

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 139				
Document ID: 9300173				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 2	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. talking points</del>	<del>Additional Points for Christopher Boutros Meeting (4 pages)</del>	<del>01/30/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBM 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001b. talking points</del>	<del>Somalia (1 page)</del>	<del>01/29/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBM 4/12/2022</del>

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([UN Sec Gen or Ghali])  
OA/Box Number: 139

### FOLDER TITLE:

9300173

2016-0933-M

kh2034

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: GROSSMAN, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 30 JAN 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

UN

PERSONS: BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS

CHRISTOPHER, W

SUBJECT: ADDL SOMALIA POINTS FOR SEC CHRISTOPHER MTG W/ UN SEC GEN BOUTROS  
GHALI ON 1 FEB

ACTION: DARRAGH SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 02 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE  
EXECSEC  
ORDWAY

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJSL

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 3 OF 3

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM/NARA, Date 7/19/2018  
2016-0933-07

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 CLARKE  
002 ITOH  
003

Z 93012918 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE  
Z 93013012 FOR SIGNATURE  
X 93013015 DARRAGH SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 930130 GROSSMAN, M

TO: GROSSMAN, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 30 JAN 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA UN

PERSONS: BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS CHRISTOPHER, W

SUBJECT: ADDL SOMALIA POINTS FOR SEC CHRISTOPHER MTG W/ UN SEC GEN BOUTROS  
GHALI ON 1 FEB

ACTION: DARRAGH SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 02 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE  
EXECSEC  
ORDWAY

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJSL CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 3 OF 3

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KM NARA, Date 4/19/2018  
2016-0933-17

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 CLARKE  
002 ITOH  
003

Z 93012918 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE  
Z 93013012 FOR SIGNATURE  
X 93013015 DARRAGH SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 930130 GROSSMAN, M

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: WA LOG # 0173  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG WA AVO \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
30 JAN 93 11:24 DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>SAD</u>	<u>A</u>
ExecSec	<u>2</u>		
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>WA 1/30</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: VP                      McLarty                      Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9300173  
DATE 30 JAN 93

SUBJECT: ADDL SOMALIA POINTS FOR SEC CHRISTOPHER MTG W/ UN SEC GEN BOUTROS  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE  
2201 C STREET, NW  
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
<u>1/30</u>	<u>1545</u>	<u><i>Jaw</i></u>

COPY: ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KRM Date: 7/19/2018  
2016-0933-m

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9300173  
DATE 30 JAN 93

SUBJECT: ADDL SOMALIA POINTS FOR SEC CHRISTOPHER MTG W/ UN SEC GEN BOUTROS  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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2201 C STREET, NW  
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
<u>1-30-93</u>	<u>3:10</u>	

COPY: ORIGINAL

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBM Date: 7/19/2018  
2016-0933-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0173

January 30, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Additional Somalia Points for Meeting with  
Boutros-Ghali (U)

Attached are additional talking points on Somalia for use by Secretary Christopher at his meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on February 1. The points and approach are consistent with the decisions made by the President on this subject. (9)

*for Sen. Dorr*  
William H. Wtoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Additional Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KSA* NARA, Date *4/19/2018*  
*2016-0133-m*

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Declassify on: OADR

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## ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR CHRISTOPHER-BOUTROS MEETING

- Our commander in Somalia believes the time has arrived to begin a phased hand-over to UN-led troops.
- We understand your concerns about taking over this mission, and we want to work with you to make sure it is a success.
- I know you are worried about your staff in New York being overwhelmed by this and other burgeoning peacekeeping obligations worldwide.
- We recognize that the operation in Somalia will be very large and will take place in an environment where virtually no support is available.
- Finally, we share your fear that the Somali warlords will attempt to overwhelm the new UN force, much as they did the Pakistani UNOSOM I contingent.
- We think we can work with you and make some contributions that will meet these challenges. But it will take commitments from you as well as us to make this work.
- If the hand-over is to be successful, it must be accomplished in a manner that eliminates, or at least minimizes, any differences between the two operations.
- The Somali warlords will be quick to exploit any weaknesses in the UNOSOM II structure.
- In order for the turn-over to be successful, several conditions must be met.
- The new force must have the right size, equipment and authority, and the right mix of troops.
- The details of the hand-over must be planned on the ground between the two commanders.
- The hand-over must be phased, with the UN taking over the most secure sectors first.
- The UN force must be assured that essential services (logistics, communications, intelligence) continue to be provided.
- Particularly in the initial stages, the UN and the troop contributing countries must feel confident that help will be forthcoming if the situation threatens to get out of hand.
- The UN civilian operation must be strengthened to ensure successful delivery of humanitarian relief and

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 135262016-0933-M(1.01)  
KBH 5/4/2021

vigorous pursuit of the political reconciliation process.

- The Clinton Administration is committed to making this turnover work, and we very much want to see the UN succeed.
- For this to work, both you and we will have to make some commitments to each other. I'm prepared to exchange those commitments today.

#### Resolution

- The first steps necessary, in our judgment, are a new UN Security Council resolution authorizing UNOSOM II and the appointment of a force commander.
- Your report to the Council will set the tone of the debate and the resolution. I hope it will propose the kind of force, and the rules of engagement, that our people have been discussing with their UN counterparts over the past several weeks.
- We want to move very quickly on this. I understand that you intend to submit the report within the next 10-15 days, and we will look forward to prompt Council action immediately thereafter.

#### Commander

- [Note: This is a sensitive subject, and probably should be raised one-on-one if possible. Boutros does not want to give the impression we have either a proxy or a veto in this area.]
- Secretary Eagleburger had some discussions with you about the force commander, and Admiral Bowman has been in touch with Mig Goulding about it as well. [Note: Boutros told Eagleburger we could provide a name, provided this fact did not become public, or even know within the UN. We have suggested a Turkish three-star general, and we believe the UN will request the right man.]
- It is important that we get this issue resolved quickly and get the commander out to Mogadishu so he and General Johnston can begin planning and implementing the turnover as quickly as possible.

#### Force Composition

- Another area which requires rapid UN action is getting the force composition right.
- Our military people have been discussing this issue with your staff, and I understand there has been a good meeting of the minds. What needs to happen now is to approach the potential contributors and get firm commitments.

- We have informal commitments for a large number of troops, and other countries are willing to commit if the UN makes the request.

### Civilian Staffing

- [Note: The UN's handling of the relief operation has been abysmal, except for the performance of Philip Johnston, an American who is temporary head of the relief operation in Mogadishu. The operation is understaffed and underfunded, and most of the staff there are either inappropriate or incompetent.]
- Beefing up the civilian staffing of UNOSOM is an area where we are prepared to cooperate strongly, if the UN provides strong leadership.
- You'll need a strong manager to succeed Philip Johnston on the humanitarian side, and a much bigger and better qualified field staff. We're prepared to second some highly qualified Americans, and believe other countries would be prepared to assist as well.
- The reconciliation process is equally vital. If Ismat Kittani goes back to Mogadishu, he will have his hand full managing the overall operation. [Note: Boutros has strongly defended Kittani, a former UNGA President, against charges that he is not up to the job. Despite Kittani's limited capacity and health problems, Boutros may insist on sending him back to Mogadishu.]
- Perhaps you might consider appointing a small political reconciliation team under Kittani, headed by a well-known, influential figure -- someone of the status of Cyrus Vance.

### U.S. Military Contribution

- Ambassador Grove and Admiral Bowman have been discussing a U.S. contribution to the UNOSOM II force with your people.
- President Clinton has authorized me to tell you we are prepared to make a significant contribution.
- However, this contribution is contingent on achieving a satisfactory UN Security Council resolution that will provide the basis for a successful UNOSOM II force, and assurances that the UN will pursue the humanitarian and political tracks as I have outlined.
- If obtain your assurances in these areas, the U.S. is prepared to contribute in three areas.
- First, we are prepared to retain a quick reaction force, under U.S. command, initially in Somalia, to deal with unanticipated military contingencies.

- As the UNOSOM II force acquires greater experience and confidence, at the discretion of the U.S. commander the QRF will be moved out of Somalia.
- However, we will provide this "quick reaction service" for the duration of the UNOSOM II mandate at an alert level to be determined by our military.
- Second, we are prepared to provide some staff support for this peacekeeping operation.
- We will detail some U.S. military officers to serve on the UNOSOM commander's staff. This would help assure continuity between UNITAF and UNOSOM II and provide a strong signal of U.S. commitment to UNOSOM's success.
- We have already provided some U.S. military planners in New York to support General Baril and the Peacekeeping Department. We will continue to provide this assistance as long as you think it useful, both for UNOSOM and any other UN peacekeeping operations.
- Third, we recognize that it will be difficult for the UN to acquire instantly some of the logistic and other support services needed to make an operation of this size run.
- Our military planners have been working with your experts, and we believe that some of this capability can be found in other troop contributing nations, and from contractors.
- Once this identification process has been completed, we will make every effort possible to provide support services, particularly logistics, that are still uncovered.
- With regard to the command relationship, except for the quick reaction force we anticipate placing any U.S. military in Somalia to support UNOSOM II under UN operational control.


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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0173

January 30, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY / RICHARD A. CLARKE

SUBJECT: Additional Somalia Points for Christopher/Boutros Meeting

The memo at Tab I provides additional points on Somalia for use by Secretary Christopher in his February 1 meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The approach is consistent with the decisions made by the President on this subject.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Marc Grossman  
Tab A Additional Talking Points  
Tab II State Department paper

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM NARA, Date 4/19/2018  
2016-0933-M

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Declassify on: OADR

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URGENT

9301573

0173

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 29, 1993


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DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Paper on Somalia for the Secretary's Meeting  
with UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, February 1

The attached briefing paper for the Secretary's February 1  
meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was prepared  
following the Principals' meeting of January 28.



Marc Grossman  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
Briefing Paper on Somalia.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By KRM NARA, Date 4/19/2008  
2016-0933-m

URGENT

Somalia

BACKGROUND

- You will be seeking from the SYG commitments that will leave no doubt that the UN has primary responsibility for Somali security, reconciliation, and development. His commitments should cover:
  - **Military:** Recruitment of a large, competent and aggressive UN force (UNOSOM II), led by a capable commander with a solid staff.
  - **Diplomatic:** Appointment of a high level envoy with appropriate stature to lead the national reconciliation negotiations.
  - **Police:** Establishing, training, and supporting non-partisan police forces, with early hand-off of supervision to local/traditional Somali authorities.
  - **Humanitarian:** Urgent in-country staffing of civilian UN relief and reconstruction agencies.
- Boutros-Ghali expects a clear and strong commitment of U.S. forces, including a UNOSOM II combat presence. Without an explicit commitment from the U.S., he will be reluctant to make any commitments of his own and will argue that other potential contributors will be similarly hesitant.
  - We can commit to retaining some forces in the area.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- UNITAF has basically met its mission objectives. Many more Somalis are being fed; death rates are declining.
- Security remains a concern, and an active UNOSOM role in supporting locally-based Somali police--as your August report envisioned--could help mitigate these problems.
- UN leadership in attaining a new political consensus is essential; a transition framework with a strong UNOSOM civilian structure in Somalia is urgently needed now.
- Your next report will be critical in addressing these issues and laying out a framework for a resolution that the Council can quickly adopt.
- We are prepared to work closely with UNOSOM in the region-by-region hand-off our planning staffs have developed.
  - U.S. forces will remain in Somalia with combat (Quick Reaction Force) and logistics capability (strategic airlift, command/control/communications, etc.).
  - We will maintain the Quick Reaction Forces in the area at least through the summer.

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 3572				
Document ID: 9300804				
Row: 47	Section: 1	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001 talking points</del>	<del>President's Meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali (6 pages)</del>	<del>02/22/1993</del>	<del>P1A(1)</del> KBH 4/12/2022

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([UN Sec Gen or Ghali])  
OA/Box Number: 3572

### FOLDER TITLE:

9300804

2016-0933-M  
kh2035

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 22 FEB 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: UN AP

PERSONS: BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS

SUBJECT: MTG W/ UN SEC GEN BOUTROS GHALI

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ACTION: ORIGINAL MTG CARDS RETURNED DUE DATE: 25 FEB 93 STATUS: C  
 STAFF OFFICER: SHEEHAN LOGREF: 9300417 9300759  
 FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

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DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO  
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NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 3 OF 3

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
002 SHEEHAN  
003  
003 PRESIDENT  
003

Z 93022216 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION  
X 93022218 FOR RECORD PURPOSES  
X 00121317 ORIGINAL MTG CARDS RETURNED  
Z 93022220 FOR INFORMATION  
Z 93022410 NOTED BY PRES

[ President's Meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros- Ghali, 6 pages ]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH UN  
SECRETARY GENERAL BOUTROS-GHALI

UN FINANCES AND ARREARAGES

- o STRESS WE WILL BE PAYING OUR DUES. PLAN ON A PAYMENT OF ALMOST \$400 MILLION IN OCTOBER. MORE FUNDS WILL COME AS THE YEAR GOES ON, BUT MY ABILITY TO GET CONGRESS TO FUND UN IS DEPENDENT UPON THE APPEARANCE OF REINVENTING THE UN. NOT AN EXCUSE FOR NOT PAYING, IT IS POLITICAL REALITY.
- o REDUCING OUR PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT FROM 31.7 PERCENT TO 25 PERCENT IS A PRIORITY FOR ME.

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Declassify on: OADR

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2016-0933-M (1.03)  
KBH 5/4/2021**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UN REFORM

- o WELCOME APPOINTMENT OF ASSISTANT SYG FOR INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS.
- o THE REPORT ON "60 MINUTES" MAKE IT HARD TO SUSTAIN SUPPORT. VP GORE'S EFFORTS TO "REINVENT" U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE A USEFUL MODEL.

PEACEKEEPING REFORM

- o APPLAUD SYG'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE UN CAPABILITIES.
- o FINDING WAYS WE CAN HELP THE UN IMPROVE HAS BEEN KEY PART OF OUR POLICY REVIEW.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 3 OF 6

SOMALIA

- PRESENT LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IS ERODING SUPPORT FOR THE UN MISSION. REMINDS US THAT WE NEED A POLITICAL, AS WELL AS MILITARY STRATEGY.
- I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD APPROACH MUBARAK, THE PRESIDENTS OF ETHIOPIA, ERITREA AND OTHERS TO CONVENE A MEETING OF THE SOMALI PARTIES. ESTABLISH CEASE FIRE, AND A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE AIDEED WHILE HE IS DETAINED OUTSIDE SOMALIA.
- WE ARE WITH YOU, BUT FIND IT HARD TO JUSTIFY OPEN-ENDED ENGAGEMENT. NEED TO GET ON WITH THE JOB OF FINDING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 4 OF 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BOSNIA

- STRONGLY BELIEVE A BOSNIA OPERATION SHOULD BE DONE UNDER NATO AUSPICES. UN OPERATION WOULD OVERWHELM THE SYSTEM.

MIDDLE EAST

- WE MUST SEIZE ON THE BREAKTHROUGH. THE GA CAN ELIMINATE ANTI-ISRAEL RESOLUTIONS AND SECURE ISRAEL'S PLACE IN A REGIONAL GROUPING.

LIBYA/PAN AM 103

- DISAPPOINTED THAT LIBYA'S LATEST MESSAGE TO YOU DOES NOT INCLUDE A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT TO SURRENDER THE SUSPECTS. NEED MORE SANCTIONS SOON.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 5 OF 6

ANGOLA

- 1000 DYING PER DAY IS TRULY SHOCKING. NOW THAT THERE IS AN EMBARGO AGAINST UNITA, MUST REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENT.

HUMAN RIGHTS

- EMPHASIZE COMMITMENT TO ESTABLISHMENT OF UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION

- SUPPORT PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP FOR JAPAN/GERMANY, RECOGNIZING THAT IT ENTAILS ACTIVE ROLE IN PEACE OPERATIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 6 OF 6

- WILL CONSIDER A MODEST NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL SEATS, TAKING CARE THAT IT DOES NOT IMPAIR SC EFFECTIVENESS.

CYPRUS

- I'M COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH JOE CLARK, YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, TO MAKE PROGRESS.

HIGH COMMISSIONER OF REFUGEES

- I SUPPORT EARLY REAPPOINTMENT OF MRS. OGATA AS HIGH COMMISSIONER TO HELP MAINTAIN DONOR CONFIDENCE.

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# MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 140				
Document ID: 9300808				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>Marc Grossman to Anthony Lake re: Materials for the President's Meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1 page)</del>	<del>02/22/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
001b. report	Boutros Boutros-Ghali -- The Person and His Vision (1 page) <i>Partial release - KBH 4/12/2022</i>	02/22/1993	P1/b(1)
001c. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages) <i>Partial release - KBH 4/12/2022</i>	01/26/1993	P1/b(1)
<del>001d. paper</del>	<del>Former Yugoslavia (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001e. paper</del>	<del>Iraq (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001f. paper</del>	<del>Palestinian Deportees and the Peace Process (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001g. paper</del>	<del>Somalia (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001h. paper</del>	<del>Haiti (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001i. paper</del>	<del>Multilateral Peacekeeping (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001j. paper</del>	<del>UN Security Council Expansion (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001k. paper</del>	<del>UN Reform (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001l. paper</del>	<del>Afghanistan (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>

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2016-0933-M

kh2036

**RESTRICTION CODES**

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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<del>001o. paper</del>	<del>Cyprus (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001p. paper</del>	<del>Guatemalan Peace Process (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001q. paper</del>	<del>Libya/Pan Am 103 (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
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<del>001t. paper</del>	<del>Salvadoran Peace Process (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001u. paper</del>	<del>The Western Sahara (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001v. memo</del>	<del>Duplicate of 001a (1 page)</del>	<del>02/22/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
001w. report	Duplicate of 001b (1 page)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1) <i>Partial release - KBH 4/12/2022</i>
001x. report	Duplicate of 001c (2 pages)	01/26/1993	P1/b(1) <i>Partial release - KBH 4/12/2022</i>
001y. paper	Duplicate of 001d (1 page)	02/00/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022

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<del>001zd. paper</del>	<del>Duplicate of 001i (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
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<del>001zf. paper</del>	<del>Duplicate of 001k (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001zg. paper</del>	<del>Duplicate of 001l (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
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<del>001zj. paper</del>	<del>Duplicate of 001o (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001zk. paper</del>	<del>Duplicate of 001p (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
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<del>001zn. paper</del>	<del>Duplicate of 001s (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001zo. paper</del>	<del>Duplicate of 001r (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001zp. paper</del>	<del>Duplicate of 001q (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>

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TO: LAKE

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 22 FEB 93  
SOURCE REF: 9303273

KEYWORDS: UN

AP

PERSONS: GHALI, BOUTROS B

SUBJECT: MATERIALS FOR PRES MTG W/ UN SEC GEN BOUTROS-GHALI ON 23 FEB

ACTION: SEE 9300804 FOR FINAL ACTION

DUE DATE: 22 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF: 9300417 9300759

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

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COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSWTL

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DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 RICE  
001

Z 93022210 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE  
X 93022220 SEE 9300804 FOR FINAL ACTION



February 22, 1993


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DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Materials for the President's Meeting with UN  
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali

The President will be meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on February 23. Attached are biographic information, background materials, talking points and suggested public remarks. The background materials and talking points are divided into those covering priority issues (Tab 2) identified in the Acting Secretary's memorandum to the President, and contingency issues (Tab 3).

  
Mary Grossman  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Boutros-Ghali Biographic Information
- Tab 2 - Priority Issues - Background material and talking points
- Tab 3 - Contingency Issues - Background material and talking points
- Tab 4 - Suggested Public Remarks

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2016-0933-17 (1.04)  
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001b. report	Boutros Boutros-Ghali -- The Person and His Vision [partial] (1 page)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1)
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2016-0933-M [1.05]

KBH 5/4/2021

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Boutros Boutros-Ghali -- The Person and His Vision

Energetic, determined, and intellectual, Boutros is very much the product of his heritage as the descendant of an elite Coptic Christian family with an illustrious record of public service in Egypt. His personal style is undeniably difficult. He remains aloof even from his most senior staff and does not delegate well. He keeps his own counsel. Once he has taken a decision, he can be very difficult to move. He has broken the traditional pattern of close consultation with the Perm-Five Security Council members that his predecessor maintained. The SYG has the habit of using his personal contacts at the highest reaches of governments to appeal positions taken by delegations in New York. He also sometimes tends to mistake an interlocutor's failure to say "no" as an assent. [REDACTED]

Even taking his style into account, Boutros remains the most effective SYG the UN has had in a long time. In his first year as UN Secretary General (SYG), Boutros Boutros-Ghali began an ambitious reform of the Secretariat, but did not proceed beyond the initial stage. He has also overseen a dramatic increase in UN peacekeeping efforts. His overall approach to peacekeeping has been conservative, largely because he believes the UN has insufficient resources and because he believes a failure would destroy confidence in the institution.

He has a vision of a world organization that can act as an agent for positive change. This vision is expressed in his "Agenda for Peace," a seminal work that defines the UN's security agenda for the future. The U.S. welcomed the "Agenda for Peace." Although we and others disagree with some of Boutros-Ghali's proposals--such as the designation of specific military units that could be deployed by UN rather than national authority and providing major funding at the beginning of an operation--we have agreed that the SYG's report should be the basis for future discussions.

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001c. report	U.S. Government Report [partial] (2 pages)	01/26/1993	P1/b(1)

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**Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI**  
(Phonetic: BOOtros-GAHlee)

**EGYPT**

*Secretary General, United Nations*  
(since January 1992)

*Addressed as: Mr. Secretary General*

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PER E. O. 13526

2016-0933-M [1.06]

KBH 5/4/2021



During his first year, diplomat and statesman Boutros Boutros-Ghali has moved quickly "to develop the United Nations so that it is equal to the new challenge" and, in the course, weathered at times harsh criticism. He has carried through on promises to institute much-needed reforms—he has restructured the Secretariat, increased peacekeeping efforts, and secured a leadership role for the UN at all major international conferences

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 12958 3.5(c)

many diplomats give the Secretary General high marks for his commitment, energy, and breadth of activities

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(1); E.O. 12958 3.5(c)

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 12958 3.5(c)

We believe the Secretary General, who has publicly said he will not seek a second five-year term, has felt free to ruffle feathers if convinced he is pursuing key interests of the UN.

**Peacekeeping**

Concerned with overextending already stretched UN resources and political capital, Boutros-Ghali has only reluctantly become engaged in the variety of peacekeeping missions the UN has undertaken in the past year. Probably fueling his frustration is the fact that the quick pace of international events has compelled him to focus on peacekeeping efforts before he could launch his initiatives for preventative diplomacy and for the creation of a UN standing army to go into troubled areas

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(1)

**Boutros-Ghali the Man**

A Coptic Christian, Boutros-Ghali was born on 14 November 1922 in Cairo into an elite family with an illustrious record of public service, which he has maintained. His ambition may stem from his family's expectations that he carry on that tradition. His grandfather served as Prime Minister in the early 1900s, and one of his uncles was Foreign Minister in the 1920s. During his own tenure in the Foreign Ministry—he was minister of state for foreign affairs (1977–May 1991) and deputy prime minister for foreign affairs (May–December 1991)—Boutros-Ghali was the architect of Egypt's policy toward Africa and nonaligned states and was actively involved in Arab-Israeli issues. He served as a key negotiator in the talks that resulted in the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty

3.5c

3.5c

received diplomas of higher studies in public law (1947), economics (1948), and political science (1949) and a Ph.D. in international law (1949). He also studied at Columbia as a Fulbright scholar (1954-55). During most of the period 1949-77, he was a member of the Cairo University faculty; he served as chairman of the political science department in the 1970s.

Despite apparently tense relations with some contacts

3.3(b)(1)

Boutros-Ghali is well-suited for the job. He is often characterized as brilliant and urbane. An excellent conversationalist who enjoys discussing many topics, he is charming and polite, sensitive to his surroundings, and attentive to other people. He has a thick skin and is unfazed by criticism, traits which have served him well during his first year in office.

while in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, he tended to dominate meetings by the sheer force of his superior intellect, but he did not impose his will in an aggressive manner. He was persistent in his pursuit of goals, defended his views forcefully, and was an extremely shrewd and skillful negotiator. he was open to new ideas, could be influenced by a good argument, and was capable of compromise.

3.3(b)(1)

Boutros-Ghali has written more than 10 books on international law and political science. In addition to his native Arabic, he speaks good English and excellent French, a language he considers essential for an educated person. His wife, Leah, was born in Egypt into a family of Romanian Jews, some of whom, including her mother and brother, now live in the United States. she converted to the Coptic faith after her marriage to the Secretary General. The couple has no children.

No stranger to multilateral diplomacy, the Secretary General came to the UN well prepared, drawing primarily—but not exclusively—from his 14 years at the highest levels of Egypt's foreign policy establishment. Boutros-Ghali is knowledgeable about a wide range of international issues. After graduating from the Faculty of Law of Cairo University (1946), he attended the University of Paris and

26 January 1993

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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2016-0933-P (1.07)  
KBN 5/4/2021

BACKGROUND

- The UN became involved in the Yugoslav conflict in 1991 after EC mediation efforts stalled. Since then, conditions have continued to deteriorate, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and most recently Croatia.
  - UNPROFOR Croatia has been unable to demilitarize UN Protected Areas in Croatia or facilitate the return of displaced persons.
  - UNPROFOR Bosnia-Herzegovina, established to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief, has been largely unable to fulfill its mandate because of Serb refusal to cooperate and limited rules of engagement.
  - Since the establishment of a no-fly zone in 10/92, the SYG has documented 437 apparent violations.
  - On February 19 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, extended the mandate of UNPROFOR until March 31, legally obligating member states to comply with UN resolutions and previous cease-fire commitments.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- The U.S. is committed to peace and stability in the Balkans, and we commend United Nations and UNPROFOR efforts to prevent a wider war. UN leadership is indispensable.
- With the new resolution extending UNPROFOR's mandate, the Council must be vigilant in ensuring that the Vance Plan is implemented, taking firm action against violators.
- With continued obstruction of humanitarian convoys by the Serbs and the resultant suspension of UNHCR humanitarian aid deliveries, other ways are required to supply the needy.
- We welcome the SYG's authorization of contacts between NATO military authorities and UNPROFOR. With respect to an agreement among the parties, we would see NATO as providing an essential ingredient.
- Kosovo is a major concern, and we believe a firm Western stance is required to prevent Serbian adventures there. We need to convince Milosevic that we are serious.
- If Skopje and Athens agree to the EC-3 draft resolution on the Macedonia application, we would support it.
- Our policy initiative in Bosnia emphasizes a broad approach, including tighter sanctions against Serbia, adoption of a no-fly zone enforcement resolution, and efforts to negotiate a settlement acceptable to all parties.

IRAQ

BACKGROUND

- U.S. policy on Iraq remains firm that Iraq must comply fully with all relevant UNSC resolutions.
  - Iraqi policy is to give partial and grudging compliance and only when threatened by force.
- Iraq rejects UNSC 688's requirement that it stop repressing its civilian population. No-fly zones have deterred large scale repression; but low level harassment continues.
  - The SYG has issued statements supportive of coalition action against Iraqi challenges of the no-fly zones which resulted in the downing of two Iraqi aircraft and targeting of Iraqi air defense installations.
- The U.N., U.S. and EC are providing humanitarian relief to northern Iraq to counter Iraq's economic embargo. At the present pace of aid delivery there will not be mass starvation or refugee flows. However, Iraq could easily disrupt deliveries and put the population at risk.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- Thank the Secretary General for supporting efforts to compel Iraq to comply with UNSC resolutions and with US and coalition steps to enforce and monitor the resolutions.
- Affirm our intention to press for continuation of sanctions until Iraq complies fully with all UNSC resolutions.
- Note that Iraq must accept and cooperate with permanent UN weapons monitoring.
- Explain that we do not seek an occasion to use force; but we will not shrink from using it if challenged.
- Make clear that we cannot permit challenges to the no-fly zones. They deter renewed killing of innocent civilians.
- Underscore that we support the territorial integrity of Iraq as an essential ingredient of regional stability.
- Inform the SYG that we expect the UN to react firmly if Iraq further interferes with relief operations in the North. We support new UN efforts to mount a relief program in Baghdad and Southern Iraq but we must be careful that UN supervision prevents Iraq from diverting supplies.

**PALESTINIAN DEPORTEES AND THE PEACE PROCESS**

**BACKGROUND**

- The Secretary General's January 25 report on UN efforts to resolve the deportation issue recommended that the Council take "whatever measures are required" to ensure that Security Council Resolution 799, which called for the deportees' immediate return, is respected.
- The Security Council met in informal session February 12 to consider the Secretary General's report, UNSCR 799, and Israel's plan for the return of the deportees. Council members agreed that the Council President make a series of agreed points to the Israeli Ambassador; he did so and briefed the press afterward. This action was designed to forestall further UNSC action on the deportees.
- The Palestinians have rejected this approach and argue that the Council has not yet "formally" considered the Secretary General's report. The Arab Group is considering whether to press for a formal Council debate. Boutros Ghali is sympathetic to Palestinian/Arab Group views. Such a debate could lead to pressure for further UNSC action, undermining our efforts to reinvigorate the peace process.
- Boutros-Ghali told Ambassador Albright February 11 that he wanted an informal Council debate on his report, but said he did not care where or how long the debate took place. You should press Boutros to accept that the Council indeed considered his report on February 12 and that no further Council action is desirable.

**KEY POINTS TO MAKE**

- The pursuit of peace in the Middle East is a very high priority for my Administration. As we speak, Secretary Christopher is in Israel to consult directly on next steps for moving the peace negotiations forward, as he did in Arab capitals. He will report back to me so we can determine how best to get the talks back on track. I seek your support in this endeavor.
- The understanding we reached with the Israelis on a process to resolve the deportation issue is the most practical means of implementing UNSCR 799.
- The Security Council handled this issue in an appropriate manner. Further Council action could do serious damage to our efforts to reinvigorate the peace process.
- I strongly urge you to help us and the other UNSC members keep the issue from returning to the Council, and to move forward with the peace process.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2016 0933- M (1.09)  
K8H 5/4/2021

SOMALIA

BACKGROUND

- The UN secretariat has drafted a status report on Somalia that lays the groundwork for a new resolution establishing a UNOSOM II force with a peace-enforcing mandate. The report should be sent to the UN Security Council this week; if the Council reaches quick agreement, a new resolution could be adopted before March 1.
- The naming of both a UNOSOM II commander, Gen. Bir, and a UNOSOM II deputy, Gen. Montgomery, last week set the stage for developing an effective headquarters staff in Mogadishu.
- Ismat Kittani, the UN Special Representative, leaves Somalia this week. The SYG has asked us to recommend a possible replacement, which we are doing. We believe it essential that an American fill this position.
- U.S. military planners are now working with UN planners to develop a comprehensive transition plan from the current UNITAF operation to UNOSOM II.
- We are also working closely with the U.N., nongovernmental organizations, and other donor governments to ensure effective continuation of the relief effort and a new focus on rehabilitation and development.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- It is essential that the UNOSOM II structure be set up quickly. On the military side, we have already offered to leave a logistical group and maintain a Quick Reaction Force in the area through the initial phase of UNOSOM II.
- We are exploring ways to detail USG personnel to the civilian side of UNOSOM as appropriate.
- To ensure the strongest possible UNOSOM II staff structure, we are also prepared to fill the position of UN Special Representative as you requested.
- UNITAF has completed its goal of ensuring that humanitarian relief can be delivered to the most vulnerable Somali populations; the broader, longterm requirements of political reconciliation, rehabilitation and development will require UN leadership and broad international support.
- You can count on the U.S. to support these efforts, through our participation in UNOSOM II and with complementary relief and development activities.

HAITI

BACKGROUND

- The OAS and UN have begun deploying human rights monitors to Haiti under terms negotiated by OAS/UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo. Thus far 62 observers have been deployed, primarily by the OAS.
- This is the first step towards laying the basis for a solution to the political crisis in Haiti. The process requires long term engagement by the U.S., UN, and OAS.
- In addition to its human rights role, the UN/OAS mission must contribute to the task of democratic institution building. Technical assistance is needed to professionalize the military, separate the military and police, and strengthen the judiciary. To build on existing momentum, work on technical issues should begin now.
- Caputo is to begin negotiations in March with the parties on the key issues of naming a consensus Prime Minister, amnesty for military leaders, and Aristide's return.

KEY POINTS

- Welcome UN efforts, led by the Secretary General, to find a solution in Haiti. Dante Caputo has made excellent progress; we fully support him.
- The UN/OAS mission to Haiti is a vital element in easing tension and creating the climate for serious negotiations. It should be expanded as rapidly as possible.
- The mission also has a role to play in technical areas -- military professionalization, strengthening democratic institutions, economic reconstruction. Talks on these issues should begin now.
- I hope you will support this effort and continue to apply your skills and prestige to the search for a Haiti solution.
- Ultimately, the UN and OAS must deploy in Haiti in sizeable numbers throughout Aristide's term of office to maintain stability and confidence. The U.S. will contribute to such an effort and will urge its allies to do so.

MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING

- With the end of the Cold War, there is unprecedented need and opportunity for multilateral peacekeeping -- both by the United Nations and competent regional organizations.
  - Determination of which political, military, or humanitarian circumstances justify multilateral intervention has grown increasingly complex.
  - The adequacy of resources and the willingness of countries to place military capabilities at UN disposal are key concerns.
- Since the Gulf War, the United Nations has launched eight new peacekeeping operations. Mandates have been broadened beyond traditional peacekeeping to include civil administration, election monitoring, refugee repatriation, and delivery of humanitarian assistance.
- Last summer the Secretary General issued a report, referred to as An Agenda for Peace, in which he proposed various means for enhancing the UN's peacekeeping capabilities.
- At the General Assembly in September, President Bush announced a U.S. initiative to strengthen further the United Nations' ability to plan and execute peacekeeping operations.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- o The Secretary General's report An Agenda for Peace is an important contribution to the discussion of what can be done to enhance the UN's role in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping.
- o The U.S. joined with other Security Council members this fall in encouraging member states to identify military assets that could be made available to the United Nations on short notice. I fully endorse that action.
- o The Clinton Administration will examine closely the Secretary General's other suggestions for invigorating the UN and assuring it the means, both political and financial, to take effective action in dealing with conflict situations.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION

BACKGROUND

- Many of the non-aligned and others support increasing the number of Security Council's permanent members.
  - Japan, Germany, and several others aspire to permanent seats.
- We would support permanent seats for Germany and Japan, but expanding the Council without diminishing its operational effectiveness will be difficult.
- We would want to avoid too large an expansion.
- At its last session, the General Assembly approved by consensus a resolution on equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council. The resolution asks member states to submit comments on the issue to the SYG prior to June 30 and for the SYG to report on the matter to the next UNGA.
- There is no consensus among UN members about how to manage expansion. Disagreement also exists over whether permanent members should have the veto.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- We would support a well thought-out effort to update Council membership.
- We support permanent seats for Japan and Germany.
- Our overriding concern must be Council effectiveness. We could not support an enlargement that might detract from the Council's effectiveness.
- We need to think creatively about how this issue can be managed and how to address the perception that the Council should better reflect global realities.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UN Under Secretary General for Management

BACKGROUND

- USYG Thornburgh's contract expires March 1, like those of other senior UN officials, in order to give the Secretary General a free hand for Secretariat reform.
- Having an American as head of the Department of Administration and Management has helped us keep informed about Secretariat operations and has given us increased influence on administrative/budgetary practices and reform.
- Congress has found the position reassuring evidence that the SYG intends to take our views into account as he reshapes the Secretariat.
- We understand Boutros may not fight us on the management slot, but may intend to give the UN Development Program leadership, traditionally a U.S. position, to a Nordic representative. He claims the U.S. has too many high-level slots.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- It is important to us that Dick Thornburgh be succeeded by another American.
- We know the U/SYG for Administration and Management is key to your reform efforts. We want to be in a position to help.
- We need to maintain American public and Congressional support for the UN. An American in the Thornburgh position is our best evidence that we are working with you to achieve reform.
- We do not believe that retaining the management slot should be at the expense of losing another senior position in the UN system.
- We are seeking to make available to you Americans of exceptional leadership quality to help you to strengthen the UN system.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UN Reform

BACKGROUND

- In his initial restructuring of the UN Secretariat last February, the Secretary General (SYG) eliminated 13 high-level posts and consolidated some offices.
- He indicated restructuring would be a continual process until the Secretariat was functioning at "full efficiency."
- His second phase, announced in November, addressed the economic and social sectors and increased high-level posts by two which concerns us.
- As part of the overall restructuring, we have called for:
  - more effective coordination and elimination of overlap and duplication among the different units of the UN system
  - establishment of a UN Executive Secretariat and an Operations Center to improve senior-level decision making and effective management of field operations; and
  - establishment of an Inspector General position to improve management and maintain donor confidence. The SYG has been unresponsive to recommendations for an Inspector General.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE:

- We have a clear commitment to UN reform. We think a leaner and more flexible structure is needed to respond to new demands. What further plans do you have?
- Creating an Inspector General position would help in your reform efforts and help maintain donor confidence.
- The UN needs to set priorities that are rigorously reviewed and resources must be redeployed in support of evolving priorities.
- Tangible progress toward achieving reforms is needed to maintain Congressional and U.S. public confidence in the UN.

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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2016-0933-17(1.14)  
KBH 5/4/2021

## AFGHANISTAN

### BACKGROUND

- Since the fall of the Najibullah regime in April 1992, Kabul has been plagued by factional warfare which has exacted a heavy civilian toll.
- After months of U.S. urging, the Secretary General has agreed to convene a "Friends of Afghanistan" group in New York to include U.S., Pakistani, Iranian, Saudi, Afghan and Chinese Permreps.
- The "Friends" group will try to press the Afghans to stop fighting and resume negotiations on genuine power sharing.

### KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- Express appreciation for Boutros-Ghali's decision to convene a "Friends of Afghanistan" group, emphasizing our hope that it will meet soon.
- Urge the Secretary General to seize the opportunity presented by the start of Ramadan, when the Afghans may be more receptive to a ceasefire and negotiations, to encourage the "Friends" group to issue a strong call for an end to the violence.

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PER E.O. 13526  
2016-0933-M (1.15)  
KBH 5/7/2021

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DECL: OADR

## ANGOLA

### BACKGROUND

- Full-scale civil war between the government (GRA) and UNITA resumed in early 1993. UNITA has the military advantage, but neither side is capable of a decisive victory.
- Direct talks between the parties under UN auspices were held in Addis Ababa January 27-30. UNITA delayed the second round but is expected to propose a new date soon.
  - Assistant Secretary Cohen will attend a meeting with his Russian and Portuguese counterparts in Lisbon February 23-24 to discuss next steps toward a ceasefire and negotiated settlement.
- UNSC resolution 804 extended the mandate for the UN operation in Angola (UNAVEM II) until April 30, but reduced the scope of UNAVEM operations due to security concerns.
- We continue to support UN Special Representative Anstee's efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement based upon the principles of the Bicesse Peace Accords of May 1991.

### KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- We will remain actively engaged in the peace process in Angola. Any lasting settlement should incorporate the principles in the Bicesse Peace Accords.
- Continued UN involvement is critical to resolving the crisis. We deeply appreciate the efforts of Mrs. Anstee and the UNAVEM mission, and will continue to support them.

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PER E.O. 13526  
2016-0933-M (1.16)  
KBH 5/4/2021

CAMBODIA

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2016-0933-M (1.17)  
KBM 5/4/2021

BACKGROUND

- The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) has registered almost 95% of the estimated five million Cambodians eligible to vote. Over 20 parties will contest the elections which should be the freest and fairest in Cambodian history.
- Constituent assembly elections under UN auspices are scheduled for May 23 - 27.
- The UN has repatriated over 300,000 of the estimated 360,000 Khmer refugees and displaced persons in Thailand.
- The international community has pledged over \$800 million for reconstruction and rehabilitation. The U.S. will provide \$50 million in FY 93 and has encouraged financial institutions to extend loans.
- The Khmer Rouge (KR) has refused to disarm and demobilize, has on occasions detained UNTAC personnel, have blocked voter registration in KR areas, and has said they will not participate in elections. They have also been involved in the massacre of more than twenty ethnic Vietnamese over the past six months.
- SOC authorities have exercised intimidation and violence against political opponents among the non-Communist parties. UN Special Representative (SRSG) Akashi has set up an office to prosecute suspects in political violence cases and ordered UNTAC Civilian Police to patrol around political party offices. We have urged UNTAC to do more to counter intimidation.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- Affirm the excellent job the SYG, SRSG Akashi and UNTAC have done under very difficult conditions.
- Support UNTAC's plans to hold elections in May despite KR non-participation.
- Welcome UNTAC's efforts to counter political violence and urge the SYG to encourage UNTAC to continue to do everything possible to control the problem including using its military component.
- Urge the SYG to present proposals to address Cambodia's long-term economic and military security.

BACKGROUND

Cypriot Elections: Glafcos Clerides, after winning right-wing support, defeated incumbent President George Vassiliou in the Cypriot presidential run-off election by 1,988 votes.

UN Sponsored Cyprus Negotiations: Efforts to restart talks are underway. U.S./UK consultations took place on February 19, and U.S. Special Cyprus Coordinator Maresca will meet with UN negotiator Feissel in Rome on February 25.

- Boutros-Ghali and his staff believe they have broad agreement on 90% of the UN "set of ideas."
- Boutros-Ghali recommended confidence-building measures that were unanimously endorsed by the Security Council.
  - We have told the parties that these measures should be taken independent of resumption of the New York talks. They should not impede the talks.

UNFICYP Reductions: Canada plans to withdraw its 514 man contingent. With other withdrawals (Finns) and reductions (UK), UNFICYP manning will drop from 2,400 (mid-1992) to below 1,000 by mid-1993, prompting the UN Secretariat to consult troop contributors on changes to UNFICYP's organization and mission. The UN may seek more troop contributors, and the method of funding UNFICYP may have to be changed.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- We support UN efforts for a fair and permanent solution to the Cyprus issue.
- With Cypriot elections over, we want to help push ahead toward a Cyprus settlement.
- We have told the parties that, with differences between them and the UN set of ideas defined, they should come to New York determined to reach a successful conclusion.
- We have urged both sides to act on the confidence-building measures you suggested. They should not be a prerequisite for resumption of the New York talks. They should be taken individually with none being a quid pro quo for any other.
- We believe that UNFICYP should continue and favor continued discussions between the UN and troop contributors on how UNFICYP can do its mission despite planned withdrawals.

GUATEMALAN PEACE PROCESS

BACKGROUND

- The UN is currently only an observer in negotiations between the GOG and the guerrilla umbrella organization (URNG) to end the long-running civil war in Guatemala. In an address to the General Assembly on January 19, President Serrano unveiled a promising proposal to reinvigorate the process. The proposal would require a significant UN commitment to verify compliance of a pending human rights accord, one of the major stumbling blocks to progress at the talks.
- The UN would also be asked to draft a ceasefire and demobilization plan. UN resources are currently taxed globally and the Secretary General is reluctant to commit to an expanded role unless there is some guarantee of success and a formal request by both parties.
- Both sides have called on the United States to participate in a group modelled upon Four Friends of the UN Secretary General (UNSYG) in the case of El Salvador where the governments (Spain, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico) supported the UNSYG in his efforts to promote a mutually acceptable peaceful settlement.
- The two sides are scheduled to meet February 23 in Mexico City for the first time since the announcement of President Serrano's initiative. An embryonic group of friends (Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico) established at the G-3 meeting in Caracas has already met with all parties within the last week. Spain and the U.S have participated as observers in these meetings.

KEY POINTS TO BE MADE

- We are keenly interested in promoting a peace agreement in Guatemala. We are encouraged by President Serrano's latest initiative.
- Both the guerrillas (URNG) and the government have asked the US to participate in a support group of friendly governments to promote the peace process.
- As in the case of El Salvador, we are willing to participate in such a group.
- We have urged both sides to demonstrate flexibility in their meeting today in Mexico City.

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2016-0933-M (1.20)  
KBH 5/4/2021

LIBYA/PAN AM 103

BACKGROUND

- On December 9, the Security Council determined that sanctions against Libya should be maintained because of Libya's failure to comply with the demands of UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748.
- The Security Council will review Libya sanctions again on April 10. We are consulting with the British and the French on the possibility of strengthening sanctions. The British have suggested seeking some form of oil embargo, probably an oil equipment embargo.
- To end sanctions, Libya must: send the indicted Pan Am bombing suspects to trial in the U.S. or U.K.; cooperate with the U.K., U.S. and French investigations of the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings; compensate the victims of Pan Am 103; and sever its ties to international terrorism.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- We remain firmly committed to bringing the bombers of Pan Am 103 to justice and ending state sponsorship of terrorism.
- Libya must comply fully and promptly with the demands contained in UNSCRs 731 and 748. If it does not do so before the Council reviews Libyan compliance with the Resolutions on April 10, further measures may be necessary.
- Only when Libya has complied with Resolutions 731 and 748 can we consider a bilateral dialogue.
- We view Libyan attempts to open back channel discussions on the Pan Am 103 bombing as an attempt to delay or avoid compliance with the Resolutions. Likewise, Libyan proposals to surrender the suspects to a "neutral third country" are an attempt to undercut the demands of the Security Council.

~~SECRET~~  
DECL:OADR

MOZAMBIQUE

BACKGROUND

- We were instrumental in brokering an October 1992 peace treaty between the Mozambican Government and the rebel group RENAMO.
- The UN will supervise the peace agreement, which lays out a timetable leading to elections by October 1993.
- The UN peacekeeping operation for Mozambique (ONUMAZ) could involve as many as 8,000 UN troops, military observers, and election monitors.
- We are reviewing an informal UN request for a battalion of US military engineers for ONUMAZ: (State and DOD are preparing an options paper for the NSC.) The unit would repair roads and bridges to facilitate relief deliveries.
- We must consider this request in the context of other peacekeeping demands on our resources.
- Italy, Uruguay, Bangladesh, Zambia and Botswana have each agreed to provide an infantry battalion.
- The transition to peace is progressing well, if slowly.
  - The cease-fire is holding and food is getting through to famine areas. Demobilization has been delayed, though, by petty disagreements and because UN observers have not yet arrived in sufficient numbers.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE (IF ASKED)

- We are considering the UN request for an engineering battalion and hope to have a decision for you soon.
- Our decision will be based on an assessment of the mission proposed for the US unit, our capabilities in this area, and other peacekeeping demands on our resources.

NICARAGUA

BACKGROUND

- The Government of President Violeta Chamorro has pursued national reconciliation for the past three years. It has brought hyperinflation under control, demobilized the Nicaraguan Resistance and reduced the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) from over 80,000 to under 17,000.
- However, political and economic conditions have deteriorated in the last year. The Government has moved closer to the Sandinistas and has driven the UNO coalition that had supported Chamorro into open opposition. Political violence and human rights violations are on the rise; civilian control has not been established over the Sandinista-run police and army; and the bulk of property claims (some involving Americans) from Sandinista-era confiscations remain unresolved.
- As a result of U.S. concerns over police reform, human rights violations and American citizen property claims, assistance to Nicaragua was frozen in mid-1992. To stave off a foreign exchange crisis in December, \$54 million of \$104 million in FY92 funds were disbursed; \$50 million of FY92 funds remain frozen.
- In December the Secretary General visited Nicaragua. He said he hoped UN assistance to Nicaragua would be renewed and strengthened, particularly in reconstruction and rehabilitation. Boutros-Ghali planned to engage in consultations during January-March, in an effort to secure contributions to a UN assistance fund for Nicaragua.

KEY POINTS

- Mrs. Chamorro deserves credit for the progress she has made in bringing hyperinflation under control, demobilizing the Nicaraguan Resistance and reducing the size of her military.
- But there is not yet effective civilian control of the military and police, continuing human rights violations continue, and property confiscations remain unresolved.
- We are reviewing our policy toward Nicaragua to determine how we can best reinforce Nicaragua's efforts to attain true national reconciliation, consolidate democracy, strengthen human rights, and achieve self-sustaining economic growth.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OADR: DECL

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0933-M (1.23)

KBH 5/4/2021

## SALVADORAN PEACE PROCESS

### BACKGROUND

- El Salvador is a major success for the UN, which negotiated the peace and has monitored its implementation. After a successful 11-month cease-fire, on December 15 the FMLN demobilized and became a political party.
- The military has given up its internal security functions, disbanded special counterinsurgency units, and reduced to half its war-time level; a new civilian police force is being formed; and land distribution is underway, as are electoral and judicial reforms. President Cristiani removed or reassigned 87 of 102 military officers named by an Ad Hoc Commission, but has stalled with removing the final 15.

### KEY POINTS

- El Salvador has been a great success for the UN; you and your staff are to be congratulated. We believe the peace process has reached the point of being irreversible.
- We must, however, continue to be vigilant. The UN and the international community serve as the guarantors of the peace process.
- We fully support your position on the removal of the final 15 officers on the Ad Hoc list.
- On February 17, Secretary Christopher sent President Cristiani a letter supporting your position.
- We remain concerned about funding shortages for programs required by the Peace Accords. We have met our pledges and are disappointed that other countries have not; I hope you can appeal to them to do so.
- The new civilian police force will not meet its potential if it does not receive greater support.
- Land redistribution is another area that requires greater foreign assistance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WESTERN SAHARA

BACKGROUND

- The Moroccan Government and the Polisario have each claimed sovereignty over the Western Sahara since Spain's withdrawal in 1976.
- Both parties have agreed to the UN Secretary General's plan to resolve the dispute by holding a referendum, in which the Western Saharans would decide between integration with Morocco or independence (i.e. victory for Polisario).
- In his January report, Secretary General asked the UNSC to consider three options for action in the Western Sahara:
  1. Continue consultations, under UN auspices, to narrow differences, particularly on voter criteria.
  2. Implement the referendum according to voter criteria suggested by former SYG Perez de Cuellar in December 1991 which call for a broad interpretation of voter eligibility. Morocco favors this plan but Polisario rejects it, wanting narrow voter eligibility based on a 1974 Spanish Census.
  3. Have the UN Security Council suggest other means of breaking the impasse in the Western Sahara.
- We share the SYG's and Morocco's desire that the referendum happen soon but urge that further efforts be made to achieve consensus among the parties. A Security Council resolution to this effect should be passed this week.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- We greatly appreciate your efforts to bring about a just and lasting settlement for the Western Sahara, and we remain fully committed to your referendum plan.
- We share your desire to hold the referendum as soon as possible, but believe that further efforts should be made to narrow differences between the parties on modalities.
- Please let us know how we may be helpful as you continue your consultations with the parties to arrange for a referendum that is perceived by both sides as well as the international community as fair and legitimate.

UNCLASSIFIED

U.S. Arrearages to the UN Regular Budget

BACKGROUND

- As of December 31, 1992, the United States owed \$239.5 million to the UN Regular Budget. The arrearage is a result of appropriation shortfalls, legislative restrictions, and policy withholdings. Currently, we do not plan to pay about \$106 million of this amount (see below).
- President Bush committed the U.S. to help restore financial stability to the UN. The President's plan for paying arrearages, broadly supported in Congress, called for:
  - Payments of some \$220 million to be made over five years (FY 1991-95) in roughly equal annual installments;
  - Payments would be directed toward activities that are mutually agreed upon by the United States and the respective international organizations; (Congressional committees must be notified of the spending plans before the funds can be contributed.)
  - Not making payments for certain withholdings resulting from legislative prohibitions and overriding policy considerations, e.g., PLO activities, Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission, excessive tax reimbursements to American citizen employees, etc.
- Congress appropriated funds for arrears in fiscal years 1991, 1992 and 1993; we paid \$42.2 million in FY 1991 and \$43.8 million in 1992. We plan to make an FY 1993 payment of \$31.1 million after we have satisfied Congressional legislative requirements (the lower FY 1993 payment is the result of using monies appropriated for arrears to offset exchange rate losses required to meet other regular budget assessments; the shortfall will be made up at the end of the payment plan.)

KEY POINTS TO MAKE:

- Our 1992 regular budget payments, including arrears, of \$325.5 million amounted to 33 percent total UN collections.
- We expect to continue full funding, less minor withholdings, of our UN assessment. Also, it is our intention to continue to pay off arrears.
- We plan to make an FY 1993 arrears payment totalling some \$31.1 million this spring.

UNCLASSIFIED

**SUGGESTED PUBLIC REMARKS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S USE  
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH  
U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL BOUTROS-GHALI**

- IT IS FITTING THAT I TAKE THIS EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE ARRAY OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES THAT ARE OF MUTUAL CONCERN. I AM COMMITTED TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH SECRETARY GENERAL BOUTROS-GHALI AND WITH THE UN.
- MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IS THE UN'S FIRST PRIORITY. WE SUPPORT AN ENHANCED UN ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING, AND WE ARE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING ADDITIONAL WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. CAN SUPPORT UN PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS.
- THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND I EXCHANGED VIEWS ON A WIDE RANGE OF TOPICS, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR EARLY REENGAGEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, A SMOOTH TRANSITION FROM U.S. TO UN COMMAND OF THE HUMANITARIAN EFFORT IN SOMALIA, THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN BOSNIA AND THE NEGOTIATION OF A WORKABLE SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS THERE, THE ROLE OF THE UN AND OAS IN EASING TENSIONS IN HAITI, IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH ALL UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, PREPARING FOR FREE ELECTIONS IN CAMBODIA, AND THE NEED FOR SIGNIFICANT REFORM OF THE UN ITSELF.
- I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THESE AND OTHER ISSUES WHICH ARE SO IMPORTANT TO THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520


February 22, 1993

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (with ~~SECRET~~ attachments)  
DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Materials for the President's Meeting with UN  
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali

The President will be meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on February 23. Attached are biographic information, background materials, talking points and suggested public remarks. The background materials and talking points are divided into those covering priority issues (Tab 2) identified in the Acting Secretary's memorandum to the President, and contingency issues (Tab 3).

  
Mary Grossman  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Boutros-Ghali Biographic Information
- Tab 2 - Priority Issues - Background material and talking points
- Tab 3 - Contingency Issues - Background material and talking points
- Tab 4 - Suggested Public Remarks

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2016-0933-M (1.25)  
KBH 5/4/2021

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001w. report	Duplicate of 001b [partial] (1 page)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1)

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**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([UN Sec Gen or Ghali])  
OA/Box Number: 140

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**FOLDER TITLE:**

9300808

2016-0933-M

kh2036

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**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

2016-0933-M [1.26]

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SECRET  
DECL:OADR

Boutros Boutros-Ghali -- The Person and His Vision

Energetic, determined, and intellectual, Boutros is very much the product of his heritage as the descendant of an elite Coptic Christian family with an illustrious record of public service in Egypt. His personal style is undeniably difficult. He remains aloof even from his most senior staff and does not delegate well. He keeps his own counsel. Once he has taken a decision, he can be very difficult to move. He has broken the traditional pattern of close consultation with the Perm-Five Security Council members that his predecessor maintained. The SYG has the habit of using his personal contacts at the highest reaches of governments to appeal positions taken by delegations in New York. He also sometimes tends to mistake an interlocutor's failure to say "no" as an assent. [REDACTED]

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 6.2(d)

Even taking his style into account, Boutros remains the most effective SYG the UN has had in a long time. In his first year as UN Secretary General (SYG), Boutros Boutros-Ghali began an ambitious reform of the Secretariat, but did not proceed beyond the initial stage. He has also overseen a dramatic increase in UN peacekeeping efforts. His overall approach to peacekeeping has been conservative, largely because he believes the UN has insufficient resources and because he believes a failure would destroy confidence in the institution.

He has a vision of a world organization that can act as an agent for positive change. This vision is expressed in his "Agenda for Peace," a seminal work that defines the UN's security agenda for the future. The U.S. welcomed the "Agenda for Peace." Although we and others disagree with some of Boutros-Ghali's proposals--such as the designation of specific military units that could be deployed by UN rather than national authority and providing major funding at the beginning of an operation--we have agreed that the SYG's report should be the basis for future discussions.

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001x. report	Duplicate of 001c [partial] (2 pages)	01/26/1993	P1/b(1)

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**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([UN Sec Gen or Ghali])  
OA/Box Number: 140

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**FOLDER TITLE:**

9300808

2016-0933-M

kh2036

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI**  
(Phonetic: BOOtros-GAHlee)

**EGYPT**

*Secretary General, United Nations  
(since January 1992)*

*Addressed as: Mr. Secretary General*

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PER E. O. 13526

2016-0933-M [1.27]

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During his first year, diplomat and statesman Boutros Boutros-Ghali has moved quickly "to develop the United Nations so that it is equal to the new challenge" and, in the course, weathered at times harsh criticism. He has carried through on promises to institute much-needed reforms—he has restructured the Secretariat, increased peacekeeping efforts, and secured a leadership role for the UN at all major international conferences.



©

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 12958 3.5(c)

many diplomats give the Secretary General high marks for his commitment, energy, and breadth of activities.

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 12958 3.5(c)

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 12958 3.5(c)

We believe the Secretary General, who has publicly said he will not seek a second five-year term, has felt free to ruffle feathers if convinced he is pursuing key interests of the UN.

**Boutros-Ghali the Man**

**Peacekeeping**

Concerned with overextending already stretched UN resources and political capital, Boutros-Ghali has only reluctantly become engaged in the variety of peacekeeping missions the UN has undertaken in the past year. Probably fueling his frustration is the fact that the quick pace of international events has compelled him to focus on peacekeeping efforts before he could launch his initiatives for preventative diplomacy and for the creation of a UN standing army to go into troubled areas.

A Coptic Christian, Boutros-Ghali was born on 14 November 1922 in Cairo into an elite family with an illustrious record of public service, which he has maintained. His ambition may stem from his family's expectations that he carry on that tradition. His grandfather served as Prime Minister in the early 1900s, and one of his uncles was Foreign Minister in the 1920s. During his own tenure in the Foreign Ministry—he was minister of state for foreign affairs (1977–May 1991) and deputy prime minister for foreign affairs (May–December 1991)—Boutros-Ghali was the architect of Egypt's policy toward Africa and nonaligned states and was actively involved in Arab-Israeli issues. He served as a key negotiator in the talks that resulted in the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(1)

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received diplomas of higher studies in public law (1947), economics (1948), and political science (1949) and a Ph.D. in international law (1949). He also studied at Columbia as a Fulbright scholar (1954-55). During most of the period 1949-77, he was a member of the Cairo University faculty; he served as chairman of the political science department in the 1970s.

Despite apparently tense relations with some contacts

Boutros-Ghali is well-suited for the job. He is often characterized as brilliant and urbane. An excellent conversationalist who enjoys discussing many topics, he is charming and polite, sensitive to his surroundings, and attentive to other people. He has a thick skin and is unfazed by criticism, traits which have served him well during his first year in office.

while in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, he tended to dominate meetings by the sheer force of his superior intellect, but he did not impose his will in an aggressive manner. He was persistent in his pursuit of goals, defended his views forcefully, and was an extremely shrewd and skillful negotiator. he was open to new ideas, could be influenced by a good argument, and was capable of compromise.

Boutros-Ghali has written more than 10 books on international law and political science. In addition to his native Arabic, he speaks good English and excellent French, a language he considers essential for an educated person. His wife, Leah, was born in Egypt into a family of Romanian Jews, some of whom, including her mother and brother, now live in the United States. she converted to the Coptic faith after her marriage to the Secretary General. The couple has no children.

No stranger to multilateral diplomacy, the Secretary General came to the UN well prepared, drawing primarily—but not exclusively—from his 14 years at the highest levels of Egypt's foreign policy establishment. Boutros-Ghali is knowledgeable about a wide range of international issues. After graduating from the Faculty of Law of Cairo University (1946), he attended the University of Paris and

26 January 1993

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

BACKGROUND

- The UN became involved in the Yugoslav conflict in 1991 after EC mediation efforts stalled. Since then, conditions have continued to deteriorate, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and most recently Croatia.
  - UNPROFOR Croatia has been unable to demilitarize UN Protected Areas in Croatia or facilitate the return of displaced persons.
  - UNPROFOR Bosnia-Herzegovina, established to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief, has been largely unable to fulfill its mandate because of Serb refusal to cooperate and limited rules of engagement.
  - Since the establishment of a no-fly zone in 10/92, the SYG has documented 437 apparent violations.
  - On February 19 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, extended the mandate of UNPROFOR until March 31, legally obligating member states to comply with UN resolutions and previous cease-fire commitments.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- The U.S. is committed to peace and stability in the Balkans, and we commend United Nations and UNPROFOR efforts to prevent a wider war. UN leadership is indispensable.
- With the new resolution extending UNPROFOR's mandate, the Council must be vigilant in ensuring that the Vance Plan is implemented, taking firm action against violators.
- With continued obstruction of humanitarian convoys by the Serbs and the resultant suspension of UNHCR humanitarian aid deliveries, other ways are required to supply the needy.
- We welcome the SYG's authorization of contacts between NATO military authorities and UNPROFOR. With respect to an agreement among the parties, we would see NATO as providing an essential ingredient.
- Kosovo is a major concern, and we believe a firm Western stance is required to prevent Serbian adventures there. We need to convince Milosevic that we are serious.
- If Skopje and Athens agree to the EC-3 draft resolution on the Macedonia application, we would support it.
- Our policy initiative in Bosnia emphasizes a broad approach, including tighter sanctions against Serbia, adoption of a no-fly zone enforcement resolution, and efforts to negotiate a settlement acceptable to all parties.

IRAQ

BACKGROUND

- U.S. policy on Iraq remains firm that Iraq must comply fully with all relevant UNSC resolutions.
  - Iraqi policy is to give partial and grudging compliance and only when threatened by force.
- Iraq rejects UNSC 688's requirement that it stop repressing its civilian population. No-fly zones have deterred large scale repression; but low level harassment continues.
  - The SYG has issued statements supportive of coalition action against Iraqi challenges of the no-fly zones which resulted in the downing of two Iraqi aircraft and targeting of Iraqi air defense installations.
- The U.N., U.S. and EC are providing humanitarian relief to northern Iraq to counter Iraq's economic embargo. At the present pace of aid delivery there will not be mass starvation or refugee flows. However, Iraq could easily disrupt deliveries and put the population at risk.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- Thank the Secretary General for supporting efforts to compel Iraq to comply with UNSC resolutions and with US and coalition steps to enforce and monitor the resolutions.
- Affirm our intention to press for continuation of sanctions until Iraq complies fully with all UNSC resolutions.
- Note that Iraq must accept and cooperate with permanent UN weapons monitoring.
- Explain that we do not seek an occasion to use force; but we will not shrink from using it if challenged.
- Make clear that we cannot permit challenges to the no-fly zones. They deter renewed killing of innocent civilians.
- Underscore that we support the territorial integrity of Iraq as an essential ingredient of regional stability.
- Inform the SYG that we expect the UN to react firmly if Iraq further interferes with relief operations in the North. We support new UN efforts to mount a relief program in Baghdad and Southern Iraq but we must be careful that UN supervision prevents Iraq from diverting supplies.

PALESTINIAN DEPORTEES AND THE PEACE PROCESS

BACKGROUND

- The Secretary General's January 25 report on UN efforts to resolve the deportation issue recommended that the Council take "whatever measures are required" to ensure that Security Council Resolution 799, which called for the deportees' immediate return, is respected.
- The Security Council met in informal session February 12 to consider the Secretary General's report, UNSCR 799, and Israel's plan for the return of the deportees. Council members agreed that the Council President make a series of agreed points to the Israeli Ambassador; he did so and briefed the press afterward. This action was designed to forestall further UNSC action on the deportees.
- The Palestinians have rejected this approach and argue that the Council has not yet "formally" considered the Secretary General's report. The Arab Group is considering whether to press for a formal Council debate. Boutros Ghali is sympathetic to Palestinian/Arab Group views. Such a debate could lead to pressure for further UNSC action, undermining our efforts to reinvigorate the peace process.
- Boutros-Ghali told Ambassador Albright February 11 that he wanted an informal Council debate on his report, but said he did not care where or how long the debate took place. You should press Boutros to accept that the Council indeed considered his report on February 12 and that no further Council action is desirable.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- The pursuit of peace in the Middle East is a very high priority for my Administration. As we speak, Secretary Christopher is in Israel to consult directly on next steps for moving the peace negotiations forward, as he did in Arab capitals. He will report back to me so we can determine how best to get the talks back on track. I seek your support in this endeavor.
- The understanding we reached with the Israelis on a process to resolve the deportation issue is the most practical means of implementing UNSCR 799.
- The Security Council handled this issue in an appropriate manner. Further Council action could do serious damage to our efforts to reinvigorate the peace process.
- I strongly urge you to help us and the other UNSC members keep the issue from returning to the Council, and to move forward with the peace process.

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2016-0933-M (1.30)  
KBM 5/4/2021

SOMALIA

BACKGROUND

- The UN secretariat has drafted a status report on Somalia that lays the groundwork for a new resolution establishing a UNOSOM II force with a peace-enforcing mandate. The report should be sent to the UN Security Council this week; if the Council reaches quick agreement, a new resolution could be adopted before March 1.
- The naming of both a UNOSOM II commander, Gen. Bir, and a UNOSOM II deputy, Gen. Montgomery, last week set the stage for developing an effective headquarters staff in Mogadishu.
- Ismat Kittani, the UN Special Representative, leaves Somalia this week. The SYG has asked us to recommend a possible replacement, which we are doing. We believe it essential that an American fill this position.
- U.S. military planners are now working with UN planners to develop a comprehensive transition plan from the current UNITAF operation to UNOSOM II.
- We are also working closely with the U.N., nongovernmental organizations, and other donor governments to ensure effective continuation of the relief effort and a new focus on rehabilitation and development.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- It is essential that the UNOSOM II structure be set up quickly. On the military side, we have already offered to leave a logistical group and maintain a Quick Reaction Force in the area through the initial phase of UNOSOM II.
- We are exploring ways to detail USG personnel to the civilian side of UNOSOM as appropriate.
- To ensure the strongest possible UNOSOM II staff structure, we are also prepared to fill the position of UN Special Representative as you requested.
- UNITAF has completed its goal of ensuring that humanitarian relief can be delivered to the most vulnerable Somali populations; the broader, longterm requirements of political reconciliation, rehabilitation and development will require UN leadership and broad international support.
- You can count on the U.S. to support these efforts, through our participation in UNOSOM II and with complementary relief and development activities.

HAITI

BACKGROUND

- The OAS and UN have begun deploying human rights monitors to Haiti under terms negotiated by OAS/UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo. Thus far 62 observers have been deployed, primarily by the OAS.
- This is the first step towards laying the basis for a solution to the political crisis in Haiti. The process requires long term engagement by the U.S., UN, and OAS.
- In addition to its human rights role, the UN/OAS mission must contribute to the task of democratic institution building. Technical assistance is needed to professionalize the military, separate the military and police, and strengthen the judiciary. To build on existing momentum, work on technical issues should begin now.
- Caputo is to begin negotiations in March with the parties on the key issues of naming a consensus Prime Minister, amnesty for military leaders, and Aristide's return.

KEY POINTS

- Welcome UN efforts, led by the Secretary General, to find a solution in Haiti. Dante Caputo has made excellent progress; we fully support him.
- The UN/OAS mission to Haiti is a vital element in easing tension and creating the climate for serious negotiations. It should be expanded as rapidly as possible.
- The mission also has a role to play in technical areas -- military professionalization, strengthening democratic institutions, economic reconstruction. Talks on these issues should begin now.
- I hope you will support this effort and continue to apply your skills and prestige to the search for a Haiti solution.
- Ultimately, the UN and OAS must deploy in Haiti in sizeable numbers throughout Aristide's term of office to maintain stability and confidence. The U.S. will contribute to such an effort and will urge its allies to do so.

MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING

- With the end of the Cold War, there is unprecedented need and opportunity for multilateral peacekeeping -- both by the United Nations and competent regional organizations.
  - Determination of which political, military, or humanitarian circumstances justify multilateral intervention has grown increasingly complex.
  - The adequacy of resources and the willingness of countries to place military capabilities at UN disposal are key concerns.
- Since the Gulf War, the United Nations has launched eight new peacekeeping operations. Mandates have been broadened beyond traditional peacekeeping to include civil administration, election monitoring, refugee repatriation, and delivery of humanitarian assistance.
- Last summer the Secretary General issued a report, referred to as An Agenda for Peace, in which he proposed various means for enhancing the UN's peacekeeping capabilities.
- At the General Assembly in September, President Bush announced a U.S. initiative to strengthen further the United Nations' ability to plan and execute peacekeeping operations.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- o The Secretary General's report An Agenda for Peace is an important contribution to the discussion of what can be done to enhance the UN's role in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping.
- o The U.S. joined with other Security Council members this fall in encouraging member states to identify military assets that could be made available to the United Nations on short notice. I fully endorse that action.
- o The Clinton Administration will examine closely the Secretary General's other suggestions for invigorating the UN and assuring it the means, both political and financial, to take effective action in dealing with conflict situations.

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2016-0933-M (1.34)  
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UN SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION

BACKGROUND

- Many of the non-aligned and others support increasing the number of Security Council's permanent members.
  - Japan, Germany, and several others aspire to permanent seats.
- We would support permanent seats for Germany and Japan, but expanding the Council without diminishing its operational effectiveness will be difficult.
- We would want to avoid too large an expansion.
- At its last session, the General Assembly approved by consensus a resolution on equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council. The resolution asks member states to submit comments on the issue to the SYG prior to June 30 and for the SYG to report on the matter to the next UNGA.
- There is no consensus among UN members about how to manage expansion. Disagreement also exists over whether permanent members should have the veto.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- We would support a well thought-out effort to update Council membership.
- We support permanent seats for Japan and Germany.
- Our overriding concern must be Council effectiveness. We could not support an enlargement that might detract from the Council's effectiveness.
- We need to think creatively about how this issue can be managed and how to address the perception that the Council should better reflect global realities.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UN Under Secretary General for Management

BACKGROUND

- USYG Thornburgh's contract expires March 1, like those of other senior UN officials, in order to give the Secretary General a free hand for Secretariat reform.
- Having an American as head of the Department of Administration and Management has helped us keep informed about Secretariat operations and has given us increased influence on administrative/budgetary practices and reform.
- Congress has found the position reassuring evidence that the SYG intends to take our views into account as he reshapes the Secretariat.
- We understand Boutros may not fight us on the management slot, but may intend to give the UN Development Program leadership, traditionally a U.S. position, to a Nordic representative. He claims the U.S. has too many high-level slots.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- It is important to us that Dick Thornburgh be succeeded by another American.
- We know the U/SYG for Administration and Management is key to your reform efforts. We want to be in a position to help.
- We need to maintain American public and Congressional support for the UN. An American in the Thornburgh position is our best evidence that we are working with you to achieve reform.
- We do not believe that retaining the management slot should be at the expense of losing another senior position in the UN system.
- We are seeking to make available to you Americans of exceptional leadership quality to help you to strengthen the UN system.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

BACKGROUND

- In his initial restructuring of the UN Secretariat last February, the Secretary General (SYG) eliminated 13 high-level posts and consolidated some offices.
- He indicated restructuring would be a continual process until the Secretariat was functioning at "full efficiency."
- His second phase, announced in November, addressed the economic and social sectors and increased high-level posts by two which concerns us.
- As part of the overall restructuring, we have called for:
  - more effective coordination and elimination of overlap and duplication among the different units of the UN system
  - establishment of a UN Executive Secretariat and an Operations Center to improve senior-level decision making and effective management of field operations; and
  - establishment of an Inspector General position to improve management and maintain donor confidence. The SYG has been unresponsive to recommendations for an Inspector General.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE:

- We have a clear commitment to UN reform. We think a leaner and more flexible structure is needed to respond to new demands. What further plans do you have?
- Creating an Inspector General position would help in your reform efforts and help maintain donor confidence.
- The UN needs to set priorities that are rigorously reviewed and resources must be redeployed in support of evolving priorities.
- Tangible progress toward achieving reforms is needed to maintain Congressional and U.S. public confidence in the UN.

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2016-0933-m (1.36)  
KBM 5/4/2021

AFGHANISTAN

BACKGROUND

- Since the fall of the Najibullah regime in April 1992, Kabul has been plagued by factional warfare which has exacted a heavy civilian toll.
- After months of U.S. urging, the Secretary General has agreed to convene a "Friends of Afghanistan" group in New York to include U.S., Pakistani, Iranian, Saudi, Afghan and Chinese Permreps.
- The "Friends" group will try to press the Afghans to stop fighting and resume negotiations on genuine power sharing.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- Express appreciation for Boutros-Ghali's decision to convene a "Friends of Afghanistan" group, emphasizing our hope that it will meet soon.
- Urge the Secretary General to seize the opportunity presented by the start of Ramadan, when the Afghans may be more receptive to a ceasefire and negotiations, to encourage the "Friends" group to issue a strong call for an end to the violence.

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2016-0933-M (1.37)  
K8H 5/4/2021

## ANGOLA

### BACKGROUND

- Full-scale civil war between the government (GRA) and UNITA resumed in early 1993. UNITA has the military advantage, but neither side is capable of a decisive victory.
- Direct talks between the parties under UN auspices were held in Addis Ababa January 27-30. UNITA delayed the second round but is expected to propose a new date soon.
  - Assistant Secretary Cohen will attend a meeting with his Russian and Portuguese counterparts in Lisbon February 23-24 to discuss next steps toward a ceasefire and negotiated settlement.
- UNSC resolution 804 extended the mandate for the UN operation in Angola (UNAVEM II) until April 30, but reduced the scope of UNAVEM operations due to security concerns.
- We continue to support UN Special Representative Anstee's efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement based upon the principles of the Bicesse Peace Accords of May 1991.

### KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- We will remain actively engaged in the peace process in Angola. Any lasting settlement should incorporate the principles in the Bicesse Peace Accords.
- Continued UN involvement is critical to resolving the crisis. We deeply appreciate the efforts of Mrs. Anstee and the UNAVEM mission, and will continue to support them.

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CAMBODIA

BACKGROUND

- The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) has registered almost 95% of the estimated five million Cambodians eligible to vote. Over 20 parties will contest the elections which should be the freest and fairest in Cambodian history.
- Constituent assembly elections under UN auspices are scheduled for May 23 - 27.
- The UN has repatriated over 300,000 of the estimated 360,000 Khmer refugees and displaced persons in Thailand.
- The international community has pledged over \$800 million for reconstruction and rehabilitation. The U.S. will provide \$50 million in FY 93 and has encouraged financial institutions to extend loans.
- The Khmer Rouge (KR) has refused to disarm and demobilize, has on occasions detained UNTAC personnel, have blocked voter registration in KR areas, and has said they will not participate in elections. They have also been involved in the massacre of more than twenty ethnic Vietnamese over the past six months.
- SOC authorities have exercised intimidation and violence against political opponents among the non-Communist parties. UN Special Representative (SRSG) Akashi has set up an office to prosecute suspects in political violence cases and ordered UNTAC Civilian Police to patrol around political party offices. We have urged UNTAC to do more to counter intimidation.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- Affirm the excellent job the SYG, SRSG Akashi and UNTAC have done under very difficult conditions.
- Support UNTAC's plans to hold elections in May despite KR non-participation.
- Welcome UNTAC's efforts to counter political violence and urge the SYG to encourage UNTAC to continue to do everything possible to control the problem including using its military component.
- Urge the SYG to present proposals to address Cambodia's long-term economic and military security.

BACKGROUND

Cypriot Elections: Glafcos Clerides, after winning right-wing support, defeated incumbent President George Vassiliou in the Cypriot presidential run-off election by 1,988 votes.

UN Sponsored Cyprus Negotiations: Efforts to restart talks are underway. U.S./UK consultations took place on February 19, and U.S. Special Cyprus Coordinator Maresca will meet with UN negotiator Feissel in Rome on February 25.

- Boutros-Ghali and his staff believe they have broad agreement on 90% of the UN "set of ideas."
- Boutros-Ghali recommended confidence-building measures that were unanimously endorsed by the Security Council.
  - We have told the parties that these measures should be taken independent of resumption of the New York talks. They should not impede the talks.

UNFICYP Reductions: Canada plans to withdraw its 514 man contingent. With other withdrawals (Finns) and reductions (UK), UNFICYP manning will drop from 2,400 (mid-1992) to below 1,000 by mid-1993, prompting the UN Secretariat to consult troop contributors on changes to UNFICYP's organization and mission. The UN may seek more troop contributors, and the method of funding UNFICYP may have to be changed.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- We support UN efforts for a fair and permanent solution to the Cyprus issue.
- With Cypriot elections over, we want to help push ahead toward a Cyprus settlement.
- We have told the parties that, with differences between them and the UN set of ideas defined, they should come to New York determined to reach a successful conclusion.
- We have urged both sides to act on the confidence-building measures you suggested. They should not be a prerequisite for resumption of the New York talks. They should be taken individually with none being a quid pro quo for any other.
- We believe that UNFICYP should continue and favor continued discussions between the UN and troop contributors on how UNFICYP can do its mission despite planned withdrawals.

GUATEMALAN PEACE PROCESS

BACKGROUND

- The UN is currently only an observer in negotiations between the GOG and the guerrilla umbrella organization (URNG) to end the long-running civil war in Guatemala. In an address to the General Assembly on January 19, President Serrano unveiled a promising proposal to reinvigorate the process. The proposal would require a significant UN commitment to verify compliance of a pending human rights accord, one of the major stumbling blocks to progress at the talks.
- The UN would also be asked to draft a ceasefire and demobilization plan. UN resources are currently taxed globally and the Secretary General is reluctant to commit to an expanded role unless there is some guarantee of success and a formal request by both parties.
- Both sides have called on the United States to participate in a group modelled upon Four Friends of the UN Secretary General (UNSYG) in the case of El Salvador where the governments (Spain, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico) supported the UNSYG in his efforts to promote a mutually acceptable peaceful settlement.
- The two sides are scheduled to meet February 23 in Mexico City for the first time since the announcement of President Serrano's initiative. An embryonic group of friends (Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico) established at the G-3 meeting in Caracas has already met with all parties within the last week. Spain and the U.S have participated as observers in these meetings.

KEY POINTS TO BE MADE

- We are keenly interested in promoting a peace agreement in Guatemala. We are encouraged by President Serrano's latest initiative.
- Both the guerrillas (URNG) and the government have asked the US to participate in a support group of friendly governments to promote the peace process.
- As in the case of El Salvador, we are willing to participate in such a group.
- We have urged both sides to demonstrate flexibility in their meeting today in Mexico City.

UNCLASSIFIED

U.S. Arrearages to the UN Regular Budget

BACKGROUND

- As of December 31, 1992, the United States owed \$239.5 million to the UN Regular Budget. The arrearage is a result of appropriation shortfalls, legislative restrictions, and policy withholdings. Currently, we do not plan to pay about \$106 million of this amount (see below).
- President Bush committed the U.S. to help restore financial stability to the UN. The President's plan for paying arrearages, broadly supported in Congress, called for:
  - Payments of some \$220 million to be made over five years (FY 1991-95) in roughly equal annual installments;
  - Payments would be directed toward activities that are mutually agreed upon by the United States and the respective international organizations; (Congressional committees must be notified of the spending plans before the funds can be contributed.)
  - Not making payments for certain withholdings resulting from legislative prohibitions and overriding policy considerations, e.g., PLO activities, Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission, excessive tax reimbursements to American citizen employees, etc.
- Congress appropriated funds for arrears in fiscal years 1991, 1992 and 1993; we paid \$42.2 million in FY 1991 and \$43.8 million in 1992. We plan to make an FY 1993 payment of \$31.1 million after we have satisfied Congressional legislative requirements (the lower FY 1993 payment is the result of using monies appropriated for arrears to offset exchange rate losses required to meet other regular budget assessments; the shortfall will be made up at the end of the payment plan.)

KEY POINTS TO MAKE:

- Our 1992 regular budget payments, including arrears, of \$325.5 million amounted to 33 percent total UN collections.
- We expect to continue full funding, less minor withholdings, of our UN assessment. Also, it is our intention to continue to pay off arrears.
- We plan to make an FY 1993 arrears payment totalling some \$31.1 million this spring.

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WESTERN SAHARA

BACKGROUND

- The Moroccan Government and the Polisario have each claimed sovereignty over the Western Sahara since Spain's withdrawal in 1976.
- Both parties have agreed to the UN Secretary General's plan to resolve the dispute by holding a referendum, in which the Western Saharans would decide between integration with Morocco or independence (i.e. victory for Polisario).
- In his January report, Secretary General asked the UNSC to consider three options for action in the Western Sahara:
  1. Continue consultations, under UN auspices, to narrow differences, particularly on voter criteria.
  2. Implement the referendum according to voter criteria suggested by former SYG Perez de Cuellar in December 1991 which call for a broad interpretation of voter eligibility. Morocco favors this plan but Polisario rejects it, wanting narrow voter eligibility based on a 1974 Spanish Census.
  3. Have the UN Security Council suggest other means of breaking the impasse in the Western Sahara.
- We share the SYG's and Morocco's desire that the referendum happen soon but urge that further efforts be made to achieve consensus among the parties. A Security Council resolution to this effect should be passed this week.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- We greatly appreciate your efforts to bring about a just and lasting settlement for the Western Sahara, and we remain fully committed to your referendum plan.
- We share your desire to hold the referendum as soon as possible, but believe that further efforts should be made to narrow differences between the parties on modalities.
- Please let us know how we may be helpful as you continue your consultations with the parties to arrange for a referendum that is perceived by both sides as well as the international community as fair and legitimate.

SALVADORAN PEACE PROCESS

BACKGROUND

- El Salvador is a major success for the UN, which negotiated the peace and has monitored its implementation. After a successful 11-month cease-fire, on December 15 the FMLN demobilized and became a political party.
- The military has given up its internal security functions, disbanded special counterinsurgency units, and reduced to half its war-time level; a new civilian police force is being formed; and land distribution is underway, as are electoral and judicial reforms. President Cristiani removed or reassigned 87 of 102 military officers named by an Ad Hoc Commission, but has stalled with removing the final 15.

KEY POINTS

- El Salvador has been a great success for the UN; you and your staff are to be congratulated. We believe the peace process has reached the point of being irreversible.
- We must, however, continue to be vigilant. The UN and the international community serve as the guarantors of the peace process.
- We fully support your position on the removal of the final 15 officers on the Ad Hoc list.
- On February 17, Secretary Christopher sent President Cristiani a letter supporting your position.
- We remain concerned about funding shortages for programs required by the Peace Accords. We have met our pledges and are disappointed that other countries have not; I hope you can appeal to them to do so.
- The new civilian police force will not meet its potential if it does not receive greater support.
- Land redistribution is another area that requires greater foreign assistance.

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0933-M (1.43)

KBN 5/7/2021

NICARAGUA

BACKGROUND

- The Government of President Violeta Chamorro has pursued national reconciliation for the past three years. It has brought hyperinflation under control, demobilized the Nicaraguan Resistance and reduced the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) from over 80,000 to under 17,000.
- However, political and economic conditions have deteriorated in the last year. The Government has moved closer to the Sandinistas and has driven the UNO coalition that had supported Chamorro into open opposition. Political violence and human rights violations are on the rise; civilian control has not been established over the Sandinista-run police and army; and the bulk of property claims (some involving Americans) from Sandinista-era confiscations remain unresolved.
- As a result of U.S. concerns over police reform, human rights violations and American citizen property claims, assistance to Nicaragua was frozen in mid-1992. To stave off a foreign exchange crisis in December, \$54 million of \$104 million in FY92 funds were disbursed; \$50 million of FY92 funds remain frozen.
- In December the Secretary General visited Nicaragua. He said he hoped UN assistance to Nicaragua would be renewed and strengthened, particularly in reconstruction and rehabilitation. Boutros-Ghali planned to engage in consultations during January-March, in an effort to secure contributions to a UN assistance fund for Nicaragua.

KEY POINTS

- Mrs. Chamorro deserves credit for the progress she has made in bringing hyperinflation under control, demobilizing the Nicaraguan Resistance and reducing the size of her military.
- But there is not yet effective civilian control of the military and police, continuing human rights violations continue, and property confiscations remain unresolved.
- We are reviewing our policy toward Nicaragua to determine how we can best reinforce Nicaragua's efforts to attain true national reconciliation, consolidate democracy, strengthen human rights, and achieve self-sustaining economic growth.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2016-0933-M (1.44)  
KBH 5/4/2021

MOZAMBIQUE

BACKGROUND

- We were instrumental in brokering an October 1992 peace treaty between the Mozambican Government and the rebel group RENAMO.
- The UN will supervise the peace agreement, which lays out a timetable leading to elections by October 1993.
- The UN peacekeeping operation for Mozambique (ONUMOZ) could involve as many as 8,000 UN troops, military observers, and election monitors.
- We are reviewing an informal UN request for a battalion of US military engineers for ONUMOZ. (State and DOD are preparing an options paper for the NSC.) The unit would repair roads and bridges to facilitate relief deliveries.
- We must consider this request in the context of other peacekeeping demands on our resources.
- Italy, Uruguay, Bangladesh, Zambia and Botswana have each agreed to provide an infantry battalion.
- The transition to peace is progressing well, if slowly.
  - The cease-fire is holding and food is getting through to famine areas. Demobilization has been delayed, though, by petty disagreements and because UN observers have not yet arrived in sufficient numbers.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE (IF ASKED)

- We are considering the UN request for an engineering battalion and hope to have a decision for you soon.
- Our decision will be based on an assessment of the mission proposed for the US unit, our capabilities in this area, and other peacekeeping demands on our resources.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~  
DECL:OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2016 0933-m (1.45)  
KBH 5/4/2021

LIBYA/PAN AM 103

BACKGROUND

- On December 9, the Security Council determined that sanctions against Libya should be maintained because of Libya's failure to comply with the demands of UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748.
- The Security Council will review Libya sanctions again on April 10. We are consulting with the British and the French on the possibility of strengthening sanctions. The British have suggested seeking some form of oil embargo, probably an oil equipment embargo.
- To end sanctions, Libya must: send the indicted Pan Am bombing suspects to trial in the U.S. or U.K.; cooperate with the U.K., U.S. and French investigations of the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings; compensate the victims of Pan Am 103; and sever its ties to international terrorism.

KEY POINTS TO MAKE

- We remain firmly committed to bringing the bombers of Pan Am 103 to justice and ending state sponsorship of terrorism.
- Libya must comply fully and promptly with the demands contained in UNSCRs 731 and 748. If it does not do so before the Council reviews Libyan compliance with the Resolutions on April 10, further measures may be necessary.
- Only when Libya has complied with Resolutions 731 and 748 can we consider a bilateral dialogue.
- We view Libyan attempts to open back channel discussions on the Pan Am 103 bombing as an attempt to delay or avoid compliance with the Resolutions. Likewise, Libyan proposals to surrender the suspects to a "neutral third country" are an attempt to undercut the demands of the Security Council.

~~SECRET~~  
DECL:OADR

**SUGGESTED PUBLIC REMARKS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S USE  
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH  
U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL BOUTROS-GHALI**

- IT IS FITTING THAT I TAKE THIS EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE ARRAY OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES THAT ARE OF MUTUAL CONCERN. I AM COMMITTED TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH SECRETARY GENERAL BOUTROS-GHALI AND WITH THE UN.
- MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IS THE UN'S FIRST PRIORITY. WE SUPPORT AN ENHANCED UN ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING, AND WE ARE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING ADDITIONAL WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. CAN SUPPORT UN PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS.
- THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND I EXCHANGED VIEWS ON A WIDE RANGE OF TOPICS, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR EARLY REENGAGEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, A SMOOTH TRANSITION FROM U.S. TO UN COMMAND OF THE HUMANITARIAN EFFORT IN SOMALIA, THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN BOSNIA AND THE NEGOTIATION OF A WORKABLE SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS THERE, THE ROLE OF THE UN AND OAS IN EASING TENSIONS IN HAITI, IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH ALL UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, PREPARING FOR FREE ELECTIONS IN CAMBODIA, AND THE NEED FOR SIGNIFICANT REFORM OF THE UN ITSELF.
- I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THESE AND OTHER ISSUES WHICH ARE SO IMPORTANT TO THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 141				
Document ID: 9301003				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001. memo</del>	<del>Meeting with Secretary General Boutros Ghali of the United Nations (11 pages)</del>	<del>02/23/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KBH 4/12/2022

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([UN Sec Gen or Ghali])  
OA/Box Number: 141

### FOLDER TITLE:

9301003

2016-0933-M  
kh2037

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9301003  
RECEIVED: 26 FEB 93 10

TO: ITOH

FROM: SHEEHAN  
CLARKE

DOC DATE: 26 FEB 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: UN

MEMCON

PERSONS: BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ UN SEC GEN GHALI 23 FEB

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 02 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SHEEHAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE  
EXECSEC  
FICKLIN  
SHEEHAN  
SIGLER

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By MB NARA, Date 4/19/2018  
2016-0933-m

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
001

Z 93022616 FOR DECISION  
X 93030309 ITOH APPROVED RECOM

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: ASK LOG # 1003  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG WA A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec <i>pmw</i>	<u>1</u>	<u>uaw</u>	<u>A</u>
ExecSec	<u>2</u>		
Staff Director	<u>4</u>		
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>WA 2/27</u>	<u>AT</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
_____			
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

26 FEB 93 4:17

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

26 FEB 93 2:53

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1003

February 26, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RAZ*

FROM: MICHAEL SHEA *MS*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali of the United Nations (U)

Attached at Tab I is the Boutros-Ghali Memcon. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be approved and filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

Tab A Boutros-Ghali Documents to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KBH* NARA, Date *4/19/2018*  
2016-0933-M

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2016-0923-M (1.46)  
KBH 5/4/2021

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary General  
Boutros-Ghali of the United  
Nations (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Clifton Wharton, Secretary of State (Acting)  
Madeleine Albright, U.S. Permanent  
Representative to the United Nations  
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Mike Sheehan, Director for Multilateral  
Affairs, NSC (notetaker)

Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of  
the United Nations  
Alvaro DeSoto, Senior Political Advisor to  
the Secretary General  
Marrack Goulding, Under Secretary General for  
Peacekeeping  
James O.C. Jonah, Under Secretary General for  
Political Affairs  
Michael Stopford, U.N. Information Centre,  
Washington, D.C.  
Russell Taylor, Office of the Secretary  
General (notetaker)

DATE, TIME February 23, 1993, 4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m. EST  
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President and the Secretary General met in the Oval Office for a discussion of UN issues and multilateral peacekeeping operations. (U)

The President: Thank you very much for coming down to see me. I'm sorry to hear that your train was a little long in getting here. I've also been thinking of taking the train to go on a trip up to New Jersey and Philadelphia. (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Thank you, Mr. President. I enjoyed taking the train. You can get some work done on the train. (U)

The President: I understand that you have been very busy. (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, there have been too many problems and they all come at the same time. There seems to be a deterioration of situations and they, also, all come at the same time. We are not always able to cope with them all. (U)

The President: Well, I'm very supportive of the United Nations and peacekeeping operations in general. (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Thank you very much. That's very important to us. I have here a report from Mr. Paul Volcker that explains some of the financial difficulties that we have. It is a plan for helping us to solve some of our serious financial problems. (Hands the President the Volcker report and budget summary sheet.) (U)

The President: I've just talked with Ambassador Albright about this and I am encouraged. We should pay our fair share. And we will be as generous as we can possibly afford to be in peacekeeping operations. I'm also very encouraged by the progress of the operation in Somalia. I'm looking forward to turning over the command as soon as possible. This is an excellent statement of what we're able to do. With the vast array of other problems that face us, we're very hopeful that we'll be successful in Somalia; so that we can continue to do such things in the future. We are also very hopeful that Congress will give us the money we request. We hope we'll be able to put forth a very serious effort to help you make some of the management changes that you have planned. (U)

I'd like to ask you what your feelings are about the airlift in Bosnia and if we could talk about it for a few moments. (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, of course. It's not just Bosnia, though. We have a lot of problems -- Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia. (U)

The President: Yes, that's true. We have many problems. But I'm encouraged by Cambodia and the prospects for Sihanouk. (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: There will be elections in May even if the Khmer-Rouge do not participate. They only represent about 10 percent of the population. We will hold the elections in any case. (U)

The President: Yes, I think that is the right decision. (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: We've had great success in Cambodia. We've been able to repatriate 300,000 people back into their community; some of them returning to their original villages. Of course, it hasn't been a complete success. But it has been a good operation. Somalia, as well, has been a good operation. (U)

The President: Yes, and also in Haiti. We're moving ahead on Haiti. This is very important to the United States. (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, we have a very good program down there. I will be sending you a letter on this soon from the Friends of the Secretary-General working on Haiti. We intend to keep the pressure on the situation down there. (U)

The President: Yes, we need to be firm, almost relentless with these people. I believe the proper way to do this is through the U.N. and the OAS. We don't want to look like the ugly American in Haiti. This issue is very important to us; a lot of their people want to come here. (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Dante Caputo is the representative there of both the U.N. and the OAS. We're enjoying complete cooperation with him. In other areas, such as Yugoslavia, we have other organizations involved and they take advantage of this; they play the EC against the U.N. and in Somalia they play the U.S. against the U.N. In Haiti we have perfect cooperation among the U.N. and the OAS because Caputo is in charge of both. We have a transition team down there now and a joint team of observers. (U)

The President: I'd like to ask you about Somalia and the timetable there. (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, in a few days we should have a report on the operation and then we should be able to move forward in the next two weeks. I also need to move forward on the appointment of the new special representative. My representative is very ill. He has cancer. We need the representative for the transition and for the new operation. This is the first peace enforcement operation and it's very important that we have the right person in there quickly. We're going to have a meeting on humanitarian aid first and then a meeting on political reconciliation. It's very important that we explain our political reconciliation carefully and that we show the Somalis that we're not there as a neo-colonial power. And we need to get on with the reconstruction and proceed not only with relief but with the reconstruction and the return of the refugees to their villages. That is the purpose of our operation there. (U)

We need to attain the cooperation of as many of the leaders as we can. There are still many bandits in the area. It'll be one or two years in Somalia and it will be very costly. We need new funding. It is for this reason that I'm going to send a special envoy to some of the rich Arab countries. Rich countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim countries in order for them to contribute to Somalia, a Muslim nation. The money is not just for U.N. forces but for the reconstruction of the country. We need an integrated approach to pull together the political, the humanitarian, and the economic reconstruction of Somalia. (U)

The Vice President: Can we proceed with the transition plan before taking all these steps? (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes. We will be able to proceed. We have the new commander in place. Security is not perfect, as you saw in the situation in Kismayu the other day. We also have many arms flowing from Kenya and Ethiopia. It will be very difficult. But, yes, we will be able to continue the transition. (C)

The Vice President: This operation is a success in the making, but it's very important that we keep the timetable moving forward. (C)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes. This is no problem. In two weeks we should be able to do that. Now we need to get all the elements in place. On the 11th and 12th in Addis Ababa we're going to have a conference and although many of the factions are still in disarray, that is o.k. Even if, at the worst, we call that conference a preparatory conference for another conference to be held at a later date, we are getting the factions more ready to cooperate. (C)

Also, it's very important that I get the Arab League and the Islamic Conference to support this process. This shows that the operation is not just coming from just Europe and the United States. It's very important to get a regular group of supporters established in order for us to proceed on reconstruction and rehabilitation. (C)

The President: I'd like to return to Yugoslavia again. We're very concerned about whether the Vance-Owen Plan is a realistic plan we can implement and whether or not the rest of the countries can support it. What about the Russians, and others, do they feel supportive of the Vance-Owen Plan? (C)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, Russia does support the Vance-Owen Plan. We're not talking about a complete partition of Bosnia. The plan is based on the idea of a Federal system. There is no other alternative. But with pressure they will be able to work things out. It will continue to take a lot of work. The situation is ten times more difficult than the one in Somalia. (C)

The President: Yes, I concur. It's very difficult. My military advisers say that it will be very difficult to enforce the Vance-Owen Plan. There are so many borders and so many small areas it's almost unenforceable from a military point of view. The military can not guarantee its success. My military advisers tell me we may want to push for additional modification of the borders. (C)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, the Vance-Owen team is ready to talk about this. (C)

The President: I'm also concerned about whether the Serbs are prepared to negotiate in good faith. (C)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, this is very difficult. The Serbs are now controlling over 70 percent of the area in Bosnia. It will be very difficult to negotiate with them on the Vance-Owen Plan. (S)

The President: What about Yeltsin? He has a lot of problems. Is Yeltsin going to be able to put pressure on the Serbians to negotiate in good faith? (S)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Well, the problem is not only Yeltsin and the Serbs. It's also the Muslims and the Bosnians themselves. They also have problems in the process. It's difficult for them to get a single position. Though the world press seems to think that all Serbs are the nasty people and the Croats and the Muslims are o.k., it's not that simple or that clean. (S)

The Vice President: Are you suggesting that the Bosnians are not a victim of this situation? (S)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Oh no, of course they are. (S)

The Vice President: Don't you agree that the Bosnians and the Muslims have had a disproportionate amount of the suffering in this situation? (S)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Of course, of course. But the image of the Muslim government as always the good guys -- it's not as simple as that. They're not always as interested in finding the solution. They're looking for a ground intervention in order to get what they want. I'm not sure they're ready to negotiate in good faith. (S)

The Vice President: Yes, but its been a terrible situation for the Bosnians. They've had many of their people abused and raped. They've been the victims of a very aggressive assault on their country. They have a blueprint that divides up their country and leaves the aggressors in charge of much of their territory. It's not surprising that they're not necessarily willing to accept this situation -- that they have some sort of ill will. (S)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: No, no. I understand that. The problem is, there's no clear representation in Bosnia. (S)

The Vice President: Yes, but prior to this situation this government was a model of multi-ethnic diversity. Now ethnicity is the basis for the organization. The fact that the President is Muslim and other leaders are more identified with other groups is a testimony to the country's being ripped apart. This government had stood for multi-ethnic representation. (S)

Secretary General Boutros Ghali: Yes, but there are two different points of view in Bosnia -- between the Prime Minister and the President. They're not on speaking terms and it complicates the ability to work on political reconciliation. (S)

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The Vice President: Yes, the Prime Minister's a Croat and its very difficult to negotiate when the two don't work together. It is a very difficult situation, a symptom of the larger problem. (S)

The President: Yes, we're very worried about the situation. We're not sure that we can get all the parties to negotiate in good faith. We're hoping the airlift will be able to help the humanitarian aspects of the situation. But I'm very concerned about the geographical quilt that we've put together -- we're not sure we can guarantee its success. (U)

The U.N. has been on a roll lately in Somalia. Somalia will be a major triumph; Cambodia as well. It is important that we do something in Bosnia that does not ratify the bad faith that some have of the U.N. We will try to get the Bosnians and others to negotiate in good faith. We'll need the help of Yeltsin and the Russians, also, to work on some of these practical problems. I understand that Vance and Owen have done a great job; but I think they may have been acting in better faith in this process than the people that they're trying to pull together. (U)

We are very concerned about the impracticality of the plan and the feasibility of enforcing it. But, we are determined to play a constructive role in this and will cooperate with you. (S)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, we need to give this process a chance. If they don't accept the situation and cooperate, we can not impose it on them. But this is the framework that we have. On Somalia, we should be able to get things on track in one to two years. Yugoslavia will be much longer. How long have we been in Cyprus -- twenty-nine years? And now Cyprus is back to square one. The failure of President Vassiliou in the recent election is a setback. Also, on Angola we're back to square one. After the elections the country went back to violence and now 70 percent of the territory is controlled by UNITA. But we have had success in El Salvador. (S)

The President: Yes, we can't win all of them, but we will do all we can to support you on these issues. I would appreciate it if I could take this opportunity, Mr. Secretary-General, to ask you for your counsel on the situation in the former Soviet Union and how we might be able to help stabilize the situation there. All of the instability could have an adverse impact on the United Nations and your ability to get things done. (S)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, we've had some meetings to discuss this very issue... the role of the U.N and other agencies and how we can assist Russia and the other States of the former Soviet Union. (S)

We're opening offices in the former Soviet Union where we're going to integrate all our functions in one place to interface with the new States. UNDP, UNICEF and other agencies will all be consolidated in one office. We are sending many missions to the

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former Soviet Union. We have two missions to the Baltics to look into the situation with the Russian minority there. We have two missions in Byelarus. We have them in Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova and others; we are there and trying to help. There are many problems and they want more support. They want us to participate with observers in their peacekeeping operations. But for financial reasons and for other problems with our capacity, we're not sure what we'll be able to do. (S)

I've talked to Yeltsin about this and we will look to support him. He needs our support. Yeltsin says he needs the United Nations for support of his peacekeeping operations so that the Russians do not look like neo-colonialists in areas such as Tajikistan. Yelstin said if we were able to add U.N. forces to his operation this would help a great deal. We are ready to help within our means. They are a member nation and it is very important to us. (S)

It is interesting that we are playing very much the same role as we did in Africa in the 1960s. We are working with these new States to help them to make contacts with the international community. At a meeting one month ago on what the U.N. can do to help, we agreed to continue to try to help within our limited capacity. (S)

Mr. Goulding: I just wanted to make sure that in regard to the Bosnian airlift we follow the existing procedures and consultative mechanisms that are in place. (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, if we are ready to provide this assistance we need to coordinate this very closely with the U.N. to avoid problems. (U)

The President: Yes, absolutely, we need to do that. We are also waiting for the participation of others, such as Russia. (U)

We are going to be operating at a sufficient altitude so that we should not have any difficulties. This is purely a humanitarian effort. There will be no fighter escorts. There will be no provocations concerning these flights. (S)

Mr. Lake: Yes, General Powell has made his intentions clear on this matter. He says this operation is an extension of the existing operation; that there will be no new name, it is the same operation. We'll have people on the ground to coordinate the flights and to work with UNHCR in order to coordinate the details. We're looking forward to close cooperation with UNHCR and we'll also have people in the staging area to look at the cargo and its content. (S)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, it's possible that some will claim that there are arms in the shipments. (S)

Mr. Lake: Yes, we'll be certain to assure the Serbs that this is not the case. We are also willing to send our humanitarian aid

to other areas in Bosnia and Croatia, where it is needed most.  
(U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: The U.N. is a very weak institution. I need to retain its credibility. I am always trying to maintain cooperation with all the member States within the U.N. It is difficult for me to keep all the member States together. (S)

The President: Yes, I understand. I want the U.N. to be a strong organization. I'll work with you to ensure that. We'll do everything we can to work with you and like-minded allies through the U.N. For instance, I've had a lot of pressure in this country, but I believe it's wrong, to intervene in Haiti unilaterally. But I think the multi-lateral framework is the proper one. I want to continue to work within the multi-lateral process in Haiti. (S)

I appreciate your working with us on the airlift. We will continue to try to be constructive and work within the framework of Vance-Owen. I want to be able to work through this framework and enhance the strength and durability of the United Nations.  
(S)

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, yes. We need the U.S. support very much. I need your support and support all around the world. (U)

Ambassador Albright: Would you also like to discuss with the President your plans of reform in the United Nations. We understand it's a weak organization and we want to help. Can you discuss some of your plans for addressing these problems? (U)

Secretary-General Boutros Ghali: Yes. When I first started the job I was able to eliminate fifteen top jobs and in the last several weeks I've been able to eliminate six more. I'm trying to help get better coordination between the U.N. and other independent agencies. It is essential that we integrate all the approaches in a comprehensive manner. For instance, in El Salvador we're trying to demobilize the army, run the elections, and conduct land reform. (U)

We need the cooperation of other agencies in order to do this effectively. We also need to obtain the support of the NGOs. They have lots of money but they're also difficult to work with. We need their support and we need their help, as in Somalia. They have been very active. They have the money, but they're also very aggressive and have their own ideas. We need to coordinate with these agencies and other NGOs. (S)

We also need to work within the regional organizations. In Somalia I've been trying to work with the Muslim Conference and Arab League. We need their political support in order to go to donors for more aid. We need African and Muslim cooperation. In El Salvador I have friends of the Secretary-General. In Guatemala as well. We need the cooperation of these regional

actors in order to gain support with public opinion and also with private corporations. (U)

We're trying to prepare a big event for the fiftieth-year anniversary so that we can renew the United Nations with a new image at the San Francisco meeting. Also at the social Summit meeting, sort of a follow-up to the Rio Conference. We need to work on the image of the United Nations within the United States and also international public opinion. Because from public opinion we get support of governments. That's key to the effectiveness of the United Nations. (U)

As an old Egyptian civil servant, I thought Egypt was the worst bureaucracy that existed. However, the U.N. is much worse. It needs a lot of work. (U)

The President: Well, we are willing to support you. It's tough, it's very tough. I understand your problems. I'm trying to do a little of that myself here. (Laughter) (U)

Ambassador Albright: The Secretary-General and myself have developed a very good working relationship. Perhaps you would be interested in sharing some of your insights from your recent trip to Japan with the President. (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, it was a very interesting trip to Japan. It is very important that we get their participation. I was also in Germany. We need their participation, as well, for peacekeeping operations and other activities. But they wanted to offer a U.N. headquarters in Bonn, another building. But I don't need buildings, I need money. But I had a very good visit to Germany as well. (U)

Tokyo went much the same way. Again, they need to participate more in peacekeeping operations. They have a team in Angola and are planning to put a team into Mozambique. But they also must accept that they must make a bigger financial contribution and they also must play a role as a global power, not just in Asia. (U)

I have many problems. For instance, with Italy. They want a General to be in charge in Mozambique, as well as have the special representative. But, no, you can't have all of this. This is a classic problem. (U)

President: I'm glad your trip to Japan went well. (U)

Boutros Ghali: Yes, they are very interested in helping. I need to get out there more often. I've made three trips to London and four to Paris, but Japan is a very long way. It is a 14-hour trip. But I have to go to Tokyo more often. I was there to talk at the U.N. University there. I also talked with the different leaders of the parties and encouraged them for more cooperation. ((U)

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Mr. Wharton: Have you talked about expanding the Security Council?

General-Secretary Boutros-Ghali: I'm very neutral on this. (Laughter). But why not, if they're willing to participate I think this is a good idea.

The President: Yes, we're very open to that suggestion -- to get them more into the action. The same with Germany. They know they need to participate more. (C)

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali: Yes. (U)

The President: I hope we'll be able to get a good report from the Middle East soon. (U)

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali: Yes. On the Middle East -- I spent the last 15 years of my career working on this issue. I think it was a great mistake by the Israelis on the issue of the 430 deportees. They've given the Muslim fundamentalists great propaganda. We are going to have problems in Tunisia, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and others. There was an excellent article recently in the New York Times. I called the journalist there to congratulate him. You also have problems with Islamic radicals working in pockets in the United States; also in Europe. (C)

I told Rabin, "Why don't you just put them in prison?" Every day we have CNN on the news. It's the best propaganda these people could have. They've got a billion dollar propaganda campaign out of this situation. They put us all in a very difficult position. Again, I think they should just put them in prison. (C)

The Vice President: Yes, but it seems we are making progress on this situation. (C)

The President: I believe Rabin knows he has made a mistake. (C)

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, I've worked with these people for the last 15 years and there is a great deal of mutual trust. We've worked together on these issues and they know it is in our mutual interest to resume the peace process. It is in the interest of the region. But I think they should be careful that they don't wake up tomorrow and find out that Yassir Arafat was a relative moderate. That we have a group of fanatics -- the Hamas, the Hezbollah, that are gaining stronger representation. They are also operating in the Gaza and on the West Bank. (C)

Under Secretary General Jonah: What about South Africa? (C)

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, we've a hundred observers in South Africa. Things are going very well. They're working closely with the South African police. I know the leaders there, Pik Botha. We've been very successful in South Africa. It's been a boost. (C)

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The President: Yes, I have recently read a good editorial about that in the New York Times. (S)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, but in Africa we still have many problems. Zaire is ready to collapse. Also, Togo has some great problems. Zaire is possibly the greatest danger. If it deteriorates we could have a Somalia times ten. I've had a representative from Mobutu send me a message to get the U.N. ready to intervene. They want the U.N. to intervene between Mobutu and the Prime Minister and they want the U.N. to intervene between Mobutu and the three foreign powers with interests there: France, Belgium and the United States. This could be very expensive. I don't know if we'll have the money. We'll have to be in consultation. However, in terms of the financial situation, it may be better to send observers to prevent a problem so that it doesn't escalate into a bigger, worse situation. (S)

Mr. Lake: We've been coordinating with the French and the Belgians on this to encourage Mobutu to allow the transitional government to get in. Mobutu wants someone to come and save him. I don't think there is any way he can be considered as part of the solution in Zaire. (S)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, I think we're going to need more preventive diplomacy down there. We need to get something done. (S)

The President: Yes, I've been following the situation. We've both have a lot of problems to deal with. (U)

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali: Yes, Mr. President, thank you very much for having me here today. (U)

The President: Yes. It's been a very good meeting. Thank you very much. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

# **Financing an Effective United Nations**

## **A Report of the Independent Advisory Group on U.N. Financing**

**Shijuro Ogata, Co-Chairman**  
**Paul Volcker, Co-Chairman**

**Abdul Aziz Al-Quraishi**  
**Raymond Barre**  
**Pehr Gyllenhammar**  
**Olusegun Obasanjo**  
**I. G. Patel**  
**Karl Otto Pöhl**  
**David Scholey**  
**Stanislav Shatain**  
**Jesus Silva Herzog**

**A Project of**  
**The Ford Foundation**  
**February 1993**

**United States of America**  
**Status of Contributions to the United Nations Budget**  
**As at 22 February 1993**

**I. Regular Budget:**

1993 rate of assessments:	25%
1993 Assessment:	\$ 309.9 million
Outstanding contributions from prior years:	<u>\$ 239.5 million</u>
Amount Outstanding	\$ 549.4 million

**II. Peace-keeping Operations:**

1993 Assessments	\$ 215.9 million
Outstanding contributions from prior years	<u>81.1 million</u>
Amount Outstanding	\$ 297.0 million
<b>Total Amount Outstanding</b>	<b>\$ 846.4 million</b>

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Original OA/ID Number: 163				
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. talking points</del>	<del>Talking Points on Somalia (1 page)</del>	<del>09/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001b. paper</del>	<del>Background Material and Talking Points for Somalia Political Strategy (4 pages)</del>	<del>09/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001c. talking points</del>	<del>Talking Points on Somali Political Strategy (2 pages)</del>	<del>09/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001d. paper</del>	<del>Re Energizing the Political Process in Somalia (3 pages)</del>	<del>09/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001e. paper</del>	<del>Background Material and Talking Points for Somalia Political Strategy; duplicate of 001b (4 pages)</del>	<del>09/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001f. talking points</del>	<del>Talking Points on Somali Political Strategy; duplicate of 001c (2 pages)</del>	<del>09/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>
<del>001g. paper</del>	<del>Re Energizing the Political Process in Somalia; duplicate of 001d (3 pages)</del>	<del>09/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([UN Sec Gen or Ghali])  
 OA/Box Number: 163

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9307339

2016-0933-M  
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**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: LAKE

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 25 SEP 93  
SOURCE REF: 9322127

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA UN  
PEACEKEEPING AP

PERSONS: BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS ANNAN, KOFI

SUBJECT: PROPOSED TALKING POINT ON SOMALIA FOR PRES MTG W/ UN SEC GEN  
BOUTROS-GHALI & POLITICAL STRATEGY UN SEC GEN FOR PEACEKEEPING KOFI

ACTION: OBE PER CLARKE DUE DATE: 30 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KBM* NARA, Date *4/19/2018*  
*2016-0933-17*

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X 93092814 OBE PER CLARKE

TO: LAKE

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 25 SEP 93  
SOURCE REF: 9322127

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA UN  
PEACEKEEPING AP

PERSONS: BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS ANNAN, KOFI

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ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE DUE DATE: 30 SEP 93 STATUS: S

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OBE - per Richard Clarke  
9/28/93

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM NARA, Date 7/19/2018  
2016-0933-17



Washington, D.C. 20520

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DECL:OADR

September 25, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Proposed Talking Points on Somalia for the President's Meeting with Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and a Political Strategy on Somalia for Presentation to U.N. Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Kofi Annan

Attached are proposed talking points on Somalia for the President's use with U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. Also attached are background material, talking points, and a nonpaper on political strategy for Somalia for use in the planned meeting between Messrs. Berger, Tarnoff, and Wisner and U.N. Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Kofi Annan.

Thank you for your assistance.

*Eileen A. Malloy*  
for Marc Grossman  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By KBH NARA, Date 4/19/2018  
2016-0933-M

Attachments:

- A. Proposed Talking Points on Somalia for the President
- B. Background Material, Talking Points, and Nonpaper on Somali Political Strategy

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2016-0933-M (1.47)  
KBH 5/7/2021

Talking Points on Somalia

- o Pressure is growing in the U.S. and other countries for a political strategy that brings fighting to a halt and allows the U.N. to achieve its objectives in a reasonable time.
- o I urge you to complement military pressure against General Aideed with efforts to find a political solution, and to make public your intentions to do so soon.
- o I support the personal and immediate involvement of the Ethiopian and Eritrean presidents in brokering an end to the fighting consistent with Security Council resolutions.
- o To improve chances that Aideed will leave, I urge that the U.N. propose the formation of an impartial investigatory commission including Somali representatives. This proposal should be combined with a cease-fire.
- o To underscore the importance of finding a political solution, you could announce plans to convene a political reconciliation conference in Somalia under U.N. and regional auspices.
- o I think that the conference should have two purposes. First, it would re-energize the moribund national reconciliation process started in March with the Addis Ababa agreement. Second, it would speed the local reconciliation process on which the U.N. already has made a solid start with the formation of district councils.
- o I recommend, too, that you invite the foreign ministers of neighboring states plus Eritrea to visit Somalia. The objectives would be to review UN operations, highlight the importance of the proposed conference, and encourage the factional leaders to accept participation by district council representatives.
- o Senior U.S. officials will meet soon with Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Kofi Annan to spell out our ideas on energizing the political process in Somalia.

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2016-0933-M (1.48)

KBH 5/4/2021

## Background Material and Talking Points for Somalia Political Strategy

Despite increasing pressure from a variety of sources, the U.N. leadership has few detailed ideas for speeding the process of political reconciliation in Somalia. Several proposals are outlined below which can sharpen their thinking and underscore our concern that the process move as rapidly as possible. The strategy proposed here has five parts.

The personal involvement of the Ethiopian and Eritrean presidents in seeking a political solution.

The formation of an international commission to investigate Aideed's role in attacks on U.N. peacekeepers.

The announcement of plans to convene a political reconciliation conference in Somalia.

A mission to Somalia of foreign ministers from neighboring states plus Eritrea.

The formalization of the Somalia Advisory Group.

### Emphasize the Role of the Ethiopian and Eritrean Presidents

The Ethiopian/Eritrean initiative for securing Aideed's voluntary departure from Somalia which began in mid-July has not produced the desired results. It is clear that senior figures in Aideed's sub-clan see no reason to press him to depart the country. The recent success in detaining Aideed's chief financial backer, Osman Ali Atto, has highlighted the vulnerability of Aideed and his senior assistants, perhaps making them more amenable to this initiative, which would be followed by an investigation of attacks on U.S. peacekeepers and a possible trial.

Ethiopian President Meles and his Eritrean counterpart President Issaias remain committed to pursuing their initiative despite its failure so far. We have reached the point, however, where we should urge the U.N. to ask Meles and Issaias to involve themselves personally in efforts to stop the fighting. This will require giving them considerable flexibility consistent with the broad guidelines contained in Security Council resolutions. They should be asked to go well

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beyond the current Ethiopian/Eritrean initiative for securing Aideed's voluntary departure from Somalia. This channel is complementary to the Gosende proposal described below for an international commission. Its success does not preclude the use of military pressure against Aideed.

Proposal for International Commission/Ceasefire

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Our Special Envoy in Mogadishu, Robert Gosende, recently suggested that the UN propose the creation of a commission of 10 members consisting of two Habr Gidr elders chosen by the 25-member Habr Gidr Council, one chosen by the Executive Committee of the Somali National Council (SNA) and the other seven chosen by the UN. (Our discussions with the U.N. need not set forth this much detail on the composition of the commission.) General Aideed would be asked to go into house arrest outside Somalia until the commission, which serves as a grand jury, concludes its deliberations.

At this time, no effort would be made to identify other persons possibly involved in attacks on UN peacekeepers. If the commission decides there is sufficient evidence to try Aideed, the subsequent court proceeding would take place in Somalia when its judicial system is deemed adequate for that purpose. While this is happening, Aideed would be asked to agree to a complete ceasefire, the immediate cantonment of all heavy weapons and the demobilization of his militia.

In the context of such an agreement the U.S. would consider the phased withdrawal of its forces. The pace of this withdrawal would depend on the stability of the ceasefire and the degree of security U.N. forces would have under the ceasefire.

Ambassador Gosende believes his proposal would place Aideed under intense pressure from his own clan and sub-clan to accept the offer. The UN would be seen as making a good faith effort to resolve peacefully the problem of south Mogadishu. If Aideed and his militant wing of the SNA reject the proposal, he will be exposed before Somali and world opinion as rejecting an impartial examination which includes members of his sub-clan and independent outside observers.

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It may be necessary to appoint a Special Representative of the UNSYG for political reconciliation. This person needs to be of sufficient stature that he/she could help galvanize the process and keep it going when, as is likely, it begins to stall or falter.

The conference would attempt to gain agreement among the participants on ways to speed progress toward implementation of the Addis accord. This could mean thrashing out the final details on a governing charter and taking other steps necessary to form one of the accord's key features, a Transitional National Council. A meeting on political developments at the local level offers an opportunity to engage Somalis directly in a process dominated heretofore by the U.N.

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encouraged to meet with Somali factional leaders for the purpose of promoting the political reconciliation conference spelled out above and the need for including representatives of district councils. In addition to the foreign ministers from neighboring Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia, the foreign minister of Eritrea should be added to the group. In order to underscore the new emphasis on a political solution in Somalia, the UN should arrange for appropriate media coverage of this visit.

Formalize and Energize the Somali Advisory Group

At our request, Secretary General Boutros Ghali is in the process of establishing a Somali Advisory Group (sometimes referred to as "Friends of Somalia"). It consists of permanent representatives in New York from about a dozen countries. The purpose of the group is to offer general guidance to the U.N. on its policies and activities in Somalia. The first informal meeting of this group took place earlier this month. It is important now to give the organization formal status, publicly highlight its existence and ensure that it is consulted regularly.

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## Talking Points:

### Ethiopian/Eritrean Initiative

-- We urge you to encourage Presidents Meles and Issaias to become personally engaged in efforts to stop the fighting in Mogadishu.

-- In making such an appeal, we think the two leaders should be given maximum flexibility consistent with the broad guidelines in the Security Council resolutions.

### International Commission/Cease Fire

-- The U.N. should propose the establishment of an impartial commission coupled with the acceptance by Aideed of a complete cessation of attacks against the U.N.

-- We have an informal paper (hand over the non-paper) which spells out the proposal.

-- We believe that this proposal should be at the initiative of the U.N.

-- Even if Aideed turns down the offer, the U.N. would be seen as offering in good faith a political solution to the problem in south Mogadishu and Aideed would be exposed to criticism as rejecting an impartial investigation.

### Political Reconciliation Conference

-- A reconciliation conference would have two purposes. First, it would energize the national reconciliation process started in March with the Addis Ababa agreement. Second it would speed the local reconciliation process on which the U.N. already has made a solid start.

-- Such a conference should have two types of participants: the signatories of the original agreement, minus General Aideed and his ally Ahmed Omar Jess, and representatives from the extant and embryonic district councils. Representatives from Aideed's organization and sub-clan should receive strong encouragement to take part.

-- Our Mission to the U.N. will make a more detailed demarche to the U.N. Secretariat.

### Invite Foreign Ministers to Somalia

-- We recommend that you invite the foreign ministers of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea to visit Somalia as a group to evaluate the progress of UN operations and to offer suggestions for improving them.

-- You could encourage the group in its discussions with factional leaders to emphasize the importance of the political reconciliation conference and the need to include district council representatives at this conference.

-- We suggest that appropriate media coverage be arranged for the visit.

Somali Advisory Group

-- We want to express appreciation for the Secretary General's having called together a Somali Advisory Group.

-- We urge that it now be established formally, complete with extensive media coverage.

-- We encourage the U.N. to consult regularly with the group and, when appropriate, provide a press release on the results of these meetings.

## RE-ENERGIZING THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN SOMALIA

The U.N.'s perceived absorption in a military conflict with General Aideed has contributed to growing dissatisfaction with the Somalia situation. This frustration is widely shared. It grows out of a sense that the U.N. lacks a clear strategy for implementing its ambitious goals within a reasonable period. In recent weeks, dissatisfaction with the present situation has prompted public disapproval of U.N. action from Italy, Germany, France, and the OAU, among others, and strengthened calls in the U.S. Congress for the early withdrawal of U.S. forces.

We fully appreciate that finding a political solution is possible only so long as UNOSOM remains militarily strong. Nonetheless, it is important that the U.N. move aggressively to demonstrate its appreciation of political realities in the U.S. and elsewhere. This paper offers several ideas which we urge the U.N. consider implementing and publicizing on an urgent basis.

o Involve the Presidents of Ethiopia and Eritrea:

- Efforts by the emissaries of Presidents Meles and Issaias to secure General Aideed's voluntary departure from Somalia have not succeeded. The two leaders should now become personally engaged in efforts to stop the fighting and create a climate which will permit political reconciliation.
- This does not foreclose the earlier Ethiopian/Eritrean initiative to obtain the voluntary departure of General Aideed from Somalia. Rather, it recognizes the reality that this effort may not succeed at the moment and underscores the urgency of ending the fighting and returning the focus to political reconciliation.
- Meles and Issaias should be given maximum flexibility consistent with the broad guidelines of Security Council resolutions.

o Proposal for an international commission and ceasefire:

- General Aideed claimed in his August 30 letter to former President Carter that he has appealed on numerous occasions to the U.N. to appoint "an independent commission composed of internationally known statesmen, scholars, and jurists ... to investigate the events in Mogadishu since June 5 ..."
- The U.N. should test Aideed's sincerity by proposing publicly a modified version of this idea. A commission should be established which could include several Somalis, even members of Aideed's Habr Gidr sub-clan, and other recognized experts chosen by the U.N.
- General Aideed would be asked publicly to go into house arrest outside Somalia until the commission, which serves as a grand jury, completes its work.
- Assuming there is sufficient evidence to try Aideed, the court proceedings should take place in Somalia when its court system is adequate.
- Establishment of the commission should be linked to Aideed's acceptance of a ceasefire.

o Announce immediately plans to convene a political reconciliation conference in Somalia under U.N. and regional auspices:

- The conference should have two purposes: re-energizing the moribund national reconciliation process started in March with the Addis Ababa agreement and speeding the local reconciliation process on which the U.N. already has made a solid start with the creation of district councils.
- Participants should include the original signatories of the Addis accord, minus General Aideed and Ahmed Omar Jess. Representatives of their organizations should be invited to take part, however. Representatives of the extant district councils should also be asked to participate.
- One focus of the conference should be on disarmament of the Somali factions.

- o Invite foreign ministers from neighboring African countries, plus Eritrea, to visit Somalia:
  - As soon as possible, the Secretary General should invite the foreign ministers of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea to visit Somalia as a group to evaluate the progress of U.N. operations there and to offer suggestions for improvement.
  - The group of ministers should meet with factional leaders to emphasize the importance of the proposed political reconciliation conference and the need to broaden its base. Although General Aideed and Jess should not be included, the group of ministers should make clear that representatives of his organization and sub-clan would be welcome.
  - The visit should receive appropriate media coverage.
- o Formalize and energize the Somalia Advisory Group.
  - At the earliest opportunity, the U.N. should establish this group formally and give its formation the widest possible media coverage.
  - The U.N. should consult the group regularly and, when appropriate, encourage wide press coverage of its activities.
- o Invigorate U.N. and UNOSOM public affairs handling of UNOSOM II.
  - The U.N. and UNOSOM should hold weekly press briefings on progress in Somalia to counter the lack of information which is distorting the public's perception of events there.
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  - To overcome the impression that the military component of UNOSOM is dominated by the U.S., UNOSOM should name a non-American as press spokesman.

Background Material and Talking Points for Somalia  
Political Strategy

Despite increasing pressure from a variety of sources, the U.N. leadership has few detailed ideas for speeding the process of political reconciliation in Somalia. Several proposals are outlined below which can sharpen their thinking and underscore our concern that the process move as rapidly as possible. The strategy proposed here has five parts.

The personal involvement of the Ethiopian and Eritrean presidents in seeking a political solution.

The formation of an international commission to investigate Aideed's role in attacks on U.N. peacekeepers.

The announcement of plans to convene a political reconciliation conference in Somalia.

A mission to Somalia of foreign ministers from neighboring states plus Eritrea.

The formalization of the Somalia Advisory Group.

Emphasize the Role of the Ethiopian and Eritrean Presidents

The Ethiopian/Eritrean initiative for securing Aideed's voluntary departure from Somalia which began in mid-July has not produced the desired results. It is clear that senior figures in Aideed's sub-clan see no reason to press him to depart the country. The recent success in detaining Aideed's chief financial backer, Osman Ali Atto, has highlighted the vulnerability of Aideed and his senior assistants, perhaps making them more amenable to this initiative, which would be followed by an investigation of attacks on U.S. peacekeepers and a possible trial.

Ethiopian President Meles and his Eritrean counterpart President Issaias remain committed to pursuing their initiative despite its failure so far. We have reached the point, however, where we should urge the U.N. to ask Meles and Issaias to involve themselves personally in efforts to stop the fighting. This will require giving them considerable flexibility consistent with the broad guidelines contained in Security Council resolutions. They should be asked to go well

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beyond the current Ethiopian/Eritrean initiative for securing Aideed's voluntary departure from Somalia. This channel is complementary to the Gosende proposal described below for an international commission. Its success does not preclude the use of military pressure against Aideed.

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