCE REACH AGREEMENT, BONN WILL JOIN. HUNTER SUGGESTED THAT

GERMAN FLEXIBILITY COULD PRODUCE THE SAME IN PARIS. END NOTE.

HUNTER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 3863

TOR: 961105151124 M2479742

DIST:

SIT: BELL BUJOLD DAALDER DOWLING EGGERT FEELEY FORT FRIED PASCUAL PIFER
SCHMIDT SZASZ VERSHBOW WISE WITKOWSKY

SIT: NSC

PRT: FUERTH

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHNOA3872 3111729-CCCC--RHEHNSC.
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 LINE3: O 061729Z NOV 96
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 DTG: 061729Z NOV 96
 ORIG: USMISSION USNATO
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6030
 INFO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5//
 RUEHNSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 2332
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1968
 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 6113
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
 ZEN/USDELTC BRUSSELS BE
 SUBJ: UKRAINIAN AMBASSADOR OFFERS DRAFT AGREEMENT ON
 "SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP" BETWEEN NATO AND UKRAINE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
 PER E. O. 13526

2015-0792-M [1.35]

KBH 3/12/2020

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 003872

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, S/NIS, EUR/WST

SECDEF FOR DAS/RUE KELLEHER, EUR/NATO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/06

TAGS: NATO, PREL, UP, BO

SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN AMBASSADOR OFFERS DRAFT AGREEMENT ON
 "SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP" BETWEEN NATO AND UKRAINE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. HUNTER.
 REASON 1.5(D).
2. (U) THIS CABLE CONTAINS A REQUEST FOR ACTION. PLEASE
 SEE PARAGRAPH 4.
3. (e) UKRAINIAN AMBASSADOR BORYS TARASYUK CALLED ON
 AMBASSADOR HUNTER NOVEMBER 4. AT THE MEETING (OTHER
 TOPICS SEPTEL), TARASYUK GAVE AMBASSADOR HUNTER A
 UKRAINIAN "DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR THE AGREEMENT ON THE
 SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN UKRAINE AND NATO" (TEXT BELOW
 IN PARAGRAPH 5). TARASYUK TOLD AMBASSADOR HUNTER THAT
 UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER UDOVENKO HAD ALSO PASSED THE
 TEXT TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT DURING HIS RECENT WASHINGTON
 TRIP AND THAT THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT WAS AWAITING U.S.
 COMMENT BEFORE IT TABLES THE PROPOSAL WITH NATO SECRETARY
 GENERAL SOLANA.
4. (e) ACTION REQUEST: MISSION WOULD BE PLEASED TO FOLLOW

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
015. cable	re: Ukrainian Ambassador Offers Draft Agreement on "Special Partnership" between NATO and Ukraine [partial] (6 pages)	11/06/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/24/1996-12/04/1996]

2015-0792-M

rs1265

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UP WITH AMBASSADOR TARASYUK IF WASHINGTON SO INSTRUCTS.

5. (C) BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT UKRAINIAN PROPOSAL (THE TEXT WAS PASSED IN ENGLISH AND CONTAINS MINOR SYNTACTICAL ERRORS THAT WE HAVE REPRODUCED):

UKRAINE'S PROPOSAL

21/10/96

DRAFT

AGREEMENT ON SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN UKRAINE AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION (NATO)

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(6)

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(6)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 USNATO 003872

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, S/NIS, EUR/WST

SECDEF FOR DAS/RUE KELLEHER, EUR/NATO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/06

TAGS: NATO, PREL, UP, BO

SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN AMBASSADOR OFFERS DRAFT AGREEMENT ON
"SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP" BETWEEN NATO AND UKRAINE

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(6)

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(6)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 USNATO 003872

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, S/NIS, EUR/WST

SECDEF FOR DAS/RUE KELLEHER, EUR/NATO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/06

TAGS: NATO, PREL, UP, BO

SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN AMBASSADOR OFFERS DRAFT AGREEMENT ON
"SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP" BETWEEN NATO AND UKRAINE

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(6)

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(6)

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(6)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USNATO 003872

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, S/NIS, EUR/WST

SECDEF FOR DAS/RUE KELLEHER, EUR/NATO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/06

TAGS: NATO, PREL, UP, BO

SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN AMBASSADOR OFFERS DRAFT AGREEMENT ON
"SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP" BETWEEN NATO AND UKRAINE

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(6)

ARTICLE VIII

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(6)

END TEXT.

HUNTER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04

SSN: 3872

<^SSN>3872

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<^TOR>961106123905 M2481719

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SCHMIDT VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA8137 3390310-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 040307Z DEC 96
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 040307Z DEC 96
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
SUBJ: THE SECRETARY'S BREAKFAST MEETING WITH NATO
SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0792-17 (1.36)
KBN 3/12/2020

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 248137

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: LL/18/06
TAGS: PREL, NATO, OVIP (SOLANA, JAVIER)
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S BREAKFAST MEETING WITH NATO
SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA

1. CLASSIFIED BY EUR/RPM ACTING DIRECTOR ROBERT SIMMONS,
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY

2. ~~(S)~~ AT A BREAKFAST HE HOSTED NOVEMBER 15 FOR NATO SYG JAVIER SOLANA, THE SECRETARY CONGRATULATED SOLANA ON THE MUCH MORE POSITIVE MOOD AT NATO THIS YEAR. THE SECRETARY REVIEWED THE U.S. POSITION ON AFSOUTH AND NOTED THAT HIS VIEW THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT AGREE TO THE WHOLE PACKAGE OF INTERNAL ADAPTATION ISSUES UNTIL THERE WAS A SOLUTION ON AFSOUTH. SYG SOLANA REPORTED THAT MOST ALLIES SUPPORTED THE U.S. BUT THAT, GIVEN PRESIDENT CHRIAC'S PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT, THE ISSUE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE SOLVED AT A HIGH LEVEL. SOLANA AGREED THAT PRESSURE WOULD CONTINUE ON FRANCE TO REINTEGRATE BUT THAT THE AFOSUTH DISPUTE MIGHT DELAY THE PROCESS.

3. ~~(S)~~ ON NATO'S EXTERNAL ADAPTATION, THE SECRETARY AND SOLANA REVIEWED NATO/RUSSIA RELATIONS. SOLANA BELIEVED THAT RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE 1997 SUMMIT ITSELF WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND THAT MAYBE TWO SUMMIT EVENTS WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE PUBLIC DIFFERENCES OVER ENLARGEMENT MADE PROSPECTS FOR MEETINGS WITH THE RUSSIANS INCLUDING AT THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS DIFFICULT. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT GETTING PRESIDENT CLINTON TO TWO NATO SUMMIT EVENTS

WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND THAT THE U.S. BELIEVED ENLARGEMENT AND NATO/RUSSIA SHOULD PROCEED IN PARALLEL. HE ADDED THAT WHILE RUSSIAN RHETORIC MIGHT REMAIN DIFFICULT, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF SUCCESSFUL ELEMENTS OF NATO/RUSSIA COOPERATION TO POINT TO IN DECEMBER. THE SECRETARY, UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF AND AMBASSADOR HUNTER EXPLAINED THE U.S. CONCEPT OF THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL AND PFP ENHANCEMENTS. SYG SO LANA WELCOMED THE PRESENTATION AND SAID THAT HE COULD SUPPORT THE IDEAS BUT SOME ALLIES WERE CAUTIOUS BECAUSE OF A POSSIBLE OVERLAP WITH OSCE AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF INVOLVING THE PARTNERS IN 'ALL ALLIANCE ACTIVITIES BUT ARTICLE V.' SYG SOLANA CLOSED THE LUNCH BY RAISING HIS CONCERNS ABOUT GREEK/TURKISH RELATIONS AND THE NATO BUDGET SITUATION. AT THE END OF THE LUNCH DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT REPORTED ON HIS INITIAL MEETINGS WITH RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV. END SUMMARY.

PARTICIPANTS

4. (C) U.S.

THE SECRETARY
 UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF
 AMBASSADOR HUNTER
 EUR ACTING A/S PERINA
 5/NIS ACTING COODINATOR HERBST
 SPOKESMAN NICHOLAS BURNS
 EUR/RPM ACTING DIRECTOR SIMMONS (NOTETAKER)

NATO

SYG JAVIER SOLANA
 DIRECTOR DE CABINET JORGE DOMEQ
 DEPUTY DIRECTOR HOYT YEE
 NATO SPOKESMAN JAMIE SHEA

5. (C) THE SECRETARY BEGAN THE DISCUSSION AT A BREAKFAST HE HOSTED NOVEMBER 15 AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR NATO SECRETARY GENERAL JAVIER SOLANA, BY NOTING THE SUCCESSFUL

VOTE IN THE SPANISH PARLIAMENT ON SPAIN'S INTEGRATION INTO NATO'S MILITARY STRUCTURE. HE SUGGESTED THIS REFLECTED THE MUCH MORE POSITIVE MOOD AT NATO THIS PAST YEAR. OBVIOUSLY CENTRAL TO THAT WAS THE SUCCESSFUL IFOR MISSION IN BOSNIA. WHILE NATO IS NOT BEING CALLED UPON TO PLAY A ROLE DIRECTLY IN THE ZAIRE MISSION, MANY HAVE SUGGESTED IT AND THE LESSONS FROM IFOR WILL BE A MAJOR PART OF ANY MISSION IN AFRICA. OVERALL THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED THIS SHOWS HOW CENTRAL NATO HAS BECOME. SYG SOLANA EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS AND NOTED THAT, WITH PREPARATIONS FOR A SUMMIT IN 1997, THE NEXT SIX MONTHS WOULD BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS COVER AT LEAST THREE AREAS: INTERNAL ADAPTATION, NATO/RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND ENLARGEMENT.

6. (C) ON THE SUMMIT, THE SECRETARY ASKED FOR SYG

SOLANA 'S VIEWS OF THE "WHEN" AND "WHERE." HE NOTED THAT SOME HAD SUGGESTED PUTTING OFF THE SUMMIT UNTIL AS LATE AS SEPTEMBER. THE SECRETARY SAID HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THAT WOULD BE TOO LATE. THE SYG RESPONDED THAT HE CONSIDERED EARLY JULY TO BE OPTIMUM. THE IGC AND G-7/P-8 SUMMIT WOULD FILL UP MOST OF JUNE. HE ALSO BELIEVED THAT A PRE-SUMMIT MINISTERIAL WOULD BE NECESSARY AND A JULY DATE WOULD PERMIT HOLDING THE SPRING MINISTERIAL ON SCHEDULE IN MAY. AS TO THE LOCATION, SYG SOLANA SAID THAT MOST NOW AGREED THAT BRUSSELS WOULD BE THE BEST PLACE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE U.S. WOULD HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THESE ARRANGEMENTS.

INTERNAL ADAPTATION

7. (C) ONE EXAMPLE OF ISSUES WHICH COULD BE WORKED BEFORE THE SUMMIT, THE SYG SAID, WAS AGREEING ON INTERNAL ADAPTATION MEASURES. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN A GOOD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON INTERNAL ADAPTATION ISSUES, INCLUDING ON D/SACEUR, HE PERSONALLY WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE ENTIRE PACKAGE UNTIL THE AFSOUTH COMMAND ISSUE HAD BEEN SOLVED. SYG SO LANA RESPONDED THAT HE DID NOT THINK AFSOUTH COULD BE SOLVED WITHOUT HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION. THE CHODS REMAINED DIVIDED OVER WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE 2 OR 3 MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS (MSC), AND WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO RESOLVE THE AFSOUTH ISSUE AT THEIR LEVEL. CHIRAC PERSONALLY EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW OTHERS IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CAN COMPROMISE. AT THE SAME TIME, SO LANA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GIVEN FRENCH

DEFENSE JEDUCTIONS, THERE IS REALLY NO POSSIBILITY FOR PARIS OTHER THAN REINTEGRATION. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF SOME COMPROMISE SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND.

8. (C) AMBASSADOR HUNTER RESPONDED THAT A FOLLOW-ON FORCE IN BOSNIA AS WELL AS MILITARY ACTION IN ZAIRE WOULD ONLY INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON FRANCE FOR REINTEGRATION. TARNOFF ADDED THAT MOST OF THE OTHER FRENCH REQUIREMENTS ON BUILDING ESDI WITHIN NATO HAD BEEN MET, BUT AFSOUTH REMAINS A CRITICAL ISSUE FOR THE U.S. PRESSURE HAD TO BE PUT ON THE FRENCH TO UNDERSTAND THAT. SYG SOLANA REPLIED THAT FOR THE FRENCH THE ISSUE HAD MORE TO DO WITH PUBLIC PRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR A VISIBLE EUROPEAN IDENTITY THAN ANY MILITARY REALITY. BECAUSE OF THE MILITARY REALITIES, SOLANA SAID, HE COULD REPORT THAT ONLY GERMANY AMONG THE ALLIES SUPPORTED FRANCE. AND WITHIN GERMANY, THE POSITION WAS NOT STRONGLY HELD. DEFENSE MINISTER RUEHE BELIEVED THAT HE HAD AN OBLIGATION TO FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER MILLON ON THE ISSUE; WHILE KINKEL WAS LESS STRONG. KOHL DID NOT CONSIDER THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE ISSUE AT THIS TIME. SOLANA ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT ALLIES ALSO DID NOT WANT THE FRENCH TO WALK BACK ON THEIR COMMITMENT TO REINTEGRATION. THUS, MOST ALLIES WERE ALSO LOOKING AT WHAT COULD BE DONE TO HELP THE FRENCH COME DOWN FROM THEIR POSITION. ARE THERE OTHER ISSUES ON WHICH WE CAN HELP THE FRENCH IN THE PROCESS, THE SYG ASKED. THE

U.S. SHOULD PLAY A ROLE IN COMING UP WITH IDEAS, ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNIZED IT WAS A VERY COMPLEX PROBLEM. &/HOR EXAMPLE, HE KNEW THAT GOING TO THREE COMMANDS MIGHT GIVE ADDED FLEXIBILITY, BUT THE GERMANS AND OTHERS WERE VERY MUCH AGAINST THREE SUBORDINATE COMMANDS.

9. ~~(C)~~ THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT IN HIS MEETINGS IN PARIS, FOREIGN MINISTER DE CHARETTE WAS UNDER NO ILLUSION ABOUT THE ISSUE AND THE STRENGTH OF THE U.S. POSITION. THE SECRETARY REITERATED HIS CONCERN THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MOVE AHEAD ON OTHER ISSUES OF INTERNAL ADAPTATION IF AFSOUTH WAS NOT RESOLVED.

ENLARGEMENT NATO/RUSSIA

10. ~~(C)~~ NATO ENLARGEMENT AND PFP ENHANCEMENT SEEMED TO BE ON TRACK, SYG SOLANA SAID. HE ADDED THAT THE SITUATION WAS LESS CLEAR ABOUT NATO/RUSSIA AND HE WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING MORE ABOUT THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR AN ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL (APC). ON NATO/RUSSIA IT WOULD BE

USEFUL TO HAVE A MEETING WITH YELTSIN, BUT IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THE RUSSIAN LEADER WOULD ATTEND AN ENLARGEMENT SUMMIT. SO PERHAPS THE ENLARGEMENT SUMMIT AND NATO/RUSSIA SUMMIT WOULD HAVE TO BE SEPARATED. ON THAT POINT THE SECRETARY INTERJECTED THAT HE DOUBTED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD BE ABLE TO DO TWO "SUMMIT" EVENTS FOR NATO WITHIN ONE WEEK. AT THE ENLARGEMENT SUMMIT, SYG SOLANA SAID THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE SOME EVENT AT THE SUMMIT FOR ALL OF THE PARTNERS. AGREEING TO FORM A NEW TRANSATLANTIC BODY LIKE THE APC, IF HANDLED CORRECTLY, COULD DO THAT, HOWEVER, MORE INFOUN WAS NEEDED ABOUT THE APC.

1. ~~(C)~~ THE SECRETARY CAUTIONED ACAINST PUTTING EVERYTHING OFF UNTIL THE SUMMIT. THE SUMMIT WOULD BE DIFFICULT ENOUGH AND WE DID NOT WANT TO OVERLOAD IT. ON NATO/RUSSIA, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT AT THEIR LAST MEETING. HE HAD EMPHASIZED LINKAGE AND SAID THAT NATO/RUSSIA MUST COME BEFORE ENLARGEMENT. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN NO FORWARD MOVEMENT ON THE CHARTER OR OTHER SPECIFICS. THE U.S. VIEW REMAINED FIRMLY THAT THE TWO PROCESSES HAD TO PROCEED Ir PARALLEL; THE RUSSIANS COULD NOT PREVENT OR DICTATE THE TERMS OF ENLARGEMENT. WE HAD TO HOPE THAT THE RUSSIAN REACTION WOULD CHANGE WHEN YELTSIN RETURNED TO ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING. MEANWHILE, WE WOULD WORK ON THE OSCE SUMMIT AND MILITARY TO MILITARY LIAISON ISSUES WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR INTEREST IN PROCEEDING.

12. ~~(C)~~ THE SYG AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE STATUS OF NATO/RUSSIA RELATIONS. HE HOWEVER RAISED AGAIN AS HE HAD WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT (SEPTTEL) THE ISSUE OF HOW THE 16 PLUS 1 MEETINGS AT THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS COULD BE HANDLED WITH PRIMAKOV AND RODIONOV. WE CAN POINT TO THE SUCCESS IN THE MUTUAL ENDEAVOR IN IFOR, CITE THE OSCE SUMMIT RESULTS AND

PERHAPS COME TO CLOSURE ON MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS. WE SHOULD ALSO REITERATE NATO'S INTEREST IN AN OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR NATO/RUSSIA RELATIONS WITHOUT CALLING FOR A CHARTER. EVEN WITH THAT, AT LEAST PRIMAKOV WAS LIKELY TO BE VERY NEGATIVE AND COMPLAIN ABOUT SETTING THE SUMMIT DATE WITHOUT CONSULTING RUSSIA OR AGREEING ON A NATO/RUSSIA PACKAGE.

13. (C) THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE LIST OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS @N NATO/RUSSIA COOPERATION WAS SIGNIFICANT. A REFERENCE TO CFE ADAPTATION COULD ALSO BE ADDED. WE COULD ALSO CONSIDER PROVIDING AN OUTLINE FOR

THE CHARTER AT THE MEETING. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE WORDED CAREFULLY SINCE 16-PLUS-I AND 17 HAD ACQUIRED A MEANING TO THE RUSSIANS WITH 17 IMPLYING SOME SAY OVER NATO DECISIONS. PERSONALLY THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH SAYING 17 SINCE WE ALL AGREED THAT IT WAS THE CONTENT NOT THE NAME. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THE PURPOSE IS CONSULTATION NOT CODECISION MAKING. SOME ALLIES MIGHT WANT TO GO BEYOND THAT, BUT NATO CANNOT ABANDON ITS RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT DECISION MAKING. AT THIS STAGE, IT WAS PROBABLY NOT USEFUL TO PRESS THE RUSSIANS ON THE CHARTER, BUT WE COULD IDENTIFY AND TRY TO GET AGREEMENT ON SOME ELEMENTS OF COOPERATION.

14. (C) AT THE END OF THE BREAKFAST, DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT REPORTED ON HIS INITIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV.

APC AND PFP ENHANCEMENTS

15. (C) SYG SOLANA THEN TURNED TO EXTERNAL ADAPTATION AND ASKED WHAT THE U.S. HOPED TO GET ON APC AND PFP ENHANCEMENT AT THE DECEMBER NAC. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE BELIEVED PFP ENHANCEMENT AND AT LEAST A POSITIVE MENTION OF APC WERE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR THE DECEMBER NAC. HE ASKED U/S TARNOFF AND AMBASSADOR HUNTER TO DESCRIBE THE DETAILS OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL. U/S TARNOFF SAID THAT EVEN WITH ENLARGEMENT, NATO STILL HAD TO HAVE PROGRAMS OPEN TO ALL OF EUROPE, INCLUDING THE RUSSIANS. GIVEN DEVELOPMENTS SINCE BOTH WERE CREATED, THE APC COMBINED NACC AND PFP DRAWING ON THE STRENGTHS OF BOTH. BOTH THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF DISCUSSIONS WITH PARTNERS AS WELL AS MILITARY COOPERATION HAD TO BE EXPANDED. THE SUMMIT WOULD ALSO REFER TO RELATIONS WITH ALL PARTNERS, BUT THIS WAS AN AREA WHERE WORK COULD BEGIN NOW.

16. (C) AMBASSADOR HUNTER NOTED THAT NACC HAD ITS ORIGINS IN THE COLD WAR BUT THAT LINKAGE HAD OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS. WE HAD TO RETAIN AN ACTIVE PROGRAM OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, BUT IT HAD TO BE EXPANDED. AT THE SAME TIME, PFP HAD PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN PROMOTING REFORM IN THE DEFENSE STRUCTURES OF PARTNERS AS WELL AS HELPING SOME PREPARE FOR POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP. AS WE DEVELOPED NEW PFP PROGRAMS, WE HAD TO

GIVE PARTNERS A SENSE OF PARTICIPATION IN THEIR MANAGEMENT. THE APC WOULD DO THAT.

17. ~~(c)~~ THE SYG RESPONDED THAT THIS MADE SENSE TO HIM BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS CONCERN AMONG SOME ALJ4LANA HAD LEFT BEFORE THE U.S. HAD RAISED APC IN BRUSSELS.) IN CONCLUSION, THE SYG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT SOME PFP ENHANCEMENT WAS POSSIBLE; HE WOULD HAVE TO GAUGE THE REACTIONS TO THE APC BUT THOUGHT AT LEAST A MENTION IN DECEMBER WAS POSSIBLE.

GREECE/TURKEY

18. ~~(c)~~ SYG SOLANA SAID THAT HE HAD TWO OTHER ISSUES TO RAISE. THE FIRST WAS RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY. HE PERSONALLY HAD TRIED TO MAKE WHATEVER CONTRIBUTION HE COULD TO IMPROVE COOPERATION BETWEEN THESE TWO ALLIES. NATO HAD OFFERED TO SET UP A SECURE TELEPHONE LINK BETWEEN ANKARA AND ATHENS BUT IT STILL WAS NOT BEING USED. CYPRUS REMAINED A MAJOR PROBLEM WHICH WOULD ONLY GET WORSE WHEN THE EU HAD TO BEGIN ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS. NATO HAS LITTLE LEVERAGE EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT BOTH COUNTRIES WERE MEMBERS. SYG SOLANA ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE WAY IN WHICH TURKEY WAS HOLDING UP AGREEMENT ON NATO/WEU RELATIONS. BECAUSE OF THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE EU, TURKEY WAS INSISTING ON WHAT AMOUNTED TO FULL MEMBERSHIP RIGHTS IN THE WEU AS A CONDITION FOR MOVING FORWARD. THIS THREATENED THE WHOLE PROCESS OF BUILDING ESDI WITHIN NATO.

19. ~~(c)~~ THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT WITH ELECTIONS, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT SEEMED WILLING TO TAKE SOME STEPS TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, TURKEY'S ATTITUDE WAS LESS CLEAR. NO TURKISH LEADER WAS REALLY INVOLVED IN FOREIGN POLICY. CILLER WAS MORE INTERESTED IN HER DOMESTIC POLITICAL ROLE AND ERBAKAN WAS OUT OF THE PICTURE EXCEPT FOR FORAYS LIKE HIS RECENT TRIP TO LIBYA. THE ONE EXCEPTION WAS THE GOOD COOPERATION WE HAD FROM TURKEY ON THE KURDS IN IRAQ, BUT HERE THE TURKS HAD THEIR

OWN INTERESTS TO DEFEND. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES BOTH THE TURKISH MFA BUREAUCRACY AND MILITARY WERE PRETTY MUCH ON THEIR OWN BUT THEY SHOWED NO CREATIVITY. THE U.S., THE SECRETARY SAID, WAS SPENDING TIME ON TURKEY TRYING TO DEAL WITH IT THROUGH THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD.

NATO BUDGET

20. ~~(c)~~ THE SECOND ISSUE WHICH THE SYG RAISED WAS THE NATO BUDGET. SOLANA SAID THAT HE HAD TAKEN STEPS TO REORGANIZE AND RATIONALIZE THE NATO BUREAUCRACY, BUT AT THE SAME TIME NATO HAD MANY NEW TASKS. THUS, ZERO NOMINAL GROWTH IS NOT AN OPTION. GIVEN THE BUDGET CLIMATE IN A NUMBER OF ALLIED STATES HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT ZERO REAL GROWTH BUT THAT REQUIRED A SPECIAL FINANCIAL EFFORT AND DID NOT PERMIT NECESSARY REPAIRS TO NATO HEADQUARTERS

ITSELF. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT HE WAS AWARE THAT NATO HAD TAKEN ON MANY NEW TASKS AND NEEDED THE RESOURCES TO PERFORM THEM. HE WAS GRATEFUL THAT NATO HAD KEPT TO ZERO REAL GROWTH AND THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT THAT LEVEL.

POST IFOR

21. (2) THE CURRENT SITUATION IN BOSNIA, THE SECRETARY SAID, PROVED THAT WE HAD BEEN RIGHT TO INVOLVE NATO. THE FOCUS NOW HAD TO SHIFT TO THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PARTIES AND CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES, WHICH FRANKLY HAD LAGGED. THE CIVILIAN SIDE NEEDED A BOOST AND SOME SECURITY FORCE WOULD BE REQUIRED BUT IT HAD TO BE DIFFERENT FROM IFOR. THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE ANNOUNCING THE U.S. DECISION THAT DAY AND WOULD SAY THAT THE U.S. WAS PREPARED, IN PRINCIPAL, TO PARTICIPATE IN A FOLLOW-ON FORCE. BUT TO PERSUADE CONGRESS IT HAD TO BE CLEAR THAT THE NEW FORCE WAS DIFFERENT. SYG SOLANA SAID THAT FROM WT HE HAD HEARD HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO AGREE ON THE U.S. CONDITIONS BUT HE EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT THE TIMING WOULD BE VERY TIGHT. WORK HAD TO BEGIN SOON ON AN OPLAN FOR IT TO BE AGREED TO BEFORE DECEMBER 20. OUT OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE, WHICH HE WOULD ATTEND, SOLANA SAID THAT A BETTER PLAN FOR CIVILIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF DAYTON HAD TO EMERGE. IN ADDITION, A NEW UN RESOLUTION AND THE RENEWED AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES HAD TO BE OBTAINED BEFORE THE END OF IFOR1S MANDATE. BOTH WOULD REQUIRE MUC CHRISTOPHER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

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