(2011-0652-F) Dual Containment of Iran and Iraq

The materials in FOIA 2011-0652-F are a selective body of documents responsive to the topic of the FOIA. Researchers should consult the archivist about related material. Martin Indyk, the Special Assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian Affairs, delivered a speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on May 18, 1993. In this speech he outlined the Clinton administration’s policy for the dual containment of Iran and Iraq. He stated that the United States would no longer depend on the competing interests and animosities of the two “backlash states”, in order to deter their regional aggressions. Mr. Indyk went on to say that the demise of the Soviet Union and the strength of our alliances with the Gulf Cooperation Council states – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the U.A.E. and Oman – would now allow Washington to “counter both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes, while not depending on one to counter the other.”1 1 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Special Report: Clinton Administration Policy toward the Middle East,” Policy Watch, May 21, 1993. This strategy was further clarified by the National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who wrote that dual containment did not mean “duplicate containment”. Although the policies directed toward Iran and Iraq were clearly linked by the use of the term, the practicalities of the policy’s implementation necessitated that “because each regime presents different challenges to our interests, we have to develop policies to deal with [each] specific case.” So rather than one focus for two countries, the strategy implied differing tactics for each situation with the over-arching goal of containment and the restraint of the two countries threats to “the security interests of our friends and the free flow of oil at stable prices.” This foreign policy strategy which came to be known as the dual containment of Iran and Iraq, was clearly informed by the more than fifty years of the Cold War struggle for global dominance with the Soviet Union. The relevant lesson taken from that struggle was that if political pressure, economic sanctions and the threat of military annihilation could work against a monolithic communist empire it should succeed when applied to much less powerful regimes in a world where the U.S. was the sole remaining superpower. This collection contains policy papers, briefing papers, and memoranda between Mr. Indyk and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, as well as reports, cables and e-mails about the political and security situation in both Iran and Iraq, primarily focused on the years 1993 and 1994. The collection also contains State Department memoranda and emails concerned with diplomatic exchanges between the United States and our allies and also with the United Nations in relation to economic sanctions of both countries. The collection also contains memoranda and e-mails related to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections of Iraqi compliance with the cease-fire agreement at the end of Operation Desert Storm. The majority of the records related to this FOIA case are closed for national security reasons.***