Laughter and Diplomacy

“I like the idea of a meeting at Hyde Park -- where Roosevelt lived. It will recall the spirit of our wartime cooperation as allies.”

President Clinton to President Yeltsin, September 27, 1995

President Clinton and President Yeltsin met in Hyde Park, New York on Monday, October 23, 1995 at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum and the Roosevelt historic home. It was the ninth meeting of the two heads of state. Ambassador-at-Large James F. Collins, an expert on the former Soviet Union, is credited with the idea of the meeting’s location. According to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, Collins reasoned “that Yeltsin, like many Russians, revered Roosevelt as a wartime ally and the last American president before the onset of the cold war,” making Hyde Park a favorable setting for what was likely to be a “high-stakes and high-tension meeting.” (The Russia Hand by Strobe Talbott, pg. 179)

The meeting was especially “high-stakes” for Yeltsin who was facing Russian parliamentary elections in December and a hotly contested presidential re-election bid in 1996, both while recovering from a mild heart attack and dealing with low public opinion polls. Yeltsin considered his positive relationship with Washington to be “his single greatest foreign policy achievement,” but, on the eve of their meeting, the relationship was strained by differences over Bosnia, NATO enlargement, and the Iran reactor sale.

“I come here with a sense of opportunity. But I also come here with a lot of anxiety. Everything will depend on what you and I agree to.”

President Boris Yeltsin during his one-on-one meeting with President Clinton, October 23, 1995

President Clinton and President Yeltsin arrived on the lawn of the Roosevelt family home in separate helicopters on the morning of October 23, 1995. Both leaders had spent the previous day in New York City celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations. Both addressed the UN General Assembly that morning, and President Clinton hosted an evening reception with First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton at the New York Public Library. President Clinton wrote the following about their arrival in Hyde Park:,

"To put him more at ease, I flew him to Hyde Park in my helicopter so that he could see the beautiful foliage along the Hudson River on an unseasonably warm fall day. When we arrived, I took him out to the front yard of the old house with its sweeping view of the river, and we talked awhile, sitting in the same chairs Roosevelt and Churchill had used when the prime minister visited there during World War II."

My Life by Bill Clinton, pg. 675

According to the President’s daily schedule, there were three hours of meetings on the agenda. Up first was a one-on-one meeting in the library of the Roosevelt historic home. Also present were two note-takers: Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Yeltsin’s foreign policy advisor Dmitri Ryurikov. President Clinton opened the meeting with a challenge to “prove the newspaper pundits wrong. They want to write about a big blow-up. Let’s disappoint them.” Clinton and Yeltsin both spent the first part of the meeting reassuring each other about their commitment to a strong U.S.-Russia relationship. Yeltsin stated that “somehow in the past two months, we’ve gotten off track. It’s not a problem between the two of us personally. There are no personal grudges between us, no personal mistrust. But our countries, our governments have started to work on opposite sides of too many issues. We’ve been pulling against each other rather than pulling together. Somehow we have to restore our personal rapport as the driving force in the relationship.” Both leaders agreed on the importance of communication and on the need to project a “sense of stability in the U.S.-Russian relationship.”

The top item on Clinton’s agenda for Hyde Park was Bosnia, specifically Russia’s participation in the peace implementation force. Clinton’s background paper on the subject states that “Moscow places great importance on being -- and being seen as -- a player on Bosnia” and that “the peace settlement issue provides Russia an opportunity to recoup prestige it feels it lost during NATO air strikes.” Yeltsin’s statement that “You decided to bomb Serbs. You did not consult with Yeltsin -- that’s not good.” summed up his feelings on the air strikes. The U.S. wanted NATO in the lead, but Russia was unwilling to place its troops under NATO command. Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to a compromise: Russian troops would perform non-combat roles (heavy airlift, reconstruction, mine-clearing), thus removing them from NATO command. Yeltsin’s only demand was that the Russian contribution be labeled “crucial” or “special”, not “auxiliary” or “secondary.”

Following their one-on-one meeting, Clinton and Yeltsin were joined by their delegations for a luncheon meeting in the green and gold White House dining room at the Roosevelt Presidential Library. The earlier meeting was summarized for the group, but not much else was accomplished. Yeltsin’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Georgiy Mamedov, tried to discuss the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, but Yelstin cut him off saying “No, no. We will talk about CFE after we eat! Otherwise we will miss this excellent American cuisine.” According to Strobe Talbot, who was present at the luncheon, Yeltsin enjoyed multiple glasses of wine with his lunch and “conducting serious business of any kind…turned out to be difficult for the usual reason.” (The Russia Hand by Strobe Talbott, pg. 182)

Clinton and Yeltsin reconvened after lunch for an unscheduled one-on-one meeting, where CFE was finally discussed. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty was negotiated during the final years of the Cold War and set limits on certain types of military equipment. The limits took effect on November 17, 1995 (less than a month after the Hyde Park meeting). Russia argued that it needed more equipment in “CFE’s flank zone … in order to deal with instability in the North Caucasus region.” Clinton pressed Yeltsin on the issue, “You asked me to get you a fix to the map; I’ve done so. With America leading the way, NATO put together a proposal that meets your basic needs. It wasn’t easy to work this through the Alliance, but we did. Now we’re waiting for your reply.” Yelstin conceded. Clinton accomplished his two main objectives for the meeting: Russia’s military role in Bosnia and CFE.

My Life by Bill Clinton, page 676

“At the press conference after our meeting, I said that we had made progress on Bosnia and that we would both push for the ratification of START II and work together to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty in 1996. It was a good announcement, but Yeltsin stole the show. He told the press that he was leaving our meeting with more optimism than he had brought to it, because of all the press reports saying that our summit “was going to be a disaster. Well, now, for the first time, I can tell you that you’re a disaster.” I almost fell over laughing, and the press laughed too. All I could say to them in response was “Be sure you get the right attribution there.” Yeltsin could get away with saying the darndest things. There’s no telling how he would have answered all the Whitewater questions.”

Clinton, William Jefferson. My Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.

“You and I might leave the scene, but what we have accomplished together will survive as our legacy. This is the main theme that we must develop between us: We’re together, Bill and Boris.”

Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Hyde Park One-on-One meeting

President Clinton and President Yeltsin met 18 times in the seven year period between Clinton’s first inauguration and Yeltsin’s resignation on New Year’s Day 2000. “While Clinton and Yeltsin considered each other friends and their work together a partnership, virtually all of their eighteen meetings were contentious.” (The Russia Hand by Strobe Talbott, pg. 9) Their meeting in Hyde Park was no different. The U.S. - Russian relationship before the meeting was strained, but both leaders left Hyde Park reassured of the other’s commitment. Agreements on Russian participation in the peace implementation force in Bosnia and on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty were also reached. In the end, one could argue, the true legacy of the Hyde Park meeting was not all that was accomplished by Clinton and Yeltsin; it was the iconic photographs of them together.

The following collections contain presidential records concerning the  Hyde Park meeting:

2006-0459-F: This collection contains Antony Blinken’s files from the National Security Council (NSC), Speechwriting Directorate. Blinken served as the chief foreign policy speechwriter in the NSC Speechwriting Directorate from 1994-1998. His materials contain background material, drafts and “final, as delivered” speeches. The speechwriting topics cover a variety of subjects: foreign trips or head of state visits; United National General Assembly addresses; speeches before domestic and international groups; memorials, commencements or holidays; State of the Union or weekly radio addresses; and editorials, book chapters or magazine articles. As an NSC speechwriter, Blinken produced speeches on major foreign policy actions during the Clinton Administration: Haiti, Iraq and Bosnia.

2014-0948-M: This Mandatory Declassification Review contains memorandum of conversations (memcons) between President William J. Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin from their meetings in Hyde Park, New York on October 23, 1995.

2015-0782-M-1: This Mandatory Declassification Review contains memorandum of conversations (memcons) and memorandum of telephone conversations (telcons) between President Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia, January 23, 1993 through April 21, 1996.

2016-0137-M: This Mandatory Declassification Review contains the briefing book from President Clinton’s meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Hyde Park, New York on October 23, 1995. Included are the briefing memorandum from Anthony Lake to the President and attached briefing papers. These documents are from the Executive Security Office of the National Security Council.