

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Christopher-Kozyrev Follow-up (4 pages)	03/03/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
002. cable	Re: Offer to Host summit (2 pages)	03/04/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
003. cable	Re: Wrapup of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Shokhin's 2/26/ 3/2 Visit to Washington (2 pages)	03/06/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
004. cable	Re: The Secretary's Meeting with NATO SYG Manfred Woerner, March 3, 1993 (5 pages)	03/06/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
005. cable	Re: Ambassador Albright's March 8 Meeting with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Lavrov (3 pages)	03/09/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
006. cable	Re: Briefing Allies on US/Russian Summit (1 page)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
007. cable	Re: Secretary Christopher's Dilateral with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev: Lunch, March 23 (7 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
008. cable	Re: Visit to Ministry of Atomic Energy on March 31, 1993 (3 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
009. cable	Re: Russian Report Possible Yeltsin Summit Agenda Item (4 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
010. cable	Re: Russian Troop Withdrawals from the Baltics: Summit Level Attention (2 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
011. cable	Re: [Russia/Vancouver Summit] [incomplete] (3 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1)
012. cable	Re: [Russia/Vancouver Summit] [incomplete - continuation of 010] (2 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1993 - Dec 1994 ([Vancouver Summit...])
 OA/Box Number: 5050000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/03/1993 - 04/02/1993]

2016-0118-M
 ke4025

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	Re: Vancouver Package and Preparations (3 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
014. cable	Re: [Vancouver Summit] (2 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1)
015. cable	Re: [Aid to Russia] (3 pages)	04/01/1993	P1/b(1)
016. cable	Re: [Message to James Judd from Tony Lake] (3 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
017. cable	Re: [Russian Political Situation] (3 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)
018. cable	Re: Letter from President Meri (2 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
019. cable	Re: Vancouver Summit (2 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
020. cable	Re: [Economic Aid Package] (5 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)
021. cable	Re: [Economic Aid Package] (2 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)
022. cable	Re: [Russia/Vancouver Summit] (3 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)
023. cable	Re: [Vancouver Summit] Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526 (2 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1993 - Dec 1994 ([Vancouver Summit...])
 OA/Box Number: 5050000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/03/1993 - 04/02/1993]

2016-0118-M
ke4025

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
 OSRI: RUEHCAA
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 LINE2: ZNY SS3SS ZZH
 LINE3: O 030520Z MAR 93
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
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 TO: ****
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 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 5896
 SUBJ: CHRISTOPHER-KOZYREV FOLLOW-UP
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0118-M-2 (1.01)
 VL 06/01/2023

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 063297
 NODIS
 NSC EYES ONLY LAKE-ITOH, CIA EYES ONLY STUDEMAN
 FOLLOWING MOSCOW 06191 DATED 3 MAR 93 SENT ACTION TO SECSTATE
 IS BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO:
 QUOTE: ~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 006191
 NODIS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PARM, RS
 SUBJECT: CHRISTOPHER-KOZYREV FOLLOW-UP
 1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. SUMMARY. ON MARCH 2 CHARGE COLLINS MET WITH
 RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV TO DISCUSS
 FOLLOW-UP ITEMS FROM THE FEBRUARY 25 GENEVA MEETING
 BETWEEN SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN
 MINISTER KOZYREV. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED INCLUDED:
 -- ADDITIONAL MINISTERIALS: MAMEDOV SAID KOZYREV
 WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO VISIT WASHINGTON, AND POSSIBLY
 NEW YORK TO DISCUSS YUGOSLAVIA, AFTER MARCH 20.
 -- SUMMIT DOCUMENT: MAMEDOV URGED PROMPT U.S.
 COMMENTS ON THE RUSSIAN OUTLINE SUMMIT DOCUMENT,
 HANDED OVER IN GENEVA.
 -- BILATERAL CW ACCORD: MAMEDOV SAID THE RUSSIANS
 WOULD LIKE TO WRAP-UP THE LOOSE ENDS ON THE 1990
 WYOMING AGREEMENT, IN TIME TO REACH AGREEMENT AT THE
 SUMMIT. HE URGED PROMPT U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR CW
 DESTRUCTION. END SUMMARY.
 ADDITIONAL MINISTERIAL MEETINGS

 3. MAMEDOV SAID HE BELIEVES IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR
 SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV TO
 MEET ONE MORE TIME BEFORE THE SUMMIT. MAMEDOV SAID
 THIS COULD BE IN WASHINGTON SOMETIME AFTER MARCH 20.
 THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE VISIT, OF COURSE, WOULD BE THE
 MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER BUT IF HE CAME TO
 WASHINGTON, KOZYREV WOULD NATURALLY ALSO WANT TO MEET
 PRESIDENT CLINTON AND OTHER OFFICIALS. IT WAS

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POSSIBLE THAT KOZYREV WOULD ALSO VISIT THE UN IN NEW YORK TO DISCUSS YUGOSLAVIA. MAMEDOV STRESSED THAT THIS PROPOSED KOZYREV VISIT TO THE U.S. SHOULD BE CONSIDERED VERY SENSITIVE AT THIS STAGE. A PROPOSAL TO MAKE THE VISIT WILL BE SENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE END OF THIS WEEK.

DRAFT SUMMIT DOCUMENT

4. MAMEDOV SAID THE RUSSIANS EXPECT U.S. COMMENTS ON THE OUTLINE OF A SUMMIT DOCUMENT HANDED OVER DURING THE GENEVA MEETING. MAMEDOV STRESSED THE RUSSIANS WOULD LIKE THE U.S. COMMENTS SOON BECAUSE KOZYREV WANTS TO BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE TO WASHINGTON A COMPLETED RUSSIAN DRAFT DOCUMENT, THAT WOULD INCORPORATE U.S. COMMENTS ON THE RUSSIAN OUTLINE. MAMEDOV SAID THE RUSSIANS ARE INTERESTED IN MAKING THE DOCUMENT AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE. IT SHOULD BE A WORKING DOCUMENT THAT WOULD SET OUT SPECIFIC AREAS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
RUSSIAN-AMERICAN WORKING GROUP

5. MAMEDOV NOTED THAT HE AND STROBE TALBOTT HAD AGREED TO ARRANGE THE FIRST MEETING OF THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN WORKING GROUP AFTER TALBOTT'S CONFIRMATION. MAMEDOV INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS SOME RELUCTANCE IN MOSCOW ABOUT THIS TIMING FOR THE FIRST MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP. MAMEDOV IMPLIED THAT THIS CAUTION WAS BASED ON A CONCERN NOT TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE MAIN KOZYREV-CHRISTOPHER CHANNEL, AT THIS TIME.

6. MAMEDOV SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOLD A PRELIMINARY, INFORMAL MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE MARGINS OF THE PROPOSED KOZYREV VISIT TO THE U.S. IF THE U.S. AGREED, MAMEDOV COULD BRING HIS TWO MAIN PARTNERS IN THE WORKING GROUP, FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF, GENERAL ANDREI NIKOLAYEV, AND THE FIRST DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE RUSSIAN EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, VYACHESLAV TRUBNIKOV.

7. MAMEDOV SAID RUSSIA IS ALSO DISCUSSING THE BROAD TOPIC OF STRATEGIC STABILITY WITH CANADA. BECAUSE OF

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 063297
NODIS

NSC EYES ONLY LAKE-ITOH, CIA EYES ONLY STUDEMAN
THE CLOSE TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CANADA AND IN VIEW OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE U.S. AND CANADIAN AIR DEFENSE AND EARLY WARNING NETWORKS IT WOULD BE USEFUL AT SOME TIME TO CONSIDER INCLUDING CANADA IN THE TALKS, AT LEAST ON THE ISSUE OF GPS.

CW IMPETUS

8. MAMEDOV ALSO SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD LIKE TO COMPLETE ACTION PURSUANT TO THE 1990 U.S.-SOVIET WYOMING CW AGREEMENT. NOTING THAT THE U.S. HAD COMPLAINED THAT THE RUSSIAN BILATERAL CW DELEGATION IN GENEVA IS MOVING TOO SLOWLY, MAMEDOV SAID THE RUSSIANS ARE SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR CW DELEGATION IN GENEVA TO ACCELERATE THE BILATERAL

TALKS. RUSSIA WOULD APPRECIATE THE US. ENSURING THAT ITS DELEGATION HAD SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS. MAMEDOV STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONCLUDING U.S.-RUSSIAN BILATERAL CW ACCORDS, CITING THE LINKAGE WITH RUSSIAN MOVES TO IMPLEMENT THE MULTILATERAL CWC AND THE NEED FOR THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE RESOURCE ALLOCATION DECISIONS. MAMEDOV NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE VISITING THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ON MARCH 3 TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE.

9. MAMEDOV POINTED OUT THAT THE QUESTION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR CW DESTRUCTION IS BECOMING POLITICALLY SENSITIVE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE IS PROMPTLY FORTHCOMING AND IS AIMED AT ACTUALLY HELPING CW DESTRUCTION. OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DROP THE QUESTION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THIS AREA ALTOGETHER. AT PRESENT, RUSSIAN COMPLAINTS ABOUT U.S. SLOWNESS IN PROVIDING CW DESTRUCTION ASSISTANCE ARE DIRECTED AT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, BUT IF THE CURRENT SITUATION CONTINUES MUCH LONGER THESE COMPLAINTS WILL BEGIN TO BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION.

10. OTHER POINTS MADE DURING THE MEETING:

-- CHARGE NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD PROMISED TO PROVIDE THE RUSSIANS WITH INFORMATION ON WHERE THE RUSSIAN APPLICATION TO JOIN GATT STOOD. MAMEDOV REPLIED THAT AS FAR AS HE IS AWARE NO PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES ARE EXPECTED AND THAT RUSSIA IS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN RECEIVING U.S. SUPPORT FOR ITS GATT APPLICATION.

-- MAMEDOV ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. HAD ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE RUSSIAN DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE G-7 TOKYO MEETING. CHARGE REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO NEW INFORMATION ON THIS POINT AND MAMEDOV SAID HE WAS STILL OPTIMISTIC RUSSIA COULD ATTEND.

-- MAMEDOV NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD SAID IT WILL PROVIDE THEM WITH ANY IDEAS ON WHAT KOZYREV SHOULD SAY IN TEHERAN. HE NOTED THAT KOZYREV IS LEAVING FOR IRAN, PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA ON MARCH 7 (SEPTTEL) AND STATED THAT THE MFA LOOKS FORWARD TO FOLLOW UP FROM THE U.S. ON THIS ISSUE. COLLINS UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

BT

#3297

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 3297
<^SSN>3297

TOR: 930303002110 M0256193
<^TOR>930303002109 M0256192

DIST:

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY KYIM LAKE SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BURNS FILE GATI SUM SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL
<^DIST>

SIT: GOTTEMOELLER
<^DIST>

SIT: BURNS GATI GOTTEMOELLER SANNER
<^DIST>

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SIT: FRY BELL
<^DIST>
SIT: PONEMAN
□

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
 OSRI: RUEHSFA
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 LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 LINE3: O 041119Z MAR 93
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
 DTG: 041119Z MAR 93
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY SOFIA
 TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6067
 INFO: ****
 SUBJ: OFFER TO HOST SUMMIT
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-M-1 (1,02)
 VL 06/01/2013

~~SECRET~~ SOFIA 01308
 EXDIS
 DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S NILES; AND
 D/MONTGOMERY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JENONNE WALKER
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, BU
 SUBJECT: OFFER TO HOST SUMMIT
 1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. PRESIDENT ZHELEV APPROACHED AMBASSADOR AT THE
 NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION MARCH 3 TO OFFER SOFIA AS SITE
 FOR UPCOMING SUMMIT BETWEEN PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND
 YELTSIN. ZHELEV REITERATED POINTS MADE IN EARLIER
 APPROACH BY HIS FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR, KAMEN VELICHKOV.
 -- HOLDING THE SUMMIT NEXT DOOR TO SERBIA WOULD
 DEMONSTRATE BOTH SIDES' CONCERN ABOUT THE CONFLICT IN
 EX-YUGOSLAVIA AS WELL AS SUPPORT FOR BULGARIA'S
 RESPONSIBLE BALKAN POLICY.
 -- IT WOULD HIGHLIGHT BULGARIA'S SUCCESS IN IMPLEMENTING
 ENLIGHTENED POLICIES VIS-A-VIS ITS OWN MUSLIM (ETHNIC
 TURKISH) MINORITY.
 -- A "SOFIA SUMMIT" WOULD BE A FITTING SYMBOL OF THE
 NEW, POST-SOVIET EUROPE IN WHICH THE FORMER SATELLITES
 ARE SOVEREIGN STATES WITH TIES TO BOTH WESTERN EUROPE
 AND RUSSIA.
 TO THESE WE ADD:
 -- HOSTING A SUMMIT WOULD BE A SOURCE OF PRIDE AND UNITY
 FOR BULGARIANS AND THUS WOULD GIVE A BOOST TO PRESIDENT
 ZHELEV, WHO IS UNDER FIRE FROM A RIGHTIST FACTION OF THE
 UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES, AND TO THE REFORM PROCESS,
 WHICH IS BOGGED DOWN WITH DOMESTIC POLITICAL SQUABBLES.
 -- IT WOULD BE A WAY OF EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR
 BULGARIAN SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AND A FORM OF
 NON-MONETARY COMPENSATION FOR THE ATTENDANT LOSSES TO
 THE HARD-HIT BULGARIAN ECONOMY.
 -- WITH THE OFFICIAL GUEST HOUSES IN BOYANA AND TWO
 LARGE LUXURY-CLASS WESTERN HOTELS, SOFIA DOES HAVE THE
 FACILITIES TO HOST A SUMMIT. THE GOB WOULD, OF COURSE,

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PULL OUT ALL THE STOPS ON SECURITY AND LOGISTICAL
ARRANGEMENTS. HILL

BT

#1308

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1308

TOR: 930304102453 M0259691

DIST:

PRT: ITOH KENNEY WALKER

SIT: SANNER VAX

□

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 OSRI: RUEHCAA
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
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 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: RUEHSD/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9805 IMMEDIATE
 INFO: ZEN/AMEMBASSY KIEV 9219
 SUBJ: WRAPUP OF RUSSIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
 SHOKHIN'S 2/26-3/2 VISIT TO WASHINGTON
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-m-1 (1,03)
VZ 6/1/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 067720
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: ECON, ETRD, EFIN, PREL, RE, UP
 SUBJECT: WRAPUP OF RUSSIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
 SHOKHIN'S 2/26-3/2 VISIT TO WASHINGTON
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
 2. SEPTTEL WILL REPORT ON DEPUTY SECRETARY WHARTON'S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SHOKHIN. THIS CABLE ATTEMPTS TO PUT SHOKHIN'S OTHER USG APPOINTMENTS DURING HIS FEBRUARY 26-MARCH 2 VISIT INTO PERSPECTIVE. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE SHOKHIN VISIT WAS TO SECURE A RESUMPTION OF U.S. GRAIN SALES BY REINSTATING RUSSIA IN THE CCC PROGRAM. SHOKHIN'S PROPOSALS TO THIS END PARALLELED IDEAS GENERATED BY THE NORTH AMERICAN GRAIN EXPORT ASSOCIATION. IN SHORT, THESE INVOLVE BREAKING OUT FORMER SOVIET FROM RUSSIAN CCC GUARANTEED DEBT, RUSSIAN PAYMENT OF THE ARREARS ON THE LATTER AND A REINSTATEMENT OF GEM-102 OR 103 GUARANTEES ON THIS BASIS. SHOKHIN SHOWED A STRONG PREFERENCE FOR RENEWAL OF THE GSM PROGRAM, BUT IN ITS ABSENCE HE TOLD USDA THAT HE WAS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE A CONCESSIONAL SALES ARRANGEMENT. TO OTHER ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTATIVES, HE EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO THE IDEA OF A CONCESSIONAL PROGRAM. EXPANDED CONCESSIONAL FOOD AID IS ONE OPTION BEING CONSIDERED BY USDA.
 3. SHOKHIN STRESSED THE URGENCY OF A DECISION ON CCC, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, IN ADVANCE OF AN APRIL SUMMIT. HE EXPLAINED THAT URGENCY IN TERMS OF THE DEPLETION OF RUSSIAN GRAIN STOCKS AND THE YELTSIN GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES. AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT, BUT UNSTATED FACTOR, IS THAT RUSSIA IS NOW CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH A NUMBER OF GRAIN SUPPLIERS. SECURING A COMMITMENT AND COMMERCIAL TERMS FROM THE U.S. WOULD ESTABLISH A BASELINE FOR THESE OTHER NEGOTIATIONS AND ENCOURAGE SUPPLIERS TO BID AMONG THEMSELVES FOR THE RUSSIAN TRADE.
 4. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS TOLD SHOKHIN THAT THE ISSUES

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INVOLVED WERE COMPLICATED AND THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CONSULT WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION AND WITH CONGRESS ON A RANGE OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS BEFORE ANY DECISION COULD BE TAKEN. SHOKHIN WAS TOLD THAT THE BEET SCENARIO WOULD BE FOR RUSSIA TO CLEAR UP ITS ARREARS ON CCC PAYMENTS SO WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE STRONG CONSIDERATION TO RESTARTING THE PROGRAM QUICKLY. THAT WOULD OFFER THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF PERMITTING RUSSIA TO DRAW ON THE SIZABLE CCC GUARANTEES ALREADY AUTHORIZED BUT TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED. WE EXPECT PRESIDENT CLINTON WILL HAVE A FULL DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES WHEN HE MEETS PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON APRIL 4.

5. ON DEBT RESCHEDULING, SHOKHIN SHOWED VERY LITTLE FLEXIBILITY. HE HELD TO RUSSIA'S POSITION THAT IT COULD ASSUME NO MORE THAN DOLLARS 2.5 BILLION IN DEBT SERVICE, INCLUDING PAYMENTS TO OFFICIAL CREDITORS, COMMERCIAL BANKS AND SUPPLIERS. HE GAVE NO SIGN THAT THERE WOULD BE AN EARLY RESOLUTION TO RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN DIFFERENCES ON MANAGING THE LIABILITY OF DEBT OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. SHOKHIN APPARENTLY LOOKS TO THE G-7 AND OTHER OFFICIAL CREDITORS TO BREAK THE IMPASSE BY DEALING DIRECTLY WITH RUSSIA ON A RESCHEDULING.

6. SHOKHIN BELIEVES (AND COULD NOT BE DISSUADED) THAT THERE ARE SERIOUS BARRIERS TO RUSSIAN EXPORTS TO THE U.S. HE IDENTIFIED COCOM CONTROLS, WHICH HE IMPLIED ARE COMMERCIALY MOTIVATED, ANTI-DUMPING CASES, INCLUDING THE RECENT URANIUM CASE, AND COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCHES AS EXAMPLES OF THIS. MARKET ACCESS IS ONE AREA WHERE SUMMIT ACTION SHOULD BE POSSIBLE. WE EXPECT TO SUPPORT RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE GATT AND SUPPLY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO HELP BRING ITS TRADE REGIME INTO GATT COMPLIANCE AS WELL AS OFFER THE RUSSIANS GSP, IF THEY IN FACT WANT THIS PREFERENTIAL TARIFF TREATMENT.

CHRISTOPHER

BT

#7720

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 7720

TOR: 930306211405 M0264449

DIST:

SIT: BURNS VAX

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
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 INFO: ALL NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL IMMEDIATE
 RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0000
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0000
 RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0000
 SUBJ: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH NATO SYG MANFRED
 WOERNER, MARCH 3. 1993

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-01-1 (1.04)
rc 20 6/1/2023

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 067584
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: NATO, NAC, CSCE, EEC, WEU. NACC' PREL
 SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH NATO SYG MANFRED
 WOERNER, MARCH 3. 1993

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. IN HIS MARCH 3 MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY, WOERNER PROPOSED THAT A NATO SUMMIT BE HELD IN THE FALL OF 1993 TO DETERMINE THE COURSE OF NATO'S DEVELOPMENT. ALSO DISCUSSED WAS HOW THE U.S. SHOULD BRIEF THE ALLIES ON THE APRIL CLINTON-YELTSIN SUMMIT. WOERNER DISCUSSED THE INTEREST OF NACC STATES, PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, IN CLOSER ASSOCIATION WITH NATO BECAUSE OF ANXIETY OVER POTENTIAL INSTABILITY AT HOME AND IN THE REGION. HE APPEALED FOR FUNDING TO PURSUE NATO OUTREACH ACTIVITIES TO THE EAST AND URGED THE U.S. TO RENEW ITS SUPPORT FOR THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM. IN A DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, WOERNER WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE EC, WEU AND NATO, BUT WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CSCE. END SUMMARY.
3. DURING HIS MARCH 1-3 VISIT TO WASHINGTON, NATO SYG MANFRED WOERNER CALLED ON THE SECRETARY AT 9:30 AM MARCH
3. SEVERAL ISSUES. INCLUDING EX-YUGOSLAVIA, HAD BEEN COVERED AT AN EARLIER WOERNER/CHRISTOPHER MEETING HELD IN BRUSSELS PRIOR TO THE FEBRUARY 26 NAC. ALSO ATTENDING THE MARCH 3 MEETING WERE EUR A/S NILES, U/S-DESIGNATE TARNOFF, U/S-DESIGNATE DAVIS, A/S-DESIGNATE OXMAN, AND AN EUR/RPM NOTETAKER.

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CALL FOR A NATO SUMMIT

4. AFTER A SHORT PHOTO OPPORTUNITY, WOERNER LED OFF THE DISCUSSION, NOTING THAT HE HAD PROPOSED TO THE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR LAKE, IN HIS MEETING WITH THEM THE PREVIOUS DAY, THE IDEA OF NATO SUMMIT. HE ASKED FOR EARLY WARNING OF USG PLANNING FOR A SUMMIT SO THAT NATO COULD BE PREPARED. HE PREFERRED THAT A SUMMIT NOT BE MERE "WINDOW DRESSING" BUT, LIKE PREVIOUS NATO SUMMITS, SHOULD DETERMINE THE COURSE OF NATO'S DEVELOPMENT.

5. THE SECRETARY ASKED ABOUT THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF A NATO SUMMIT. WOERNER RESPONDED WITH THREE POINTS. FIRST, A SUMMIT WOULD ALLOW NATO TO DEFINE CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY ITS NEW ROLES AND PROPOSE CONCRETE INITIATIVES. THE PUBLIC CONTINUES TO ASK ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF NATO IN POST-COLD-WAR EUROPE AND DOES NOT FULLY RECOGNIZE THE CHANGES NATO HAS ALREADY MADE. A SUMMIT WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PUBLICIZE THIS ONGOING TRANSFORMATION AND NATO'S OUTREACH TO THE EAST.

6. SECOND, A SUMMIT WOULD GIVE THE U.S. A FORUM IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT COULD, IN ONE EVENT, MEET ALL 15 ALLIANCE LEADERS AND GIVE THEM A CLEAR VIEW OF HIS ADMINISTRATION'S AGENDA. THIS VISIBLE EXERCISE OF U.S. LEADERSHIP COULD TAKE PLACE EITHER IN THE U.S. OR IN EUROPE. WOERNER RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD USED HIS FIRST SUMMIT TO ESTABLISH HIS LEADERSHIP IN NATO SOON AFTER TAKING OFFICE (MAY 1989).

7. THIRD A SUMMIT COULD FURTHER DEFINE NATO'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE EVOLVING EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY (ESDI). MODALITIES OF THIS RELATIONSHIP STILL NEED TO BE WORKED OUT, AND THE FALL OF 1993 WOULD THEREFORE BE THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY FOR A WELL-PREPARED NATO SUMMIT. INTER ALIA, A NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN PLACE.

8. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY FROM THE SECRETARY, WOERNER NOTED THAT NATO HAD HELD THREE SUMMITS SINCE 1989: BRUSSELS IN MAY 1989, LONDON IN JULY 1990, AND ROME IN

NOVEMBER 1991. HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY THAT A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF LEAD-TIME WOULD BE DESIRABLE BUT MAINTAINED THAT AS SOON AS THE U.S. DECIDES TO CALL FOR A NATO SUMMIT, THE ALLIES WILL QUICKLY AGREE TO ATTEND.

NATO'S OUTREACH TO THE EAST

9. THE SECRETARY ASKED WOERNER HOW TO INTEGRATE FORMER WARSAW PACT STATES INTO THE NATO ORBIT AND INCREASE COOPERATION ACTIVITIES. WOERNER RESPONDED THAT OUTREACH AND COOPERATION WILL REMAIN DIFFICULT AS LONG AS THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA IS UNSTABLE AND UNPREDICTABLE. THERE IS GROWING PRESSURE FROM CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN (CEE) STATES TO MOVE CLOSER TO NATO. HOWEVER, AN INCREASE IN NATO TIES WITH CEE STATES CAN BE

SEEN IN MOSCOW AS THREATENING AND AFFECT RUSSIAN INTERNAL POLITICS.

10. WOERNER POINTED TO A RELATED QUESTION - THE EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE EC AND POSSIBLY THE WEU OF TRADITIONAL EUROPEAN NEUTRALS (E.G. SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, AND AUSTRIA) -- WHICH LEADS TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A STATE CAN JOIN THE EC/WEU WITHOUT JOINING NATO. WOERNER SAID THE ALLIES HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE ISSUE, BUT HE URGED THE U.S. TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF EC EXPANSION UPON NATO. WE HAVE SOME TIME SINCE THE FIRST ADMISSION OF THESE STATES TO THE EC IS NOT SCHEDULED BEFORE 1995/96, AND TO THE WEU BEFORE 1996/97.

11. WOERNER ARGUED THAT NACC STATES ARE INCREASINGLY INTERESTED IN MOVING CLOSER TO NATO BECAUSE OF ANXIETY ABOUT RUSSIAN INSTABILITY AND FEARS OF THEIR OWN DOMESTIC INSTABILITY. BY AND LARGE. MOST DO NOT FEEL MILITARILY THREATENED BY RUSSIA (EXCEPT UKRAINE AND THE BALTIC STATES) BUT ALL FEAR THAT CONSERVATIVE FORCES IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES COULD OBTAIN RUSSIAN SUPPORT AND DESTABILIZE THEIR FLEDGLING DEMOCRACIES. THE NACC STATES BELIEVE THEY LIVE IN A "SECURITY VACUUM," AND THAT NATO MEMBERSHIP CAN HELP STAVE OFF THE RETURN OF AUTHORITARIAN FORCES.

12. THE SYG SAID THE NACC STATES UNDERSTAND THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF NATO MEMBERSHIP IN THE SHORT TERM. HOWEVER. WOERNER URGED THE SECRETARY TO START CONSIDERING POSSIBLE TIMEFRAMES, CANDIDATES AND CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION. IN THE MEANTIME, WOERNER BELIEVED NATO MUST ADD TO THE SECURITY OF NACC STATES. SHORT OF EXTENDING FORMAL SECURITY GUARANTEES.

13. WOERNER POINTED TO ANOTHER PROBLEM: THE CEE STATES SUPPORT DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN GROUPS OF NACC MEMBERS. CEE STATES LIKE HUNGARY AND POLAND, WHERE STABLE DEMOCRACIES ARE BEING BUILT, OBJECT TO EQUAL TREATMENT WITH RUSSIA. WOERNER SAID HE CONTINUES TO ASSURE THE CEE STATES THAT NATO, IN FACT, DIFFERENTIATES BETWEEN NACC STATES AND COOPERATES WITH CEE STATES IN WAYS IT COULD NOT WITH RUSSIA. IN WOERNER'S VIEW, THE TRICK IS TO CONTINUE CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE CEE STATES WITHOUT ANGERING RUSSIA. (COMMENT: WOERNER DID NOT RAISE THE OTHER PERSPECTIVE ON "NACC DIFFERENTIATION" -- THE DEGREE TO WHICH NATO MAY WANT TO DEVELOP A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH RUSSIA. END COMMENT)

MORE FUNDING NEEDED FOR NATO OUTREACH TO THE EAST

14. THE SYG COMPLAINED THAT ONE OBSTACLE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE NACC WAS FINANCIAL. THE WEST SENDS BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AID TO THE EAST, BUT HE COULD NOT GET EVEN 2-3 MILLION DOLLARS FOR EFFECTIVE OUTREACH. WOERNER STRESSED THAT NATO COULD DO A LOT WITH JUST A LITTLE; HE HAD CUT PERSONNEL IN ORDER TO FUND OUTREACH ACTIVITIES. HE URGED THE U.S. AND THE OTHER ALLIES TO PROVIDE FUNDS FOR THE TRAVEL AND PER DIEM OF NACC PARTNER STATE REPRESENTATIVES WHO VISITED BRUSSELS TO PARTICIPATE IN

OUTREACH ACTIVITIES. WITH FUNDING, WOERNER COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, INVITE UZBEK DELEGATIONS TO ATTEND NATO SEMINARS, FOLLOW UP ON RUSSIAN REQUESTS TO INVITE CORPS COMMANDERS TO VISIT NATO HQ, AND OPEN NATO SCHOOLS TO THE POLES.

15. WOERNER SAID MORE SECURITY DISCUSSIONS WITH NACC PARTNER STATES WERE NEEDED AS WELL AS CRISIS MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE CSCE. (HE OFFERED HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT NATO WAS A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AND COULD NOT ACT MILITARILY ON A GLOBAL BASIS.) THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THE NACC COULD BE STRENGTHENED THROUGH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, CONFERENCES, JOINT MANEUVERS, AND CRISIS PREVENTION ACTIVITIES.

16. THE SYG OPINED THAT CEE STATES HAD MORE TRUST IN NATO THAN IN CSCE, SINCE NATO WAS AN ORGANIZATION WITH POWER. WOERNER SAID THAT IN VIENNA, CSCE AMBASSADORS COMPLAINED THAT EASTERN STATES WERE MORE INTERESTED IN CLOSE TIES WITH NATO. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE ATTRACTION WAS BASED IN AN EASTERN VIEW THAT NATO WAS THE POWER INSTRUMENT OF THE U.S. IN EUROPE. FOR NACC PARTNERS, CLOSER TIES TO NATO MEAN CLOSER TIES TO THE U.S.

17. THERE ARE LIMITS TO NACC OPERATIONS, WOERNER NOTED. THERE WOULD BE NO NATO CONSENSUS TO SEND NATO TROOPS TO ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, OR GEORGIA. HE SAID SHEVARDNADZE HAD INVITED HIM TO VISIT GEORGIA AS A SIGNAL THAT NATO IS INTERESTED; WOERNER ACCEPTED BUT CONTINUES TO POSTPONE HIS TRIP OUT OF CONCERN FOR RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES.

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS

18. THE SECRETARY ASKED WOERNER TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH TO MANY AMERICANS ARE AN ALPHABET SOUP WITH OVERLAPPING RESPONSIBILITIES AND BLOATED BUREAUCRACIES. WOERNER REPLIED THAT THE EC WILL SURVIVE AND, WITH IT, THE WEU. EUROPEANS WANT A SEPARATE INSTRUMENT TO USE IF AND WHEN THEY REACH THE GOAL OF A COMMON SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY. THIS INSTRUMENT WOULD BE USED IN CASES WHERE THE U.S., FOR WHATEVER REASON, CHOSE NOT TO BE INVOLVED. THE EC'S PAINFUL AND PUBLIC FAILURE IN EX-YUGOSLAVIA FOSTERED A DETERMINATION TO BE READY TO ACT IN ANY CASE IN WHICH THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT TO ENGAGE.

19. FOR THIS REASON, THERE SHOULD BE TWO PILLARS UNDER THE NATO ROOF -- THE U.S. AND THE WEU. THE WEU IS NATO'S EUROPEAN PILLAR. INSTITUTIONAL MODALITIES FOR ACTION SHOULD BE DECIDED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. BUT IN EACH CASE. THE COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR USE. WOERNER ARGUED THAT THE KEY IS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE MODALITIES OF THE NATO/WEU RELATIONSHIP AND TO AVOID CONSTRUCTING A SECOND, DUPLICATIVE, SEPARATE WEU SECURITY STRUCTURE. IN WOERNER'S VIEW THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE EASIER TO REACH WHEN FRANCE MOVES CLOSER TO KEY NATO DEFENSE BODIES.

20. WOERNER WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT NATO WOULD SURVIVE -- AS

LONG AS THE U.S. MAINTAINS ITS COMMITMENT TO EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN PILLAR IS FIRMLY IN PLACE. AFTER THE STRUCTURE IS COMPLETE, THE ALLIES CAN CONSIDER FURTHER REORGANIZATION.

21. THE SYG SAID HE PERSONALLY DOUBTED THE CSCE WOULD SURVIVE. ALTHOUGH CSCE DESERVES A CHANCE. WOERNER WORRIES THAT IT IS NOT DEVELOPING "AS A REGIONAL UN" DUE TO THE LACK OF A STEERING ORGANIZATION. HE BELIEVES THE CSCE IS A TALKING SHOP WITHOUT ENOUGH SUBSTANCE. WOERNER NOTED THIS WAS ONLY HIS PERSONAL VIEW. NATO IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN STRENGTHENING THE CSCE.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE

22. WOERNER ASKED IF HE COULD RAISE AN ADDITIONAL SUBJECT: RENEWED U.S. SUPPORT FOR NATO INFRASTRUCTURE. HE SAID NATO WAS DOWN TO THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, AND LOWER FUNDING LEVELS WOULD THREATEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE PROGRAM, WHICH ALONG WITH THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE WAS THE BACKBONE OF NATO. THE SYG ASKED FOR A U.S. COMMITMENT OF 250 MILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR, NOTING THE GERMANS PAY ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT AND THE UK JUST A BIT LESS.

23. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT THE HILL'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN TO WOERNER'S LOBBYING THE PREVIOUS DAY ON INFRASTRUCTURE. WOERNER SAID THAT CONGRESS HAD BEEN "FRIENDLY BUT NONCOMMITTAL." THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD WOERNER'S POINT, BUT IT WAS A TIME OF COMPETING PRIORITIES, AND MANY WERE NOT YET AWARE OF NATO'S ADAPTATION AND NEW ROLE.

NATO BRIEFING ON THE CLINTON/YELTSIN SUMMIT

24. IN CLOSING, THE SECRETARY MENTIONED THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING HOW THE U.S. COULD BEST BRIEF THE NAC ON THE RESULTS OF THE APRIL 4 CLINTON/YELTSIN SUMMIT. WOERNER RESPONDED THAT DEBRIEFING THE NAC WAS A GOOD TRADITION WHICH SHOULD BE CONTINUED. HE ASKED THAT A SENIOR OFFICIAL BE SENT TO NATO WHO HAD PARTICIPATED IN ALL THE SUMMIT MEETINGS. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT MODALITIES OF THE DEBRIEFING WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BEFORE HE COULD GIVE WOERNER DEFINITE INFORMATION. CHRISTOPHER

BT

#7584

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 7584

TOR: 930305195238 M0263504

DIST:

SIT: LOWENKRON VAX WITKOWSKY

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
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 SUBJ: AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S MARCH 8 MEETING WITH
 -- RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-M-3 (1,05)

R 6/1/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001059
 DEPT PLEAS PASS TO NATOE COLLETIVE
 E.O.12356 : DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PREL, UNSC, RU, US
 SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S MARCH 8 MEETING WITH
 -- RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV
 REF: STATE 46800
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. SUMMARY DURING A MARCH 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT, RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV SAID THAT HE WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE UPCOMING MEETING OF THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES' DEPUTIES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SUMMIT BUILD ON WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED, AND EMPHASIZE THE POINT THAT RUSSIA AND THE U.S. WILL PURSUE FOREIGN POLICIES CLOSELY TIED TO THEIR DOMESTIC NEED TO IMPROVE THEIR PEOPLES' LIVES. LAVROV SAID THAT HE HAD BROUGHT WITH HIM A MESSAGE FROM YELTSIN TO THE SYG EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR UN PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES. HE ADDED THAT AT SOME POINT, THESE ACTIVITIES MIGHT INVOLVE ARTICLE 43. END SUMMARY
 3. RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV DISCUSSED THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCENE AND UN REFORM ISSUES WITH AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT DURING A CALL MARCH 8. THE DPM FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS HAD CONDUCTED CONSULTATIONS MARCH 4 IN THE DEPARTMENT.
 4. EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS: IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT, LAVROV EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT YELTSIN WOULD COME OUT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS OF PEOPLES' DEPUTIES ON MARCH 10 WITH AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PRESERVE STABILITY. HE COULD NOT PREDICT THE FORM OF THE DELINEATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE. HOWEVER, THERE HAD BEEN SOME POSITIVE SIGNS OF COOPERATION. YELTSIN HAD MET WITH FOUR

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FACTIONS FROM ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, DEMONSTRATING HIS DESIRE TO CONSULT WITH VARIOUS POLITICAL FORCES ON THE NEED TO ESTABLISH CLEAR AGREEMENT ON THE DIVISION OF POWER BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE. THERE WAS NO MAGIC SOLUTION, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT A POLITICAL AGREEMENT WAS REQUIRED FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO FOLLOW.

5. DOMESTIC PRESSURES: LAVROV SAID THAT THE RUSSIAN RIGHT WING CRITICIZED YELTSIN FOR BEING TOO CLOSE TO THE WEST. THIS WAS DONE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES, AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV HAD NOT BEEN ATTACKED PERSONALLY FOR CARRYING OUT GOVERNMENT POLICY. THE POLITICAL CENTER, ON THE OTHER HAND, FOCUSED CRITICISM ON THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, RATHER THAN RELATIONS WITH THE WEST PER SE. KOZYREV'S STRATEGY CALLED FOR COOPERATION WITH THE WEST BECAUSE DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET ECONOMY WERE THE KEYS TO A BETTER LIFE FOR THE MAJORITY. HOWEVER, RUSSIA WAS NOT FOLLOWING A ONE-SIDED PRO-WEST FOREIGN POLICY.

6. SUMMIT: LAVROV THOUGHT THAT THE SUMMIT SHOULD BUILD ON THE EXISTING AGENDA AND MOVE ON TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS ON CONCRETE ISSUES. HE THOUGHT BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHOULD STRESS PUBLICLY THAT THEIR MAJOR RESPONSIBILITIES WERE TO IMPROVE THEIR OWN PEOPLES' LIVES AND THAT INTERNATIONAL POLICIES WERE FORMULATED TO THIS END. THIS DID NOT, IMPLY, HOWEVER, A TURNING AWAY FROM INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

7. REFORM AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT STRESSED THAT WE WERE COMMITTED TO UN REFORM AS ESSENTIAL IN MAKING THE ORGANIZATION MORE EFFECTIVE. LAVROV AGREED. HE NOTED THAT DURING CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON IT HAD BEEN MENTIONED THAT THE MECHANISM OF REGULAR CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE SYG AND THE P - 5 WAS NOT USED MUCH THESE DAYS. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT BOUTROS-GHALI NEEDED TO MAINTAIN SOME PUBLIC DISTANCE FROM THE P - 5, LAVROV ARGUED THAT THE SYG STILL SHOULD CONSULT REGULARLY ON MAJOR DECISIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SHOULD HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED MOVE OF DISARMAMENT FUNCTION TO GENEVA WITH KEY COUNTRIES BEFORE INDICATING A PREFERENCE. MOVEMENT OF UN PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS INVOLVED MANY COMPLEX ISSUES WHICH NEED CAREFUL STUDY BEFORE DECISIONS CAN BE MADE; THE SYG SHOULD NOT GO OFF BY HIMSELF IN THIS AREA. HOWEVER, BOUTROS-GHALI SEEMED "OBSESSED" WITH MAKING USE OF EXISTING FACILITIES, SUCH AS THE MOSTLY EMPTY UN UNIVERSITY IN JAPAN OR FACILITIES IN BONN OFFERED BY GERMANY.

8. MESSAGE FROM YELTSIN: LAVROV SAID THAT HE HAD BROUGHT A MESSAGE TO THE SYG FROM YELTSIN OF RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING OPERATIONS. DRAFT LEGISLATION HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR THE USE OF ARTICLE 43 OF THE UN CHARTER (ARMED FORCES ASSISTANCE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001059
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO NATOE COLLECTIVE

E.O.12356 : DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, RU, US

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S MARCH 8 MEETING WITH

-- RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV

MADE AVAILABLE TO THE UN). IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHEN THIS

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LEGISLATION MIGHT BE NEEDED. NEVERTHELESS, ONCE AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, COMPLEX DETAILS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY COUNCIL POLITICAL CONTROL AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL BY THE PARTICIPATING STATES WOULD NEED TO BE WORKED OUT. AT SOME POINT THERE COULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ARTICLE 43.

ALBRIGHT

BT

#1059

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
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SSN: 1059
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TOR: 930309104959 M0268348
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PREC: IMMEDIATE
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 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
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 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 1798
 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3595
 RUFHDE/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6209
 INFO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1871
 SUBJ: BRIEFING ALLIES ON US/RUSSIAN SUMMIT

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

7-16-0118-M-2 (1,06)

VL 6/1/2023

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 096538
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, RS, EEC
 SUBJECT: BRIEFING ALLIES ON US/RUSSIAN SUMMIT

REF: STATE 80833 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL INFORMED POSTS OF PLANS TO SEND A SENIOR OFFICIAL FROM VANCOUVER TO BRUSSELS TO BRIEF THE NAC ON THE RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S APRIL 3-4 MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN.

3. THESE PLANS HAVE NOW CHANGED. A SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL WILL PROVIDE A READOUT ON THE SUMMIT TO ALLIED AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON (INCLUDING THE AMBASSADORS OF JAPAN, KOREA, AUSTRALIA), AS WELL AS THOSE OF IRELAND AND THE EC COMMISSION DELEGATION. A SEPARATE READOUT WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE NAC BY THE U.S. CHARGE AT NATO AND BY AMBASSADOR DOBBINS TO EC COMMISSION OFFICIALS. COPIES OF THESE POINTS WILL BE PROVIDED TO OTHER ADDRESSEES. CHRISTOPHER

BT

#6538

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
 SSN: 6538
 TOR: 930401002436 M0314746
 DIST:

SIT: VAX

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 TO: ****
 INFO: NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3838
 SUBJ: SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S BILATERAL WITH RUSSIAN
 FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV: LUNCH, MARCH 23
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

616-0118-M-1 (1.07)
VL 6/1/2023

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 096607
 NODIS
 THE FOLLOWING STATE 096607 DATED 01 APR SENT ACTION MOSCOW
 BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
 QUOTE: SECRET STATE 096607
 NODIS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL. RS BK
 SUBJECT: SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S BILATERAL WITH RUSSIAN
 FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV: LUNCH, MARCH 23
 1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. SUMMARY: ON MARCH 23, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HOSTED
 RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV FOR A WORKING LUNCH AT THE
 STATE DEPARTMENT. THE CONVERSATION TOUCHED ON THE
 U.S.-RUSSIA POW/MIA COMMISSION, THE SCHNEERSON LIBRARY,
 RUSSIA-UKRAINE RELATIONS. NORTH KOREA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
 NPT. POTENTIAL SALES OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR REACTORS TO
 PAKISTAN AND IRAN. AND BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT.
 HOWEVER, THE LUNCHEON CONVERSATION WAS LARGELY DEVOTED TO
 ECONOMIC ISSUES: THE G-7 PROCESS. DEBT RELIEF, RUSSIAN
 CONCERNS ABOUT MARKET ACCESS. AND A BROAD DESCRIPTION OF
 THE U.S. BILATERAL ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR THE VANCOUVER
 SUMMIT. THE DISCUSSION ALSO COVERED THE U.S.-RUSSIA HEU
 SALES AGREEMENT AND RUSSIA'S MISSILE TECHNOLOGY SALE TO
 INDIA. END SUMMARY.
 3. JOINING THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE LUNCH WERE
 DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS MAMEDOV AND CHURKIN AMBASSADOR
 LUKIN. DCM KOLOSOVSKIY. KOZYREV AIDE SIDOROVA, AND MFA
 NOTETAKER SPASKIY. PARTICIPATING WITH THE SECRETARY ON THE
 U.S. SIDE WERE UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF. UNDER SECRETARIES-
 DESIGNATE SPERO AND DAVIS, NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR RUSSIAN,
 UKRAINIAN, AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS TOBY GATI. ASSISTANT
 SECRETARY NILES, EUR/ISCA DIRECTOR NAPPER, AND INTERPRETER
 DMITRIY ZARECHNAK.
 4. THE SECRETARY BEGAN THE LUNCHEON DISCUSSION BY
 STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMICS, ALTHOUGH IT OFTEN
 SEEMED TO GET PUSHED OFF THE AGENDA OF U.S.-RUSSIAN

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MEETINGS BY URGENT DIPLOMATIC BUSINESS. IT WAS THEREFORE APPROPRIATE THAT THE BULK OF THE LUNCHEON DISCUSSION BE DEVOTED TO ECONOMICS. BEFORE TURNING TO THE MAIN AGENDA, HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WANTED TO MENTION BRIEFLY TWO OR THREE ISSUES. FIRST, WE GREATLY VALUED THE WORK OF THE U.S.-RUSSIAN POW/MIA COMMISSION. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING SOON WITH THE HEAD OF THE COMMISSION ON THE U.S. SIDE AMBASSADOR MALCOLM TOON. THE POW/MIA ISSUE HAD GREAT RESONANCE WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND WE NEEDED TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER ON IT. HAVING JUST COME FROM ADDRESSING AN AIPAC MEETING, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE COULD NOT HELP MENTIONING THE IMPORTANCE OF RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO STAMP OUT ANTI-SEMITISM. ON ANOTHER ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE TO US, WE HOPED THAT A WAY WOULD BE FOUND TO RELEASE THE DOCUMENTS IN THE SCHNEERSON ARCHIVE WHICH WAS HELD IN THE RUSSIAN STATE LIBRARY. MAMEDOV NOTED THAT, GIVEN THE NEW VICE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL INTEREST IN THIS ISSUE, THE RUSSIAN SIDE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO HEAR ABOUT IT.

5. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT WE WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT TENSIONS IN THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONSHIP. WE HAD OFFERED TO HOST A TRILATERAL MEETING DURING THE VISITS OF KOZYREV AND UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ZLENKO BUT UNDERSTOOD THE RUSSIAN VIEW THAT KOZYREV'S PLATTER IN WASHINGTON WAS ALREADY TOO FULL. HOWEVER THE U.S. REMAINED READY TO BE HELPFUL IF THE PARTIES WANTED OUR ASSISTANCE. WE WERE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED WITH UKRAINIAN FAILURE THUS FAR TO RATIFY START I AND ACCEDE TO THE NPT. THESE WERE ISSUES THAT WE SHOULD BE WORKING ON. TURNING TO ECONOMICS, THE SECRETARY ASKED UNDER SECRETARY-DESIGNATE JOAN SPERO TO ADDRESS EFFORTS WITHIN THE G-7 TO WORK OUT A BASIS FOR COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA.

6. UNDER SECRETARY-DESIGNATE SPERO SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE HONG KONG G-7 SHERPA MEETING. RUSSIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FEDOROV HAD GIVEN A FRANK AND INTERESTING STATEMENT ON THE STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY AND RUSSIA'S PLANS FOR ECONOMIC STABILIZATION. FEDOROV HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR A STABILIZATION PROGRAM, AND THE G-7 REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE DETAILS OF HIS PRESENTATION. RUSSIA'S SUCCESS IN IMPLEMENTING STABILIZATION MEASURES WOULD BE CRITICAL, SINCE G-7 ASSISTANCE WOULD BE LINKED TO PROGRESS IN THAT EFFORT. WE WERE EAGER TO HAVE DETAILS ON RUSSIA'S STABILIZATION PLANS AND HOW THE WEST COULD BE HELPFUL.

7. RUSSIAN DCM KOLOSOVSKIY NOTED THAT THE HONG KONG DISCUSSION HAD BEEN BROADER THAN RUSSIAN STABILIZATION PLANS. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF DEBT RE-SCHEDULING AND G-7 ASSISTANCE IN THE MICRO-ECONOMIC AND

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"SOCIAL" ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM. IF NOT A SOCIAL SAFETY NET, THERE NEEDED TO BE A PILLOW OF SOME KIND. MS. SPERO REPLIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GOOD DISCUSSION OF DEBT AND THE REACTION AMONG THE G-7 TO THE RUSSIAN PRESENTATION ON THAT SUBJECT HAD BEEN POSITIVE. THERE REMAINED SOME CONFUSION, HOWEVER, ON WHETHER THE RUSSIANS PROPOSED TO PAY 2.5 OR 3.5 BILLION DOLLARS IN DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS ONCE A RE-SCHEDULING IS APPROVED.

8. KOZYREV EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND NOTED THAT MS. SPERO'S SUMMARY OF THE HONG-KONG MEETING COINCIDED WITH FEDOROV'S. FEDOROV HAD DONE MORE WORK FOLLOWING THE HONG KONG MEETING AND HAD PREPARED SOME ADDITIONAL WRITTEN POINTS. KOZYREV THEN PASSED OVER A PAPER IN RUSSIAN. NOTING THAT IT CONTAINED IDEAS ON INTEGRATING RUSSIA INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY THROUGH COOPERATIVE EFFORTS. KOZYREV ADDED THAT THE TIME WAS PASSED FOR GENERAL EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT. STABILIZATION WAS THE CORE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS AND A MAJOR PRIORITY ON ITS AGENDA. HOWEVER, IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO MAKE PROGRESS WHEN THE WEST ESSENTIALLY SAID "TELL US WHAT YOU'RE UP TO AND WE'LL SEE WHAT WE CAN DO TO HELP". THIS APPROACH CREATED FRUSTRATION ON BOTH SIDES. IT WAS NOT POSITIVE IN ECONOMIC TERMS. AND IT WAS ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS IN POLITICAL TERMS. REFORMERS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT WERE LOSING FACE AS THEY PURSUED COOPERATIVE APPROACHES. KOZYREV SAID THAT RUSSIA HAD IN MIND A MEDIUM TERM PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH THE G-7 OVER 5-7 YEARS. THERE NEEDED TO BE FIRM TARGET FIGURES FOR FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TRADE, AND INVESTMENT. ACCORDING TO KOZYREV. THE GOR WANTED TO SET UP A SPECIAL MECHANISM FOR THIS PURPOSE. THERE NEEDED TO BE A BETTER ORGANIZED NEGOTIATING PROCESS. WITH A TIMETABLE AND PLAN OF ACTION TO INCLUDE RUSSIA IN THE G-7.

9. THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHETHER THE GOR WOULD BE INCLUDED IN G-7 MEETINGS CAUSED ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTY FOR RUSSIA. THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT A RUSSIAN INVITATION TO THE TOKYO SUMMIT DEMONSTRATED THE TENDENCY TO USE THE G-7 AS A TOOL ON BILATERAL ISSUES THAT WERE TOTALLY IRRELEVANT TO THE WORK OF THE GROUP. KOZYREV ADDED THAT RUSSIA WANTED TO SEE AN EARLY G-7 MEETING, PREFERABLY AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL, NOT TO TAKE THE PLACE OF THE TOKYO SUMMIT. BUT TO COORDINATE WORK ON AN IMMEDIATE PACKAGE OF SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA. TURNING TO DEBT, KOZYREV ASSERTED THAT EARLY ACTION TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF FORMER SOVIET UNION DEBT WAS CRUCIAL. HE STATED THAT RUSSIA WAS PREPARED TO PAY 2.5 BILLION DOLLARS IN DEBT SERVICE. THIS WAS A PRECISE FIGURE. RUSSIA ALSO WANTED CREATION OF A RUBLE STABILIZATION FUND TO SUPPORT GOR EFFORTS TO BRING DOWN INFLATION. CONTROL MONETARY EMISSIONS. AND BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT DEFICIT. KOZYREV SAID THAT HE HOPED INFLATION COULD BE REDUCED TO FIVE PERCENT BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

10. KOZYREV SAID THAT HE HOPED TO SEE INCREASED WESTERN INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA ESPECIALLY IN DEFENSE CONVERSION. HE ADDED THAT THE HESITANCY OF INVESTORS WAS UNDERSTANDABLE GIVEN RUSSIA'S LACK OF SETTLED LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES. THAT IS WHY A CONCERTED EFFORT BY GOVERNMENTS WAS NEEDED TO OVERCOME INVESTOR HESITATION. KOZYREV ASSERTED THAT IT WAS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT FOR RUSSIA TO BE ABLE TO SELL ITS EXPORTS ON THE WORLD MARKET. HE ADDED THAT RUSSIA FACED MANY PROTECTIONIST BARRIERS FROM THE EC, AND WAS ENGAGED IN DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS TO REMOVE THEM. THE U.S. ALSO HAD A LEGACY OF RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATION SUPPORTED BY SPECIAL INTERESTS AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. RUSSIA THEREFORE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO MAKING A POLITICAL STATEMENT ON MARKET ACCESS, INCLUDING IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES. ON THE PRACTICAL LEVEL RUSSIA FACED OBSTACLES SUCH

AS RECENT BACKSLIDING BY THE U.S. ON AN AGREEMENT FOR URANIUM SALES TO THE U.S. THIS PROBLEM NEEDED TO BE PUT UNDER POLITICAL SUPERVISION. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO FIND SOME RESOLUTION OF THE THREATENED IMPACT ON U.S.-RUSSIA SPACE COOPERATION OF THE RUSSIAN MISSILE TECHNOLOGY SALE TO INDIA.

11. MAMEDOV SAID THAT THE GOR WOULD SOON BE PUBLISHING EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE U.S. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INDIAN DEAL WERE WELL KNOWN AS WERE THE STATEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP ON THE SUBJECT. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO WORK OUT COOPERATION ON THIS DEAL. A U.S. TEAM WOULD BE COMING TO MOSCOW NEXT WEEK AND IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HEAR WHAT THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO DO IN RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN RESTRAINT ON THE INDIA DEAL.

MAMEDOV SAID THAT THE RUSSIAN SIDE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A NON-PAPER ON SPACE COOPERATION THAT COULD BE PRESENTED TO THE TWO PRESIDENTS IN VANCOUVER. HOWEVER, A PURELY POLITICAL DECISION WOULD BE NEEDED. THE RUSSIAN SIDE NEEDED TO HEAR MORE ABOUT U.S. IDEAS BEFORE MAKING SUGGESTIONS TO THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP. MAMEDOV SAID.

12. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ASKED DR. DAVIS TO RESPOND TO THE RUSSIAN POINTS ON MISSILE TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS AND SPACE

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COOPERATION. DR. DAVIS SAID THAT SHE WANTED TO OFFER COMMENTS ON THE SALE OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND ON THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME. SHE SAID THAT THE U.S. PROPOSED TO SEND TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO MOSCOW, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF A SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, TO GIVE FRESH POLITICAL IMPETUS TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN SIDE IN ORDER TO RESOLVE BOTH ISSUES BEFORE THE SUMMIT. IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S GREAT EMPHASIS ON NON-PROLIFERATION, DR. DAVIS WANTED TO RAISE TWO ADDITIONAL ISSUES. FIRST, WE LOOKED FORWARD TO WORKING WITH THE RUSSIAN SIDE TO CHANGE THE NORTH KOREAN DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE NPT. SECOND, WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT RUSSIAN PLANS TO SELL NUCLEAR REACTORS TO IRAN AND PAKISTAN. WE HOPED THAT RUSSIA WOULD NOT MAKE THOSE SALES BECAUSE OF THE LONG-TERM NON-PROLIFERATION DANGERS OF THESE TRANSFERS. OUR CONCERN WAS NOT REDUCED BY IRANIAN AGREEMENT TO SUBJECT THE REACTOR TO INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION. WITH REGARD TO PAKISTAN'S SALE OF THE REACTOR WOULD BE CONTRARY TO RUSSIAN OBLIGATIONS AS A MEMBER OF THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP.

13. THE SECRETARY SUMMARIZED THAT U.S. POLITICAL/TECHNICAL TEAMS WOULD TRAVEL TO MOSCOW NEXT WEEK ON HEU AND MTCR. LUKIN CLAIMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN "UNPLEASANT" SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN WHICH THE U.S. HAD BACK-TRACKED ON THE HEU AGREEMENT. THE DECISION REACHED ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL HAD BEEN FRUSTRATED AT THE BUREAUCRATIC LEVEL. IF WE WERE GOING TO SOLVE THE URANIUM ISSUE BEFORE VANCOUVER, WE NEEDED VERY CONCRETE AND PRINCIPLED IMPETUS TO SETTLE. KOZYREV ADDED THE URANIUM ISSUE WAS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE, SINCE IT WAS ONE OF THE FEW POTENTIAL HIGH-VALUE EXPORTS FOR RUSSIA. ON NORTH KOREA. KOZYREV SAID MOSCOW HAD EXPRESSED ITS CONCERNS FORCEFULLY TO THE DPRK. IF THE ISSUE WERE NOT SOLVED WITHIN A MONTH. WE WOULD PROBABLY BE FACED WITH THE NEED FOR UNSC ACTION. KOZYREV SAID THAT HE WOULD SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO NORTH KOREA TO MAKE THE

PROBLEM CLEAR. WE MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER CONSULTATIONS AMONG RUSSIA, JAPAN, THE U.S., AND CHINA TO BRING ADDITIONAL PRESSURE TO BEAR ON NORTH KOREA, KOZYREV SAID.

14. TURNING TO RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE, KOZYREV SAID HE HAD HAD NUMEROUS CONTACTS WITH ZLENKO. BUT IT WAS NOT ZLENKO WHO MADE THE KEY DECISIONS. IT WAS TIME TO CONVINCING KIEV THAT THERE IS NO ROOM FOR MANUEVER. THE UKRAINIANS HAD SOMEHOW CONCLUDED THAT THEY HAD MORE TO GAIN FROM DELAY. BUT WE HAVE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE IS A NECESSITY FOR THEM TO MEET THEIR OBLIGATIONS. NOT ONLY UKRAINE'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LISBON PROTOCOL WERE AT STAKE; KRAVCHUK HAD MADE COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE C.I.S. TO SEND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINE TO RUSSIA FOR DISMANTLEMENT. IT WAS REALLY TIME TO BE FIRM.

15. RETURNING TO ECONOMICS KOZYREV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE SHARP DIFFERENCES BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE GOR. PARLIAMENT HAD NOT EVEN APPROVED THE BUDGET FOR THE CURRENT YEAR. THEY WERE APPARENTLY TOO BUSY WITH OTHER ISSUES. THERE WERE MANY INTERNAL DIFFERENCES. KOZYREV SAID THAT HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THE NEED TO PASS FROM GOOD INTENTIONS TO PUTTING TOGETHER DECISIONS ON VARIOUS ISSUES. WE NEEDED A CONCERTED EFFORT SINCE THERE MIGHT BE ONLY A SHORT TIME WITHIN WHICH TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION. MS. SPERO AGREED THAT THE G-7 DISCUSSIONS ON DEBT, IMF ACTIVITY, AND THE EBRD ROLE NEEDED TO MOVE QUICKLY.

16. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ASKED WHAT MIGHT BE DONE BILATERALLY AND SUGGESTED THAT MS. GATI BRIEF ON THE WORK OF U.S. WORKING GROUPS. MS. GATI NOTED THAT WE HAD BEEN WORKING INTENSIVELY SINCE THE SECOND WEEK OF THE ADMINISTRATION. AND THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON THE DEVELOPING PACKAGE. THE PACKAGE WOULD FOCUS ON MICRO-ECONOMIC ISSUES AND WOULD HAVE A CORE PACKAGE OF HUMANITARIAN AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOCUSSED ON SPECIAL GROUPS IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY. THE PACKAGE WOULD ALSO INCLUDE TRADE AND INVESTMENT STEPS AND IMPORTANT ROLES FOR EX-IM AND OPIC. WE INTENDED TO PRESENT TO THE PRESIDENT A FOCUSSED PLAN IN CONCERT WITH RUSSIA'S NEEDS AND OUR CAPABILITIES. KOZYREV NOTED THAT, EVEN IF THE U.S. PACKAGE WERE INCOMPLETE IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO ANNOUNCE SOME PROPOSALS IN ADVANCE OF VANCOUVER, PERHAPS EVEN DURING KOZYREV'S VISIT.

16. CHURKIN THEN TURNED THE DISCUSSION TOWARD THE ONGOING UNSC DISCUSSIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA. HE AGAIN URGED AGAINST PRECIPITOUS ACTION ON THE BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ), NOTING THAT WE NOT ACT IN DEFIANCE OF THE UNSYG. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER THE UNSYG WAS OPPOSED TO THE NO-FLY VOTE. CHURKIN SAID THAT BOUTROS GHALI WAS OPPOSED BECAUSE OF THE THREAT NFZ ENFORCEMENT WOULD POSE FOR UN HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS ON THE GROUND. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ASKED WHETHER KOZYREV'S IDEA OF A 7-DAY WARNING PERIOD WAS AT PLAY IN NEW YORK. CHURKIN REPLIED THAT IT HAD NOT YET COME UP. THE RUSSIAN IDEA OF SEALING BOSNIA'S BORDERS HAD BEEN

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DISCUSSED, BUT THE P-3 WERE NOT READY FOR IT. IN CHURKIN'S VIEW, IT MIGHT TAKE ANOTHER 2-3 DAYS TO COME UP WITH AN OVERALL PACKAGE.

17. UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF REPLIED THAT OUR PROBLEM WITH PULLING NFZ ENFORCEMENT OFF THE IMMEDIATE AGENDA WAS THAT IT MIGHT APPEAR TO BE A RETREAT FROM OUR POSITION. THIS MIGHT IN TURN BE SEEN BY THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AS A REASON NOT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON VANCE-OWEN. CHURKIN ASKED HOW WE WOULD DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF ENHANCED DANGER TO HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS AND THE OPPOSITION OF THE UNSYG. TARNOFF REPLIED THAT IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO CONVINCING THE MUSLIMS THAT WE WOULD KEEP UP PRESSURE ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS. IT WAS ALSO SIGNIFICANT THAT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH WERE PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD. WE WERE SENSITIVE TO MS. OGATA'S (UNHCR) CONCERNS BUT UNPROFOR. PERHAPS BEEFED UP IN SOME AREAS, OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO KEEP HUMANITARIAN AID MOVING. CHURKIN REJOINED THAT THE NFZ WOULD HAVE LITTLE IMPACT. IF WE SEALED THE BOSNIAN BORDERS, THE NFZ COULD BE ADDED. BUT WE SHOULD NOT TARGET OUR ACTIONS ON A NON-EVENT. WE MIGHT SATISFY TODAY'S PERCEIVED NEED FOR ACTION, BUT CREATE LARGER PROBLEMS DOWN THE ROAD.

18. AS HE HAD WITH THE SECRETARY THE PREVIOUS DAY (SEPTEL), KOZYREV ARGUED FOR A 7-DAY WARNING PERIOD TO THE PARTIES, AFTER WHICH ANY PARTY THAT REFUSED AGREEMENT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE "NEGATIVE ATTITUDE" OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE NFZ AND OTHER MEASURES COULD THEN BE IMPLEMENTED. THE SECRETARY ASKED THAT THE RUSSIAN SIDE REEXAMINE ITS VIEW OF THE IMPACT OF NFZ. TARNOFF ADDED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO HAVE A WAITING PERIOD, BUT WE HAD CONCERNS ABOUT LINKING IT TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE VANCE-OWEN AGREEMENT AND TO POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES ON BOSNIA'S BORDERS. WE HAVE NFZ ON THE TABLE. CHURKIN PREDICTED THAT THE SERBS WOULD WALK OUT OF NEGOTIATIONS IF NFZ WERE VOTED. KOZYREV SAID THAT THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS HAD THE MISTAKEN NOTION THAT SOMEONE WOULD SWEEP IN AND SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS FOR THEM. THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF PHYSICALLY IMPOSING A SETTLEMENT. NFZ WOULD APPEAR TO BE OF LITTLE USE IF IT WERE NOT LINKED TO ACHIEVEMENT OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. CHURKIN SAID THAT THE LOGIC OF SUPPORTERS OF NFZ ENFORCEMENT IS THAT IT WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA AND EVENTUALLY BY MILITARY INTERVENTION.

19. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT THE REAL QUESTION WAS HOW TO STOP SERBIAN AGGRESSION. CHURKIN REPLIED THAT WE SHOULD SEAL THE BORDERS AND PUT UN FORCES INTO EASTERN BOSNIA. THEN WE WOULD WARN THEM THAT THEY MUST ACCEPT VANCE-OWEN. TARNOFF RESPONDED THAT WE COULD NOT COMMIT U.S. FORCES IN THAT FASHION. CHURKIN REPLIED THAT U.S. FORCES MIGHT NOT BE NEEDED. ONLY 3-4 THOUSAND TROOPS WOULD BE REQUIRED. TARNOFF SAID THAT MANY MORE TROOPS THAN THAT WOULD BE NEEDED. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ASKED WHY NOT WARN THAT THE PARTIES MUST AGREE WITHIN 7 DAYS OR THE UNSC WILL ADDRESS NFZ. YES' AND OTHER MEASURES, KOZYREV ADDED. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WARNED AGAINST AN EFFORT TO COERCE THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT TO A SETTLEMENT. WE NEEDED BOTH CARROTS AND STICKS TO BRING THEM TO A CONSENSUAL AGREEMENT. IT WAS THEN AGREED THAT U.S. AND RUSSIAN NEGOTIATORS WOULD BE IN TOUCH ON THE IDEA OF A 7-DAY WARNING PERIOD FOLLOWED BY UNSC ACTION ON NFZ ENFORCEMENT. CHRISTOPHER UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER
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SIT: AOKI BURNS GATI GOTTEMOELLER PONEMAN WHSR_SPECIAL

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: P 011319Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 DTG: 011319Z APR 93
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9097
 INFO: RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
 RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEAADN/OSIA WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1975
 SUBJ: TTBT: CG-030. VISIT TO MINISTRY OF
 ATOMIC ENERGY ON MARCH 31, 1993
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-M-2 (1.08)
VZ 6/1/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 009791
 DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/ISCA AND ACDA - ROB COCKERHAM
 GENEVA PLEASE HOLD FOR BCC
 OSIA ALSO FOR DON PHILLIPS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PARM, MNUC, PREL, KTIA, NTT, RS, US
 SUBJECT: TTBT: CG-030. VISIT TO MINISTRY OF
 ATOMIC ENERGY ON MARCH 31, 1993
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. ON WEDNESDAY, MARCH 31, COLONEL MCKENZIE AND TEN
 OTHER MEMBERS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION WERE TAKEN TO
 THE MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY (MINATOM) HEADQUARTERS,
 LOCATED ON BOL'SHAYA ORDYNKA ULITSA IN DOWNTOWN
 MOSCOW, FOR A SHORT MEETING WITH MINISTER VIKTOR
 MIKHAILOV. THE U.S. DELEGATION INCLUDED C.
 MCWILLIAM, R. HILL, J. BEHNE, T. DAVIS, W. HAWKINS,
 R. IDE, K. KELLY, M. MAINES, T. MCKOWN, AND L.
 PIRKL. ALSO IN ATTENDANCE FROM THE RUSSIAN SIDE WERE
 MR. TSARKOV, MR. IVANOV AND MR. ANDRUSENKO OF
 MINATOM, AND VICE ADMIRAL ZOLOTUKHIN AND MR. LEPSKY,
 REPRESENTING THE NOVAYA ZEMLYA TEST SITE. MIKHAILOV
 WELCOMED THE U.S. GROUP TO HIS MINISTRY, WHICH HAD
 ONLY RECENTLY BEEN OPENED TO FOREIGN VISITORS.

 SUMMIT AND FUTURE NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS

 3. MIKHAILOV FONDLY RECALLED HIS PARTICIPATION IN
 THE JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT (JVE) AND NOTED THE
 NUMBER OF FAMILIAR MEMBERS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION
 WITH WHOM HE HAD WORKED, BOTH DURING THE JVE AND
 DURING THE NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA.

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MIKHAILOV NOTED THE READINESS OF AMERICAN TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO COOPERATE ON THE VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES FOR THE PRILIV TEST PLANNED FOR THIS YEAR AT NOVAYA ZEMLYA. HE STATED THAT THIS ACTIVITY, (I.E., TESTING AND U.S. PARTICIPATION IN VERIFICATION) WOULD DEPEND TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT ON WHAT IS DECIDED BETWEEN PRESIDENTS YELTSIN AND CLINTON AT THE UPCOMING SUMMIT. MIKHAILOV IS TO ATTEND THE SUMMIT WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN, AND COMMENTED THAT HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING PRESIDENT CLINTON, AND WOULD PERSONALLY INVITE HIM TO VISIT NOVAYA ZEMLYA IF A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY AROSE. IN ANY EVENT, MIKHAILOV WAS CONFIDENT THAT HE WOULD SEE MEMBERS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION IN GENEVA AGAIN BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER LIMITS ON THE NUMBER AND YIELD OF NUCLEAR TESTS. MIKHAILOV WAS NEUTRAL IN HIS DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR TESTING. HE DID NOT MENTION ANY PLANS REGARDING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB), NOR DID HE STRESS A CONTINUED NEED FOR TESTING.

CONVERSION, ANTI-DUMPING AND OTHER ISSUES

4. MIKHAILOV NOTED THE LONG TRADITION OF HIS MINISTRY, WHICH WILL BE 40 YEARS OLD THIS YEAR, AND NOTED THE MANY CHANGES AND DIFFICULTIES CURRENTLY FACING HIM. HE NOTED PROBLEMS HE HAD ENCOUNTERED IN THE PAST YEAR WITH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE IN REGARD TO THE ANTIDUMPING CASE. ACCORDING TO MIKHAILOV, THIS CASE HAD COST MINATOM OVER 200 MILLION DOLLARS IN LOST REVENUES FROM SALES OF URANIUM. MIKHAILOV STRESSED THE ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS FACING HIS MINISTRY, WHICH INCLUDED ONE MILLION PERSONNEL. THE TWO DESIGN LABORATORIES, ARZAMAS-16 AND CHELYABINSK-70, FACED PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES WITH THE NEED FOR CONVERSION. ACCORDING TO MIKHAILOV, ONE OF EVERY THREE LABORATORY EMPLOYEES WAS NOW ENGAGED IN PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS RATHER THAN WEAPONS WORK.

5. WHILE THE CHANGING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN RUSSIA PLACED A GREAT DEAL OF STRESS ON THE MINISTRY, THEY ALSO OFFERED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT. MIKHAILOV ENDED BY NOTING THE MANY SERVICES AND TECHNOLOGIES MINATOM HAD TO OFFER IN THE WORLD MARKET, AND WELCOMED CONTINUED COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES WITH THE U.S. ON THE TECHNICAL LEVEL. COLONEL MCKENZIE CLOSED THE MEETING BY SECONDING THE HOPE FOR CONTINUED COOPERATION, AND AN EXCHANGE OF GIFTS TOOK PLACE.

6. ACTION REQUEST: NONE. YALOWITZ

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#9791

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 9791
TOR: 930401084348 M0315631
DIST:

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SIT: BELL VAX

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 OSRI: RUEHMOA
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 DTG: 011333Z APR 93
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9101
 INFO: ****
 SUBJ: RUSSIANS REPORT POSSIBLE YELTSIN SUMMIT AGENDA
 ITEM

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0114-M-1 (1,69)

52 6/1/2023

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 009797
 EXDIS
 DEPARTMENT FOR S/NIS
 ALSO FOR EUR/ISCA (PICKERING/COLLINS/NAPPER)
 DEPT PASS WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC AND NEC
 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PREL, ELAB, EAID, ECON, EMIN, ENRG, SOCI, RS
 SUBJECT: RUSSIANS REPORT POSSIBLE YELTSIN SUMMIT AGENDA
 ITEM

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: EMBASSY HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL RAISE THE "PARTNERS IN ECONOMIC REFORM" (PIER) COAL PROJECT AT THE SUMMIT AS AN EXAMPLE OF PARTICULARLY USEFUL JOINT U.S. - RUSSIAN COOPERATION AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD YELTSIN WILL REQUEST FURTHER USG ASSISTANCE IN COPING WITH THE MULTIPLE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CRISES IN THE RUSSIAN COALFIELDS. HE WILL REPORTEDLY INCLUDE THE COAL PROJECT IN A SPEECH AND/OR IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON. RUSSIAN OFFICIALS MAY ALSO RAISE IT AT THE MARGINS OF THE SUMMIT. END SUMMARY.
 POSSIBLE SUMMIT AGENDA ITEM
3. EMBASSY HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL RAISE THE "PARTNERS IN ECONOMIC REFORM" (PIER) COAL PROJECT AT THE SUMMIT AS AN EXAMPLE OF PARTICULARLY USEFUL JOINT U.S. - RUSSIAN COOPERATION AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD YELTSIN WILL REQUEST FURTHER ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. LABOR, MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT IN COPING WITH THE MULTIPLE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CRISES IN THE RUSSIAN COALFIELDS. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCES, YELTSIN WILL INCLUDE THE COAL PROJECT AMONG PRIORITY PROJECTS FOR SUPPORT IN RUSSIA.
4. ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION, A YELTSIN SPEECHWRITER INTENDS TO INCLUDE THE PIER "COAL PROJECT" IN A SPEECH PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL MAKE DURING THE SUMMIT AND/OR IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON. RUSSIAN

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OFFICIALS MAY ALSO RAISE IT AT THE MARGINS OF THE SUMMIT.
SOURCES

5. OUR PRIMARY SOURCE IS IGOR KOZHUKOVSKIY (PROTECT),
PRESIDENT OF THE "FUND FOR SOCIAL GUARANTEES," A MOSCOW-
BASED FOUNDATION TASKED WITH EASING THE TRANSITION TO
MARKET MECHANISMS IN THE TURBULENT RUSSIAN COALFIELDS.
KOZHUKOVSKIY IS PARTICULARLY WELL PLUGGED INTO THE
KUZBASS COAL-PRODUCING REGION OF WESTERN SIBERIA.
KOZHUKOVSKIY TOLD LABOFF APRIL FIRST THAT HE HAD
PERSONALLY RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
THE MFA USA/CANADA DESK GOLOVIN THAT THE COAL PROJECT
WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SUMMIT.
ASSISTING A KEY GROUP OF YELTSIN SUPPORTERS: THE
DEMOCRATIC MINERS MOVEMENT

6. KOZHUKOVSKIY SAID LEADERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC MINERS
MOVEMENT, IN PARTICULAR THE INDEPENDENT MINERS UNION
(NPG) AND THE WORKERS COMMITTEES IN KUZBASS AND THE
ARCTIC CITY OF VORKUTA HAD BROUGHT THE IMPORTANCE WITH
WHICH THEY REGARD THE COAL PROJECT TO PRESIDENT
YELTSIN'S ATTENTION. LEADERS OF THESE GROUPS HAVE BEEN
AMONG YELTSIN'S MOST VISIBLE AND OUTSPOKEN SUPPORTERS,
FROM THE BEGINNING. ACCORDING TO KOZHUKOVSKIY, YELTSIN
AND HIS ADVISORS "WANT TO DO SOMETHING FOR THE MINERS"
IN APPRECIATION FOR THEIR SUPPORT. THE PROJECT IS ALSO
A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS AT U.S.-
RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP IN PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC, MARKET
REFORMS WHILE ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE SERIOUS SOCIAL
PROBLEMS.
TEXT OF LETTER FROM FORMER LABOR SECRETARY USERY TO
CLINTON

7. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT FORMER LABOR SECRETARY
W.J. USERY JR., PIER CHAIRMAN AND A CLINTON ADVISOR ON
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, HAS SENT OR SOON WILL SEND
THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON. AFL-CIO
PRESIDENT LANE KIRLKAND HAS REPORTEDLY ALSO BEEN
INFORMED VIA AIDE JIM BAKER. TEXT OF USERY LETTER IS
REPORTEDLY AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS I HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN A JOINT
EFFORT OF U.S. LABOR AND MANAGEMENT, WORKING WITH LABOR
AND MANAGEMENT PARTNERS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 009797
EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/NIS

ALSO FOR EUR/ISCA (PICKERING/COLLINS/NAPPER)

DEPT PASS WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC AND NEC

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, ELAB, EAID, ECON, EMIN, ENRG, SOCI, RS

SUBJECT: RUSSIANS REPORT POSSIBLE YELTSIN SUMMIT AGENDA
ITEM

KAZAKHSTAN, TO HELP SOLVE THE SERIOUS SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE RUSSIAN COAL INDUSTRY AND THE
REGIONS WHERE COAL IS MINED. THIS EFFORT, THE "COAL
PROJECT," IS ADMINISTERED BY THE NON-PROFIT FOUNDATION

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"PARTNERS IN ECONOMIC REFORM" (PIER).
 ASIDE FROM THEIR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE,
 THESE REGIONS ARE SIGNIFICANT FOR THEIR PIONEERING
 EFFORTS AT SERIOUS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM,
 FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL STRIKES BY COAL MINERS IN THE
 FORMER USSR BEGINNING IN 1989. OUR WORK WITH MINERS AND
 THEIR ALLIES IN MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING
 PRESIDENT YELTSIN), HAS CONVINCED US THAT THE SUCCESS OF
 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA COULD WELL
 DEPEND ON THE ABILITY TO RESOLVE THE DEEP ECONOMIC AND
 SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE COAL REGIONS.
 THANKS TO A GRANT FROM THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
 DEVELOPMENT, PIER HAS BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH
 COORDINATING OFFICES IN MOSCOW AND KIEV AND COOPERATION
 AND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS IN THE MAJOR COAL REGIONS.
 WHILE THESE FACILITIES ARE ALREADY PROVIDING BADLY
 NEEDED TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, OUR LIMITED
 RESOURCES CAN ONLY BEGIN TO DEAL WITH THE DEEP CRISES IN
 THESE AREAS.

WE HAVE LEARNED FROM OUR RUSSIAN PARTNERS THAT PRESIDENT
 YELTSIN INTENDS TO RAISE THE CRISIS OF THE COAL INDUSTRY
 AND REGIONS DURING HIS MEETING WITH YOU AND WILL REQUEST
 U.S. ASSISTANCE IN COPING WITH THIS CRISIS. ACCORDING
 TO OUR SOURCE, HE WILL ALSO CITE THE COAL PROJECT AS A
 GOOD EXAMPLE OF RUSSIAN - AMERICAN COOPERATION AT THE
 REGIONAL LEVEL.

PIER FULLY SUPPORTS PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S REQUEST, BASED
 ON OUR CONVICTION THAT THESE REGIONS NOT ONLY NEED
 ASSISTANCE, BUT ALSO THAT THEY CAN AND WILL MAKE
 EFFECTIVE USE OF ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO FURTHER THE
 PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC ECONOMIC REFORMS.

ENCLOSED IS A BRIEF SUMMARY OF PIER'S GOALS AND
 ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE. I WILL BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS OUR
 WORK WITH YOU OR YOUR STAFF.

VERY TRULY YOURS,

W.J. USERY JR.

END TEXT.

COMMENT

 8. THERE IS, OF COURSE, A CHANCE THAT THE LIST OF
 PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S AGENDA ITEMS WILL CHANGE OR GROW TO
 THE POINT THAT THE "COAL PROJECT" DOES NOT MAKE THE
 FINAL CUT. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT YELTSIN WANTS TO
 RECOGNIZE MINERS' SUPPORT, AND THAT, FOR THE GOR,
 REQUESTING FURTHER U.S. ASSISTANCE IS A PAINLESS AND
 COST-FREE WAY OF DOING SO. YALOWITZ

BT

#9797

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
 <^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
 SSN: 9797
 <^SSN>9797
 TOR: 930401114643 M0316059
 <^TOR>930401114646 M0316061
 DIST:
 PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY KYIM LAKE SIT SODERBERG

SIT: BURNS FILE GATI SANNER SUM SUM2 VAX
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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 OSRI: RUEHVLA
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHVLA0595 0911430-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 011430Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
 DTG: 011430Z APR 93
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1801
 INFO: RUFHMB/USMISSION USVIENNA 0082
 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0383
 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0915
 RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0883
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0071
 RUFHSK/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0219
 RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0230
 RUFHOS/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0086
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0477
 RUFHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0310
 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0224
 RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 0265
 RUSNDNA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
 SUBJ: RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM THE BALTICS:
 SUMMIT-LEVEL ATTENTION
 TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VILNIUS 000595

EXDIS

FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/EE, D/EEA

COPENHAGEN ALSO FOR USDAO

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: MARR, PREL, RS, LH

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM THE BALTICS:

SUMMIT-LEVEL ATTENTION

REF: A) VILNIUS 0584, B) USNATO 1417, C) VILNIUS 0527

1. ~~e~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FROM THE LITHUANIAN STANDPOINT, IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM THE BALTICS IN HIS MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN THIS WEEKEND. THE LITHUANIANS HAVE REACTED WITH RELATIVE CALM TO DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV'S THREAT TO HALT THE WITHDRAWALS, AND DEFENSE MINISTER BUTKEVICIUS HAS TOLD US THAT THE WITHDRAWALS FROM LITHUANIA ARE APPARENTLY CONTINUING (ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE TOO EARLY TO TELL) (SEE REF A). BUT THE RUSSIAN THREAT TO HALT THE WITHDRAWALS IS BEING TAKEN SERIOUSLY. EQUALLY SERIOUS IS THE SUGGESTION IN GRACHEV'S STATEMENT THAT THE SUSPENSION MAY BE LINKED TO A WESTERN-SUPPORTED HOUSING PROGRAM FOR THE RETURNING TROOPS. THE LITHUANIANS (AND

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PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-m-1 (1.10)
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PRESUMABLY THEIR BALTIC NEIGHBORS) SUPPORT THE IDEA OF PROVIDING HOUSING FOR THE DEPARTING RUSSIAN TROOPS, AND IN FACT ARE ALREADY HELPING WITH A CONSTRUCTION PROJECT IN KALININGRAD. BUT GRACHEV'S SEQUENCE IS BACKWARDS: THE HOUSING PROGRAM SHOULD BE A REWARD FOR COMPLIANCE, NOT AN EXCUSE FOR NONCOMPLIANCE. IT SHOULD ALSO, IF POSSIBLE, BE STRUCTURED IN A WAY THAT THE BALTIC ECONOMIES COULD BENEFIT FROM THE PROGRAM, E.G. BY DOING SOME OF THE CONSTRUCTION.

3. THE MORE SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE LITHUANIANS IS THAT MOSCOW'S STATEMENTS ON BALTIC ISSUES IN RECENT MONTHS HAVE BEEN ERRATIC AND INCONSISTENT AND POTENTIALLY THREATENING. IN OCTOBER, YELTSIN STATED THAT THE TROOP WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE SUSPENDED AND HE LINKED THAT DECISION BOTH TO THE LACK OF HOUSING AND TO THE ALLEGED MIS-TREATMENT OF THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES. BUT THE TROOP WITHDRAWALS DID NOT STOP AND THE STATEMENT WAS DESCRIBED BY RUSSIAN OFFICIALS AS AN EFFORT TO PLACATE YELTSIN'S NATIONALIST CRITICS. FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV'S "FALSE ALARM" SPEECH OF DECEMBER 1992 IN STOCKHOLM ALSO CAUSED QUITE REAL SHIVERS HERE, AND IT HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN RECALLED EVEN THOUGH THE WORDS WERE OFFICIALLY RESCINDED. PERHAPS GRACHEV DID NOT REALLY MEAN WHAT HE SAID EITHER. BUT THE WORDS ARE TROUBLING, WHETHER OR NOT THEY LEAD TO ACTION.

4. ON A RELATED POINT, MOSCOW HAS IN RECENT MONTHS BEGUN TO REFER TO THE SMALL COUNTRIES ON RUSSIA'S PERIPHERY AS THE "NEAR ABROAD." LITHUANIA AND OTHERS ARE VERY TROUBLED BY THE IMPLICATION THAT THEY THEY ARE PART OF AN AREA IN WHICH RUSSIAN ASSERTS SPECIAL SECURITY RIGHTS. IF THESE COUNTRIES ARE TRULY SOVEREIGN, AS YELTSIN HAS SAID AND AS DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION IMPLIES, THEY DESERVE TO BE TREATED AS SUCH, NOT AS REMNANTS OF THE FORMER EMPIRE.

JOHNSON

BT

#0595

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0595

TOR: 930401134408 M0316403

DIST:

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY KYIM LAKE SIT SODERBERG

SIT: BURNS FILE GATI SANNER SUM SUM2 VAX

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
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 RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0580
 RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1700
 SUBJ: VANCOUVER PACKAGE AND PREPARATIONS
 TEXT:

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PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-M-2 (1.12)
RL 6/1/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 097839
 NODIS
 EYES ONLY NSC FOR LAKE-ITOH, CIA FOR WOOLSEY,
 DOD FORSHERFIELD AND CJCS FOR SHEFFIELD.
 FLOWING MOSCOW 09862 DATED 04/01/93 SENT ACTION SECSTATE.
 QUOTE....
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 009862
 NODIS
 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PREL, EAID, ETRD, EFIN, EAGR, RS, US
 SUBJECT: VANCOUVER PACKAGE AND PREPARATIONS
 REF: (A) STATE 96608, (B) MOSCOW 9469
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~--ENTIRE TEXT. ACTION REQUEST FOR
 S/NIS:TALBOTT, EUR/ISCA:NAPPER, NSC:GATI:PARA 4.)
 2. SUMMARY. IN APRIL 1 MEETING WITH CHARGE, DEPUTY
 ----- FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV:
 -- NOTED ADDITIONS TO RUSSIAN DELEGATION AT
 VANCOUVER: DPM SHOKHIN (COMING DIRECTLY FROM PARIS
 CLUB NEGOTIATIONS), ATOMIC ENERGY MINISTER MIKHAILOV
 (TO TALK HEU), GEN-MAJ. KOLTUNOV (VICE GRACHEV);
 -- DISCUSSED YELTSIN'S TRAVEL (PARA 7) AND SCHEDULING
 DETAILS (PARA 8);
 -- ASKED FOR A PAUSE IN ADOPTION OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS
 ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND REPORTED DFM CHURKIN'S VIEW
 FROM BELGRADE THAT "IF THE UNSC SHOWS PRUDENCE,"
 KARADZIC WILL LIKELY ACCEPT "THREE OF FOUR ELEMENTS"
 OF VANCE-OWEN WITH TERRITORIAL ISSUES TO BE WORKED
 OUT (REPORTED SEPTEL). MAMEDOV SAID THAT KOZYREV,
 AND PERHAPS YELTSIN, WOULD WANT TO TALK MORE AT
 VANCOUVER. END SUMMARY.

 3. VANCOUVER PACKAGE. MAMEDOV EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT
 ----- INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS OF THE
 PACKAGE INCLUDING THE ENTERPRISE FUND, BUT DID NOT
 CHARACTERIZE IT AS A WHOLE. REFERRING TO AMBASSADOR

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LUKIN'S REPORTING CABLE ON MARCH 31 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR TALBOTT AND NSC:GATI, MAMEDOV NOTED WASHINGTON'S PLAN TO PROCEED WITH A THREE-PHASED APPROACH, BUT DID NOT REACT TO THE TIME-SEQUENCE GIVEN TO LUKIN.

4. BACKGROUND PAPER: ACTION REQUEST. WE ASSUME
----- THAT THE
BACKGROUND PAPER WAS DRAFTED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE AT VANCOUVER, AND WOULD URGE--ALONG LINES OF MOSCOW 9667 AND WASHINGTON'S INTENT OF STRESSING "PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION, NOT ASSISTANCE" (REF A)--THAT THE TEXT BE FURTHER EDITED WITH THAT POINT IN MIND. IN PRESENT VERSION, "TO ASSIST" IS THE DOMINANT OPERATIVE VERB.

5. REGARDING MILITARY HOUSING, RUSSIAN POPULAR REACTION TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WE ARE BUILDING 450 RPT 450 HOUSES IS LIKELY TO BE DERISIVE. EMBASSY URGES THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO ANNOUNCE NO NUMBER THAN SUCH A LOW NUMBER, OR SIMPLY TO STATE THAT "AS A FIRST STEP, WE WILL AS A PILOT PROJECT BUILD A SMALL NUMBER OF HOUSES WITHIN 12-16 MONTHS FOR OFFICERS WHO ARE BEING DEMOBILIZED AND RETURNING TO RUSSIA FROM THE BALTICS AND ELSEWHERE, AND PLAN A LARGER PROGRAM OVER A LONGER PERIOD."

6. REGARDING THE SSD ITEM FROM THE BACKGROUND PAPER, THE STATED PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING "A DEMILITARIZED MARKET ECONOMY IN RUSSIA" WILL, IF IT BECOMES PUBLIC, PROVOKE CONTROVERSY HERE AS CONFIRMATION THAT THE U.S. IS PURSUING A NEW MORGENTHAU PLAN. IF THIS CHARACTERIZATION GAINS CURRENCY IN RUSSIA AS ONE OF OUR PURPOSES IN SSD PROGRAMS, THE SSD AGREEMENTS, ALREADY IN POLITICAL TROUBLE HERE, WOULD SINK INTO THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL MORASS. PLEASE DELETE THE WORD "DEMILITARIZED." END ACTION REQUEST.

7. YELTSIN TRAVEL PLANS. YELTSIN WILL DEPART MOSCOW
----- FOR MAGADAN AND VANCOUVER
AT 2230 LOCAL ON FRIDAY, APRIL 2. (WE UNDERSTAND FROM BRITISH EMBASSY THAT HURD, WHO WILL BE IN MOSCOW FOR FOUR HOURS FRIDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING, WILL SEE KOZYREV BUT NOT YELTSIN.)

8. OTHER SUMMIT ARRANGEMENTS. MAMEDOV ANNOUNCED
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 097839
NODIS

----- THREE ADDITIONS TO
THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION: DPM ALEKSANDR SHOKHIN, WHO WILL FLY TO VANCOUVER FROM THE PARIS CLUB MEETINGS, ATOMIC ENERGY MINISTER VIKTOR MIKHAILOV, WHO WILL BE ABLE TO SPEAK TO HEU ISSUES, AND GEN-MAJ. KOLTUNOV OF THE GENERAL STAFF (VICE DEFMIN GRACHEV). RESPONDING TO OUR SUGGESTION OF MINISTERIAL MEETINGS TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE ONE-ON-ONE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTS ON SATURDAY, MAMEDOV CONFIRMED THAT KOZYREV WOULD BE PLEASED TO USE THE TIME WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER. HE ANTICIPATED NO PROBLEM WITH A BENTSEN/FEDOROV MEETING BUT WAS NOT ABLE TO MAKE A COMMITMENT FOR FEDOROV. MAMEDOV NOTED THAT, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE PRESIDENTS WOULD HAVE TO

ACCEPT THE IDEA OF COVERING ECONOMIC ISSUES AT THE
SATURDAY DINNER AND POLITICAL/SECURITY ISSUES ON
SUNDAY. YALOWITZ UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

BT

#7839

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 7839
<^SSN>7839

TOR: 930401153212 M0316626
<^TOR>930401153205 M0316624

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SIT: BURNS FILE GATI SANNER SUM SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL
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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
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 LINE3: ZKZK OO SOA DE
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 DTG: 020041Z APR 93
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 TO: OTTAWA CANADA
 INFO: ****
 SUBJ: ***NO SUBJECT FOUND***
 TEXT:

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PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-M-2 (1,15)
v2 6/1/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA FEDCAN CHANNELS
 QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO JAMES JUDD, ASSISTANT
 SECRETARY TO THE CABINET, FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY FROM TONY LAKE.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JIM,

AS DISCUSSED.

APRIL 3-4 VANCOUVER SUMMIT PACKAGE:

THE USG WILL ANNOUNCE A PACKAGE OF ECONOMIC INITIATIVES AT THE APRIL
 3-4 VANCOUVER SUMMIT. THE BROAD AIM OF THIS PACKAGE IS TO SIGNAL
 STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA, IN CONCERT
 WITH OUR PARALLEL EFFORTS TO ASSEMBLE A SUBSTANTIAL MULTILATERAL
 PROGRAM OF SUPPORT THROUGH THE G-7. THE TOTAL VALUE OF THE
 VANCOUVER PACKAGE WILL BE \$1.6 BILLION IN FISCAL YEAR 1993. THIS
 INCLUDES \$691 MILLION IN GRANTS, \$700 MILLION IN CONCESSIONAL FOOD
 SALES AND MORE THAN \$230 MILLION IN OTHER CREDITS.

THE PACKAGE HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO SUPPORT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT'S
 MOST IMPORTANT ECONOMIC PRIORITIES. IT INCLUDES NEW INITIATIVES AS
 WELL AS THE SUBSTANTIAL EXPANSION OF EXISTING PROGRAMS. THE PACKAGE
 HAS EIGHT COMPONENTS:

1. HUMANITARIAN FOOD AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. AN ADDITIONAL \$194
 MILLION IN GRANT FOOD ASSISTANCE IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE THIS
 FISCAL YEAR AS WELL AS HEALTH CARE AND MEDICAL SUPPORT VALUED
 AT \$30 MILLION.
2. CONCESSIONAL FOOD SALES. THE U.S. WILL MAKE AVAILABLE UP TO
 \$700 MILLION IN AGRICULTURAL CREDIT SALES TO RUSSIA UNDER THE
 FOOD FOR PROGRESS PROGRAM. THESE SALES WILL BE MADE ON
 CONCESSIONAL TERMS AND ARE AN INTERIM MEASURE DESIGNED TO
 RESTORE RUSSIAN ACCESS TO U.S. AGRICULTURAL MARKETS FOR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

GRAINS AND OTHER COMMODITIES.

3. PRIVATE SECTOR SUPPORT. A RUSSIAN-AMERICAN ENTERPRISE FUND, WITH AN INITIAL \$50 MILLION IN FUNDING THIS FISCAL YEAR, WILL SUPPORT THE CREATION OF NEW, PARTICULARLY SMALL, PRIVATE BUSINESS THROUGH LOANS, EQUITY INVESTMENTS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. OTHER PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVES, AMOUNTING TO \$95 MILLION, WILL SUPPORT AUCTIONS OF STATE ENTERPRISES, AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS, BUSINESS TRAINING AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRO-BUSINESS LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT. A NEW EURASIAN FOUNDATION WILL FUND \$4 MILLION IN PROJECTS IN SUPPORT OF ECONOMIC REFORM AND DEMOCRATIZATION.
4. DEMOCRATIZATION. A NEW DEMOCRACY CORPS WILL BE CREATED. THIS CONCEPT WILL PULL TOGETHER AN ARRAY OF PROGRAMS WHICH DRAW THE AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN PUBLICS INTO THE EFFORT OF SPREADING DEMOCRACY. ELEMENTS INCLUDE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES, RULE-OF-LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMS AND STRENGTHENING CIVIC AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS. TOTAL FUNDING OF THIS INITIATIVE IN THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR WILL BE \$48 MILLION.
5. RUSSIAN OFFICER RESETTLEMENT INITIATIVE. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST BY THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT, WE ARE ANNOUNCING A \$6 MILLION PROGRAM TO CONSTRUCT 450 HOUSING UNITS OVER THE NEXT 12-16 MONTHS AND TO PROVIDE EMPLOYMENT RETRAINING FOR THE SAME NUMBER OF DE-MOBILIZED OFFICERS RETURNING TO RUSSIA.
6. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT. WE ARE FUNDING SOME \$38 MILLION IN PROJECTS IN THIS AREA TO ENHANCE THE EFFICIENCY AND REDUCE POLLUTION OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AND PIPELINE SYSTEMS. USG FINANCED PROJECTS WILL ALSO DEMONSTRATE THE USE OF AMERICAN EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY AND PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT.
7. TRADE AND INVESTMENT. WE WILL PROPOSE CALLING AN EARLY MEETING OF OUR BILATERAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE. TO SUPPORT THE COMMITTEE'S WORK WE RECOMMEND:
 - APPOINTMENT OF FULL-TIME, SENIOR OFFICIALS AS INVESTMENT OMBUDSMEN TO CLEAR OBSTACLES TO BUSINESS COOPERATION, WITH A SPECIAL PRIORITY ON PROMOTING INVESTMENT IN THE RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS SECTOR;
 - URGING THE SUPREME SOVIET TO MOVE QUICKLY TO RATIFY OUR BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (BIT) NEGOTIATED LAST YEAR AND URGING THE U.S. CONGRESS TO APPROVE OUR DOUBLE TAXATION TREATY;
 - U.S. SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE GATT AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION TO BRING ITS TRADE REGIME INTO COMPLIANCE WITH GATT RULES;
 - U.S. LEGISLATION TO ALLOW THE EXTENSION OF PREFERENTIAL TARIFF TREATMENT TO RUSSIA'S EXPORTS UNDER THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP);

--\$11 MILLION IN PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT FOUR AMERICAN BUSINESS CENTERS IN REGIONAL CITIES OUTSIDE OF MOSCOW, BUSINESS EXCHANGES AND OTHER COMMERCIAL PROGRAMS; AND

--ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SIGNING OF FEASIBILITY STUDY GRANTS, PARTICULARLY FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY, \$82 MILLION IN EXIM BANK CREDITS AND \$150 MILLION IN GUARANTEES AND INVESTMENT INSURANCE CREDITS FOR THE "POLAR LIGHTS" OIL PRODUCTION JOINT VENTURE.

8. SECURITY COOPERATION. MORE THAN \$215 MILLION WILL BE PROVIDED IN GRANT FUNDING UNDER THE NUNN-LUGAR AUTHORIZATION FOR STRATEGIC ARMAMENT ELIMINATION; SECURE NUCLEAR WARHEAD STORAGE; AND NUCLEAR WARHEAD ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL.

END TEXT

#0445
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0445

TOR: 930401214755 M0317455

DIST:

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH ITOH KENNEY KYIM LAKE SIT SODERBERG
SIT: COQ FILE HOTLINE_OUT OLEARY SIGLER SUM SUM2

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 OSRI: RUEHTLA
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHTLA0549 0921454-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 021454Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY TALLINN
 DTG: 021454Z APR 93
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY TALLINN
 TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1501
 INFO: *****
 SUBJ: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT MERI
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0656-M (1.02)
2/27/2017 KBH~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TALLINN 000549

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, EN

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT MERI

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT MERI FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON CONCERNING THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

HAVING JUST LISTENED WITH GREAT INTEREST TO YOUR SPEECH ON AID TO THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE EMERGED FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION, I WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU SEVERAL OF MY REACTIONS. FIRST, I AM VERY GRATEFUL THAT YOU SEE THE ISSUE OF STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN REGIONAL TERMS RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ALONE. THAT IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT. SECOND, I WELCOME YOUR CALLS FOR COOPERATION TO ENSURE THAT DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CAN PROCEED. WE IN ESTONIA ARE DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO PROMOTE THOSE VALUES. AND THIRD, I WANT TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION SEVERAL OF OUR CONCERNS WITH REGARD TO THE UPCOMING SUMMIT.

I UNDERSTAND JUST HOW IMPORTANT THE STABILITY OF RUSSIA IS TO YOU AND TO THE ENTIRE WORLD, BUT I HOPE THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES UNDERSTAND THAT STABILITY THERE WILL NEVER BE REAL IF IT IS PURCHASED AT THE COST OF ALLOWING RUSSIA A FREE HAND IN WHAT USED TO BE CONTROLLED BY THE SOVIET UNION. RUSSIA MUST RECOGNIZE THE IMPERATIVES OF DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MARKET. HAVING HEARD YOUR WORDS, I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT YOU SHARE MY VIEW THAT THE THREE ARE INTERRELATED AND WILL EXPRESS THAT CONVICTION TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN VANCOUVER.

WITH BEST WISHES FOR YOUR SUCCESS THERE AND HOPE TO MEET YOU IN THE NEAREST FUTURE, I REMAIN, SINCERELY YOURS, LENNART MERI. END TEXT.
 FRASUR3

BT

#0549

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0549

TOR: 930402100218 M0318662

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DIST:

SIT: BURNS FICKLIN GATI SANNER VAX WHSR_IN

□

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 OSRI: RUEHKVA
 LINE1: OACZYUW RUEHKVA1902 0921730-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 021730Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY KIEV
 DTG: 021730Z APR 93
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY KIEV
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6306
 INFO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2085
 SUBJ: VANCOUVER SUMMIT
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-M-2(1,18)
 v2 6/1/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KIEV 001902
 DEPT FOR EUR/ISCA HESS AND KRAMER
 DEPT FOR S/NIS TALBOTT
 NSC FOR GOTTMUELLER
 E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PARM, PGOV, UP, RS
 SUBJECT: VANCOUVER SUMMIT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. UKRAINE WILL BE CAREFULLY WATCHING THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT FOR ANY INDICATION OF HOW STRONGLY THE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP WILL BE DEVELOPING, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY WHETHER UKRAINE WILL SUFFER AS A RESULT OF THAT. IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IF WE CAN MAKE SOME PUBLIC COMMENTS AND PARTICULARLY IF WE CAN HAVE YELTSIN JOIN IN SUCH COMMENTS, THAT WOULD BE FAVORABLE/REASSURING TOWARDS UKRAINE.
3. AS USUAL, KIEV IS VIEWING DEVELOPMENTS IN MOSCOW AS HAVING A DIRECT IMPACT ON UKRAINE. THIS IMPACT IS BEING VIEWED AS NEGATIVE. WITH A THREAT TO UKRAINE'S SECURITY THE ULTIMATE POSSIBILITY, NO AMOUNT OF RATIONAL DISCUSSION WITH UKRAINIAN LEADERS CAN DISSUADE THEM FROM USING RUSSIA AS AN EXCUSE FOR EVERY ILL, REAL OR PERCEIVED. TO PRE-EMPT THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT FROM FALLING INTO THIS TRAP AND TO PORTRAY RUSSIA IN A FAVORABLE LIGHT POST RECOMMENDS THAT THE PRESIDENT AND YELTSIN MAKE SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT RUSSIA'S RESPECT FOR AND DESIRE TO WORK WITH HER NEW NEIGHBORS. IN PARTICULAR, THE IMPORTANCE OF UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS CAN BE UNDERLINED AS WELL AS THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO BOTH COUNTRIES.
4. SUCH A STATEMENT (WRITTEN OR VERBAL) COULD SERVE FOUR PURPOSES:
 - (1) UNDERMINE THE VISION OF A U.S.-RUSSIAN CONDOMINIUM;
 - (2) UNDERMINE THOSE IN THE RADA WHO CLAIM RUSSIA HAS AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS (THIS COULD HELP IN START DEBATE);
 - (3) PUT SOME PRESSURE ON UKRAINE TO RESPOND PUBLICLY;
 - (4) PUT THE USG IN A POSITION TO USE THE STATEMENT AS

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LEVERAGE AGAINST UKRAINE.

5. POST ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT A HIGH LEVEL VISITOR COME TO UKRAINE TO DEBRIEF GOU ON VANCOUVER SUMMIT. THIS WILL SHOW THAT WE TAKE UKRAINE'S INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT. POPADIUK

BT

#1902

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1902

TOR: 930402123643 M0319068

DIST:

SIT: BURNS GATI GOTTEMOELLER SANNER VAX

□

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
023. cable	Re: [Vancouver Summit] Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526 (2 pages)	04/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1993 - Dec 1994 ([Vancouver Summit...])
OA/Box Number: 5050000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/03/1993 - 04/02/1993]

2016-0118-M
ke4025

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: SECRET
 OSRI: RUCNFBA
 LINE1: OAASZYUW RUCNFBA0186 0930301-SSSS--RHEHNSC.
 LINE2: ZNY SS3SS
 LINE3: O 022255Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM DIRECTOR FBI
 DTG: 022255Z APR 93
 ORIG: DIRECTOR FBI
 TO: RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DO//
 RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC
 RHEBAAA/DOE HQ FORRESTAL BLDG WASHINGTON DC
 RUCPDC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
 RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

**DECLASSIFIED IN PART
 PER E.O. 13526**

2016-0118-M-1 (1.22)
 VL 6/1/2023

INFO: ****

SUBJ:

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d)

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN
 WARNING: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION; THIS COMMUNICATION IS
 CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET NOFORN~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.
 SERIAL: 3A-RU-360-1-93
 PASS: NSC FOR WHITE HOUSE/ATTN: MIKE WAGUESPACK.
 COUNTRY: EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d)


SUBJ: EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d)

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

QPAGE TWO DE RUCNFB 0186 ~~SECRET~~
 DOI: MARCH 1992
 SOURCE: A HIGHLY RELIABLE SOURCE.

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d)

OPAGE THREE DE RUCNFB 0186 ~~S E C R E T~~



EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d)

~~C BY 10166, D ON OADR.~~

BT
#0186
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0186

TOR: 930402224114 M0320441

DIST:

SIT: AOKI BURNS GOTTEMOELLER MCGEATH PONEMAN SANNER VAX WAGUESPACK

<^DIST>

PRT: SMIGAY

□

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: [Russia/Vancouver Summit] (2 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Housing Initiative to be Announced at Vancouver Summit (2 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
003. cable	Re: April 3-4 Vancouver Summit Package (3 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
004. cable	Re: [Message to Prime Minister Mulroney from President Clinton] (4 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)
005. cable	Re: [Message to Prime Minister Major from President Clinton] (4 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)
006. cable	Re: [Message to Prime Minister Miyazawa from President Clinton] (4 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: [Message to Chancellor Kohl from President Clinton] (4 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)
008. cable	Re: [Message to President Mitterand from President Clinton] (4 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)
009. cable	Re: [Message to Prime Minister Amato from President Clinton] (4 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)
010. cable	Re: [Cancellation: Russia/Vancouver Summit] (2 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)
011. cable	Re: [Russia/Vancouver Summit] (2 pages)	04/03/1993	P1/b(1)
012. cable	Re: Russia Fishing Proposal for Vancouver (3 pages)	04/04/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1993 - Dec 1994 ([Vancouver Summit...])
 OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/03/1993 - 04/09/1993]

2016-0118-M
ke4026

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	Re: [Nagorno-Karabakh Five Plus One Talks] (6 pages)	04/04/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
014. cable	Re: Undersecretary Tarnoff's Meeting with Canadian Political Director Gaetan Lavertu (5 pages)	04/06/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
015. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Mitterrand] (2 pages)	04/07/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
016. cable	Re: S/P Director Lewis Meeting with Belgian Ambassador: Russia, Bosnia, Middle East (4 pages)	04/09/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
017. cable	Re: Vancouver Summit Debrief (1 page)	04/09/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
018. cable	Re: [Commercial Space Launches] (6 pages)	04/09/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
019. cable	Re: CODEL Gephardt Meeting with Yeltsin (7 pages)	04/09/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
020. cable	Re: [Balkan Crisis] (2 pages)	04/09/1993	P1/b(1)
021. cable	Re: [Baltics - Russia/Troop Withdrawal] (2 pages)	04/09/1993	P1/b(1)
022. cable	Re: [Russia-France-U.S./Relations] (2 pages)	04/09/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1993 - Dec 1994 ([Vancouver Summit...])
 OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/03/1993 - 04/09/1993]

2016-0118-M
ke4026

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 OSRI: RUEHCAA
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA0753 0930816-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O R 030814Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 DTG: 030814Z APR 93
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 3807
 RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 3546
 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA IMMEDIATE 4108
 INFO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2132
 RUFHOS/AMEMBASSY OSLO 6702
 RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 5327
 RUFHSK/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 2848
 RUFHNC/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 1028
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 5053
 RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1599
 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 7894
 RUFHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 2696
 SUBJ: HOUSING INITIATIVE TO BE ANNOUNCED AT VANCOUVER
 SUMMIT

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2018-0118-11-1 (1.24)
v 6/1/2023

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 100753
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: ECON, EAID, RS
 SUBJECT: HOUSING INITIATIVE TO BE ANNOUNCED AT VANCOUVER
 SUMMIT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.
3. EMBASSIES ARE INSTRUCTED TO INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS THAT AS PART OF THE ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR RUSSIA TO BE ANNOUNCED AT THE APRIL 3-4 VANCOUVER SUMMIT, THERE WILL BE A MILITARY HOUSING INITIATIVE. PARA. 4 PROVIDES BACKGROUND ON THE INITIATIVE. PARA. 5 PROVIDES TALKING POINTS FOR USE IN DISCUSSING THIS PART OF THE PACKAGE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS.
4. BACKGROUND. THE UNITED STATES WILL UNDERTAKE A PROGRAM TO FACILITATE THE RESETTLEMENT OF OFFICERS WHO ARE BEING DEMOBILIZED UPON RETURN TO RUSSIA. THIS INITIATIVE RESPONDS TO A DIRECT APPEAL FROM THE GOR. THE RESETTLEMENT INITIATIVE: HAS TWO IMPORTANT COMPONENTS:
 - 1) IT WILL BUILD A FIXED NUMBER OF HOUSING UNITS WITHIN 12-16 MONTHS FOR OFFICERS WHO ARE BEING DEMOBILIZED AND

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RETURNING TO RUSSIA FROM THE BALTICS AND ELSEWHERE; AND 2) IT WILL PROVIDE EMPLOYMENT TRAINING TO REINTEGRATE THESE OFFICERS INTO THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY. (EMBASSY FYI ONLY. THE SUMMIT ANNOUNCEMENT WILL COMMIT THE USG TO CONSTRUCTION OF 450 HOUSING UNITS OVER THE NEXT 12-16 MONTHS. THIS INITIATIVE COULD BE EXPANDED IN FY'94. END EMBASSY FYI.)

5. BEGIN TALKING POINTS.

-- THE HOUSING INITIATIVE TO BE ANNOUNCED AT VANCOUVER IS MEANT AS A CONTRIBUTION TO PROMOTE TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND RESPONDS TO A DIRECT APPEAL FROM THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT.

-- IT IS DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF DE-MOBILIZED MILITARY OFFICERS TO RUSSIA. IT WILL INCLUDE CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING AND RE-EMPLOYMENT TRAINING.

-- WE WILL BE ENCOURAGING OUR ALLIES TO ADOPT SIMILAR MEASURES.

-- IN PRESENTING THIS INITIATIVE TO THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT WE ARE MAKING CLEAR THAT THIS OFFER IS MEANT TO HELP IT ABIDE BY ITS COMMITMENT TO AN EXPEDITIOUS WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM THE BALTICS AND ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE NIS.

-- OUR COMMITMENT TO AN EXPEDITIOUS WITHDRAWAL REMAINS FIRM. WE BELIEVE RUSSIAN FORCES SHOULD CONTINUE WITHDRAWING FROM THE BALTICS.

-- WE WILL ACCEPT NO LINKAGE BETWEEN THE PACE OF DELIVERY OF THIS HOUSING ASSISTANCE AND THE SPEED OF THE RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BALTICS.

WHARTON

BT
#0753
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0753

TOR: 930403031944 M0320692

DIST:

SIT: BURNS SANNER VAX

□

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 OSRI: RUEHCAA
 LINE1: OAACZYUJW RUEHCAA0906 0931128-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZEX
 LINE3: O R 031030Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 DTG: 031030Z APR 93
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: RUEHSD/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 7065/66
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 9950/51
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3657/58
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 7317/18
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 2852/53
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 8014/15
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 3971/72
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 5019/20
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 7896/97
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 2136/37
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 3135/36
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 4330/31
 RUEHBS/USEC BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0000
 INFO: ZEN/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0029/30
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2148/49
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY MINSK 4499/4500
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 4176/77
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 4906/07
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY ALMA ATA 5709/10
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3072/73
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0830/31
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 3023/24
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 3331/32
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2363/64
 ZEN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 5329/30
 SUBJ: APRIL 3-4 VANCOUVER SUMMIT PACKAGE
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2010-0118-m-2 (1,25)

NL 6/1/2003

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 100906
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
 C O R R E C T E D COPY (FOR OMITTED ACTION ADDEE)
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: EAID, ECON, RS, EFIN, ETRD
 SUBJECT: APRIL 3-4 VANCOUVER SUMMIT PACKAGE
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.
 3. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A NON-PAPER
 OUTLINING IN BROAD DETAIL THE ECONOMIC INITIATIVES TO BE
 ANNOUNCED IN CONNECTION WITH THE APRIL 3-4 VANCOUVER
 SUMMIT. EMBASSIES ARE REQUESTED BELOW TO SHARE THE TEXT
 OF THE NON-PAPER WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS PRIOR TO THE APRIL

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3 OPENING OF THE SUMMIT. IN PRESENTING THE NON-PAPER, EMBASSIES SHOULD UNDERScore THAT, WHILE THIS PARTICULAR PACKAGE APPLIES TO RUSSIA, OUR COMMITMENT TO ASSISTING THE OTHER NIS REMAINS FIRM. FUNDING LEVELS FOR THESE INITIATIVES WILL NOT BE ANNOUNCED PRIOR TO THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT.

4. ACTION G-7 EMBASSIES AND USEC BRUSSELS, THESE POSTS SHOULD DELIVER THE NON-PAPER TO THE MFA. THEY SHOULD ALSO ATTACH THIS TEXT TO A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER WHICH IS BEING SENT SEPTEL TO THE HEAD OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT

5. ACTION ALL OTHER ADDRESSEES. POSTS SHOULD MAKE THE TEXT OF THE NON-PAPER AVAILABLE TO THE MFA.

6. BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER.

THE USG WILL ANNOUNCE A PACKAGE OF BILATERAL ECONOMIC INITIATIVES AT THE APRIL 3-4 VANCOUVER SUMMIT. THE BROAD AIM OF THIS PACKAGE IS TO SIGNAL STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA, IN CONCERT WITH PARALLEL EFFORTS TO ASSEMBLE A SUBSTANTIAL MULTILATERAL PROGRAM OF SUPPORT THROUGH THE G-7. THE PACKAGE WILL INCLUDE GRANT HUMANITARIAN AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, CONCESSIONAL FOOD SALES AND TRADE CREDITS. THE PACKAGE HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO SUPPORT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT'S MOST IMPORTANT ECONOMIC PRIORITIES. IT INCLUDES NEW INITIATIVES AS WELL AS THE SUBSTANTIAL EXPANSION OF EXISTING PROGRAMS. THE PACKAGE WILL HAVE EIGHT COMPONENTS:

A. ADDITIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND FOOD ASSISTANCE.

ADDITIONAL GRANT FOOD ASSISTANCE IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE THIS FISCAL YEAR AS WELL AS HEALTH CARE AND MEDICAL SUPPORT.

B. CONCESSIONAL FOOD CREDITS. THE U.S. WILL MAKE AVAILABLE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT SALES UNDER THE FOOD FOR PROGRESS PROGRAM.

C. PRIVATE SECTOR SUPPORT. THIS WILL INCLUDE ANNOUNCEMENT OF FUNDING FOR A RUSSIAN-AMERICAN ENTERPRISE FUND TO SUPPORT THE CREATION OF NEW, PARTICULARLY SMALL, PRIVATE BUSINESSES THROUGH LOANS, EQUITY INVESTMENTS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. OTHER PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVE WILL SUPPORT PRIVATIZATION AUCTIONS OF STATE ENTERPRISES, BUSINESS TRAINING AND ECONOMIC REFORM.

D. DEMOCRATIZATION. A NEW DEMOCRATIZATION INITIATIVE WILL BE CREATED TO PULL TOGETHER AN ARRAY OF PROGRAMS AND DRAW THE AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN PUBLICS INTO THE EFFORT OF SPREADING DEMOCRACY.

E. MILITARY HOUSING. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST BY THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT, WE ARE ANNOUNCING AN INITIAL PROGRAM TO CONSTRUCT HOUSING OVER THE NEXT 12-16 MONTHS AND TO PROVIDE EMPLOYMENT RETRAINING FOR DE-MOBILIZED OFFICERS RETURNING TO RUSSIA.

F. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT. USG FINANCED PROJECTS TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THIS AREA WILL DEMONSTRATE THE USE OF AMERICAN EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY AND PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT.

G. TRADE AND INVESTMENT. WE WILL PROPOSE WAYS TO WORK COOPERATIVELY TO CLEAR OBSTACLES TO BUSINESS COOPERATION. WE WANT TO PLACE SPECIAL PRIORITY ON PROMOTING INVESTMENT IN THE RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS SECTOR. WE WILL ALSO SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE GATT AND OUR INTENTION TO SEEK U.S. LEGISLATION TO ALLOW THE EXTENSION OF

PREFERENTIAL TARIFF TREATMENT TO RUSSIA'S EXPORTS UNDER THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES GSP.

H. SECURITY ASSISTANCE. UNDER THE NUNN-LUGAR AUTHORIZATION WE WILL ANNOUNCE ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR STRATEGIC ARMAMENT ELIMINATION AND SAFE AND SECURE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS.

END TEXT.

7. IN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ON THE MILITARY HOUSING INITIATIVE, POSTS MAY USE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON AN "IF ASKED" BASIS:

-- OUR COMMITMENT TO AN EXPEDITIOUS WITHDRAWAL REMAINS FIRM. WE BELIEVE RUSSIAN FORCES SHOULD CONTINUE WITHDRAWING FROM THE BALTICS.

-- WE WILL ACCEPT NO LINKAGE BETWEEN THE PACE OF DELIVERY OF THIS HOUSING ASSISTANCE AND THE SPEED OF THE RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BALTICS. WHARTON

BT

#0906

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0906

TOR: 930403063318 M0320844

DIST:

SIT: VAX

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
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 ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9353
 INFO: ****
 SUBJ: RUSSIAN FISHING PROPOSAL FOR VANCOUVER
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-018-m-2 (1-40)
 v 6/1/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010049
 DEPT FOR EUR/ISCA, L/OES, AND OES (COLSON AND
 CAMPBELL)
 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS: EPIS, PREL, PBTS, PHSA, SENV, RS, US
 SUBJECT: RUSSIAN FISHING PROPOSAL FOR VANCOUVER
 SUMMIT: ADDITIONAL DETAILS
 REFS: (A) MOSCOW 9740
 (B) STATE 96106
 (C) STATE 81774
 (D) MOSCOW 8666

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. S&TOFF MET WITH SERGEI KAREV, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF MFA'S LEGAL DEPARTMENT, ON APRIL 1 TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED SUMMIT JOINT DECLARATION ON FISHERIES COOPERATION IN THE NORTH PACIFIC (REF A). KAREV STATED THAT THE PROPOSAL SEEKS TO ACHIEVE TWO MAIN OBJECTIVES: (1) OBTAIN U.S. POLITICAL AND MORAL SUPPORT FOR THE CONSERVATION OF LIVING MARINE RESOURCES IN THE OKHOTSK SEA, ESPECIALLY THE "PEANUT HOLE," (REFS B&C) AND (2) DECLARE THE BERING SEA AN AREA OF JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN FISHERIES COOPERATION.
3. KAREV STATED THAT RUSSIA IS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT OVERFISHING (PRIMARILY OF POLLOCK) BY FOREIGN VESSELS (POLAND, SOUTH KOREA, AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA) IN THE OKHOTSK SEA, ESPECIALLY THE CENTRAL PART (PEANUT HOLE) WHICH LIES OUTSIDE OF RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC ZONE. (RUSSIAN POLITICAL PROPOSALS FOR CONTROLLING THIS REPORTED SEPTEL). KAREV ANALOGIZED THE OVERFISHING IN THE PEANUT HOLE TO THE OVERFISHING IN THE BERING SEA'S "DONUT HOLE." KAREV URGED THAT AMERICA SUPPORT RUSSIA'S EFFORTS ON FISHERIES CONSERVATION IN THE OKHOTSK SEA.
4. COMMENT: THE MFA IS CLEARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LOS IMPLICATIONS OF THE OKHOTSK SEA STRADDLING STOCKS. KAREV EARLIER HAD ASKED US "INFORMALLY" FOR OUR VIEWS ON HOLDING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON STRADDLING STOCKS. HE SAID THAT POLAND MAY BE

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WILLING TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE IN A MULTILATERAL FORUM. CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA HAD ALSO SHOWN TENTATIVE, PRELIMINARY INTEREST.

5. COMMENT CONTINUED: THE MFA IS ALSO CONCERNED OVER TIME CONSTRAINTS. THE FISHING SEASON BEGINS IN THE FALL AND THE MFA HAS WARNED US THAT THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT MAY TAKE MATTERS INTO ITS OWN HANDS BY ADOPTING UNILATERAL MEASURES AGAINST FOREIGN FISHERIES IN THE OKHOTSK SEA. KAREV REMINDED US OF THE "UNFORTUNATE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT" A UNILATERAL STEP WOULD HAVE, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF PERU'S RECENT ATTEMPT TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER STRADDLING STOCKS OUT TO THE EXTREME LIMITS OF ITS EEZ. HE ALSO ASSERTED THAT CANADA MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN EXTENDING ITS FISHERIES JURISDICTION.

6. ASKED ABOUT RUSSIA'S PROPOSAL TO DECLARE THE BERING SEA "AN AREA OF COMPREHENSIVE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN FISHERIES COOPERATION," KAREV EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS A "POLITICAL DECLARATION" AND WOULD NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA. NOR, HE ADDED, WOULD THIS DESIGNATION BAN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE U.S. AND RUSSIA FROM THE RIGHT TO FISH IN THIS AREA. KAREV ARGUED THAT SINCE THE BERING SEA IS BOUNDED BY THE ECONOMIC ZONES OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES, IT IS OUR "JOINT RESPONSIBILITY" TO ENSURE THE CONSERVATION OF ALL LIVING MARINE LIFE, NOT JUST FISHERIES, IN THIS AREA. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS DESIGNATION WAS THE NEXT "LOGICAL STEP" IN THE SERIES OF JOINT SUMMIT STATEMENTS ON THE BERING SEA.

7. IN DISCUSSING CONSERVATION OF THE BERING SEA ECOSYSTEM, S&TOFF ASKED KAREV ABOUT THE PROPOSED "ALEUTIAN CHAIN BIODIVERSITY INITIATIVE (REF D). KAREV STATED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD OF THIS PROPOSAL. HE ADDED HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND NATURAL RESOURCES (MINENV) AND MINENV MINISTER DANILOV-DANILYAN FREQUENTLY ACT INDEPENDENTLY OF THE MFA IN DEALING WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. KAREV CONTRASTED THIS WITH THE PROPOSAL ON FISHING COOPERATION WHICH, HE EMPHASIZED, HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY COORDINATED WITH THE RUSSIAN COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES.

8. COMMENT: EMBASSY HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT THE ALEUTIAN CHAIN BIODIVERSITY INITIATIVE HAS BEEN SENT TO THE MFA. A MINENV OFFICIAL STATED THAT THE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN SENT TO MFA'S DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION. THE MFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THAT DEPARTMENT, HOWEVER, TOLD S&TOFF THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN THE PROPOSAL AND THAT IT WAS NOT INCLUDED AMONG THE S&T ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE SUMMIT.

9. COMMENT CONTINUED: KAREV DID NOT TRY TO TIE THE ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 010049 DEPT FOR EUR/ISCA, L/OES, AND OES (COLSON AND CAMPBELL)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: EFIS, PREL, PBTS, PHSA, SENV, RS, US

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN FISHING PROPOSAL FOR VANCOUVER

SUMMIT: ADDITIONAL DETAILS

JOINT FISHING COOPERATION STATEMENT TO THE MARINE
BOUNDARY AGREEMENT. HE DID ACKNOWLEDGE THAT RUSSIAN
FAR EAST FISHING INTERESTS ARE STRENUOUSLY LOBBYING
THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE URGENT MEASURES TO REDUCE
FOREIGN FISHING IN THE OKHOTSK SEA. END COMMENT.
YALOWITZ

BT

#0049

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 0049
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TOR: 930404044055 M0321318
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SIT: VAX
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Cable

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 DTG: 041106Z APR 93
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 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN IMMEDIATE 0172
 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 3110
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7745
 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 9984
 RUFHSK/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 6379
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2516
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0724
 RUFHMB/USMISSION USVIENNA IMMEDIATE 7200
 SUBJ: NAGORNO-KARABAKH FIVE PLUS ONE TALKS:
 / ON VERGE OF BREAKDOWN, APRIL 3

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

1016-0118-A-1 (1.41)

V2 206/1/2013

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 03433
 DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
 FROM SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR MARESCA
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, PBTS, CSCE, RS, TU, AM, AJ
 SUBJECT: NAGORNO-KARABAKH FIVE PLUS ONE TALKS:
 / ON VERGE OF BREAKDOWN, APRIL 3
 REF: GENEVA 3431
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. SUMMARY: ARMENIAN REFUSAL TO DISCUSS THE OCCUPATION
 OF KELBAJAR (AZERBAIJAN) BROUGHT THE LATEST ROUND OF NK
 FIVE PLUS ONE TALKS TO THE VERGE OF BREAKDOWN APRIL 3.
 BOTH ITALIAN CHAIR SICA AND U.S. NEGOTIATOR MARESCA
 WARNED THAT THE FIVE PLUS ONE TALKS -- AND INDEED THE
 MINSK GROUP -- COULD NOT PROCEED IF THEY SERVED NO
 PURPOSE BUT TO COVER UP ACQUISITION OF NEW TERRITORY.
 THE GROUP ATTEMPTED TO FIND A BASIS ON WHICH TO PROCEED,
 BUT ARMENIAN REP SHAHNAZARYAN REFUSED TO DISCUSS
 ANYTHING RELATING TO KELBAJAR "ON FORMAL GROUNDS."
 CONTRARY TO THE BASIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE GROUP OF
 FIVE, SHAHNAZARYAN REFUSE TO DISCUSS ANYTHING THAT HE
 CLAIMED WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH.
 MINSK GROUP CHAIRMAN RAFFAELLI SENT A NEW MESSAGE TO ALL
 PARTIES REQUESTING A REPLY ON WITHDRAWAL FROM KELBAJAR
 BY APRIL 4. PARTIES WILL TOUCH BASE APRIL 4 TO SEE IF A
 REPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND TO REVIEW ANY NEW
 DEVELOPMENTS. IN OUR VIEW, THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF

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KELBAJAR COULD VERY WELL DESTROY THE PEACE PROCESS, AND
 COULD ALSO LEAD TO A BROADER WAR BETWEEN ARMENIA AND
 AZERBAIJAN. WE EXPECT THE RUSSIANS TO RAISE THE ISSUE
 IN VANCOUVER WITH THE PRESIDENT. END SUMMARY.
 TALKS RUN INTO A BRICK WALL

 3. AZERBAIJANI FONMIN KASYMOV LED OFF THE FIVE PLUS ONE
 GROUP'S APRIL 3 MEETING AT THE U.S. MISSION IN GENEVA BY
 ANNOUNCING THAT ARMENIAN FORCES HAD OCCUPIED THE ENTIRE
 PROVINCE OF KELBAJAR ON APRIL 2. HE ALSO INFORMED THE
 GROUP THAT NK ARMENIANS HAD LAUNCHED AN ATTACK IN THE
 FIZULI DISTRICT, SOUTHEAST OF NK.
 4. ARMENIAN REP SHAHNAZARYAN REFUSED TO DISCUSS
 KELBAJAR OR ANY OTHER ASPECT OF THE CONFLICT WHICH HE
 CLAIMED WAS UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF NK, AND WARNED
 THAT "ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY SITUATION" WOULD LEAD THE
 FIVE PLUS ONE TO THE "SAME DEAD END AS THE ROME TALKS."
 HE DEMANDED WORK PROCEED ON THE TIMETABLE WITHOUT
 REFERENCE TO SPECIFIC MILITARY ACTIONS. HE ASSERTED
 THAT ALL DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH
 IS UNACCEPTABLE IN THE ABSENCE OF NK ARMENIAN REPS. HE
 REPEATEDLY AND HEATEDLY SAID THAT AZERBAIJAN WOULD HAVE
 TO TAKE UP THESE PROBLEMS DIRECTLY WITH THE LEADERS OF NK.
 5. ITALIAN ACTING CHAIR SICA POINTED OUT THAT
 SHAHNAZARYAN'S POSITION DIFFERED FROM THAT OF ARMENIAN
 PRESIDENT TER-PETROSYAN, WHO SENT A LETTER OF DEEP
 CONCERN TO NK ARMENIAN DEFENSE LEADER ROBERT KOCHARYAN
 (TEXT FAXED TO EUR/RPM). AFTER IT PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO
 DISCUSS THE TEXT OF A FOLLOW-UP MESSAGE FROM THE MINSK
 GROUP CHAIRMAN TO THE PARTIES AS SUGGESTED BY U.S. REP
 MARESCA APRIL 2 (REFTEL), MARESCA SUGGESTED THAT THE
 CHAIRMAN SIMPLY SEND IT WITHOUT A CONSENSUS AGREEMENT,
 AS HE HAD HIS PREVIOUS MESSAGE. AFTER A COFFEE BREAK,
 SICA ANNOUNCED THAT RAFFAELLI HAD SENT THE FOLLOW-UP
 DEMARCHE TO THE PARTIES CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL
 FROM KELBAJAR. THE NEW MESSAGE ASKS FOR A REPLY BY
 APRIL 4.

AND ANOTHER BRICK WALL

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 GENEVA 03433
 DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
 FROM SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR MARESCA
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, PBTS, CSCE, RS, TU, AM, AJ
 SUBJECT: NAGORNO-KARABAKH FIVE PLUS ONE TALKS:

6. MARESCA CALLED FOR THE GROUP TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE
 TIMETABLE, TAKING UP TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM KELBAJAR AS
 THE FIRST ITEM. THE MINSK GROUP COULD NOT IGNORE THE
 OCCUPATION OF KELBAJAR; OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE PUT IN THE
 POSITION OF SERVING AS A COVER FOR THE OCCUPATION AND
 ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY. MARESCA NOTED THAT WHEN THE
 FIVE PLUS ONE GROUP WAS FORMED IT WAS THE CLEAR
 UNDERSTANDING AND THE PREMISE OF THE GROUP OF FIVE THAT
 ARMENIA WOULD CONVEY THE VIEWS OF THE NK ARMENIANS. THE
 PROBLEM OF KELBAJAR MUST BE DEALT WITH IN THIS GROUP.
 MARESCA ADDED THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME REASON FOR A
 MILITARY SWEEP THROUGH KELBAJAR, BUT THERE COULD BE NO

JUSTIFICATION FOR REMAINING THERE. CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF THE AREA WOULD CONSTITUTE AN UNACCEPTABLE CONQUEST AND SEIZURE OF TERRITORY. THE AREA CANNOT EVEN SERVE AS A "HUMANITARIAN CORRIDOR" SINCE IT IS RINGED BY HIGH MOUNTAIN RANGES.

7. SHAHNAZARYAN REPEATED HIS BLUNT REFUSAL TO DISCUSS ANYTHING RELATING TO THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF NK. MARESCA SAID THAT THIS WAS CONTRARY TO THE BASIS OF THE WORK OF THE FIVE, AND IF THE ARMENIANS INSISTED ON THIS NEW POSITION, THE GROUP OF FIVE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE UNABLE TO FUNCTION. CHAIRMAN SICA CALLED FOR A DISCUSSION AMONG THE "THREE PLUS ONE" -- EXCLUDING AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA -- TO WORK ON A TEXT WHICH COULD FORM AN AGREED BASIS FOR CONTINUED WORK, INCLUDING A CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM KELBAJAR. AND ANOTHER

8. THE WHOLE GROUP RECONVENED AT ABOUT 5 P.M., ONLY TO MEET SHAHNAZARYAN'S REFUSAL TO DISCUSS THE NEW TEXT (SEE BELOW, PARA 8) "ON FORMAL GROUNDS." "THIS GROUP," HE ASSERTED, "HAS NO MANDATE TO DO ANYTHING BUT PREPARE DRAFTS FOR THE MINSK GROUP." SHAHNAZARYAN THEN CALLED DISCUSSION OF THE SET OF PRINCIPLES A "PRECONDITION," AND REJECTED ALL PRECONDITIONS.

9. MARESCA REMINDED SHAHNAZARYAN THAT THE FIVE PLUS ONE GROUP HAS NO FORMAL MANDATE AND CANNOT DISCUSS ANYTHING IT WANTS TO. FURTHERMORE, THE ARMENIAN POSITION ALSO CONSTITUTED A PRE-CONDITION: THAT THE NK ARMENIANS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO REMAIN IN CONTROL OF KELBAJAR. MARESCA SAID THE NK ARMENIANS HAD NO RIGHT WHATSOEVER TO BE IN KELBAJAR AND THEY HAD TO LEAVE. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD NOT CONDONE THE CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY FORCE, AND THE GROUP OF FIVE, AND THE MINSK GROUP, COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH A "PRE-CONDITION" FOR CONTINUING THEIR WORK. THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN A COVER-UP FOR THE CONQUEST OF TERRITORY. SICA REVEALED THAT SHAHNAZARYAN TOLD HIM PRIVATELY HE WOULD REFUSE TO WORK ON THE DEFINITION OF THE AREA OF CONFLICT INsofar AS IT AFFECTED NAGORNO-KARABAKH -- IN OTHER WORDS, SICA CONTINUED, THE ARMENIAN DELEGATION HAD NO INTENTION OF DISCUSSING EVEN THE AGENDA PREVIOUSLY AGREED ON BY THE ENTIRE FIVE PLUS ONE, INCLUDING ARMENIA.

10. THUS THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE TALKS IS IN QUESTION, SICA CONTINUED. AT THE LAST SESSION IN GENEVA THE PARTIES AGREED TO A FORMULA SAYING THEY ARE COMPETENT TO WORK ON ALL TEXTS. YET, SICA SAID, THE ARMENIAN SIDE CHALLENGES THIS IN PRACTICE. SICA SAID THIS MUST BE RESOLVED OR THE FIVE PLUS ONE GROUP WOULD COLLAPSE AND COULD NOT RECONVENE -- AT LEAST NOT UNDER HIS CHAIRMANSHIP. MARESCA POINTED OUT THAT IF THE FIVE PLUS ONE DIES, THE MINSK GROUP WILL DIE WITH IT. THE NK ARMENIANS, BY OCCUPYING KELBAJAR, ARE DESTROYING THE ONE FORUM IN WHICH THEY HAVE A VOICE ABOUT THEIR OWN FUTURE.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 GENEVA 03433
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
FROM SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR MARESCA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, PBTS, CSCE, RS, TU, AM, AJ
SUBJECT: NAGORNO-KARABAKH FIVE PLUS ONE TALKS:
NEXT STEPS -- AND LOOKING TO VANCOUVER

11. AT MARESCA'S SUGGESTION, THE GROUP AGREED TO AWAIT EITHER RESPONSES TO THE CHAIRMAN'S MESSAGE, NEW DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE REGION OR NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO SHAHNAZARYAN FROM YEREVAN BEFORE ADJOURNING, POSSIBLY SINE DIE. THE GROUP WILL TOUCH BASE AT THE RUSSIAN MISSION LATE APRIL 4, AND WILL MEET FORMALLY AT THE U.S. MISSION THE MORNING OF APRIL 5. AT THAT TIME THE GROUP WILL ALSO CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS ADVISABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO GO AHEAD WITH THE IMPENDING VISIT TO THE REGION OF THE MONITOR MISSION PREPARATORY GROUP, NOW SET TO LEAVE FOR THE REGION APRIL 6.

12. KAZIMIROV TOLD MARESCA HE HAS RECOMMENDED THAT YELTSIN RAISE WITH THE PRESIDENT IN VANCOUVER THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING A JOINT MESSAGE TO THE WARRING SIDES OR MAKING A JOINT DECLARATION. MARESCA SAID HE REPORTED THIS TO WASHINGTON (REFTEL), AND REITERATED THAT A JOINT MESSAGE SHOULD GO ONLY TO BAKU AND YEREVAN; ADDING STEPANAKERT AS AN ADDRESSEE WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL, SINCE NK HAS NO/NO INDEPENDENT STATUS. SEVERAL OTHER PARTICIPANTS ASKED MARESCA WHAT THE SUMMIT MIGHT DO ABOUT THE SITUATION.
COMMENT

13. THE ARMENIAN REFUSAL TO JOIN IN AN EFFORT TO GET THE NK ARMENIANS TO WITHDRAW FROM KELBAJAR, OR EVEN TO DISCUSS ANYTHING THEY CONSIDER UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF NK, THREATENS THE CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE PRESENT SITUATION COULD CLEARLY FUEL THE POSSIBILITY OF A BROADER WAR BETWEEN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN. THE MINSK GROUP WAS STYMIED BY ARMENIAN INSISTENCE ON A RECOGNIZED STATUS FOR NK, WHICH NO OTHER COUNTRY COULD ACCEPT. THE GROUP OF FIVE WAS SET UP BY MARESCA TO GET AROUND THIS OBSTACLE ON THE BASIS OF PRESIDENT TER-PETROSYAN'S ASSURANCE THAT ARMENIA WOULD ACT AS A GO-BETWEEN TO ENSURE THAT NK VIEWS WERE REPRESENTED IN THIS SMALLER GROUP. BUT NOW THE ARMENIANS ARE REFUSING TO PLAY THIS ROLE, AND ARE ONCE AGAIN INSISTING ON A STATUS FOR NK, WHICH NO COUNTRY CAN ACCEPT.

14. IN ADDITION, BY ALIGNING THEMSELVES WITH THE NK OCCUPATION OF KELBAJAR THE ARMENIANS ARE OPENLY CHALLENGING AZERBAIJAN'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE AREA. UNLIKE THE NK OCCUPATION OF LACHIN, WHICH WAS ARGUABLY NECESSARY TO PROVIDE A LIFELINE FOR NK, THE OCCUPATION OF KELBAJAR HAS NO JUSTIFICATION ON MILITARY OR HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. KELBAJAR IS RINGED BY HIGH MOUNTAIN RANGES WHICH MAKE IT IMPRACTICAL TO USE AS A SUPPLY CORRIDOR. EVEN AZERI SUPPLIES TO THE AREA HAD TO CROSS HIGH MOUNTAINS TO GET THERE. TER-PETROSYAN'S LETTER TO NK LEADER KOCHARYAN REVEALS THAT HE IS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE NK ACTION (IT OMITTS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE RITUAL CONDEMNATION OF AZERI PROVOCATIONS). BUT BY DEFENDING THE NK ACTION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ARMENIA JOINS IN RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, AND THIS CAN ONLY

PROVOKE AN ENRAGED REACTION IN AZERBAIJAN, WHERE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED PRESIDENT ELCHIBEY IS FIGHTING FOR HIS POLITICAL LIFE AGAINST ULTRA-NATIONALISTS AND FORMER COMMUNISTS. REPORTS OF THE POSSIBLE FIRST-TIME ARMENIAN USE OF FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT IN THE KELBAJAR ATTACK FUEL THE GROWING IMPRESSION OF WAR BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT CANNOT OPERATE OUT OF THE ONE TINY AIRFIELD IN NK.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 GENEVA 03433

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

FROM SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR MARESCA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, PBTS, CSCE, RS, TU, AM, AJ

SUBJECT: NAGORNO-KARABAKH FIVE PLUS ONE TALKS:

15. THE DESPERATION FELT IN THE GROUP OF FIVE HAS BEEN PALPABLE IN THE LAST TWO DAYS, AND SEVERAL DELEGATES HAVE APPEALED TO MARESCA FOR SOME ACTION FROM THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT. MARESCA HAS SAID THAT THE MAXIMUM ANY SUMMIT OF THIS KIND CAN DO IS TO ISSUE A STATEMENT OR AN APPEAL, AND THAT HE CANNOT FORESEE WHAT MIGHT BE AGREED AT A MEETING WHICH WILL CLEARLY BE FOCUSED ON OTHER PRIORITIES.

16. NONETHELESS, THIS CANNOT BE BRUSHED OFF AS A MINOR ISSUE. THE PROSPECT OF A WIDER WAR WHICH COULD DRAW IN TURKEY, RUSSIA OR IRAN IS STRONGER NOW THAN EVER BEFORE, AND THE NK OCCUPATION OF KELBAJAR IS A PROVOCATION FOR THE AZERIS AND TURKS. THUS FAR, THIS NEGOTIATING PROCESS HAS BEEN THE ONLY HOPE FOR FINDING A SOLUTION. IF IT DISINTEGRATES THERE WILL BE FEW ALTERNATIVES FOR THE POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE AREA TO POINT TO IN THEIR EFFORTS TO STAVE OFF THE POPULAR CLAMOR FOR AN ALL-OUT WAR. END COMMENT.

17. TEXT OF PROPOSED AGREED BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK OF THE FIVE PLUS ONE:

-- TO CONSIDER THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT AND EXPEDIENT PART OF THE DE-ESCALATION IS AN IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE REJECTION BY ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT OF ANY BORDER VIOLATION IN THE AREA OF CONFLICT RESULTING IN TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIONS.

-- TO DEMAND A PROMPT AND CLEAR RESPONSE THAT THERE WILL BE AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMED UNITS FROM THE KELBAJAR REGION, AS REQUESTED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MINSK CONFERENCE IN HIS FOLLOW-UP MESSAGE OF APRIL 3.

-- TO CONTINUE DISCUSSING THE MINSK PROCESS DOCUMENTS AND COME BACK TO THE KELBAJAR PROBLEM, IF NECESSARY, UPON RECEIVING THE RESPONSE MENTIONED IN POINT 2.

RODGER3##

BT

#3433

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04

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<^SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04

SSN: 3433

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DIST:

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SIT: FORSYTHE SANNER SUM SUM2 VAX

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
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 LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 LINE3: P 062203Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 DTG: 062203Z APR 93
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0000
 INFO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000
 RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
 RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0000
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0000
 SUBJ: UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF'S MEETING WITH CANADIAN
 POLITICAL DIRECTOR GAETAN LAVERTU

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2016-0118-M-A (U.42)
 VZ 6/1/2023

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ STATE 103091
 EXDIS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, CA, RS, BK
 SUBJECT: UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF'S MEETING WITH CANADIAN
 POLITICAL DIRECTOR GAETAN LAVERTU

1. ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: DURING A MARCH 24 COURTESY CALL, LAVERTU AND U/S TARNOFF EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE CRISIS IN RUSSIA. THE TWO DISCUSSED THE AGENDA AND TIMING FOR THE APRIL KYOTO GATHERING OF G-7 DIRECTORS AND HOW IT MIGHT FIT WITH A PLANNED GATHERING OF FOREIGN AND FINANCE MINISTERS. CANADA HOPED TO INCLUDE U.N. REFORM, PEACEKEEPING, AND NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE G-7 AGENDA. ON SOMALIA, LAVERTU NOTED OTTAWA INTENDED TO WITHDRAW ITS UNITAF CONTINGENT THIS SUMMER, BUT WOULD CONTRIBUTE SOME STAFF TO UNOSOM II HEADQUARTERS AS WELL AS CIVILIAN ELEMENTS TO HELP WITH SOMALI POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION. END SUMMARY.
3. TARNOFF BEGAN BY REFERRING TO THE U.S.-RUSSIAN SUMMIT IN VANCOUVER. THE RUSSIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT NOTWITHSTANDING, FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV TOLD SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER THAT RUSSIA PREFERRED TO HOLD THE SUMMIT IN VANCOUVER.

 G-7 SUMMIT TIMING

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

4. TARNOFF REPORTED THAT A CANADIAN OFFICIAL, PRESUMABLY SHERPA REID MORDEN, HAD TELEPHONED UNDERSECRETARY-DESIGNATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS JOAN SPERO TO DISCUSS THE G-7 SUMMIT. THEY AGREED THAT IT SHOULD NOT OCCUR IMMEDIATELY AFTER VANCOUVER. FOREIGN AND FINANCE MINISTERS SHOULD FIRST GATHER IN JAPAN TO SEE WHAT CONCRETE OFFERS COULD BE ACHIEVED. THE MINISTERS WOULD INCLUDE THE NOTION OF AN EARLY SUMMIT ON THEIR AGENDA. THE U.S. BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO WAIT FOR THE RESULT OF THE APRIL 25 REFERENDUM IN RUSSIA BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH A DECISION ON AN EARLY G-7 SUMMIT.

THE CRISIS IN RUSSIA

5. TARNOFF NOTED THE SUPREME SOVIET APPEARS LESS STRIDENT IN ITS DESIRE TO PUNISH YELTSIN. YELTSIN, TOO, HAS SCALED BACK HIS DEMANDS. IMPEACHMENT FORCES APPEARED TO BE LOSING STEAM. RUTSKOI MAY NOT EMERGE VICTORIOUS, BUT YELTSIN ALSO COULD LOSE THE APRIL 25 PLEBISCITE. YELTSIN UNFORTUNATELY HAS NOT RE-EMERGED TO REASSERT HIS AUTHORITY. TO KEEP THE RESPECT OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE, HE NEEDS TO DO THAT.

6. LAVERTU AGREED WITH TARNOFF'S ASSESSMENT AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUPPORT OF REGIONAL RUSSIAN LEADERS. CANADA REMAINED BEHIND YELTSIN. HE IS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF DEMOCRATIC TRENDS. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SITUATION IS OUT OF LINE AND WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND YELTSIN'S RESORT TO UNCONSTITUTIONAL METHODS. PM MULRONEY STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF COMING UP WITH A GOOD PACKAGE FOR YELTSIN.

7. TARNOFF OBSERVED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON SHARES THAT VIEW. THE PRESIDENT SPENT TWO HOURS IN THE OVAL OFFICE ON THE EVENING OF MARCH 23 WORKING ON THE AID PACKAGE. THE U.S. WAS BEGINNING TO GET SIGNS THAT THE JAPANESE WERE BECOMING ENGAGED ON THE NEED TO PROVIDE INCREASED ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA.

BOSNIA

8. TARNOFF EXPRESSED SORROW AT THE WOUNDING OF TWO CANADIAN PEACEKEEPERS IN SREBRENICA EARLIER IN THE DAY, REPORTEDLY AS A RESULT OF SERBIAN SHELLING. LAVERTU WONDERED IF ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY RESOLUTION WAS SCHEDULED TO BE TAKEN UP SOON AND EXPRESSED CONCERN WITH THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ENFORCEMENT ON UNPROFOR. TARNOFF REPLIED THAT THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA HAD COMPLICATED MATTERS.

9. LAVERTU ASKED IF THE RUSSIANS HAD DRAWN ANY LINKAGES TO SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTION. TARNOFF REPORTED THE RUSSIANS ORIGINALLY HAD LINKED THEIR SUPPORT TO THREE

ITEMS: A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION APPROVING THE VANCE-OWEN PEACE PLAN, IMPLEMENTATION OF A PLAN FOR BORDER MONITORS, AND A CORDON SANITAIRE.

10. IN RESPONSE, THE U.S. PROPOSED A "7 PLUS 7 SOLUTION": WAIT SEVEN DAYS, IF ANY OF THE THREE WARRING FACTIONS HAS NOT SIGNED ON TO THE VANCE-OWEN ACCORD, NO-FLY ENFORCEMENT WOULD KICK IN AFTER ANOTHER SEVEN DAYS. USUN AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT WAS MEETING WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N. VORONTSOV. TOGETHER THEY WOULD APPROACH THE FRENCH AND BRITISH WITH THE 7 PLUS 7 IDEA. LAVERTU REPLIED THAT A DELAY WOULD SRAT CANADA AS IT WOULD GIVE OTTAWA TIME TO REGROUP CANADIAN FORCES ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA.

PEACEKEEPING

11. TARNOFF OBSERVED THAT PEACEKEEPING WAS BECOMING AN INCREASINGLY BIG ISSUE ON CAPITOL HILL. SOME MEMBERS BELIEVED WE HOLD A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO GET ENGAGED IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. OTHERS BELIEVED THE REGION IS A QUAGMIRE, HOWEVER. THE ISSUE WAS COMPLEX, AND IT MIGHT TAKE TIME TO REACH A CONSENSUS.

12. LAVERTU ADDED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF CASUALTIES NEEDED TO BE EXAMINED. WHEN IT CAME TIME TO ENFORCE THE NO-FLY ZONE, THE U.N. MIGHT NEED TO DISCUSS THE MANDATE. SOME MIGHT ARGUE THAT THE INHIBITION OF FLIGHTS GOES TOO FAR. PEACEKEEPERS SHOULD BE THERE TO FACILITATE PEACE NOT TO IMPOSE IT. THE ISSUE, LAVERTU IMPLIED, COULD PROVE DIFFICULT.

CANADA'S G-7 WISH-LIST

13. LAVERTU SAID CANADA WISHED TO PROMOTE THREE THEMES AT THE G-7 POLITICAL DIRECTORS' MEETING: (1) U.N. REFORM, I.E., PROMOTING LANGUAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE THAT WOULD ENDORSE THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS FOR U.N. REFORM; (2) PEACEKEEPING, I.E., RECOGNIZING THAT THE U.N. CAPACITY WAS LIMITED TO MEET GROWING NEEDS; AND, (3) NON-PROLIFERATION.

14. ON NON-PROLIFERATION, CANADA WISHED TO SEE A GREATER EMPHASIS ON IMPLEMENTATION. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REMAINED A PRIORITY. IN ADDITION, CANADA HOPED TO STRENGTHEN THE IAEA. THE G-7 SHOULD INCREASE ITS INVOLVEMENT AND COOPERATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES.

15. TARNOFF AGREED THAT THESE WERE ALL IMPORTANT POINTS. HE NOTED THAT NON-PROLIFERATION WAS ONE OF THE HIGHEST FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION. TARNOFF NOTED THAT INTERNAL U.S. DELIBERATIONS ARE CONTINUING ON U.N. PEACEKEEPING AND HOW TO FUND IT.

16. TARNOFF NOTED THE JAPANESE HAVE A PARTICULAR INTEREST IN U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION WHETHER LAVERTU WAS REFERRING TO THAT ISSUE OR REFORM OF INTERNAL MANAGEMENT OF THE SYSTEM. HE NOTED AN AMERICAN WOULD BE TAKING OVER A KEY U.N. MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO. LAVERTU REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT MEANT UNSC REFORM BUT RATHER INTERNAL REFORM. OTTAWA WANTED TO FOCUS ON MANAGEMENT OF THE U.N. AND REALLOCATION OF RESOURCES. CANADA WAS NOT INCLINED TO SEE AN EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT WOULD WELCOME GREATER OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

17. TARNOFF NOTED THAT JAPAN MAY WISH TO RAISE DEVELOPING COUNTRY ISSUES AT THE SUMMIT. THE JAPANESE PLACE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON REACHING OUT TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD. THE U.S. IS COOL TO THE NOTION OF INVITING INDONESIAN PRESIDENT SOEHARTO TO THE SUMMIT BECAUSE OF THE PRECEDENT IT WOULD SET.

18. IRAQ, TOO, MIGHT FIND ITS WAY ONTO THE AGENDA, AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF LARGE QUESTIONS IN THE GULF. AFTER RENEWAL OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME, IRAQI MISBEHAVIOR MIGHT INCREASE. AT THE KYOTO MEETING, THE DIRECTORS MAY ALSO WISH TO DISCUSS IRAN.

SOMALIA

19. TARNOFF ASKED IF CANADA PLANNED TO CONTRIBUTE TO UNOSOM II. LAVERTU NOTED THAT THE CABINET ORIGINALLY HAD TAKEN THE DECISION THAT CANADIAN TROOPS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN UNITAF FOR ONE YEAR. GIVEN THE SLOWER TIMETABLE, THEY HAVE PUSHED BACK DEPARTURE UNTIL SUMMER. IT REMAINED OTTAWA'S INTENTION NOT TO CONTRIBUTE PEACEKEEPERS TO UNOSOM II, BUT TO PROVIDE STAFF OFFICERS FOR HEADQUARTERS. CANADA MIGHT HELP "IN CIVILIAN WAYS" BY PROVIDING ELECTORAL EXPERTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISERS. ONE FOCUS MIGHT BE TO HELP WITH POLICE FORCE REHABILITATION. LAVERTU ADDED THAT THE CANADIAN MINISTERS WOULD DECIDE ON THE LEVEL OF FUTURE COMMITMENT TO SOMALIA, PRESUMABLY LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INCREASED DONATION.

20. EXPLAINING THAT PEACEKEEPING RESOURCES WERE STRETCHED THIN, LAVERTU SAID CANADA HAS ABOUT 5,000 PEACEKEEPERS DEPLOYED WORLDWIDE, INCLUDING 2,400 IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. BECAUSE OF ROTATION REQUIREMENTS, THAT IMPLIED A REQUIREMENT FOR 15,000 TROOPS. CANADA'S ARMY IS ONLY 18,000 STRONG.

21. TARNOFF THOUGHT THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM SOMALIA WOULD OFFER A GOOD TEST OF THE U.N. SYSTEM. IF THEY CAN PROVIDE EFFECTIVE FOLLOW-ON COVERAGE, IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO LEAD FUTURE SHORT-TERM PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, E.G., IN MOGADISHU. DEVELOPING DOMESTIC POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR SHORT-TERM PEACEKEEPING WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT GOAL FOR THE U.S.

CHRISTOPHER

BT

#3091

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 3091

TOR: 930406192032 M0326146

DIST:

SIT: PONEMAN VAX

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
OSRI: YEXXWHX
LINE1: OAAMZYUW YEXXWHX0523 0970035-MNSH--YEXXWHX YEXBLUE.
LINE2: ZNY MMNSH
LINE3: ZKZK OO SOA DE
LINE4: O 070035Z APR 93
DTG: 070035Z APR 93
ORIG: WHITE HOUSE
TO: ELYSEE PALACE
INFO: ****
SUBJ: ***NO SUBJECT FOUND***
TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I AM WRITING TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION ABOUT LIBYA THAT WE HAD OVER
LUNCH IN THE WHITE HOUSE. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE SINCE EXAMINED
THE ISSUE OF SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA AND DECIDED THAT FRANCE COULD
NOT SUPPORT FURTHER MEASURES AT THE NEXT SECURITY COUNCIL REVIEW
THIS WEEK.

I KNOW YOU SHARE MY SENSE OF OUTRAGE AT THE DEATHS OF INNOCENT
FRENCH AND AMERICANS, ALONG WITH CITIZENS OF MANY OTHER COUNTRIES,
WHO DIED WHEN UTA 772 AND PAN AM 103 WERE ATTACKED IN MID-AIR BY
LIBYAN AGENTS. ALTHOUGH THOSE CRIMES OCCURRED FOUR AND FIVE YEARS
AGO, NO ONE HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO JUSTICE. SUCH INACTION MAY LEAD
TERRORISTS TO BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN PERPETRATE SUCH ACTS WITHOUT
PAYING A PRICE.

THE GREAT POWERS MUST DEMONSTRATE TO POTENTIAL TERRORISTS THAT THEY
MAKE A GRAVE ERROR WHEN THEY VICTIMIZE OUR CITIZENS. WE OWE
CONTINUED ACTION NOT JUST TO THE PAST VICTIMS, BUT ALSO TO THOSE WHO
COULD BECOME THE NEXT VICTIMS IF TERRORISTS ARE NOT DETERRED.

MORE THAN A YEAR AFTER THE ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WERE ADOPTED, THERE
IS NO SERIOUS INDICATION THAT LIBYA INTENDS TO COMPLY WITH THE
COUNCIL'S DECISION. THUS, I ASK YOU TO JOIN WITH ME IN THE ACTIVE
PURSUIT OF ADDITIONAL UN SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA. I BELIEVE THAT AN
OIL EMBARGO SHOULD BE IMPOSED. THERE ARE OTHER OPTIONS THAT ALSO
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SERIOUSLY. I HAVE ASKED SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER
TO PURSUE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WITH HIS BRITISH AND FRENCH
COUNTERPARTS AT THEIR G-7 MEETING NEXT WEEK.

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2015-0808-M (1.01)
KBT 7/31/2018

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WE WILL NOT BE PURSUING ADDITIONAL MEASURES AT THIS WEEK'S COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF LIBYAN SANCTIONS, BECAUSE THE LIBYANS COULD MISJUDGE OUR COLLECTIVE SENSE OF PURPOSE SHOULD SUCH MEASURES FAIL. I HAVE, THEREFORE, INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT TO ANNOUNCE IN THE COUNCIL THAT WE WILL BE SEEKING ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS IF LIBYA DOES NOT COMPLY SOON. I ASK, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT FRANCE JOIN IN A STRONG DECLARATION TO THIS EFFECT. DURING THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT, PRESIDENT YELTSIN TOLD ME HE WOULD NOT OPPOSE ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS. WORKING TOGETHER, WE MAY BE ABLE TO ARRANGE FOR A STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL AS A WHOLE.

MR. PRESIDENT, OUR COMBINED VIGOROUS PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN THESE CASES HAS BEEN A MODEL OF ALLIED COOPERATION. IT SHOWS WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE TOGETHER IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN WE ACT IN A COMMON PURPOSE. I HOPE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO DO SO ON THIS MATTER.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0523

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0523

TOR: 930406205114 M0326258

DIST:

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH ITOH KENNEY KYIM LAKE SIT SODERBERG
SIT: COQ FILE HOTLINE_OUT OLEARY SIGLER SUM SUM2

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 OSRI: RUEHCAA
 LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHCAA6548 0990502-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: P R 090459Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 DTG: 090459Z APR 93
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0000
 INFO: RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0000
 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0000
 RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0000
 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0000
 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0000
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000
 RUFHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0000
 RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0000
 RUEHBS/USEC BRUSSELS
 SUBJ: S/P DIRECTOR LEWIS MEETING WITH BELGIAN
 - AMBASSADOR: RUSSIA' BOSNIA, MIDDLE EAST

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-m-2 (1.44)

v2 6/1/2023

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 106548
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, UR, BK, BE
 SUBJECT: S/P DIRECTOR LEWIS MEETING WITH BELGIAN
 - AMBASSADOR: RUSSIA' BOSNIA, MIDDLE EAST

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: S/P DIRECTOR LEWIS TOLD BELGIAN AMBASSADOR CASSIERS IN A MEETING IN WASHINGTON N APRIL 6 THAT RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAD MADE A VERY GOOD IMPRESSION AT VANCOUVER. ALTHOUGH RUSSIA WOULD REMAIN IN A STATE OF FLUX FOR SOME TIME, YELTSIN COULD SURPRISE MOST OBSERVERS AND THE COUNTRY WOULD SOMEHOW LURCH FORWARD. TURNING TO RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST TAKE THE POSITION THAT ANY RUSSIAN ACTION SHOULD FIRST HAVE A UNSC OR CSCE MANDATE. REGARDING BOSNIA, CASSIERS EMPHASIZED THAT SERBIA MUST NOT BE SEEN AS HAVING PROFITED FROM AGGRESSION AND THAT TIGHTENED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WERE THE ONLY OPTION AVAILABLE. END SUMMARY.

YELTSIN'S STRENGTHS

3. DIRECTOR LEWIS SAID THAT DESPITE CONTINUING CONCERNS, YELTSIN HAD LEFT THE SECRETARY AT THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS VERY PREMATURE TO WRITE OFF

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT. YELTSIN REMAINS THE ONLY FIGURE WITH NATIONAL APPEAL ACROSS RUSSIA. HE IS A GOOD POLITICIAN WHO WILL CAMPAIGN NON-STOP UNTIL THE APRIL 25 ELECTION. LEWIS ADDED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY YELTSIN'S COMMAND OF A WIDE RANGE OF COMPLICATED ISSUES. ALTHOUGH CASSIERS NOTED THAT YELTSIN SOMETIMES DISAPPEARS FOR TEN DAYS AT A STRETCH, LEWIS SAID HE EXPECTS YELTSIN CAN SUSTAIN THE CAMPAIGN THROUGH THE REFERENDUM.

4. LEWIS EXPLAINED THAT HE SEES RUSSIA IN A STATE OF FLUX/TRANSITION FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD -- WITH ONE STEP BACK FOR EVERY TWO FORWARD. NONETHELESS, YELTSIN SEEMS DETERMINED TO PUSH AHEAD WITH REFORM IF HE WINS THE REFERENDUM. INTER ALIA, HE WILL PROBABLY PUSH FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION. ANOTHER KEY PROBLEM WILL BE CONTROLLING CURRENCY EXPANSION. MOREOVER, LARGE INPUTS OF CAPITAL NEED TO BE MONITORED CLOSELY BY DONOR COUNTRIES, NOT SIMPLY HANDED OVER TO THE RUSSIAN CENTRAL BANK. EXPRESSING OPTIMISM, LEWIS SAID YELTSIN WILL SURPRISE MOST OBSERVERS; RUSSIA WILL SOMEHOW LURCH FORWARD.

BALTIC RUSSIANS, UKRAINIAN NUKES, TRANSCAUCASUS CONFLICTS

5. REGARDING THE BALTIC STATES, THE S/P DIRECTOR INDICATED THAT THE OVERALL SITUATION IN THESE STATES IS IMPROVING; RUSSIAN TROOPS ARE BEING WITHDRAWN. ALL THREE KNOW THEY ARE GOING TO HAVE TO LIVE NEXT DOOR TO RUSSIA. NONETHELESS, ISSUES REGARDING RUSSIAN MINORITIES IN THE THREE COUNTRIES WILL NOT GO AWAY. THE RUSSIANS HAVE A POINT THAT RIGHTS OF MINORITIES MUST BE RESPECTED. THE BALTIC STATES NEED TO AVOID ALLOWING A SITUATION TO DEVELOP WHERE THE RUSSIANS FEEL A NEED TO "PROTECT" RUSSIAN MINORITIES IN THE BALTICS.

6. TURNING TO THE UKRAINE, CASSIERS SAID WHILE THE RUSSIANS ARE UNLIKELY TO DO ANYTHING "FOOLISH" WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HE WAS NOT SURE ABOUT THE UKRAINIANS. LEWIS RESPONDED THAT ALTHOUGH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE PHYSICALLY SITED IN THE UKRAINE, THE RUSSIANS ACTUALLY HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL THROUGH THE CIS. NONETHELESS, THE U.S. WAS REITERATING THAT THE UKRAINE SHOULD RATIFY THE NPT AND START II TREATIES. THE UKRAINIANS WOULD BE SAFER WITHOUT NUKES. TO CONVINCE THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT

OF THIS, THE NACC COULD PERHAPS PLAY A USEFUL ROLE.

7. MOVING EASTWARD, LEWIS STATED THAT NO WESTERN COUNTRY HAS ANY INTEREST IN INTERVENING IN CONFLICTS IN PLACES SUCH AS GEORGIA OR NAGARNO-KARABACH. NONETHELESS, THE WEST MUST TAKE THE POSITION THAT ANY PEACEKEEPING RUSSIA DOES ON ITS PERIPHERY OR ANYWHERE ELSE MUST BE ONLY UNDER A CSCE OR UN SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE. BUT WITH THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN POOR SHAPE, THE RUSSIANS DO NOT APPEAR PARTICULARLY EAGER TO BECOME INVOLVED IN FIGHTING ANYWHERE AT PRESENT.

BOSNIA: MUST PREVENT SPECTACLE OF REWARDING AGGRESSION

8. CASSIERS SAID THAT SINCE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS DECIDED AGAINST MASSIVE MILITARY INTERVENTION, THE ONLY OPTION IS TO TIGHTEN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. SERBIA IS "NOT CHINA." IF THE WORLD IS SERIOUS AND CAN MAKE SANCTIONS STICK, SOMETHING IN SERBIA WILL "HAVE TO GIVE." WHILE THE OLD YUGOSLAVIA WILL NEVER BE REASSEMBLED, THE PROBLEM IS TO ENSURE THE SERBS ARE NOT SEEN AS WINNERS. IF ETHNIC CLEANSING IS REWARDED, A TERRIBLE EXAMPLE WILL HAVE BEEN SET FOR RUSSIANS AND OTHER NATIONALITIES IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE

9. LEWIS AGREED THAT SERBS SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS BENEFITTING FROM AGGRESSION, BUT WAS SKEPTICAL THAT THIS COULD BE PREVENTED. SANCTIONS WILL REQUIRE THE ACTIVE LONG-HAUL COOPERATION OF MANY COUNTRIES. CASSIERS REPLIED THAT BELGIUM IS READY TO DO ITS PART WITHIN THE WEU AND EC, BUT THAT THE U.S. MUST TAKE THE LEAD IN A NUMBER OF AREAS, SUCH AS TRACKING SERBIAN ASSETS. PART OF THE PROBLEM WAS GETTING THE GERMANS AND BRITISH TO SUPPORT TIGHTER SANCTIONS. ONCE THEY ARE ON BOARD, THE REMAINDER OF THE EC STATES, INCLUDING GREECE, WOULD FOLLOW.

LESS POLITICAL SPACE FOR RABIN AND PALESTINIANS

10. ACKNOWLEDGING THE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS, LEWIS STATED THAT ALL SIDES CANNOT CONTEMPLATE A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN IN THE TALKS. THE WINDOW WOULD LAST A FEW MORE MONTHS. THAT SAID, TANGIBLE EVIDENCE IS NEEDED THAT PEACE BRINGS DIVIDENDS. BOTH RABIN AND THE PALESTINIANS HAVE LESS AND LESS POLITICAL SPACE. THEY NEED PROGRESS SOON, OR THE ENEMIES OF PEACE WILL GAIN FURTHER STRENGTH.

11. THE GROUNDWORK HAS BEEN LAID FOR A RETURN TO THE TALKS IN LATE-APRIL. BOTH SIDES WANT TO TALK. THE PALESTINIANS ARE LOOKING ONLY FOR A FIG LEAF TO ENABLE THEM TO RETURN. THE ISRAELIS ARE UNLIKELY TO GIVE THIS AS THEY FEEL THEY HAVE ALREADY MADE MANY CONCESSIONS AND ARE IN A NARROW PSYCHOLOGICAL BOX. NONETHELESS, CHANCES ARE GOOD THAT SOMEHOW THE SIDES WILL FIND A WAY TO RETURN TO THE TALKS.

12. LEWIS ADDED THAT SYMBOLIC ACTS ON THE PARTS OF BOTH THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO PROMOTING PEACE. RENOUNCING VIOLENCE AND ENDING THE ARAB ECONOMIC BOYCOTT WERE STEPS THE ARABS COULD TAKE. THERE ARE STEPS THE ISRAELIS COULD TAKE. IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED, IT WILL REQUIRE OBVIOUS, VISIBLE CHANGE ON THE GROUND FOR IT TO BE ACCEPTED BY THE PALESTINIANS. BUT IF THIS IS ACHIEVED, THE DESIRE FOR CHANGE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME OPPOSITION TO PEACE. REGARDING OPPOSITION IN ISRAEL TO ANY KIND OF CONCESSIONS TO THE PALESTINIANS, ELIMINATION OF THE SUSTAINED VIOLENCE THAT HAS BEEN DIRECTED AT ISRAELIS WOULD GO A LONG WAY.

13. LEWIS ADDED THAT THE PARALLEL MULTILATERAL TALKS INVOLVING THE EC AND OTHERS ARE A VERY IMPORTANT INGREDIENT IN MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM OF PEACE TALKS.
CHRISTOPHER

BT

#6548

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 6548

TOR: 930409010619 M0331616

DIST:

SIT: VAX

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OSRI: RUEHSFA
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHSFA2191 0991058-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 091058Z APR 93
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
DTG: 091058Z APR 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6585
INFO: ****
SUBJ: VANCOUVER SUMMIT DEBRIEF
TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SOFIA 02191

FOR EUR

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, RS

SUBJECT: VANCOUVER SUMMIT DEBRIEF

REF: STATE 104965

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL TO DRAW ON THE REFTL TO BRIEF PRESIDENT ZHELEV, PRIME MINISTER BEROV AND ONE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE SUMMIT. I WOULD SANITIZE THE TEXT TO ELIMINATE SENSITIVE STATEMENTS, E.G., U.S. JUDGMENTS ABOUT YELTSIN'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL MOTIVES FOR STATEMENTS ON YUGOSLAVIA AND WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM THE BALTICS. AN EARLY REPL/ WOULD BE APPRECIATED. HILL
BT

#2191

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2191

TOR: 930409070640 M0332127

DIST:

SIT: VAX

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DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-M-1 (1.45)

v2 6/1/2023

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 OSRI: RUEHCAA
 LINE1: OAACZYUJW RUEHCAA7327 0991418-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZEX
 LINE3: O R 091414Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 DTG: 091414Z APR 93
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: ALL EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0000
 RUFHOS/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0000
 RUFHSK/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0000
 RUFHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0000
 INFO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000
 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0000
 SUBJ: COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCHES: DEMARCHES FROM EC
 COMMISSION AND FRENCH ON RUSSIAN ENTRY INTO MARKET

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-M-2 (1,46)
 h 6/1/2023

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 107327
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: TSPA, ETRD, PREL, EEC, FR, RS, IN
 SUBJECT: COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCHES: DEMARCHES FROM EC
 COMMISSION AND FRENCH ON RUSSIAN ENTRY INTO MARKET

1. ON APRIL 1 EC COMMISSION DELEGATION DCM JAMES CURRIE PRESENTED S/NIS RICHARD KAUZLARICH WITH A DEMARCHE EXPRESSING EC CONCERN OVER U.S. EFFORTS TO FACILITATE RUSSIAN ENTRY INTO THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH SECTOR. FRENCH AMBASSADOR JACQUES ANDREANI PRESENTED A FOLLOW-UP DEMARCHE APRIL 2 IN SUPPORT OF THE EC APPROACH. BELOW WE PROVIDE MEMCONS OF THE TWO DEMARCHES. SEPTTEL WILL TRANSMIT THE TEXT OF COUNTER-DEMARCHES WE WOULD LIKE AMBASSADORS OR CHARGES AT USEC, EMBASSY PARIS AND POSTS IN OTHER EC/ESA MEMBER STATES TO MAKE SUPPORTING RUSSIAN ACCESS TO A SHARE OF THE MARKET.

2. EC DEMARCHE PARTICIPANTS:

EC: EC COMMISSION DELEGATION DCM JAMES CURRIE, DELEGATION COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR GERHARD LOHAN

U.S.: S/NIS RICHARD KAUZLARICH, PM ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERT GALLUCCI, EB DAS JOANNA SHELTON, EUR/ISCA RENO

HARNISH EUR/RPE SUE BREMNER (NOTETAKER)

3. TEXT OF EC DEMARCHE MEMCON

SUMMARY OF DEMARCHE

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CURRIE PRESENTED KAUZLARICH WITH A DEMARCHE EXPRESSING THE "DEEP CONCERNS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF GRANTING RUSSIA SIGNIFICANT ACCESS TO THE WESTERN SPACE LAUNCH MARKET." CURRIE NOTED THAT THE MARKET PRESENTLY HAD A TREMENDOUS OVERCAPACITY. HE INDICATED THAT THE EC HAD BEEN WORKING WITH USTR TO TRY TO FIND WAYS TO INVOLVE THE RUSSIANS WITHOUT DISRUPTING THE MARKET. THE EC BELIEVED THE U.S. SHARED ITS CONCERNS; STILL THE COMMISSION FELT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ASK THE U.S. TO "DEFEND OUR COMMON INTERESTS" IF THE MATTER CAME UP AT THE U.S.-RUSSIAN SUMMIT IN VANCOUVER. THE EC "EXPECTS THAT NO COMMITMENTS WILL BE MADE WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN ACCESS" TO THE WESTERN MARKET AT VANCOUVER.

STRATEGIC ARGUMENTS FROM THE U.S.

KAUZLARICH REPLIED THAT THE RUSSIANS BELIEVED THEMSELVES CAPABLE OF INVOLVEMENT IN COMMERCIAL SPACE, AND THEY MIGHT UNDERTAKE IRRESPONSIBLE INVOLVEMENT (I.E., INCREASING SALES TO INDIA) IF WE DID NOT FACILITATE AN ORDERLY ENTRY INTO THE WESTERN MARKET. KAUZLARICH INDICATED DISCUSSION OF SPACE LAUNCHES MIGHT OCCUR AT VANCOUVER, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF KOZYREV'S STATEMENTS TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER THAT RUSSIA DIDN'T WANT TO SELL "JUST TO BOTTOM FEEDERS." BUT THE U.S. DID NOT INTEND TO PRESENT THE RUSSIANS WITH AN AGREEMENT RIGHT NOW.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ARGUMENTS FROM THE U.S.

SHELTON POINTED OUT THAT EARLY MAY WOULD BE THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK IN DETAIL WITH THE RUSSIANS. SHE NOTED THAT LIKE THE EC THE U.S. WAS CONCERNED WITH THE VIABILITY OF ITS COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH INDUSTRY. AND LIKE THE EC WE WERE CONCERNED WITH RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC HEALTH AND NEED FOR HARD CURRENCY. AT THIS STAGE WE DO NOT INTEND TO OFFER THE RUSSIANS ANYTHING EXCEPT AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO LET THEM INTO THE MARKET. BUT THAT WOULD HELP CONVINCCE THEM WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE TERMS OF THEIR EVENTUAL ENTRY.

CONCERN OVER INDIAN SALES

KAUZLARICH REITERATED THAT THE U.S. AND EC BOTH HAD AN INTEREST IN SHORING UP THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY. WE ALSO NEEDED TO WORK TOGETHER TO HELP THE RUSSIANS FOR STRATEGIC REASONS. GALLUCCI NOTED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN SALES TO THE INDIANS AND SALES TO THE WEST: RUSSIAN ACCESS TO THE SLV IS DIRECTLY CONNECTED TO WILLINGNESS TO ADOPT MTCR STANDARDS ON MISSILE EXPORTS AND MAY LIMIT ITS DEAL WITH INDIA. GALLUCCI SAID THE U.S. AND EC SHOULD COORDINATE AN APPROACH TO THE RUSSIANS TO GUARANTEE OUR COMMON SECURITY OBJECTIVES. KAUZLARICH NOTED THAT THE TRICK WOULD BE BALANCING THESE OBJECTIVES WITH COMMERCIAL GOALS.

EC CONCERNS ABOUT VANCOUVER

CURRIE REPLIED THAT THE EC WAS WILLING TO HELP RUSSIA "IN A FORMALIZED SENSE." WHILE THE EC DIDN'T WANT TO "BLOCK" RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN WESTERN COMMERCIAL SPACE, IT ALSO DIDN'T WANT A "DISRUPTIVE AGREEMENT" TO BE ANNOUNCED IN VANCOUVER THAT WOULD PREVENT A BALANCE FROM BEING STRUCK BETWEEN SECURITY/ASSISTANCE NEEDS AND THE NEED TO PROTECT WESTERN COMMERCE. CURRIE SAID HE FELT "REASSURED" THAT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEXT FEW WEEKS THERE WOULD BE NO "OPEN AND SHUT" AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIA THAT FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT EUROPEAN POINTS OF VIEW.

SHARING THE BURDEN

SHELTON AND GALLUCCI NOTED WHILE WE WANT TO WORK WITH EUROPE, WE ALSO ARE INTERESTED IN MOVING QUICKLY TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS, IN PART DUE TO OUR OWN LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION SIDE. WE WANT TO ENGAGE THE EC IN TALKS ON HOW TO INVOLVE THE RUSSIANS SO NEITHER THE EC NOR THE U.S. IS UNFAIRLY DISADVANTAGED BECAUSE IT HAS TO GIVE UP TOO MUCH TO RUSSIA. OUR COMMON GROUND IS THAT THE BURDEN SHOULD BE SHARED.

CURRIE SAID THE EC HAD SHARED A DRAFT EC-RUSSIAN BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, AND ASKED THAT WE KEEP THE EC APPRISED OF BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN DEVELOPMENTS.

OTHER ISSUES

CURRIE THEN ASKED KAUZLARICH ABOUT WHAT SORTS OF BILATERAL ASSISTANCE OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF COMMERCIAL LAUNCH COOPERATION THE U.S. WAS PLANNING TO OFFER RUSSIA.

KAUZLARICH REPLIED THAT WE WOULD PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WITH HOUSING, PRIVATIZATION, TRADE AND FINANCE (INCLUDING DEBT RELIEF, STABILIZATION AND OTHER ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE IFIS). WE WANT TO SHOW THE RUSSIANS WE ARE IN THIS WITH THEM "FOR THE LONG RUN." WE DON'T THINK A GOOD SHOW IN VANCOUVER BY ITSELF WILL KEEP YELTSIN IN POWER, BUT WE HOPE IF HE CAN MANAGE HIS PROBLEMS SKILLFULLY THE BOOST FROM VANCOUVER WILL IMPROVE HIS CHANCES. CURRIE SAID THE EC WAS ALSO HOPEFUL THAT YELTSIN WOULD HOLD ON.

KAUZLARICH ASKED CURRIE WHO FROM THE EC WOULD GO TO THE TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT. CURRIE SAID HE HAD RECENTLY HEARD IT WOULD BE EC COMMISSION VICE PRESIDENT FOR FINANCIAL AFFAIRS HENNING CHRISTOPHERSEN.

4. FRENCH DEMARCHE PARTICIPANTS

FRANCE: FRENCH AMBASSADOR JACQUES ANDREANI, FRENCH EMBASSY ECONOMICS OFFICER ALAIN HOLLEVILLE

U.S.: S/NIS RICHARD KAUZLARICH, PM ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ROBERT GALLUCCI, EB DAS JOANNA SHELTON, EUR/WE PAM ROE
(NOTETAKER)

5. TEXT OF FRENCH DEMARCHE MEMCON

SUMMARY OF DEMARCHE

ANDREANI OPENED BY INFORMING KAUZLARICH THAT FRANCE WISHED TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH THE EC'S APRIL 1 DEMARCHE EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF GRANTING RUSSIA ACCESS TO THE WESTERN SPACE LAUNCH MARKET. HE SAID FRANCE WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. PLANNED TO DISCUSS SATELLITE LAUNCHES WITH THE RUSSIANS IN VANCOUVER. FRANCE HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS TO RUSSIA ON SPACE LAUNCHES UNTIL THE COMMERCIAL SITUATION HAD BEEN CLARIFIED.

FRENCH CONCERNS FOR VANCOUVER

ANDREANI SAID THE SPACE LAUNCH MARKET IS VERY NARROW. ITS VIABILITY DEPENDS UPON ALL PARTICIPANTS FOLLOWING THE NORMAL RULES OF COMMERCE, AND THE RUSSIANS USUALLY DO NOT DO SO. ANDREANI ADDED THAT RUSSIA IS NOTORIOUS FOR DISREGARDING THE COSTS OF PRODUCTION WHEN ESTABLISHING LAUNCH PRICES. GIVEN THIS BEHAVIOR, FRANCE IS HESITANT TO GRANT RUSSIA ACCESS TO THE WESTERN SPACE LAUNCH MARKET.

ANDREANI SAID THE U.S. AND FRANCE HAVE A WELL-ESTABLISHED HISTORY OF CONSULTING TOGETHER ON SATELLITE LAUNCHES. HE NOTED THAT FRANCE REMAINS INTERESTED IN CONTINUING THESE DISCUSSIONS AND SAID FRANCE WOULD EXPECT THE U.S. TO CONSULT WITH ITS WESTERN COLLEAGUES BEFORE GRANTING RUSSIA ACCESS TO THE SPACE LAUNCH MARKET OR OFFERING THE RUSSIANS LAUNCH QUOTAS AT VANCOUVER.

JUGGLING COMPETING CONCERNS

KAUZLARICH SAID PRESIDENT CLINTON DID PLAN TO DISCUSS RUSSIA'S ACCESS TO THE SPACE LAUNCH MARKET AT VANCOUVER, BUT WOULD NOT OFFER PRESIDENT YELTSIN LAUNCH QUOTAS. KAUZLARICH SAID THE U.S. BELIEVES RUSSIA MUST BE BROUGHT INTO THE MARKET AND UNDERSTANDS THAT ACCOMPLISHING THIS GOAL WILL BE AT A COST TO OTHER LAUNCH SUPPLIERS. HE SAID THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH FRANCE AND THE EC ON HOW BEST TO SHARE THE BURDEN. GALLUCCI ADDED THAT FRANCE'S INTEREST IN CONSULTATIONS MATCHED THE UNITED STATES' DESIRE TO WORK WITH ITS PARTNERS ON THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE.

GALLUCCI POINTED OUT THAT FOR POLITICAL, STRATEGIC, NON-PROLIFERATION, AND COMMERCIAL REASONS, THE WEST MUST GRANT RUSSIA ACCESS TO THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH MARKET. DOING SO WILL REQUIRE THE U.S. AND OTHERS TO JUGGLE COMPETING CONCERNS. THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT TO UNDERMINE THE COMMERCIAL VIABILITY OF U.S. INDUSTRY, BUT IT ALSO HAS A STRATEGIC INTEREST IN WORKING WITH THE RUSSIANS. GALLUCCI SAID THE U.S. WANTS TO ENCOURAGE RUSSIA TO CONVERT TO A MARKET ECONOMY AND TO FIND PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS FOR ITS MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. ALLOWING RUSSIA INTO THE SPACE LAUNCH MARKET IS ONE WAY OF

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ACCOMPLISHING THESE GOALS.

GALLUCCI ALSO POINTED OUT THE STRONG CONNECTION BETWEEN RUSSIA'S MISSILE EXPORT POLICY AND ITS ACCESS TO THE WESTERN MARKET, NOTING THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD REPEATEDLY TALKED TO THE U.S. ABOUT THE LINK BETWEEN THEIR BEHAVIOR IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS AND THEIR ACCESS TO THE COMMERCIAL MARKET. GALLUCCI SAID THE RUSSIANS BELIEVE THEMSELVES CAPABLE OF INVOLVEMENT IN COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCHES AND MIGHT TAKE IRRESPONSIBLE ACTION IF THE WEST DOES NOT FACILITATE THEIR ENTRY INTO THE MARKET. GALLUCCI SAID THE U.S. WOULD LIKE THE RUSSIANS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT VIS-A-VIS INDIA, AND THE RUSSIANS HAVE INDICATED THAT IT WILL BE EASIER FOR THEM TO DO SO IF THEY ARE ASSURED OF ACCESS TO THE MARKET IN SPACE LAUNCH SERVICES. GIVEN THIS

LINKAGE, GALLUCCI SAID THE U.S., FRANCE, AND THE EC SHOULD WORK TOGETHER ON AN APPROACH TO THE RUSSIANS TO GUARANTEE WESTERN SECURITY OBJECTIVES.

SHELTON ECHOED GALLUCCI'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE NEED FOR A BALANCING ACT. SHE SAID THAT WHILE THE U.S. WANTS TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY OF OUR COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH INDUSTRY, WE REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC HEALTH AND NEED FOR HARD CURRENCY. SHELTON SAID THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO TALK WITH FRANCE AND THE EC ABOUT HOW TO INVOLVE THE RUSSIANS IN THE MARKET WITHOUT UNDULY HARMING U.S. OR EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS. AFFIRMING KAUZLARICH'S STATEMENT ABOUT SHARING THE BURDEN, SHELTON ADDED THAT BOTH THE U.S. AND EUROPE WOULD NEED TO GIVE GROUND COMMERCIALLY TO ALLOW THE RUSSIANS INTO THE MARKET.

NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS

SHELTON REMINDED ANDREANI THAT THE U.S. HAS DISCUSSED WITH THE EC OUR DESIRE FOR A UNIVERSAL "RULES OF THE ROAD" FOR THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH MARKET. EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A LARGER AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, WE WOULD LIKE TO WORK WITH OUR PARTNERS TO FRAME A TRANSITIONAL SET OF RULES FOR RUSSIA. SHE SAID THIS MUST BE DONE SOON, GIVEN RUSSIA'S MOUNTING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND OUR CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIAN PROLIFERATION.

ANDREANI REPEATED FRANCE'S DESIRE FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND SUGGESTED THE U.S. WORK WITH ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS TO DEVELOP THE "RULES OF THE ROAD." HE AGAIN REMINDED KAUZLARICH OF THE GOF'S DEMARCHE, EXPRESSING FRENCH CONCERN THAT THE U.S. NOT OFFER RUSSIA TOO MUCH AT VANCOUVER. KAUZLARICH SAID THE U.S. DID NOT INTEND TO OFFER THE RUSSIANS ANYTHING OTHER THAN AN EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN HAVING THEM JOIN THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH MARKET. CHRISTOPHER

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 OSRI: RUEHMOA
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHMOA0697 0991729-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
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 RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0362
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 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 5901
 INFO: ****
 SUBJ: CODEL GEPHARDT MEETING WITH YELTSIN
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 010697
 EXDIS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, YO, RS
 SUBJECT: CODEL GEPHARDT MEETING WITH YELTSIN
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. SUMMARY: ON APRIL 7 CODEL GEPHARDT MET RUSSIAN
 PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN IN THE KREMLIN. THE U.S.
 DELEGATION EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR YELTSIN
 PERSONALLY, FOR REFORM IN RUSSIA AND FOR BIPARTISAN
 U.S. ASSISTANCE TO REFORM IN RUSSIA. FOLLOWING ARE
 THE MAIN POINTS YELTSIN MADE:
 -- AT THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT HE AND PRESIDENT CLINTON
 HAD AGREED ON A SERIES OF REAL ASSISTANCE MEASURES
 THAT COULD ACTUALLY BE IMPLEMENTED, UNLIKE SOME IN
 THE PAST THAT HAD BEEN MADE FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.
 THESE HAD CREATED SKEPTICISM AMONG THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE
 ABOUT ASSISTANCE.
 -- YELTSIN DISCUSSED "IRRITANTS" IN THE
 RELATIONSHIP, IN THE FORM OF OUTMODED COLD WAR
 RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE.
 -- YELTSIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN
 DIFFICULTIES WITH REFORM BUT HE PRAISED PROGRESS IN
 PRIVATIZATION AND SAID CONDITIONS WOULD IMPROVE THIS
 YEAR.
 -- YELTSIN WILL BE TRAVELLING THROUGHOUT RUSSIA TO
 PREPARE FOR THE UPCOMING APRIL 25 REFERENDUM. HE
 EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN A POSITIVE OUTCOME, NOTING
 THAT HIS SUPPORT LEVEL IS CURRENTLY RUNNING AT ABOUT
 60 PERCENT, BUT SAID HE WOULD RESIGN IF THE VOTE WENT
 AGAINST HIM.
 -- YELTSIN SAID HE AND PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD AGREED
 TO "INFLUENCE" UKRAINE TO GIVE UP NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND

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COMPLAINED ABOUT ALLEGED U.S. FOOT-DRAGGING IN TALKS ON THE SALE OF URANIUM.

-- ON YUGOSLAVIA, YELTSIN PRAISED THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN, SAID RUSSIA IS PRESSURING THE SERBS TO ACCEPT, AND ARGUED AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN YUGOSLAVIA AND AGAINST LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO. END SUMMARY.

3. YELTSIN OPENED THE MEETING BY NOTING HIS SATISFACTION WITH THE VAWCOUVER SUMMIT. HE SAID HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY A SPIRIT OF PARTNERSHIP AND PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING. MANY IMPORTANT DECISIONS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AND MANY OF THESE WOULD ALSO COME BEFORE THE U.S. CONGRESS. YELTSIN COMPLAINED THAT IN THE PAST YEAR A NUMBER OF ASSISTANCE MEASURES HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED MAINLY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. THESE HAD NOT WORKED OUT AND HAD EVOKED A CERTAIN SKEPTICISM AMONG THE RUSSIAN POPULATION. THE MEASURES THAT HE HAD AGREED WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON, HOWEVER, ARE INTENDED TO BE THOSE THAT COULD ACTUALLY BE ACHIEVED. THERE IS A FIRST STAGE WHICH CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED NOW AND SUBSEQUENT STAGES THAT WOULD REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. YELTSIN SAID THAT HE HAD RAISED A NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT THE RUSSIANS CONSIDER IRRITANTS IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. YELTSIN ALSO NOTED THAT HE IS SOMETIMES CRITICIZED FOR DEALING TOO MUCH WITH THE U.S., BUT IT IS NATURAL FOR THE U.S. AND RUSSIA, AS THE TWO MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS IN THE WORLD, TO TRY TO WORK TOGETHER FOR AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD BENEFIT THEIR COUNTRIES AND THE ENTIRE WORLD.

4. YELTSIN SAID THAT MOST OF THE IRRITANTS HE HAD RAISED CONSTITUTED LIMITATIONS ON RUSSIA'S ABILITY TO TRADE NORMALLY WITH THE U.S. THESE STEMMED FROM THE PAST COLD WAR ERA, SUCH AS THE 1959 CAPTIVE NATIONS ACT. YELTSIN EXPRESSED UNHAPPINESS THAT MANY SUCH LIMITATIONS STILL REFERRED TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE NEW DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA. YELTSIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS WANTED TO SEE A STRONG AND FREE RUSSIA BECOME AN EQUAL PARTNER WITH THE U.S. BUT MANY PEOPLE IN RUSSIA, INCLUDING EVEN INTELLECTUALS, SAY THAT THE U.S. IS NOT INTERESTED IN DEALING WITH RUSSIA AS AN EQUAL. YELTSIN POINTED OUT THAT RUSSIA SUPPORTS THE TRADE SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ AND LIBYA. RUSSIA HAD COMPLETELY CUT OFF TRADE AND TECHNOLOGICAL TIES WITH THESE COUNTRIES AT CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE TO ITSELF.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE U.S. STILL HAS LEGISLATION WHERE RUSSIA IS CONSIDERED A COMMUNIST COUNTRY. THIS IS DOUBLY STRANGE IF ONE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 010697
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, YO, RS

SUBJECT: CODEL GEPHARDT MEETING WITH YELTSIN
CONSIDERS THAT IF YELTSIN LEAVES OFFICE IT REALLY
WILL BE THE COMMUNISTS WHO COME TO POWER.

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5. YELTSIN COMPLAINED THAT HE HAD THOUGHT HE HAD AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION TO REPEAL THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT BUT THAT LAW IS STILL IN EFFECT. NOTING THAT HE WAS DESCRIBING THE SITUATION FRANKLY, AS HE SAW IT, YELTSIN HOPED THAT THE CONGRESSMEN WOULD NOT TAKE OFFENSE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD GIVEN "BILL" A 5-PAGE LIST OF LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH RUSSIA. "HOW IS IT POSSIBLE TO TREAT A PARTNER LIKE THAT?" YELTSIN ASKED.

6. YELTSIN NOTED THAT RUSSIA HAD SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES AT PLESETSK AND BAIKONAR AND IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO USE THESE FOR PROFITABLE LAUNCHES OF SATELLITES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY USING THE RUSSIAN ADVANTAGE IN HEAVY LIFT CAPABILITY. RUSSIA COULD EARN OVER USD ONE BILLION ANNUALLY FROM SPACE LAUNCH SERVICES, BUT THE U.S. FORBIDS THIS.

7. YELTSIN CONTINUED THAT THERE ARE OVER 300 U.S. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH RUSSIA. OF COURSE, THESE COULD NOT ALL BE ELIMINATED OVERNIGHT, BUT CONGRESS COULD GRADUALLY AMEND AND REMOVE THESE LIMITS. THIS ACTION WOULD ALLOW RUSSIA THE ACCESS IT NEEDS TO THE U.S MARKET. YELTSIN ALSO SAID THAT A NUMBER OF UNRESOLVED "MILITARY-TECHNICAL" QUESTIONS REMAIN ON THE AGENDA, TO BE ADDRESSED WHEN RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV VISITS THE U.S. IN JUNE.

8. TURNING TO DOMESTIC ISSUES, YELTSIN NOTED THAT REFORM IN RUSSIA IS PROCEEDING WITH DIFFICULTY, BUT IT HAS ONLY BEEN ONE YEAR SINCE REFORM BEGAN WITH THE LIBERALIZATION OF PRICES ON JANUARY 2, 1992. SINCE THAT TIME OVER 6000 PRIVATE ENTERPRISES HAD BEEN CREATED AND 5000 LARGER ENTERPRISES HAD BEEN CONVERTED INTO JOINT-STOCK ORGANIZATIONS. ON HIS WAY BACK FROM VANCOUVER, YELTSIN NOTED HE HAD VISITED ONE SUCH JOINT-STOCK ENTERPRISE, THE MAJOR ALUMINUM PLANT AT BRATSK. PEOPLE ARE BECOMING USED TO WORKING FOR THEMSELVES; THEY ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY ADJUSTING TO THE MARKET. OF COURSE PRICES HAVE GONE UP, BUT SO HAVE WAGES. MOST OF THE DECLINE IN PRODUCTION HAS BEEN IN MILITARY-RELATED ENTERPRISES. PEOPLE EXPECT THAT CONDITIONS WILL IMPROVE IN THE COMING YEAR.

9. YELTSIN CONCLUDED HIS OPENING REMARKS BY NOTING THAT HE AND PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD DISCUSSED 52 SEPARATE ISSUES AT VANCOUVER, INCLUDING THE JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN IL-96M AIRCRAFT.

10. MAJORITY LEADER GEPHARDT RESPONDED BY EXPRESSING PLEASURE ON BEHALF OF THE DELEGATION FOR THE VISIT AND PASSING ON CONDOLENCES TO YELTSIN FOR THE RECENT DEATH OF HIS MOTHER. GEPHARDT EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP YELTSIN HAD DISPLAYED IN LEADING ECONOMIC AND DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN RUSSIA. GEPHARDT ALSO EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE COURAGE YELTSIN HAD DISPLAYED IN OPPOSING THE AUGUST COUP. THE PEOPLE OF THE U.S. WOULD NEVER FORGET THIS. THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL STAND BY YELTSIN IN HIS FURTHER EFFORTS TOWARD DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC REFORM. AT THE SUMMIT, PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD SAID THAT DEMOCRATIC REFORM CONSTITUTES THE BASIS FOR A BETTER LIFE FOR THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND FOR

BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. THE FINAL OUTCOME WOULD BE DECIDED BY THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE BUT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DO NOT INTEND TO BE BYSTANDERS. NOTING THAT HE BELIEVED ALL MEMBERS OF THE CODEL HAD VOTED FOR THE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT, GEPHARDT SAID THE CONGRESS SUPPORTS THE MEASURES THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD PROPOSED AT THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT. PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA IS AN INVESTMENT IN THE RUSSIAN AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE. GEPHARDT CONCLUDED BY ASKING YELTSIN WHAT HE EXPECTED FROM THE APRIL 25 REFERENDUM AND WHAT HE WOULD BE DOING IN THE COMING DAYS TO PREPARE FOR THE REFERENDUM.

11. YELTSIN REPLIED THAT HE HAD PROPOSED THAT THE REFERENDUM CONSIST ONLY OF A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN HIMSELF. THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES, HOWEVER, HAD DECIDED TO HAVE FOUR QUESTIONS AND HAD ADAPTED THE LAW TO REQUIRE THAT 50 PERCENT OF ALL ELIGIBLE VOTERS AND NOT JUST 50 PERCENT OF THOSE VOTING WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE QUESTIONS TO BE APPROVED. THE SUPREME SOVIET WOULD HAVE TO FIND SOME WAY TO RESOLVE
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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, YO, RS

SUBJECT: CODEL GEPHARDT MEETING WITH YELTSIN
THIS, BUT YELTSIN ADDED THAT HE IS INTENSIVELY PREPARING FOR THE REFERENDUM. IN THE COMING MONTH ALL HIS ACTIONS, INCLUDING THIS MEETING WITH THE CODEL, WOULD BE AIMED AT THE REFERENDUM. HE WOULD TRY TO COVER AS MUCH OF RUSSIA AS POSSIBLE TO LOOK PEOPLE IN THE EYE. ON FRIDAY (APRIL 9) HE WILL GO TO KEMEROVO AND ON SATURDAY (APRIL 10) TO THE "YAKUT REPUBLIC."

12. HE WOULD ALSO BE MEETING EACH DAY WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS GROUPS -- WITH STUDENTS, WORKERS, INTELLECTUALS, SCIENTISTS AND TEACHERS. IF THE VOTE WERE HELD TODAY, YELTSIN SAID HE WOULD GET OVER 60 PERCENT POSITIVE VOTES. YELTSIN SAID HIS PROBLEM IS TO KEEP HIS POLLS UP AT THIS LEVEL. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT THE OPPOSITION IS GAINING STRENGTH. THERE IS PRESSURE FROM THE OLD PARTY NOMENKLATURA, BUT ITS SOCIAL BASIS IS WEAK.

13. YELTSIN SAID HE WAS TELLING LOCAL SUPPORTERS TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF ALL FOUR QUESTIONS, INCLUDING FOR THE EARLY ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT. IF THE VOTE SHOWED A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT, HE WOULD RESIGN EVEN THOUGH THIS IS NOT DIRECTLY REQUIRED. "I HAVE A CONSCIENCE," YELTSIN NOTED. THE PEOPLE, HOWEVER, UNDERSTAND THAT IF HE IS DEFEATED, A PRO-COMMUNIST REGIME WILL TAKE HIS PLACE, AND THEY DO NOT WANT TO REPEAT THE EXPERIENCE OF 74 YEARS UNDER A COMMUNIST REGIME. A NEGATIVE OUTCOME FOR THE REFERENDUM, YELTSIN CONCLUDED, WOULD BE SERIOUS NOT ONLY FOR RUSSIA, BUT FOR THE FSU, THE U.S. AND THE ENTIRE WORLD.

14. MAJORITY LEADER GEPHARDT SAID THE CONGRESS WOULD REVIEW THE RESTRICTIVE LAWS YELTSIN HAD MENTIONED AND WOULD TRY TO MAKE POSSIBLE CHANGES, CONSISTENT WITH

THE FACTS. MINORITY LEADER MICHEL, NOTING THAT THIS IS HIS FIFTH VISIT TO MOSCOW SINCE 1957, ENDORSED GEPHARDT'S REMARKS ON U.S. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA. DURING PREVIOUS VISITS, WHERE MICHEL SAID HE HAD MET BREZHNEV AND GORBACHEV, THE U.S. AND THE USSR HAD ALWAYS BEEN IN AN ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP. TODAY THE SITUATION IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT AND MICHEL STRESSED THAT THE U.S. HAS A WARM REGARD FOR YELTSIN AND FOR ALL HE SYMBOLIZES. POINTING OUT THAT THE CODEL HAD JUST VISITED KIEV, WHERE IT HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE, WHICH IS PROBLEM FOR RUSSIA AND THE U.S., MICHEL ASKED YELTSIN HOW HE INTENDED TO RESOLVE THAT CONFRONTATION.

15. YELTSIN REPLIED THAT RUSSIA HAS REACHED FULL AGREEMENT WITH BELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN THAT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE UNDER RUSSIAN JURISDICTION AND BE SUBJECT TO START I AND START II LIMITS. UKRAINE IS NOT FOLLOWING THIS PATH. THIS ISSUE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT VANCOUVER AND A DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED TO "INFLUENCE" UKRAINE ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION. YELTSIN SAID IT IS IMPORTANT TO PREVENT UKRAINE FROM BECOMING A NUCLEAR STATE. ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE MOVED TO RUSSIAN JURISDICTION FOR DESTRUCTION.

16. YELTSIN COMPLAINED THAT THE U.S. HAD REFUSED THREE TIMES TO SETTLE THE ISSUE OF THE SALE OF "URANIUM" IN THE U.S. (YELTSIN WAS APPARENTLY REFERRING TO LOW ENRICHED URANIUM (LEU)). THE U.S. IS CAUSING PROBLEMS BECAUSE DOE IS SEEKING TO MAINTAIN ITS MONOPOLY. THE ISSUE, ACCORDING TO YELTSIN, IS PRICE. THE U.S. HAD PROPOSED FIXING A PRICE FOR THE URANIUM WHICH IS WELL BELOW WHAT DOE WILL RESELL IT FOR. YELTSIN CITED FIGURES OF USD 1200/PER TON AND USD 800/PER TON IN THIS REGARD. NOTING FRUSTRATION BECAUSE RUSSIA HAD 500 TONS READY TO SELL (AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM), YELTSIN SAID THAT HE AND PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD "GIVEN AN ORDER" THAT THE ISSUE SHOULD BE DECIDED WITHIN A WEEK. YELTSIN DESCRIBED THIS AS A MATTER OF HIGH POLITICAL IMPORTANCE, THAT IS ALSO LINKED WITH THE

UPCOMING REFERENDUM.

17. MAJORITY WHIP BONIOR ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH THE REMARKS OF THE MAJORITY AND THE MINORITY LEADERS ON TRADE AND ASSISTANCE. BONIOR ALSO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE WITH MEASURES AGAINST LIBYA AND IRAQ. HE NOTED THAT IT IS BECOMING CLEAR TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT THE CATASTROPHE IN BOSNIA MUST END. BONIOR URGED YELTSIN TO USE HIS
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 010697
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, YO, RS

SUBJECT: CODEL GEPHARDT MEETING WITH YELTSIN
INFLUENCE WITH THE SERBS TO PRESSURE THE SERBS TO END THE CARNAGE.

18. YELTSIN REPLIED THAT RUSSIA HAD SUPPORTED THE U.S. AND UN EFFORTS IN YUGOSLAVIA. A RUSSIAN

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BATTALION IS IN YUGOSLAVIA WITH UN FORCES. YELTSIN ADDED THAT THE SERBS, ESPECIALLY THE BOSNIAN SERBS, ARE VERY STUBBORN. RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER CHURKIN HAS JUST RETURNED TO BELGRADE TO PRESSURE THE SERBS TO ACCEPT THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN. RUSSIA CONSIDERS THIS A GOOD PLAN. NOTING THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE STILL SEEKING TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO THE V/O PLAN, YELTSIN SAID HE HAD ASKED CLINTON FOR A DELAY IN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION TO GAIN MORE TIME TO SECURE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLAN.

19. LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO, YELTSIN SAID, WOULD AGAIN UNLEASH WAR. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO CONTINUE JOINT EFFORTS TO TRY TO PRESSURE THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT THE PLAN. THE USE OF FORCE, HOWEVER, WOULD BE A MISTAKE. RUSSIA IS DEEPLY OPPOSED TO THE USE OF FORCE, SEEING HOW SUCH CONFLICTS HAVE ALREADY UNFOLDED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER USSR. ONLY PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS, WHICH WOULD TRY TO CREATE CORRIDORS SEPARATING THE SIDES, SHOULD BE EMPLOYED. RUSSIA HAD SUCCESSFULLY EMPLOYED SUCH METHODS IN SOUTH OSSETIA AND THE TRANS-DNIESTR REGION OF MOLDOVA. SENDING ADDITIONAL ARMS TO BOSNIA WOULD BE A MISTAKE BECAUSE THEY WOULD FALL INTO THE HANDS OF OTHER PARTIES, NOT JUST THE MUSLIMS.

20. REP GINGRICH SAID HE SUPPORTED BIPARTISAN AID FOR RUSSIA AND ASKED YELTSI ABOUT WHAT COULD BE DONE TO HELP DURING THE CODEL'S VISIT AND AFTER IT RETURNED TO WASHINGTON. YELTSIN REPLIED THAT THE RUSSIAN AND U.S. GROUPS AT VANCOUVER HAD WORKED ON THIS QUESTION AND HE HAD PERSONALLY GIVEN TO PRESIDENT CLINTON A DOCUMENT ON THIS MATTER.

21. COMMENT: YELTSIN SPOKE STRONGLY AND WITH CONVICTION, WITHOUT REFERRING TO BRIEFING PAPERS. THE DELEGATION THOUGHT YELTSIN WAS IN VERY GOOD FORM EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVES THOUGHT HE SEEMED SOMEWHAT TIRED, HOWEVER, AND ON A FEW OCCASIONS APPEARED TO BE GROPING FOR THE RIGHT WORD. HIS WORDS AND MANNER EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN THE OUTCOME OF THE UPCOMING REFERENDUM AND IN HIS OWN ABILITY AND DETERMINATION TO CARRY OUT HIS REFORM POLICIES. END COMMENT.

22. CODEL CLEARED THIS CABLE BEFORE ITS DEPARTURE.
COLLINS

BT

#0697

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04

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PRT: KYLE SIT
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Prime Minister Chernomyrdin: Meeting with Deputy Secretary Talbott (8 pages)	04/10/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
002. cable	Re: U/S Tarnoffs April 5 Meeting with NATO SYG Claes (4 pages)	04/10/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
003. cable	Re: S/P Director Steinberg's April 7 Meeting with MOD Strategic Affairs Director Jean-Claude Mallet (5 pages)	04/10/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
004. cable	Re: [Russian Response to Demarche] (3 pages)	04/12/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
005. cable	Re: [Snapshot of Russo-Japanese Relations] (3 pages)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
006. cable	Re: [Japan-U.S./Russian Relations] (3 pages)	04/28/1995	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: Moldovan Foreign Minister on Transnistria Dispute, Relations with Neighbors (3 pages)	05/03/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
008. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to Russian President Yeltsin] Released in Part Per E.O. 13526 (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
009. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl] Released in Part Per E.O. 13526 (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
010. cable	Re: Briefing Non-NATO European Partners on Preparations for the Clinton-Yeltsin Summit (2 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
011. cable	Re: Letter to Engering on New Regime Membership (2 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
012. cable	Re: [G-7 Ambassadors Meeting] (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1995 - Dec 1996 ([Moscow Summit...])
 OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/10/1995 - 05/11/1995]

2016-0118-M
 ke4027

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	Re: [Russian President Yeltsin] (2 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)
014. cable	Re: [Iran-Russia/Nuclear Trade] (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)
015. cable	Re: [Moscow Summit] (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)
016. cable	Re: Proposed Revisions to Summit Statement on European Security (6 pages)	05/07/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
017. cable	Re: Status of Summit Joint Statements on STI and Nonproliferation (2 pages)	05/07/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
018. cable	Re: Ambassador's Meeting with Russian Presidential Programs Center Director Malishev and Possible Summit Item (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
019. cable	Re: [Caspian Sea] (4 pages)	05/09/1995	P1/b(1)
020. cable	Re: [Moscow Summit] (2 pages)	05/11/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
021. cable	Re: [Letter to Yeltsin] (3 pages)	05/11/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1995 - Dec 1996 ([Moscow Summit...])
 OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/10/1995 - 05/11/1995]

2016-0118-M
 ke4027

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
 LINE1: OAASZYUW RUEHMOA1843 1001158-SSSS--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 LINE3: O 101158Z APR 95
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 OSRI: RUEHMO
 DTG: 101158Z APR 95
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8162
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN: MEETING WITH
 - DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

7016-0118-M-2 (1.01)

r 6/1/2023

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 011843

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:APRIL 1, 2000

TAGS: PREL, US, RS

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN: MEETING WITH
 - DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN AN HOUR AND 15 MINUTE MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PM CHERNOMYRDIN, DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT DELIVERED A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON EMPHASIZING THAT HE WANTS THE UPCOMING SUMMIT TO BE A SUCCESS, THAT WE SHOULD AVOID ANOTHER BUDAPEST, AND THAT KEY ISSUES, INCLUDING EUROPEAN SECURITY, NEED TO BE DISCUSSED AND WELL-PREPARED. TALBOTT STRESSED THE HISTORIC NATURE OF THE SUMMIT AND THE STRONG COMMITMENT OF THE PRESIDENT TO A SUPPORTIVE POLICY FOR RUSSIAN REFORM AND THE NEED TO AVOID LETTING RUSSIAN POLICY BECOME A DIVISIVE ISSUE IN THE AMERICAN CAMPAIGN, AND AMERICAN POLICY IN THE UPCOMING RUSSIAN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN WAS SUPPORTIVE OF THESE GOALS, COMMITTED TO REFORM, AND STRESSED THE EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF AMERICA'S CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE REFORM PROCESS, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC AREA. ON THE RED SQUARE PARADE, THERE WILL BE NO CHECHEN VETERANS AND NO CHECHEN-ASSOCIATED UNITS. ON TIMAN PECHORA, CHERNOMYRDIN SEES NO OBSTACLES TO SETTLEMENT BY THE SUMMIT. HE CALLED COCOM A GROWING IRRITANT, AND DESCRIBED THE EFFORTS HE PERSONALLY WAS MAKING, SPENDING ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON CHECHNYA, TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THAT TROUBLED REGION. HE EMPHASIZED THE NEXT STAGE WILL NOT BE MILITARY AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO PARDON ALL WHO LAY

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DOWN THEIR ARMS. HE DESCRIBED THE REESTABLISHMENT OF SERVICES IN CHECHNYA, THE GOR'S HOPES FOR EARLY ELECTIONS, AND WELCOMED THE OSCE PERMANENT MISSION AND U.S. ELECTION OBSERVERS. END SUMMARY.

3. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS SENIOR STAFF OFFICER TARASOV, DFM MAMEDOV, AND AN INTERPRETER MET WITH THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND THE AMBASSADOR FOR AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES ON APRIL 7 IN HIS OFFICE AT THE RUSSIAN WHITE HOUSE.

4. AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD MET WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON JUST BEFORE LEAVING FOR MOSCOW. THE PRESIDENT ASKED THE DEPUTY SECRETARY TO CONVEY HIS THOUGHTS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND THROUGH THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THE PRESIDENT HAD GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO THE UPCOMING SUMMIT MEETING. THE LAST MEETING IN BUDAPEST HAD NOT GONE WELL. THE ISSUE IN BUDAPEST WAS, OF COURSE, EUROPEAN SECURITY. THINGS HAD BEEN WORKING WELL WHEN BOTH PRESIDENTS WERE WORKING HARD TOGETHER. THE PRESIDENT HAS CONFIDENCE THAT HE AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN CAN DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUE WHEN THEY MEET AGAIN ON MAY 9 AND 10 AT THE SUMMIT.

5. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD ASKED HIM TO STRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS COMMITTED TO MAKING MAY 10 A SUCCESS AND AN ACHIEVEMENT, AND WANTS THE VISIT TO MAKE A LASTING CONTRIBUTION TO THE FUTURE OF BOTH RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES. MAY 9 AND MAY 10 WILL ALLOW PRESIDENT CLINTON TO SEND/A POSITIVE MESSAGE TO ALL RUSSIAN CITIZENS AND TO THE WHOLE WORLD ABOUT THE PAST, THE PRESENT, AND THE FUTURE.

6. REGARDING THE PAST, HE AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE UNDYING RESPECT AND GRATITUDE FOR THE SACRIFICES OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE IN THE VICTORY IN ONE OF THE GREAT AND TERRIBLE STRUGGLES OF THE 20TH CENTURY, WORLD WAR II. WE WERE ON THE SAME SIDE DURING THE WAR; IT IS NATURAL FOR US TO BE ON THE SAME SIDE IN THE FUTURE. THE PRESIDENT ALSO FEELS DEEP RESPECT AND ADMIRATION FOR THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE TODAY FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY SACRIFICES THEY ARE MAKING FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THEIR COUNTRY. THE SUMMIT WILL SERVE TO REASSURE HIM AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED TO REFORM. IT ALSO WILL ALLOW HIM TO REASSURE THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE STEADFAST IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR REFORM IN RUSSIA. THE TWO DEMOCRATS WHO WILL MEET ON MAY 9 AND 10 PROBABLY WILL BE GETTING TOGETHER BILATERALLY FOR THE LAST TIME BEFORE THEY BECOME DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS. (AT THIS POINT, PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN CHECKED EXACTLY WHEN THE UNITED STATES ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD IN 1996 AND CONFIRMED THAT THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WOULD OCCUR IN JUNE, 1996.)

7. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO USE THE SUMMIT AS A FORCE FOR STABILITY FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AS WE MOVE ANEAD IN THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS IN BOTH COUNTRIES.

8. THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN SAID. MAY 9 AND 10 WILL BE A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR BOTN OF US, DESPITE THE EXISTING DIFFICULTIES. THERE ARE,
~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 011843

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:APRIL 1, 2000

TAGS: PREL, US, RS

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER CNERNOMYRDIN: MEETING WITH
- DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT

OBVIOUSLY, CERTAIN THINGS THAT WE MUST DO IN THE COMING DAYS. THERE IS NO DOUBT OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE DIFFICULTIES, BUT WE CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT TNEM WITHOUT GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO LEADERS. TO OUR PEOPLE, THE DIFFERENCES AT THE MOMENT ARE LESS VISIBLE, A@D FOR THEM, RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES REMAIN QUITE GOOD. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN ESTABLISHING STABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. CERTAIN PEOPLE IN BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES, OF COURSE, TAKE NOTICE OF WHAT HAPPENS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. CERTAINLY HISTORIANS IN THE FUTURE WILL BE ABLE POSITIVELY TO JUDGE THE CURRENT PERIOD. THE PRIME MINISTER BELIEVED THAT WE NOW WERE FACING A PERIOD OF TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA AND ONE OF PROFOUND REFORM. THEREFORE, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND INDEED WITHOUT SUCH GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, THE WHOLE PROCESS DOMESTICALLY WOULD SUFFER. IT PARTICULARLY IS IMPORTANT THAT THE UNITED STATES BE ABLE TO DEPMDN ON THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF RUSSIA'S LEADERS ON KEY ISSUES IN ORDER TO DEVELOP GOOD RELATIONS, AND THAT IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF HIMSELF AND OF PRESIDENT YELTSIN. OF COURSE, THERE ARE PROBLEMS TO SOLVE. WE NOW ARE ENGAGED INTENSIVELY IN PREPARATIONS FOR MAY 9 AND 10.

9. IN RUSSIA, OF COURSE, THERE WILL BE A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION PAID TO PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AT THE END OF 1995 AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, LIKE YOURS, IN 1996. PRESIDENT YELTSIN IS A WISE LEADER AND POLITICIAN AND UNDERSTOOD THIS WELL.

10. FOR THE VERY SIGNIFICANT 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE VICTORY, LEADERS OF ALL THE ALLIES WHO FOUGHT THE GERMANS ARE COMING TO RUSSIA AS GUESTS - LEADERS WHOSE COUNTRIES HAD FOUGHT THE GREATEST HORROR OF THE 20TH CENTURY. THIS IS A GOOD SIGN. THEY WILL FIND RUSSIA A COUNTRY WHICH IS TOGETHER AND WELCOMING. THERE IS THE GOOD SYMPOLESM IN THIS MEETING -- THAT WE ALL WERE AND ARE ON THE SAME SIDE AND THAT THE LEADERS ARE HERE AS A GREAT TRIBUTE TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE.

11. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE HAD TOLD SECRETARY PERRY EARLIER THIS WEEK THAT DURING THE YALTA CONFERENCE, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT HAD SAID THAT LEADERS NEED TO DO THEIR UTMOST TO PREVENT WAR FOR THE NEXT 50 YEARS. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN SAID TODAY'S LEADERS NOW MUST DO THEIR UTMOST TO PREVENT WAR FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER 50 YEARS. WE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN HAVING PEACE, AND WE MUST NOW DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO ASSURE THAT IT REMAINS. THE MODEL BEFORE US MUST SURELY BE THE ONE WHICH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ENVISAGED. WE HAVE PERSEVERED IN THE PAST BY WORKING TOGETHER AND LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE WITH HARD WORK. THIS IS A GOOD OBJECTIVE, AND IT WILL BE OF GREAT INTEREST BOTH TO EUROPE AND ON A WORLD-WIDE BASIS. HE WANTED TO THANK THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND THROUGH HIM, PRESIDENT CLINTON VERY MUCH FOR THE THOUGHTS WHICH HE HAD PASSED ON.

12. CHERNOMYRDIN CONTINUED: THE SUPPORT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS GIVEN US PERSONALLY FOR OUR REFORMS HAS BEEN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE PROCESS WILL NOT BE EASY; INDEED, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT. AS WE ENTERED 1995, WE ADOPTED A VERY STRICT BUDGET. WE WORKED HARD WITH THE IMF ON THE AGREEMENT WITH THEM. PERSONALLY, I WANT TO TELL YOU THAT I INTEND TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT WE IMPLEMENT ALL THE PARAMETERS OF THE IMF AGREEMENT. THIS IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR THE ECONOMIC SUCCESS OF OUR GOVERNMENT. FROM YOUR SIDE, WE WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT YOUR SUPPORT IS VERY IMPORTANT, ESPECIALLY YOUR MORAL SUPPORT. AS WE GO ON IN THIS DIRECTION, IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE ARE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE AGAINST THE REFORM AND WHO WILL TRY TO UNDERCUT OUR EFFORTS. IT IS THE RIGHT TIME TO PROCEED WITH REFORM. THE EXTREMISTS WILL TRY TO CHANGE DIRECTIONS, AND WE VALUE YOUR SUPPORT AND WILL KEEP ON IN THE PRESENT LINE. IT WILL NOT BE EASY TO MEET THE MOST SIGNIFICANT GOALS, BUT AGAIN I EMPHASIZE OUR INTENTION TO KEEP MOVING FORWARD.

13. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS ON MAY 9. FROM 1941-1945 WE WORKED TOGETHER TO END THE WAR. THEN, FROM THE LATE 1940'S TO THE 1980'S, THE OVERWHELMING POTENTIAL FOR A THERMONUCLEAR CATASTROPHE ENSURED THAT WE DID EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID A CLASH. NOW, WE CAN MOVE AHEAD INTO THE FUTURE AS PARTNERS. STILL, MANY AMERICANS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE OUR PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION. AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT WE CAN DO TOGETHER, TALBOTT SAID HE ALWAYS CITES THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN PROCESS, IN WHICH YOU HAVE PLAYED SUCH AN IMPORTANT ROLE. WE PLACE THE HIGHEST VALUE ON WHAT YOU

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 011843

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E.O. 12356: DECL:APRIL 1, 2000
TAGS: PREL, US, RS

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SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN: MEETING WITH
DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT

HAVE DONE TO KEEP YOUR COUNTRY MOVING IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED HIS THANKS.

14. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY WAS ALSO IMPRESSED BY THE
PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS ON THE IMF AGREEMENT AND ITS
IMPORTANCE. HE HAD MET WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT ON THE
DAY THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED. TOGETHER THEY
HAD RECALLED THE PRIME MINISTER'S FIRST DINNER IN BLAIR
HOUSE, DURING WHICH THEY HAD TALKED ABOUT THE IMF AND
THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MICHEL CAMDESSUS.
UNDER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LEADERSHIP, THIS ACTIVITY
HAS COME A VERY LONG WAY INDEED.

15. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT
IS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING PRIME MINISTER
CHERNOMYRDIN IN JUVE. IT WOULD BE TERRIFIC, THE VICE
PRESIDENT THOUGHT, IF WE COULD CONCLUDE THE TIMAN
PECHORA DEAL BEFORE THE SUMMIT.

16. ANOTHER ISSUE ON WHICH WE HAVE WORKED HARD WAS
COCOM. WE JUST HAVE RECEIVED YOUR REPLY ON THE
EXCHANGE OF LETTERS. WE STILL HAVE SOME WORK TO DO,
BUT THE DEPUTY SECRETARY WAS CONFIDENT WE CAN ADVANCE
THIS PROCESS WITH HARD WORK ON BOTH SIDES. THE VICE
PRESIDENT WOULD WRITE TO HIM SHORTLY ON THIS SUBJECT.

17. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT
PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAD GIVEN THE PRIME MINISTER A
MANDATE TO FIND A PEACEFUL POLITICAL SOLUTION IN
CHECHNYA. HE ASKED IF THERE IS ANYTHING THE PRIME
MINISTER COULD TELL US ABOUT THE SITUATION. THERE ARE
MANY REASONS FOR CONCERN.

18. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID FIRST HE WANTED TO SPEAK
ABOUT THE IMF AND SOME OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS. THEY NOW HAVE SIGNED TWO AGREEMENTS
WITH THE IMF AND IT IS NECESSARY, AND THEY UNDERSTOOD
THIS FULLY, TO MAINTAIN FULL CONTROL OVER ALL OF THE
PARAMETERS. THIS HAD HELPED TO REDUCE INFLATION DURING
1994. THEY INTEND TO CONTROL THESE PARAMETERS EVEN
MORE CLOSELY AGAIN IN 1995. THERE ARE MANY IN RUSSIA
WHO ARE AGAINST THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THE
EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
ALL OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. HE WAS
CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP MOVING
AHEAD, AND WHILE IT WOULD NOT BE EASY TO STAY ON THE
LINES THAT HAVE BEEN SET OUT, HE ONCE AGAIN EMPHASIZED
THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN SUPPORT.

19. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, CHERNOMYRDIN
SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN IN TOUCH BY PHONE EARLIER IN
THE WEEK. THE NEXT MEETING IS SET FOR JUNE 29 AND 30.
BEFORE THAT, THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL FLY WITH HIS
FAMILY TO VLADIVOSTOK AND TO THE LAKE BAIKAL REGION.

20. ON THE TIMAN PECHORA PROJECT, CHERNOMYRDIN SAW NO SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTATION. HE SAID HE WOULD APPLY HIMSELF TO THIS ISSUE. THERE ARE NO INSUPERABLE PROBLEMS.

21. ON COCOM, CHERNOMYRDIN SAID ONLY THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO PUT IT BEHIND US. IT WAS BECOMING A SIGNIFICANT IRRITANT. RUSSIA IS CONTINUALLY CHALLENGED TO EXPLAIN WHY WE ARE NOT A PART OF THIS POST-COCOM REGIME.

22. ON CHECHNYA, NE SAID THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVE IS CLEAR -- TO END ALL HOSTILITIES. HE WAS SURE THAT THIS IS THE RIGHT OBJECTIVE. THE PRESIDENT HAS MET WITH HIM AND HAS AGREED IT IS IMPORTANT TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO END THE ARMED CONFLICT. IN THAT REGARD, CHERNOMYRDIN MET WITH THE TWO CLOSEST RELATIVES OF GENERAL DUDAYEV, HIS FINANCE MINISTER AND HIS ECONOMIC MINISTER. THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT HAD OFFERED TO PARDON ALL CHECHENS WHO LAID DOWN THEIR ARMS, AND THEY WILL PARDON THEM. IF THEIR RELATIVES RETURN, THE RUSSIANS WILL HELP REPATRIATE THEM TO CHECHNYA. THEY HAVE OFFERED TO SEND CHECHENS ABROAD IF THEY SO DESIRE. WE ARE DETERMINED TO STOP THE MILITARY OPERATION, CHERNOMYRDIN STRESSED. HAPPILY, NOW IT IS PRACTICALLY OVER. WHILE THERE ARE STILL SOME ARMED BANDS IN AND OUT OF THE COUNTRY, THEY WILL BE GIVEN A CHOICE: THEY MAY LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND BE PARDONED, OR BE "ELIMINATED."

23. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED A STATEMENT BY MR. KHADJIEV, THE ACTING HEAD OF THE TEMPORARY CHECHEN GOVERNMENT, CALLING UPON ALL CHECHENS TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND RECEIVE THE PARDON OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN THIS REGARD, THERE ARE CHECHEN CUSTOMS THAT WE NEED TO PAY ATTENTION TO. CHECHENS WILL NOT GIVE UP THEIR ARMS WITHOUT COMPENSATION. BUT UNDER THEIR CUSTOMS, THEY CAN SELL THEIR ARMS. WE ARE PREPARED TO BUY THEM OUT.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 011843

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: APRIL 1, 2000

TAGS: PREL, US, RS

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN: MEETING WITH
- DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT

LIFE CLEARLY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN MONEY. HOWEVER, THIS APPROACH IS HINDERED BY THE PRESENCE OF FANATICS.

24. AS FAR AS THE PRESENT SITUATION IS CONCERNED, THIS MORNING (APRIL 7) THE RUSSIAN FORCES OPENED THE RAILROAD LINE TO DAGESTAN AND TO AZERBAIJAN. NOW, IT IS POSSIBLE TO TRANSPORT HEAVY EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS POWERSTATION EQUIPMENT, TO GROZNY. GROZNY AIRPORT WILL OPEN SOON TO INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC. ALTHOUGH STILL UNDER MILITARY CONTROL, IT WILL ACCEPT CIVIL AIRCRAFT. ALSO, THE RAILROAD IN THE SOUTHERN DIRECTION

IS UNDER RUSSIAN CONTROL AND WILL BE REOPENED. THE RUSSIANS ARE PLEASED THAT SOME 1,500 LOCAL CHECHENS HAVE ENTERED INTO INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. PEACE, CHERNOMYRDIN EMPHASIZED, IS THE ONLY PRE-CONDITION TO PROGRESS.

25. A CLEAN UP AND RESTORATION OF THE BATTLE-DESTROYED AREAS HAS BEGUN. IT WAS GOOD THAT HEAVY EQUIPMENT CAN BE MOVED BY RAILROAD AND BY THE ROAD SYSTEM. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT EFFORTS BE MADE TO RESTORE THE SITUATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE IS AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN CHECHNYA. THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE CONCEPT OF A DEMOCRATIC ELECTION. MOSCOW HAS INVITED THE OSCE TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN GROZNY. IT CAN MONITOR THE ELECTIONS WHEN THEY OCCUR. THE U.S. SHOULD DO SO ALSO, AND CHERNOMYRDIN HOPES WE WILL SEND OBSERVERS TO REVIEW THE ELECTIONS. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID HE APPRECIATED THE BRIEFING VERY MUCH AND EXPRESSED HIS SUPPORT FOR SUCCESS. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ASKED WHAT PERCENTAGE OF TIME CHERNOMYRDIN CURRENTLY WAS SPENDING ON CHECHNYA, AND CHERNOMYRDIN SAID HE LITERALLY WAS UP TO HIS EARS IN THE SUBJECT. WHILE IT VARIED FROM DAY TO DAY, AND SOME DAYS IT WAS VERY HEAVY, HE ESTIMATED THAT HE WAS SPENDING AN AVERAGE OF 30 PER CENT OF HIS TIME IN DEALING WITH THE QUESTION.

26. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID "WHAT A SORE SPOT" CHECHNYA HAS BEEN FOR RUSSIA. IT HAS BEEN A GREAT TRAGEDY, AND HE WANTS TO END IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE ARE OTHER AREAS AND CENTERS WHERE THE POPULATION HAD TURNED THE MILITANTS OUT. THEY NEED TO WORK FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND INTEND TO PUSH AHEAD ON THAT SOON AS WELL AS A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS WHICH WILL INVOLVE THE PEOPLE OF CHECHNYA.

27. IT HAS BEEN A DIFFICULT AND SENSITIVE ISSUE, ESPECIALLY THE EVENTS IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY. THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSITION OF AZERBAIJAN. WEAPONS ARE COMING IN FROM AZERBAIJAN. CHERNOMYRDIN SPOKE TO ALIEV ABOUT THE PROBLEM, AND ALIEV SAID HE WOULD DO WHATEVER HE COULD TO PREVENT THE TRANSPORT OF ARMS ACROSS THE BORDER.

28. MAMEDOV SAID HE HOPED THE PRIME MINISTER COULD REASSURE THOSE OFFICIALS IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND ELSEWHERE THAT MILITARY FORCES FROM CHECHNYA WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE MAY 9 MILITARY PARADE THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD ATTEND. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE FULLY AGREED. HE ASKED ABOUT COMMEMORATIVE EVENTS THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD ATTEND IN WASHINGTON. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTED THERE WOULD BE A RELIGIOUS CEREMONY ON MAY 8 AT ARLINGTON CEMETERY WHERE PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS BURIED, AND THEN THE PRESIDENT WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO THE AIRPORT TO FLY TO MOSCOW.

29. THE PRIME MINISTER CLOSED BY ASKING THE DEPUTY

SECRETARY TO CONVEY HIS VERY BEST WISHES TO THE
PRESIDENT, TO THE VICE PRESIDENT, AND TO THE SECRETARY.
HE SAID THAT RUSSIA ANTICIPATES SUCCESS ON MAY 9 AND
10. HE WOULD REPORT DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON
THEIR TALKS. HE WOULD EMPHASIZE THE GREAT IMPORTANCE
THAT WE WERE ATTACNING TO SUCCESS IN THE SUMMIT TALKS
ON MAY 9 AND 10, AND WOULD REPORT FULLY AND CLEARLY
EVERYTHING THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM THE DEPUTY SECRETARY.

PICKERING

BT

#1843

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04

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SIT: BEYRLE BLACKER CLEMENTS HESLIN LAKEA MITCHELL PIFER PONEMAN STERN

SUM SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL

<^DIST>

SIT: WALSH SAUNDERS

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SIT: WITKOWSKY

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
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 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
 INFO: RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 SUBJ: U/S TARNOFF'S APRIL 5 MEETING WITH NATO SYG CLAES

DECLASSIFIED**PER E.O. 13526**

2016-0118-M-2 (1.02)

6/1/2023 v2

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USNATO 001450

EXDIS

STATE FOR EUR AND S/NIS
 DEFENSE FOR ISA/NATO
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: NATO, PARM, PREL, OVIP (TARNOFF, PETER)
 SUBJECT: U/S TARNOFF'S APRIL 5 MEETING WITH NATO SYG CLAES

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.YM

 SUMMARY

2. U/S TARNOFF MET APRIL 7 WITH NATO SYG CLAES IN A DISCUSSION THAT FOCUSED ON ALLIANCE PREPOSITIONING PLANS IN THE EVENT OF AN EVACUATION OF UNPROFOR TROOPS FROM BOSNIA AND ON NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS. THEY TOUCHED ON FRENCH INSISTENCE THAT FUTURE NATO MEMBERS BE ALLOWED TO ENTER ON THE FRENCH OR SPANISH MODEL, WHICH U/S TARNOFF REJECTED AS LEADING TO "CAFETERIA-STYLE" MEMBERSHIP.

3. ON BOSNIA, CLAES NOTED THAT FRENCH FONMIN JUPPE HAD TOLD HIM OFF THE RECORD TWO MONTHS EARLIER THAT PM BALLADUR DID NOT BELIEVE THAT BOSNIA HAD A FUTURE. HE PREDICTED THAT, DESPITE THE DANGER OF INCREASED FIGHTING, FRANCE WOULD TAKE NO ACTION ON WITHDRAWAL UNTIL AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. U/S TARNOFF SUGGESTED ANALYSIS BY NMA'S OF A POSSIBLE "INCREMENTAL" APPROACH TO PREPOSITIONING SO THAT ALLIES WOULD NOT HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN 80 AND 1500 SOLDIERS ON THE GROUND.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

4. ON NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS, CLAES CONCURRED WITH THE U.S. VIEW THAT, WHILE RUSSIA WAS UNLIKELY TO BE CONSIDERED FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP, THERE WAS LITTLE POINT IN SAYING SO AS THE FRENCH AND GERMANS WANT; HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO DEVELOP A PARALLEL "SPECIAL" RELATIONSHIP. THIS WOULD NEED TO BEGIN WITH RUSSIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE TWO DOCUMENTS. U/S TARNOFF NOTED THAT THE UPCOMING U.S.-RUSSIAN SUMMIT WOULD BE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE. END SUMMARY.

BOSNIA AND PREPOSITIONING

5. UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF OPENED HIS APRIL 7 MEETING WITH NATO SYG CLAES BY ASKING HIS ASSESSMENT OF NEXT STEPS ON PREPOSITIONING. CLAES RESPONDED THAT THE ISSUE WAS FROZEN FOR THE TIME BEING, ALTHOUGH THE PROCESS WOULD LIKELY ACCELERATE IN A FEW WEEKS AS A RESULT OF INCREASED FIGHTING IN BOSNIA AND THE PERCEPTION OF INCREASED VULNERABILITY, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE SMALLER ALLIES. ASKED ABOUT FRANCE'S ATTITUDES TOWARD EVACUATION, CLAES SAID THAT MITTERRAND HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT FRANCE WOULD REMAIN, AND THEREFORE NOTHING WOULD HAPPEN UNTIL AFTER THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS; NO CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY WILL ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR URGING THAT FRANCE ABANDON THIS POSITION.

6. CLAES TOLD U/S TARNOFF THAT FRENCH FONMIN JUPPE HAD TOLD HIM OF THE RECORD TWO MONTHS AGO THAT PM BALLADUR DID NOT BELIEVE IN THE FUTURE OF BOSNIA AND FORESAW ITS BEING DIVIDED INTO 2-3 SEPARATE PARTS. HE ALSO RELATED SOME OF THE DETAILS OF HIS APRIL 6 PHONE CALL TO JUPPE, WHOM HE CALLED THE MOST REASONABLE OF THE FRENCH LEADERS, TO GET FRENCH AGREEMENT ON PREPOSITIONING A FORCE OF 80 IN CROATIA.

7. AMBASSADOR HUNTER ASKED CLAES WHETHER THERE WERE ANY POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERMEDIATE STEP BETWEEN THE 80 ALREADY AGREED AND THE NUMBER 1500 FORESEEN IN THE CURRENT PLAN. CLAES RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE WISE TO WAIT A LITTLE BEFORE TAKING UP THE ISSUE. U/S TARNOFF AGREED THAT THERE MUST BE WAYS TO TAKE A MORE INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO PREPOSITIONING, ALTHOUGH CLEARLY A GENERAL EVACUATION WOULD REQUIRE LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS. IN ORDER TO AVOID THAT SCENARIO, THE NEXT DIPLOMATIC TASK WAS TO FIND A WAY TO CONVINCE THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND TO FIND A WAY TO EXTEND THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT.

8. CLAES ASKED FOR U/S TARNOFF'S ASSESSMENT OF MILOSEVIC. U/S TARNOFF RESPONDED THAT MILOSEVIC HAD DEMONSTRATED NO SERIOUS INTENTIONS, FELT STRONGER INTERNALLY, SAW DIVISIONS WITHIN THE CONTACT GROUP, QUESTIONED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON KARADZIC, AND REALIZED THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE RESISTANT TO FULL SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF SERBIAN RECOGNITION OF BOSNIA AND CROATIA. CLAES SAID THAT INCREASED MILITARY CONFRONTATION SEEMED LIKELY. U/S TARNOFF NOTED THAT COMMENTATORS IN THE U.S. WERE DISTINGUISHING ONLY BETWEEN A "SMALL" AND "LARGE" AR. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE CONFLICT FROM

SPILLING OVER HAD PROVED SUCCESSFUL.

9. CLAES SAID THAT, IF THINGS WENT WRONG, THE GAP BETWEEN THE END OF PREPOSITIONING AND THE START OF WITHDRAWAL COULD HAVE A VERY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON NATO'S CREDIBILITY. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN FRENCH ATTEMPTS TO SABOTAGE ALLIANCE DECISION MAKING. AMBASSADOR HUNTER ADDED THAT THE UK WAS ALSO HIDING BEHIND FRENCH INTRANSIGENCE TO A DEGREE.

NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

10. U/S TARNOFF SAID HE HAD SENSED A POSITIVE DISPOSITION AMONG ALLIED PERMREPS TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA AND POSSIBLY UKRAINE. CLAES SAID IIS WAS TRUE, BUT ADDED THAT SOME ALLIES, ESPECIALLY FRANCE AND GERMANY, ARGUED THAT NATO SHOULD TELL RUSSIA IT COULD NEVER JOIN NATO. U/S TARNOFF ASKED WHY IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A PARALLEL RELATIONSHIP NOW, WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING THAT RUSSIA WOULD NEVER JOIN. OF COURSE, IF THAT EVER DID HAPPEN, IT WOULD MEAN THAT SO MUCH HAD CHANGED THAT NATO WOULD PROBABLY NO LONGER BE NEEDED. CLAES ALLOWED THAT REMAINING AMBIGUOUS ON THE ISSUE OF EVENTUAL RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP HAD MERIT, BUT HE DID NOT FORESEE THAT THERE COULD EVER BE ANY CONSENSUS TO ADMIT RUSSIA. HUNTER NOTED THE FRENCH ARGUMENT, SUPPORTED ALSO BY GERMANY, THAT NOT SAYING "NO" NOW WOULD MAKE IT HARDER TO DEVELOP AN ALTERNATIVE RELATIONSHIP. THE FRENCH SEE A LOGICAL INCONSISTENCY. U/S TARNOFF SAID ALLIES SHOULD TAKE THE VIEWS OF THOSE RUSSIANS INTO ACCOUNT WHO WANTED THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP TO DEVELOP, BUT WHO BELIEVED THAT TO EXCLUDE RUSSIA SPECIFICALLY FROM EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP WOULD HAVE A DEVASTATING IMPACT.

11. SYG PRIVATE OFFICE DIRECTOR SCHARIOOTH NOTED THE IMPORTANCE THAT DUMA FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN LUKIN HAD PLACED ON THE IDEA OF "17" AS OPPOSED TO "16 PLUS 1." U/S TARNOFF RESPONDED THAT THE G-7 HAD REMAINED THE G-7 WITH RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN A "P-8," EVEN THOUGH THE LAST TIME THE RUSSIANS HAD PARTICIPATED IN ALL BUT ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF THE MEETINGS.

12. U/S TARNOFF SAID THE NEXT MONTH LEADING UP TO THE CLINTON-YELTSIN SUMMIT WOULD BE CRUCIAL. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN THE POSITIONS THE RUSSIANS TOOK PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY; IT WAS NOT HELPFUL FOR THEM TO BE POSITIVE IN PRIVATE BUT NOT TO CONFIRM THAT IN PUBLIC. CLAES BRIEFLY REVIEWED THE TIME LINE FOR PREPARATION OF NATO'S INTERNAL STUDY ON ENLARGEMENT AND THE PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS TO INTERESTED PARTNERS. HE SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE EASY TO GAIN SEVERAL ADDITIONAL MONTHS OF TIME AFTER THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL WITHOUT ANY DIRECT REFERENCE TO RUSSIAN ELECTIONS.

FRANCE AND ENLARGEMENT

13. CLAES CALLED "DANGEROUS" FRENCH INSISTENCE THAT FRANCE WOULD NEVER AGREE TO ENLARGEMENT IF THERE WERE NO OPTION OF NOT JOINING THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE, ALONG FRENCH OR SPANISH LINES. HE NOTED AN OUTBURST BY THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN WHICH HE HAD SAID THAT FRANCE WOULD NEVER CHANGE ITS POSITION: "JAMAIS, JAMAIS, JAMAIS!" HUNTER ADDED THAT THE FRENCH HAD ARGUED PRIVATELY THAT OTHER ALLIES SHOULD ACCEPT THEIR POINT FORMALLY, IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT EVERY COUNTRY INTERESTED IN JOINING NATO IN FACT WANTS TO JOIN THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. U/S TARNOFF NOTED THE RISK OF OTHER "MODELS" AND SAID THE U.S. REJECTED SUCH A "CAFETERIA STYLE" APPROACH.

14. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH CLAES' NOTING HOW DIFFICULT WORK AT NATO HAD BECOME IN GENERAL BECAUSE OF MEETINGS AT 16, 15, OR LESS, AND THE NUMBER OF AD HOC COMMITTEES. THE FRENCH WERE EXPERT AT EXPLOITING SUCH ARRANGEMENTS TO REDUCE EFFICIENCY. HUNTER NOTED THAT, IRONICALLY, FRENCH BEHAVIOR HAD BEEN EASIER TO TOLERATE DURING THE COLD WAR THAN SINCE, GIVEN THE VERY REAL PROBLEMS OF TRYING TO MANAGE A NATO WITH MORE MEMBERS AND A LESS-RIVETING RATIONALE FOR COHESION. CLAES AGREED, NOTING THAT RECENT NAC'S HAD SHOWN THE FRENCH AT THEIR WORST BEHAVIOR.

15. UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THIS MESSAGE.

HUNTER
BT
#1450

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1450

TOR: 950410130208 M1611727

DIST:

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
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 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE
 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 7508
 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 9005
 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0441
 SUBJ: S/P DIRECTOR STEINBERG'S APRIL 7 MEETING WITH
 - MOD STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR JEAN-CLAUDE
 - MALLET

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2016-0118-1A-2 (1.03)
 6/1/2023 v2

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 08831

EXDIS - MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

GENEVA FOR CD DEL

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, PARM, NATO, BK, RS, FR

SUBJECT: S/P DIRECTOR STEINBERG'S APRIL 7 MEETING WITH
 - MOD STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR JEAN-CLAUDE
 - MALLET

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. OADR: FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
 INFORMATION.

SUMMARY

2. FRENCH MOD STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR JEAN-CLAUDE
 MALLET RECEIVED S/P DIRECTOR JAMES STEINBERG WARMLY
 APRIL 7 FOR A WIDE-RANGING BUT VERY FRANK DISCUSSION OF
 POLITICAL/MILITARY ISSUES. MALLET COMPLAINED OF THE
 IRRESPONSIBILITY OF CURRENT RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY,
 EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DEAL WITH
 IRAN, URGED FIRM REJECTION OF RUSSIAN ATTEMPTS TO LINK

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CFE REVISION TO NATO ENLARGEMENT, AND WARNED AGAINST ANY U.S.-RUSSIAN DEALS (E.G., OO NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL) AT FRENCH EXPENSE DURING THE UPCOMING U.S.-RUSSIA SUMMIT. MALLET WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE VOTE COUNT FOR NPT EXTENSIONS T URGED CLOSE COORDINATION AMONG THE PERM-FIVE TO ENSURE THE UPCOMING EXTENSION CONFERENCE IS A SUCCESS. HE WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE WILL MAKE NO FURTHER CONCESSIONS ON COLLATERAL ISSUES (E.G., CTBT AND FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF) TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE FOR NPT EXTENSION. FINALLY, HE COMPLAINED THAT NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARE TRYING TO FORCE FRANCE TO ACCEPT OPLAN 40104 FOR BOSNIA. HE CHARGED THAT THERE ARE SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN THE PLAN WHICH MUST BE REMEDIED AND STRESSED THAT FRANCE HAS 5000 SOLDIERS ON THE GROUND AND IS DETERMINED TO HAVE A VOICE IN WHAT NATO DECIDES. END SUMMARY.

RUSSIA

3. S/P DIRECTOR STEINBERG BEGAN HIS APRIL 7 MEETING WITH MOD STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR MALLET BY REVIEWING PROBLEMS IN RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST AND EMPHASIZING THE TENDENCY IN MOSCOW TO CONCENTRATE ON DOMESTIC POLITICS RATHER THAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. MALLET OBSERVED IN TURN THAT RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY IS TAKING A TROUBLING TURN -- NOT BECAUSE MOSCOW IS SUDDENLY BECOMING HARDLINE OR EXPANSIONIST BUT BECAUSE ITS DIPLOMATS "ARE PUPPETS DIVORCED FROM REALITY." IN PARTICULAR, HE COMPLAINED BITTERLY OF RUSSIAN BEHAVIOR IN THE BOSNIA CONTACT GROUP OVER THE PAST YEAR. THE RUSSIANS ACT LIKE "CLOWNS," HE CLAIMED, BUT THIS ISN'T A GAME; IT IS WHAT RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY HAS BECOME.

4. MALLET NOTED THE UPCOMING U.S.-RUSSIA SUMMIT AND CAUTIONED THE U.S. NOT TO MAKE ANY DEALS AT EUROPEANS' EXPENSE. MANY IN FRANCE FEAR THAT THE U.S. AND RUSSIA ARE COOL TO THE EU AND KEEN TO SETTLE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN DIRECT DEALINGS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LETTER TO YELTSIN ON NATO ENLARGEMENT CAUSED GREAT IRRITATION IN PARIS AND BONN, FOR EXAMPLE, AND PARIS IS NOW ESPECIALLY WORRIED THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY LAUNCH FURTHER INITIATIVES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH COULD AFFECT FRENCH INTERESTS.

5. STEINBERG SET MALLET STRAIGHT. THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO YELTSIN WAS DELIBERATELY DRAFTED TO AVOID DISCUSSION OF ISSUES WHICH HAVE TO BE DECIDED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AND THE U.S. IS MORE INTERESTED IN OBTAINING RUSSIAN RATIFICATION START II THAN LAUNCHING

NEW ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE RUSSIANS A PRETEXT TO PUT START II IN LIMBO.

6. TURNING TO OTHER ISSUES IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, MALLET INQUIRED ABOUT PROSPECTS YP
IN TURNING OFF

RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN. STEINBERG REPLIED THAT THIS MIGHT BE AN ISSUE ON WHICH RUSSIA WILL ACCOMMODATE THE WEST, ALTHOUGH IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY FOR CERTAIN. MALLET WELCOMED THIS NEWS AND REPORTED THAT DEFENSE MINISTER LEOTARD IS PERSONALLY INTERESTED IN THIS ISSUE. MALLET SAID THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE IT WITH THE RUSSIANS ON HIS NEXT TRIP TO MOSCOW.

8. STEINBERG RAISED RUSSIAN CLAIMS THAT THE CFE TREATY WOULD HAVE TO BE MODIFIED IN THE EVENT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT AND SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST SHOULD BE ABLE TO RESIST RUSSIAN DEMANDS AS LONG AS ALL NATO ALLIES ARE UNITED IN OPPOSING THEM. MALLET RESPONDED THAT FRANCE SUPPORTS A HARDLINE ON THE ISSUE AND COMMENTED THAT THE GREATEST WORRY IN PARIS IS THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT BE FIRM.

NPT

9. MALLET WAS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE NPT EXTENSION CONFERENCE. THERE SEEM TO BE ENOUGH VOTES FOR EXTENDING THE TREATY, EVEN THOUGH SOME AFRICAN ISLAMIC STATES HAVE YET TO COME ABOARD. THE MAIN WORRY NOW IS MANAGING THE CONFERENCE ITSELF. MALLET APPEALED FOR EVEN GREATER COHESION AMONG THE PERM-FIVE AND, ABOVE ALL, AMONG THE PERM-THREE TO ENSURE THAT THE CONFERENCE STAYS ON THE RAILS AND REACHES THE CONCLUSION WE ALL SEEK.

CTBT/FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF

10. MALLET LAID DOWN A CLEAR MARKER, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE IS NOT INTERESTED IN MAKING ANY MORE GESTURES ON OTHER ISSUES (E.G., ON CTBT AND FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF) IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE FOR NPT EXTENSION. FRENCH AGREEMENT TO JOIN WITH RUSSIA, BRITAIN, AND THE U.S. IN A SECURITY ASSURANCES DECLARATION MARKS THE END OF THE LINE; THE FRENCH CD DELEGATION HAS RECEIVED FIRM INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT. MALLET EXPLAINED THAT FRANCE IS NOW IN THE FINAL COUNT-DOWN TO THE APRIL 23-MAY 7 FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND THAT THE GOV CANNOT MAKE DECISIONS WHICH TIE THE HANDS OF THE NEXT PRESIDENT ON NUCLEAR ISSUES. HE EXPRESSED RELIEF THAT FRANCE'S NUCLEAR POSTURE HAS NOT BECOME A CAMPAIGN ISSUE SO FAR AND SAID HE IS DETERMINED TO ENSURE THAT IT DOES NOT.

CJTF

11. MALLET EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH DISCUSSIONS IN MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CHANNELS ON CJTF. MORE WORK IS STILL NEEDED, HOWEVER, AND HE SUGGESTED THAT FRENCH MOD OFFICIALS MAY SEEK TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON IN THE COMING WEEKS FOR FURTHER TALKS.

OPLAN 40104

12. MALLET COMMENTED THAT FRENCH MOD OFFICIALS WILL WANT TO DISCUSS MORE THAN JUST CJTF WITH THEIR U.S. COLLEAGUES IF THEY COME TO WASHINGTON. REFERRING TO DIFFERENCES AT NATO OVER OPLAN 40104, HE COMPLAINED HEATEDLY OF GROWING PROBLEMS AT EVERE OVER HOW TO USE NATO STRUCTURES. NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES (NMA'S) ARE ENGAGED IN ANTI-FRENCH LOBBYING, AND "WE'RE BEING OUT-MANEUVERED," HE CHARGED. FRENCH VIEWS ARE BEING REJECTED IN THE SPC/R AND MILITARY COMMITTEE, LEAVING THE GOF TO CONCLUDE THAT THE NMA'S WANT A FREE HAND. "FRANCE HAS 5000 TROOPS IN THEATER, AND WE WILL NEVER AGREE TO THIS," MALLET DECLARED.

13. THERE ARE SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN THE NATO OP PLAN AS CURRENTLY DRAFTED, MALLET CONTINUED. THE PLAN IS SILENT, FOR EXAMPLE, ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE REFUGEES WHO WILL UNDOUBTEDLY FLEE THE ENCLAVES AS UNPROFOR WITHDRAWS, NOR DOES IT SPECIFY TO WHOM CONTROL OF SARAJEVO AIRPORT WILL BE HANDED. ALSO, THE PLAN APPEARS TO CALL FOR USE OF WARTIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, EVEN IF THE WITHDRAWAL TAKES PLACE IN A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT. THESE AND OTHER DEFICIENCIES MUST BE FIXED, BEFORE FRANCE CAN AGREE TO THE PLAN.

14. STEINBERG ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MESHING POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN ARRANGING FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL WILL BE DIFFICULT BUT ASKED WHY FRANCE COULD NOT AGREE TO SOME PRELIMINARY STEPS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT MILITARY PREPARATIONS PROGRESS WHILE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE ON THE PLAN. MALLET REPLIED THAT THIS IS WHY FRANCE AGREED TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF 80 COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS EARLIER THAT SAME WEEK.

15. ASKED WHERE EVENTS ARE HEADED IN BOSNIA, MALLET FORESAW A RESUMPTION OF LIMITED HOSTILITIES. FRENCH OFFICERS ARE HEARING RUMORS THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS WILL LAUNCH A MAJOR ATTACK IN A FEW WEEKS. WHILE MALLET CAREFULLY NOTED HE COULD NOT SAY FOR CERTAIN WHAT THE NEW FRENCH PRESIDENT WILL DO, HE SUGGESTED THAT WHOEVER IS ELECTED WILL PROBABLY DECIDE NOT TO WITHDRAW BUT RATHER TO MAINTAIN THE FRENCH PRESENCE IN UNPROFOR AND TO SEEK TO CONTAIN THE CONFLICT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THE CURRENT GOF HAS INSTRUCTED NEWLY-ARRIVED FRENCH UNPROFOR COMMANDER GENERAL JANVIER TO BE ASSERTIVE, AND JANVIER AND HIS BRITISH COLLEAGUE GENERAL SMITH ARE GIVING EVERY INDICATION THAT THEY INTEND TO BE TOUGH WITH THE SERBS.

16. AS THE MEETING CONCLUDED, MALLET EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE ARE AT ODDS OVER OPLAN 40104, SINCE WE ARE NOW WORKING WELL TOGETHER IN THE CONTACT GROUP AND ARE CLOSER THAN WE HAVE BEEN IN MANY MONTHS ON THE APPROACH NEEDED FOR AN OVER-ALL SETTLEMENT IN BOSNIA. WE MUST HAVE MORE CONTACTS

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BETWEEN CAPITALS TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES, HE DECLARED.

17. THIS CABLE WAS DRAFTED AFTER STEINBERG'S DEPARTURE.

HARRIMAN

BT
#8831

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 8831

TOR: 950410133912 M1611794

DIST:

SIT: NSC

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Cable

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 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 2285
 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 1852
 RUEHKE/AMEMBASSY BAKU 1139
 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 1138
 RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0927
 SUBJ: RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DESTRUCTION
 EAST OF THE URALS

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-A-2(1,04)

6/1/2013 r2

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012212

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356; DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, OSCE, PARM, KCFE, RU

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DESTRUCTION
EAST OF THE URALS

REF: STATE 83398

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: RUSSIAN MFA DISARMAMENT OFFICIALS BELIEVE SENIOR LEVEL U.S.-RUSSIAN TALKS ON DESTRUCTION/CONVERSION OF CFE-COVERED EQUIPMENT LOCATED EAST OF THE URALS (AS PROPOSED REFTEL) WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE WORTHWHILE. THE SHORTAGE OF FINANCING FOR DESTRUCTION/CONVERSION IS MOSCOW'S MAIN PROBLEM, THEY SAID, AND ACKNOWLEDGED IT IS UNLIKELY ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT WILL BE DESTROYED BY THE END OF 1995. THEY DID SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT EXPERT-LEVEL TALKS IN MOSCOW ON TECHNICAL ISSUES, INCLUDING PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION, COULD PROVE USEFUL IN CONJUNCTION WITH JCG DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA. END SUMMARY.

3. ON APRIL 11, POLOFF DELIVERED REFTEL DEMARCHE TO

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RUSSIAN MFA DISARMAMENT DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS VADIM SOLOMENKO AND SERGEY MOSTINSKIY. SOLOMENKO IS A RUSSIAN DELEGATE TO THE JCG AND HAD JUST RETURNED FROM THE LATEST JCG SESSION IN VIENNA.

SENIOR LEVEL DISCUSSIONS NOT USEFUL

4. SOLOMENKO AGREED THAT IT APPEARS UNLIKELY RUSSIA WILL BE ABLE TO COMPLETE DESTRUCTION/CONVERSION OF THE EQUIPMENT EAST OF THE URALS BEFORE THE END OF 1995. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR SENIOR LEVEL MEETINGS TO DISCUSS THE DESTRUCTION ISSUE WOULD PROBABLY NOT PROVE USEFUL. HE REITERATED THE RUSSIAN POSITION THAT THE RUSSIAN SIDE IS NOT ATTEMPTING TO DECEIVE ANYONE OR HIDE ITS HOLDINGS; THE MAIN PROBLEM ON THIS ISSUE IS A FINANCIAL ONE. THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE DOES NOT HAVE THE FUNDS, EITHER WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE BUDGET, TO MOVE MORE RAPIDLY ON EQUIPMENT DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION, HE CLAIMED. SOLOMENKO SAID HE HOPED RUSSIA'S RECENT PROPOSAL AT THE JCG TO ESTABLISH A FUND FOR SUPPORT OF CFE IMPLEMENTATION WOULD RECEIVE A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM OTHER PARTIES TO THE TREATY.

5. A SECOND PROBLEM CONCERNS THE EQUIPMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN AND UZBEKISTAN. RUSSIA IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THESE TWO STATES TO DEVELOP BILATERAL AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD CLEARLY DEFINE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EQUIPMENT DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION; FOR NOW, RUSSIA'S AGREEMENTS WITH THESE TWO STATES ON CFE ARE ONLY OF AN INFORMAL NATURE. MOSTINSKIY NOTED THAT RUSSIA IS CLOSE TO REACHING FORMAL AGREEMENTS WITH BOTH SIDES, BUT THAT THE "LEGAL TECHNICALITIES" OF THESE AGREEMENTS WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO WORK OUT. FOR THIS REASON, THERE MAY BE DELAYS IN DESTRUCTION/CONVERSION OF EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN KAZAKHSTAN AND UZBEKISTAN.

EXPERT-LEVEL TALKS IN MOSCOW?

6. ALTHOUGH SOLOMENKO WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE PROPOSAL TO HOLD SENIOR-LEVEL TALKS, HE DID SUGGEST THAT EXPERT-LEVEL TALKS TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL ISSUES, HELD IN MOSCOW, MIGHT PROVE USEFUL. IN THIS WAY, HE SUGGESTED, U.S. EXPERTS COULD MEET WITH RUSSIAN EXPERTS, PARTICULARLY FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE GENERAL STAFF, TO DISCUSS HOW BEST TO IMPLEMENT TREATY PROCEDURES. HE REPEATED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WAS ONLY HIS OWN PERSONAL VIEW AND SAID THE U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD BE PASSED TO MORE SENIOR-LEVEL OFFICIALS.

7. MOSTINSKIY COMMENTED THAT MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT EAST OF THE URALS SCHEDULED FOR DESTRUCTION IS IN ANY CASE NON-OPERATIONAL, GIVEN ITS LACK OF MAINTENANCE AND EXPOSURE TO THE ENVIRONMENT

PERHAPS THE SIDES
 COULD FIND SOME WAY TO RECOGNIZE THIS FACT, HE
 SUGGESTED, AND THEREBY OVERCOME THE COMPLIANCE PROBLEM
 RUSSIA FACES.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 012212

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356; DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, OSCE, PARM, KCFE, RU
 SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DESTRUCTION
 EAST OF THE URALS

U.S. RESPONSE TO YELTSIN LETTER

8. ON A RELATED ISSUE, MOSTINSKIY NOTED THAT MOSCOW
 CONTINUES TO WAIT FOR A U.S. RESPONSE TO THE DECEMBER
 YELTSIN-CLINTON LETTER ON CFE FLANK LIMITS. HE NOTED
 THAT U.K. PRIME MINISTER MAJOR RESPONDED IN JANUARY.
 MOSTINSKIY ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. WAS HOLDING THE
 RESPONSE FOR THE MAY SUMMIT MEETING.

9. COMMENT: POST IS ENCOURAGED BY RUSSIAN
 WILLINGNESS TO MEET IN MOSCOW AT THE EXPERTS LEVEL.
 WHILE WE UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF RUSSIAN
 COMPLIANCE ON EAST OF THE URALS DESTRUCTION DEADLINES,
 WE WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT THE LIST OF ISSUES FOR PRE-
 SUMMIT DISCUSSION IS ALREADY LONG. DISCUSSION OF THIS
 ISSUE AT HIGHER LEVELS DURING THE COMING WEEKS,
 THEREFORE, WOULD LIKELY BE DILUTED.

PICKERING
 BT
 #2212

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
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 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 INFO: RUEHKOS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0312
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 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1668
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2368
 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9506
 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4928
 SUBJ: SNAPSHOT OF RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS:
 - NOT WELL DEVELOPED

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2016-0118-M-2 (1.05)
 6/1/2013 v2

TEXT:

////////////////// INCOMPLETE MESSAGE //////////////////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 004305

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARA 5)

DEPT FOR S/NIS, EUR/RUS, EAP, EAP/J

MOSCOW ALSO FOR VLADIVOSTOK

E.O.12356: 4/12/2025

TAGS: PREL, JA, RS, KS, KN, CH

SUBJECT: SNAPSHOT OF RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS:
 - NOT WELL DEVELOPED

REF: STATE 70038

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: MOFA EUROPEAN AFFAIRS DG NOMURA VIEWS HIS WASHINGTON VISIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MOSCOW MAY 9 EVENTS AS WELL AS THE HALIFAX SUMMIT. NOMURA TOLD THE DCM THAT WE SHOULD AVOID PUBLICLY GANGING UP ON YELTSIN AT HALIFAX, BUT RATHER, SHOULD LET HIM SPEAK HIS MIND ON CHECHNYA. HALIFAX SHOULD BE USED TO REVIEW RUSSIAN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC REFORMS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, AND TO

USE THIS REVIEW AS A BASIS FOR ADJUSTING OUR RESPECTIVE POLICIES VIS-A-VIS RUSSIA, NOMURA SUGGESTED. REVIEWING THE BLEAK SHORT TERM PROSPECTS FOR RUSSO-JAPANESE TIES, NOMURA MADE THE CASE FOR RUSSIAN MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, BUT SAID JAPAN WOULD GLADLY SEIZE ANY OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. HE TALKED DOWN RUSSIAN APEC MEMBERSHIP. NOMURA INDICATED THAT HE HAS BACKED AWAY FROM HIS TRACK I PROPOSAL FOR THE TRILATERAL FORUM ON NORTH PACIFIC SECURITY, AND IS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE. END SUMMARY.

3. DCM HOSTED MOFA EUROPEAN AFFAIRS DG NOMURA TO LUNCH APRIL 12 TO DISCUSS RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS. ACCOMPANYING NOMURA WERE RUSSIA DIVISION DIRECTOR HARADA, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR MATSUDA, AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS TAKEWAKA. DCM WAS JOINED BY POLMIN AND POLOFFS.

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS

4. ASKED WHAT WAS DOMINATING THE RUSSIA DIVISION'S WORK IN RECENT DAYS, JAPANESE PARTICIPANTS VIRTUALLY REPLIED IN CHORUS "THE AUM SHINRI KYO," THE GROUP SUSPECTED OF CONDUCTING THE RECENT TOKYO SUBWAY GAS ATTACK. THE GROUP'S RUSSIAN CONNECTION IS APPARENTLY VERY COMPLEX; A PARTICULAR POINT OF CONCERN IS THAT A NUMBER OF RANKING OFFICIALS, SUCH AS PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR LOBOV, HAVE CULTIVATED THE AUM SHINRI KYO, PERHAPS FOR FINANCIAL BENEFIT.

NOMURA'S WASHINGTON VISIT - MAY 9 AND HALIFAX

5. NOMURA SAID HE VIEWS HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON (APRIL 19) PRIMARILY AS A CHANCE TO CONSULT IN ADVANCE OF THE HALIFAX SUMMIT AS WELL AS TO DISCUSS THE MAY 9 MOSCOW EVENTS. (NOTE: ON THE LATTER, THE JAPANESE APPEAR TO BE A BIT ANXIOUS ABOUT BEING LEFT OUT OF PREPARATORY DISCUSSIONS. END NOTE.)

6. WE SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY GANG UP ON YELTSIN AT HALIFAX, BUT SHOULD ALLOW HIM TO SPEAK HIS MIND ON CHECHNYA, NOMURA SUGGESTED TO DCM. OTHERWISE, HALIFAX PROVIDES US WITH A VERY GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, INCLUDING MOSCOW'S SUCCESS OR LACK THEREOF IN PURSUING ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC REFORM. MOREOVER, WE SHOULD USE THIS REVIEW AS A BENCHMARK IN ADJUSTING OUR FOREIGN POLICIES VIS-A-VIS RUSSIA, NOMURA SUGGESTED.

7. ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, SINCE THE 1993 G-7 SUMMIT, JAPAN HAS "DONE A GOOD JOB" OF ASSISTING RUSSIA, NOMURA SAID. HOWEVER, HE ADDED BLUNTLY THAT JAPAN WILL REJECT ANY CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE GEARED AT DEVELOPING EUROPEAN RUSSIA, \$PREFERRING TO LEAVE THAT TO THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEANS. JAPAN IS MUCH MORE FOCUSED UPON RUSSIA'S ASIAN REGIONS AND IS GEARING ITS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ACCORDINGLY, NOMURA TOLD DCM.

BILATERAL TIES: AS ALWAYS, TERRITORIAL QUESTION KEY

8. YELTSIN AND OTHER RUSSIAN LEADERS WANT TO RESOLVE THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE WITH JAPAN BECAUSE THEY REALIZE THAT A PRODUCTIVE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP COULD THEN BE DEVELOPED, NOMURA TOLD DCM; THE PROBLEM, NOMURA SAID, IS "POWER AND POLITICS" ON THE RUSSIAN DOMESTIC SCENE. GIVEN FEARS OF ZHIRINOVSKIY'S INFLUENCE AND CONCERNS ABOUT UPCOMING NATIONAL ELECTIONS, MAKING PROGRESS IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP IS PROBLEMATIC IN THE SHORT TERM.

BT

#4305

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

SSN: 4305

TOR: 950416194526 M1621713

DIST:

SIT: NSC

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 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 0000
 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0000
 SUBJ: MOLDOVAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON TRANSDNIESTER
 DISPUTE, RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-WA-2 (1107)

6/1/2023 v2

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 108526

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MD
 SUBJECT: MOLDOVAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON TRANSDNIESTER
 DISPUTE, RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: IN AN APRIL 27 MEETING WITH S/NIS/RA COORDINATOR PRESEL AND EUR/WST DIRECTOR PURNELL, MOLDOVAN FONMIN POPOV WELCOMED PRESEL'S PROPOSED TRAVEL TO CHISINAU AND THE TRANSDNIESTER REGION. HE SAID THAT THE MOST RECENT SCHEDULED MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT SNEGUR AND TRANSDNIESTER LEADER SMIRNOV AND THEIR ADVISORS HAD BEEN POSTPONED. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE UPCOMING MEETING OF PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN COULD BE HELPFUL TO MOLDOVA IF THE TWO LEADERS REITERATED THEIR RESPECT FOR MOLDOVAN INDEPENDENCE D SUPPORT FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE 14TH ARMY. HE DOWNPLAYED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT STUDENT STRIKES IN CHISINAU, SAYING THAT THEY WERE MORE A MANIFESTATION OF SPRINGTIME THAN OF DISCONTENT. POPOV CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA WERE GOOD AND THE AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK PROMISING. END SUMMARY.
3. S/NIS/RA COORDINATOR JOE PRESEL AND EUR/WST OFFICE DIRECTOR JON PURNELL HAD LUNCH WITH MOLDOVAN FOREIGN MINISTER MIHAI POPOV APRIL 27 IN NEW YORK. POPOV WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MOLDOVAN UN MISSION THIRD SECRETARY VITALIE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SNEGUR (SON OF PRESIDENT SNEGUR). PRESEL OUTLINED FOR POPOV HIS INTENTION TO VISIT MOLDOVA THE WEEK OF MAY 15 TO MEET WITH MOLDOVAN OFFICIALS AND TRANSDNIESTER SEPARATIST LEADERS. THIS WOULD BE A FOLLOW-ON TO THE TRIP HE HAD MADE IN FEBRUARY WITH USREP TO THE OSCE SAMUEL BROWN. PRESEL SAID HE HOPED TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON, THE DEPUTY COORDINATOR FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE NIS. THE MESSAGE IN TRANSDNIESTER WOULD BE TWOFOLD: THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION FOR TRANSDNIESTER AND NOW IS THE TIME FOR TIRASPOL TO RETURN TO THE FOLD, BUT A TRANSDNIESTER REINTEGRATED INTO THE MOLDOVAN STATE STRUCTURE WOULD BENEFIT FROM U.S. ASSISTANCE AS THE REST OF THE COUNTRY DOES (AND MAYBE EVEN GET SOME LIMITED AMOUNT TARGETED TO THEM SPECIFICALLY TO EASE THEIR RETURN). PRESEL ADDED THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN IN THE HAGUE LOBBYING--HE THOUGHT SUCCESSFULLY,--FOR THE DUTCH, WHO REPRESENT MOLDOVA IN THE IMF AND WORLD BANK, TO DO MORE.

4. POPOV WELCOMED THE PROPOSAL AND SAID THAT MOLDOVAN OFFICIALS WOULD BE READY TO RECEIVE PRESEL AND BRING HIM UP TO DATE ON RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. HE WOULD HAVE TO CHECK ON DATES. POPOV KNEW SNEGUR WOULD WANT TO SEE THE TEAM AND WANTED TO BE SURE THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE IN TOWN. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WAS CLEARLY UNDER NO ILLUSIONS AS TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF QUICK PROGRESS. POPOV INDICATED THAT THE LATEST ROUND OF MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT SNEGUR AND TRANSDNIESTER LEADER SMIRNOV HAD BEEN POSTPONED, AND HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN THE TWO MIGHT NEXT MEET. HE THOUGHT THE TRANSDNIESTERIANS WERE BEING FOOLISH AND SHORTSIGHTED, NEVERTHELESS THAT WAS THE CASE. THEY WERE HOLDING OUT FOR SALVATION FROM A RESURGENT RUSSIA; THAT THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN SEEMED TO HAVE NO EFFECT. RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE, BY CONTRAST, WERE VERY GOOD. POPOV SAID THAT UKRAINE HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO MOLDOVA'S SUGGESTIONS THAT UKRAINIAN FORCES MIGHT REPLACE THOSE RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM THE MONITORED ZONE BETWEEN TRANSDNIESTER AND THE REST OF MOLDOVA. UKRAINE, HE SAID, WAS WILLING TO HELP IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OSCE-SPONSORED EFFORT. THEY MIGHT EVEN BE WILLING TO HELP GET THE 14TH ARMY'S EQUIPMENT ACROSS UKRAINE.

5. ASKED ABOUT RECENT STATEMENTS BY RUSSIAN 14TH ARMY COMMANDER LEBED THAT HE WOULD RESIGN RATHER THAN WATCH THE REORGANIZATION AND DOWNSIZING OF HIS FORCES, POPOV SAID THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE ANY VESTIGE OF THE 14TH ARMY IN

MOLDOVA, HE WOULD RATHER SEE LEBED IN CHARGE THAN ANYONE ELSE. LEBED, HE REASONED, CONTROLS HIS TROOPS AND THEIR ARMAMENTS WELL. IN ADDITION, TRANSDNIESTER LEADERS DISLIKE AND FEAR HIM. THE BEST OPTION, OF COURSE, SAID POPOV, IS FOR BOTH THE 14TH ARMY AND LEBED TO LEAVE MOLDOVA. WHEN PRESEL OBSERVED THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE 14TH ARMY WERE RESIDENTS OF TRANSDNIESTER, POPOV SAID HE MEANT THOSE WHO CAME FROM OUTSIDE TRANSDNIESTER AND THE EQUIPMENT. THOSE OFFICERS WHO STAYED COULD WELL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE MOLDOVAN MILITARY.

6. PRESEL ASKED POPOV HOW, IN HIS VIEW, THE UPCOMING MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN MIGHT BE USED TO FURTHER OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES IN MOLDOVA. POPOV PONDERED THE QUESTION FOR A MOMENT BEFORE SUGGESTING THAT SIMPLY HAVING THE TWO LEADERS REITERATE THEIR RESPECT FOR MOLDOVA'S INDEPENDENCE AND THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 14TH ARMY WOULD BE OF REAL SIGNIFICANCE.

7. ASKED BY PURNELL ABOUT RECENT INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, POPOV DOWNPLAYED THE RECENT STUDENT STRIKES AS MORE A MANIFESTATION OF SPRINGTIME THAN OF POLITICAL DISCONTENT. HE SUGGESTED THAT LEADERS OF THE STRIKE HAD HOPED TO CREATE THEIR OWN TIENANMEN-STYLE CONFRONTATION BY TAKING OVER A CENTRAL SQUARE IN CHISINAU. THE AUTHORITIES HAD FRUSTRATED THEM, HOWEVER, BY ESSENTIALLY CEDING THEM THE TERRITORY AND OTHERWISE GOING ABOUT BUSINESS AS USUAL. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION POPOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ISSUE ON WHICH THE STRIKE WAS NOMINALLY FOCUSED - DESIGNATING THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE TO BE ROMANIAN RATHER THAN "MOLDOVAN" - WAS ONE THAT ATTRACTED SOME POPULAR SYMPATHY. HE SAID THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT AGAINST SUCH A DESIGNATION. MANY COUNTRIES OUTSIDE ENGLAND AND FRANCE, HE NOTED, HAVE ENGLISH OR FRENCH AS THEIR NATIONAL LANGUAGES AND NO ONE QUESTIONS THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. HE SAW NO REASON WHY THE SAME LOGIC SHOULD NOT APPLY TO MOLDOVA AND THE ROMANIAN LANGUAGE.

8. SPEAKING OF ROMANIA, POPOV ADDED THAT THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN VERY "SENSIBLE" IN ITS RELATIONS WITH MOLDOVA. THE ROMANIANS, HE SAID, HAVE BEEN EXERTING NO PRESSURE ON MOLDOVA AND, INDEED, HAVE BEEN QUIETLY SUPPORTIVE. ON ANOTHER UPBEAT NOTE POPOV SAID THAT THE WEATHER SO FAR THIS SPRING HAS BEEN VERY GOOD AND THAT FARMERS ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THIS YEAR'S GROWING SEASON, IN MARKED CONTRAST TO LAST YEAR'S WEATHER: DROUGHT FOLLOWED BY FLOODS.

CHRISTOPHER

BT

#8526

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 8526

TOR: 950503165252 M1649752

DIST:

SIT: NSC

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to Russian President Yeltsin] Released in Part Per E.O. 13526 (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995 - Dec 1996 ([Moscow Summit...])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/10/1995 - 05/11/1995]

2016-0118-M
ke4027

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
 LINE1: OAAMZYUW YELADA 5975 1250041-MNSH--YEXXWHX YEKOHR.
 LINE2: ZNY MMNSH
 LINE3: ZKZK O SOA DE
 LINE4: O 050041Z MAY 95 ZFF-1/ZFF-4
 OSRI: YELADA
 DTG: 050041Z MAY 95
 ORIG: WHITE HOUSE
 EO 13526, 13443, 133(b)(1), 133(b)(6)
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: /**NO SUBJECT FOUND**/
 TEXT:

Released in Part
 Per E.O. 13526
 2015-0815-M-2 (4.70)
 4/19/2018 VZ

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
 QQQQ
 FOR THE ANBASSADOR OR CHARGE

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO
 RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE OPENING OF BUSINESS.

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS,

IT WAS A PLEASURE SPEAKING TO YOU LAST WEEK. I WAS PLEASED
 THAT WE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS EUROPEAN SECURITY AND
 OTHER ISSUES THAT WILL BE ON OUR AGENDA WHEN WE MEET.

ONE ISSUE WE DID NOT DISCUSS BUT WILL NEED TO TAKE UP IN
 MOSCOW IS THE CFE TREATY. THIS TREATY IS ONE OF THE SUCCESS
 STORIES OF THE LAST DECADE. IT HAS BEEN AN ESSENTIAL
 FOUNDATION FOR OUR WORK IN BEGINNING TO BUILD A
 NONCONFRONTATIONAL EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. WE NEED TO FIND
 A WAY TO MAINTAIN IT. OUR EXPERTS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSING
 ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTING THE TREATY. THEY HAVE
 MADE PROGRESS, BUT SOME CRITICAL ISSUES STILL REMAIN TO BE
 RESOLVED. I APPRECIATED YOUR LETTER ON THIS SUBJECT AND HAVE
 STUDIED YOUR IDEAS CAREFULLY. I BELIEVE WE NEED TO TURN OUR
 ATTENTION TO CFE NOW.

I AM AWARE OF YOUR CONCERNS WITH CFE FLANK LIMITATIONS. THE
 STRATEGIC PICTURE HAS CHANGED IN EUROPE SINCE THE TREATY WAS
 SIGNED. I UNDERSTAND AS WELL THE IMPORTANCE OF ALL PARTIES
 BEING IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY WHEN ITS LIMITS COME INTO
 FORCE IN NOVEMBER. IF RUSSIA IS OUT OF COMPLIANCE AT THAT
 TIME, IT WILL BE SEEN BY THE REST OF EUROPE AS A POLITICAL
 STATEMENT THAT RUSSIA HAS CHOSEN NOT TO COOPERATE ON A VITAL
 SECURITY ISSUE. THE LONG-TERM RESULTS WOULD NOT BE IN THE

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INTEREST OF EITHER OF OUR COUNTRIES, AND WOULD UNDERMINE OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN AN UNDIVIDED EUROPE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE -- DESPITE SHORT TERM DIFFICULTIES -- WOULD BE WELCOMED THROUGHOUT EUROPE AS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT RUSSIA SEES ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE SECURITY INTERESTS AS BEING INTIMATELY ALIGNED WITH THOSE OF EUROPE.

THE RIGHT PLACE TO MEET RUSSIA'S FLANK CONCERNS IS THE CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE, IN MAY, 1996. WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOU AT THE CONFERENCE TO ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS. THE KEY TO THIS, HOWEVER, IS RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY IN NOVEMBER.

I UNDERSTAND THAT IT WILL BE EASIER FOR YOU TO TAKE THE STEPS NECESSARY FOR COMPLIANCE IN NOVEMBER IF YOU HAVE SOME IDEA WHAT KINDS OF SOLUTIONS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING MAY. FOR THAT REASON, I HAVE INSTRUCTED MY EXPERTS TO SHARE WITH YOURS OUR IDEAS FOR ADDRESSING YOUR CONCERNS AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE. THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO DO THIS BY THE END OF NEXT MONTH. GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TREATY FOR STABILITY IN EUROPE, OUR FOCUS AT THE 1996 REVIEW CONFERENCE SHOULD BE ON FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE FLANK PROBLEM, NOT ON RENEGOTIATING THIS AGREEMENT.

BORIS, I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS WITH YOU IN MOSCOW. WE NEED TO DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO PREVENT THIS FROM BECOMING A SOURCE OF CONTENTION AT THE END OF THE YEAR.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#5975

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 5975

TOR: 950504205536 M1652282

DIST:

PRT: BASS BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BELL BEYRLE BLACKER COQ GRAY HARMON LAKEA PRIVACY_OUT SIGLER SUM
SUM2 WITKOWSKY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

□

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl] Released in Part Per E.O. 13526 (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995 - Dec 1996 ([Moscow Summit...])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/10/1995 - 05/11/1995]

2016-0118-M
ke4027

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
 LINE1: OAAMZYUW 1.4(c) 5977 1250215-MNSH- E.O. 13526 1.4(c)
 LINE2: ZNY MMNSH
 LINE3: ZKZK OO SOA DE
 LINE4: O 050215Z MAY 95 ZFF-1/ZFF-4
 OSRE: O 13526 1.4(c)
 DTG: 050215Z MAY 95
 ORIG: WHITE HOUSE
 TO: E.O. 13526 1.4(c)
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: //*NO SUBJECT FOUND*//
 TEXT:

Declassified in Part
 Per E.O. 13526
 2016-0118-M-2 (1.10)
 6/1/2023 VZ

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
 QQQQ
 FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HELMUT:

I'M SORRY OUR SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT US AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO EACH OTHER THIS WEEK; IT WOULD HAVE BEEN USEFUL TO CONSULT BEFORE WE SEE EACH OTHER IN MOSCOW.

LET ME GIVE YOU A PREVIEW OF THE APPROACH WE PLAN TO TAKE IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN. WE WILL HAVE JUST UNDER FOUR HOURS OF MEETING TIME WITH BORIS ON MAY 10. THE CHIEF SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION WILL BE NATO, REACTOR SALES TO IRAN, THE ENTRY OF RUSSIA INTO THE POST-COCOM REGIME, CHECHNYA AND ECONOMIC REFORM. OVERALL WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EMPHASIS ON ENSURING RUSSIA CONTINUES INTEGRATING WITH THE WEST AND MOVING AWAY FROM ISOLATIONISM.

ON NATO, WITHOUT DILUTING THE BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT NATO WILL ENLARGE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE TRY TO DISPEL RUSSIAN MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE PACE OF ENLARGEMENT -- THEIR APPREHENSION THAT NATO WILL ACTUALLY TAKE IN NEW MEMBERS IN 1995. SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER HAS MADE SOME PROGRESS WITH KOZYREV ON THIS; I ALSO HAD A GOOD CONVERSATION WITH YELTSIN OVER THE PHONE LAST WEEK.

OUR ADVISORS HAVE DISCUSSED THE OUTLINES OF AN UNDERSTANDING THAT KOZYREV AND CHRISTOPHER WORKED OUT. YELTSIN WOULD AGREE TO GO FORWARD WITH THE NATO PARTNERSHIP DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN MAY. THAT MINISTERIAL

WOULD THEN LAUNCH AN EXPANDED DIALOGUE ON THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP THAT WOULD PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS.

WE WILL NOT ASK THE RUSSIANS TO ENDORSE NATO ENLARGEMENT, BUT RATHER SEEK A LOWERING OF THEIR RHETORIC ON THE SUBJECT. THE POLITICAL VOLATILITY OF THIS ISSUE ENSURES CONTINUED EFFORTS BY SOME IN MOSCOW TO SHAPE OR EVEN BLOCK NATO ENLARGEMENT. BY ACCEPTING THE NATO-RUSSIAN PROCESS, HOWEVER, THEY WILL IMPLICITLY ACCEPT OUR FRAMEWORK AND COME CLOSER TO ACCEPTING THE REALITY OF NATO TAKING IN NEW MEMBERS.

WE WOULD ALSO SEEK TO GIVE RENEWED EMPHASIS TO THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AT THE NATO MINISTERIAL, WHICH IS IMPORTANT TO THE RUSSIANS, WHILE NOT GOING BEYOND A REAFFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS STATEMENTS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT.

WHEN WE SPOKE, BORIS SAID HE AGREED WITH THE IDEA IN PRINCIPLE, BUT WANTS TO WAIT UNTIL HE SEES ME TO GIVE HIS FINAL APPROVAL.

I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR REINFORCING OUR SUPPORT FOR THIS PLAN WHEN YOU TALK TO YELTSIN. AT THE CORE, WHAT WE ARE SAYING IS THAT WE WANT RUSSIA TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN BUILDING THE FUTURE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE. WE NEED TO URGE HIM NOT TO ALLOW RUSSIA TO BE ISOLATED FROM THIS PROCESS.

IN MY MOSCOW MEETINGS, I WILL ALSO REITERATE OUR OPPOSITION TO THE REACTOR SALE TO IRAN. NEW REVELATIONS ABOUT ENRICHMENT FACILITIES ONLY HEIGHTEN THE DANGER OF THIS DEAL. WE HAVE SOME INDICATIONS THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS MAY BE SCRAPPED, BUT OUR OPPOSITION TO THE SALE OF THE MAIN REACTORS WON'T CHANGE.

WE SEEM TO BE CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT ON A FINAL CUTOFF OF RUSSIAN ARMS SALES TO IRAN. THIS WILL ALLOW US TO ANNOUNCE THAT RUSSIA WILL JOIN AS A FOUNDING MEMBER OF THE POST-COCOM REGIME, WHICH WILL HIGHLIGHT RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST.

THERE IS MUCH TO PRAISE ON THE ECONOMIC REFORM FRONT, AND I WILL REAFFIRM OUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE DIRECTION RUSSIA IS TAKING. THE KEY IS TO HOLD STEADY. THE PRESSURES ON YELTSIN AND CHERNOMYRDIN TO INCREASE SUBSIDIES WILL BE INTENSE IN THE AUTUMN, AS THE DUMA CAMPAIGN HEATS UP.

ON CHECHNYA, WE CONTINUE TO URGE AN END TO THE FIGHTING, BUT THERE DOESN'T APPEAR TO BE AN END IN SIGHT. THE MORATORIUM THEY DECLARED WAS NOT OBSERVED BY THE CHECHENS; IN ANY CASE, THE IDEA THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO RESUME THE FIGHTING AFTER ALL THE FOREIGN GUESTS HAD LEFT TOWN SEEMED CYNICAL. I PLAN TO DO ALL I CAN, FACE TO FACE WITH BORIS, TO GET HIS COMMITMENT TO MAKE THE TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE A PERMANENT ONE.

HELMUT, I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE ONE ADDITIONAL ISSUE WITH YOU: NORTH KOREA. AS I PROMISED WHEN WE SPOKE, I SENT YOU A

LETTER EXPLAINING THE IMPORTANCE OF A GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION. A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM YOU NOW, AT THIS PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS MOMENT, WOULD HELP PERSUADE NORTH KOREA TO MAINTAIN THE NUCLEAR FREEZE THAT SO MUCH ENHANCES OUR SECURITY AND THAT OF OUR FRIENDS IN ASIA. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS WITH YOU IN MOSCOW.

IN CLOSING, LET ME SAY ONCE AGAIN HOW MUCH I REGRET NOT BEING ABLE TO BE PRESENT FOR THE COMMEMORATIVE EVENTS IN BERLIN ON MONDAY. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN MOSCOW.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#5977

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 5977

TOR: 950504223607 M1652385

DIST:

PRT: BASS BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BEYRLE BLACKER COQ GARDNER GRAY HARMON LAKEA PONEMAN PRIVACY_OUT
SIGLER SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<^DIST>

PRT: SIT

SIT: PONEMAN SUM SUM2

□

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHTAA2783 1251129-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: P 051129Z MAY 95
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
 OSRI: RUEHTA
 DTG: 051129Z MAY 95
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY ALMATY
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5220
 INFO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0843
 SUBJ: BRIEFING NON-NATO EUROPEAN PARTNERS ON
 - PREPARATIONS FOR THE CLINTON-YELTSIN
 - MOSCOW SUMMIT

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-M-2 (1.12)

6/1/2023 v2

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ALMATY 002783

E.O. 12356: 05/05/05
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, RS, KZ
 SUBJECT: BRIEFING NON-NATO EUROPEAN PARTNERS ON
 - PREPARATIONS FOR THE CLINTON-YELTSIN
 - MOSCOW SUMMIT

REF: STATE 109159

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE ACTION REQUEST IN
 PARA 2.

2. POST SEEKS PERMISSION TO SHARE APPROPRIATE PORTIONS
 OF REF'TEL WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN. TO SHARE
 SOME OF THIS MATERIAL WOULD BUTTRESS A MAJOR RECENT
 EFFORT OF U.S. WITH KAZAKHSTAN: TO ENCOURAGE KAZAKHSTAN
 TO AVOID TRADING ITS SOVEREIGNTY AWAY TO RUSSIA THROUGH
 JOINT MILITARY AGREEMENTS AND INSTEAD, AS VICE PRESIDENT
 GORE TOLD PRIME MINISTER KAZHEGELDIN IN WASHINGTON IN
 MARCH AND SECDEF PERRY TOLD PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV AND
 OTHERS IN ALMATY IN APRIL, TO EXPAND KAZAKHSTANI'S
 PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN SECURITY STRUCTURES, SUCH AS THE
 PFP.

COURTNEY

BT

#2783

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2783

TOR: 950505082154 M1653078

DIST:

SIT: BRANSCUM NSC

□

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA0881 1251317-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 051317Z MAY 95
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 051317Z MAY 95
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1006
 INFO: RUCNCCM/COCOM CAPITALS COLLECTIVE
 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0140
 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 7148
 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7251
 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 8697
 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 2299
 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 7445
 RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 8378
 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 7544
 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 8411
 RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0470
 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8897
 SUBJ: LETTER TO ENGERING ON NEW REGIME MEMBERSHIP

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2016-0118-M-2 (1.13)
 6/1/2023 v2

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 10881

E.O. 12356: DECL: 5/4/2002
 TAGS: ETTC, PARM, PREL, FR
 SUBJECT: LETTER TO ENGERING ON NEW REGIME MEMBERSHIP

REF: STATE 105897

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE TRANSMITTED REFTEL LETTER TO MFA AS FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS FREDERIC GRASSET ON MAY 3, AND DISCUSSED IT WITH HIM ON MAY 5. GRASSET SAID FRANCE FAVORS ENTRY OF HUNGARY, POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC, "...AS WELL AS BULGARIA, ROMANIA AND SLOVAKIA," BUT WENT ON TO SAY THAT ADMISSION OF ANY OF THEM MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE NEW REGIME.

3. HE SAID FRANCE COULD NOT SUPPORT ENTRY OF THE CENTRAL EUROPEANS INTO THE NEW REGIME BEFORE RUSSIAN ENTRY, ALTHOUGH THE GOF HAS NO PROBLEM WITH CONCURRENT ENTRY. (GRASSET SAID WE WOULD FIND THE UNITED KINGDOM EVEN MORE CATEGORIC THAN FRANCE ON THIS POINT.) HE GAVE TWO REASONS FOR THE FRENCH POSITION. POLITICALLY, ENTRY OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN

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STATES IN ADVANCE OF THE GOR WOULD FEED ALREADY
GROWING RUSSIAN DISTRUST OF THQATIVELY,
FRANCE DOES NOT SEE ANY POINT TO AN ARRANGEMENT THAT
DOES NOT INCLUDE RUSSIA.

4. GRASSET NOTED WRYLY THAT THIS IS THE FRENCH
POSITION FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT TWO DAYS, REFERRING AS
MUCH TO THE FRENCH ELECTIONS AS TO THE FORTHCOMING
U.S.-RUSSIA SUMMIT. HE SAW THREE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES
FOR THE CLINTON-YELTSIN SUMMIT. FIRST, THE GOR DOES
ENOUGH TO SATISFY THE U.S. AND COMES ON BOARD, MAKING
EVERYONE HAPPY. SECOND, A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF
U.S.-RUSSIAN DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS TRANSFERS, WHICH
WOULD REQUIRE MAJOR RETHINKING OF HOW CONCERNED
STATES SHOULD PROCEED WITH EXPORT CONTROL
COORDINATION. FINALLY, A "GRAY OUTCOME," IN WHICH
THERE IS AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS, BUT
INSUFFICIENT CONCESSIONS TO PERMIT U.S. SUPPORT OF
RUSSIAN ENTRY INTO THE NEW REGIME. GRASSET SAID THE
LATTER CASE WOULD FORCE THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO
RE-EXAMINE ITS OPTIONS AND DECIDE WHETHER TO CONTINUE
TALKS ON THE NEW ARRANGMENT. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID,
"THINGS CAN'T GO ON AS THEY HAVE BEEN GOING IN RECENT
MONTHS."

HARRIMAN

BT
#0881

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 0881
TOR: 950505092129 M1653189
DIST:
SIT: NSC
□

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYJW RUEHMOA4771 1251434-CCCC--RHEHAAA.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 051434Z MAY 95
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 OSRI: RUEHMO
 DTG: 051434Z MAY 95
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO: RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0321
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: G-7 AMBASSADORS' MEETING WITH YASIN; YELTSIN
 TO RAISE MYRA WITH PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2016-0118-m-2 (1.14)
 6/1/2023 VL

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 014771

NSC FOR JOHN BEYRLE
 S/NIS CLIFF BOND

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EFIN, KSUM, ECON, PREL, RS
 SUBJECT: G-7 AMBASSADORS' MEETING WITH YASIN; YELTSIN
 TO RAISE MYRA WITH PRESIDENT

1. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR AND OTHER G-7 AND EUROPEAN UNION AMBASSADORS MET MAY 3 WITH MINISTER OF ECONOMICS YEVGENY YASIN TO DISCUSS THE RESULTS OF THE CHUBAYS/YASIN MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON THE PREVIOUS WEEK. REFERRING TO THE FINANCE MINISTERS' MEETING, YASIN SAID THERE WAS "NO POSITIVE DISCUSSION" ON RUSSIA'S INTEREST IN A MULTI-YEAR RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT (MYRA) AND THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL BE "CERTAIN" TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON IN MOSCOW. END SUMMARY.

2. G-7 AMBASSADORS SPENT 90 MINUTES DISCUSSING THE RESULTS OF WASHINGTON MEETINGS AND HIS VIEWS ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL VIEWS IN RUSSIA. YASIN BEGAN BY STATING THAT THE FINANCE MINISTERS MEETING WAS "NOT TO RUSSIA'S LIKING" IN EITHER FORM OR SUBSTANCE. IN ADDITION TO YASIN'S CONCERN OVER THE MYRA HE ALSO EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON A NEW SDR ALLOCATION. ADDITIONALLY, HE MENTIONED THE ISSUE OF RUSSIA JOINING THE PARIS CLUB AS A CREDITOR.

3. COMMENTING ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN RUSSIA, YASIN NOTED THAT INFLATION IS NOT DECLINING AS RAPIDLY AS HE WOULD LIKE ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL ON A DOWNWARD

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TREND. HE ATTRIBUTED THE RECENT RISE IN IMPORT TARIFFS TO THE SMALLER-THAN-FORECAST DECLINE IN THE MARCH INFLATION RATE. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE RUBLE EXCHANGE RATE HAD STABILIZED AND THAT THIS MARKED THE FIRST STEP OF RUSSIA'S STABILIZATION PROGRAM. IN ADDITION TO THE MEASURES IN RUSSIA'S CURRENT MONETARY PROGRAM, YASIN NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL BANK ARE DISCUSSING FURTHER STEPS TO FIGHT INFLATION AND CITED AS AN EXAMPLE THE CENTRAL BANK'S PLAN TO TIGHTEN RESERVE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE BANKING SYSTEM. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA WAS IMPLEMENTING ALL REVENUE GENERATING MEASURES AS AGREED WITH THE IMF BUT WAS STILL EXPERIENCING A SHORTFALL BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT INTERNAL/EXTERNAL CREDITS. HE SAID THAT AS RECENTLY AS MAY 3 THE GOVERNMENT HAD DISCUSSED WAYS TO REMEDY THE SHORTFALL, INCLUDING AN INCREASE IN THE ISSUANCE OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

4. REGARDING THE POLITICAL SITUATION, YASIN SAID THAT THE DECISION TO CREATE TWO ELECTORAL BLOCS (CHERNOMYRDIN AND RYBKIN) WAS A VERY IMPORTANT AND POTENTIALLY EFFECTIVE STEP BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF GATHERING TOGETHER THE CENTRIST FORCES AND CUTTING OFF THE EXTREMISTS. HE HOPED THAT THIS STEP, IN ADDITION TO RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC REFORMS, WOULD LEAD TO GREATER UNDERSTANDING BY THE G-7 FOR RUSSIA'S REFORM EFFORTS. HE CAUTIONED THAT THIS WAS A VERY CRITICAL PERIOD FOR RUSSIA AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT MANY IN THE WEST BELIEVED THAT RUSSIA COULD PURSUE AN A LEFTIST POLITICAL PATH IN THE NEXT ELECTIONS. WESTERN COUNTRIES BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN WAIT OUT THIS PERIOD UNTIL A MORE LIBERAL GOVERNMENT RETURNS. YASIN STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT RUSSIA IS NOT THE SAME AS POLAND AND THAT THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR ALLIES IN RUSSIA CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO ACT AS POLAND'S COMMUNISTS HAVE DONE. AT ISSUE, HE BELIEVES, IS WHETHER RUSSIA WILL MAINTAIN A WESTERN-ORIENTED REFORM EFFORT, OR ENTER A PERIOD OF SERIOUS VOLATILITY. HE NOTED THAT IN SOME SENSE THE REFORMERS ARE ON THE DEFENSIVE BECAUSE THEIR MANY EFFORTS TO TURN AROUND RUSSIA'S PAST WILL NOT REAP TANGIBLE BENEFITS UNTIL LATER ON. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE CENTRIST BLOC WOULD LESSEN PRESSURE ON THE REFORMERS BY REDUCING THE POLARIZATION OF THE POLITICAL DEBATE, WHICH IN TURN WOULD LET THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUE THE ECONOMIC PROGRAM AND TAKE THE STING OUT OF POPULIST DEMANDS FOR ELECTION CONCESSIONS.

5. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION OF WHAT TYPE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT YASIN WOULD CONSIDER BENEFICIAL, YASIN RESPONDED THAT SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAMS/MEASURES WHICH LEAD TO FINANCIAL STABILIZATION ARE UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND, SO THAT THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE COULD SEE AT LEAST SOME "SHOOTS" OF IMPROVEMENT BY THE TIME OF WINTER AND THE ELECTIONS. HE CITED AS EXAMPLES THE DECLINE IN INFLATION AND THE STABILIZATION OF THE RUBLE, BUT NOTED HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS FOR THE RUSSIANS TO SEE A MORE RESPONSIVE ECONOMY. HE NOTED THAT THE SMALL VAN "GAZELLE" WAS AN EXAMPLE OF A NEW PRODUCT WHICH

RESPONDED TO TODAY'S NEEDS. HE FURTHER NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF EXIM BANK'S SUPPORT FOR ILYUSHIN, SAYING THAT PEOPLE IN OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT ARE ALWAYS ALLEGING THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS SELLING OUT ON NATIONAL INTERESTS AND TURNING RUSSIA INTO A RAW MATERIALS STATE, WHEREAS THE ILYUSHIN PROJECT WOULD BE TANGIBLE PROOF OF BROADER EFFORTS TO SUPPORT RUSSIA'S INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING. PICKERING

BT

#4771

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 4771

TOR: 950505104226 M1653393

DIST:

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG

SIT: BEYRLE BLACKER HARMON LAKEA NSC SUM SUM2

<^DIST>

SIT: TARULLO

[]

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OACZYUW RUEHCAA2185 1270209-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
 LINE3: O 070203Z MAY 95 ZFF6
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 OSRI: RUEHC
 DTG: 070203Z MAY 95
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: PROPOSED REVISIONS TO SUMMIT STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN
 SECURITY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2016-0118-M-2 (1.18)
 6/1/2025 v2

(NOTE ON NIACT PRECEDENCE: THIS TELEGRAM REQUIRES
 AMBASSADOR'S ATTENTION ON SUNDAY DUE TO PROXIMITY OF MOSCOW

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 112185

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 5/6/15
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, EU, RS, US
 SUBJECT: PROPOSED REVISIONS TO SUMMIT STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN
 SECURITY

(NOTE ON NIACT PRECEDENCE: THIS TELEGRAM REQUIRES
 AMBASSADOR'S ATTENTION ON SUNDAY DUE TO PROXIMITY OF MOSCOW
 SUMMIT.)

1. FURTHER TO COLLINS/KORNBLUM-MAMEDOV DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON MAY 4-5, WASHINGTON SENIOR POLICY LEVELS REVIEWED, DURING FRIDAY AND SATURDAY, THE DRAFT PUT FORWARD BY MAMEDOV AND PROPOSE A FEW CHANGES INCLUDING ONE IN THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH DEALING WITH THE PARTNERSHIP.
2. FOR MOSCOW: AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT PROPOSED CHANGES TO MAMEDOV, DRAWING ON NOTES IN PARA 5. CLEAN PROPOSED REVISED TEXT IS IN PARA 3. REVISED TEXT SHOWING DELETIONS AND ADDITIONS FOLLOWS IN PARA 4.
3. BEGIN CLEAN TEXT OF MAY 6 U.S.-PROPOSED REVISED VERSION
 JOINT DRAFT STATEMENT ON EUROPE

1500 MAY 6

(1) PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN CONDUCTED A THOROUGH REVIEW OF PROGRESS TOWARD THEIR SHARED GOAL OF A STABLE, SECURE, INTEGRATED AND UNDIVIDED DEMOCRATIC

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EUROPE. THEY AGREED THAT THE END OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION, IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT, AND DIVISION OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC REGION INTO OPPOSING BLOCS HAS CREATED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL OF ITS PEOPLES. THEY EMPHASIZED THEIR DETERMINATION TO COOPERATE CLOSELY TO ENSURE THAT IN THE FUTURE, ALL PEOPLES OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC REGION SHALL ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF A STABLE, JUST, PEACEFUL ORDER.

(2) THE PRESIDENTS NOTE THAT THE TASK OF STRENGTHENING EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY NOW REQUIRES DEALING WITH CHALLENGES VERY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE COLD WAR ERA. AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM, PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, AND VIOLATIONS IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRESENT SERIOUS THREATS TO STABILITY, PEACE, AND PROSPERITY. THE PRESIDENTS AGREE THAT THE EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THESE CHALLENGES MUST BE BASED ON RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES AND COMMITMENTS OF THE OSCE, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL PLURALISM, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, FREE MARKET ECONOMIES, AND STRICT RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION.

(3) THE PRESIDENTS REVIEWED PROSPECTS FOR EURO-ATLANTIC STRUCTURES IN RESPONSE TO THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES POSED BY THE NEW ERA. THEY AGREED THAT THE CENTRAL ELEMENT OF A LASTING PEACE&MUST BE THE INTEGRATION OF ALL OF EUROPE INTO A SERIES OF MUTUALLY SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS WHICH ENSURE THAT THERE WILL BE NO RETURN TO DIVISION OR CONFRONTATION. THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN STRUCTURES SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARD THE OVERALL GOAL OF INTEGRATION. THE PROCESS SHOULD BE TRANSPARENT, INCLUSIVE, AND BASED ON AN INTEGRAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AND THAT OF NORTH AMERICA.

(4) THE PRESIDENTS NOTE THE HISTORIC TASK OF WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER TOWARD FULLER PARTICIPATION OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE RANGE OF WORLDWIDE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS OF THE 21ST CENTURY. IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT THE TWO PRESIDENTS REVIEWED STEPS IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY SYSTEM THROUGH THE FURTHER

DEVELOPMENT OF RELEVANT ORGANIZATIONS AND BILATERAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION. THIS INCLUDES THE DECISION OF RUSSIA TO PROCEED WITH ITS INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM FOR THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND WITH THE DOCUMENT ON A BROAD, ENHANCED RUSSIA-NATO DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION. PRESIDENT CLINTON ALSO NOTED THAT, AS NATO BEGINS A GRADUAL, TRANSPARENT PROCESS OF ADMITTING NEW MEMBERS, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD DEVELOP A RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA THAT PROTECTS AND ENHANCES THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTIES AND THAT ADVANCES THE GOAL OF AN UNDIVIDED EUROPE.

(5) PRESIDENT CLINTON SUPPORTED RUSSIA'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP FURTHER ITS PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH THE EU. HE STRESSED U.S. SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN

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THE WTO, GATT, AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS IMPORTANT TO EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, AS APPROPRIATE. PRESIDENT YELTSIN REVIEWED THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC TIES AND COOPERATION AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES.

(6) THE PRESIDENTS AGREE THAT THE OSCE'S COMMITMENTS IN THE AREAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ECONOMICS, AND SECURITY PROVIDE A FOUNDATION FOR THEIR EFFORT TO BUILD A STABLE AND INTEGRATED EUROPE. IN THIS REGARD, SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO STRENGTHENING THE PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES OF THE OSCE AND TO ITS POTENTIAL IN THE SPHERE OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.

(7) THE PRESIDENTS RECALLED THE DECISION OF THE DECEMBER 1994 OSCE SUMMIT IN BUDAPEST TO DEVELOP A MODEL FOR ENSURING COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY FOR EUROPE IN THE 21ST CENTURY. THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA BELIEVE THAT SUCH A MODEL SHOULD AIM TO BUILD AN UNDIVIDED EUROPE, A COMMON SPACE OF SECURITY AND STABILITY, AND A SYSTEM THAT ENSURES THE WIDEST COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AMONG ALL COUNTRIES OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC REGION. THE PRESIDENTS ALSO RECALLED THAT THE CHARTER OF PARIS AND THE BUDAPEST SUMMIT DECLARATION RECOGNIZED THE INHERENT RIGHT OF ALL STATES TO FREELY CHOOSE OR CHANGE THEIR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING TREATIES OF ALLIANCE, AS THEY EVOLVE.

END TEXT.

4. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MAY 6 U.S.-PROPOSED REVISED VERSION SHOWING ADDITIONS AND DELETIONS. LANGUAGE IN DOUBLE BRACKETS -- (()) -- HAS BEEN ADDED SINCE THE ITERATION PRESENTED BY DFM MAMEDOV IN LONDON MAY 5.

LANGUAGE IN DOUBLE BARS -- // // -- HAS BEEN DELETED.

JOINT DRAFT STATEMENT ON EUROPE
1500 MAY 6

(1) PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN CONDUCTED A THOROUGH REVIEW OF PROGRESS TOWARD THEIR SHARED GOAL OF A STABLE, SECURE, INTEGRATED AND UNDIVIDED DEMOCRATIC EUROPE. THEY AGREED THAT THE END OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION, IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT, AND DIVISION OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC REGION INTO OPPOSING BLOCS HAS CREATED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL OF ITS PEOPLES. THEY EMPHASIZED THEIR DETERMINATION TO COOPERATE CLOSELY TO ENSURE THAT IN THE FUTURE, ALL PEOPLES OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC REGION SHALL ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF A STABLE, JUST, PEACEFUL ORDER.

(2) THE PRESIDENTS NOTE THAT THE TASK OF STRENGTHENING EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY NOW REQUIRES DEALING WITH CHALLENGES VERY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE COLD WAR ERA. AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM, PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, AND VIOLATIONS IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRESENT SERIOUS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THREATS TO STABILITY, PEACE, AND PROSPERITY. THE PRESIDENTS AGREE THAT THE EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THESE CHALLENGES MUST BE BASED ON RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES AND COMMITMENTS OF THE OSCE, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL PLURALISM, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, FREE MARKET ECONOMIES, AND STRICT RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION.

(3) THE PRESIDENTS REVIEWED PROSPECTS FOR EURO-ATLANTIC STRUCTURES IN RESPONSE TO THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES POSED BY THE NEW ERA. THEY AGREED THAT THE CENTRAL ELEMENT OF A LASTING PEACE MUST BE THE INTEGRATION OF ALL OF EUROPE INTO A SERIES OF MUTUALLY SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS WHICH ENSURE THAT THERE WILL BE NO RETURN TO DIVISION OR CONFRONTATION. THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN STRUCTURES SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARD THE OVERALL GOAL OF INTEGRATION. THE PROCESS SHOULD BE TRANSPARENT ((,)) //AND// INCLUSIVE ((AND BASED ON AN INTEGRAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AND THAT OF NORTH AMERICA)). (NOTE "A", PARA 5.)

(4) THE PRESIDENTS NOTE THE HISTORIC TASK OF WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER TOWARD FULLER PARTICIPATION OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE RANGE OF WORLDWIDE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS OF

THE 21ST CENTURY. IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT THE TWO PRESIDENTS REVIEWED //RECENT AND PROSPECTIVE// STEPS //TOWARD THE BUILDING OF THE EVOLVING// ((IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE)) EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY SYSTEM (NOTE "B", PARA 5) THROUGH THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF RELEVANT ORGANIZATIONS AND BILATERAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION. THIS INCLUDES THE DECISION OF RUSSIA TO //APPROVE// ((PROCEED WITH)) (NOTE "C", PARA 5) ITS INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM FOR THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND ((WITH)) THE DOCUMENT ON A BROAD, ENHANCED RUSSIA-NATO DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION. PRESIDENT CLINTON ALSO NOTED THAT ((, AS NATO BEGINS A GRADUAL TRANSPARENT PROCESS OF ADMITTING NEW MEMBERS, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD)) (NOTE "D", PARA 5) //THE ALLIANCE IS PREPARED TO// (NOTE "E", PARA 5) DEVELOP A RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA THAT PROTECTS AND ENHANCES THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTIES AND THAT ADVANCES THE GOAL OF AN UNDIVIDED EUROPE.

(5) PRESIDENT CLINTON SUPPORTED RUSSIA'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP FURTHER ITS PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH THE EU. HE STRESSED U.S. SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, GATT, AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS IMPORTANT TO EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, AS APPROPRIATE. PRESIDENT YELTSIN REVIEWED THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC TIES AND COOPERATION AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES.

(6) THE PRESIDENTS AGREE THAT THE OSCE'S COMMITMENTS IN THE AREAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ECONOMICS, AND SECURITY PROVIDE A FOUNDATION FOR THEIR EFFORT TO BUILD A STABLE AND INTEGRATED EUROPE. IN THIS REGARD, SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO STRENGTHENING THE PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES OF THE OSCE AND TO ITS POTENTIAL IN THE SPHERE

OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.

(7) THE PRESIDENTS RECALLED THE DECISION OF THE DECEMBER 1994 OSCE SUMMIT IN BUDAPEST TO DEVELOP A MODEL FOR ENSURING COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY FOR EUROPE IN THE 21ST CENTURY. THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA BELIEVE THAT SUCH A MODEL SHOULD AIM TO BUILD AN UNDIVIDED EUROPE' A COMMON SPACE OF SECURITY AND STABILITY, AND A SYSTEM THAT ENSURES THE WIDEST COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AMONG ALL COUNTRIES OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC REGION. THE PRESIDENTS ALSO RECALLED THAT THE CHARTER OF PARIS AND THE BUDAPEST SUMMIT DECLARATION RECOGNIZED THE INHERENT RIGHT OF ALL STATES TO FREELY CHOOSE OR CHANGE THEIR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ((, INCLUDING TREATIES OF ALLIANCE,)) (NOTE "F", PARA 5) AS THEY EVOLVE.

END TEXT.

5. NOTES:

(A) WE VIEW THIS PASSAGE, DROPPED BY THE RUSSIAN SIDE FROM PREVIOUS ITERATION, AS IMPORTANT IN REAFFIRMING THE U.S. ROLE IN EUROPE AS WELL AS THE VIEW THAT RUSSIA IS PART OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC STRUCTURE.

(B) CHANGE FOR GRAMMATICAL REASONS.

(C) "PROCEED WITH" VICE "APPROVE": "PROCEED WITH" ADDRESSES RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ALLIANCE, WHILE "APPROVE" COULD BE READ AS ADDRESSING ONLY RUSSIAN INTERNAL PROCESSES.

(D) REFERENCE TO NATO ENLARGEMENT: HIGH LEVELS OF THE USG CONSIDER THIS LANGUAGE TO BE A CRITICAL ELEMENT FOR THE CREDIBILITY AND POLITICAL BALANCE OF THE DOCUMENT. ITS INCLUSION IS TIED TO U.S. ABILITY TO ACCEPT REFERENCE TO CIS.

(E) "SHOULD" VICE "IS PREPARED TO": THE PRESIDENT CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE ALLIANCE. "SHOULD" IS APPROPRIATE TO A U.S. POSITION PRESENTED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

(F) CONFORMS TO OSCE-AGREED LANGUAGE (BUDAPEST LANGUAGE ESTABLISHING SECURITY MODEL), ABSENCE OF WHICH WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT.

6. FOR MOSCOW: PLEASE REPORT INITIAL RUSSIAN REACTIONS SOONEST. AMBASSADOR CAN MAKE CLEAR THAT, IF RUSSIANS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT FOREGOING CHANGES, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO SIGN THE DOCUMENT AT THE SUMMIT. IF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ARE REQUIRED IN MOSCOW ON TUESDAY, DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT WILL BE AVAILABLE TO LEAD THE U.S. SIDE. PLEASE ADVISE TIME AND VENUE.

7. THIS MESSAGE IS BEING PASSED TO OVP:LEON FUERTH IN LONDON THROUGH ANOTHER CHANNEL.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CHRISTOPHER
BT
#2185

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2185

TOR: 950506223257 M1655245

DIST:

PRT: DOHSE SIT SODERBERG VP_TRIP

SIT: AOKI BELL FRIED GARDNER KERRICK LITWAK PONEMAN SCHIFTER SCHMIDT
STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL WITKOWSKY

□

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA2186 1270210-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
 LINE3: O 070206Z MAY 95 ZFF6
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 OSRI: RUEHC
 DTG: 070206Z MAY 95
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 5076
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: STATUS OF SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENTS ON STI AND
 NONPROLIFERATION

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-M-2 (1.19)
6/1/2023 r2

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 112186

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PARM, PREL, %PGOV, RS
 SUBJECT: STATUS OF SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENTS ON STI AND
 NONPROLIFERATION

REF: (A) 95 LONDON 6605, (B) 95 STATE 111515

1. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARAS 3 AND 4.
2. RATIONALE FOR NIACT-IMMEDIATE: NEED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON JOINT STATEMENTS QUICKLY GIVEN PROXIMITY OF SUMMIT.
3. THE STATUS OF THE STI AND NONPROLIFERATION JOINT STATEMENTS FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT IS AS FOLLOWS:
 - A. THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED STI JOINT STATEMENT AS DISCUSSED IN LONDON HAS BEEN REVIEWED IN WASHINGTON AND IS APPROVED. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT AMBASSADOR SHARE THIS INFORMATION WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV AND DETERMINE IF THE GOR HAS ALSO APPROVED THE LONDON TEXT.
 - B. WE DO NOT SEE PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT LANGUAGE OF THE JOINT STATEMENT ON NONPROLIFERATION, BUT PREFER NOT TO FINALIZE IT PENDING DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THIS STATEMENT WILL BE SIGNED WILL ALSO BE DETERMINED IN MOSCOW. AMBASSADOR SHOULD SO INFORM MAMEDOV.
4. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT POST DETERMINE APPROPRIATE TIME FOR MEETING TO BE HELD ON TUESDAY, MAY 9, BETWEEN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
MAMEDOV WHERE THESE ISSUES WILL BE FURTHER DISCUSSED.

CHRISTOPHER
BT
#2186

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2186

TOR: 950506222754 M1655244

DIST:

PRT: DOHSE SIT SODERBERG VP_TRIP

SIT: AOKI BEYRLE BLACKER PIFER PONEMAN SUM SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL

□

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHMOA4851 1280638-CCCC--RHEHAAA.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 080638Z MAY 95
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 OSRI: RUEHMO
 DTG: 080638Z MAY 95
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO: RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5621
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0393
 RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 INFO: RUCPDC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
 RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC
 RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 5616
 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0211
 SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
 PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS CENTER DIRECTOR MALISHEV AND
 POSSIBLE SUMMIT ITEM

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2016-0118-m-2 (1.20)
 6/1/2013 v2

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 014851

DEPT. FOR OES/SCP, EUR/RUS, AND S/NIS
 BONN FOR SCICOUNS
 WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC AND OSTP (WALES/STAHELI)

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: TSPL, EINV, KSCA, ETTT, RS
 SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
 PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS CENTER DIRECTOR MALISHEV AND
 POSSIBLE SUMMIT ITEM

REF: A) MOSCOW 9126 (NOTAL); B) 94 MOSCOW 25372
 (NOTAL); C) 94 MOSCOW 31495 (NOTAL)

1. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. SEE PARAS. 13 AND 14.

 SUMMARY

3. AMBASSADOR MET MAY 4 WITH DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL
 PROGRAMS CENTER NIKOLAY MALISHEV TO DISCUSS THE WORK
 OF THE CENTER AND MALISHEV'S EFFORTS TO ATTRACT U.S.
 AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT. MALISHEV STATED THAT AS A
 RESULT OF HIS APRIL 1995 VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND NEW

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YORK, THERE IS INTEREST IN THE U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR IN PURSUING COOPERATION WITH SEVERAL RUSSIAN PARTNERS IDENTIFIED THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS CENTER. MALISHEV MENTIONED HIS INTENT TO HAVE YELTSIN, AT THE MAY 10 BILATERAL SUMMIT, RAISE WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY. MALISHEV'S STAFF MAY 5 CONFIRMED YELTSIN WILL RAISE THIS WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON ON MAY 10. (EMBASSY COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION IN PARA. 13. FOR EMBASSY BONN: SEE REQUEST FOR INFORMATION PARA 14.)

4. THE AMBASSADOR STATED IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT IN THE CURRENT BUDGET CLIMATE TO OBTAIN MUCH FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM GOVERNMENT, BUT SINGLED OUT THE U.S.-ISRAELI R&D FOUNDATION AS A GOOD MODEL FOR MALISHEV TO LEARN FROM. THE AMBASSADOR HIGHLIGHTED THE SUCCESS OF THE ISRAELI FOUNDATION IN MARKETING ISRAELI TECHNOLOGY, AND OFFERED TO ARRANGE A VISIT TO THE FOUNDATION FOR MALISHEV. MALISHEV ACCEPTED, SAYING HE WOULD INVITE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OSSIPOV AND OTHERS TO ACCOMPANY. END SUMMARY

MALISHEV'S CENTER AND PLANS

5. THE AMBASSADOR MET MAY 4, 1995 WITH CENTER FOR SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS DIRECTOR DR. NIKOLAY MALISHEV, AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST, TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE CENTER AND RESULTS OF MALISHEV'S VISIT TO THE U.S. IN APRIL. ESTCOUNS AND ESTOFF ACCOMPANIED THE AMBASSADOR TO THE MEETING. DR. MALISHEV WAS ACCOMPANIED BY CENTER DEPUTIES GUSEEV AND KARPOV, CENTER STAFFER AVRAMENKO, AND SCIENCE COUNSELOR LEV MUKHIN OF THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY TO THE U.S.

6. MALISHEV BRIEFLY REVIEWED FOR THE AMBASSADOR THE HISTORY OF THE CENTER FOR PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS, ITS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, AND ITS BASIC PURPOSE (SEE REFTELS). TURNING TO HIS U.S. VISIT IN APRIL, MALISHEV SAID HE MET WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE ENERGY AND COMMERCE DEPARTMENTS; WITH MEMBERS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S STAFF; WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS; AND WITH GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY (GMU) OFFICIALS. IN NEW YORK, MALISHEV STATED HE MET WITH THE INVESTMENT FIRMS OF PAINE-WEBBER, OPPENHEIMER, AND MORGAN STANLEY, AS WELL AS LAW FIRMS PRACTICING IN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS AREAS.

7. MALISHEV DECLARED HIMSELF SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT, WHICH WAS INTENDED TO:

-- STIMULATE U.S. INTEREST IN RUSSIAN INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IDENTIFIED THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS CENTER;

-- LEARN MORE ABOUT SECURITIES AND OTHER SOURCES OF

FINANCING FOR THE CENTER, AND;

-- CREATE (TOGETHER WITH GMU AND OTHER UNIVERSITIES IN THE U.S.) A NON-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTE WHOSE MEMBERS WOULD HAVE TECHNICAL AND BUSINESS EXPERTISE TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL PROGRAM PARTNERS AND PROVIDE ADVICE AS NEEDED (REF B).

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 014851

DEPT. FOR OES/SCP, EUR/RUS, AND S/NIS
BONN FOR SCICOUNS
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC AND OSTP (WALES/STAHELI)

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: TSPL, EINV, KSCA, ETTT, RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS CENTER DIRECTOR MALISHEV AND
POSSIBLE SUMMIT ITEM

FOCUS ON TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION

8. MALISHEV TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT RUSSIA HAS SPECIFIC INTEREST IN TELECOM PROJECTS, METALLURGY, MICROELECTRONICS, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY. MALISHEV STATED HIS OFFICE ESPECIALLY WANTS TO PROMOTE TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION IN AREAS WHERE RUSSIA HAS SPECIAL STRENGTHS. IN THAT REGARD, MALISHEV SAID REPRESENTATIVES FROM OPPENHEIMER AND SMITH BARNEY WOULD MEET WITH HIM IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE JOINT PROJECTS IN PRODUCTION OF ARTIFICIAL BLOOD AND ARTIFICIAL SKIN. HE ADDED THAT IN JUNE HE WILL RETURN TO NEW YORK TO OPEN AN EXHIBIT ON UNIQUE RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGIES THAT ARE AVAILABLE FOR COMMERCIALIZATION (E.G. SPECIAL MAGNESIUM/ALUMINUM ALLOYS, LASER TECHNOLOGY, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY, X-RAY MICROSCOPE, ETC.).

9. MALISHEV REITERATED HIS BELIEF (REF C) THAT GOVERNMENTS ARE THE "ENGINE" THAT DRIVE PRIVATE SECTOR INTEREST AND INVESTMENT. HE MENTIONED HIS INTENT TO HAVE YELTSIN RAISE WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON AT THEIR MAY 10 MEETING THE POSSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT COOPERATION IN HELPING RUSSIA MARKET UNIQUE TECHNOLOGIES. (CENTER STAFFER AVRAMENKO CALLED ESTOFF 5/5 TO CONFIRM THAT THE ITEM WILL BE PLACED ON YELTSIN'S AGENDA AS A PROPOSAL TO COOPERATE IN "THE FIELD OF COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGIES").

10. THE AMBASSADOR DREW MALISHEV'S ATTENTION TO PROGRAMS RUN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE INTENDED TO ADVERTISE INVESTMENT AND TRADE POSSIBILITIES IN RUSSIA, AND TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL PARTNERS. AMBASSADOR PICKERING ADVISED MALISHEV TO CONTACT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PRIVATE, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE SOROS FOUNDATION, WHICH MAY BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE FUNDING. THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THIS MAY BE MORE REWARDING THAN TRYING TO OBTAIN FUNDING FROM THE U.S. OR RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTS, GIVEN THE DIFFICULT BUDGET CLIMATE IN BOTH COUNTRIES. MALISHEV CONFIRMED PROBLEMS HE HAS HAD IN OBTAINING SUFFICIENT GOR RESOURCES FOR THE INSTITUTE AND OTHER INITIATIVES HE HAS IN MIND.

ISRAEL R&D FOUNDATION

11. AMBASSADOR PICKERING STATED THAT, AS A FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN STATE'S SCIENCE BUREAU, HE WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO MARKET TECHNOLOGIES. THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL HAD COOPERATED IN ESTABLISHING THE U.S.-ISRAELI R&D FOUNDATION (AMBASSADOR PICKERING IS A FORMER DIRECTOR), WHICH HAS HAD ENORMOUS SUCCESS IN COMMERCIALIZING ISRAEL'S TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENTS. THE AMBASSADOR STATED THAT THE FOUNDATION IS ENDOWED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, WITH OVER SEVENTY PERCENT OF PROJECTS APPROVED BY THE FOUNDATION BEING SUCCESSFULLY MARKETED. HE STRONGLY URGED MALISHEV TO LOOK TO THE ISRAELI FOUNDATION AS A MODEL FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL CENTER PROCESSES AND DECISION-MAKING, AND STATED THAT HE COULD ARRANGE A VISIT TO ISRAEL FOR MALISHEV TO SEE THE FOUNDATION AND WORK WITH THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR FOR VISITS TO OTHER SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTES.

12. MALISHEV ACCEPTED THE AMBASSADOR'S OFFER, SAYING THE VISIT COULD POSSIBLY TAKE PLACE IN LATE JUNE OF THIS YEAR. MALISHEV WOULD LEAD A DELEGATION THAT WOULD INCLUDE, MALISHEV HOPES, RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (RAS) PRESIDENT OSSISOV AND OTHER LEADING SCIENTISTS. THE AMBASSADOR AND MALISHEV AGREED TO STAY IN TOUCH IN THE FUTURE REGARDING PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF THE VISIT.

COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 014851

DEPT. FOR OES/SCP, EUR/RUS, AND S/NIS
BONN FOR SCICOUNS
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC AND OSTP (WALES/STAHELI)

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: TSPL, EINV, KSCA, ETTT, RS
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13. AS EMBASSY HAS STATED PREVIOUSLY, WE BELIEVE THE "FACILITATING" ROLE MALISHEV ENVISIONS FOR HIS CENTER IS CURRENTLY PLAYED BY SEVERAL AMERICAN ENTITIES, INCLUDING THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, AND WE NOTE THAT U.S. AND RUSSIAN BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS CONTACTS ARE THRIVING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION. MALISHEV'S PROPOSAL IS SKETCHY AND FURTHER DETAILS WILL NEED TO BE PROVIDED BEFORE IT CAN BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. IN THE EVENT YELTSIN RAISES WITH THE PRESIDEN
T A PROPOSAL TO COOPERATE ON
COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY ISSUES, EMBASSY SUGGESTS THE PRESIDENT TAKE A CAUTIOUS, "LET ME LEARN MORE" APPROACH, AND ASK THAT GOR OFFICIALS PROVIDE MORE SPECIFICS WHEN SUCH ARE AVAILABLE.

14. FOR BONN - IF POSSIBLE, EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOU MAY HAVE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RUSSIAN-GERMAN FUND (REF A) OR ANY OTHER FORM OF GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT COOPERATION IN THIS AREA. END COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST
PICKERING
BT
#4851

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

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SSN: 4851

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DIST:

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SIT: BEYRLE BLACKER HARMON LAKEA NSC PIFER SUM SUM2

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SIT: WALES

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SIT: STERN

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Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: RAACZYUW RUEHADA3248 1311123-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: R 111123Z MAY 95
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
 OSRI: RUEHAD
 DTG: 111123Z MAY 95
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5500
 INFO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0127
 RUEHZM/GCC COLLECTIVE
 SUBJ: UAEG ENCOURAGED BY REPORTS FROM THE MOSCOW
 - SUMMIT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0118-11-2 (1,22)
 4/1/2023 v2

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ABU DHABI 003248

E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/05

TAGS: PREL, RS, TC

SUBJECT: UAEG ENCOURAGED BY REPORTS FROM THE MOSCOW

- SUMMIT

1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON MAY 10, THE AMBASSADOR WAS SUMMONED TO MEET WITH UAE MINISTR OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHAYKH HAMDAN BIN ZAYED TO DISCUSS JERUSALEM (SEPTEL). AT THE OUTSET OF THE MEETING, HOWEVER, SHAYKH HAMDAN SAID HE HAD JUST BEEN LISTENING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION REPORTS COMING OUT OF THE SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN MOSCOW. HAMDAN SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STATEMENT EARLIER THAT DAY. HE(SAID IT SOUNDED TO HIM AS IF PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD ACHIEVED AN "EXCELLENT RESULT" WITH RESPECT TO IRAN. HE SAID THE UAEG VERY MUCH APPRECIATED CONTINUING AMERICAN EFFORTS TO BLOCK IRAN'S ABILITY TO DEVELOP WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THIS WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO THE UAE WHICH REGARDED IRAN AS VERY DANGEROUS. THE UAE AGREED WITH THE U.S. THAT IRAN'S POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, EXTREMISM, AND OPPONENTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS HAD TO BE CHANGED. IT WAS A DIFFICULT THING TO DO, BUT THE UAE APPLAUDED AMERICA'S EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.

RUGH

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#3248

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 3248

TOR: 950511072744 M1662383

DIST:

SIT: LAIPSON NSC

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