

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	re: Kosovo (2 pages)	05/13/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
002. email	re: Kosovo (2 pages)	05/21/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
003. email	re: Kosovo (4 pages)	05/24/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
004. email	re: Kosovo (4 pages)	05/24/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
005. email	re: Kosovo (4 pages)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
006. email	re: Kosovo (3 pages)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
007. email	re: Kosovo (3 pages)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
008. email	re: Kosovo (3 pages)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022
009. email	re: Kosovo (3 pages)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 4/12/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Blumenthal and Kosovo])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/02/1999 - 05/25/1999]

2019-0307-F
rc2630

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/13/99 9:10:07 AM
 FROM Malinowski, Tomasz P.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/12/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 05/12/2009
 SUBJECT RE: Kosovo: Read-Out of Meeting with Bodo Hombach [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Blinken, Antony J.

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**
 2019-0824-M (1.01)
 KBH 5/17/2021

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY right

-----Original Message-----

From: Blinken, Antony J.
 Sent: Thursday,
 May 13, 1999 8:58 AM
 To: Malinowski, Tomasz P.
 Subject: RE: Kosovo:
 Read-Out of Meeting with Bodo Hombach [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

yeah, i agree.
 also has unfortunate echo of UN safe havens in Bosnia which proved
 to be neither safe nor havens.

-----Original Message-----

From: Malinowski,
 Tomasz P.
 Sent: Thursday, May 13, 1999 8:56 AM
 To: Blinken, Antony
 J.
 Subject: RE: Kosovo: Read-Out of Meeting with Bodo Hombach [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Interesting.

Problem
 with a humanitarian corridor is that if we're going to take the risk
 of putting troops in Kosovo, there would be enormous pressure --and
 rightly so -- to go all the way and win, instead of making it a half
 measure.

-----Original Message-----

From: Blinken, Antony J.

 Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 1999 9:10 PM
 To: @ADHOC KOSOVO; @EUROPE
 - European Affairs; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
 Subject: Kosovo:
 Read-Out of Meeting with Bodo Hombach [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

For SRB/JS/@Kosovo

--

Sid Blumenthal gave me a last minute invite to join him in a meeting with Bodo Hombach, Schroeder's Chief of Staff and chief political strategist. Highlights:

On German support for the airstrikes:

Still solid but likely to wane. Public fails to see effectiveness. Looks more like punishment. Not improving plight of refugees. Hombach himself said he thought we had run out of good military targets yet there is little will to go after "civilian" targets. He complained we are not doing enough from the air in Kosovo proper ('we only got 20% of their tanks.')

The dynamic in Germany post-Chinese embassy is less support for cease-fire/pacifism and more a crisis of confidence in NATO's competence (especially when you add in Apache crashes and other NATO misfires.)

On German support for ground troops. Forget it. Bonn had to get Bundestag approval to plus-up troops in Macedonia for humanitarian assistance. Parliament made clear they would not approve troops in combat role. I asked whether in the hypothetical situation other NATO countries deployed ground forces in a non-permissive environment, Germany would continue to take part in other aspects of NATO campaign (e.g. in the air). He responded even that would be problematic, as introduction of ground forces would create huge domestic conflict, but in the end, he expected Germany would sustain its other commitments.

Hombach added that he thinks Milo is not only waiting for but wants ground troops. Milo allegedly told Fischer around the time of Rambouillet: "You can't win because I don't care about dead people and you do."

On arming the KLA. Terrible idea, but not as bad as ground troops.

On the need for a mission. More and more, people don't understand what our objectives are/what we're doing to achieve them. We need to focus public on a clear mission. One such mission that would garner strong support would be to provide relief to IDPs in Kosovo. Hombach asked about the feasibility of a humanitarian corridor. He speculated that there could be support for a military "bridgehead" in Kosovo for humanitarian purposes. Then, if Milo attacked our troops, there would be support to respond on the ground...

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/21/99 7:25:45 PM

FROM Blinken, Antony J.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/21/1999

DECLASSIFYON 05/21/2009

SUBJECT RE: For Today: Bodo Hombach on Kosovo ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

TO Schulte, Gregory L.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2019-0824-M (1.02)
 KBH 5/14/2021

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY sorry -- Sid Blumenthal from the WH and Bodo Hombach (Schroeder's Chief of Staff and principal political adviser)

-----Original
 Message-----
 From: Schulte, Gregory L.
 Sent: Friday, May 21, 1999
 6:37 PM
 To: Blinken, Antony J.
 Subject: FW: For Today: Bodo Hombach
 on Kosovo ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

I'm embarrassed to ask: Who are Sid
 and Bodo???

-----Original Message-----
 From: Blinken, Antony
 J.
 Sent: Friday, May 21, 1999 12:19 PM
 To: @ADHOC KOSOVO; @NSA
 - Natl Security Advisor
 Subject: For Today: Bodo Hombach on Kosovo
~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

For SRB/JS/@Kosovo:

In Sid's most recent conversation
 with Bodo, the latter had the following to say about Kosovo:

On
 Ground Troops. Provided we exhaust all diplomatic efforts in good
 faith, Germany will not block a move to ground troops in NATO or
 blast the move rhetorically. Of course, nor will it contribute ground
 troops, though it will continue to provide other support. This is
 the most positive read-out we've had about German intentions, but
 I wouldn't take it to the (bundes)bank.

On U.K. Calls for Ground
 Troops. Schroeder irritated with vocal Brit calls for ground force

planning. It jams him domestically. The louder the Brits get, the more vociferous in opposition the Germans will become. The message, in short: let's keep these discussions to ourselves and out of the press.

On Prospects for Success. Schroeder feels more confident than two weeks ago that our diplo/air strike strategy will work. Encouraged by reports of problems in Serbia.

On the D'Alema Initiative.

Schroeder concerned that if and when we stop bombing in the context of a pause it will be very hard to start up again when Milo fails to deliver. Thus his added concern about the DAlema kicker on ground troops: if the D'Alema initiative fails, we will have to assume the consequences of its failure (i.e. move to ground troops.)

On Negotiating

with Milo. Hombach convinced Milo will only do a deal that keeps him in power and does not make him an international pariah. This means, says Hombach, that Milo will want to come to the U.S. to "sign." [No idea if this is just off the reservation thinking by Bodo or a reflection of something Germans are hearing from Belgrade. Flies in the face of our thinking that Milo will never "surrender" to U.S, NATO or the EU. Maybe conflation with notion Milo would "surrender" to U.N., which is in NYC...]. Hombach thinks we should entertain such an idea by telling Milo directly or indirectly: Here are our demands. We're presenting them to you. You are the only interlocutor -- for now. You have one week to accept. If you do not, we will never deal with you again.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/24/99 11:40:31 PM
FROM Blinken, Antony J.
CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/24/1999
DECLASSIFYON 05/24/2009
SUBJECT FW: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer [~~SECRET~~]
TO

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2019-0824-M (1.03)

KBH 5/14/2021

Bayley, Douglas C.
 Broadwick, Bonnie .
 Campanella, Anthony
 Chastain, George M.
 Crowder, Stevan D.
 Crowell, Thomas R.
 Erdahl, Douglas M.
 Fuchs, Joachim D.
 Glick, Bonnie L.
 Jansen, Christian P.
 Laskowski, Gregory J.
 McClellan, Christina L.
 McGee, Jenny A.
 Porterfield Patrick C.
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 Schrader, Joel M.
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 Sigler, Ralph H.
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Sigler, Ralph H.
Smith, James A.
Tarver, J. Sean

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Sorry meant to copy you for instruction below re. Mssrs. Berger and Steinberg.

Would you also please WASHFax e-mail to the following for delivery by 8 a.m. Tuesday, classified ~~SECRET~~ and EYES ONLY:

Marc
Grossman -- A/S EUR
Ron Asmus -- DAS EUR
Jim Dobbins -- Kosovo
Coordinator

-----Original Message-----

From: Blinken, Antony
J.
Sent: Monday, May 24, 1999 10:50 PM
To: @ADHOC KOSOVO; @NSA
- Natl Security Advisor; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: Priority
Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer [~~SECRET~~]
Importance: High

[Sit
Room: Pls. put in a.m. take for Mssrs. Berger and Steinberg]

For
SRB/JS/@Kosovo:

Attended German embassy dinner for Fischer and colleagues where it turned out Sid Blumenthal and I were most senior Americans present and so had seats of honor next to and across from Fischer. Fischer deputies Pleuger and Scharioth also in attendance. We were in a listening mode. Highlights of conversation (which I am passing to State in advance of MKA bilat tomorrow:)

Germany's
Political Dilemma. Ground troops impossible to support -- now (more on this below). Schroeder remains irritated at Brits for jamming Germans in public, tho Chancellor and Blair spoke over the weekend and cleared the air.

U.N.S.C.R as Holy Grail. Fischer harped on this; "it would legitimize everything."

Need a Direct Channel
to Milo. Can't rely on Cherno or even the Finns. We need a direct, quiet channel to talk directly to Milo. Fischer offered no suggestions for who this would be. He noted in passing that Milo felt "personally betrayed" by Holbrooke (presumably a reference to their last meeting pre air strikes.)

Pursue the Two Tracks. Fischer's main point was that even as we continue to intensify Track II (force) we had to pursue Track I (diplomacy) as far as possible, and then even further. At the least, this would result in UNSCR; at best, it would result in Milo's acceptance of the UNSCR (preferably pre-cooked.). Then, and only then, if Milo flip flopped and rejected peace, we would be justified in moving to ground troops. While Germans could not directly take part in ground war, they could and Fischer believed would support such a mission by other allies, through NATO, and would take part in other ways (air; logistics etc...) -- provided they could show German public there was an international mandate for peace that Milo had rejected.

On the Russians. Fischer seemed neither overly optimistic nor pessimistic about our efforts to get Moscow to sign on to the specifics of our conditions. He suggested we must make it absolutely clear to Russians (as he says he has done with Ivanov) that Milo will have one chance to accept the peace when we present it to him in the form of a UNSCR -- if he does not, we will move decisively to Track II. He also said he thought Russians were sensitive to argument they had to choose which side of history they want to be on -- the intolerant, violent past represented by Milo and Russian isolation from Europe or a democratic, peaceful future in which Russian was fully part of Europe. He also said making clear to them NATO cannot and will not lose given stakes helps them understand how serious we are.

We have to Win. Fischer was eloquent in making clear we have to win; "everything is at stake -- the future of progressive forces in Germany, the future of Southeastern Europe, indeed the future of Europe." This rhetoric does not match the reality that Germany would not take part in a ground mission...

Bombing

Pause -- A Variation. Fischer's deputy Pleuger suggested Germans may propose to MKA the notion of a pause targeted to specific cities like Belgrade -- i.e. announce we will suspend bombing these cities for 48 hours to remind people what peace is like -- war is over if they want it. Germans seem to think this could result in internal pressure on Milo.

Comment: Germans seem to believe (or want to believe) that we will get the Russians on board by the June 8-10 Ministerial (they think Yeltsin may show! But no evidence to back that up) and so be in a position to present an international diktat to Milo by the G8. We had the impression they have not digested the distinct possibility (probability?) that we will not succeed by then and the resulting challenge to alliance cohesion as the calendar forces us to put the ground troops discussion on NATO's front burner. [Germans suggested we would be able to keep this conversation to ourselves; we made the point our press corps seems to believe such a decision must be confronted by the end of June and would certainly be asking the question]. In such a situation, the Germans would be forced to reject ground troops publicly (probably joined by the Italians, Greeks and a few smaller countries), though they would argue to keep bombing. Then, we would be in an alliance free-for-all as those desperate for a diplomatic solution took increasingly desperate measures to achieve it. Of course, this may be just what Milo is counting on. All he has to do is hold out until the time we must confront

the ground troops decision and then watch Alliance cohesion evaporate.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/24/99 11:48:08 PM

FROM Blinken, Antony J.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/24/1999

DECLASSIFYON 05/24/2009

SUBJECT RE: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer ~~[SECRET]~~

TO

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2019-0824-M (1.04)
KBH 5/14/2021

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Smith, James A.
Tarver, J. Sean

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

And I should have made clear that all individuals listed for WASHFAX are at State. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Blinken,
Antony J.
Sent: Monday, May 24, 1999 11:41 PM
To: @COMM - WHSR
Comm Officers; @WHSR - WH Situation Room
Subject: FW: Priority Kosovo:
Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer [SECRET]
Importance: High

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-- A/S EUR
Ron Asmus -- DAS EUR
Jim Dobbins -- Kosovo Coordinator

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10:50 PM
To: @ADHOC KOSOVO; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @EUROPE
- European Affairs
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NATO, and would take part in other ways (air, logistics etc...)
-- provided they could show German public there was an international
mandate for peace that Milo had rejected.

On the Russians. Fischer

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to get Moscow to sign on to the specifics of our conditions. He
suggested we must make it absolutely clear to Russians (as he says
he has done with Ivanov) that Milo will have one chance to accept
the peace when we present it to him in the form of a UNSCR -- if
he does not, we will move decisively to Track II. He also said he
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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/25/99 12:35:32 AM
FROM McGee, Jenny A.
CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/24/1999
DECLASSIFYON 05/24/2009
SUBJECT RE: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer [~~SECRET~~]
TO

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2019-0824-M (1.05)
 KBH 5/14/2021

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CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

So done.

-----Original Message-----

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Sent: Monday, May 24, 1999 11:41 PM
To: @COMM - WHSR Comm Officers;
@WHSR - WH Situation Room
Subject: FW: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with
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-- A/S EUR
Ron Asmus -- DAS EUR
Jim Dobbins -- Kosovo Coordinator

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- European Affairs
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take for Mssrs. Berger and Steinberg]

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/25/99 7:33:33 AM
FROM Schwartz, Eric P.
CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/24/1999
DECLASSIFYON 05/24/2009
SUBJECT RE: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer [~~SECRET~~]
TO Blinken, Antony J.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2019-0824-M (1.06)
KBH 5/14/2020

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

I think they would have given you seats of honor whoever showed up.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Blinken, Antony J.

Sent: Monday, May 24, 1999

10:50 PM

To: @ADHOC.KOSOVO; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @EUROPE
- European Affairs

Subject: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka
Fischer [~~SECRET~~]

Importance: High

[Sit Room: Pls. put in a.m.
take for Mssrs. Berger and Steinberg]

For SRB/JS/@Kosovo:

Attended

German embassy dinner for Fischer and colleagues where it turned out Sid Blumenthal and I were most senior Americans present and so had seats of honor next to and across from Fischer. Fischer deputies Pleuger and Scharioth also in attendance. We were in a listening mode. Highlights of conversation (which I am passing to State in advance of MKA bilat tomorrow:)

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U.N.S.C.

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/25/99 8:00:29 AM
 FROM Schulte, Gregory L.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/24/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 05/24/2009
 SUBJECT RE: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer [~~SECRET~~]
 TO Blinken, Antony J.

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2019-0824-M (1.07)
 KBH 5/14/2021

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

tony -

many thanks. what is the June 8-10 ministerial??? (are you thinking of the June 18-19 G-8 summit in Cologne?)

-----Original

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From: Blinken, Antony J.

Sent: Monday, May 24, 1999

10:50 PM

To: @ADHOC KOSOVO; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor, @EUROPE

- European Affairs

Subject: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka

Fischer [~~SECRET~~]

Importance: High

[Sit Room: Pls. put in a.m.

take for Mssrs. Berger and Steinberg]

For SRB/JS/@Kosovo:

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/25/99 8:05:12 AM
 FROM Pascual, Carlos E.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/24/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 05/24/2009
 SUBJECT RE: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer [SECRET]
 TO Blinken, Antony J.

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2019-0824-M (1.02)
 KBH 5/14/2021

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

good readout; thanks

-----Original Message-----

From: Blinken,
 Antony J.

Sent: Monday, May 24, 1999 10:50 PM

To: @ADHOC KOSOVO;

@NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @EUROPE - European Affairs

Subject: Priority

Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer [SECRET]

Importance: High

[Sit

Room: Pls. put in a.m. take for Mssrs. Berger and Steinberg]

For

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/25/99 11:17:19 AM
 FROM Blinken, Antony J.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/24/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 05/24/2009
 SUBJECT RE: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer [~~SECRET~~]
 TO Schulte, Gregory L.

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2019-0824-M (1.09)
 KBH 5/17/2021

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

that's what i said to Germans. They seemed to think there was a chance. very bizarre....

-----Original Message-----

From: Schulte,
 Gregory L.
 Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 1999 10:05 AM
 To: Blinken, Antony
 J.
 Subject: RE: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer
 [~~SECRET~~]

I think you're right -- but would Yeltsin show up for that???

-----Original Message-----

From: Blinken, Antony J.
 Sent: Tuesday,
 May 25, 1999 8:35 AM
 To: Schulte, Gregory L.
 Subject: RE: Priority
 Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer [~~SECRET~~]

maybe my dates
 are wrong but is there not an FM level G8 meeting that leads into
 the G8 about 10 days before?

-----Original Message-----

From: Schulte,
 Gregory L.
 Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 1999 8:00 AM
 To: Blinken, Antony
 J.
 Subject: RE: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka Fischer
 [~~SECRET~~]

tony -

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(are you thinking of the June 18-19 G-8 summit in Cologne?)

-----Original

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Sent: Monday, May 24, 1999

10:50 PM

To: @ADHOC KOSOVO; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @EUROPE
- European Affairs

Subject: Priority Kosovo: Dinner with FM Joschka

Fischer [SECRET]

Importance: High

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take for Msrs. Berger and Steinberg]

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